Bharat Rakshak

Wherever there will be both Krishna, the Lord of yoga, or Dharma in the form of the scriptures, and Arjuna with the weapons of duty and protection; there will be everlasting prosperity, victory, happiness, and morality. This is my conviction. (18.78)

Instead of diminishing the movement’s [Deoband] influence, however, the international border that now bisected its sphere of influence may have strengthened the Deobandis. Now new leaders had additional space in which to grow without having to threaten the center’s power. Deobandi madrassas proliferated in the new environment and today, the force of the movement can be seen in the Deobandi madrassas that can be found, not just in India and Pakistan, but also in countries as far away as Europe and North American. An estimated 600 of Britain’s 1,350 mosques are identified as Deobandi mosques according to a London Times report. (The Times, Sep. 7, 2007).


Moreover, many of the Deobandi centers are characterized by the media as “hard-line.” (The Times, Sep. 7, 2007). This is because like the Taliban, many of the Deobandi madrassas have been linked to extremism. “Dirty bomber” Jose Padilla, for example, attended a Deobandi mosque in South Florida where he is said to have learned the interpretation of Islam that would steer him toward Al Qaeda, and land him a 17-year prison sentence for aiding terrorists.
[...]
Adil Siddiqi, the public relations officer, was made available to the researchers. Mr. Siddiqi introduced himself, telling the researchers he has served the school in this capacity, for twenty years now, ever since he retired as an official in the Indian Ministry of Culture and Information. A native of Deoband, Mr. Siddiqi, never attended the madrassa himself though, curiously, his father taught at the school.


He explained that he was educated in the secular system for “economic reasons” – the same reasons he chose to educate his own children – two boys and two girls – in the same state-run secular system as opposed to the Deobandi madrassa. Like his father, he went on to say that he never imposed any religious views on his children. Though he identifies himself as a Deobandi, he never memorized the Koran and any religious education he has is “self-taught.”

In addition, he admitted that his lifestyle is not as pure as the Deobandis who stay at the center. While at the center all forms of entertainment are banned as they are considered to be corrupting. Mr. Siddiqi confessed to watching television at home – “the news,” he said, smiling. Here are excerpts from the researchers’ conversation with Mr. Siddiqi. Kabul Center researchers wanted to find out what the Darul Uloom Deobandi leaders thought about the school’s various connections to terrorism and so they set out from Delhi in November.

Kabul Direct: How are Muslims doing in India?
Adil Siddiqi: In general, Muslims in India are very depressed due to economic problems. They have the problem of educational backwardness. Because of their backwardness, Muslims have not been able to serve the Indian nation very well.
Kabul Direct: How many Muslims are there in India?
Adil Siddiqi: Around 200 million, spread throughout the country.
Kabul Direct: What explains their economic and educational backwardness?

Adil Siddiqi: Muslims in India were originally drawn from the lower castes. They were the people who were exploited by the Brahmins. This is why they converted to Islam. They responded to Islam’s message of equality. Still, they remain weak, economically and educationally.

Kabul Direct: What about the political participation of Muslims in Indian government?
Adil Siddiqi: Indian Muslims take part in all political spheres. But again, because of their weakness in the economic and educational spheres, their political progress is less than it should be.

Kabul Direct: The Bush policies notwithstanding, don’t you think it has been Bin Laden and his harsh and inhuman interpretation of Islam that has most damaged Islam’s image in the world?
Adil Siddiqi: Well, it is claimed that Osama Bin Laden was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks. But where is the evidence? Who has proved this claim that Osama has planned the attacks? This has never been proved.

Kabul Direct: But what about his interpretation of Islam? Do you think he is right in his interpretation of our religion?

Adil Siddiqi: Well, I have to mention one major point. Osama and his organization have misused the word of Jihad, they have applied it in the wrong sense. We oppose what he describes as jihad. We direct our efforts to interpret Jihad according to the present situation, the time and context.


Kabul Direct: So what is [Darul Uloom Deoband’s] interpretation of Jihad?

Adil Siddiqi: Jihad means efforts to make our lives peaceful. [we have ample proof from the Quran and the Hadiths that overwhelming citation of jihad in the core texts is as violent agressive war on the non-Muslim - my addition] This is the true message of Islam throughout the world. This is the real meaning of Jihad. We have to promote Islam. I don’t think it is Jihad to kill, oppress, and attack people.[we can show this on a case by case basis - with at least 24 distinct offensive actions in the Hadiths clearly associated with the founder, sometimes on the flimsy excuse that firishtas have informed him of the supposed intention of tribes who had been friendly or helpful towards him and his party and mount ambushes on unsuspecting settlements or caravans - my addition].

The other major usage of Jihad is that Muslims can defend themselves. In Islam and in Jihad, we can defend ourselves from the attacks of the enemy. All the rights of self-defense are declared in Islam. Only for self-defense are we allowed to fight. Otherwise we are not allowed to wage war. [So here is the cat out of the bag - for there is no clear definition of what constitutes an attack on Islam. Even in the founding days this excuse was apparently used to mount attacks on communities on assumed pretexts of "intended" harm. - my addition]

Kabul Direct: What about suicide attacks in Afghanistan? Are suicide attacks legitimate? Are they right to conduct suicide attacks?
Adil Siddiqi: Well, this is Afghanistan’s matter. We can’t interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or the affairs of other countries.
[..]
Kabul Direct: You don’t think suicide attacks are unIslamic?
Adil Siddiqi: Well, in particular situations, I think they are unIslamic.

The Afghan Insurgency


Kabul Direct: [The Taliban] say they are fighting Jihad [in Afghanistan] with their suicide attacks and murders. They say they are doing these things under the banner of Islam, in accordance with the Hanafi and the Deobandi schools to Afghan citizens. But is what they are doing in Afghanistan, to an Islamic nation with a constitution that states that Islam is the basis of its law, with a government that was elected by Muslim people, really in accordance with the teachings of Deobandism?

Adil Siddiqi: Well what the Taliban claims that is Deobanism dates back to fifty years ago. But since that time, we have brought about many changes to Deoband. Today our approach to any case is based on the current situation and present era. So Deoband cannot be held responsible for the Taliban’s mind set.

Kabul Direct: So are you saying that what the Taliban is doing is anti-Deoband?
Adil Siddiqi: Well, every place has its own problems. We have to analyze the particular context to see what is good and what is bad. Then we can decide about that.

Kabul Direct: What do you think about the terrorism that is currently happening?
Adil Siddiqi: I don’t think there is a unique definition of terrorism in the international level. Terrorism’s roots go back to economic problems. Its causes are local. For example, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has one aspect and terrorism in Afghanistan has another aspect. So everywhere it is defined differently.

Kabul Direct: So what do you say when innocent people are killed under the name of Islam?

