Bharat Rakshak

suryag wrote:Sad we couldnt assimilate Chitral/Hunza during the '48 war

Paul wrote:....He died in Beirut. Unsung and forgotten even in East Pakistan.

In 1984, the MQM was born as an umbrella organisation for the political expression of the Mohajirs grievances. The MQM which was largely a student movement emerged as a major political force to reckon with, and by 1988, it was the third largest political party in Pakistan with such a short political history. For the MQM, ethnic identity took priority over religious identity. The Mohajirs were convinced that their ethnic identity would bring them more political benefits than any amalgamation of identities. Moreover, the rise of Sindhi nationalism had questioned the political prudence and efficacy of a Sindhi political identity encompassing all ethno-linguistic groups, other than exclusive Sindhi-speaking community. Because rise of Sindhi nationalism frustrated all attempts to have a converging Sindh identity on the basis of a geography than any ethno-cultural diacritics. All this brought about a radical change in the Mohajirs political orientation. They had been supporters of a strong authoritarian government at the centre and often aligned themselves with the fundamentalist party which emphasised religious identity rather than ethnic identity. Now the Islamic affinity was underplayed and new parameters for political mobilisation was constructed. Thus, they dismissed their previously held emphasis on religion by saying, "We have not signed a contract to uphold Pakistan and Islam."

Altaf Hussain, while criticising the 1981 census, said, "We are at least 45-50 per cent in Sindh but they put us at 22.6 per cent. Karachi's population is 10 per cent of the country's total and produces 63 per cent of federal revenue, yet it gets only a 2 per cent quota of jobs and facilities. Anyone for a small bribe can get proof of domicile and compete for jobs, whereas Mohajirs have no place to go."29 Referring to the grievances of the Mohajirs, he said "When a Sindhi comes to power, the Sindhis fight us; when a Pathan comes to power, the Pathans fights us. Will whoever come to power always victimise us?"30 This perception of victimization made the MQM more militant in their activities. In their political struggle, the Biharis provided a new cadre of young activists ready to display their combat skills which they had acquired during their exposure to military activities in the former East Bengal in 1971.

The MQM cashed on its tremendous street power. It has a large following amongst the youth and educated classes and the largest urban following (given its political base) compared to any other party in Pakistan. It is surprising that a party whose leader is in London on a self-imposed exile has such a larger following and has emerged as one of the most charismatic leaders with tremendous mobilising capacity. However, it is perceived as a party which does not have a broad based ideology to include other groups within its fold, the reason being its demand for a separate province that includes the urban areas of Sindh otherwise to be known as Jinnahpur. In the absence of a broad based support it cannot fulfill its objectives. "The MQM is caught between a rock and a hard place: without cooperation or alliance with other ethnic groups, it can make little headway in the national politics; to have this alliance, it must moderate its stance...the fate of Mohajir separatism will be decided by the ability of the State of manipulate the political process, the attitude of other ethnic groups towards Mohajir nationalism and, above all, by the capacity of the Mohajir community to eschew its sense of self-righteousness." Any dilution in Mohajir stand will affect its electoral prospect and challenge its status as indisputed leaders of Mohajirs.

Mukesh.Kumar wrote:Think in context of the discussion this maybe an interesting read. Mods please remove elsewhere if felt necessary.

Why My Father Hated India

The reversal in the fortunes of the two countries—India's sudden prosperity and cultural power, seen next to the calamity of Muhammad Iqbal's unrealized utopia—is what explains the bitterness of my father's tweet just days before he died. It captures the rage of being forced to reject a culture of which you feel effortlessly a part—a culture that Pakistanis, via Bollywood, experience daily in their homes.

This rage is what makes it impossible to reduce Pakistan's obsession with India to matters of security or a land dispute in Kashmir.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=67094&Cat=9

It was a day that changed the world. Pakistan was deeply affected by the event that took place 10 years ago today. Many in Pakistan believe that we might have been better off if we had not complied with the United Nations resolutions. I am afraid these critics have little or no knowledge of history and on ground facts as they existed then. It may be instructive to revisit the events and the rationale behind our decision to comply with UN resolutions passed in the wake of that most traumatic event.

On another fateful day, nearly two years earlier, my military secretary had whispered into my ear that the pilot of my flight wanted me in the cockpit; that information had led to the hijacking crisis. On this day too, he came up to me during an important meeting with the Karachi corps commander and whispered that an aircraft had crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. As we watched in horror the second plane crashing into the second tower, I knew that the world as we knew it would change and I mentally braced myself for what I knew would be a make-or-break period in our history.

