Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
For China we need something bigger.
China is a big kahoona.
We need something which takes care of their border as well as their maritime region.
China is a big kahoona.
We need something which takes care of their border as well as their maritime region.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
We need to be swift. We hear a lot about the Cold Start for the Pakis, we should have something similar for the Chinese as well. They might have greater numbers, but logistics is on our side.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Defeating Vietnam, however, appealing and easy. Will not get the PRC, the results, that giving a bloody nose to India will. If Indian military economic capability Strong enough that we can beat the PRC, in a short sharp fight.nakul wrote:They can't. Not till they have a clear superiority in our backyard. They know that it is probably easier to bully Vietnam, Phillipines & other weaker states. To subdue us, they need a force many times greater. We only need to add a single ship for 3-4 Chinese ships. We are baniyas onlee.
Moreover, the PRC need not enter the IO Littoral in order to take on India. It may choose to go after ONGC, assets in the Vietnamese territorial waters. The Vietnamese / Indian Navies perceived in ability to deal with the PLAN will provide the PRC with the same payoff that defeating the IA on the LAC will.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
We have already stated that IN's concern in the Indian Ocean region. ONGC is protected by Vietnamese Navy on paper. We might send a submarine but officially anything outside the IOR is not IN's main responsibility. Since we don't have any official pact with Vietnam, attacking an undefended civilian asset is not going to bode well for their image.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
^^^
I agree with your point that attacking a civilian asset will not sit well with the PRC image. However, the inability to protect the said asset will also not help the Vietnamese / Indian image.
As it shows a lack of capability / resolve on our part.
PS: any further on this and we will go OT.
I agree with your point that attacking a civilian asset will not sit well with the PRC image. However, the inability to protect the said asset will also not help the Vietnamese / Indian image.
As it shows a lack of capability / resolve on our part.
PS: any further on this and we will go OT.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
We need all those assets in Vietnam for showing Chinese that we can poke in their backyard too. China is not going to move out of PoK if we just request them. However, if we have bargaining chips, we can exchange one for another. Some say that the Gwadar port was used bu China as a bargaining chip to limit our involvement with Vietnam. We need more such chips on the table.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
ONGC has withdrawn from Nam for all practical purposes. Whether it was an honest excuse or not about feasibility, or Chinese pressure - we will not be certain about until say another 50 years, and even then we may not know the truth since congrez leadership from independence times appear to have a reputation for destroying and vanishing uncomfortable documents.
Regarding potential for Chinese aggression, the reality is much more complex than a simple polemical battle between hagiographers of the congrez foreign policy and their critics.
As far as Indian steps are concerned, we do not seem to have moved out of the cyclical bluster-show-dramatics-anti-chinese rhetoric followed by emotional torrent of camaraderie and "peace" followed by more bluster etc, that was the hallmark of Nehruvian foreign policy between 1948 and 1962. On top of that the Nehruvian characteristic of giving false reassurances to the public and then when disater or reversals strike, blame it on others or make it look like a natural event not the responsibility of any human being - seems to have continued over succeeding generation of national leadership.
So whatever the national leadership is claiming - cannot be relied on. The overt preparation stuff could be bluster, a kind of psychological gamble that precipitated the crisis in 1959-62, with criminal negligence and unconcern for not only the lives of men in the forces but also long term geo-strategic consequences.
Just as 40 years ago, we also have the alternating interludes of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai and the much hyped and touted current round of "military" tete-a-tete between the two sides. Even if the army is level headed, the political leadership swings between extremes of paranoia and euphoria, with the risk avoiding hedging mentality probably the best description of underlying guiding principle.
As for China, it has sufficient problems of its own - and at an increasing rate from now on to 2017-2019, to prevent any immediate large scale offensive. It may do so, only if certain internal battles within the party and the army get out of hand - and then both sides of that conflict agree to a military adeventure to postpone the inevitable crumbling of the current state. That risk is more in the 2019-2024 phase than right now.
The third factor to model is the potential mediating role of both UK and Russia in stablizing the frontier between China and India. Indian foreign policy seems to be uncannily aligned with British perceptions and moves - not always in tandem or complementarily, but there is always a de-facto convergence. For the global financial machinery that is primarily run by the relics of the British empire - the drugs and other flows from China to the west is an important conduit for capital - and cannot be jeopardized. So the see-saw of frontier battles between China and India will be determined to a large extent by the influence that this empire-relic system has on the two countries.
There are reasons to model continued underlying connections between the Russian state and UK based biz and political interests - that continued through the disruption of Bolshevism and USSR and may even be continuing now. So Russians might have vehemently overtly opposed USA - but it could be aligned to the internal rivalry that UK has always had with American hegemony. In that sense Russian policy about India need not be entirely uninfluenced by British inner perceptions and needs. Russians will do this out of the formal excuse of the need to bolster China for larger geopolitical interests while protecting Indian presence too as a balancing factor.
Regarding potential for Chinese aggression, the reality is much more complex than a simple polemical battle between hagiographers of the congrez foreign policy and their critics.