Adil Siddiqi: Islam has never been for the killing innocent people. Islam is a religion of peace. We are not even allowed to tease our neighbor, who might be from any religion.

Adil Siddiqi: Hamid Karzai’s government has completely failed in Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: But the constitution of Afghanistan is based on Islam. It is totally believed to be Islamic. In the third article even, it says that Islam is the source of law in Afghanistan, that nothing that is against Islam can be passed as law.
Adil Siddiqi: The United States army is attacking the Taliban. They are acting in self-defense. They don’t have any other way except to defend themselves. And they have the right of self defense.

Kabul direct: But you know that out of some thirty million Afghan citizens, the majority of them support the Afghan government. They see at as the legitimate Islamic government. They have never opposed it. So we have an Islamic constitution, an elected and legitimate government, a government that is supported by the majority of Afghan Muslims. So you do not think that the Taliban’s claims are not true? That the Taliban’s claims are against the will of Afghan population?
Adil Siddiqi: Well, this is the age of democracy. If a majority of people are positive, then they are right. The Taliban are defending their own thoughts.
Kabul Direct: So what do you think about the insurgency which is going on in the name of Jihad in Afghanistan? Is the Taliban’s jihad against the legitimate Afghan government acceptable according to your organization’s view of Jihad?
Adil Siddiqi: You know that the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. Now it is charging its way toward Pakistan. The Bush administration is using Pakistani territory to attack Afghanistan.

Kabul Direct: Well, it is the Taliban who are claiming to be waging Jihad in Afghanistan
Adil Siddiqi: The Taliban are not saying that. They are being compelled to say it and wage Jihad. This is not their basic idea.
Kabul Direct: What do you mean that this not their basic idea?
Kabul Direct: Has the Darul Uloom done anything to dissociate itself from the Darul Uloom madrassas in Pakistan – the ones that are being used by the insurgents?
Adil Siddiqi: We have no links with those seminaries in Pakistan. The Daral Uloom Deoband was opposed to the partition of India from the very beginning. Since Partition in 1947 we have never been in touch with the seminaries that were established there, the seminaries who claim to be following the Deobandi school of thought.

Kabul Direct: But it was reported that Mawlana Fazal Rahman, [the leader of the Pakistan’s hard-line Jamiat Ulema-e Islam] visited your institution recently. Did this not indicate that you have links to one of the leading extremist organizations in Pakistan?
Adil Siddiqi: When he visited India, he did visit the Darul Uloom Deoband, yes. There were no talks of politics, however. That is it.
Kabul Direct: If your relations with the Pakistani seminaries ended in 1947 with the partition of India, why did Mawlana Fazal visit your institution then?
Adil Siddiqi: Before the Partition, the seminaries in what are today’s Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh were in close touch. There was no difference between them. They were all united during that time. They had talks in those days, dialogues. This is the only reason leading scholars from Pakistan – like Mawlana Fazul Rahman – visit India’s Darul Deoband today.


What Mr. Siddiqi told the researchers in November 2008 contradicted what he had told a reporter in May of 2001, as the Darul Uloom was celebrating its 150th anniversary. The century-and-a-half celebrations must have been heightened by the fact that at the time, Deobandis known as the Taliban were in possession of their own state – the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as they called it.
[...]
This then was the context in which Mr. Siddiqi told a reporter months before the 9/11 attacks, that there was little distance between the Darul Uloom Deoband in India and the Taliban madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As he explained the relationship then: “We expect madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan to refer to us when they have any religious doubts.” (Globe and Mail, May 12, 2001).

Saudis Active Again during Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan:

In view of their covert link with the Wahhabi ideology of violent Jihad, Islamist organisations/institutions in India maintained stony silence for a couple of decades over security related threat of Wahhabi sponsored terror war from across the country.

Deoband, a premiere Islamic institution though organised a conference in April 2008 and condemned terrorism, it did not mention the name of any Islamist organisation like Al Qaeda and its terror outfits like Jaishe Mohammad or Lashkar-e -Tayeba which were responsible for their terror acts in the country.

Instead, the speakers criticised the police action against SIMI activists who were accused in terror violence in different parts of the country. Ironically, despite the arrest of many Indian Muslims for their alleged involvement in various terror explosions in the country, no Islamic clergy in India is ready to believe that the arrested Indian Muslims were involved in the terror war against India.

Petro Dollar Influence:

However, various reports suggest that Saudi Arabia with its petro-dollar influence on these Islamic outfits succeeded in making a visible Wahhabi dent among Indian Muslims. In fact some saner sections of Indian Muslims accept that the on going terror war against India has been launched by Wahhabi terror groups. One Mohammad Hamid from Nagpur said, "The terror that is being inflicted in India is not Islamic terror, but Wahhabi terror" (India Today, July 31, 2008).

Similarly, one Shabib Rizvi, a professor at Rizvi College in Mumbai was quoted saying, "From just 28 websites eight years ago, there are over 1000 websites dedicated to spreading Wahhabi ideology" (Ibid.)

Except Ahl-i-Hadith which is a carbon copy of Wahhabism , none of the prominent Islamic institutions and organisations like Deoband , Jamaate Ulemae Hind, Jamaate Islami Hind, Tablique Jamaat and Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) has ever accepted their link with Wahhabism. Therefore, it is difficult to pin pointedly identify the Wahhabi groups in India.

Although, Deobandi Ulema often deny their link with Wahhabism, the ground reality on the huge growth of Deobandi madrasas suggests that without the heavy financial support from oil rich Arab lands such growth was not possible.

Their war cry against Supreme Court verdict in Shahbano case in 1984 which forced the then Congress Government to neutralise the verdict after constitutional amendment was the reflection of Wahhabi influence on Indian Muslims. Deoband has never disclosed its balance sheet including its financial source to the public.

Since the Saudi sponsored charities are the main funding agencies operating in India for propagation of Wahhabism, a natural question would be -t how can Deoband afford to run this vast institution which provides free boarding and lodging to its students without entering into the ideological ring of Wahhabism?
[...]
Deoband related Tabligh Jamaat is another organisation which is known as Wahhabi. "Yusuf Kandhalavi, son and successor of the founder of the Tablighi Jama‘at, Ilyas Kandhalavi, declared, ‘We are staunch Wahhabis’. (SikhSpectrum.com Quarterly Issue No. 19, February 2005). Saudi funded new Tablighi mosques in different parts of India also suggest the penetration of Wahhabism among Indian Muslims who are the followers of this Jamaat.

Taking advantage of the secular democratic constitution of India and vote banking politics of Indian political parties, these Saudi backed radical Muslim bodies are blackmailing the latter and operating in this country from outside the political mainstream without any fear. The seismic shift towards Islamic conservatism as being seen among the Indian Muslims and their increasing dependence on madrasa educated leaders suggest that Wahhabism pushed them towards the Jihadi spirit of political Islam.