Smoke from the burning aircraft fuel and the dust and debris from the largest building in the world made the scene look like a nuclear explosion. A multitude of thoughts raced through my mind. The world’s most powerful country had been attacked on its own soil, with its own aircraft used as missiles. This was a great tragedy and a great blow to the ego of the superpower. America was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear. If the perpetrator turned out to be Al-Qaeda, then that wounded bear would come charging straight at us.

Sure enough, the next morning the call came. My friend Gen Colin Powell was absolutely candid: “You are either with us or against us.” This was a blatant ultimatum. But forewarned is forearmed, and I was ready for this important call. Contrary to some published reports, that conversation did not go into specifics. I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism, having suffered from it for years, and would fight along with his country against it. I had time to think through exactly what might happen next. It was also communicated to me that “if Pakistan was against the United States then it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”

I would also like to clear the notion that we accepted all the demands put forward by the US. We did not.

I analysed the situation and took stock of the potential realities. I made a dispassionate analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons. My complete focus was on ensuring that Pakistan was not at the wrong end of a long and bloody reprisal, and to try and steer it through that most turbulent period with as little damage as possible. I also wanted to do the right thing.

What options did the US have to attack Afghanistan? It wasn’t possible from the north, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Nor from the west, through Iran. The only viable direction was from the east, through Pakistan. If we did not agree, India was ready to afford all support.

A US-India nexus would obviously have to trample Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. Our airspace and land would have been violated. Should we then have pitched our forces, especially the Pakistan Air Force, against the combined might of the US and Indian forces? India would have been delighted with such a response from us. This would surely have been a foolhardy, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests – our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause – would have been irreparably compromised. Indeed, we might have put our very territorial integrity at risk.

The economic consequences of confronting the United States and the entire West would also have been devastating. Pakistan’s major exports and imports and investments are linked to the United States and the European Union. Our textiles – 60 percent of our export earnings – go to the West. Any sanction on these would have crippled our industry and choked our economy.

China, our great friend, also has serious apprehensions about Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The upsurge of religious extremism emboldening the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in China is due to events in Afghanistan and the tribal agencies of Pakistan. China would certainly not be too happy if Pakistan sided with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Even the Islamic Ummah had no sympathy for the Taliban regime. Turkey and Iran were certainly against the Taliban. The UAE and Saudi Arabia – the only two countries other than Pakistan that had recognised the Taliban regime – had become so disenchanted with the Taliban that they had closed their missions in Kabul.

This is how I analysed the losses and harms we would suffer if we took an anti-US stand. At the same time, I was obviously not unmindful of the socio-economic and military gains that would accrue to my country from an alliance with the West.

On Sept 13, 2001, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, brought me a set of seven demands. These demands had also been communicated to our foreign office.

1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.

2. Provide the United States with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.

3. Provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence as needed and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbour them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on borders.

4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases and internal security information to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, and its friends and allies.

5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of Sept 11 and any other terrorist acts against the United States and its friends and allies and curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends and its allies.

6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.

7. Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbour him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist the United States in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.

Some of these demands, such as “curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends, and its allies,” were ludicrous. How could my government suppress public debate when I had been trying to encourage freedom of expression?

I also thought that asking us to break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was neither realistic nor in our interest. The United States too would need us to have access to Afghanistan, at least till the Taliban fell. Also, such decisions are the internal affair of a country and cannot be dictated by anyone. We had no problem with curbing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. In fact, we had been itching to do so even before the United States became its victim.

Thus, we had problems only with demands two and three. How could we allow the United States “blanket overflight and landing rights” without jeopardising our strategic assets? I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from all sensitive areas. Neither could we give the United States “use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.” We refused to give any naval port or fighter-aircraft bases. We allowed the United States only two bases – Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh – and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no “blanket permission” for anything.

The rest of the demands we could live with.

I took it to the cabinet. I met with a cross-section of society. Between Sept 18 and Oct 3, I met intellectuals, top editors, leading columnists, academics, tribal chiefs, students and labour union leaders. I also met with a delegation from China and discussed the decision with them. Then I went to army garrisons all over the country and talked to the soldiers. I thus developed a broad consensus on my decision.

I am happy that the US government accepted our counter-proposal without any fuss. I am shocked at the aspersion being cast on me: that I readily accepted all preconditions of the United States during the telephone call from Colin Powell.

I have laid down the rationale of my decision in all its details. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not regret it. It was the correct decision and very much in the interest of Pakistan.

As head of state, I faced many challenges and had to take many difficult decisions. This was easily the most difficult one. I am convinced that it was the right decision and I am confident the majority of my countrymen also think so. I can say, hand on heart, that in all matters I always kept the interest of Pakistan above all else. My motto is, has been, and, Inshallah, always will be “Pakistan First.”