As far as Indian steps are concerned, we do not seem to have moved out of the cyclical bluster-show-dramatics-anti-chinese rhetoric followed by emotional torrent of camaraderie and "peace" followed by more bluster etc, that was the hallmark of Nehruvian foreign policy between 1948 and 1962. On top of that the Nehruvian characteristic of giving false reassurances to the public and then when disater or reversals strike, blame it on others or make it look like a natural event not the responsibility of any human being - seems to have continued over succeeding generation of national leadership.
So whatever the national leadership is claiming - cannot be relied on. The overt preparation stuff could be bluster, a kind of psychological gamble that precipitated the crisis in 1959-62, with criminal negligence and unconcern for not only the lives of men in the forces but also long term geo-strategic consequences.
Just as 40 years ago, we also have the alternating interludes of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai and the much hyped and touted current round of "military" tete-a-tete between the two sides. Even if the army is level headed, the political leadership swings between extremes of paranoia and euphoria, with the risk avoiding hedging mentality probably the best description of underlying guiding principle.
As for China, it has sufficient problems of its own - and at an increasing rate from now on to 2017-2019, to prevent any immediate large scale offensive. It may do so, only if certain internal battles within the party and the army get out of hand - and then both sides of that conflict agree to a military adeventure to postpone the inevitable crumbling of the current state. That risk is more in the 2019-2024 phase than right now.
The third factor to model is the potential mediating role of both UK and Russia in stablizing the frontier between China and India. Indian foreign policy seems to be uncannily aligned with British perceptions and moves - not always in tandem or complementarily, but there is always a de-facto convergence. For the global financial machinery that is primarily run by the relics of the British empire - the drugs and other flows from China to the west is an important conduit for capital - and cannot be jeopardized. So the see-saw of frontier battles between China and India will be determined to a large extent by the influence that this empire-relic system has on the two countries.
There are reasons to model continued underlying connections between the Russian state and UK based biz and political interests - that continued through the disruption of Bolshevism and USSR and may even be continuing now. So Russians might have vehemently overtly opposed USA - but it could be aligned to the internal rivalry that UK has always had with American hegemony. In that sense Russian policy about India need not be entirely uninfluenced by British inner perceptions and needs. Russians will do this out of the formal excuse of the need to bolster China for larger geopolitical interests while protecting Indian presence too as a balancing factor.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Any reports on the unreported parts of the Hindi-Chini military bhai-bhai meet?
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Just trying to understand, why Indians have not built a trade route for crude, such as one with Iran, from Russia -> around Japan -> Phillipines north -> around Combodia -> around Thailand -> India. This in spite of Russia having largest resources of crude. Or is it that huge ships that can carry millions of tonns of oil are rare and tough to be hired?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Do you mean mixed land-sea route?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
It has to do with the extreme weather in easter Russia/Siberia. please browse down in below link to see existing trade routes.vishvak wrote:Just trying to understand, why Indians have not built a trade route for crude, such as one with Iran, from Russia -> around Japan -> Phillipines north -> around Combodia -> around Thailand -> India. This in spite of Russia having largest resources of crude. Or is it that huge ships that can carry millions of tonns of oil are rare and tough to be hired?
http://www.cruiselawnews.com/tags/bunker-fuel/
The easiest way for India to get energy security is thru land route. For that we need to get back PoK. But alas, we think it would hurt some desert religions feelings if we take back what is legally hours.
There is so much self-doubt in our country that even most knowledgeable gets into numbness when it comes to PoK.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Sea route could be possible from east Indian shores to the east of Russia. Whether it would touch land is subjective perhaps.
Oh ok, my understanding was that countries do buy and transport crude from one end of the world to another. USA not only imports crude from far away but also exports refined jet fuel all over. This keeps the shipping industry busy and fuel source available.
Such a trade deal could also make available a direct Indo-Russian joint guarantee mechanism for fuel reaching India, along with co-operation from countries across the route that may benefit from refueling however a direct voyage could be the most preferable.
India should immediately start a company that would own such a transportation. Indian Navy could aid in making security guarantee available too.
Oh ok, my understanding was that countries do buy and transport crude from one end of the world to another. USA not only imports crude from far away but also exports refined jet fuel all over. This keeps the shipping industry busy and fuel source available.
Such a trade deal could also make available a direct Indo-Russian joint guarantee mechanism for fuel reaching India, along with co-operation from countries across the route that may benefit from refueling however a direct voyage could be the most preferable.