1. The Older Islamic Right Political Parties
Jamaati–i Islami (JI)

The Jamaati-i Islami (JI) was formed in 1941 in colonial India and exists today in Pakistani,
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, UK and elsewhere. The JI is based firmly on the
ideology of one of the key founders and thinkers of fundamentalist Islam, Abul a’la Maududi.
Maududi was one of the first modern Islamic Right thinkers to have outlined a theory of the
Islamic State and a theory of modern jihad. He developed an Islamic Right political party based on a hierarchical command structure. Maududi opposed initially the partition of India, but became involved in Pakistani politics following independence. The JI developed numerous wings, including an extremely violent student wing (Islami Jamiat Tulaba, IJT). Associates of the JI were directly implicated in the massive genocide in (what is now) Bangladesh during the war of liberation in 1971, as well as other acts of systematic repression, anti-minority hatred or violence in Pakistan. The JI was instrumental in influencing the ideology of Islamicization during the highly authoritarian and repressive Zia dictatorship. Currently, the JI is part of a political alliance of mostly Islamic Right parties that controls the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan. It also has a jihadi wing which is also part of a broader alliance of jihadi forces operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The Jamaat-e Islami is also highly active in Bangladesh and has a violent youth wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir. In the UK, JI influences are bestrepresented in the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Dawatul Islam, the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), Young Muslims UK (YMUK), Young Muslim Organization UK (YMO), Muslim Educational Trust, Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), London Muslim Centre / East London Mosque, Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Muslim Aid, several mosques, madrassah and various other projects and organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood also has key influence or control over some of the organizations listed above.


Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

The Brotherhood was formed in the late 1920s in Egypt under the influence of Hassan al-
Banna and now exists as a large international movement active in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Algeria, Sudan and other mid-East and north African countries, western and eastern Europe, south-East Asia and elsewhere. The MB, like the JI, has an ideology of the Islamic State, political jihad and political struggle. The MB and its offshoots also have a long history of political violence. It is possible to trace the histories of most contemporary salafi-jihadi groups to the ideological thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood and especially to several of its key figures, including (but not only) Sayyid Qutb. In the UK, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) is the most important MB influence and Islamic Relief is a Muslim Brotherhood influenced charity. MB is also very strongly represented in several organizations listed under JI above.


Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT)

Hizb-ut Tahrir is a political movement based in Europe, the middle-east, Pakistan and Bangladesh, central Asia and elsewhere. Its ideology is based on the political theory of the ‘caliphate’ developed in the 1950s by Taqiuddin an Nabhani, an Islamist ideologue and former MB associate. HT is vigorously opposed in principle to the idea of democracy. In the UK, the HT has presented itself as respectable, though its history in the UK and abroad would suggest otherwise. It is fair to say that HT is committed to struggle for a global Caliphate through political means and ideological struggle, but that offshoot organizations and individuals associated with HT have not necessarily followed this strictly political approach.

2. Sectarian Salafi International Networks

[...]
Wahabbi-Salafism is widespread in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and other gulf
states, Yemen, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and among some key (but small) groups in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and India. Salafi ideology has strong Europe-wide influence, including extensive UK organizational influence, often overlapping with JI / MB organizations. Salafism is mainly (but not exclusively) sponsored by official as well as independent Saudi largesse (especially through the Muslim World League – Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami). Globally, salafism probably represents the views of less than a tenth of all Sunnis (and Wahabbism a tiny fraction of this), and yet it can be the most vocal where it gains a foothold. In the UK, Salafi-Wahabbi groups usually present themselves as ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’, ‘non-violent’ and opposed to terrorism. For a wide variety of political and theological reasons, they can also severely criticise salafi-jihadi groups, but this can also disguise the authoritarian and dogmatic nature of their own beliefs and ideologies.

3. The intersections of JI / MB and Salafi tendencies

In the UK, there can also be considerable overlap in personnel between JI / MB organizations
and the kind of Salafi-Wahabbi organizations and networks represented under 2. The JI and
MB, under independent and official Saudi and gulf patronage, effectively operate under a
division of labour globally regarding their respective spheres of influence. Usually, the JI and
MB act in concert with each other and in a complementary way. Individuals from both also
work together under a single group, as in the case of several UK organizations. It is not at all unusual to find, for example, a JI-controlled ‘centre’, with strong MB representation in its management (as well as some Deobandi representation). The centre may have extensive Saudi funding, employs a Wahabbi-Salafi (inevitably Saudi approved) cleric for mosque or religious functions, runs salafi study circles for young people (a key inculcation strategy), houses a fundraising charity run by the JI or MB, has a youth branch, receives local authority funding and support, and is considered ‘moderate’ and ‘representative’ by the public sector. For example, key individuals involved in the highly authoritarian (Wahabbi) World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, Riyadh, London) may also be involved in the MB, the MCB, the MAB and Similarly, in the example of the East London Mosque / London Muslim Centre, there is a noticeable convergence of JI political ideology and authoritarian forms of salafi theology. It is also possible to speak of a broader political ‘axis’ of organizations comprising JI, MB, Wahabbi-Salafis, Ahl-e Hadith, other right-wing political Deobandi groups, and even the Tablighi Jamaat. On sectarian grounds, Wahabbi-Salafi clerics would oppose each of the other groups as ‘deviates’ or worse; but on practical grounds, wealthy Saudis and others would fund them. So, this JI / MB / Salafi /political Deobandi ‘axis’ may have internal sectarian and theological differences, but collectively has come to represent what is called ‘moderate Islam’ by the UK government. It bears little relation to the religious,ethnic, cultural and secular traditions and practices of the majority of south Asian Muslims in the UK.

Conspiracy Theories in Bangladesh!

Sep 14, 2011

Lily Quaraishi

Conspiracy Theory on the Great 1/11:

It was a well thought-out Zionist plan, carried out directly by Indian government and aided by UK, USA, Israel and EU – the Zionist circle. Probably this is the first major operation India conducted in favor of Awami League without informing Sheikh Hasina beforehand considering the sensitivity of the operation and considering Hasina’s uncontrollable talking-habit. It was not a difficult guess to see BAL to win in 2008 December election, when Hasina was arrested before Khaleda and been hustled to the jail as we all saw on TV. This was the second major misdirection to shape people’s perception.

It is presumed that Hasina did not know that 1/11 was a part of the big game at that time. Likewise, in order to mislead public perception, Khaleda Zia was arrested much later and been honorably (almost) taken to jail, just in the opposite manner of Hasina. These incidents mislead BNP supporters and they perceived 1/11 as a pro BNP coup. There is another tricky gauge to realize that the election was rigged looking at the vote of Jamat. Jamat may not be an ideal political party for Bangladesh (until they clarify and defend their standing during liberation war), but simultaneously it is not normal for Jamat to get only 2 seats in general election due to the demographic change we see in our general population. Hasina’s land slide victory creates suspicion on the voting process while Jamat’s winning number (2 seats only) confirms who were involved rigging the whole election process.

