This whole debate on M-777 and MSC has been so corrupted with inane comments and stupid arguments that it seems all sanity has been lost.
Final try to drill some sense into the heads of keyboard ninjas here:
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The main counter-argument put forth against purchase of M-777 type of weapon and its USP of heliport-ability is that it is a silver bullet and roads are the answer to army’s problem. And if you can develop a proper road, than it means you can lug around a 45/52 caliber 155 guns as well.
Another argument has been about the definition of air-mobility – Are we talking about Indian version of 101 Air Assault Division? And do we have resources and what is the use? This actually flows from the above argument about roads and helicopters and mountain warfare.
(A) Mountain Artillery – Before we delve into the issue about roads and helicopters let me digress a bit and talk about Mountain Artillery. Any student of history of Indian Army would have heard about the famous five Mountain Artillery Batteries of British Indian Army. These were retained with their Indian crew even as Artillery was made out of bounds for natives after 1857.
Link to introduction on Mountain Artillery Batteries of BIA:
http://wegunners.webs.com/mountainartillery.htm
In independent India, Mountain Artillery guns continued to be used in Indian Army. The Mountain Artillery guns could be broken down into sub-parts and were carried on Mountain Artillery Mules – which are superior to General Duty Mules. In emergency, these guns were even carried on man-pack basis.
The important point to note is that Mountain Artillery battalions had the mobility required to keep pace with the infantry and operations in the mountains. They had the required elevation for mountains and provided the fire-support to infantry. We fought the 1947-48 and 1962 wars in mountains with these guns.
Check an image here:
http://centreright.in/wp-content/upload ... r-1962.jpg
But in due course of time, the artillery guns were found to be inadequate in terms of range and weight of projectile and were discontinued. Lighter version of Indian Field Gun - called LFG – has been the main stay of the mountain divisions for quite some time now. I am willing to be corrected but I don’t think we have any artillery system which can be transported on mules across the mountains.
(B) Deployment in mountains –the challenges.
Let me elaborate this point and problem using some terrain maps from Bum-La area north of Tawang and on LAC:
If you look at the maps, the following issues about deployment of artillery come immediately to mind:
(a) The valleys are very narrow and the gun positions will have to be on either side of the roads connecting forwards and rear areas. The depth available on either side will again be limited. We saw in Kargil the gun pits on either side of NH-1A and in adjoin valleys.
(b) The general valley orientation is in north-south direction so no reverse slope protection as one saw in Kargil where the firing was in east-west direction across the mountain ridges. The arty boys will have to be imaginative in deploying their guns.
(c) Further, the gradient of the mountain ranges means that guns in reverse slope position will have to fire at close to max angles – thereby negating the ability to exploit range in full.
In my opinion, the artillery will be deployed to provide support to own defenses, target enemy defenses in forward areas and depth as well as the main communication axis supporting the enemy formation(s) to interdict the movement of men and supplies.
Now, how deep will be the arty battery sited from LAC to perform the required role? In the map above, the same is assumed to be sited ~6 km in depth from LAC. And that the gun has 35 km range.
From the above picture, it might seem that a gun with 35 km range will be able to cover targets in depth – but there are some challenges:
Maximum range is assuming it gets open space to fire at 45 degree angle to exploit the full range. Given the slopes and gradient of the mountain ranges, the gun will perforce have to fire at high angles of elevation.
Also, the position of enemy troops on reverse side will mean that shell will have to approach the target at high angles.
As per one document that I read, the artillery of an armored/mechanized division can provide fire cover for 50 km depth and 60 km arc. In plains, a similar coverage area would be restricted due to nature of terrain and penalty on effectiveness it places.
One thing that becomes evidently clear from the above map is the disadvantage which IA faces in mountains with 105mm LFG – which has a theoretical range of 17 km. All the above factors further reduce the effectiveness of this gun and it needs to be sited that much closer to the LAC. And it simply cannot touch targets in depth or interfere with enemy movements. And highlight why we need a new gun ASAP.
(C) Movement in mountains - Now imagine a situation on western border in Rajasthan or Punjab. An artillery regiment arrives by train and is offloaded at the nearest rail-head to international border. From there on, it travels by road with guns pulled by Field Artillery Tractors (FAT) of the guns. But the road leads up till what point? IB? Or some kilometers short of IB? Well, never-mind because in either case, the FAT can simply pull through pre-reconnoitered road to its firing position – You see the land is plain and the FATs can pull in any direction required. Further, when main body of troops pushes into enemy territory, the FATs will simply pull the guns behind them. Simple, no?
Now, what happens if the same battery was moving from Tawang to LAC? Let us assume that an all-weather two lane roads exists to Tawang from the Brahmaputra plains and from roads going from it to LAC are also similar. This will allow moving even 52 Cal guns from plains to Tawang and further to areas before LAC. But, what then?
In the previous section we saw the likely deployment and coverage of a 155/52 gun battery. The guns are deployed in pre-defined locations. But what about the movement of guns from this location? Given the geographical restraints and the weight + size of the gun, the movement of gun is restricted to areas where good and big roads are located. And these locations are going to come under fire.
Further, how far into enemy territory can own forces go while still within the cover of support fire? In our example, the battery is already 6km from the LAC – and it cannot move any further. So, for every one kilometer own troops move into enemy territory, they move one km out of support fire. And since no roads connect Indian side with Tibet, Indian artillery simply cannot move into the enemy territory. That is the crux of the matter.
Look at the map below – now imagine, if the gun needs to be moved into enemy territory (10 kms in the map) where no road connectivity exists or Indian Territory not connected by a suitable road, how does one move an 11 ton gun? If required, the IFG can be heli-lifted to the required location or even para-dropped. But can one do the same with a full-fledged arty gun? The answer is simply no.
And this is where a gun like M-777 comes handy – it heli-operation part is given but more importantly, the road aspect is also there. Not all your roads can take a 10 ton load.
(D) MSC and Air-Mobility – So, the MSC is not going to be a replica of US Army 101 Air Assault Division or 82nd Airborne. It will have organic capability for vertical airlift and suitable support equipment. And M-777 is such equipment along with helicopters required to move them.
Coming to quantum of helicopters required, that depends on the planned airlift capability. Sometime back I had written about IA plans to introduce graded capacity for vertical lift starting from Corps level. Each Corps is to have capability to airlift a Company of troops and the planned Aviation Brigades at Corps level should be able to accomplish that. Similarly, Command HQ should be able to airlift a Battalion with Brigade level capability at AHQ level.
With the level of resources committed to MSC, it is quite possible at each Division may be able to airlift a Battalion at a time and sustain a Brigade level formation through helicopter led air-maintenance. So, let us not get into the territory of comparing ourselves with US Army and other fancy stuff. A MSC may have 1 x Chinook Squadron for heavy lift of troops and M-777 guns.
(E) M-777 required – I had earlier advised against using the simple No of Divisions x Brigade x Regiments to arrive at the final number. 145 guns are enough only for eight regiments. That will not even equip two full brigades. IMO, the final number required will be based on two factors:
a. Kind of mobility planned for MSC
b.Advantage of M-777 over IFG (105mm) in terms of weight and range trade-off.
Point A will determine number of guns required from air-mobility perspective. IA may decide to have 2x M-777 Regiments per Division of the MSC (assuming three divisions) for taking care of such cross border movement requirements.
Point B will decide the larger induction number in IA – it is obvious that LFG is simply outgunned and outranged in the mountains. If the IA is looking at IFG kind of footprint with some weight penalty, then M-777 can enter into wider service. It might simply not be feasibile to build roads everywhere to accomodare a heavier 45/52 Cal gun across the eastern border.