India should immediately start a company that would own such a transportation. Indian Navy could aid in making security guarantee available too.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The Shipping Corporation of India operated by Ministry of Surface transport is one such company.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
RamaY ji,
its more about fear of consequences of a supposed nuke war with Pakis, and all the countries of the world shunning India for its immoral behaviour shown by no other country, and no funds flow from international investors - especially from the Gulf, which will doom "our" (==[ finance lobby+infrastructure development lobby+superpower lobby+prosperity lobby]-[the aam who is supposed to be benefiting]) growth and future prosperity for hundreds of years.
its more about fear of consequences of a supposed nuke war with Pakis, and all the countries of the world shunning India for its immoral behaviour shown by no other country, and no funds flow from international investors - especially from the Gulf, which will doom "our" (==[ finance lobby+infrastructure development lobby+superpower lobby+prosperity lobby]-[the aam who is supposed to be benefiting]) growth and future prosperity for hundreds of years.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The sea route has no problems - except the gains already made on the hazardous Malacc straits by the Chinese. Two solid Islamist nations sit on two sides and who naturally look to China as an Islam-friendly ally as long as Islam tries nothing within China. Any gains made by India, or increasing presence of Indian navy - will be instantly reacted to by the Islamist elements in Malaysia and Indonesia, in cahoots with Chinese [and perhaps significant Gulf +western underhand support]. The Islamist countries to our east, all look to China as a more favoiurable ideologically compatible power and the Indians as a nation of "hindus" to be kept as low as possible.
I know people will protest about the inherent "liberalism" of Malaysia and "taking-pride-in-Hindu-past" of Indonesia - but where practical, concrete, foreign policy and on-ground balance of forces are concerned, the odds are against "Hindu" India. Indian gov's Islamophilic policies have not helped either. For the real and upcoming forces in both these countries - concessions or favours or non-intervention from non-Muslim majority country's govs are more a sign of inherent weakness and potential eventual capitulation as guided by their divine authority. Malaysia has been Islamizing at an increasing pace, and the same is going on in Indonesia. Islamic radicalization first is undertaken in the coercive wings of the Islam majority states - the police or the army and the long arm of the gov on thought control and religious offensives on the non-Muslims. Follow the activities of the Indonesian police, and the nexus between ex-army and Sunni clerics there. Similarly track the activities of the Ministry of Islamic affiars in Malaysia and the way the courts are moving along in Malaysia.
I know people will protest about the inherent "liberalism" of Malaysia and "taking-pride-in-Hindu-past" of Indonesia - but where practical, concrete, foreign policy and on-ground balance of forces are concerned, the odds are against "Hindu" India. Indian gov's Islamophilic policies have not helped either. For the real and upcoming forces in both these countries - concessions or favours or non-intervention from non-Muslim majority country's govs are more a sign of inherent weakness and potential eventual capitulation as guided by their divine authority. Malaysia has been Islamizing at an increasing pace, and the same is going on in Indonesia. Islamic radicalization first is undertaken in the coercive wings of the Islam majority states - the police or the army and the long arm of the gov on thought control and religious offensives on the non-Muslims. Follow the activities of the Indonesian police, and the nexus between ex-army and Sunni clerics there. Similarly track the activities of the Ministry of Islamic affiars in Malaysia and the way the courts are moving along in Malaysia.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
ramana wrote:Key relevant passages for India and Indian sub-continent
Indian elite thinks that they can prevent the players from changing by rewriting history. That is what the syncretic history nonsense is supposed to do.People who have their eye on short-term, contemporary events and the world around us tend to forget this. I sometimes think they imagine the world politic to be a chessboard, where you play games, have a crisis, and then you put all the pieces back and have another game. Well it’s not like that. You can have a chessboard, you have players who are either pawns or kings or whatever, but the players themselves are always changing.
Again if one applies this tendency to narration of Indian history its very obvious. The INC claims succession from the Brits who claim from Mughals who in turn claim from Slave Sultans who defeated the Hindus. But this is only about dilli region.The main thing is that mainstream history – the subjects which we concentrate on in schools, in television programmes and influential books – is driven by a number of factors, one of which is power politics. The powers of today wish to trace their rise and the origins of their influence. But also, historians are drawn to power. ....... And it’s not just powerful states, it’s powerful issues. It might be feminism or slavery – things which were missing but are now contemporary issues. They drive a lot of history writing.
Are you disparaging this tendency? Because that seems to suggest that if a polity has vanished it has less merit for the present day.
Well, I complain about the American style that nothing succeeds like success. That’s a very primitive way of looking at history, as between winners and losers. Sure, there are crackpot rickety states, but who’s interested in them? What they are really interested in is the successful cultures, the big civilisations, the mighty powers and so on. That gives a very false view of the panorama of the past. The past is full of everything. Great powers, obscure powers – which may have other achievements to their name.
Precisely that is how Dilli fell to the Slave Sultans and not due to any inherent defect of the Hindus. Yet the narrative forced down on us is that of a linear relentless decline of the Non Abrahamic India.Well, what do we mean by the losers? Even the mightiest of states eventually decline and die, like human beings. There are some states which are powerful, mighty and impressive for a time. Prussia was, of course, one of the biggest beasts. ..... And then it develops internal diseases and is swallowed up by its neighbours....
So we should think of it in terms of ebb and flow, not winner and loser?
