Bharat Rakshak

ramana wrote:
Who? Legitimate govt is the one that has the broadest support of all Afghans.

Why? Such a a govt will press for Durand Line erasure.

double edged sword. can't let the Talibs, even under nominal Karzai/Afghan leadership, have control of the vicinity around Punjab. Panipat won't be far off, if that happens.

Even Taliban refused to recognize the Durand Line.


Lets discuss Panipat elsewhere.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7#p1425357

ramana garu, what do you mean by "press for the erasure"? going beyond the token statement of not accepting it?

Pakistan, Afghanistan trade accusations at UN over extremis havens - ToI

Afghanistan and Pakistan traded accusations in the UN Security Council on Thursday over the whereabouts of Islamist extremists on their porous border as the United Nations described increased tensions between the neighbors as "unfortunate and dangerous."

Afghanistan's UN envoy, Zahir Tanin, told a council debate on the situation in Afghanistan that "terrorist sanctuaries continue to exist on Pakistan's soil and some elements continue to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy."

Pakistan's UN ambassador, Masood Khan, said "terrorists operate on both sides of the porous border" and many attacks against Pakistan were planned on Afghan soil. He said aggressive policing and border surveillance were needed.

"I reject most emphatically Ambassador Tanin's argument - root, trunk and branch - that terrorist sanctuaries exist in Pakistan and some elements continue to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy," Khan told the council.

He told Reuters in an interview afterward that Tanin had been "ill-advised" to raise the border issues at the Security Council as Kabul and Islamabad were already talking through other channels. Khan blamed Afghan President Hamid Karzai for stoking tensions.

"When President Karzai meets our leadership, he's most gracious, engaging, he's a statesman. But when he talks to the media, he says things which inflame sentiment and that's most unhelpful and destabilizing," Khan said. "We have given very restrained responses."

Pakistan's role in the 12-year-old war in Afghanistan has been ambiguous {ambiguous ? It has been downright treacherous} - it is a US ally but has a long history of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan in a bid to counter the influence of its regional rival India.

Pakistan's military played a key role in convincing Afghan Taliban leaders to hold talks with the United States, US and Pakistani officials said, but Afghan anger at fanfare over the opening of the Taliban's Qatar office this week has since delayed preliminary discussions.

"We were talking to multiple interlocutors behind the scenes and we have been asking them to participate in these talks, (telling them) that we think the war should come to an end," Khan told Reuters.

'Succeed or fail together'

US-backed Afghan forces toppled the Taliban in late 2001 for refusing to hand over al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Pakistan helped the Taliban take power in Afghanistan in the 1990s and is facing a Taliban insurgency itself. The Pakistani Taliban, known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban, is a separate entity from the Afghan Taliban, though allied with them.

"Stability and sanctity of Pakistan-Afghanistan border is a shared responsibility. Robust deployment of Pakistani troops on our side is meant to interdict terrorists and criminals," Khan told the council. "This must be matched from the other side."

A spate of cross-border shelling incidents by the Pakistani military, who said they were targeting Taliban insurgents, has killed dozens of Afghan civilians in the past couple of years.

"We are very concerned with ongoing border shelling," Tanin told the council. "This constitutes a serious threat to Afghan sovereignty and the prospect of friendly relations between the two countries."

UN special envoy to Afghanistan, Jan Kubis, told the Security Council that the heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan were a serious concern, especially at this stage of Afghanistan's development.

"Such tensions are unfortunate and dangerous," he said. The NATO command in Kabul on Tuesday handed over lead security responsibility to Afghan government forces across the country and most foreign troops are due to withdraw from the country by the end of 2014.

"It is for the two countries to address these concerns and problems and their underlying reasons, to build trust and to refrain from any step that could contribute to an escalation of tensions and inflamed public sentiments," Kubis said.

"They share common concerns and interests in fighting terrorism. They can succeed or fail together," he said.

US-Taliban peace talks: Pakistan's political fortunes set to revive, India concerned - Indrani Bagchi, ToI

A prospective Afghan political deal crafted by Kerry and Kayani threatens to sink Karzai. As the Taliban set up an office in Doha to start peace talks with the US dressed up in their old flag and named the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, in one fell swoop, the gesture has marginalized Hamid Karzai, presaged a future Taliban role in the Afghan government and revived Pakistan's political fortunes with the US.

The new situation has profoundly negative implications for India's security, particularly if the Haqqani network is added to the talks as Pakistan desires. India has promised to take up the issue with US secretary of state John Kerry during the strategic dialogue to be held here next week. {The US will shrug it off. India's security concerns do not matter for other countries in their pursuit of their own policies. Of course, India must register a strong protest with the US but we must do whatever we have got to do}

In Baghdad, foreign minister Salman Khurshid said, "We have from time to time reminded all stakeholders about the red lines that was drawn by the world community and certainly by the participants should not be touched, should not be erased and should not be violated." The "red lines" included a renunciation of Taliban's links with al Qaida and an acceptance of the Afghan constitution. However, its been a couple of years that the US has abandoned all preconditions for talks with the Taliban.

India is one of the largest donors to Afghanistan's stabilization, but India has a minimal role in the political chess-game currently under way, which will minimize India's security concerns in the larger transition.

Officials in Kabul said, despite repeated assurances to Karzai by the US, the Taliban went ahead to set themselves up almost as a government in exile. Their initial statement said, as an afterthought, that they could even talk to "Afghans", but not the government. With the Taliban also opening talks with Iran as well as with the former Northern Alliance, the US, helped by Pakistan, could be preparing the way to bring the Taliban back into government in Kabul, a decade after they were removed from power by the US invasion.

For the present, the Taliban in Doha, with the blessings of the US and Qatar, is more than an Afghan insurgent group. Just by the very fact that they are not in Afghanistan, its very easy for them to scale up their international profile to position themselves as a challenger or alternative Afghan government.

Its clear the Taliban are sitting at the table because Pakistan has played a key role in getting them there. While Mullah Omar is believed to have agreed to the talks, the fact is that all the Taliban leaders in Doha have a strong Pakistan connection, with their families all living in Pakistan.

