Rudradev wrote:You seem to suggest that the US was party to Pakistan's plan of undermining direct (non-ISI-brokered) contacts between the Taliban and Karzai; and that Baradar was arrested because Saleh had convinced him to enter negotiations directly with Karzai. I don't understand why the US did this... was it to once again "placate" the Pakistani concerns that their "interests" in Afghanistan would be secured after US withdrawal?
RD, thanks.
I see three reasons. I would put them in the descending order of importance (from a US perspective). The US is still interested in ensuring that post-2014, Afghanistan does not turn out to be again a pre-2001 Afghanistan
as far as the US is concerned. They want to retain some force in Afghanistan after 2014 to monitor that country, maintain listening posts, keep at bay forces inimical to US interests, have a means to quickly intervene if the situation so demanded etc. This, they have realized, is impractical without Pakistani cooperation, especially when Russia bristles with opposition to this and influences CIS, and a China is working behind the scenes without revealing much about its real intentions. They know that the Pakistani masses totally oppose US presence in Afghanistan, a popular view that all Pakistani governments will support. Unlike during Musharraf's regime when he hunted with the hounds and also ran with the hares, popular governments in Pakistan can no longer resort to such practices
easily. It was clear even by c. 2010, that the PPP government would have no chance of returning to power whenever its term ended and that Imran Khan (he was becoming very popular around that time) or NS would assume the throne. In fact, the PPP government's fate has been hanging by a thin thread since c. 2010. Both IK & NS, the possible successors were well-known Taliban supporters. NS is a well known entity to the US and completely mistrusted by them. Though IK was unknown yet he was certainly not a friend of the US.
The US had to weigh its options and hedge and they were left with none other than the PA. The gradual shift towards the PA in the US thinking has been happening since c. 2009 though at times it was acrimonious because each was jockeying up for dominant positions in the final countdown. We will shortly see why c. 2009. The change of hands in Pakistan recently coincided with the US preparations to leave and they wanted to ensure that their twin objectives of a hassle-free evacuation of men and material in the 2013-2014 time frame followed by retaining a level of force in Afghanistan securely could not be achieved through an inimical civilian government that would be ruling Pakistan at that time. Since 2011, the US has sought the support of warlords for evacuation purposes and in one such deal, a warlord was reportedly getting a cool USD 2.5 M per month. There was no way an under-prepared ANA with its suspect loyalty or a Karzai who was disliked by the US Establishment (dislike being mutual) could be expected or even trusted to be of any help.
C. 2009 was a bloody year for the US forces in Afghanistan. 54 US soldiers were killed in August that year, another 51 in October and then in an audacious suicide attack, 8 CIA officers inside the Forward Operating Base Chapman at Khost including the chief of the base.
That took the American deaths in c. 2009 to 304 from the 151 in the previous year. It was also a miserable year for the entire NATO forces as they lost in c. 2009 alone as many personnel as in the entire period of 2001 to 2006. There were threats of withdrawal from many member countries like Italy, Germany, Canada and New Zealand. There were calls within the UK to withdraw which ultimately led to the January 2010 London Conference. Two well-known protaganists of engaging with the Taliban, Richard Holbrooke of the US and Sherard Cowper-Coles of the UK were in position in Afghanistan as special representatives of their respective governments when the
London conference was convened in the background of the huge losses in c. 2009. So, an embattled US had to fall back upon the time-tested PA. Naturally, the PA which was concerned about its 'strategic depth' to avenge India, had to be indulged in. Gen. Kayani's words at Madrid, which I had quoted from in the earlier post, are plain and forceful. That was an inflexion point as far as India was concerned.
India was ditched. At the same time, the US-Karzai relationship began to be defrayed too. Thus, it was c. 2010 that set the trajectory for the next five years. I would therefore say that rather than 'placating the PA',
it was the necessity of the US that determined whatever has happened. No doubt, several incidents took place after 2010 that took the US-Pakistan relationship to breakpoint. Some of them were jockeying up attempts and others might have been genuine.
The second reason could be the need to contain India. I have believed that the US learnt a solid lesson when it went overboard in the 70s and 80s in its relationship with China. This allowed PRC, among other reasons, to consolidate its position and reach the level that it is in today.
India is of a similar size and capacity and the US does not want to repeat that mistake. The India-Pakistan relationship must be maintained at a simmering point, but never boil over. That was why the US linked Afghanistan with the Kashmir issue at the prompting of Pakistan. Viceroy Holbrooke was initially appointed as Special Adviser for Af-Pak-Ind region. Soon upon his take over, he said in Brussels in the NATO meeting that India was a key element in resolving the Afghan problem. Many Indians were elated that at last our role has been recognized but it was a ruse to link Kashmir etc with Afghanistan. When
that ploy fell through because India forcefully rejected Holbrooke's position vis-a-vis India and even went to the extent of not receiving him at all in new Delhi, another ploy had to be invented and that was the Indian involvement in Balochistan. The Pentagon spokesperson, Ms. Christine Fair, was tasked with supporting the Pakistani falsehood of Indian consulates in Herat and Jalalabad destabilizing Pakistan through Balochistan.