Precisely. Rise and fall. These are biographies, life stories, of states. There’s always a birth, a struggle for existence. Some candidates fall by the wayside before they really establish themselves, some flourish, some go on for millennia. But they all come to an end.
The classic book on all this, ...., is Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. This was the guidebook, if you like, to long-term history – that there are these enormously powerful, extensive empires which exude an air of immortality and yet which all, sooner or later, come to an end. At the end of the Roman Empire, in the Byzantine period, the empire shrinks and shrinks until it consists of one city, Constantinople, and the Ottoman Turks can encircle it. There’s a final siege and the Turks go over the wall. The last emperor – number 156 or whatever – disappears in the fray, is killed, and that’s the end of the empire. This is, if you like, the guidebook to this story, to exactly what Rousseau is saying. No matter how powerful they may look, the time will come, as in the lives of men and women, when they die. It’s not a topic that people are eagerly looking at.
I submit the Freedom Struggle against the British was a resurgence of the people and not just of any one party or group.
...The idea of relative decline we can see in TSP, Bangla Desh and the perihery of India.Let’s move on to your third selection.
The third one is Aragon, and again is a very long story. The Iberian peninsula, for a long period, was dominated by three powers – Castile, Portugal and Aragon. Together, these Christian states drove out the Islamic, Moorish elements. Reconquista starts in the 11th century and goes on until the end of the 15th. Of these three, the winner in terms of power politics is Castile. Castile gets hold of the Americas. Although Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabelle of Castile, the Catholic monarchs, join together, the two kingdoms remain separate within Spain. The Castilians insist that no Aragonese will go to America, and that none of the gold of America will go to Aragon, it all goes to Castile. Gradually the Aragonese part of the Spanish complex declines, and its empire in the Mediterranean is taken over – Sicily, Naples, Corsica. The Aragonese even ruled Athens and Crete, in the late 14th century.
So why did they decline?
Well, it’s relative decline. ....Aragon is a big chunk of it – and it was a big chunk of the Western Mediterranean for 500 years. The Aragonese monarchy fell to the house of Trastámara in 1369 and the monarchy becomes Castilian. Gradually the Aragonese interests are neglected, and Castile centralises and takes over Aragon by a series of risings. It’s a bit like Poland and Russia – the big power taking over, with constant risings against the greater power which keep getting crushed.A new identity was created by conversion in the Indian sub-continent. However this identity is a superficial one. Its like wearing a coat to get protection from the fierce winter of the invasion or governance. The Prussians got a Lutherna identity but that did not remove their Prussian indentity. It just covered it up for a long duration.Whether by military defeat or political decline, if a state vanishes that doesn’t necessarily mean that its identity vanishes with it. The people and culture remain, surely?
That’s a good question. When the Visigoths were defeated, how many stayed behind to serve the Franks? The identity of a state is very fluid, and a lot depends on the fate of the people{nation} – what happens to the people when one country is conquered by another.
Two lessons for India from above passage:My final question – a counterpoint of sorts – is about the European experiment today. Europe has been at war with itself for millennia. Now we have the EU. Do you think that the EU will put an end to this history of conflict, that there will be no more redrawn borders?
It’s an absolutely key question. I think that a crisis such as we see developing now makes it absolutely essential for Europe to refocus itself, to weigh up what its aims and perspectives are. The changes that happened in 1989 and afterwards were unprepared for. Nobody saw it coming, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and all these countries dying to join the union. Enlargement took place without any real change of governance. Systems which were designed to rule six countries of similar economic and political development simply don’t work with 27.
Enlargement took place, and the Eurozone was created without any due recognition of basic facts. Basically, no enforcement. You set up a common currency, and you lay down rules that you’re not allowed to increase your debt to more than whatever it was. The first country to break them was Germany. Then the French broke it. And then along come the Greeks, who say, “Ah, well if the big boys can get away with it, who’s going to control us?” It’s got completely out of hand, because the Eurozone was set up without enforceable rules, without the political mechanisms for governing this currency area. I think it’s obvious now that they either have to transform the Eurozone quickly and make it workable – give it rules which can be observed and for which there are penalties – or it really is going to fall apart.
And behind that is the European Union. Is there a European identity strong enough to overcome the national identities of its member states?
It’s touch and go. But I’m an optimist. I think there will be one hell of a crisis. I doubt if the EU will disappear, but it will be severely chastened. And it will have to put its house in order. Otherwise it will become one of the vanished kingdoms. It wouldn’t be unprecedented for that to happen.
The gradual decline in governance and enforcement of the laws especially to suit the power politics of the leading parties will lead to the shattering of the confidence in the Indian state.
The other lesson is the recent virtual pogrom on the citizens from North East India by lumpen elements in the main cities of India is blow at shattering the Indian identity.
India also needs to put the house in order and pronto.
BTW, Edward Luttwak's "Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" describes how they survived for so long while the Western Roman Empire was overcome by the Germanic tribes.
We should read these two articles together and draw conclusions....
