Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Akshutji,
If you are referring to the "Jhalda" case, the main recipient was supposed to be AnandaMarg. Is it possible that they were allowed to be "caught" because this was a supposedly "majority faith" connected militant organization? Not many arms shipment meant for Naxalites/Jihadists appear to get caught in the net. :mrgreen: (The timing was also close to the "demolition" - in '95)

http://cbi.gov.in/judgements/padc.pdf
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Acharyaji,
you can use dikgajone ampersand gmail dot com.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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If one starts reading the 'The Federalist Papers' one does not get the view that it stems from narrow selfish motives. We have to grant the time was just right when some great folks gathered around to create a new country out of the 13 colonies.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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X-posted..
India’s missile defense: changing the nature of the Indo-Pakistani conflict by Taylor Dinerman: The Space Review
During a panel talk at New York’s Asia Society on January 21, Professor Ashutosh Varshney of Brown University claimed that some “right wing” forces in the US and India were interested in seeing Pakistan break up and that they imagined that somehow India would be able to “neuter the nukes” and prevent them from getting into unfriendly hands, something he considered highly risky and likely to lead to catastrophe. During the same event former Pakistani diplomat Munir Akram claimed that any war between India and Pakistan would escalate uncontrollably and go nuclear quite quickly.
Even if they give missile defense a big budget and a high priority, it will be many years before India has a moderately effective, indigenous missile defense shield.

At this moment, they are both right. The India-Pakistan nuclear stand-off is stalemated to Pakistan’s advantage, in that they can launch (or allow) terror attacks such as the November 2008 one on Mumbai and India can do essentially nothing in response. The unmistakable smugness of the former Pakistani diplomat made this evident. However, this situation will not last forever. India is now seeking way to neutralize the majority of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and within a decade or perhaps a little longer they may come up with a solution.

In 2006 India began testing a missile defense version of its Prithvi medium-range ballistic missile. This test is just one sign that New Delhi is seeking to develop a multi-layer complex that can defend against Pakistan’s nuclear missiles. Due to its liquid-fueled first stage, the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) is certainly not an ideal system, but it is both available and locally made. The Indian military is comfortable enough with this weapon’s effectiveness to make it their main battlefield ballistic missile for both conventional and nuclear applications.

Even if they give missile defense a big budget and a high priority, it will be many years before India has a moderately effective, indigenous missile defense shield. The claim last year by the head of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that they will have a multi-layered system ready in 2010 is taken with a grain of salt by observers both inside and outside the subcontinent. However, unless the geopolitical situation radically changes, there is no doubt that India will continue work on the systems for the foreseeable future.

If they wanted to they could buy systems from the US, Israel, or Russia, and they have already bought themselves a pair of Israeli Green Pine radars originally designed for the Arrow ABM system. If they were ready to spend the money they could combine, for example, the US PAC 3 version of the Patriot with the Israeli Arrow and have an effective but limited defense system within a fairly short timeframe. While the US may have blocked India from buying the Israeli system in the past, this no longer would be the case.

What is more likely, though, is that they will continue to build up their own technology while procuring a few items from overseas and entering into collaborative development programs with carefully selected foreign firms. The hard part may not be the interceptors themselves but building up the network of sensors and command and control systems needed to make the whole thing credible.

One requirement will be for some sort of space based early warning system to supplement the powerful long-range radars they will have to deploy both in the air and in the western Himalaya mountains. India is lucky in that it does have a few good places where it could place radars that, if they were powerful enough, could cover most of the possible launch sites. But they will still need satellites to cover the whole of Pakistan and to provide a secure and unambiguous warning of a launch event.

India could, if they wanted to, gain access to the US DSP (Defense Support Program) and SBIRS (Space Based Infra Red System) information the same way that NATO, Israel, Japan, and South Korea all have this data available to one degree or another. However, given the history of the subcontinent, and the shaky basis on which the new US-India relationship rests, the government may not be willing to put its trust in Washington’s goodwill.

They may choose to build their own heat detecting satellites. The IRS (Indian Remote Sensing) and Cartosat series of remote sensing spacecraft have given India some of the expertise required to build an equivalent of the DSP. Such a system does not have to be as heavy or as sophisticated as the US one; it could, in fact, consist of a larger number of small satellites in low Earth orbit. This would certainly be expensive by Indian standards and would take at least as long to develop and deploy as the indigenous interceptor missiles themselves.

India could, if they wanted to, gain access to the US DSP and SBIRS information, but given the history of the subcontinent, and the shaky basis on which the new US-India relationship rests, the government may not be willing to put its trust in Washington’s goodwill.

Another factor that will add to the expense of this project is the fact that India is a big country and will need a fairly large number of long-range and short-range BMD missiles. The better that they can do in the boost phase the better off they will be, but there are few signs that they, or anyone else except the US, are seriously looking at this capability.

As long as India vigorously pursues this capability it will put Pakistan into the same kind of dilemma that faced the Soviet Union after President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program in March 1983. Islamabad has neither the resources nor the technology to compete with India in this field. Indian missile defense will not, by itself, prevent a Pakistani “loose nuke” situation, but it will reduce the value of their atomic stockpile.

They also lack the resources to build up a very large and diverse force of reliable, sophisticated, nuclear-tipped missiles that could overwhelm an effective Indian defense system. If they tried to build such a force they would either have to weaken their already limited conventional defense forces or spend themselves into economic oblivion. India’s robust and growing economy is a strategic asset that is slowly but surely making itself felt in the military balance between the two subcontinental rivals.

Taylor Dinerman is an author and journalist based in New York City.
Another 10 years. Then TSP will be left with no more grass to eat, as it will bite the dust. :)
-----------

can alsways depend on desi transplanted DIE to find a insect in the Indian kheer.

Getting rid of TSP is a good thing. Why add color to it?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Swamy_G wrote
If one starts reading the 'The Federalist Papers' one does not get the view that it stems from narrow selfish motives. We have to grant the time was just right when some great folks gathered around to create a new country out of the 13 colonies.
Well this is something I was trying to point out. I did not mean this or that leader, although even that angle can be explored - for example Washington's attitudes towards native Americans or slavery. The fact remains that individual leaders speak eloquently of "high principles" but that does not rule out the possibility that such representations could have been used to legitimize the political demands based on selfish economic considerations. Political leadership can use rallying cries which serve as focal points for mass mobilizations. Moreover, if societal values do not encourage flaunting of such selfish interests - then showing that the mobilization was for a high ideal, something detached from the immediate personal motivations of the leadership - then it is likely to be more readily accepted. Lenin for example used the slogan of "peace/land to the peasant" to get support of the Workers and Peasants Soviets, although he wanted to establish the dictatorship of the "proletariat" which literally translated into the dictatorship of "vanguard" or the "party". If I really look for the type of leaders you hint at, I would look for leaders who really risked and braved unpopularity and hostility even from the majority of the vocal - to stand solidly for their principles or beliefs - one such will be the 6th President, the deserter from "federalist" camp, John Quincy Adams.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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X-Posting rom the TSP Psyche thread:
ramana wrote
Actually birhaspatiji, If India declares the right of self determination of the Pashtuns the whole hill sides will erupt and throw away the TSP yoke. The Durranis and Ghilzais will unite to achieve this.

Thats my conclusion after reading reams of papers and books.
The big idea is to ensure no GOI will do that.
ShauryaT wrote
My view too. Pashtunistan is a far stronger idea than TSP. And we know, which party is the most likely to do this. Although, I personally have not seen the top leadership of the BJP with the guts, to publicly or materially change the game in such a manner, yet.

the main thing to consider is whether this will be desirable for India or not. There is a strong question of AFG claims over the Pashtuns. Whether that brings in a possible split in AFG, and how far is that desirable. If AFG gets shaky (the Tajik counterpart) then that will side with TSP. There will be pressure on the Paktuns to enter Afg if they want liberation from TSP. Viability of a n independent Pakhtunistan is a very old question. Moreover, given the possibility of Talebanizaion of a significant portion of the Pakhtuns, whether it will be wise to give the Talebs an independent country. The difference between the more prosperous and affiliated/integrated to TSP society plains Pakhtuns, and the more hill-roaming obstinately independent tribal Pakhtuns - could be a factor. We do not know ground realities of this difference after Talebanization. Parts of these hill-tribes were probably participants in the abortive Kashmir raid before accession.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

ramana wrote:The guy's name is Vellupalli Prabhakaran or VP. So PVK is not there.

Samuel, Before you get into set theory morass, a little history is needed to understand the periphery angst.

You know the Islamist connection for TSP and Bangla Desh. however SL, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar are driven by the fear of assimilation in greater India. Its besides the point that these areas were part of the greater abroad of classical India. Since then they have developed separate indentities and value that. They see no benefit in losing that. The UK and US stoked those fears of assimilation to perpetuate the separateness. And everytime any half-informed INC leader talked about ancient Indian ties to SE Asia etc these periphery countries hugged the West more tightly.

In the 60s SL and TSP used to talk of peripheral ties and were encouraged by Anglo-Saxon Western powers. That is what Mrs G sough to undo and did. In fact Colombo allowed TSP troop flights to stage thru their land despite the atrocities in East Pakistan.

So Indian interest is that the peripehry tie up with core and not themselves as a ring of containment. So Indian policy should be that which encourages and incentivises their ties to India.
and
brihaspati wrote:I would agree with Ramanaji's assessment. Direct connections to the core will encourage stability on the long run, and should be convincingly argued with the periphery as something that benefits them more than a separate peripheral ring connection.