The writer is a former chief of the army staff and president of Pakistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/249469/fighting-other-peoples-wars/

After 11 years of war and having caught and killed Osama bin Laden, the US seems willing to withdraw from the region. Yet again, Pakistan will be left with a large number of ‘strategic assets’ that have by now solidified their ideological perspective. But the post-1980s world was markedly different from the post-9/11 war decade. In the 1990s, there was still greater patience, with non-state actors re-engaging at different fronts, which they did, especially in Kashmir and Central Asia, mainly because the Zia regime wanted to forcibly shape up Afghanistan’s future to meet its requirements.

The situation is different today. We have China that is gradually replacing the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a major benefactor and investor. Its concerns with security in Southern China and security of its interests elsewhere will probably require that non-state actors be leashed well and proper. Thus far, Pakistan’s security establishment claims that it has no capacity to control splinter groups. This is an argument which even foreign scholars such as Stephen Tankel are encouraged to make. If the splinter groups are a reality then the state of Pakistan may be confronted with yet another situation on fighting someone else’s {China's} war on its territory. And if it can actually exercise better control then this is the time the government chalks out an extensive and serious plan to de-radicalise and demobilise these religious combatants. For Pakistan, this is the time to make choices.

But both groups feel trapped: Afghanistan is still caught up in war, and my country is on the brink of meltdown. And so now there is something beyond just disliking America. We have begun to ask the question of 9/11 in reverse: why do Americans hate us so much ?

Ten years is a long time to be at war, and to be faced with a daily threat of terrorist attacks. It is a long time spent in an unequal alliance in which the battle gets only more arduous and divisive, especially for the weaker partner on whose soil the battle is playing out. Under such long strain, resentments about intrusions, miscalculations and feckless performance make a leap to an assumption: that Americans must hate Pakistanis because they would otherwise never treat them so carelessly, speak so badly of them, or distrust them so much.

Americans should not be particularly surprised by this. War diminishes everyone and all states, even the victors, and that is especially true if the war is characterized by broken promises and dashed hopes, perceptions of betrayal, and disappointment in an ally. For the people living in this theater of war, the litany of such disappointments is long.

Throughout the war, it has feared that the United States was treating India as the real ally, so it maintained the extremists it had trained in the 1990s to fight its larger neighbor. But nothing stands still, and the military lost control as the extremists morphed into the Pakistani Taliban and began focusing on the state itself.

Pakistan, which is now the fourth largest nuclear armed state in the world, has been gravely destabilized by its involvement in wars in Afghanistan. This, at least, did not begin 10 years ago. It has spanned three decades. The 1980s war against the Soviet Union was fueled by C.I.A. operatives, Saudi money and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Kalashnikovs, drugs, madrasas and sectarian divisions proliferated then, while Pakistan was ruled by an American-backed military dictatorship. Since Sept. 11, Pakistan has again been destabilized by the insurgency in Afghanistan, and for most of that time it was again being ruled by an American-backed military dictatorship.

RajeshA wrote: Published on Sep 10, 2011
By Ahmed Rashid
And Hate Begat Hate: NYTimes
. . ., while Pakistan was ruled by an American-backed military dictatorship. Since Sept. 11, Pakistan has again been destabilized by the insurgency in Afghanistan, and for most of that time it was again being ruled by an American-backed military dictatorship.

THOUGHTFUL TRAVELLER IN A DANGEROUS COUNTRY
This is the concluding part of a review essay of Anatol Lieven’s Pakistan: A Hard Country (Penguin, £ 19.60) by Ayesha Jalal


Taliban commanders at a surrender ceremony


The need for a more balanced historical perspective is most felt when it comes to the arguably controversial take on the military, which in Anatol Lieven’s view is “the only element of a great society that has ever existed in Pakistan”. Unlike other kinship networks, the military is the one modern institution that is immune to the narrow calculations of clan. Although recruited from a handful of districts in Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the unrepresentative character of the mainly Punjabi army has been a red rag for non-Punjabi provinces during periods of military rule. The breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971 was a direct consequence of more than a decade of controlled politics under military authoritarianism. Dubbing the union of the two wings “as a malign influence on Pakistan’s development”, Lieven thinks the separation of Bangladesh was “inevitable”. This dispenses with the need for an explanation of the greatest blot on the Pakistani national conscience: a bloody civil war in which Muslim killed Muslim followed by military defeat at the hands of India and the added blow of losing the eastern wing despite the much touted bond of Islam. Lieven concedes that the “revolting campaign” in East Pakistan from March to mid-December 1971 was “the most terrible blot on the entire record of the Pakistani army”. However, he rules out the possibility of this ever happening again on the grounds that the military crackdown and its associated violence was due to Punjabi and Pathan racial contempt for Bengalis, who were considered to be “crypto Hindus” and not true Pakistanis. The Pakistani military’s approach to Baluchistan, where India is accused of fomenting a nationalist struggle for independence, is reminiscent of its attitude towards East Pakistan. Missing the similarities, and for once dropping the ubiquitous shadow of kinship, Lieven thinks Pervez Musharraf’s and the army’s antipathy to Akbar Bugti, who was killed in a military operation in August 2006, was owing to “class and culture”.