Interesting op-ed by Gautam Sen. he appears to have read Norman Davis latest book' Europe's Vanished States' and is applying the model to India to see future scenarios. Note Davis identifies critical events that led to state erasure:key battles, effete eleite or rulers, external factors, people/nation's changing mind set etc.
Sen identifies major factors in India: effete elite, hostile neighbors, apathetic public kept bored by venal leaders.
kshatriya wrote:India in peril - 1
The Union is threatened by fragmented politics and external enemies, writes Gautam Sen.
London, 5 September 2012: There is no guarantee that India will continue to exist within its current borders. The historical record suggests the sizeable continental span of India today has not been the norm in the past. A relatively uncontested substantial expanse of territory was held together for the longest period in history, approximately the mid-nineteenth century till independence, by British military and diplomatic prowess. Of course it almost ended in 1857 and stirrings of nationalist unease began within a generation following the Mutiny. But for much of the period, the majority of Indians mostly acquiesced in British rule and the possibility of any sectarian Islamic upsurge was held in check until Britain cynically decided to inflame it in response to what it deemed Hindu nationalism.
Partition altered the situation dramatically for India, by creating two militarised Ghazi entities along its borders, with threats against the Indian Union emanating from both of them. In the period since Partition, an ostensibly unified Indian State has had little meaningful control of Kashmir and the Northeast, and its sovereign prerogatives in them would cease without the unbroken military presence obligated by constant local insurgencies. This is not customarily the indefinite state of affairs within a country. In addition, the cultural association of these territories with the rest of India, characterized by religious estrangement, is minimal, and routine access into them for Indian citizens circumscribed in varying degree. Elsewhere, over two misguided and self-destructive generations, citizens of Assam and West Bengal also contrived to diminish their affiliation with the rest of India. They managed to weaken it by altering the demography of their states, implanting large numbers of foreigners on their own soil. And the political loyalties of a significant number of alleged Indian citizens of these states are suspect and their net annual tax contribution to the Indian Central exchequer usually negative.
The views of India's contemporary elites on the future of their country, who inherited a truncated nation in 1947, can be dismissed outright. Their socio-political hallmarks, with few exceptions, have been lack of historical perspective, astounding greed, cowardice and complacency masquerading as political sagacity. Their political impulse has usually been to follow the path of least resistance and bury their heads in the sand and surrender meekly when overwhelmed by circumstances. The twin goals of India's political elites are likely to remain wealth and political power to attain it. Virtually everything else positive in India is a product of enervated inertia and the genius of exceptional individuals, who achieve extraordinary goals. Some of these accidental attainments, like nuclear fission and India's missile programme, are of lasting significance, but primarily issuing from their innate technological dynamism and only secondarily owing to any considered political wishes of the Indian State to take advantage of them purposefully.
In contemporary India, major elements of its political class are precipitating conditions likely to destroy the Indian Union in its present form. Despite spending untold sums on acquiring military hardware, India's politicians and bureaucrats are manipulating venally to foster a pliant senior officer corps, which could have potentially disastrous consequences in the event of a major war. It must be surmised that treasonous corruption over defence purchases is the underlying reason why it is necessary to subvert the senior corps and install obliging officers. The appointment of a supposedly upright politician to head the defence ministry is presumably designed to contrive a misleading aura of probity, which makes the minister personally culpable for any crimes being committed. It is simply not credible to imply that the minister would have acted differently had he been aware of the lethal misconduct, since the family of his own patrons is evidently involved in the scandals. All those implicated should face summary wartime sanctions if India's military forces suffer major reverses in the field of battle owing to the intolerable conduct of politicians and officers appointed by them. It might be recalled that the late Lieutenant-General J. N. Chaudhuri threatened to impose the ultimate sanction against the cowardly mediocrity favoured by Jawaharlal Nehru for the post of chief of staff during the 1962 debacle, when the prime minister appointed him to reform the Indian armed forces
.
The brutal fact of the matter is that India's semi-literate elites, besotted with shopping sprees abroad, Bollywood and absurdities like the IPL tournament, are incapable of fathoming their country is not unique. It happens to be located in the same planetary system as other countries. In this world, mighty states' systems regularly fade away, this being the fate of the ancient Greeks, Romans, Persians or indeed the Ottomans, Spanish, Austro-Hungarians or the former Soviet Union. Their own country could also become the victim of the inexorable forces of history. Such disintegration is a product of the internal political and economic dynamics of large polities, whether domestic political schisms and economic setbacks, or how they cope with external political, military and environmental challenges. The question to be pondered is whether India, misgoverned by a profoundly dysfunctional and discredited political order, unable to sustain basic economic and institutional goals, can survive as a united political entity in one of the most hostile political and military environments in the world; perhaps only less demanding than that faced by Israel. In both instances, all their significant neighbours are anxious to do them harm, the lesser ones awaiting action by the stronger, for an opportunity to join the melee to crush them.