Overall, under the supervision of India, the Zionist circle materialized three major objectives under the cloud of 1/11:

a. To create a pro-Indian alternative leadership in BAL. In order to do that, India wrong footed Amir Hossain Amu, Abdur Razzak, Tofael Ahmed and Shuronjeet, who have more than 60% acceptance among BAL supporters. If Hasina is assassinated by India as a part of plan B, these four leaders will be brought back to the limelight again and they will be utterly grateful to India for reinstating them in party leadership, and will serve the same purpose as Sheikh Hasina did. That’s why one can always wonder why a vindictive person like Hasina did not oust these 4 leaders from BAL, and the answer is, India convinced her not to do that showing reason of unpleasant impact in party unity. But the main reason for India was to maintain a shadow alternative second line of command in BAL.

b. To create a mass hatred against Armed forces of Bangladesh, specially among wealthy people and politicians of the country, and to pave the way for damaging Bangladesh Armed forces for multi purpose reasons i.e. to take revenge of Roumari BSF killing, to form a pro-Indian army leadership by cleansing bright officers from army, and to retain a poor armed force. Having a strong Muslim neighbor with strong armed force sharing 4,096 k.m. border with India isn’t a pleasant situation for Indian government anyway.

c. To ensure BAL forms the next government (2009-2013) in Bangladesh so that India can attempt to destroy pro-Islamic political parties in Bangladesh under the banner of “fighting terrorism” and ensuring “secularism”. It was always a fearful issue for India to have a next door prosperous Islamic country. India did not aid Bangladesh to win the battle against Pakistan in 1971 to become a strong and prosperous Muslim nation in both economically and militarily. India (and whole world too) knew that Bangladesh had to get separated from West Pakistan any way either in 1975, or 1980 on 1990 or whenever due to acute demographic and geographic difference between the then east and west Pakistan. The key reason for India to help Bangladesh get liberated so quickly (within 9 months only) was because Bangladeshis were not intellectually and economically ready to rip the fruit of independence in 1971, and thus it was thought to be easier to dominate Bangladesh government for Indi a’s own benefit. In 2008, 1/11 was plotted by India and Zionist circle to milk Bangladesh for the key following reasons:

i. To construct Tipaimukh dam and other projects alike.

ii. To get hold of Bangladesh’s deep sea Oil Rigs either physically or economically i.e. to gain from the rigs in such a way as if India owns the rigs.

iii. To ensure transit through Bangladesh in order to transport commercial and military goods. It is very important for India to deal with its seven sisters, and this will give India an alibi to strike inside Bangladesh if any of their convoy comes under attack (by Indian themselves, but blame will given to Bangladeshi Islamic or like minded parties).

iv. To ensure Bangladesh can never rise as a strong Muslim nation with dependable allies, so that it can be manipulated economically and politically. Probably India does not want to take Bangladesh as a part of their country because they don’t want 160 million Muslims to join its population, rather they want to make money out of us Bangladeshi economy by any means.

In this 1/11 regime, India just used the image of Fakharuddin Ahmed, General Matin and similar strong national figures to gain credibility from mass population and these national figures were successfully used and fooled (I am giving the benefit of doubts to these people), along with the whole countrymen, all the way from the beginning (1/11) to the end (2008 national election).

Conspiracy Theory on 21 August Grenade Attack on Sheikh Hasina:

This was a classical attempt of adopting desperate measure to tackle desperate situation by both Hasina and Tarek Zia.

a. Hasina won only 62 seats in the parliament in 2001and was fooling around here and there, while BNP was more engaged in corruption and politicizing the administration under the leadership of wicked Tarek Zia. They had no intention or plan to attack on Hasina at this stage, especially after 10 trucks of ammunitions were revealed to the whole world. Those ammunitions were meant to deliver to the separatists of seven sisters of India, under the surveillance of Bangladesh intelligence agencies, a part of top secret national policy to support the enemies of the enemy.

b. However, RAW intercepted the transport inside Bangladesh (see Pinak Ranjan’s controversial speech where he mentioned candidly about how 10 trucks load of ammunitions were revealed) and created confusion among the intelligence agencies. RAW also involved local police, who did know nothing about the shipment, and stopped the transport in good faith. As the part of the plan, RAW notified press (probably through anonymous phone calls, and/or by own inside agents) to spread the news of the arms transport over the country and beyond. The operation of RAW to expose the arms transport was a high risk in nature, and therefore India wanted the BNP government itself to be under pressure with domestic problems so that they can’t find enough time to act against India i.e. by supporting its seven sisters to fight against India. That’s how the plan of staging attack on 21AUG2009 was formulated, which eventually off-guarded BNP and put lot of pressure on the then government.

c. The grenade attack was planned exclusively with Hasina, which was decided to be carried out by trained RAW agents themselves instead of informing other party members, and instead of involving untrained party cadres to carry out the operation.

d. Hasina knew about the Grenade stunt, because she did similar stunts before during Ershad’s regime, but what she did not know was final plan of RAW to make the stunt more realistic and kill some prominent figures by blasting the grenades in closer proximity than Hasina was previously agreed.

e. As a result, Ivy Rahman along with many others died and severely injured during the blast and none was the wiser but RAW. Hasina was surprised seeing the overall affect, but could not complain, and it seems RAW also explained why they did not tell the actual plan to Hasina of attacking in closer proximity. This was because the actual plan could scare Sheikh Hasina and her facial expression along with body gesture could create suspicion among others.

f. BNP came under severe pressure and criticism after the grenade attack, while the activities of Tarek Zia and his gang members also created additional negative image among people of homeland and abroad. Due to media propaganda, general people of Bangladesh became suspicious on BNP, though BNP had no clue about how the 21 August grenade attack was conducted and by whom. Finally, the wrong headed Tarek Zia did what RAW expected him to do. Though he and his party had nothing to with the grenade attack, BNP decided to frame someone in this case to show BNP’s innocence and thus they produced a horse shit name Joj Mia.

g. BNP would have acted more aggressively and would have blamed Hasina herself for staging the drama (like she did before as mentioned in Motiur Rahman Rentu’s Book – “Amar Fashi Chai”), if BNP were really involved. BNP could also implant finger prints of some prominent BAL cadres/criminals on the un-blasted grenades (it is easy to do so using adhesive tapes and taking finger prints on that, and then implanting the print on any object), and arrest that person(s) instead of making up a weak case like Joj Mia. BNP made the mistake by framing Joj mia because they were utterly surprised seeing the attack under their regime and wanted to do something to prove their innocence. If they had planned and executed this attack, BNP’s reaction would have been much more intelligent and offensive while dealing with the issue. If Hasina was the main target, then a long distance sniper rifle and only 1 bullet could serve the purpose. BNP was in power, and it wasn’t difficult for! them to acquire one of these rifles anyway. Moreover, Grenade has always a wide margin of error to destroy a “specific” target and thus it was a wrong weapon BNP to use to kill Hasina.

h. Since Tarek and Babor framed this Joj mia in a hurried manner and without giving much thought, ultimately they might get trapped in to this case, which will be a real amusing event for us to watch. That’s what actually happens when great leader’s son stops learning and starts making friends with low life street boys and tries to handle issues without giving much thought.