In an idle momnet I wrote a two page essay on a new way to accomodate the periphery in the Indian system while retaining their separateness. I suggested that the periphery countries can elect(not nominate) two represtatives to the Indian Rajya Sabha and these folks ahve the saem rights of participation as those elected by the Indian public. They get to represent their peoples views in the Indian polity. they have to be elected and not nominated. i dodnt want it to be a dumping ground for has been or unelectable politicians. They would argue with their people as to why they would be the best representatives in India. The formal amabssadors etc can still be theri for moving offcial papers etc.

What I had in mind was that these people would be like the samanta rajas of the yore who graced the Chakravarti's court. I wanted to supplant the Westphlian state model which was good for Europe which helped them post-Papal supremacy.

Off course it was anonmouse!

I was told adhunik Chanakya was delighted and had a file opened.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Off course it was anonmouse!
Can we get the original?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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There have been three interesting developments recently in the periphery: In TSP it appears now that the Talebjabis have twisted Gilani/Zardari long ears to make them bleat about complete non-involvement of TSP in the Mumbai blasts and the claim that it is being falsely "framed". In Sri-Lanka, Tigers appear to be cornered and the final push towards complete liquidation of VP and his politics imminent. In BD, the newly elected givernment has taken formal resolution to try Islamic militant leaders involved in atrocities during '71 as war criminals.

What do they indicate for the future? How does each of these indicate a subtle failure of the core in India?

For TSP, as we have been discussing in other threads, it is possible to consider the outcome that the Talebs and the PA have mutually transformed each other into the core of a neo-Caliphate. What we are seeing now is the gradual spreading of the tentacles of this neo-Caliphate straddling both sides of the AFG-TSP border. The victory of the neo-Caliphate within TSP is indicated by the the formal civilian mask of a so-called democratic government toeing the the desired line of the neo-Caliphate at this stage. Under normal Jihadi ego, the Caliphate would have been proud to claim responsibilty for the Mumbai attacks. But claiming responsibility now detracts from the greater strategic aim of the neo-Caliphate. Its primary need is to obstruct US plans to obtain greater control over the border with AFG and plans to stabilize the AFG government. The Caliphate needs to spread in both directions - inside TSP to the south and east towards India, and to the west through AFG to Iranian borders. It is probably being desperately egged on by PRC which is nervous to see any further wind in Indian sails if US makes its presence stronger in AFG. The Mumbai attack would be perfectly planned to make India totally confused and show its real weakness - inability to pursue ruthless strategic policies. This in turn would help the US hawks not to consider India as a reliable component of any military plan for the subcontinent. At the moment India is not the prime target of the Caliphate - it simply needs to hold India back. It will now use its European and PRC contacts to impress upon US and NATO the need to establish the Talebs as a legitimate government in AFG, delegitimizing any separate Pashtun or Tajik identity claims to the throne of AFG. Once this is done, the neo-caliphate runs most of central and southern AFG (Tajiks may yet stay stubborn, but on the other hand maybe for the first time collaborate with the fleeing Pashtuns to form a real AFghan identity to fight back), and northern TSP and Pakjab. Then it will be the turn to move south and east into India.

In Sri Lanka, the military solution to the VP problem will create a new pressure on the core to salvage remnant Tamil pride. India as a core loses on all counts - by failing to stabilize the Tamil situation it loses internal Tamil support, and reinforces the perception that GOI literally identifies itself with the territory of Delhi and simply survives by playing off one fracture in Indic society against another. It may not be able to guarantee fair treatment of surviving Tamil populations within Sri Lanka. A trumphant Sri Lankan army will bolster the Sri Lankan regime to feel freer to act independently in regional questions. India may have to face the possibility of sheltering (knowinglly or unknowingly) fugitive Tiger leadership, whom it cannot liquidate on Indian soil or turn over to Sri Lanka for the consequences to South Indian politics could be devatating for the "northern alliance". On Indian soil, any Jihadi or PRC or D-company type connections to the Tigers can get reinforced and prompt them to think of relaunching the "homeland" target based from India. Simultaneously the extremist contacts may be able to use them for trouble inside India itself.

In BD, the formal parliamentary resolution to initiate the process of trial of Islamic or Jihadi extremists for war crimes is something that India could have initiated right at the end of the '71 war. I have repeatedly raised the question of whether there was an agreement with India not to initiate war-crimes trials against TSP army members, but have been able to find no answer. Now BD will proceed on this, and at some stage GOI will have to face the question of its own inaction about war-crimes trials for Jihadi warfare on Indian soil and on the subcontinent right from the beginnings of modern Republican India. This brings into question the entire basis of the policy of generations of Indian regimes as to what to do with and how to treat perpetartors of Jihadi violence. A proper and satisfactory to the victims, trial and penalty - would have gone a long way towards not only doing justice to the victims of the 1947 violence, but also in preventing resurgence of such Jihadi tactics of rape, loot and genocide.

All three cases reveal the fundamental weakness of Indian regimes - a complete lack of clarity about long term strategy towards the peripheral regions and ideologies that are hostile to the core (maybe from a complete lack of understanding what is the ideology of the core and hence inability to recognize whether a given ideology is hostile to the core or not).
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati wrote:Akshutji,
If you are referring to the "Jhalda" case, the main recipient was supposed to be AnandaMarg. Is it possible that they were allowed to be "caught" because this was a supposedly "majority faith" connected militant organization? Not many arms shipment meant for Naxalites/Jihadists appear to get caught in the net. :mrgreen: (The timing was also close to the "demolition" - in '95)

http://cbi.gov.in/judgements/padc.pdf
I happen to know one of the investigators of that case, also referred to in the doc and the case is nowhere as clear as is made out to be.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Rahul_Mji, can you elaborate - as far as feasible? Possible outline hypotheses will do.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Turning point..

Image
Why the change in Kazakhstan's attitude towards India? Both US and Rus pressure? Kazkhis do not have an easy relation with Russians at the societal level, but maybe they are beginning to converge at the elite level, and Kazakhis are learning the value of playing up to multiple suitors.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Khazaks have a very good image of India. Soon after the collapse of FSU one of the first things the leader of Khazakstan said was he wanted good relations with India. Unfortunately the MEA which is Moscow centered did little or nothing to foster ties to Central Asia in the decade of 90s till NDA came to power in the fag end.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati wrote:Rahul_Mji, can you elaborate - as far as feasible? Possible outline hypotheses will do.
not too much, as the said person was extremely reluctant to share additional info other than that the investigation itself was inconclusive in most part.

the AMs were chosen as a very convenient scapegoat, I'm sure you are aware that there is no love lost b/w the AMs and the CPM. the fact that the bulk of the investigation was carried out during the tenure of a friendly govt at the centre helped matters in no small way.

from what he left out and some tidbits I gathered the impression that the actual drop target was in a border area, probably in BD and there were some cpm leaders directly involved.
the group was of same extraction as the ones who make regular headlines in India due to their violent activities, both here and in BD.

(what follows is my conjecture)
perhaps all this can be tied up with the curious case of US consulate official douglas kelly who had a number of meetings with SIMI activists in murshidabad including a four hour long one, ostenibly to discuss publication of a magazine (!)
all this just a couple of days before the gujrat explosions of last year.

or am I way off target and the target was red activists(purulia, remember) and not green ones ?
I doubt we will ever know for sure.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Khazaks have a very good image of India.
This was my impression too. Even from German immigrants from Kazakhstan. But I was referring to the "turning point" ref about India losing out on the petrochem bid. By the way this reminds me of the importance of reoccupying PRCOK and PRCOL - an easier connection to CAR and Kazakhstan.

Rahul_Mji, that was an angle I dropped off long ago. Good that you brought it up again. Contacts developed during the cold war with Islamist groups have no inherent reasons to go dead. Inter agency rivalry and its manipulation by the political machine could continue in the US and UK. What you say is also perfectly feasible for "reds". To the higher ups it could be sold as "penetration" and "deep undercover" - to others as potential deniable hands that carry out outrages. Will try chew on this. Thanks.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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In many threads, I see that there are two opposite positions with regard to Pakistan or the religious identity of TSP. One has no problem with the aim of absorption of the populations of an ex-TSP into India. The other side is extremely opposed to absorption for they identify the population with a completely hostile identity. This reminds me a problem I was given to address some time ago theoretically - the problem of borders and identities. My position on absorption is primarily based on the understanding I gained as result of trying to grapple with this. And this is the reason, I advocate military or otherwise incorporation of TSP populations and territories into India as early as feasible. Waiting longer will simply reinforce separate Islamic identities beyond redemption. The more we recognize such differences, the more we accept such claims of separation - the more we make them unremovable and irrevocably hostile. In asequence of posts I will quote from my original writing to explain the theoretical basis for this.

********************************

I propose that borders can be characterized as a spatio-temporal process of resolution of conflicts between micro and macroidentities which a macroidentity has not been able to completely erase or replace. Further, that because of the very nature of the processes that form micro-macroidentities (defined here precisely) in humans, creation of a border process as a spatio-temporal membrane impermeable to outside influences/entries is practically impossible and the result of such attempts appear as compromise spaces where a temporary equilibrium exists. Briefly recounting the development of the concept of the "border" within anthropology and geography, we can see that the concept of the "border" as a dynamic process rather than a fixed demarcation line has developed over the twentieth century.

Malinowski's characterization of "well-defined boundaries" separating "tribe"s (of homogeneous cultural identity) as the basis of the "modern model of nationality" (LeVine and Campbell), Holdich's opposition to L.W. Lyde's (1915, Some Frontiers of Tomorrow: an Aspiration for Europe) proposal to draw state boundaries assuring maximum ethnic homogeneity and providing for areas where two state populations could meet/mingle (Prescott) by an alternative proposal for strong artificial boundaries, and K.Haushofer's, (1927) insistence on establishment of the strongest possible boundary surrounding ethnically homogeneous "German Kultur" (Prescott) represents the keynote of the European theories of border until the 60's. In the 1970's, immigration from former colonies discounted automatic connection between "distant others" and geographic remoteness, and "otherness" had to be expanded on European "self" to extend from non-European presence to identity fragmentation within the "homogeneous" European nationalities.