According to Pakistani media reports, the deal came about largely because of a personal relationship between Kerry and Kayani. Quoting unnamed Pakistan military officials, a report in Pakistan's Express Tribune said, "The hardliners among the Taliban ranks did not want to give any space to US forces. They had realised that by stalemating international forces they had actually won militarily. It was Pakistan's turn to use its influence even though everyone in Washington had deep doubts about the Taliban showing flexibility. Our pitch to the Taliban was that by becoming part of the dialogue process they could gain international sanction, end conflict peacefully and achieve their goals of foreign forces exiting their country much more swiftly than through perpetual conflict."

Karzai angrily suspended security talks with the US, as Washington scrambled to save the Doha talks by getting the Taliban to take down the offending banner. No peace talks started between the US and Taliban on Thursday, and a visit by the Afghan High Peace Council to Qatar on Friday too was cancelled. In Kabul, Karzai called in envoys from Russia and China and India to brief them on his position, even as Kerry tried to pacify him about the talks.

While the US takes some time to pacify Karzai, sources said the first deals the US would be looking for includes the release of a US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, in Taliban custody. On Thursday, Taliban spokesmen said he could be released in return for five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. The US has not yet agreed to that though there may be some offer of keeping the prisoners in Bagram rather than Cuba.

Second, the US will seek safe passage from the Taliban for their equipment and weapons as they prepare to leave Afghanistan. The Taliban may have entered peace talks but only on Wednesday they carried out an attack for which they even claimed responsibility. It's clear the forthcoming negotiations will be arduous, where the Taliban have the advantage of waiting for their demands to be met, while the US is heading for the exits.

This is worse then the fall of Saigon to negotiate with terrorist.
In Vietnam atleast there was an invading force from North along with the Viet Cong in other words a war.

Here its terrorists sitting in safe havens in TSP an ally of US and they want to set terms.

Ramana, absolutely right. The US gloated, along with the mujahideen and the Pakistanis, of having defeated the USSR in 1988. But, the real defeat is what the US is experiencing now. I am sure the humiliation for the US has just started. Let us watch the unfolding drama. The US forces will be certainly given a kick in their hinds as they tuck their tail between the legs and run back. There is not going to be any US soldier left on Afghan soil after 2014. And, if by any chance they remain, they will be subjected to a mauling by the Taliban. Getting all vestiges of the US out of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would be the foremost task of the Taliban (and the ISI).

^^^
Islamic taqyia tactics are well positioned now to play out against other enemies. India is one of them.
pretending defeat and surrender. laying low for years to substantiate the illusion of defeat. then spring back as the enemy is winding up.

India will have to remember this. CANT GIVE THE JIHADIS ESCAPE ROUTES TO HIDE. if and when India's turn comes up, this will have to be kept in mind.

Russia throws its weight behind Karzai - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai’s refusal to participate in peace talks with Taliban on grounds of contested sovereignty has led to an indefinite postponement of the dialogue in Doha that the Americans were keen to steer.

Itar-Tass news agency quoting sources close to the negotiating process reported the postponement of the talks. The U.S. State Department said on Wednesday that the visit to Qatar by the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan James Dobbins has been delayed.

After following closely the open spat between the Americans and the Afghans, the Russians, already at odds with Washington over the situation in Syria and Iran, expressed their stance on the rapidly mutating situation in the heart of the Hindu Kush. On Wednesday, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that it fully supported Mr. Karzai’s position that peace efforts in the war-torn country should be led by the government of Afghanistan, instead of the U.S.

Talks halted

Apprehending that the Americans and the Taliban had taken custody of the Doha peace talks, the Karzai administration had retaliated strongly by suspending security talks with Americans over stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan after the 2014 NATO withdrawal from the country.

Upholding the principle of sovereignty, Mr. Karzai also asserted that members of the High Peace Council — the body entrusted with peace talks with the Taliban — would “neither attend nor participate in the talks” until the process was “completely” in the hands of Afghans. He also signalled the necessity of ceasefire, pointing out that talks “will be possible when only Afghan parties will take part and the country will put an end to violence”.

The Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that a peace dialogue in Afghanistan could have a positive outcome only if the government in Kabul led the process, and on condition that the Taliban severed ties with al-Qaeda, ended the violence and accepted Afghanistan’s constitution, including its protections of women and minorities.

By Thursday, it had become clear that the Karzai government was in no mood to be placated by the removal of the Taliban flag and the plaque which said the facility belonged to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan {So, unlike what the US stooge Qatar tried to mislead, there indeed was a plaque referring to the Taliban office as the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan} from its new office. These two signs of Taliban’s attempt at usurping Afghan sovereignty had been removed overnight following intervention by the Qatari government on the insistence of the Americans.

The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had thrice called Mr. Karzai on Wednesday, but his exertions have not yielded any visible results so far. The Afghan website TOLO news is reporting that Kabul has expressed serious reservations about the U.S. initiative.

The Taliban, meanwhile, seemed to be mounting a fresh charm offensive to engage with the Americans. The Associated Press quoting a senior spokesman reported that Afghan Taliban are ready to free a U.S. soldier, held captive since 2009, in exchange for five of their senior operatives, imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, as a conciliatory gesture.

This is what winning looks like.

so it is increasingly clear that riyadh/doha are trying to pull the wool over washington's eyes and strong arming their world vision onto the mid-east and west asia - and reaching into south asia. putin is clearly sticking the boot in
i am sure that cameron and hollande are holding on to each other and shivering in their chaddies, waiting for their turn in the barrel

Defeat in Afghanistan ended Soviet Russia.
Defeat in Vietnam finished the Democrats in US till GWB ushered in the 1990's recession.
What will this do?

ramana wrote:Defeat in Afghanistan ended Soviet Russia.
Defeat in Vietnam finished the Democrats in US till GWB ushered in the 1990's recession.
What will this do?

This will hasten the demise of Hinduism and Hindus by way of total conversion to Islam either by force and/or under pressure.