Conspiracy Theory on Resignation of State Minister for Home Affairs Tanjim Ahmed Sohel Taj:

All the above mentioned plans required active involvement of Sohel Taj as State Minister of Home Affairs, and Taj realized the way Hasina (under direct supervision of RAW of course) planning to frame Tarek and Babor in 21 August grenade attack case, and he realized the same fate can happen to him in future by another govt.

Moreover, if the case goes wrong, Hasina will not hesitate to make Taj skip goat. Mujib felt jealous about late Tajuddin for his true contribution during the liberation war, and his family was neglected for a long time previously by Hasina’s family. It will not be surprising for Hasina to show her back to Taj to prove her point, and Taj realized the downside risk and decided to leave the job. In addition to that, After Hasina, Sohel Taj’s name will also be uttered with Sheikh Rehana and Joy for the next party head, so it will not be an exaggeration to think about possible backstabbing by Hasina on Sohel Taj when required.

Conspiracy Theory on New Faces in Cabinet:

These new faces are expendable, and perhaps “killable” in worse case scenario i.e. when BAL will get stuck in some thick soup. During acute crisis moment, either Hasina will fire/sack these new faces like Dipu Moni, Nahid or Sahara Khatun etc, or perhaps will kill one or two among the new faces to declare nation wide emergency. Shahara Khatun would be a good choice for killing due to two reasons, first, she is unimpressive by manner, and second, she holds a very important post. It will not be surprising for a government to declare emergency if its home minister dies out of RAW plotted terrorist attack !

Conspiracy Theory on Why Blame India:

The main problem with India is that, it is mostly a non-religious country. When human lacks religious faith, they just turn in to some very cunning and dangerous species. For a Hindu kid of age 10, 11 or 12 year can have some faith on Hindu religion and its idols i.e. elephant, snake, lady monster with long red tongue, monkey etc. As the kid grows up, it becomes clearer that these deities can’t be a god or goddess, nor god/goddess will be spiritually riding those. By the time they realize this truth, they cross 25 years of age and been running after arranging bread and butter for living. This bars them from learning about other religions i.e. Christian, Islam etc. On the other hand, Hindu religious festivals have become a culture of amusement and event for large commercial activities in India. This also bars these grown up youngsters to leave their Hindu religion to avoid social isolation. This give them no choice but to become atheists, who believe in no god from the core! of their hearts. This new belief system lets them realize that they are on their own in this earth and there is no after life and thus they devote their all their passion and energy for earthly gains. This is a general theory, and might not match exactly with individuals, but this is what truth is in broader term. And this is why, Indians always suffer from a sense of in-security that made them ultra efficient in their profession and ultra cunning in their dealings. They don’t believe in life after death and want to consume as much as possible on this earth.

It is unfortunate that so many people are still ignorant of the fact that India has never accepted the concept of the Two-Nation theory which resulted in the break up of India into two separate parts in 1947. It is well known that they employ stooges and quislings in all the countries of the sub-continent promoting the view that the Two Nations theory based on religion was a mistake. This author would agree with that assessment but not in an attempt to distract from India’s own fissiparous and centrifugal forces or in a cheap attempt to break up Pakistan further but to promote a more realistic evaluation and appraisal of India’s conduct to its neighbours which depends largely on the ideological imperatives of an Akhand Bharat.

Two quite extraordinary books revealing the lack of commonality between the two parts of Pakistan and the inherent cultural anomalies within East Pakistan sheds light on why a Two Nation Theory could not be a solution to Jinnah’s fear of Hindu domination. The whole notion of Two Nations based on religion was far too simplistic to begin with:

“If there were two religious ‘nations’ in India, there were many more cultural and linguistic ‘nations’. Certainly what was true of the U.P. Muslims was not so of their co-religionists in eastern India, notwithstanding the fact that they professed the same faith. The dominant culture of the former was based on the Mughal heritage with Urdu as its nucleus, while the latter were integrated more with the local Bengali culture than with any heritage of Muslim rule in India. The former looked upon Kurta and paijama as the proper dress for a Muslim, the latter wore a modest lungi, if not a dhoti like their Hindu neighbors; one looked upon Urdu as the appropriate language of Muslims in India, the latter hardly knew any word of it.”

The events of 1971 had substantially resolved this dichotomy but there still remains good reasons for minorities and Moslems in both Pakistan and Bangladesh to be apprehensive about current trends in India as the Congress Government and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) have taken a more hostile approach towards these countries which has involved creating unrest in Balochistan and violence in the industrial sectors of Bangladesh prior to the 2007 elections. These incidents have been further incited by the constant goading of the BJP and RSS that have taken on distinctly communal overtones which had been the original justification for the Muslim League’s demand for partition in 1947:

“…the growth of extreme Hindu nationalism with symbols repugnant to Muslims caused great uneasiness in their minds. A familiar idiom of nationalist Hindu militancy was the anti-Muslim rhetoric, which traced historically the Hindus fall from grace to the tyranny of the ‘alien’ rule. Muslims were contemptuously referred to as yavanas, melechchas, katchakholas and the like in the nationalist literature and exclusive Hindu symbols introduced as sources of Indian nationalism.”

In the authors opinion, it should not have been a Two-Nation theory but a ‘Several Nation Theory’ that could have been implemented in the 1947 partition program had there been the necessary will and foresight. That this would have been the far better solution to the communal and cultural divisions within India was subsequently shown in the several wars fought with Pakistan, the rise of Hindu fanaticism, the civil war in the Seven Sisters and the Indian governments brazen and obtrusive policy of domination and interference in the entire South Asian region that has been the cause of untold misery for the areas inhabitants.

It is unfortunate that from this perspective Viceroy Louis Mountbatten became so enamored with a unified India (or was it with Nehru’s idea and concept of India that must have been retold to him in their many private conversations together) that he failed to appreciate the autonomous tendencies within India itself, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast region.