Edmund Leach, Fredrik Barth, Jack Goody, Michael Moerman, and J. Lehman (LeVine and Campbell) reported field investigations disputing concepts of clearly bounded, compact/self-sufficient/territorially discrete societies. Barth considered "boundaries" between ethnicities as a dynamic process and delinked "culture" from ethnicities. For Cohen, "boundary" represents a wide conceptualization of delineation, "border" represents situationally specific boundaries, and "frontier" represents geopolitical/legal boundaries. Further "boundary suggests contestability, and is predicated on consciousness of a diacritical property". Cohen (1994a) coined his concept of consciousness and extended the study of boundaries between groups, to intra-group interactions.

Prescott credits Ratzel (Politische Geographie, 1897) to be the first to characterize borders as dynamic, and distinguish between border line as a legal reality and border zone within the context of a border landscape (Prescott). Minghi (1963) notes change of focus "away from the nature of the boundary's location and history, to its function as it has changed over time". He suggests a methodology for comparing spatio temporal analysis of several boundaries simultaneously as demarcation lines and interfaces, and proposes that "the boundary creates its own distinctive region, making an element of division also the vehicle for regional definition" (Minghi 1991).

Stephen Jones coined the term "borderland" in 1937, observing that cultural dissimilarities in this zone were created by the the boundary itself (Minghi and Rumley). Platt and Bucking-Spitta in 1958 comments similarly on the Dutch-German border (Prescott). John Augelli (1980) concluded "borderlands tend historically to be zones of cultural overlap and political instability where the national identity and loyalties of the people often become blurred" (Minghi and Rumley). Minnich however disputes confused identity in his case-study of Valcanale (Minnich) and shows that the inhabitants of "borderlands" themselves are not confused. Similarly House views the border landscapes as spatial processes (Minghi and Rumley). As we see, concepts of borderland/processes always involve concepts of identities occupying space, and we first specify a relevant concept for identity.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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2 Identity and identity formation:

Identity of self/other humans is a model, created in the imagination of a person, that helps the person in deciding on strategies/modes of interaction with humans. As a model, identity of the "other" in the mind of the constructor of this identity, reduces the complexity of planning strategic interactions with a completely unknown entity who can potentially react in an infinite/uncountable number of ways. Identity of self is also a behavioral model outlining the framework within which the person can operate and thereby reduce the complexity of choosing from a large number of options. Identity of self can form out of copying perceived identities of others which appear to be successful, minimize risk or maximize utility (not necessarily quantitative, such as social approval/disapproval). Distinctions of identity can result from perceptions of differences, which at its simplest can be apparent physical differences and can include more complex/abstract constructs such as "culture". We propose, that, identities are always simplified models of perceptions of humans, and all such models carry a cost of knowledge (the mental load of calculating behavioural interactions), with the tendency towards minimizing cost of knowledge subject to gain in efficiency from "better"/complicated models. An identity forming process ends in the building of a set of descriptions outlining for individuals (or group members sharing in common) a model. Here, we are only considering identity as directly relevant for interactions with other identities. There can be ascriptions which do not affect interactions in a given context, such as if a society is divided into those who do/not believe in extra-terrestrial sentience then belief (in ET sentience) will not define an identity unless this leads believers to take actions affecting non-believers, or vice-versa.

2.1 Macro-micro identity formation and duality

The literature in sociology discusses macro-micro categories loosely, although it is apparent that the authors have a mental association of the words with certain structures and entities, such as macro-state/religion and micro-family/clan/ethnicity, etc. We can formulate these two categories precisely. For a given set of human beings termed a population, any proper subset is a microidentity, and the entire set comprising the population is the macroidentity. The union of all possible proper subsets of the population (therefore of all microidentities), is identical to the entire population/macroidentity. In any given population comprising more than one individual, there exists at least two microidentities (individual self and the social other/rest of society), and at least one macroidentity ("all humans" or the entire society in context). In mathematical set theory, finite sets can always be described by complete enumeration, and sometimes in a shorter descriptive form giving a simple characterization/rule that can construct/list the elements of the set. In the literature we can identify the shorter descriptive form in the ascriptions defining membership, such as linguistic, ethnic categories.

Describing identities is thus dependent on definitions of belonging, i.e., subsets are abstract constructs which do not have tangible existence, in contrast to their human members. To explicitly incorporate the role of human agents in describing these subsets, we need to describe the process of identity formation by individuals/groups. We define an association, called a construction of identities, where for each subset, called a constructor of identities, we associate a cluster of subsets called identities constructed by the constructor.

Since (for us) identities determine interactions taking place through visible mechanisms (language/legislation) between subsets, we define an interaction structure, called a identity structure, which is the ensemble of all interactions (and mechanisms/structures/institutions of mediation) guided by the construction of identities. It is important to explicitly distinguish between constructors, constructed identities, and identity structure. It can be tempting to give identity structures the role of constructors, since in real life, institutions of interaction can appear to enforce/promote/sustain identities and by a descriptive/linguistic tradition of personification ("the heart has its reasons" ) can invite a convenient description as an independent, decision making entity. This can lead to ideologies that claim suprahuman authority, by disjointing the identity structure of what appeared to work for a certain group, time and place, away from the constructors/humans and confusing/presenting this source identity structure itself as a constructor, and claiming enforceability/implementability for all times, peoples, and places.

The formal definition allows (a) each individual/group to construct identities for not only themselves (as individuals/members of groups) but also for all other individuals/groups (b) list of ascriptions (self/other given) characterizing a particular "identity", resulting in the isolation of a group bearing that "identity" with the inherent recognition of the complementary set as not sharing this "identity" (c) the same individual/group to construct different identities for others/self as members of different groups/identities (d) structures, non-human entities (language-ideology/religion/culture-legislature/state) manifesting interactions between various groups and expressing constructed identities, to represent a dynamic equilibrium of the construction of identities, i.e, even if a construction of an identity is contested, this contest in itself is not powerful enough to alter the identity structure at that instant, (e) "hidden" ascriptions which however must be relevant for interactions.

Thus for the set A={a,b,c}, the subsets are given by {a},{b},{c}, {a,b}, {b,c}, {a,c}, {a,b,c}, (which are also the constructors), and a particular instance of constructed identities can be (a:{b},{a,b,c}) that is {b}, {a,b,c} are identities constructed by {a}. Every construction implies a corresponding cost of knowledge.

Only a finite number of identities, as well as constructors of identities (at most the size of the so-called power set) constructed by any constructor, are possible (irrespective of number of ascriptions/interactions). If two different descriptive rules used by a given constructor give rise to identical associated clusters, then the different rules are not interpreted to give rise to different identities, but simply add to the description, forming a "longer description" characterizing the identity. As an illustration, consider a hypothetical society consisting of either men or women on an isolated island where every woman has blonde hair, and every man has dark hair, and every subset of humans on this island construct only two subsets of men and women as constructed identities. Subsets based on hair colour coincide with the subsets based on sex, and do not generate new constructed identities, but simply add a description to the already constructed identities of men/women (men+dark, women+blonde). Note that the different parts of a long description can give rise to different contextual interactions, and is a source of confusions/hidden motivations -such as male homosexuality could appear to be absent independent of any other reason if a sexual preference for blondes is not publicly expressed. A related but mathematically involved development for ascriptions and identity structures, is possible.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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"microidentity" satisfies the following : (a) in the case of self-ascription, "consistent", i.e., that the constructor of identities belongs to its own collection of constructions (b) in case of other given ascription, "given", i.e., that the microidentity belongs to the collection of identities constructed by "others", (c) there exists a corresponding macroidentity of which it is a subset (d) any "other" macroidentity is a set which is disjoint from the macroidentity of (c). A collection of microidentities will be called "acceptable" if each member is "consistent", and also "given" by all other members in the collection.

Microidentities can commonly form out of perceptions/interpretations of visible differences, or by reductions of absorbed macroidentities, and tend to occur in clusters of constructions (e.g., ethnicity-religious sects: White Europeans-Christianity versus Ottoman Turks/Arabs-Islam, Sunni-Arab versus Persian-Shias) which could be more than mere coincidence, as pre-existing contradictions/conflicts between microidentities (e.g., ethnic conflicts) might lead to deliberate adoption of new opposing microidentities where feasible (Arrian Goths versus Catholic Italians , [Heather, Wolfram1988], Celtic/Gaelic-Irish-Scottish adherence to the Catholic versus Germanic/Anglo-Saxon Protestant [Anglo-Saxon-Gaelic-Celtic as cultural categories rather than genetic]). We propose that once formed, a microidentity becomes sustainable only if it helps in mobilization/unification benefiting the whole group, or carries lesser cost of knowledge compared to competing/new micro/macro identities (substituting culture for religion to counter "rationalist onslaught", Weber).

Historically, macroidentities appear to form out of threat perceptions which do not distinguish between microidentities. Thus if two groups are in conflict over a microidentity, feeling threatened without distinction by a third group can lead to the search for and formation of a macroidentity incorporating themselves into a single identity without necessarily completely erasing previous conflicts, which, however, no longer take priority in determining the nature of their mutual interactions (the pair forming an "acceptable" collection of two member identities but extending both their constructions to also include the union of their groups). English subsumption of Welsh, Irish and Scottish identities helped form the British macroidentity acting as a single imperialist entity - Irish Lieutenant-governor of Punjab, India, Sir Michael O'Dyer defended English Reginald(Rex) Dyer, educated from Middleton College, Cork, in the court of Scottish McCardie who instructed the jury before trial that "where the safety of the Indian Empire was in question and through that the safety of the British Empire, perhaps it might be necessary to do things which would not be justified in other circumstances", on a libel case involving Rex Dyer's massacre of unarmed festive gathering including children at Jalianwallabag in India, purportedly in "defense" of the British empire/nation (Rex being consistently supported/ lauded/endorsed by his regiment, the British press, and even MP's -Colett). However the consciousness of distinct Scottish/Welsh/Irish microidentities as opposed to the English, persists, mostly in non-military conflicts. Similarly it is possible that color based "white" identity formed/intensified in Commonwealth colonies as a result of perceptions of threat from natives.