This leavening approach towards the much criticized role of the military in politics makes for a contrast to Lieven’s generally low opinion of Pakistan’s kinship based politics. Making light of the military’s drain on the State’s meagre resources, he considers the perks given to them as “necessary and admirable” since they aim at bolstering morale among its members who are hugely outnumbered by their Indian counterparts. He plays down criticism of the military’s role in the political economy, arguing that, contrary to the general impression, the large industrial complex maintained by the welfare trusts set up for each of the three armed services do pay their taxes. He does not say how much. In a further pat on the military’s back, Lieven lauds their collective spirit which ensures that resources generated by the welfare trusts are not tucked away in foreign bank accounts, as is the case with civilian politicians, but used for the benefit of the armed forces. More remarkably, he thinks it unfair to attribute the prominent role of ex-servicemen in Pakistani society to State patronage as, in his view, military personnel are better disciplined and honest.

If setting the military apart in a glass case from the rest of society is questionable, Lieven’s understanding of its historical role in Pakistan is open to question. Historical scholarship has explicated the reasons and consequences of military dominance in Pakistan, linking it to the structural implications of colonialism’s divided legacy in the subcontinent. In the context of the Cold War and tensions with India over Kashmir, senior military and civil officials manoeuvred Pakistan into joining American-backed security alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. The Pakistani objective to use American military aid to raise a shield of defence against India was a stretch removed from Washington’s interest in the containment of communism. Whatever the advantages accruing to Pakistani militarily, the pacts placed enormous strains on political parties who had to contend with the anti-imperialism of their constituents at a time of intense nationalist ferment in Iran, Egypt and Iraq. The assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in October 1951, was a blow to an incipient democratic process. Together with the lack of an effective political party system, the diversion of scarce resources into defence in the name of Kashmir alienated the non-Punjabi regions, especially the Bengali majority in the eastern wing.

The success of the Pakistani military has been achieved at considerable cost to other institutions of the states. The disaffections they have stirred in the non-Punjabi provinces have been put down with an iron hand. Several failed experiments in democracy followed the first military takeover in 1958. The infirmities of civilian institutions, most notably parliament, are a direct product of extended periods of military rule. Kinship ties reveal an aspect of the complex matrix of Pakistani politics. But there is more to the story. An up-close and personal examination of kinship structures in the different parts of the country, Lieven’s perspective is fine in so far as it provides insights into political culture. He shows the difficulties politicians face in competing for control of the state’s resources that they need to extend patronage to their constituents. He does not probe why politicians have done precious little to try and formalize political party structures. If part of the answer, as Lieven will have us believe, lies in the conveniences of kinship-driven patronage outside the pale of the law, much more has to do with the denial of democracy under military and quasi-military dictatorship.

Without denying the rapacity of Pakistani politicians, their kleptocratic instincts or unconscionable disregard for any rule of law other than their own, the negative consequences of repeated interventions by the military on political institution building cannot be over emphasized. The travesty made of law in Pakistan is a weighty theme, which is meaningless without reference to the military takeovers, their justification by the judiciary under the law of necessity in which any successful coup was deemed to be legitimate. Legal arbitrariness has been the bane of Pakistan with withering consequences for the rights of citizenship. Yet even a supine judiciary has been the last resort for victims of injustice at the hands of fellow kinsmen as well officials of the State who, according to Lieven, act and kill “on their own account”. Law in Pakistan, he quips, is akin to the Pathan saying that the bird belongs to the man who seizes it.

The lawyers’ movement for the reinstatement of the chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, whom General Pervez Musharraf removed unceremoniously from office in March 2007, had raised hopes of moves to uphold the supremacy of the law. Lieven is sceptical about the historical significance of the lawyers’ movement. Conservative and liberal lawyers he encountered demonstrated “a contempt for logic, rationality and basic rules of evidence much like the rest of the population”. Under the circumstances, any attempt to reform Pakistan along radically Western lines would “require most of the population to send itself to gaol”. The culture of corruption forms such an intrinsic part of the family and clan-based patronage system that party loyalties are a kind of “medieval allegiance”. Though the lawyers’ movement did not live up to expectations, it was a moment in history shaped by modern associational politics and not kinship. The failure of the lawyers’ movement to retain unity following the return of Chaudhry to office in March, 2009 has less to do with Pakistan’s kinship structures than with the infirmities of both civil and political society in a military authoritarian state.