Pakistan-based militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are increasingly a threat to China’s core interests: national stability and territorial integrity. In July, Turkestani Islamic Party (TIP) militants trained in FATA launched yet another attack against China with bomb explosions in Kashgar, Xinjiang, ahead of China’s launch of “China-Eurasia Expo” in Urumqi under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). TIP wants Xinjiang to be an independent Islamic state and the China-Eurasia Expo is a centerpiece of China’s Eurasia strategy of developing its western provinces and rebuilding the Silk Road of trade and commerce across the Eurasia heartland (Beijing Review, September 15, 2011; China Daily, September 6, 2011; Xinhua, September 1, 2011). Outraged at Pakistan’s inability to clean up its own backyard, Chinese Communist Party-controlled press was immediate and harsh in decrying this incident (China Daily, August 12, 2011; Xinhua, August 1, 2011). This quickly prompted a scurrying of Pakistani leaders—military intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and President Asif Ali Zardari—to Beijing to mend relations with its patron (Dawn, August 25, 2011; New York Times, August 1, 2011).

In these meetings, China allegedly demanded to set up military bases in FATA or in the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) that borders Xinjiang province (Asia Times, October 26, August 10, 2011). After the bombing, the Chinese government reportedly deployed at least 200,000 security personnel to pursue Uyghur terrorists in the region, more than the 140,000 coalition troops currently in Afghanistan (Asia Times, August 31, 2011). China also is revising its anti-terror law to possibly allow military intervention abroad (Xinhua, October 27, October 24, 2011). One official commentary warned that “If the violent forces in Xinjiang gain ground, China may be forced to directly intervene militarily in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but this is clearly not the situation China would like to see” (Xinhua, September 27, 2011; “China and Pakistan: Evolving Focus on Stability within Continuity,” China Brief, November 30, 2011).
[...]

FATA-Based Militants’ Threat to China’s Core Interests

[...]
Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie spelled out China’s core interests at the IISS 10th Asia Security Summit last June:

“The core interests include anything related to sovereignty, stability and form of government. China is now pursuing socialism. If there is any attempt to reject this path, it will touch upon China’s core interests. Or, if there is any attempt to encourage any part of China to secede, that also touches upon China’s core interests related to our land, sea or air. Then, anything that is related to China’s national economic and social development also touches upon China core interests” (Straits Times, June 6, 2011).

China also fears TIP’s close ties with al-Qaeda in FATA and increasing Chinese “Turkistan-ization” of al Qaeda. Trained by al-Qaeda in FATA, TIP already has claimed a number of attacks in Xinjiang as well as against Chinese economic interests in Pakistan. The extent of TIP militants’ network of terrorist activities in Pakistan was revealed in 2009 when they threatened the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad through a letter to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers. In a video on August 1, 2009, TIP leader Abdul Haq al Turkistani urged Muslims to attack Chinese interests to punish Beijing for what he described as massacres against Uyghur Muslims during their uprising in Xinjiang (Asia Times, August 10, 2011). Abdul Haq had been appointed a member of al-Qaeda’s majlis-e-shura or executive council in 2005, but was subsequently killed in a 2010 U.S. drone strike and succeeded by Abdul Shakoor Turkistani, a Chinese Uyghur well known for his friendly terms with major Taliban groups in Waziristan (Asia Times, October 26, 2011). A few weeks before the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda appointed him as new commander of its Pakistan forces and training camps (Times of India, May 11, 2011). Beijing thus has legitimate fears that Pakistan’s inability to crack down on TIP and al-Qaeda in FATA will undermine China’s hold over Xinjiang and sabotage China’s access to strategic minerals and markets across the Eurasian heartland.

Political Dimensions of the Threat

It was not surprising therefore when Beijing dispatched its elite commando forces, the Snow Leopard, near Pakistan’s borders in the aftermath of the Kashgar bombing and stepped up its “Strike Hard” campaign (China Daily, August 13, 2011). Xinjiang is a strategic region for China. Three times the size of France and one sixth of China’s land area, it share borders with eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. It is rich in energy resources and a key transport corridor for China to access energy and strategic minerals from Central Asia, Caspian region and the Middle East [1].

Instability in Xinjiang is a threat to CCP credibility and legitimacy. Senior CCP officials seem to think that if the government is seen as weak and unable to control Xinjiang, this may encourage separatism in other regions, such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Taiwan and potentially elsewhere. Moreover, the CCP needs continued access to energy and strategic minerals in Central Asia to help feed its voracious economic growth. The SCO is China’s vehicle to project its influence across this pivot of the Eurasia heartland.

In 1996, then-President Jiang Zemin presided over a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that addressed Xinjiang’s stability. In a document called “Document #7,” CCP issued directives to resolve regional issues. Document #7 outlined three main security concerns: (1) outside influence in destabilizing Xinjiang; (2) erosion of state’s authority as religiously-motivated groups challenge authority at the local level; and (3) economic impoverishment in the region as a catalyst for discontent. CCP’s courses of action to address these issues are threefold: (1) resolve problems of foreign influence through multilateral diplomacy with Central Asian republics; (2) crack down on challenges to state authority; and (3) promote economic development to resolve impoverishment [2]. This Document #7 served as the blueprint for China’s ”Develop the West” Silk Road Strategy to stabilize Xinjiang and spur local economic growth.

Economic Dimensions of the Threat

Terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda-trained TIP potentially threaten a core tenet of China’s strategy of stabilizing Xinjiang—as an ‘inseparable part of China”, for resource extraction and as a springboard into Central Eurasia. More than 43 percent of investment allocated by the central government to expand domestic demand was used for projects in western regions (Xinhua, October 16, 2009). Xinjiang is also a vital section of the continental rail route, the Eurasia Land Bridge, which connects China with Europe (Beijing Review, August 11, 2011).

On April 23, 2010, in a meeting held by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, President Hu Jintao stated, “it is a major and urgent task of strategic significance for us to boost the economic and social development of Xinjiang to achieve lasting stability in the region.” According to Wang Ning, an economist with the Academy of Social Sciences in Xinjiang, the development of the region would speed up the political, economic and cultural exchanges between China and Central Asian states and contribute to regional prosperity and stability. To that end, China’s Civil Aviation Administration plans to have six new airports in the region by 2015, bringing the total number to 22. There are also plans for new flight routes to link Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi to Istanbul, Dubai, Samarkand in Uzbekistan, Yekaterinburg in Russia and Tbilisi in Georgia (Xinhua, July 2, 2010).

Kashgar, a key hub near China’s far western border, is emblematic of both Beijing’s outreach and vulnerability. Kashgar is being developed into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and together with Pakistan’s northern provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, this will form the central plank in the emerging architecture for new silk routes. There are ideas to establish a trans-border economic zone on both sides of Pakistan and China by establishing manufacturing hubs, trade houses and clearing houses as well as the use of yuan for cross-border trade settlement (Global Times, September 18, 2011). Since FATA borders Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan and the latest terrorist attack was in Kashgar, collectively the foundational stone of China’s Silk Road development strategy, China would not be able to launch this central plank if FATA militants became a more significant destabilizing force.