A macroidentity once formed need not remain unaltered in space/time. Previous macroidentity of a numerical minority immigrant group in the geopolitical space dominated by another macroidentity, will appear as a microidentity. Similarly the needs of a modern nation for economic/political cooperation can lead to its submergence in supra-national entities evolving into macroidentities (the European Union - a recognition of some shared macroidentity, however contested its definition might be) resulting in the individual nation states becoming microidentities.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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2.2 Spatio-temporal nature of borders and its links to identity

Germans traveling into Netherlands can feel "out of their own land" even under non-existence of physical barriers (Henk et al). Subtle perceptions of differences/identities remain even though physical borders do not exist. This "border" exists in peoples consciousnesses (social groups inhabiting different parts of the township with streets/rail lines/canals/bridges forming virtual borders). Another example is gender space, unmarked by physical borders but restricted/"alien" to the "other sex" which can have a hard time crossing them, such as pubs and women with infants considered minors (Jackson), "landscape/nation" as masculine space which excludes the "abject/feminized" other (Hawthorne), etc. Consciousness of identities occupying space-time is the crucial basis for borders, and is consistent with anthropological/geopolitical observations.

3 Characterization of borders and macro-micro conflicts

We can compare a community defining itself by a certain microidentity occupying a space/territory, to a selfish biological cell with a controlled membrane. The optimal strategy is to extract all useful resources into the cell, expel all undesirable elements including byproducts of important internal processes, and actively prevent any other cell from entering/extracting/competing for useful resources- a strategy of maximum gain from outside with the minimum possible concession. Thus, outsiders welcome only as tourists who will typically be charged more than locals in terms of higher seasonal average costs than annual, and who will not compete for resources on a long term basis, foreign capital welcome but not foreign immigrants, female immigrants (biologically desirable in a male dominated society) socially preferred to male immigrants as in historical debarring of "white female-African male" marriages in some states of USA, European extraction of capital from colonies while resisting labour immigration from them, expulsion of undesirables into penal colonies in the New World/Oceania/Africa. The membrane of the selfish cell therefore serves as a mechanism for achieving the agenda of the cell. Human "cells" which have more sophisticated functional patterns as parts of complex or "higher" organisms, typically have to compromise on their own benefits and cooperate with competitors, i.e., cannot be as selfish as single celled "lower" organisms.

The three main reasons behind this problem are as follows:
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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3.1 microidentities are never constant over time, they mutate

Microidentities cannot escape mutative processes that affect any society, which stem from not only simple biological processes (dilution over generations due to distance from first-hand experiences and generational reconstructions) but also from complicated cultural processes. Internal and external, economic and technological pressures also stress microidentities, like guilds to slave traders to capitalist accumulation to industrial revolution in Britain (Williams, Clairemonte). Mutation can lead to a new microidentity which opposes its own initial features simply as an optimal strategy over time. A microidentity which advocates/implements immigration and exploitation by force, once successful, can model all other subsequent immigrants as themselves and therefore sharing the violent-immigration ascription. It is optimal then for the original violent-immigrants to deny their founding microidentity and label any new immigrant microidentity as the violent/threatening/incompatible/unshared one. Examples are attempts at denying role of colonial extraction of capital/profits from slave-trade ("Brenner thesis" vs Williams, Du Bois, Diggs, Robert etal, Meltzer), military imposition of unequal trade (Dutt,Dutt), exploitation of European child (bonded/slave -Cincinnati Times Star) labour (Nardinelli vs Tuttle), in capital accumulation/prosperity of Europe/USA, thereby leaving the door open to label other microidentities as the ones trying to profit from "slave-labour/neo-colonialism/unfair-trade/protectionism". It is possible that awareness of "unpleasant" components in a microidentity leads to louder denials with conspicuous absence of (and where denials are contested, to try and suppress) "unpleasant" information in school texts/media and a tendency to construct the very same "unpleasantness" in other microidentities as a strategy of "shifting guilt" ("guilt" in itself could simply be a manifestation of reluctance to be on the receiving end of "strategies" applied to "others").

3.2 perceptions of threat that do not distinguish between microidentities

Perceptions of threat not distinguishing between microidentities have been historically important sources of weakening of microidentities. The temporary coalition of Germanic tribes that slaughtered Varrus's legions, demonstrated that submergence of microidentities for a common purpose into a constructed macroidentity can be a successful strategy for survival/expansion, and provided a focal point for future regimes towards unification/mobilization (Schama). An invading/conquering regime associating territory with identity, may find it advantageous not to distinguish between microidentities of the conquered (due to factors, such as necessarily incomplete knowledge about the conquered, deliberate submergence of microidentities as that of sharing same geopolitical space and therefore uniformly to be liquidated/replaced). By ignoring the different microidentities and ascribing a common macroidentity, a successful and dominant regime creates a macroidentity gradually accepted/reformed by previously distinct microdientities, resulting in the peculiar coexistence of submerged/lingering traces of the latter within the former. The macroidentity reacts to perceptions of threats from other macroidentities, while the microidentities manifest insistence on signaling distinctions such as dialects/accents, and attempts at autonomy (Northerners/Swabeans in Germany, Frankish/Basque movements -Weiß et al). Similarly "selfish cell" nations (which gain economically from being parts of a macroidentity) can turn "Right/micro" whenever prospects of "giving/losing wealth" is imagined, but turn "Left/macro" ("Left" as aiming for eradicating "distinctions") when "others" do (or are needed to do) the "giving" (Hacke provides a description without being aware of it) .

Thus, early Romans use the disparaging Greek "Barbarians" without emphasizing (even if noted) the distinctions between the various tribal groups that made up the Goths/Gauls/Lombards/Huns/Vandals (Wolfram), with the trend peaking in Tacitus who shows greater awareness of diversity while constructing a common identity in contrast to the "decadent/fallen" Roman (Tacitus). In doing so, Romans start the processes of formation of the nations of the Franks, Spanish, and Germans (Heather, Carr). Within European nations, provincial microidentities are still maintained through the more modern and moderate forms of distinctive dialects, mutually sarcastic/disparaging characterization, etc. In India, the surviving texts of the ancestors of modern Hindus typically show sects within monotheism, polytheism, (even atheism) but no evidence of the word Hindu before the 15-th century(Thapar). However chroniclers (emphasizing their Islamic identity in contrast to the "Qufr" Indians) accompanying military/colonizing campaigns of the Arabs/Turko-Afghans in India from the 8th-14th century, usually make no mention of the notorious caste/sectarian distinctions among the Indians they refer to uniformly as "black faced hindoo/but-prasts" and target for enslavement/massacre (Elliott and Dawson - a notable exception being AlBeruni who does translate certain Indian textual conceptualizations of caste without showing awareness of sects - possibly arising out of motivations similar to that in Tacitus).
A macrodentity which understands this dynamic, has been unable/unwilling to entirely subsume/assimilate several microidentities into their own, (could also be deliberate in the need to maintain a power differential between itself and the microidentities it needs to exploit for its own benefit) and considers their potential unification a threat, can adopt the strategy of selectively enhancing microidentity differences, reinforcing identities with "sharper" distinctions as a result (British role in "partition" inevitably starting with the reconstruction of "identities", in Ireland, Palestine, and India -Curtis,Sandria, Pandey, Starr - in contrast to the extreme reluctance to apply similar principles within United Kingdom). A peculiar but predictable feature of incomplete/defeated assimilations under a dominant macroidentity is the formation of a new "elite" microidentity once the dominant group disassociates/leaves, which is forced to search for identification (or develop ties) with or take on the role of, the previously dominant one, to overcome the resistance/autonomy of the remnant competing microidentities(Starr). Thus the Germanic tribes unite under the eagle standards of a Kaiser - Caesar, long after the fall of the Roman empire, the various Irish Republic governments are forced to suppress the incarnations of IRA in parallel/cooperation with the British, or a modern Indian Prime Minister recalls "fair play that characterized[...]ways of the British in India" and "asserts" "that India's experience with Britain had its beneficial consequences too" and this ex-"Oxonian" reminds us that "Many of those who were to rule India set course from Oxford." (Singh - his speech is a very concise illustration of most of the mechanisms of "continued psychological proximity" such as education, or interpretations of history that create/justify such relations).

3.3 microidentities do not form exclusive clusters

The fact that it is nearly impossible to form disjoint communities of humans based on exclusive clusters of microidentities leads to the most pervasive and persistent threat to preservation of microidentities. Shared biological characteristics being an example. While European white males were going out hunting natives in Australia or South Africa, some of them appear to have left genetic signs of the irresistible charms of aborigine or Bush-women. There is world-wide evidence of liberal sexual contact between distinct groups of modern humans (Oppenheimer). Sex and the thirst for knowledge (in the form of technology/skills) appears to subvert all attempts at segregation between communities. This fundamental problem of any human identifying with another human irrespective of various physiognomic and visible cultural differences and engaging in intellectual/biological interaction is a persistent problem facing social hierarchies, and authorities dependent on microidentities to maintain power. However non-biological characteristics can be shared by two humans across apparently disjoint microidentities, such as enjoyment of a particular type of alcohol/sports/scientific investigation, thereby providing the nucleus of a shared microdientity.