The demise of Hinduism will hasten the demise of all other non-Islamic cultures, even the demise of other non-Islamic Abrahamic cultures.

All in all, this hastens that day when we would all be living in caves, slicing each other's throats........real slow! And this is as far as men go. I shudder to think what will happen to our women.

And while we are burning, let us get all drugged on playing the "how humiliating it is for the US" fiddle, and at least try to get some temporary vicarious pleasure out of their misery, until we hit bottom!

It would be a defeat of USA if this had anything to do with direct USA interests such as land of USA etc.

This is more like paki proxy, USA and Qatar chattering among each other under banner of 'talks' while Govt of Afghanistan, India and Russia are not included as interested parties.

Any legitimacy to terrorist talibs mean that USA/Oman are free to donate to terrorists in pakis under any related excuse, while pakis will arm the talib proxy. USA will stay on side of pakis under such excuses while ignoring rabid terror activities of paki jihadis in Afpak, as it has till now.

Pakis have come out clean as frontline ally of USA on war on terror, inspite of terrorizing Afghans and Indians.

India should erect 10 times bigger fence, and much more integrated border protection all over. Total warfare against jihadis & annihilation of all anti-India forces is one way to deal with this. Any firm passing on any weapons to terrorists should be banned globally under UN terror rules.

^^ Sorry vishvak ji what is Oman's role in all this?

^Sorry I meant Qatar not Oman. My mistake.

The Political Games in the Taliban Negotiations



Chapter 1 (PDF)

Table of Contents

India reacts. Peace Efforts Should Not Undermine Karzai Government - The Hindu

India on Friday voiced its support to Afghanistan’s opposition to the Taliban having opened a political office in Doha and asserted that the reconciliation process in the war-torn country should not undermine its legitimate government or confer legitimacy to insurgent groups.

Kabul had on Tuesday backed out of peace talks scheduled with the Taliban.

“The reconciliation process should not seek to create equivalence between an internationally recognised Afghan government and insurgent groups, confer legitimacy to [these] groups or convey the impression [that there are] two competing state authorities [in] Afghanistan,” External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Syed Akbaruddin said.

The spokesperson said this move “could undermine the legitimate Afghan state, Afghan government and the political, social and economic progress witnessed in the nation over the past decade, to which the international community itself has contributed in great measure”.

He said India had followed the developments in Qatar and statements made by representatives of the Taliban office and others.

“These statements reflect some confusion about the name of the Qatar office, its structure, its political and legal status, and its objectives,” Mr. Akbaruddin said.“Our position is clear. The Government of India has always called for a broad-based Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled reconciliation process within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and the internationally accepted red lines,” he said.

Mr. Akbaruddin stressed that such a process would necessarily recognise the centrality of the Government of Afghanistan in the process and involve all sections of the Afghan society, as also the insurgent groups — including the Taliban — who wish to join the mainstream.

He said India remained committed to supporting the Afghan government and people in accordance with the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, a reconciliation process that has the support of the government and the people of Afghanistan.

India has cautioned Afghanistan over peace talks with the Taliban and observed that the new initiative should not violate the “red lines” drawn up by the international community.

Need to Isolate Syndicate of Terrorism in Afghanistan: India at the UN - Business Line

India has called for concerted actions to root out syndicates of terrorism, including al-Qaeda, Taliban and LeT from Afghanistan, noting that security situation remains fragile in the war-torn country.

During a special briefing on Afghanistan, Deputy Ambassador to the UN Manjeev Puri said the security situation in Afghanistan remains fragile as demonstrated by a number of high-profile terrorist attacks over the last two months.

“We condemn these attacks in the strongest possible terms and convey our condolences to the Government and people of Afghanistan,” he said.

“Concerted action is needed to isolate and root out the syndicate of terrorism, which includes elements of the Taliban, AI-Qaida, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorist and extremist groups,” he said.

It is, therefore, important that the transition plan in Afghanistan is based on the ground situation rather than a “pre-determined timeframe”, Puri told members of the UN Security Council during the briefing.

“It is also important that the ongoing transition must remain Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, must be multi-faceted and should ensure the protection and promotion of the human rights of all Afghans, and lead to the strengthening of the Afghan state and its institutions,” the top Indian diplomat said.

The efforts of the international community in Afghanistan should remain focused on security, development, governance, and regional and international cooperation which is aligned with the overall objective of the Afghan Government, the Indian official said.

“This alone will enable the Afghan Government to eventually assume full responsibility and take charge of Afghanistan’s destiny without outside interference,” he said.

Stressing that Afghanistan’s stability and economic development depend a lot on its neighbours and the region as a whole, Puri said, “We must expand, rather than hinder, trade, transit and transport ties, including overland transit and trade.”

That is the best way of bringing the regional dimension into play in a positive manner, he added.

“Growing economic inter-dependence will also help in weaning disaffected youth away from insurgency and militancy and in creating a zone of co-prosperity in the region. We support the wishes of the Government of Afghanistan to take the lead in this direction,” he said.

^^^
Let the dogs roll into Kabul...what exactly is going through Indian elites' mind right now?
where are their beloved "secularist" western friends? is any of them thinking why this is happening?
better question: how it ever got to this point? Taliban now officially recognized as a power broker in Afghan future.

how? what? and why? they need to focus on these simple one-word questions.

http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/Ni ... 00139.aspx

Kyrgyzstan-US: On Thursday, 20 June, the Kyrgyz parliament voted 91 to 5 in favor of ending the lease agreement with the US for use of Manas air base when it expires in 2014. The bill will take effect after being signed by the Kyrgyz president. The US has been given notice to vacate the premises by July 2014 when the lease expires.

Comment: The vote is no surprise, though the US had hoped to keep using Manas after 2014. President Atambayev campaigned in 2011 to end the lease agreement with the US and to establish closer ties with Russia. Last year, Kyrgyzstan extended for 15 years the Russian lease to use Kant air base, which is not far from Manas.