Does a reprieve await Pakistan? In the final and most impressive part of his book dealing with the Taliban insurgency, Lieven issues a sobering warning to the world. Western governments and Western media may think they are promoting democracy, when in fact they have forced governments in Islamabad to support a “war against terror” that the majority of Pakistanis loathe. This has been the crux of the dilemma for Pakistan since September 2001. His analysis of the Taliban is spot on. Having displaced the tribal notables succoured by the post-colonial Pakistani State, the Taliban, like Max Weber’s “rational bandits”, are taxing the people and laying the original basis of the State. Far from harbouring ambitions of capturing State power, the Pakistani Taliban have been resisting the Pakistan army’s invasion of their territory since 2004. Talibans are not terrorists, Lieven insists, but are using suicide attacks to extend the defensive war into the rest of Pakistan. The Taliban can pose a serious threat to the State only if an American military operation on Pakistani soil, with or without Indian collusion, splits the army down the middle. Mindful of the strains within the military and their critical bearing on Pakistan and the region as a whole, Lieven favours an early end of the American presence in Afghanistan, correctly identifying it as one of the primary reasons for heightened instability in Pakistan.

Barring an aversion to acknowledging change, and a tendency to reaffirm the stereotypes of colonial gazetteers and suppositions of “feudals” he rubbed shoulders with during boar hunts, Lieven must be commended for writing a readable account of the “most dangerous country” in the world. A long-time traveller to Pakistan where he has made many friends and for which he has developed a genuine intellectual interest, he relates the story of its grim internal challenges, its awkward international posturing and conspiracy-driven discourse on national identity and security concerns with passion and humour. The contemporary focus has its limitations. His estimation of Pakistan as a society that is asleep, and whose only dynamism is its downward spiral, is only marginally better than the doomsday chorus on the ‘failed state’. Pakistan needs correction, but this will have to happen from within, not by chanting Western mantras on democracy or crying wolf while the lambs are up for slaughter.

Lieven has done much to clear the air for a major reassessment of Pakistan. More still needs to be done before the wider international community can really assist Pakistan find its own way through the morass of its fears and self-delusions so that it can play its part as a responsible member of the international community. The obsessive dimensions of Pakistan’s India-centric security paradigm are in need of review. So is the three-decades-old policy of meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs to prevent a pro-Indian government in Kabul, thereby facing hostilities on its eastern and western fronts.

Change in Pakistan may be mercilessly slow, but it is in the making. There has been a rising tempo of criticisms of the military institution, most significantly by the former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in the wake of the American raid on Osama’s hideout in Abbottabad. The audacious attack on a high security naval base in Karachi, and the alleged torture and murder by ISI operatives of an independent journalist, Syed Shahzad Saleem, who had identified al Qaida links with senior naval officers while investigating the story, has provoked public anger against both the army and the ISI. Whether Pakistanis can use the opening to move a step closer to restoring a much-needed balance in civil-military relations will go a long way in determining their ability to cope with the grave political, economic and ecological challenges they are facing. There is enough dynamism still left in Pakistan to turn the tide. But for that dynamism to surface and be felt, Pakistan needs extended periods of elected and accountable civilian governments. Policy makers in Washington and their Nato allies must avoid the temptation of letting short-term military gains cloud the long-term political imperative of ensuring a stable and prosperous Pakistan. Lieven’s book is mandatory reading for anyone thinking otherwise.

http://pakteahouse.net/2011/09/19/teaching-students-about-ranjeet-or-bhagat-singh-would-not-harm-pakistan%e2%80%99/comment-page-2/#comment-68332

Casual Observer wrote:If the proponents of the Pakistan Movement want to look for serious pain they only need to take off their rose colored glasses and take a good look around; there is still plenty of pain among the Muslims to go around; most of it is still out there.
For example:

1. They should explain to the Muslims of East Bengal why, when and where did the movement for the homeland for the Muslims of India morph into an ‘Empire of the Indus Man’?

2. Next it should explain to the remaining Indian Muslims and their progeny why the doors of the Promised Land for Indian Muslims were slammed shut on the rest of them soon after ?

3. Next it should explain to the million plus ‘Biharis’ trapped inside Bangladesh as to what was their fault that they become stateless twice in a single life time. Where is their homeland? Why Pakistan still refuses to accept them back?

4. Then it should explain to the Ahmediyas within Pakistan why their legal status is today worse in a free Pakistan than it ever was in a British ruled or in a Hindu run India?

Only after taking into account for all of the above questions can one deliberate whether the proponents of the Pakistan Movement were the heroes for a majority of the Muslims of United India. …. or the villains who duped and then ditched them once their personal ambitions were realized……

Prem wrote:Did some one answer him or Poakers used the usual Mushaffresque sink hole escape route?