Thus, where preexisting microdientities are seen to be fundamental in unification/mobilization to acquire/maintain resources (power), emergence of shared new microidentities can be a potential threat in two ways, (a) there are more people to share resources with, (b) dilution of the cohesion of the original identity structures that evolve through and maintain microidentities. Examples are moves to remove "faith symbols" from educational institutions(the French case-Starr), the perception in some "white" British that the "disappearnce" of their local pubs stem from "moving in" Asian Muslims ("loss of territorial characteristics") and is a sufficient incentive to move out (BBC), the need to refute perceptions of spatial/cultural consolidation of "white" British immigrants within Spanish towns with particular sensitivity against being labeled a "ghetto/enclave" in spite of evidence of standard symptoms used to classify immigrants in Britain, such as persistent failure to learn/converse in the host dialect, building separate cultural institutions etc. (King etal vs O'Reilly).
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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4 Border as temporary and spatially flexible compromise to resolve macro-micro conflicts

Apart from the historically important aggression/repression factor behind macro-micro conflicts, a fundamental human dynamic could be involved, the contradiction between the perceptions (a) (real/imagined) that "belonging" to a particular group (which also accepts/acknowledges such belonging) contributes towards enhancing survival/consumption of the individual (rewards for social cooperation) and (b) that competition with other individuals in this enlarged group can reduce this very same survival/consumption (another penalizing factor can be the increased cost of knowledge for more complex identities). Thus the microidentity may search for bigger/more powerful/successful identities that can transcend its current identity with the contradictory pull in the other direction where fears about potential reduction of benefits through competition and cost of knowledge will tend to encourage retaining/consolidating current identity.

It is this conflict and contradiction that gives rise to the attempt to solve it through the creation of a border as a space-time process to control in/out flow of resources/information/signals. Since emergence of shared identities is facilitated by interaction/signaling across distinct microidentities, consolidation of members bearing a microidentity in a contiguous spatial region can provide spatial depth where outer layers absorb signals preventing/weakening signals penetrating the interior. Since some members have to be positioned in and make up the outer layers, a complete insulation from signals coming from a competing/distinct microidentity in spatial contact, is impossible. This is a dynamic process, since the development of a shared microidentity that spans both sides of the initial demarcation lines, occupies space, and the outer regions of this space will have new "border" interactions. If viable, this new "border-microidentity" will try to sustain itself as an unique spatio-temporal process against attempts by centres of previous microidentities to absorb or expel. Parent microidentities then treat them as newly created microidentities occupying space, and the process continues. This can explain why the state sometimes has confusions about the loyalties of the people in the border region, whereas the border residents develop a distinct identity of their own. Similarly, tendency of spatial consolidation among both migrant groups as well as surrounding host groups can develop, even though the migrants might not have immigrated through a point in the spatial boundary.

Spatial consolidation can not only be socially (e.g. state) imposed strategy of insulating the interior from signals/contamination from an external microidentity, but also adopted by members scared of their own vulnerability/susceptibility when faced with the "other" ("temptation/sin"). Thus "white women" are conspicuously absent in the pre-revolutionary Cuban street/public landscape, which is dominated by free "colored" women (Mena) (similar "shielding" is observable in India during the "Raj").

Barth proposes, that the persistent reproduction of ethnic boundaries manifested mainly through the actor's strategy of selected signalizing as either over/undercommunicating those cultural differences that the actor recognizes as contextually significant (Barth). We can explain the motivations for over/undercommunication as a means of interrupting the development of signal exchanges that can lead to increased interactions exposing vulnerable members to "other's"s influence, jeopardizing the preservation of microidentity.

The threat to microidentities becomes stronger as technology brings people together directly in close personal interaction irrespective of their spatial position in the interior/exterior of a microidentity-contiguous/homogeneous region. Not all such threats are mere perceptions as microidentities can conceal those of its "long description", whose revelation can be strategically disadvantageous (European arrivals in India as traders/missionaries who reveal militant colonizing/exploiting traits only later when advantageous). Counter-strategies for a wary microidentity are, (a) trying to restrict the spread of the "other" by subsumption, i.e., try to force the "other" to accept descriptions making them "belong" ("integration" issue), or (b) fragment the "other" by selectively focusing on different parts of its "long description" to split it into several (constructing "extreme" and "moderate", encouraging sects/divides, questioning the existence of "Hinduism" by focusing on historical existence of "sects" as a means of delegitimizing its modern "reconstruction"-Thapar).
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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5 conclusion

Until technology can completely substitute for close personal interaction, however, microidentities have a defense in strategies to interrupt/control communication, and border, a spatio-temporal process attempting filtration of signal-exchange result. The necessity of cooperating with other microidentities in the hope of or actual realization of increasing efficiency/consumption, makes it impossible to seal off all interactions. Thus a permanent prevention of all border interactions is impracticable and borders can only be realized as a spatio-temporal process of temporary compromise.

***********************************************************

This is why I take the existing borders around the core as temporary compromises, and when necessary we should expand and remove separations - derecognizing separate claims of identities. TSP and the Islamic identity for me is no exception either.

Ref:
Barth, Fredrik (ed.), 1970. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference, London
BBC, Panorama, Vivian White reports from a northern town.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid ... w=bb&mp=rm]
Carr, R., 2000. Spain: A History, Oxford University Press
Clairemonte, F., 1960. Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment: Studies in the Disintegration of an Idea, New York: Asia Publishing House
Cohen, Anthony P., 1994a. Self Consciousness. An Alternative Anthropology of Identity, London and New York: Routledge
Cohen, Anthony P., 1994b. “Boundaries of Consciousness, Consciousness of Boundaries. Critical Questions for Anthropology”, In: Vermeulen, Hans and Cora Govers (eds.), The Anthropology of Ethnicity, Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 59-79
Collett, Nigel., 2005. The Butcher of Amritsar, General Reginald Dyer, Hambledon and London
Curtis, Liz., 1985. Nothing but the same old story: the roots of anti-Irish racism, London: Turnaround Distribution
Weiß, Dieter, and . Blessing, Werner, K., 2003 Franken.Vorstellung und Wirklichkeit in der Geschichte - Franconia 1. Beihefte zum Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung, Neustadt a.d. Aisch.
Diggs, Ellen Irene., 1983. Black chronology : from 4000 B.C. to the abolition of the slave trade, Boston, Mass. G.K. Hall
Du Bois, W. E. B., 2007. Black folk then and now: an essay in the history and sociology of the Negro race, New York, Oxford University Press
Dutt, R.P., 1949. India Today, 2nd edition, Calcutta, Manisha
Dutt, Romesh C., (1902), 2001, The Economic History of India under early British Rule, Routledge
Elliott, H.M. and Dawson, John., 1964, India through its own historians, The History of India, Kitab Mahal; Lukhnow
Freitag, Sandria, B., 1989. Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India. Berkeley: University of California Press
Hacke, Christian., 2005. Challenges for German Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century, European Review, 13, 4, 541-550, Academia Europaea, U.K.
Hawthorne, Sîan Melvill, 2006., Origins, genealogies, and the politics of identity: towards a feminist philosophy of myth, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, PhD thesis.
Heather, P., 1996. The Goths, Blackwell, Oxford
Van Houtum, H. and Strüver, A., 2000. Where is the Border?, The journal of creative geography, 4, 1, 20-23
Johnson, Rebecca., 2005. Blurred boundaries: A Double-Voiced Dialogue on Regulatory Regimes and Embodied Space, 9, Law, Text, Culture: "Legal Spaces"
King, T., Warnes, T., and Williams, A., 2000. Sunset Lives, British Retirement Migration to the Mediterranean, Berg
LeVine, Robert A. and Campbell, Donald, T., 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Meltzer, Milton., 1993, Slavery, A World History, Da Capo
Mena, Luz, 2005 “Stretching the Limits of Gendered Spaces: Black and Mulatto Women in 1830s Havana”, Cuban Studies 36 , Univ of Pittsburgh Press
Minghi, Julian V., 1963, Review Article: Boundary Studies in Political Geography, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 53, 407-428
Minghi, Julian V. and Dennis, Rumley (eds.), 1991. The Geography of Border Landscapes. London and New York: Routledge.
Minnich, Robert G., 1993. Social Anthropologist on Slovenes. The Volume of social-anthropological texts. Ljubljana: Slovenski raziskovalni institut, Trst, Sedez kanalska dolina. Minnich, Robert G., Socialni antropolog o Slovencih: zbornik socialno-antropoloskih besedil. Translated and edited by Irena Sumi. Ljubljana: Slovenski raziskovalni institut-- SLORI, 1993
Nardinelli, Clark., 1988. Were Children Exploited During the Industrial Revolution? Research in Economic History, 11, 43-276
Oppenheimer, Stephen., 2004. Out of Eden, Constable and Robinson,
Oppenheimer, Stephen., The Real Eve, Carroll & Graf; 2004.
O'Reilly, Karen., 2000, The British on the Costa del Sol,: Transnational Identities and Local Communities: London ,Routledge
Pandey, Gyanendra., 1990. The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India. Delhi, Oxford University Press
Prescott, John Robert Victor, 1978, Boundaries and Frontiers, London: Croom Helm.
Robert Paul, Thomas and Richard Nelson, Bean, 1974. The Fishers of Men: The Profits of the Slave Trade, The Journal of Economic History, 34, 4
Schama, S. 1995. Landscape and Memory, London: HarperCollins.
Singh M., Oxford University July 11. Acceptance speech. As published in The Hindu, online version, 8th July, 2005 [http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/nic/0046/pmspeech.htm]
Starr, Jill., 2000. The Indian National Project: Failures and Successes, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2.5/3.1
Tacitus, Cornelius. In The Complete Works of Tacitus. "Germany and Its Tribes." Trans by Church, Alfred John & Brodribb, William Jackson, trans. NY: Random House, 1942.
Thapar, Romila., 1997. A paradigm shift, Frontline, 14, 16,
The Cincinnati Times Star, The Child Market in Germany, published April 17, 1908, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Child ... in_Germany]
Tuttle, Carolyn., 1998. A Revival of the Pessimist View: Child Labor and the Industrial Revolution, Research in Economic History, 18, 53-82
Weber, Max., 1946. Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford, 139
Wolfram, H, 1988, History of the Goths . Berkeley, .
Wolfram H., 1997. The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples, trans, Thomas Dunlop, University of California Press, Berkeley
Williams Eric., 1944. Capitalism and Slavery, University of North Carolina Press
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati - interesting but long. Much of the theory fits in well with what I have in my own mind and I will post a more detailed set of comments later.