The transit center at Manas has been critical in military personnel movements to and from Afghanistan, but the lease agreement has been a longstanding source of controversy among Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the US. The significance of a firm end date is that it takes away any easy option and capability for an emergency surge or bailout, to help save the Karzai government after mid-2014. It also means the final phase of the withdrawal must transit Pakistan or use Russian bases.

Like South Asia, Central Asia is a half-continent too far for the US to sustain deep engagement in defiance of Russia or China.

Afghanistan: For the record. In web postings today, the Taliban gloated about their political victory over the US.

Like South Asia, Central Asia is a half-continent too far for the US to sustain deep engagement in defiance of Russia or China.

US looked at access to all these bases in Af Pak and central asia as a incentive to stay in the War on Terror for this extended time. But looks like it is not sustainable

Lashkar is busy setting up in Kunar province per latest inputs.

Kerry is soft on TSP and telling india to ask Karzai to join the talks/peace process. This is the state of relations at the moment.

Acharya wrote:US looked at access to all these bases in Af Pak and central asia as a incentive to stay in the War on Terror for this extended time. But looks like it is not sustainable

** Long Post **

I am not sure if the last word is spoken on shutting the Manas airport for the US, though it appears more certain this time around with the voting taking place. Only the President stands between the closure and the continuation. As a country, Kyrgyzstan is part of CIS as well as NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PPP). Both Russia and China are its largest trade partners and the US has nothing significant. In February 2009, the Kyrgyzstan government closed down the crucial Manas Airbase due to Russian pressure, a base where over 1000 US Air Force personnel were stationed supporting Afghan operations for eight years since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. The US renegotiated and agreed to triple the rent in June when Kyrgystan re-opened the base. Later in early July, the US and Russia also agreed to have transit facilities for American troops and weapons using Russian airspace. In early April, 2010, the revolt in Kyrgystan drove away the President even as the US-Kyrgystan accord was only a few months away from expiry and renewal. This cast a shadow on the Obama administration’s attempts to send in more troops into Afghanistan as part of the new policy. However, the agreement was renewed until 2014.

The Russia-China axis and the rivalries between them and the US are also adding enormous dynamics to the Af-Pak situation. Once again, Pakistan is going to bed with both the US and China simultaneously, a skill that this whore has honed well. While India was a prominent member in the Russo-India-China axis on Afghanistan, I am afraid that it is no longer the case. The Russo-China-TSP axis wants to shut all avenues for the US to stay in Af-Pak beyond July 2014. India has conflicts of interests with both groups, the US and the Russo-China-TSP axis. With the US, India feels let down at several crucial times, in the US recognition accorded to the Taliban and in diluting the redlines with respect to the Taliban. The Russians and the Chinese want to protect their interests in Afghanistan and CIS and may find India a hindrance vis-a-vis getting Pakistan's help in these matters.

Let us also recall that in March 2009, the Barack Obama administration started a long-drawn process of reviewing the Afghanistan situation. The new policy, while making Pakistan more accountable for the aid it receives from the US, places reliance on equipping and training both the Pakistani and the Afghani armed forces and law enforcement agencies while continuing to target the hard-core and recalcitrant Al Qaeda/Taliban leadership while willing to negotiate with moderate elements. With this possibly in mind, the US Commander in Afghanistan was replaced in May 2009 by General Stanley McChrystal, a US Special Forces counterinsurgency specialist. The policy identified Pakistan as having received huge monetary benefits but not delivered commensurately . The policy also recognized that the Afghan situation will be best handled by involving immediate neighbours and powerful regional players. The US Administration has also clearly stated that the Pakistani intelligence agencies should cut-off their historic links with the mujahideen and Taliban leaders, commanders and warlords. Today, after four years, none of these happened and yet Pakistan is at the core of US efforts for Afghanistan.

On the same day this policy review was announced, an equally powerful initiative was announced by the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) in what is known as the Moscow Declaration. While there was similarity in approach as far as the involvement of neighbours and regional players such as Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan in resolving the Afghan situation was concerned, it significantly differed from the US policy of differentiating among the Taliban. This Declaration also castigated Pakistan for its support to terrorism and asked it to dismantle these infrastructure. Later, in October 2009, the foreign ministers of the RIC triangle of Russia, India and China met in Bangalore and demanded a greater say for themselves in the resolution of the Afghan problem. Like the 2009 US policy review, these have also gone with the wind and a deep, sinister move is afoot by Russia and China.

It amuses me to find people believing that somehow the contacts between the US, Taliban and Karzai have been taking place now and only now. Below is a long history of over three years of these tortuous talks and intrigues. Also, Pakistan is a prime mover in these as the following would show and it is having its way. My belief is also that India which got sidelined by the Western powers in London three years back but then found resonance with Russia and China is now getting sidelined by these two countries as well.

Concerned with increased local demands to recall the British troops from Afghanistan, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called important stakeholder nations for a Conference in London on January 28, 2010. The British plan was to ask the Taliban to join the Karzai-led government and integrate their militia within the Afghan National Army (ANA) within the next 18 months coinciding with the American withdrawal starting by 2011. India was excluded from the conference at the behest of Pakistan. . In the NATO commanders’ conference just before the London Conference, Gen. Kayani explaining Pakistan’s position said, inter alia, that India was the only existential threat for Pakistan which necessitated the strategic depth into Afghanistan, India’s presence in Afghanistan posed security challenges to Pakistan and must therefore be curtailed etc. He also offered to train the Afghan Army (ANA) as a counter to India’s proposals.