World powers continue to come to Pakistan, focus on it, help it, abuse it, and betray it (we Pakistanis are very fond of being betrayed, because we ourselves do not hesitate to betray). As defined by Paul Kennedy, Robert Case and Emily Hill in The Pivotal States: Policy in Developing World, Pakistan is among the world’s nine “pivotal countries”. Mike Mullen, while parting, told his successor “to remember the importance of Pakistan. …There is no solution in the region without Pakistan”. This affirmation of Pakistan’s importance makes some people very jealous.

Inside the Pakistan Army
Author: Carey Schofield

Publisher: Pentagon Security International,

Price: Rs 695

Carey Schofield not only talks about the army's constant meddling with Pakistani politics but also its Islamisation drive under Gen Zia-ul-Haq, writes Anil Bhat

The Pakistan Army has been going through a bad phase. First came the WikiLeaks exposé on its links with the Taliban, then the killing of Osama bin Laden, who had holed up for years in the barrack town of Abbottabad near Islamabad. Shortly afterwards, Syed Saleem Shahzad’s book, Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, provided another blow to the Pakistan Army and the ISI; the author, however, had to pay the price with his life. Now, with Carey Schofield’s book, Inside the Pakistan Army, comes the ultimate condemnation for Pakistan’s armed forces and their wily allies.

Schofield thanks Pervez Musharraf and Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, along with other army officers, for their support and encouragement while she was researching for the book. On the first page itself, however, her verdict on the Pakistan Army is scathing. She says that the military has never been entirely trusted by the West, as its role in the “war against terror has been seen to be ambiguous”. She also asks a few questions that observers in India have repeatedly dwelt upon: “Has the army’s notorious ISI continued to support its long-term allies amongst the Taliban, with or without the tacit consent of the head of state? Have elements in the army siphoned off aid given to them by the Americans to support the very forces it was supposed to be used to suppress? How strenuous or even sincere has the army ever been in its attempts to round up Taliban fighters fleeing from NATO forces across its borders? To what extent has every element in the military machine been under the control of the head of the state?”

Schofield’s conclusions are reinforced by Ralph Peters, a retired US army officer who had worked briefly with the Pakistan Army and intelligence leadership in the mid-1990s. His military report, which “nobody in Washington cared” about, reads: “Your (America’s) tax dollars are being used to help kill and maim our soldiers, marines and navy corpsmen fighting in Afghanistan... Over the past 10 years, we’ve given the Pakistanis — primarily their military — over $20 billion in aid. What did we get in return? Our Pakistani allies hid and protected Osama bin Laden; they increased their support to the Afghan Taliban and their partner, the Haqqani terror network; they sponsored repeated terrorist attacks against India; they provided safe havens for terrorists from a ‘rainbow coalition’ of extremist outfits; and, all the while they purposely whipped up anti-Americanism among the country’s 180 million Muslims. Your tax dollars at work.”

The army has always been one of the biggest threats to Pakistan’s democratic forces, if any. It justified the bloodless coup of Gen Ayub Khan by citing chaos and corruption in the country. The army promised a “sound, solid and strong nation”. Gen Khan began by delivering growth and prosperity, helped primarily by economic assistance from the US and the UK. In 1961, he initiated the process of shifting the nation’s capital from Karachi to Islamabad, about 10 miles from the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister, encouraged the General to adopt an aggressive policy vis-à-vis India. Following moves by the US to supply arms to India during its 1962 war with China, Bhutto also instigated a change in foreign policy which until then had been entirely pro-West/US; he saw China as a potential ally to strengthen Pakistan’s position in the region. In 1963, this shift culminated in the Sino-Pakistan Agreement, by which China ceded 750 sq miles of land to Pakistan which, in turn, acknowledged Beijing’s sovereignty over a large part of Pakistan-occupied northern Kashmir.

For the Pakistan Army, India has been a perennial threat. It constantly reminds the countrymen of Delhi’s alleged perfidy on the Kashmir issue. During its initial years, the army primarily comprised of sons of landed families and successful professionals, with almost all prominent families having someone in the forces. Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation drive, however, changed that trend, bringing in both officers and jawans from less affluent and more religious backgrounds. Having lost out to India in three conventional wars since 1947 — the third of which severed off erstwhile East Pakistan — Gen Zia’s Islamisation programme gave the India-Pakistan rivalry a religious colour.

Schofield, however, commits a mistake when she states that President Musharraf awarded the Sitara-e-Pakistan posthumously in 1994 to William Brown (for raising the flag of Pakistan in Gilgit in 1947 — considered an act of treason against his own King). This is a wrong information as in 1994, Musharraf was neither the army chief, nor the President; he was a Lt General heading military operations. Barring this error, the author has authoritatively written about the army’s internal bickerings and intrigues. She quotes several senior military officers. “Recurrent confrontation and collusion with politicians have blackened the army’s reputation and has, arguably, hampered its military effectiveness,” said one of them.