I make this post to ask if you can provide me with a cite for the following statement made in your series of posts
However chroniclers (emphasizing their Islamic identity in contrast to the "Qufr" Indians) accompanying military/colonizing campaigns of the Arabs/Turko-Afghans in India from the 8th-14th century, usually make no mention of the notorious caste/sectarian distinctions among the Indians they refer to uniformly as "black faced hindoo/but-prasts" and target for enslavement/massacre (Elliott and Dawson - a notable exception being AlBeruni who does translate certain Indian textual conceptualizations of caste without showing awareness of sects - possibly arising out of motivations similar to that in Tacitus).
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati, Good article more suited for scholars. Need a dumbdown version also for wider dissemination. In essence what you are saying dont be hung up about borders, which are Westphalian construct of nation states, but use a more flexible definition to accomodate the ebb and tide of progress.

Have you read the Romanes lecture on "Frontiers" by Lord Currzon? His Indian sojourn made him think of Forntiers as being more important than borders. The link is in wikipedia.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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Shivji,
yes , perhaps too long for this forum. Do you want a citation of "black face/butprast" or the Alberuni-Tacitus comparison? Specifics of the first can be found in Masudi, Firishta, etc. or translations in Vols 1-IV of Eliott and Dowson. Can give details but too loaded down this week. Alberuni-Tacitus comparison is mine - both could have been indirectly motivated by the need to create an ideal for their respective cultures by comparing with "noble savages" - but because of possible repercussions they construct this "under deep cover".

Ramanaji,
thanks. yes reviewed Curzon's lecture again after a long time. Quite revealing. His arguments can now be turned around.

To both: should I replace these posts with a summary and simplification? But cannot until the weekend. This was part of a sequence of articles I wrote on the theme, and thought I should give the full arguments.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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brihaspati wrote:Shivji,
yes , perhaps too long for this forum. Do you want a citation of "black face/butprast" or the Alberuni-Tacitus comparison? Specifics of the first can be found in Masudi, Firishta, etc. or translations in Vols 1-IV of Eliott and Dowson. Can give details but too loaded down this week. Alberuni-Tacitus comparison is mine - both could have been indirectly motivated by the need to create an ideal for their respective cultures by comparing with "noble savages" - but because of possible repercussions they construct this "under deep cover".

Ramanaji,
thanks. yes reviewed Curzon's lecture again after a long time. Quite revealing. His arguments can now be turned around.

To both: should I replace these posts with a summary and simplification? But cannot until the weekend. This was part of a sequence of articles I wrote on the theme, and thought I should give the full arguments.
I am lookig for the black-faced hindoo refs

Please leave the posts as they are - I need to re read them - I have made some annotations because I have comments. Need to re read the posts though.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by shiv »

brihaspati, you said:
My position on absorption is primarily based on the understanding I gained as result of trying to grapple with this. And this is the reason, I advocate military or otherwise incorporation of TSP populations and territories into India as early as feasible. Waiting longer will simply reinforce separate Islamic identities beyond redemption. The more we recognize such differences, the more we accept such claims of separation - the more we make them unremovable and irrevocably hostile.
This is valid as your viewpoint, but I believe your own view is not sustainable on the basis of the voluminous research that you have quoted.

Let me quote from your passage and then post my take:
Historically, macroidentities appear to form out of threat perceptions which do not distinguish between microidentities. Thus if two groups are in conflict over a microidentity, feeling threatened without distinction by a third group can lead to the search for and formation of a macroidentity incorporating themselves into a single identity without necessarily completely erasing previous conflicts, which, however, no longer take priority in determining the nature of their mutual interactions
The Indian National Congress (INC) and Gandhi attempted to create a macroidentity based on secularism and equality of all faiths out of the conflict generating caste/faith microidentities of India in order to oppose the threat of the British Raj
A macroidentity once formed need not remain unaltered in space/time. Previous macroidentity of a numerical minority immigrant group in the geopolitical space dominated by another macroidentity, will appear as a microidentity.
The efforts of the INC and Gandhi were seen by the Muslim league, Jinnah and Allama Iqbal as an attempt to make a microidentity out of Islam, instead of their view of islam as a unique macroidentity. I need to explain this more clearly.

The formation of micro or macro identities that you have so clearly explained are evolutionary processes that can occur "naturally" without deliberate human intervention. However identities can also be created by humans based on common threat perceptions, or common perceptions of superiority ("Nazi Aryans are a superior race", "Muslims are superior to all others")

One process is involuntary, and the other is deliberate. The problem here is that when there is deliberate creation of an identity, it must be based on a continuous and unending threat perception. In other words a new macro identity created by a threat can survive only so long as the threat is continuous and unending. Unity and loyalty to the new identity begins to fall apart by the natural reversion to old microidentities if the threat that created the new identity goes away.

Islam itself set about creating a new identity by claiming superiority for itself and claiming that its superiority was under constant threat from others - notably Christianity and Judaism, but Islamic tradition left enough leeway to declare anyone else a threat, including atheists and Hindus.

What Jinnah and co did was to take this islamic identity and claim that it could never survive as a microidentity along with other microidentities within the larger macro-identity of independent India. They successfully created a "cell" (as you call it) or an "oil droplet in water" (as I have described it in the past) called Pakistan.

Pakistan was deliberate reinforcement of an Islamic identity over all other microidentities. Within Pakistan, Islam was the macro identity, The micro identities of Punjab, East Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan and others was suppressed by the threat of the "other" macro identity "Hindu, non Islamic, India"

it is clear then, using your own well researched findings that the idea of Pakistan used islam as a macro identity and used the "Hindu India" threat as the binding agent to suppress its own micro-identities. As long as Hindu India is a threat to the macro-identity of Islamic Pakistan, there will be a suppression of micro-identities of Pakistan.

The curious feature of Pakistan is that it has double identity, one inside the other, each competing for macroidentity status. One is Islam, and the other is the Pakistan identity (India is a threat)

If you remove the threat of India to the macro-identity of Pakistan, the micro-identities of Pakistan start coming to the foreground based on societal characteristics that you have yourself pointed out. I quote:
The fact that it is nearly impossible to form disjoint communities of humans based on exclusive clusters of microidentities leads to the most pervasive and persistent threat to preservation of microidentities
and
The necessity of cooperating with other microidentities in the hope of or actual realization of increasing efficiency/consumption, makes it impossible to seal off all interactions. Thus a permanent prevention of all border interactions is impracticable and borders can only be realized as a spatio-temporal process of temporary compromise
A little explanation is in order here.

1) India did not create the border the "spatio-temporal process" between India and Pakistan.

2) The border was created for the creation and preservation of the idea of Pakistan

3) All spontaneous interactions across this border are more detrimental to Pakistan than India

4) An attempt by India to remove the border is used as a unifying attempt to reinforce the "Pakistan" macrodentity

5) If India were to vanish (unlikely) or not threaten the Pakistan identity in any way, the micro identities of Pakistan (actors, singers, patients, "basant", irredentist urges) start reaching across the border and damaging Pakistani identity

Every one of these interactions is a threat to the Pakistan macroidentity and is sought to be countered by two primary means.
  • One is to try and focus on breaking India as an Islamic goal giving all sorts of historic or other (Muslim discrimination in India) rationalizations

    The other is to protect Pakistani unity by enhancing the India threat
If you study these two means used by Pakistan you will realize that they contradict each other :lol:

If India becomes weak, the Pakistan identity that unites the micro-identities of Pakistan also becomes weak. The final party that inherits a weak India cannot be guaranteed to be Islam, or even the Pakistan army

On the other hand, a powerful India is a continuous threat to Pakistan - but only if India continuously seeks to break Pakistan. If India does nothing, it cannot be portrayed as a threat. So it must be provoked.

For India it is better to be united and strong. For this it is better to reduce the micro-identities of "Muslim" and "Hindu" in favor of India. But at the same time a blind attack on Pakistan will only unite Pakistan. It is better to encourage the micro-identities of Pakistan to manifest themselves by showing that India is not a threat to their identities.

Islam (Pakistan's Islamic identity) is a confounding factor here, because it is a self destructive (or self limiting) ideology. It destroys its own allies until the only people left are those who will fight everyone else. If it wins it rules by coercion initially and conversion gradually. When it loses it retreats into geographical cells or oil droplets that show a moderate identity towards the outside borders while preserving its "fight everyone else" identity at the center. The only option here is to apply enough pressure on Islam so that the fundamentalist core remains hidden and dormant while it becomes a survival advantage to show moderation.

Because borders are a spatio-temporal feature it is important to note that the ratio of circumference to area (or volume) increases as radius decreases. This is a fundamentally important fact that I think nobody has referred to on this forum or outside in the context of Islamic communities.