What shape could the denouement take for India? Scrutinising India from Beijing, Rawalpindi (which an exultant Indian actress visited recently to entertain Pakistani troops),(Who is this ?) Dhaka and Kathmandu, it is possible to discern a scenario. National political impasse, resulting in weak leadership, fiscal crisis, limiting the capacity of the government to borrow, falling growth rates and social unrest as unemployment rises, are inviting conditions for striking a blow against India. It may be surmised that an assault scripted in Beijing would also involve Pakistan, to create a two-front quandary for India. Pakistan may merely need to mobilise its forces to threaten India at several points along the border to compel precautionary diversion of significant Indian troops. The Pakistani ISI will also instigate a bombing campaign across India to panic the civil population, disable some key economic facilities and stretch internal security forces. It will surely paralyse governmental authorities across India, a posture that nowadays comes easily to the Centre in any case. It may be safely predicted that a majority of India's state governments will baulk at measures that will inevitably require harsh intervention in Muslim-dominated areas and prompt shrill protest from suspect human rights NGOs.
Chinese forces are likely to launch three separate assaults against India along its northern borders, a major one to divert Indian troops, a massive airborne invasion of Arunachal Pradesh, targeting Tawang, and a third ground attack to rendezvous with its airborne divisions. Their airborne divisions may need to survive without supply lines for a period or only have access to restricted supplies from the air -- hopefully, this math has been worked out carefully by Indian defence planners. India will impose potentially substantial costs on any Chinese ground assault across the Arunachal Pradesh border, but the question is whether Indian resistance can be sustained for several months against better-equipped and vastly superior numbers. China will also launch disabling strikes against the Indian Air Force (IAF), engaging it in aerial combat and destroying airfields and any aircraft vulnerable on the ground; the IAF will need to be extremely alert to a surprise strike while still on the ground. What role the Indian Navy can play in these specific circumstances is unclear unless China and Pakistan join forces to disrupt India's international commerce, especially its fuel supply lines. It will probably be a side show, with even a blockade of Karachi failing to make a significant impact on the ominous challenges on the ground.
If Indian forces suffer major setbacks in the encounter with China, it may prompt Pakistani incursion into J and K and elsewhere along the Indo-Pak border. India could pound Pakistan from the air and make a dash across the border towards Lahore to hold their territory hostage to signal mutual vulnerability. However, Indian fear of escalation to nuclear standoff has become clear to observers and would constrain it from capturing significant Pakistani territory. Nevertheless, if adequate military resources can be mobilized by India, deliberately sacrificing territory and allowing enemy forces to advance into India may allow Indian forces to surround the invading army in a wide pincer arc to exterminate them altogether. Unfortunately, the idea that the anaemic and self-servingly duplicitous UPA or indeed any dispensation in India's Parliament today would decide to wage a prolonged military struggle, at whatever human and material cost, and accept huge territorial losses in the interim to achieve victory, like the Russia of Alexander and the USSR of Stalin, is a forlorn expectation. An Indian government, facing disaster in the north, could easily be tempted to negotiate territorial concessions rather than fight. Of course, Pakistan may, instead of initiating combat, wisely await a political settlement between a defeated India and victorious China to have their own territorial claims enshrined in it as well as their reward.
To be continued
A key measure that is needed to preserve States is to have a law just like the PRC has to treat secession as a capital offence.
The existence of such a law prevent PRC leaders from negotiating away territory and is a huge redline to their neighbors and far away powers.
If India had such a law then Nehru and his ilk would not talk about "not a blade of grass grows there!" nor would all this phappi-jhappi and aman ka tamasha continue.
For some reason, American diplomats and national security experts continue to fail to grasp the significance of China's anti-secession law of 2005. That law makes it a capital offense for any leader to agree to any compromise of Chinese territorial and sea claims. Chinese leaders simply have no authority to make deals without risking their lives.
It means that China cannot tolerate a declaration of independence by Taiwan or a declaration of independence by the Tibetans or the Uighurs in western China. The leaders in Beijing cannot agree to a compromise of Chinese claims to all of the South China Sea.
That explains the Chinese rejection of positions proposed by Secretary Clinton and the diplomatic insult from a cancellation of her audience with China's likely next leader, Xi Jinping. Both China and the US told the press corps the cancellation was not an insult, but everyone knows China dissed the US and got away with it.
Clinton appears not to have been well briefed on the Chinese legal position about sovereignty issues. She had lots of high level meetings and dinners, but the take away message is a total rejection of US compromise suggestions for settling South China Sea ownership claims and a pointed warning against US meddling in issues involving Chinese sovereignty.
To reiterate, Chinese leaders have no flexibility on issues of sovereignty in light of the passage of the 2005 anti-secession law. The Clinton visit was a diplomatic humiliation for the US. Nevertheless, the Chinese have no military capability to match that which the US can bring to bear on the issue of maintaining freedom of the seas.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The Chinese anti-secession law would contradict the UN charter included right to self determination clause. The reason that China can get away with it is because China allows no dissenting voice from within itself, and the Chinese communist party was totally committed from the time of Mao's ascendancy to imperialist expansion of Chinese territories.