Military Dimensions of the Threat
[...]
Xinjiang hosts China’s nuclear test site Lop Nur and elements of the Second Artillery Corps, China’s strategic missile force. Some of the Second Artillery’s vaunted tunnels—the so-called “Underground Great Wall” for hiding missiles and nuclear warheads—also surround Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang and site of the July 2009 riots that killed 200 people and injured almost 2,000 others. Persistent unrest on a national scale has left at least China’s Xinjiang-based nuclear warheads vulnerable, like during the Cultural Revolution (Washington Post, November 29, 2011; People’s Daily, July 6, 2009) [3]. Should such unrest occur again—probably on a scale even more substantial than 1989—these weapons might become vulnerable to seizure by Uighur militant groups.

Implications of Pakistan’s Inability to Neutralize FATA Militants
[...]
Increased PLA Presence in Pakistan

One course of action, as mentioned earlier, is the reported demand for PLA bases in the FATA in addition to its current troop presence in northern Pakistan. When it comes to China’s territorial integrity, China has a history of responding forcefully when its borders are violated or threatened: in 1950 it invaded North Korea; in 1962 it invaded India; in 1979 it invaded Vietnam; and, since the 1990s, it has confronted other claimants in the South China Sea several times. PLA engineers have been assisting in earthquake recovery since last January; however, its not clear how long they will stay or whether the PLA contingent lacks security elements for its protection (India Today, January 4; Financial Times, November 3, 2011; Asia Times, October 26, 2011; Asia Times, August 1, 2011; ).
[...]
The recent fallout between the United States and Pakistan also suggests Pakistani weakness that could spur Beijing to act or pressure Islamabad to boost the Chinese presence in the country. Islamabad’s demands of Washington correspond almost point by point with the Taliban’s list of demands in November as conditions for entering into peace negotiations: Pakistan’s review of its U.S. ties, suspension of NATO supply lines and closure of Shamsi Air Base (Asia Times, December 3, 2011; Long War Journal, November 28, 2011; Associated Press, November 21). This further underscores Pakistan’s weakness in face of militants and could prompt China to pressure Islamabad to support Chinese bases in the FATA or FANA.
[...]
Slowing Future Chinese Investments in Pakistan

Another course of action is further withdrawal and deterrence of future Chinese investments in Pakistan. On November 22, militants targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in a bomb attack in Balochistan. In September, China’s Kingho Group withdrew from a $19 billion coal deal in Balochistan after bombings in Pakistan’s major cities. In November, Pakistan sent a large delegation from Sindh to Beijing to try to garner Chinese investments. Downplaying security concerns, the delegation reiterated how Pakistan has taken special measures to protect China’s 120 projects and over 13,000 staffers throughout Pakistan (Xinhua, November 22, 2011; Global Times, November 18, October 25, 2011; Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2011). China’s massive investment losses in Libya and evacuating its 36,000 workers however are still fresh in Chinese minds—reminding them of the high cost of investing in highly unstable countries, especially in one that is the central base of several dozen terrorist organizations. With TIP’s close links with al-Qaeda that explicitly targets Xinjiang and Chinese citizens and al-Qaeda’s cooperation with other terrorist organizations, Beijing has legitimate fears that the status quo in the FATA is increasingly unsustainable.

Conclusion: Pakistan Between a Rock and a Hard Place

In light of recent U.S/NATO-Pakistani fallout, Islamabad is trying to play the China card and their “all weather friend” as an alternative to the United States. However, upon closer scrutiny, Chinese aid pales in comparison to U.S. aid and is not a feasible replacement in the near or medium term. Nor does Beijing want to take on the U.S. burden. For example, Center for Global Development published a report in May revealing that average recorded grant assistance to Pakistan for FY2004-2009 from China was $9 million compared with the United States at $268 million. Oxford University also published a report in February that revealed U.S. FDI flow in Pakistan averaged 28 percent of total share from 2001-2009, while China stood at a meager 2 percent of total share in the same period. As for military aid, a few defense deals between China and Pakistan is no comparison for U.S. military assistance at $2.5 billion in addition to economic assistance at $1.8 billion in 2010 [4].

There also is growing perception in Beijing that it must take proactive measures to protect its interests abroad (Asia Times, December 17, 2011; “Mekong Murders Spur Beijing to Push New Security Cooperation,” China Brief, November 11, 2011). Its willingness to deploy paramilitary forces to patrol the Mekong in December in response to the October killing of 13 Chinese sailors underscores how changing security pressures may lead Beijing to diverge from its previous policies of “nonintervention” and deploying troops abroad. China has long contributed to UN peacekeeping missions overseas, but this is the first time it will carry out sustained operations in another country without a UN mandate. By deploying more than 300 armed police to the lawless triple-border area of the Golden Triangle (Laos, Thailand and Burma) in a joint patrol, coupled with its new domestic anti-terror laws to pave way for military intervention abroad, this may be an indicator of how China will address TIP militants in the lawless AfPak border area of FATA to safeguard its growing economic interests if Pakistan fails to control its militants.

Pakistan is in need of help. India alone can provide the help—and will also benefit from this. Pakistan faces the danger of self-destruction if it fails to make amends with its folly of mounting the tiger of Islamic extremism.
[...]
Before it is too late, India must devise, and assiduously work on a strategy to stabilise and save Pakistan. India must help Pakistan strengthen its democracy; make its generals subservient to the people’s rule; and defeat the forces of Islamic extremism without wishing to break its unity or to erase its Muslim identity.

Why India? Because no outside power can be a true friend of Pakistan or of other nation-states in the Indian subcontinent. Outside powers are mostly interested in taking advantage of the hostility between India and Pakistan, as has been clearly shown by our troubled history since 1947. The longer India and Pakistan continue to look, and act as incorrigible enemies of one another, the stronger the nexus between Pakistan’s religious extremists and its military rulers will become. This will only accelerate the process of Talibanisation of Pakistan, and also the consequent export of terror to India.
[...]
There is yet another reason why India alone can help our hapless neighbour. We are both products of a common cultural, spiritual and civilisational heritage, and the unifying and regenerative power of that ancient heritage is far from exhausted. A tragic situation in our recent history, which was precipitated and exploited by our common colonial master, created Pakistan and India as two separate nation-states. But there is no reason why we must treat as unchangeable a flawed design that was imposed on us, and which our forefathers accepted out of a combination of myopia and helplessness, at the end of the colonial era.
[...]
Firstly, India must strongly oppose America’s continued military occupation of Afghanistan and also condemn its drone attacks on innocent civilians in Pakistan. It is high time we Indians realised that the US has aided the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan both by supporting the Taliban covertly in the 1980s, and also by fighting it overtly now. Indeed, America would do itself good by leaving Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to manage our own affairs, and resolve our own disputes. Moreover, today’s economically weakened America has no stomach for prolonging its unwinnable war in Afghanistan. Therefore, here is an opportunity for India to play the role of a benign leader in South Asia, by winning the confidence of the peoples of neighbouring countries.