For those concerned with Pakistan, this is a must-read book. In fact, it would be worthwhile to have it translated into other languages.

The reviewer, a Delhi-based defence expert, is Editor of WordSword Features & Media

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Earlier this year, you made the statement that no one can save Pakistan except Pakistan itself. What do you think Pakistan will look like in ten years, considering the coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan, the aims of the Taliban, fractures within Pakistan right now, and the aims of China?

I admire your researching ability that you have fished this out of the maze of posts on the forum. I had forgotten that I did say that Pakistanis alone can save Pakistan.

Pakistan is an enigma. It is a maze of unresolved, self-created contradictions. While it wants to be a modern democratic and thriving country, it also wants to be an Islamic country in its true sense. I presume that is a rather difficult situation to resolve to full satisfaction either way!

Pakistan inherited the instruments of a democracy on Partition and should have been a success story. However, while Jinnah claimed in his 11 Aug 1947 address to the Constituent Assembly that Pakistan would be a secular country, it almost simultaneously embraced Islam as supreme, and which anyway, was its raison d’être! Therefore, the Qaid (Jinnah) contradicted himself, where he spoke of secular aspirations and yet he had fought for the creation of Pakistan to free the Indian Muslim from the domination of the Indian Hindu.

That apart, sub-nationalities also came into play. The land (Pakistan) belonged to the West Pakistanis who were the "sons of the soil" and yet, unlike the West Pakistanis who were the feudal lords, jagirdars (large land holders who had been given this as rewards for loyal service to the Raj, mostly military men), military men (this was the recruiting zone for Muslims of the British Indian Army) and a large mass of illiterate and bonded peasants, the Mohajirs (refugees from India) were the educated elite, well versed in government administration, judiciary, commerce and so on. It was but natural that the instruments of governance to include judiciary and commerce were taken over by the Mohajir and they became the natural "heirs" to Pakistan. Obviously, it did not endear the Mohajir to the "sons of the soil"! However, in the euphoria of having got their "Land of the Pure", it did not have public manifestation, even though it simmered below the surface.

The Mohajir were equally uncomfortable, they had no roots to the land, being basically usurpers! They had to create an identity for themselves that would make them acceptable. They used Islam (which no Muslim could dare contest) as the foundation and imposed their language, Urdu, as the national language. Thus, they became the de facto ruling class of the newly created Pakistan, the sons of the soil coming a poor second!

Kashmir came as manna to the sons of the soil who were the backbone of the Pakistan Army. It helped the Army to showcase themselves as the sword arm and champion of Islam, and muscled back into reckoning. Ever since, they have ensured that the Army is made the paramount shareholder in Pakistani politics and governance.

The extent the Army has taken over the reins of governance has been illustrated in Musharraf’s book In the Line of Fire. ISI, in addition, has become a major player ever since Zia’s foray into Afghanistan and which is so evident till date.

Democracy has lost its sheen in Pakistan due to the rampant corruption signaturing every single Pakistani government, and this has given ipso facto the military the right to remove governments and install themselves without any protest from the citizenry. This is the rationale for the see-saw in government formation that is seen in Pakistani governance between the elected government and the military.

To add to the murky milieu of the Pakistani governance, thanks to Zia, who promoted Islam as the panacea of all ills, as also to give legitimacy to his illegitimate government, the fundamentalist terrorists have found a chord and acceptability with the Pakistani populace in the misconceived belief that Islam shall reign supreme. One cannot fault them, especially the unlettered ones, since it is instilled in their psychology that Islam is uber alles being the true religion, and a Muslim is the purest form of human existence in all aspects.

Therefore, until Pakistan reconciles these contradictions that they have created themselves and adopt a rational mindset, keeping in conformity with the demands of the modern world, none others can help them out.

ramana wrote:keshav, Shah Walliullah looked up to Shaik Ahmed Sirhindi for inspiration.

While at it look for Jemaluddin Afghani an exile from Ottomon Turkey living in India- Hyderabad and Calcutta. He was the link between the old and new Muslim.

Wiki on Jamal al Din al Afghani

With picture and all that

Jhujar wrote:India should publicly declare that in case of dispute with Pakjab , water will be dlivered to Sindh directly via canal/s. This will strengthen the spirit of Khappe Sindh , Jiye Sindh , Muhajirs etc.

Jhujar wrote:India should publicly declare that in case of dispute with Pakjab , water will be dlivered to Sindh directly via canal/s. This will strengthen the spirit of Khappe Sindh , Jiye Sindh , Muhajirs etc.

shiv wrote:

Jhujar wrote:India should publicly declare that in case of dispute with Pakjab , water will be dlivered to Sindh directly via canal/s. This will strengthen the spirit of Khappe Sindh , Jiye Sindh , Muhajirs etc.