If you take an area of dar-ul-Islam as an oil droplet and realize that the core of fundamentalists is surrounded by a periphery of moderates, you will find that the larger the area of dar-ul-Islam, the smaller the number of moderates required to line the circumference for a relatively larger area (or volume) occupied by fundamentalists inside the cell/oil-droplet.

Therefore it is better to have a larger number of smaller areas of dar ul Islam in which the combined ratios of circumference to area is larger, requiring a larger number of moderates to cover a relatively smaller number of fundamentalists.


Allowing Pakistan's microidentities to manifest and helping the break up of Pakistan will reduce both the Pakistan threat and the Islamic fundemantalist threat IMO.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RayC »

Thursday,

The issue is quite simple - Pakistan has to be de-fanged. It is an impediment to peace, progress and prosperity of the region.

Pakistan is too full of contradictions and all those contradictions have to be addressed. Sectarian, subnational and tribal.

Economically it is in the dumps and this should be encouraged.

There is, however, no reason to absorb any of what remains.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Raja Ram »

brihaspatiji,

Interesting sequence of posts with original thinking. I need some time to assimilate it. Further to shivji's prelimenary take on it, which I find quite convincing, I want to seek your views on two other perspectives.

1. In your analysis, it appears that you have looked at identities, nationhood and the multiple ways of defining borders. Most of which has been drawn from Occidental viewpoints. It would be interesting to bring into this an Indian viewpoint and the way we have seen ourselves. What you say about spaces, macro and micro identities, how would they play out from an Indian narrative perspective? India as a civilizational entity has always or from time immemorial recognised, accepted, codified and institutionalized a multi-dimensional civilizational entity called "Bharata varsha". The kind of a mosaic civilizational supra identity that allows for a million identities to co-exist (neither surpressed nor dominating) with the idea that is Bharata. The one you perceive better if you travel across India by road or rail, where the culture changes slowly almost seamlessly but there is enough reiteration at every step of the supra identity.

This I believe is something that is in contrast to the occidental view of how nations and nation states are formed and dissolved. To complement this view ther political, social and economic arrangements allowed for the concept of chakravartin as an upholder of dharma across the land and other rajas as vassals with a loose federation.

Nehru's "Discovery of India", Tilak's "Artic Home of the Aryans", Savarkar, Gandhi et al have provided different modern takes on this. Recently Amartya Sen's work that talked about the multiple identities being more important and even denying a supra identity is a flawed take of this as well. It has more in common with the Nirad Chowdhury view of a civilizational that is dead and survives and responds to life only when there is external stimuli is there in terms of threats.

In this context it will be interesting to know if we really need to take back territory and population of what is now Pakistan based on occidental view of micro and macro entities or is it better to have an area of influence in the resulting states post implosion of Pakistan without distorting the young nation state of India's progress to achieve its tryst with destiny? For assimilating now will come with a cost that can distort seriously the Indian society.

2) I want to introduce the dimension of time into this. The twin macro identities of pakistan as captured by shiv are mutually contradictory but both need an India that is against them. Perhaps the Pakistani elite have really stumbled upon the only way to survive is to alternatively promote both these macro identities to prolong their survival as nation state. But the reality is this. In pursuit of these identities they have created a human psyche that covers all of their population that is fundamentally opposed to the idea of India. Different people in pakistan today have different reasons to hate their natural identity of being Indians in the civilizational sense. They may have different reasons, but the outcome is the same. It has taken years to build this mentality. It will take generations to get out of that mentality.

If we look at world history, the concept of Nazi Germany was removed only by complete anhilation of nazism, occupation and forcible renounciation of that ideology followed by decades of occupation by allied forces on boths sides of the curtain to get Germany give up nazism for good. Still there is remnants of it. Same was the case with Japan. What would have happened if the allied powers had moved out of defeated Germany and Japan? Would the nazi identity of German master race made a come back? Would Japan's divine emperor status brought about the resurgence of Japan as the chosen children of the Sun god come back with its militirisatic state?

Is there a lesson in it for India? If you bring in time as a factor, then shivji, may be brihaspati has a point in stating that it is best for India to take over and destroy the twin identities fully, completely and forcibly to ensure that the original true supra-identity of Bharata re-emerges in these lands and binds the resulting nation states of the region to the chakravartin state of Republic of India.

I hope that the debate continues here in this thread. For when really good minds debate, the lesser minds like yours truly can gain :) .
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by R Vaidya »

-- End of west –Asia as New Power

http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1227165


Rvaidya
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

Shiv, Brilliant segue on brihaspatiji's ideas. What you write explains the Bahmani Kingdom and the Vijayanagara dynamic.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Atri »

Brilliant analysis Shiv.. The analogy of surface to volume ratio was succinct. This is the way even body digests fats in aqueous environment of intestine. The fats being insoluble in water are broken down into tiny droplets thus increasing their net surface area. Furthermore, at any given time, the hydro-phobic part of the lipid content keeps hiding in the core of hte droplet while hydrophilic polar part is in contact with water.

As we go on breaking the droplet to smaller size, the hydrophilic part of fats become more and more sparse, and hydrophobic parts slowly are exposed for enzymatic degradation. Enzymes, which are in aqueous environment, can't reach the hydrophobic core for their activity. However, they are sensitive towards hydrophobic chains and are efficient at their degradation.

As the size of droplets go on reducing, more and more hydrophobic domain starts coming in contact with enzymes are are degraded. The major difference is, the environment is extremely aqueous. This is the major flaw in your suggestion.

Comparing this analogy to problem of Islam, you are right in noting that breaking a monolithic islamist structure into small Dar ul Islams will increase the efficiency of assimilation. However, there is one catch. In absence of sufficiently high water concentrations in areas surrounding fat droplets, these droplets show a tendency to coalesce and fuse with each other and become bigger droplets.

Hindus do not have such high numerical superiority over Muslims in subcontinent today, as they had 60 years ago. Muslims have increased in numbers exponentially, while growth of Hindus has been linear. This may result in several (comparatively) bigger Dar-ul-Islam droplets being created within India owing to fusion of of smaller Dar-Ul-Islam droplets, owing to absence of Hindus in sufficient concentrations around them. This will be an additional pain in the ass for Hindus. The only way out for this solution to work successfully is to bring down the numbers of Pakistani muslims. This is not very good idea, because, there is only one way to bring the numbers of Muslims down. Otherwise, the result is indigestion.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, while the process of digestion is on after heavy fatty meal, brain usually sleeps. It is difficult to do anything creative after a fatty heavy meal as the blood supply is diverted to stomach for digestion. Consider the time Hindu India will loose while the assimilation of muslims by this process is on. It will at least take a century for complete assimilation. The fruits of this assimilation (if complete and successful) will be seen 100-150 years later. Till then, India will have to lag behind in development as most of the energy will be spent on digestion.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Rudradev »

Fascinating write up, Brihaspatiji. Has this been published somewhere?

Great analysis Shiv, but perhaps it overlooks something.

The agent holding up the twin pillars that reinforce the Paki macro-identity (Islam and Not-India) is itself a Paki micro-identity... the Pakistan Army.

This is an essential difference. The Indian macro-identity is a naturally evolved civilizational bequest to which we, India, are the present-day legate. We can elect any sort of government, UPA or NDA, or even non-governments such as we've had at various times during the '90s. Competition between our micro-identities persist at all levels and different intensities. Regardless, the macro-identity endures.

The Paki macro-identity is an artifice. It needs to be propped up continuously or it will fail. And the agent holding up that artifice is a micro-identity... therefore, by definition, the Paki macro-identity does not subsume all micro-identities of Pakistan, as the Indian macro-identity does all the micro-identities of India.

Your image of an oil-droplet broken into many small micelles to maximize the ratio of surface area:volume is an interesting consideration. I find myself thinking of Sardar Patel's vision of "many Pakistans" inside Indian territory. He of course, thought this would be a bad thing, and one Pakistan outside India's borders would be a preferable solution. But was he right about that? I wonder if the eventual solution may not be a synthesis of your view and Brihaspati's.

Just for argument's sake, can we envision an India (including present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) where there are small enclaves, Muslim "homelands" if you will, with special privileges like the Native American (don't hit me, I know the analogy is flawed in 400,000,000 ways) "nations" within the United States? Reservations where the Muslims can live as Islamically as they like, and maybe even have tax-free casinos (or matka-halls) and such local perks. Each "Reservation" would be an oil drop unto itself... Islamic yes, but emphasizing the other facets of its micro-identity, Moplah or Assamese or Azamgarhi just as there are Navajo or Sioux or Inuit reservations. Meanwhile, Muslims would be free to leave the Reservation and integrate with the mainstream in the cities at any time (just as Native Americans are in the USA today).There are two reasons I suggest this:

1) Even in present day India there are such "reservations" already in existence... "no-go" zones around Muslim majority areas, as some BRF posters have described them. However, such zones are imbued with an anti-GOI stance because of the implied counter-nationalism of their formation and existence, and hence serve as hospitable breeding-grounds for SIMI and LeT types. If Muslim enclaves were seen as an exercise in co-existence, as Native American reservations are, things might be different.