Richard Holbrooke, for his part, said that nearly 70 percent of the Taliban were not fighting because of ideological commitments. Echoing similar thoughts was the British position that “Only 20 percent Taliban have a fundamentalist jihadi ideology whereas the rest…are not fundamentalist jihadis; they are our primary focus,” Thus, the US allocated a Billion dollar fund to wean away 'susceptible' Taliban from the AQAM. Events of the last three years since the fund was announced have shown that this experiment fell flat on its face and never got up afterwards. In the January 2010 London conference, Pakistan offered to bring around most of the Taliban to the peace talks table. Who knows, the billion US dollars were possibly a bribe to PA Generals to get the Taliban to speak. As a follow-up, on Feb. 11, 2010, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a brother-in-law of Mullah Omar, the head of the Quetta Shura and the second in command after Mullah Omar, was arrested in a joint operation by the CIA and the ISI in Karachi. It later emerged that Baradar was planning to attend the May 2-3, 2010 Jirga of about 1200 to 1400 people that Karzai had called of the tribal leaders to give a shape to the reconciliation process. The jirga was expected to set the terms and conditions for reintegrating the insurgents, a development that Pakistan clearly did not want. Thus, the US-Pakistani nexus in undermining Karzai stood thoroughly exposed. One can be sure that Baradar was contacted by the Afghan intelligence led by the shrewd Amarullah Saleh, much to the dislike of the US and the Pakistanis. he was to pay the price soon.

On August 22, 2010, the New York Times reported that the ISI officials admitted that Baradar and his aides were by-passing the ISI and hence were arrested. Only in 2012, after much pressure was brought to bear upon the US and Pakistan, was a Karzai representative allowed to meet Baradar in a Pakistani jail. After Baradar was arrested, Pakistan also arrested a number of Taliban leaders and commanders. The arrests also coincided with the two-day Strategic Dialogue in Washington between Pakistan and the US on March 24 & 25, 2010. This is a familiar Pakistani tactic that has been in vogue since 26/11. Though Pakistan wanted to make these arrests appear as a reversal of its policies regarding protection of certain Taliban groups for eventual use after the NATO and American forces left the region, it was clear that these commanders were guilty of crossing Pakistan Army’s red lines and interests. Pakistan wanted to control the dialogue process between its trusted Taliban and the Karzai / US governments. Pakistan thus killed two birds in one shot. On June 24, 2010, the New York Times reported that the Pakistanis were offering to mediate a power-sharing agreement with Sirajuddin Haqqani. A few days later the Middle-Eastern Al Jazeera, which had broken many authentic news about Al Qaeda earlier, dramatically announced that Sirajuddin Haqqani, accompanied by the Pakistani COAS Gen. Kayani and the ISI Chief Shuja Pasha, had already met the Afghan President Karzai in his Kabul Palace. A few days later, the US President Barack Obama, at the G-20 meeting in Toronto in June 2010, praised the efforts of Pakistan to find a political settlement for the Afghan crisis. Refusing to directly comment on the meeting between Haqqani and Karzai, he said, “I think it’s too early to tell. I think we have to view these efforts with skepticism but also with openness”.

One can only presume in these matters because details are sketchy or are simply not available. Haqqani must have demanded in his meeting with Karzai both his arms and legs, if not his life, because no further contacts took place. In September, 2010, the US dramatically increased the frequency of its attacks from a monthly average of ten strikes to twenty and killing many militants. Though it was later touted to be a pre-emptive strike to prevent a Mumbai-style urban terror attack in the UK, Germany and France, there is no denying that a frustrated US wanted to demonstrate to the Pakistanis its determination to go after the Haqqani group which Pakistan has been successfully defending.

Why were the Americans angry with the Haqqanis, their close friend in the earlier jihad ? Apart from the period between 2001-2009 when the Haqqanis helped AQAM in so many ways, they were becoming a major hurdle in an American operation. In early February 2010, the US/NATO forces announced a major offensive, codenamed Operation Mushtarak (Together), in the southern Helmand region of Marjah, a rural poppy-growing area which has been under the control of druglords for decades. Later, it was revealed that the operation in Marjah was a tactical prelude to the more major effort to capture Kandahar before end of circa 2010 and Kunduz in the North later. However, after more than a month, the contingent of 15000 soldiers and the 400-odd fighter aircraft and gunships were holding on to Marjah only tenuously. The Haqqanis had effectively grounded the US/NATO plans. Finally, in early May, 2010, the NATO commanders scrapped the Kandahar offensive citing the Afghans to take charge, a ridiculous claim ! In June, the New York Times reported that the Kandahar offensive was no longer a military one but rather a civilian reconstruction effort with the military in a supportive role only. The Haqqanis were directly responsible for this massive US failure and that hurt. They took this out on Pakistani Army as well with the helicopter attack on a Pakistani Army post in early October, 2010 which led to the closure of border crossings at Torkham and Chaman and the US ultimately issuing an apology (or a sort of apology).

On May, 21, 2010, the Maldives government spokesman announced that representatives of Hizb-e-Islami and the Karzai government were holding talks there, which was confirmed by Humayun Jareir, a prominent member of Hizb-i-Islami and Hekmatyar's son-in-law. He further said that the meeting was to bring together people who were influential in both Afghanistan's government and insurgent groups to try to come up with ideas for a peaceful resolution in Afghanistan. In June 2010, under intense US pressure which in turn was no doubt prompted by Pakistan, Karzai replaced the two bitterest critics of Pakistan in his cabinet, the powerful Afghan intelligence chief Amarullah Saleh and the Interior Minister Hanif Atmar. This further strengthened Pakistan's hands. The frequency of visits to Kabul by the Pakistani COAS, Gen. Kayani, indicated mediatory efforts between Haqqani and Mullah Omar on the one hand and the Kabul Government on the other hand. After one such visit in August 2010, Karzai called for withdrawal of US/NATO maintained ‘private security forces’ (employed to guard ISAF convoys and installations) within four months (i.e by year end, 2010) as they were ‘poorly regulated, reckless and effectively operate outside local law’ though one must concede that Karzai himself had promised as much in his 2009 Presidential election campaign.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai also confirmed on a US Television channel that discussions were going on with the Taliban, an announcement that caused Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani to warn on October 12 that any direct talks with the Taliban without Pakistan would fail. A few days later, on October 14, 2010, the US Special Envoy for Af-Pak, Richard Holbrooke, confirmed the talks with the Taliban while Gen. Petraeus, Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan, said his troops facilitated a high-level Taliban leader to travel to Kabul to have talks with the Government. Later, it turned out that they were referring to Anwarul Haq Mujahed, a terrorist leader who is in custody in Peshawar along with the former Taliban governor of eastern Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, Maulvi Abdul Kabir, and his deputy governor Sedre Azam. These leaders were taken in a helicopter from Peshawar, obviously with Pakistani consent and knowledge.