By repeating Pakistani assertions that its Afghan interests are dictated by its 'only existential threat', India, the US has implicitly recognized that Pakistani position and has used it so far to deny effective Indian involvement in Afghanistan and beyond.
The third reason could be the local situation in Afghanistan itself. Karzai is hated by the US. His powerful brother,
Ahmed Wali Karzai, one of the most powerful individuals in southern Afghanistan, was killed at Kandahar by an assassin, one of his own security bodyguards in July 2011 and eight weeks later, the High Peace Council (HPC) Chairman and a possible contender for a Presidential position in c. 2014,
Burhanuddin Rabbani, was also eliminated. In between, other high profile Karzai supporters such as
Jan Mohammad Khan, a member of Mr. Karzai's inner circle and a former Governor of the Uruzgan province and the Mayor of Kandahar,
Ghulam Haider Hamidi were also killed by the Taliban. Karzai was considerably weakened especially with the loss of his Kandahari brother.
The deaths of Wali Ahmed Karzai and Burhanuddin Rabbani were clearly meant by the Taliban and Pakistan to sabotage the peace process,
eliminate non-Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, and reduce the involvement of those who may not toe the Pakistani line of thinking in the resolution of the Afghan crisis. These assassinated individuals were playing the role of weaning away the Pashtun from the Taliban, a goal with the January 2010 London conference and Holbrooke. But, by the third quarter, this was all gone. As Afghanistan’s Presidential
elections in c. 2014 loomed, the fight for the Presidency is likely to be among
Muhammad Umar Daudzai, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan (Pashtun and a former member of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami),
Hanif Atmar, a fomer Interior Minister in Karzai’s cabinet (Pashtun),
Abdullah Abdullah, a former Afghan Foreign Minister representing the Northern Alliance of non-Pashtuns,
Amarullah Saleh, the former Intelligence Chief in Karzai’s government and
Ahmed Zia Masoud, the brother of the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masoud. None of them is to the liking of the US for different reasons.
They (US) might have therefore preferred a Taliban instead, as alternatives are not viable and Karzai or his supporters are no longer in the good books of the US after c. 2009.
One thing doesn't seem to make sense on the face of it. First the US gives Pakistani generals $1B as a bribe to get the Taliban talking to Karzai; then the US helps Pakistan to close down an alternate channel whereby the Taliban were already talking to Karzai. Why was it in the US interest to close down that alternate channel, which after all was directed at the same end-result of mediating reconciliation between Taliban (allegedly the "70% of Taliban who were non-fundamentalist") and Karzai?
Was it because the alternate channel of Baradar-Karzai (and subsequent alternate channels like Rabbani-Karzai) were created at the behest of the RIC triangle to bypass Pakistan? Does the US, or at least a section of the US apparatus, believe that it is not in the American interest to have a solution in Afghanistan where Pakistan isn't controlling the mediation?
I do not think that the RIC was influential enough to strike contacts between Karzai and Baradar. Karzai had been willing to talk to those Taliban who shunned extremism, accepted Afghan constitution, and was willing to fight the elections democratically. His group was able to strike deals independently with Baradar et al behind the backs of the ISI. Amarullah Saleh was running an efficient intelligence and counter-intelligence setup.
As to why the US should spend money to get the Taliban to the table and yet close down the Karzai-Baradar dialogue, there can be only one answer.
That is that the US decided at some point (during the 2009 - 2010 time frame) that they should not encourage anything that was not to the liking of the Pakistani friends.
2) Also, I remember on May 23rd 2011 a TOLO report that Mullah Omar had been killed while Hamid Gul was escorting him from Quetta to North Waziristan.
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/1546514/r ... an-channel
Do we know for sure that Mullah Omar is still alive? It is not unthinkable that certain TTP leaders who were former proteges of Hamid Gul might have attacked and killed Mullah Omar, in much the same way as they killed other former mentors like Colonel Imam. Pakistan might be pretending Mullah Omar is alive as a bargaining chip, but in fact they might have him in custody or might have killed him. Following the Baradar episode, it would make sense for the ISI to get rid of all other contenders with enough heft and authority to negotiate with Kabul or Washington on the Taliban's behalf, except for the 100% Aabpara-approved Siraj Haqqani.
The report of Mullah Omar's death was perhaps a psy-ops by Afghan intelligence. There is absolutely no need for the US to suppress Mullah Omar's death if indeed it had happened. Nor, can we expect the Taliban to remain silent on this for more than two years now. There was no follow-up news after that one, which is a giveaway that no such incident took place.
Commanders and foot soldiers of the TTP take a bayat on Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar remains a rallying point for the Taliban and even the Pashtun warlords such as the Haqqanis. Mullah Omar wore Prophet Muhammad's robe in Kandahar on one fateful day in c. 1996 and was thus proclaimed as the Leader of the Believers (Amir ul Momineen) by the ecstatic crowd. He is a far more credible Amir-ul-Momineen even to the Pakistani masses than the wannabes like Zia-ul-Haq or a Nawaz Sharif in 1998. A number of Taliban commanders might be susceptible to blandishments but not so long as Mullah Omar lives.
The Haqqanis would have reduced Aabpara and the entire Rawalpindi-Islamabad region to ashes had Mullah Omar been killed. Today, Mullah Omar is the head of Al Qaeda and Allied Movements.