2) Separated as discrete oil-drops, each with its aspirations at least partially fulfilled, subcontinental Islam may be impelled towards finding equilibrium in the form of myriad micro-identities; rather than the way it is today, rife with the sort of persecution-myths and cultural paranoia that fuel an expansionist and supremacist ethos. It should be recognized that, even though Islam is expansionist, it has never been able to maintain its supremacism in the subcontinent because as you very rightly describe it,
it is a self destructive (or self limiting) ideology. It destroys its own allies until the only people left are those who will fight everyone else.
I know that my suggestion is complete pie-in-the-sky $hit with millions of holes and potential pitfalls ... but if we don't start floating new ideas, however absurd they might be, we'll continue to stomp around in the same old circles. The biggest hole in my proposal is that the Native Americans were a defeated people... while the subcontinent's Islamists think they're invincible. The only way to impose the "reservation"/"homeland" template on subcontinental Islam will be after delivering a mind-numbing, head-spinning, jaw-breaking series of jhaapads to Pakistan and its proxies. Utter, humiliating defeat (with ourselves in full control of determining a new dispensation in the aftermath) would be a necessary intermediate step.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RajeshA »

Rudradev wrote:The only way to impose the "reservation"/"homeland" template on subcontinental Islam will be after delivering a mind-numbing, head-spinning, jaw-breaking series of jhaapads to Pakistan and its proxies. Utter, humiliating defeat (with ourselves in full control of determining a new dispensation in the aftermath) would be a necessary intermediate step.
Rudradev,

your comment does ignite some thinking in me relating to the Indian Muslim community.

Let us consider the repercussions of, as you say, a mind-numbing jhaapad to Pakistan on the IMs.

1. Should Pakistan be broken up, it would free the IMs from fingers pointed at them, falsely (or rightly) accusing them of being more loyal to Pakistan than to India. GOOD THING for IMs

2. In contrast to all other countries hitting on some Muslim nationalities (Chechens, Palestinians, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghans, Kashmiris, South Thai Muslims, Philippine Muslims, Muslim communities in West, etc.) and the ensuing cries of victimization, in the case of a war between India and Pakistan, Pakistan would indeed have some difficulty making that same plea in the aftermath of the war. Not after so much terrorism they have caused in India, where India has always acted as a sponge. Of course, they can still call Jihad, as it is against Muslims, but the victimization would be more or less absent. Without this victimization, there may not be that much sympathy amongst the IMs for Pakistan.

3. However after such a solid defeat of a nuclear armed Islamic nation with a huge army, an equal to India, hopefully the feeling would be reinforced that Islam and Muslims are doomed for DEFEAT. That would give the IMs some pause to reconsider the sustainability of their own ideology.

4. The whole exercise would give the IMs some necessary push to ponder over their loyalty to their homeland vs Islam. Some may become more patriotic, others may become more radical.

5. The destruction of Pakistan, would also mean that IMs would suddenly be promoted to the keepers of the faith in the Indian Subcontinent. Let's just say the IMs would be the bigger group than Bangladesh and more TFTA than them also. As such they will suddenly have a even higher profile.

6. There will certainly be some churning.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Gurujis - thank you so much for your observations! A bit rushed, so will very briefly write out my quick takes: will have more details over the weekend.

In my write up I simply expressed a mechanism by which borders form and enclose populations in the presence of identity conflicts. I did not include any normative considerations as to whether formation of such border processes were optimal according to some criteria or not. All my life I have tried to see if it is possible to have a theory of action without any normative criteria - what we more commonly refer to as "values", is possible. So far I have failed - and seen that to a certain extent Godel's incompleteness theorem does appear to have a bearing here too.

From the identity viewpoint the two problems with TSP stem from inclusion of normative criteria : suppose we think that there were "timeless" components of Indic identity from before the advent of Islam, that should continue to be "timeless" - continue to be practised indefinitely into the future on the subcontinent at least as a "living culture". First problem: if the non-Indic identity is singularly exclusive and hostile to the Indic one, and aims at complete erasure of the Indic, then the "value" of continued "timeless" practice of the Indic identity is destroyed. second problem : which is so much evident in Indian history, is that of adoption of identity elements from the non-Indic in order to/forced to preserve/protect the Indic identity. The second is the most dangerous one according to my experience. Because tit-for-tat is a successful strategy, the longer an aggressive/expanding/proselytizing identity survives - the more it wins. Either it defeats and destroys its target, or it makes the target exceed its own attitudes and adopt the very same destructive attitudes in sufficient intensities so that it itself gets destroyed instead. Either way, that destructive aspect of the initial aggressor survives and becomes incorporated into the surviving identity. In India, we see this effect in adoption of retrogressive socio-cultural practices, that did not exist/or were not widespread in Indic populations before advent of these non-Indic identities and their practices.

The interaction across the border process, need not just lead to mutual admiration and conversion from the non-Indic to the Indic - that is a lesser fear. But more importantly, in reacting to these continued surviving pockets of microidentities, be it in contiguous pockets outside the current borders or inside as "reservations", there is the danger of becoming more and more like the "aliens" themselves, and thereby lose our very Indicness/identity itself.

My other normative objection against independent survival of the "pockets" is that the corresponding ideology obstructs the "value" of continuous expansion, upgrading and retestability of understanding and knowledge, and is geared towards "cutting the human to fit the clothe" policy. It simply insists on what is claimed to have worked for a certain group, at a certain period, and at a certain area, to work for all groups, at all periods and for all areas indefinitely into the future - and that this hypothesis is not tetstable, i.e, beyond human interrogation. It reduces the cognitive load required on the human brain by making all actions rule based. As long as such pockets of example survive, they will be tempting escape routes for many who might decide that the increasing complexity of modern knowledge society, and the consequent loss of the "goodies" (including power) if sufficient effort and abilities are not shown in skills competition - is avoidable through a identity that promises all these desirables with say simply the ability to strike down heads.

The encouragement of microidentities within TSP can actually proceed not only along the traditional ethnic lines, but while encouraging the benefits of placing the Indic identity above the others. New microidentities can be created and encouraged - for example, that one based on landholding. This is a serious problem in TSP, and we could promise land reforms and redistribution -isolating the elite semifeudals. In Japan, I think steps to break the landholding patterns were undertaken under McArthur's occupation as part of a wider strategy of weakening or destroying the feudal-military class.

The border process across India-TSP is also complicated by the overlap of Pakistani Islam and Indian Islam. My prediction is that if they are forced to interact within a single national framework they will actually give rise to two mutually suspicious, microidentities in conflict over certain issues for generations. When such microidentities compete, they are more likely to search for bigger identities to transcend into, to gain advantage over its competitor. Such a process is best mediated under constant threat of retaliation and state repression if it deviates from accepted norms of political expression.

The main reason I think the Bahmani-Vijaynagar dynamic may not obtain in the case of TSP is because of presence of external helpers who will keep those independent pockets afloat. Also the broken up pieces of the Bahmans were swallowed up by a bigger imperialist power professing the same faith - resulting in status quo for the "dhimmis".
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Shivji,
I agree with your observation about the dynamic of microidentities within TSP, this has also been my thought for a long time. But my point is also based on using this dynamic against TSP itself, and make adoption of the Indic identity more "lucrative". There are several microidentities to target and represent to various components of TSP as a threat - the Pakjabi elite against Pakjabi marginal or landless agricultural worker. Pakjab as the exploiter of Sindhis, Balochis or Pashtuns. Substantial minorities in Sindh against majorities in Sindh. Embed all that in an offer of alignment and merging with India to help against the opponent. Simultaneously create the fear that the main threat results from belonging to a certain faith - overwhelming fear won converts to Christianity in Germany under Charlemagne.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Raja Ramji,
You are correct in the criticism that the take was more occidental in assumptions. It was originally meant for a western peer circle. I have thought of the Indic viewpoint, but I try to avoid bringing in such discussions here, as those with severly limited understanding of Indic philosophies could try to trash up such discussions as "religious ones". My experience from political polemics says that such aggressive debates usually hide personal power dynamics and ultimately lead to unncessary bitterness, and is practically useless. I hope you will forgive me. :)

To a certain extent, the micro-macro framework is applicable to Indic systems also. I will just indicate the comparison. The Indic system actually recognizes what we call in mathematics as the power set as its identity construction - that is all possible subsets. (individual to entire society - all have separate and overlapping identities at various levels). We can show that this is the richest class of subsets possible (the maximal sigma algebra possible). Non-Indic philosophies mostly fall in between this richest class and the "binary system" where only two mutually exclusive subsets are recognized.

Arthasastra (sorry! to refer to it again) has some indications that peripheral powers and identities were recognized as layers that can be incorporated. Although perhaps the question of identity does not appear there - more a characterization of imperialist expansion perhaps. But, the principles behind "raajaniti" as propounded is based on "values" and preservation or extension or establishment of such "values" to ever extending populations.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Rudradevji,
yes it was published in another version. I think your observation that such reservations already exist, is highly accurate. I have first hand experience. :) But extreme "orthodoxy" in practice within such enclaves cannot be allowed. The native Americans were initially massively crushed and traumatized militarily, and the reservation politics is one of the darkest chapters in the history of "visionary" "humanitarian" "liberal" early founders of the USA. But such brutal and authoritarian treatment took out all power of military assertion of independent and defiant power from the natives. Ironically, this is what I have been proposing to deal with these TSP "pockets" before incorporation.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by svinayak »

brihaspati wrote:Raja Ramji,
You are correct in the criticism that the take was more occidental in assumptions. It was originally meant for a western peer circle. I have thought of the Indic viewpoint, but I try to avoid bringing in such discussions here, as those with severly limited understanding of Indic philosophies could try to trash up such discussions as "religious ones". My experience from political polemics says that such aggressive debates usually hide personal power dynamics and ultimately lead to unncessary bitterness, and is practically useless. I hope you will forgive me. :)

Arthasastra (sorry! to refer to it again) has some indications that peripheral powers and identities were recognized as layers that can be incorporated. Although perhaps the question of identity does not appear there - more a characterization of imperialist expansion perhaps. But, the principles behind "raajaniti" as propounded is based on "values" and preservation or extension or establishment of such "values" to ever extending populations.
If Indic point of view is not discussed in BR where else can it be discussed. It has to be encouraged here.
BR has come a long way when at one time talking about Islam was considered big mistake. It was OK to talk against Indic and considered secular.
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