In mid-April 2011, President Zardari visited Ankara and persuaded the Turkish government to allow the Taliban to open an office with diplomatic level status to enable negotiation with them there. The Turkish government agreed {However, the Taliban liaison office was eventually opened in Doha, Qatar in November, 2011 after Afghan President Hamid Karzai dropped his opposition to Qatar in preference to Saudi Arabia or Turkey}. On the same date, Prime Minister Gilani visited Kabul along with COAS Ashfaq Kiyani and ISI Chief Shuja Pasha when Pakistan and Afghanistan decided to set up a two-tier joint commission to facilitate the reconciliation process in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign troops. Gilani claimed “The U.S. is on board. That's our core group and whatever will be decided will be among Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S.” But in an oblique reference to the U.S.' contention that negotiations ought to be held only with Taliban elements willing to accept the Afghan Constitution, Mr. Gilani said “conditions, qualifications or demands at this stage, in our view, may not be helpful”. One of the reasons that an away-office was opened at Qatar was to insulate the Taliban from the ISI as western diplomats involved in the negotiations later admitted. Such an office would also ensure that impersonators do not pose as Taliban representatives as it happened twice, once leading to the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the other time the US airlifting the impostor with high security to Kabul from Peshawar.

So, the talks have been going on for a long time and as usual Pakistan's central role was needed. Spain conferred its highest military award on Kayani in late 2011. The Pakistani plan is going well. China is going to play a decisive part in keeping India out of Afghanistan after the US eventually leaves in 2014. Currently, that role is being played by the US on behalf of Pakistan while continuing to mouth plattitudes about Indian economic assistance to Afghanistan and its deep historical relationship etc.

Thanks for the detailed post
The WOT will morph into a low key long term small force campaign till 2024. It will linger on beyond that period

Good post indeed, more of a good article I'd say.
Sure doesn't look good for India.
Problem with not having proper influence in Afghanistan is, Pakistan will then use the future Afghanistan against India one way or the other.
We have no nefarious plans in Afghanistan, atleast not any that would harm them. And of all countries, we are the ones booted out.
That is what happens in Kaliyuga

Irrespective of the Yuga, it is important in statecraft to protect your own interests even if you are a status-quo state. And sometimes states, entities and individuals invest time, money and other resources expecting a certain ideal outcome. The ideal outcome need not happen but if your conscience and conviction is that you did the best given the circumstances, then there is no point whipping yourself to death. S**t happens!

However, in Afghanistan, the investments we have made (monetary or otherwise) will stand us in good stead with the people of Afghanistan. Things haven't come full circle yet. And it is bound to. And that's when we will see our good intentions (as it has always been) and our investments pay off.

Funny how some on this thread were so optimistic about the US presence and peddling this weird logic of good vs bad taliban and how the afghan army will keep the taliban at bay. I'm enjoying the back peddling. Afghanistan will be chewed up by these PA backed jihadis and then the fireworks will start in Kashmir. We got a little taste recently.

US for their own reasons undermined Karzai govt credibility and ensured ANA has little combat ability. All this ro keep TSP propped up. The negotiation with Taliban without disarming them after defeating them also reveals their strategic concerns.

^^ I don't think the US undermined the ANA - probably initially without approving SF to placate TSPA. They approved that later and its the only unit thats capable and has members of all the tribes.

They tried to recruit heavily in Pakhtun's last year and that failed dramatically. So they said ok... we'll pay you and arm you to defend your own villages - obviously this worked both ways.

SS ji - Only bit I disagree with is the conspiracy with the RIC's. They don't trust TSP. They know anything that TSPA signs up to is not worth its paper. I think they are just seeing what Pak can offer - its worth a shot for them.

-----------------------------
Difficulties on the drawdown... Discussed here:
Centcom Undertakes Massive Logistical Drawdown in Afghanistan

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service
TAMPA, Fla., June 21, 2013 – Two years ago, as commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, Army Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III was marching against a strict Dec. 31, 2011 deadline to complete the largest logistical drawdown since World War II.