India’s ability to play the leadership role, and thereby establish a new design for a secular, democratic and cooperative South Asia, critically hinges on early resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The longer Kashmir remains strife-torn, the more oxygen it will provide to religious extremists in Pakistan and also to anti-India sections in its armed forces. Therefore, there is an urgent need to intensify efforts in India for a national consensus on resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

The third bold idea is to unleash the power of Indianised Islam to bring the Muslims of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh into a closer fraternity, not as a dominant or separate community enjoying exclusive rights and a privileged status over others (such as is given by the blasphemy law in Pakistan) but as an equal member of a secular, multi-religious subcontinental family.

The third bold idea is to unleash the power of Indianised Islam to bring the Muslims of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh into a closer fraternity, not as a dominant or separate community enjoying exclusive rights and a privileged status over others (such as is given by the blasphemy law in Pakistan) but as an equal member of a secular, multi-religious subcontinental family

RajeshA wrote:Sroy ji,

I wouldn't mind if that Indianised Islam is Ahmadiyya. That would immediately cut off Subcontinental Islam from the Ummah - not a bad proposition.

Atri wrote:

RajeshA wrote:Sroy ji,

I wouldn't mind if that Indianised Islam is Ahmadiyya. That would immediately cut off Subcontinental Islam from the Ummah - not a bad proposition.

fusion of dara shikoh's islam and Ahmadiyya to begin with, should be a good template.. This will be definitely a Dharmik tradition..

brihaspati wrote:Even if a neo-Mughalistan happens, maye with active collaboration of a section of "Hindus"

RoyG wrote:i agree with your pov bji, but don't dharmists need a launch pad and land access to project our economic, cultural, and military strength to other regions of asia? how can we do so if we have newly created stans pin pricking us from territory sitting on vital land and sea routes?

Carl wrote:

brihaspati wrote:Even if a neo-Mughalistan happens, maye with active collaboration of a section of "Hindus"

Are you serious? Is this re-partitioning of India anywhere near the realm of possibility? I hear some open chatter about it in leftist circles, which is kind of scary, but then in my mind I dismissed it as the reckless prattle of old generation jholawalas angry at Hindutva activism, and who have nothing to lose with one foot in the grave. I would think that India is past the failsafe point as far as its territorial and civilizational resurgence is concerned.

Carl wrote:

brihaspati wrote:Even if a neo-Mughalistan happens, maye with active collaboration of a section of "Hindus"

Are you serious? Is this re-partitioning of India anywhere near the realm of possibility? I hear some open chatter about it in leftist circles, which is kind of scary, but then in my mind I dismissed it as the reckless prattle of old generation jholawalas angry at Hindutva activism, and who have nothing to lose with one foot in the grave. I would think that India is past the failsafe point as far as its territorial and civilizational resurgence is concerned.

Surasena wrote: Stop relying on mainstream media because their job is to keep you in a fantasy world, just go to these areas and observe things first hand, if not search out for blogs of people living this reality in these areas.

Also check the vernacular media especially reports from BD that bji occasionally posts, you can hear their plans from their own mouth.

SRoy wrote:

Surasena wrote: Stop relying on mainstream media because their job is to keep you in a fantasy world, just go to these areas and observe things first hand, if not search out for blogs of people living this reality in these areas.

Also check the vernacular media especially reports from BD that bji occasionally posts, you can hear their plans from their own mouth.

I think this becoming problem. You post a line and you are required to support the same with press report from mainstream media. Mainstream media in this case acts as a force multiplier for the Jihadis. They really don't need to carry out active psy ops. Just suppressing news about Jihadi activities effectively denies the right wing movement the very basis it exists on.

I posted something about "safe havens" and why should it work for Hindus as well. People who responded (Brihaspati included) simply failed to take the cue. I think the hint misintrepreted. "Safe haven" does not simply imply no-go zones where criminal from one community hide and community as a whole bar entry of others (including police). A "safe haven" need not have a negative connotation always. They have a geo-political implication.

Fundamentally for majority, it means securing territories by demographic leverage, squeeze out little oil drops from majority areas. Village by village. Some states can replicate this as their level where demographic advantage is on the majority side. There are economic means to achive this.

Of course it means cedeing good amount of areas to Jihadis. But if it comes to the worst, would we like to have a 1946-47 like situation (loosing territory and yet burdened with future Jihadis) or we would like to have a clean cut (all Jihadis...active and potential go with it)?

CURRENT GFP RANK
4 India 3 China


Total Population 1,189,172,906 1,336,718,015
Military Manpower Available 615,201,057 749,610,775
Fit for Military Service 489,571,520 618,588,627
Reaching Military Age Yearly 22,896,956 19,538,534
Active Military Personnel 1,325,000 2,285,000
Active Military Reserves 1,747,000 800,000
Total Aircraft 2,462 5,176
Total Land-Based Weapons 75,191 47,575
Total Naval Units 175 972
Towed Artillery 10,000 25,000
Merchant Marine Strength 324 2,012
Major Ports and Terminals 7 8
Aircraft Carriers 1 1
Destroyers 8 25
Frigates 12 47
Submarines 15 63
Patrol Coastal Craft 31 332
Mine Warfare Craft 8 52
Amphibious Operations Craft 20 233
Defense Budget / Expenditure $36,030,000,000 $100,000,000,000
Foreign Reserves $284,100,000,000 $2,876,000,000,000
Purchasing Power $4,060,000,000,000 $10,090,000,000,000
Oil Production 878,700 bbl 4,273,000 bbl
Oil Consumption 2,980,000 bbl 9,189,000 bbl
Proven Oil Reserves 5,800,000,000 bbl 20,350,000,000 bbl
Total Labor Force 478,300,000 815,300,000
Roadway Coverage 3,320,410 km 3,860,800 km
Railway Coverage 63,974 km 86,000 km
Waterway Coverage 14,500 km 110,000 km
Coastline Coverage 7,000 km 14,500 km
Major Serviceable Airports 352 502
Square Land Area 3,287,263 km 9,596,961 km

When people speak about Napoleon Bonaparte they usually recall his military campaigns in Europe and do not pay attentions to the fact that the dream of all his life was the conquest of India.

His famous Egyptian campaign in 1798 was to become the first step towards the conquest of India.

Napoleon confessed that France had started the Egyptian campaign in order to conquer the British India. To establish itself in North Africa and the Middle East was the minor goal of that campaign. In fact France planned to turn the international basin of the Mediterranean Sea into the French Lake.

"Your sovereign agrees with me that if we take India away from England we will weaken England's might. India, this fairy land, this Oriental diamond, has given much more wisdom to the world than this drunken and vicious England with its shopkeepers"

Two powers acting as allies could dictate terms to the whole Europe... Russia with all its Asian lands would give the French army a helping hand in Egypt and acting together with France would carry the war to Bengal"