rohiths wrote:Chasma nuclear complex is supposed to be a light water reactor.
To the best of my knowledge one cannot produce weapons grade plutonium in a light water reactor. . . .
I understand that many people claim that successful weapons can be made out of Reactor Grade Pu (containing some amount of Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242 etc) as well, apart from Pu-239, which of course, one would try to maximise.
Opening the reactor pressure vessel of an LWR to remove the fuel rods from it is a rather time consuming process. If the said LWR manages to have frequent equipment-related maintenance shutdowns, then it might provide some excuse and make it more attractive to open the reactor vessel to remove the partially unburnt fuel, containing higher concentration of Pu-239, for reprocessing. This would be all the more desirable if some fuel rods happen to develop weld or other types of failures that lead to escape of fission products from the fuel matrix (U oxide) into the coolant, past the stainless steel or zircaloy sheath. In such a case, removal of the faulty fuel rod would become necessary as otherwise the coolant circuit components may become unacceptably radioactive making maintenance very difficult. Nevertheless, one may have to replace the removed fuel rod with a fresh one containing enriched U (U-235) - is this indigenously available in Pakistan in sufficient numbers?
Of course, as has been pointed out by Gerard Sir above, IAEA safeguards inspections are supposed to preclude such behind the scene activities on the part of an npp operator.