Army Sgt. Andrew Markley, materiel redistribution yard noncommissioned officer for Forward Operating Base Sharana, helps move containers at his facility. U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Henry Chan
(Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available.
It was a mammoth undertaking, involving troop redeployments and equipment retrogrades that had peaked at the height of coalition operations in 2007 and 2008. At that time, the United States had 165,000 service members and 505 bases in Iraq – all packed to the gills with everything from weapons systems and computers networks to bunking and dining facilities.
Austin had to reduce the force to zero, collaborating with U.S. Central Command to determine whether equipment should return to the United States or be transferred to the Iraqis or sent to Afghanistan to support the war effort there.
Centcom, in lockstep with U.S. Transportation Command and its service components, redeployed the 60,000 troops who remained in Iraq at the time and more than 1 million pieces of equipment ahead of their deadline.
Then-Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, commemorating the end of America's military mission in Iraq at a mid-December 2011 ceremony in Baghdad, praised Austin for conducting “one of the most complex logistical undertakings in U.S. military history.”
“Your effort to make this day a reality is nothing short of miraculous,” Panetta told Austin.
Today, as the Centcom commander, Austin is facing an even more-daunting challenge as he carries out a larger, more complex drawdown operation, in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s geography, weather and security situation and its limited transportation infrastructure present bigger obstacles than planners ever faced in Iraq, Scott Anderson, Centcom’s deputy director for logistics and engineering, said during an interview at the command headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base here.
Also, there’s no other combat operation to transfer the mountain of logistics to. Everything has to be transferred to the Afghans, sold to a partner nation, destroyed so it doesn’t fall into the wrong hands, or returned to the United States, Anderson noted.
First and foremost among the challenges is Afghanistan’s landlocked location. There’s no ready access to a seaport, and no Kuwait next door, providing an initial staging point for retrograde operations as it did during the Iraq drawdown.
“Kuwait was our ‘catcher’s mitt,’” Anderson said. “If you were to ask me how long it takes to retrograde out of Iraq, I would say as long as it takes to get across the border to Kuwait.”
In contrast, there’s no similar “catcher’s mitt” for Afghanistan, he said. “Leaving Afghanistan, you can’t just go next door to Pakistan or up into Uzbekistan and park. Once the movement begins, you have to keep moving, and the velocity continues until [the shipment] gets home to the U.S.”
Outgoing shipments -- about 1,000 pieces of rolling stock and more than 2,000 cargo containers per month -- are moving primarily by air or through ground routes across Pakistan, Eastern Europe and Western Asia known as the Northern Distribution Network, Anderson reported.
When flying equipment out from Afghanistan,“multimodal transport” is the most-favored option. It involves an initial movement to one country, usually by air, then a transfer to another conveyance such as a ship for the rest of the trip.
The shortest and least-expensive ground routes out of Afghanistan pass through Pakistan to its port in Karachi. Centcom and Transcom used the “Pakistan ground lines of communication” for about 70 percent of Afghanistan-bound shipments until the Pakistan government abruptly closed them in November 2011 for seven months over a political dispute, Anderson said.
That forced the United States to make greater use of the Northern Distribution Network, an elaborate network of rail, sealift and trucking lines established in 2009, to sustain forces in Afghanistan, he said. It continues to provide about 80 percent of all sustainment operations.
With agreements in place to channel an ever-increasing amount of retrograde cargo through Pakistan, Anderson said Centcom is satisfied that it has ample capacity to support the drawdown.
But recognizing lessons learned, he said the United States wants to keep every possible exit route open to ensure no single “point of failure” can disrupt the effort. “If you lose a route, you lose capacity,” he said. “So you keep your options open. That’s why we look to maintain redundant routes and we want to keep those routes ‘warm’ by using them.”
Yet for now, only about 4 percent of retrograde equipment is flowing through the Northern Distribution Network.
One reason, Anderson explained, is that the vast majority of U.S. forces now are operating in eastern Afghanistan, which is closer to Pakistan than the NDN. “The majority of our cargo simply isn’t leaving the northern part of Afghanistan,” he said.
To get it across Afghanistan to the NDN involves crossing the towering Hindu Kush mountain range -- a logistical challenge that becomes monumental during the winter months.
But there are other complications to making greater use of the Northern Distribution Network, particularly for many of the shipments that initially entered Afghanistan via Pakistan or by air, Anderson explained.
Some of the physical infrastructure simply can’t accommodate the heavy equipment being moved. Many of the countries involved have strict rules about what kinds of equipment can and can’t transit through their territory -- with particular objection to weapons systems and combat vehicles. In some cases, nations will allow these shipments to cross into their borders -- but only if the contents are covered.
“For retrograde, we have had to renegotiate agreements with all the Central Asian nations” that make up the Northern Distribution Network, Anderson said. “It may not be as viable as route as we would like, but the bottom line is, we need it.”
Anderson said he’s optimistic that the retrograde is on schedule to meet President Obama’s directive that the current force -- about 60,000 -- reduce to 34,000 by February.
“Between now and February, we are going to have a substantial amount of cargo move,” he said. Calling the February deadline “achievable,” he called it an important milestone toward the Dec. 31 deadline.
Meanwhile, Centcom leaders recognize the operational requirements that continue in Afghanistan, including upcoming elections next spring.
“Some of the equipment that we would otherwise be retrograding must remain because there is an operational imperative there,” Anderson said. “So in everything we do, we are working to maintain this balance between operations going on in Afghanistan -- folks who need their vehicles and equipment -- and our ability to retrograde.”
Emphasizing that Centcom will continue to sustain forces on the ground throughout drawdown operations, Anderson said signs of the transition underway will become increasingly evident over time.
U.S. bases, which once numbered more than 600, are down to about 100, some closed but most now transferred to the Afghan National Security Forces. Much of the equipment is being shared as well, although strict U.S. laws dictate what kinds of equipment can be transferred to the Afghans or any other partners, Anderson noted.
There’s another consideration to weigh: leaving equipment the Afghans can’t maintain over the long haul does them no good. “If we know there will be challenges in maintaining what we give them, then giving them more equipment is not going to help,” Anderson said.
Meanwhile, Centcom will strive to maintain the highest quality of life for U.S. forces on the ground throughout the drawdown, he said.
One seemingly small change, however, is sending a big signal of what’s ahead. Rather than three hot meals each day, U.S. forces in Afghanistan are now getting Meals, Ready to Eat for their mid-day rations.
The idea, Anderson explained, is to use up what’s already available in the theater, particularly when shipping it home costs more than it’s worth.
“Every day, [Marine] Gen. [Joseph F.] Dunford [Jr., commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan], sits down at lunch like everyone else and eats his MRE,” Anderson said. “It sets a tremendous example.” In a small way, he said, it sets the tone for the entire drawdown process.
“We are doing the drawdown in a balanced way, and with concern about the taxpayers’ money,” Anderson said. “We want to do this in the most economical, most efficient way possible, without causing excess or waste.”

This is what winning looks like.


They could have won. They could have won in Vietnam. They could have won in Somalia. They could have won in Lebanon. They could have won in Afghanistan.

America knows how to fight wars.


Anyhoos, India has no core interest in Afghanistan. Best for the Pakis and Afghans to continue to slaughter each other for another ten years only without American interface-mano a mano. That should crystalise the Afghan objective of reclaiming the lands up to Attock. Currently the Pathans are ambivalent about Afghanistan-they may have contempt for the Panjabi Muslim but they know Afghanistan is even more hard-scrabble and primitive than Pakistan.

Amreeka and Parat need to encourage the love of Pathans for their fellow Pashtuns. A busy Pakistan will be no threat to anyone but itself.