China did not form its polity with obligatory subservience to UN decisions - which JLN committed India to right at the very beginning, over J&K.
Such a law would only work in India, if there is a clear recognition of the need - as and when opportunity arises - to expand soverignty to areas that were closely tied to India, and crucial for its security by sanitizing foreign intervention opportunities through interested parties in those regions. I agree that talking of giving up claims on territories should be made a treasonable act.
China did not form its polity with obligatory subservience to UN decisions - which JLN committed India to right at the very beginning, over J&K.
Such a law would only work in India, if there is a clear recognition of the need - as and when opportunity arises - to expand soverignty to areas that were closely tied to India, and crucial for its security by sanitizing foreign intervention opportunities through interested parties in those regions. I agree that talking of giving up claims on territories should be made a treasonable act.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I am no expert in law but we did merge Sikkim with India post independence. So a precedence exists if a situation arises. This could also be applied when a state bordering India breaks up (Sindh separating from Pakistan for eg). Moreover, an article like 370 can be used if the new state does not want to give up its rights to form its own laws.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Nakul and Bji, Can you get together and write an article on how to expand the geography of modern India?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
The logic used for Sikkim could actually be used even for Tibet, or Bhutan, or Nepal. The historical legacy and legitimacy arguments are parallel. That is not the issue. An anti-secession law will be ineffective, if there is not sufficient political agreement within the country that supports such a move. There are at least 3 different forces - very legitimate and very regime-pasand - who will object. They will object not giving their real reasons, but use other excuses like - they are against fascsistic and imperialist tendencies, that such measures will be counterproductive and foster more separatist reaction, etc.
added: ramanaji - working on it.
added: ramanaji - working on it.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I am not really keen on expanding India until we can handle it. There are various reasons for it. Partly economic & partly social. We could however have defense agreements (like Bhutan, tried with Lanka but failed) & VOA for their citizens. This will ensure the proper base for judging the next move. In case of extreme cases, like Pakistan, we have to ensure that the process is mutually beneficial. However, countries not hostile can be used to ensure that India & Greater India can exist at the same time in different planes. This will be more like the India of yore where Delhi was ruled by one king & Deccan by another but we had no hostility among citizens.
After a state of equilibrium is reached, we can choose to allow them to tightly integrate themselves to form a common front (BCCI with other Asian cricket boards). In the end, for the eventual integration to succeed there will be a long process of economic & social stability that could fulfill MMS dream of making borders inconsequential. There is a nice lesson for us to learn from Russia in forming CSTO and the problems they are facing with the CIS states.
dont mind helping bji as ramana requested
After a state of equilibrium is reached, we can choose to allow them to tightly integrate themselves to form a common front (BCCI with other Asian cricket boards). In the end, for the eventual integration to succeed there will be a long process of economic & social stability that could fulfill MMS dream of making borders inconsequential. There is a nice lesson for us to learn from Russia in forming CSTO and the problems they are facing with the CIS states.
dont mind helping bji as ramana requested
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
OK you can stay out.
Bji
While these guys have no problem with corruption and loot!
Bji
Such a plan needs to address potential holdouts.There are at least 3 different forces - very legitimate and very regime-pasand - who will object. They will object not giving their real reasons, but use other excuses like - they are against fascsistic and imperialist tendencies, that such measures will be counterproductive and foster more separatist reaction, etc.
While these guys have no problem with corruption and loot!
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Russia is already making moves to supply energy to Japan (either through tankers or a high tech undersea pipe passing through earthquake prone seabeds, former is more likely). We could have a joint agreement with Russia and Japan to have the Sakhalin island converted into a dedicated port for O&G supplies.vishvak wrote:Sea route could be possible from east Indian shores to the east of Russia. Whether it would touch land is subjective perhaps.
In addition to Bji's points on Malaysia and Indonesia, there is also the prospect that Indian Navy might get entangled in Japan's issues with PRC on Senkaku and East China Sea islets.India should immediately start a company that would own such a transportation. Indian Navy could aid in making security guarantee available too.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
In addition to Bji's points on Malaysia and Indonesia, there is also the prospect that Indian Navy might get entangled in Japan's issues with PRC on Senkaku and East China Sea islets.[/quote]
As defense, India and Russia can have strategic energy deals too for reasonable rates for long time. That will lighten the excessive load of greed that Indians have to carry as per whims of shekhs and oil traders from the west.
Japan could also be made as an observer so that if needed an alternate route could be made available to Japan as buyer and Russia as seller temporarily as needed.
As defense, India and Russia can have strategic energy deals too for reasonable rates for long time. That will lighten the excessive load of greed that Indians have to carry as per whims of shekhs and oil traders from the west.