That is a very TFTA statement to make. But how can it be done? A hydrologist or geologist will ROTFL at the idea and we will have to hope that Pakistan has no such folks.

ManuT wrote:Ubiquitous Pakistan

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi
....
Mullen, while parting, told his successor “to remember the importance of Pakistan. …There is no solution in the region without Pakistan”. This affirmation of Pakistan’s importance makes some people very jealous.

http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/27/ubiquitous-pakistan.html

ManuT wrote:Ubiquitous Pakistan

Muhammad Ali Siddiqi
....
Mullen, while parting, told his successor “to remember the importance of Pakistan. …There is no solution in the region without Pakistan”. This affirmation of Pakistan’s importance makes some people very jealous.
http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/27/ubiquitous-pakistan.html

shiv wrote:

Jhujar wrote:India should publicly declare that in case of dispute with Pakjab , water will be dlivered to Sindh directly via canal/s. This will strengthen the spirit of Khappe Sindh , Jiye Sindh , Muhajirs etc.

That is a very TFTA statement to make. But how can it be done? A hydrologist or geologist will ROTFL at the idea and we will have to hope that Pakistan has no such folks.

Atri wrote:
We have Indira gandhi canal system in place anyways.. that can be used as scaffold to go in sindh. so it is possible "in principle".. It won't be a technically baseless statement to make.. and TFTA nonetheless..

shiv wrote:I mean imagine public works being implemented for "Giving water to Sindh to spite Pakjab". And who would do the Sindh side? Are you serious? Next I guess we would have a BRFite say -Not GoI, give it to Tata or Mahindras".

Good for a laff. No more.

RajeshA wrote: if India were assured that Sindh is going to go its own way, [/b]!

RajeshA wrote:

shiv wrote:I mean imagine public works being implemented for "Giving water to Sindh to spite Pakjab". And who would do the Sindh side? Are you serious? Next I guess we would have a BRFite say -Not GoI, give it to Tata or Mahindras".

Good for a laff. No more.

Sindh is dependent on Pakjab for its water. Through the blackmail of water, the Pakjabis force Sindh to stay within the Pakistani federation.

Were it not for water blackmail, why would the Sindhis want to stay in the union? For Islam! Paaah! Islam has only given them the loss of their lands - Karachi to Mohajirs and Pushtun, and much of the land to the Pakjabi Jernails to build their farmhouses, etc. Moreover much of its revenue is simply sent to Pakjab!

As India becomes better in building infrastructure, extending the IG canal to Sindh and sourcing the water from the Western Rivers can be done, if India were assured that Sindh is going to go its own way, and separate itself from Pakjab!

chetak wrote:Sindh's population is mainly Muslim (91.32%). What part of this is so difficult to understand?

Have we not learned enough from dealing with the religion of peace for so many centuries?

shiv wrote:Chetak this water to Sindh is as harebrained an idea as Aman ki Tamasha. I don't suppose we could use the same language about people with this idea as BRFites use regarding MMS, Mani Shankar Aiyer and Times of India for their support to Aman ki Tamasha.

There are serious drought areas in India that can do with water shifting from one place to another, and this business of giving water to Sindh on the basis of suitable assurances to please 50 million Pakis and win them over is MFN++

RajeshA wrote:

chetak wrote:Sindh's population is mainly Muslim (91.32%). What part of this is so difficult to understand?

Have we not learned enough from dealing with the religion of peace for so many centuries?

Bangladesh separated from Pakistan! Iraq and Iran went to war! Iraq invaded Kuwait! Sudanese butchered Darfurians! Pakistanis are butchering Afghans! What part of this is so difficult to understand!

Religion of Peace may hate Kufr, but that is no reason for Muslims to hold hands all the time! Are you going to sit on your butt forever waiting for the dawn of Dharmic Awakening among the Mohammedans or would you also do something in the meantime? One can't take away the public hate, that is built-in! What one can do is to keep their capacity to do mischief in check and to wean away their elites (from Sindh) with promises of money if it helps us to kill the bigger evil (Pakistan)! If it works, it works! If not, what have you lost?

chetak wrote:Get real, saar.

You are trying to straighten the crooked tail of a dog.

Impossible task and a hare brained scheme

1. if Sind breaks away from Pakistan and
2. if Sind requests India to provide its share of water from the Western Rivers through a Canal passing through India!

RajeshA wrote:

chetak wrote:Get real, saar.

You are trying to straighten the crooked tail of a dog.

Impossible task and a hare brained scheme

What fun is there in real! Real is that India is doing nothing about Pakistan and its terror networks! That is the reality!

So what do I have to do in order to get real? Bring out my towels and whine and wail?! Should we join the therapy group of Anonymous Wailers?