Af-Pak isolation from India is a good thing as it quarantines the powers that be to play in "Non-Indian" area. Till we get a respectable indigenous military capability, all this talk of looking forward is of no value. We should focus on that and on consolidating other areas like SL, MALDIVES, BDESH, sea access to NE etc. Then comes Af-Pak.

SSridhar guru, thanks for a tour-de-force of a post. You consolidate reams of information that has trickled in disparately over the years, into a solid narrative of very complex intrigues in recent history. Posts like this are the reason why BRF is still one-of-a-kind!

However I would like to go deeper into two questions:

1) The strange case of Mullah Baradar.

In the January 2010 London conference, Pakistan offered to bring around most of the Taliban to the peace talks table. Who knows, the billion US dollars were possibly a bribe to PA Generals to get the Taliban to speak. As a follow-up, on Feb. 11, 2010, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a brother-in-law of Mullah Omar, the head of the Quetta Shura and the second in command after Mullah Omar, was arrested in a joint operation by the CIA and the ISI in Karachi. It later emerged that Baradar was planning to attend the May 2-3, 2010 Jirga of about 1200 to 1400 people that Karzai had called of the tribal leaders to give a shape to the reconciliation process. The jirga was expected to set the terms and conditions for reintegrating the insurgents, a development that Pakistan clearly did not want. Thus, the US-Pakistani nexus in undermining Karzai stood thoroughly exposed. One can be sure that Baradar was contacted by the Afghan intelligence led by the shrewd Amarullah Saleh, much to the dislike of the US and the Pakistanis. he was to pay the price soon.

You seem to suggest that the US was party to Pakistan's plan of undermining direct (non-ISI-brokered) contacts between the Taliban and Karzai; and that Baradar was arrested because Saleh had convinced him to enter negotiations directly with Karzai. I don't understand why the US did this... was it to once again "placate" the Pakistani concerns that their "interests" in Afghanistan would be secured after US withdrawal?

One thing doesn't seem to make sense on the face of it. First the US gives Pakistani generals $1B as a bribe to get the Taliban talking to Karzai; then the US helps Pakistan to close down an alternate channel whereby the Taliban were already talking to Karzai. Why was it in the US interest to close down that alternate channel, which after all was directed at the same end-result of mediating reconciliation between Taliban (allegedly the "70% of Taliban who were non-fundamentalist") and Karzai?

Was it because the alternate channel of Baradar-Karzai (and subsequent alternate channels like Rabbani-Karzai) were created at the behest of the RIC triangle to bypass Pakistan? Does the US, or at least a section of the US apparatus, believe that it is not in the American interest to have a solution in Afghanistan where Pakistan isn't controlling the mediation?

2) Also, I remember on May 23rd 2011 a TOLO report that Mullah Omar had been killed while Hamid Gul was escorting him from Quetta to North Waziristan. http://www.dnaindia.com/world/1546514/r ... an-channel

Do we know for sure that Mullah Omar is still alive? It is not unthinkable that certain TTP leaders who were former proteges of Hamid Gul might have attacked and killed Mullah Omar, in much the same way as they killed other former mentors like Colonel Imam. Pakistan might be pretending Mullah Omar is alive as a bargaining chip, but in fact they might have him in custody or might have killed him. Following the Baradar episode, it would make sense for the ISI to get rid of all other contenders with enough heft and authority to negotiate with Kabul or Washington on the Taliban's behalf, except for the 100% Aabpara-approved Siraj Haqqani.

SS ji, thank you for that post!

Rudradev wrote:You seem to suggest that the US was party to Pakistan's plan of undermining direct (non-ISI-brokered) contacts between the Taliban and Karzai; and that Baradar was arrested because Saleh had convinced him to enter negotiations directly with Karzai. I don't understand why the US did this... was it to once again "placate" the Pakistani concerns that their "interests" in Afghanistan would be secured after US withdrawal?

One thing doesn't seem to make sense on the face of it. First the US gives Pakistani generals $1B as a bribe to get the Taliban talking to Karzai; then the US helps Pakistan to close down an alternate channel whereby the Taliban were already talking to Karzai. Why was it in the US interest to close down that alternate channel, which after all was directed at the same end-result of mediating reconciliation between Taliban (allegedly the "70% of Taliban who were non-fundamentalist") and Karzai?

RD ji, perhaps it had something to do with Iran's role in it. Iran had also become involved in materially aiding sections of the Taliban, and those comm channels were more favorable to them that did NOT go via TSP control.

A Deadly Triangle: William Dalrymple

long article

N^3 used to say Mullah Omar is one-eyed ISI subedar who was sent back to pretend to be a leader of Taliban.
Also look at Mullah Baradar's tribal origins.

I think he is a Durrani Pasthun. Rare one.
It still is a Durrani-Ghilzai affair. The Pak pasand Taliban are mostly Ghilzais.
Karzai et al are Durranis.

The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara Afghans would rather have Durrani Pashtuns as the rulers.

RD give some time to answer why the US would undercut its own efforts.



SS I hope Pak Watch blog is updated with this awesome summary.

ShyamD, ANA was under armed, under trained and made to be a glorified police force when it is facing Taliban terrorists armed with rockets and automatic weapons.
ANA should be the old NA fighters for they can clamp down in case of rebellion. The Taliban can be regularized as civilian militias and police forces in the Pashtun majority areas.

NATO has undermined ANA. It is in NATO interests to create a power vacuum of sorts in Afghanistan, while still propping up Pak's deep state. By creating a vortex in Afghanistan, it creates an open backdoor of both conflict and opportunity in Iran's east. It also keeps Pak employed and willing while they focus on the other side in Syria.

OARN, Ahmed Rashid has just written something in FP - "Karzai is part of the problem." Gives an indication of perspectives, and why ANA would be undermined by NATO.

Prithwiraj wrote:http://www.brookings.edu/research/essay ... 23328448-3

Before posting this, did you read this post: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1475585 ?

I skimmed through this. Condescending India TSP equal equal rubbish from the white Moghul. TSP faces threat from India, my arse. If somebody else finds something profound and insightful in that essay, please let me know.