Japan could also be made as an observer so that if needed an alternate route could be made available to Japan as buyer and Russia as seller temporarily as needed.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Russia has been holding a far-eastern conclave. Putin's Mongolia and China strategy might be the crucial piece for us to understand. Putin has virtually neutralized Poland and Ukraine and Georgia - the three traditional separatist enclaves within the Russian "empire". If the rescue appeal from Ukraine does not get addressed in the west, the pro-Rus faction within Ukraine will line up with Putin. If this front is stabilized, Putin will move on about the East. It would be so crucial for us to get into Mongolia.
On the other note Nepal is sliding deeper into Chinese military pockets. This could be both a setback as well as an opportunity for us. We do need to secure the image of Nepali ruling classes to have gone over to China, and aswell as the country becoming a seat of communism and souce of violence in India. The mountain terrain and the Chines emoney now pouring in, makes it difficult for the future but here may lie a very good opportunity to fix the "rear gateway" problem for ever.
On the other note Nepal is sliding deeper into Chinese military pockets. This could be both a setback as well as an opportunity for us. We do need to secure the image of Nepali ruling classes to have gone over to China, and aswell as the country becoming a seat of communism and souce of violence in India. The mountain terrain and the Chines emoney now pouring in, makes it difficult for the future but here may lie a very good opportunity to fix the "rear gateway" problem for ever.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
http://web.mit.edu/cis/precis/2012sprin ... FeGbER5E00
What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like? [Alternative title: Why Pakistani scum must be preserved at all costs]
By Christopher Clary
Christopher Clary
[Christopher Clary is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT.]
Whatever the US mouthpieces say, it should only add to our determination to see to the end of not only Pak, but erasure of everything that is likely to regenerate any future Pak. No compromises, tactical retreats yes - but erasure, complete and total erasure of all foundations as the ultimate target.
PS: This man should be added on to a watchlist of voices that can give us a window on to the section that will maintain, and even become more desperate to preserve the abomination called Pakistan in the immediate future.
What Might an India-Pakistan War Look Like? [Alternative title: Why Pakistani scum must be preserved at all costs]
By Christopher Clary
Christopher Clary
[Christopher Clary is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT.]
Apart from the usual barbs, this does represent a dominant portion of thinking within the US-NATO axis. It does also give a lot of points that should be taken into account unemotionally. Two of the assets they are concerned about is their shared interests with China in the west of Pak - namely Balochistan, and the port infrastructure that they use to supply the Islamists/"good" Talebs in AFPAK and the spying/disruptive activity from the Baloch side into Iran, and the other one is preserving their listening infrastructure and missile/nuke facilities on the subcontinent nearer the northern neck with India.Conventional wisdom suggests that India has gained sufficient conventional superiority to fight and win a limited war, but the reality is that India is unlikely to be able to both achieve its political aims and prevent dangerous escalation.
[...]
While India is developing limited options, my analysis suggests India's military advantage over Pakistan is much less substantial than is commonly believed. This means the outcomes over limited military campaigns are uncertain, with some chance they will not achieve India's political objectives. Such limited military campaigns are also risky, because if they are unsuccessful with limited force, there will be strong pressures for combatants to escalate and attempt to achieve more decisive political results.
[...]
India's substantial quantitative and qualitative naval superiority is unlikely to be an important factor in a short, limited war. India has twelve frigates to Pakistan's six, an aging aircraft carrier and ten destroyers where Pakistan has none, twenty corvettes with anti-ship missiles compared to Pakistan's six smaller missile boats, and fourteen diesel-electric submarines compared to Pakistan's five (excluding Pakistan's midget subs).6 But the question is not which navy would win a maritime war, but rather whether the Indian Navy could beat its Pakistani counterpart so decisively and quickly that it might alter the strategic situation on land. ... the Indian Navy played a limited role in earlier Indo-Pakistani conflicts and this pattern seems likely to persist.
Most analyses do not account adequately for how difficult it would be for the navy to have a substantial impact in a short period of time. Establishing even a partial blockade takes time, and it takes even more time for that blockade to cause shortages on land that are noticeable. As the British strategist Julian Corbett noted in 1911, "it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow…."7 Meanwhile, over the last decade, Pakistan has increased its ability to resist a blockade. In addition to the main commercial port of Karachi, Pakistan has opened up new ports further west in Ormara and Gwadar and built road infrastructure to distribute goods from those ports to Pakistan's heartland. To close off these ports to neutral shipping could prove particularly difficult since Gwadar and the edge of Pakistani waters are very close to the Gulf of Oman, host to the international shipping lanes for vessels exiting the Persian Gulf. A loose blockade far from shore would minimize risks from Pakistan's land-based countermeasures but also increase risks of creating a political incident with neutral vessels. Even if India were to be successful in establishing a blockade, new overland routes to China are likely to further protect Pakistan from strangulation from the sea. While the navy is not irrelevant, there are strong reasons to be skeptical that the naval balance has tilted in such a way as to affect strategic outcomes in a limited India-Pakistan conflict.
[...] While India has a qualitative and quantitative advantage, the air capabilities gap narrowed rather than widened in the last decade. The Pakistan Air Force has undergone substantial modernization since 2001, when Pakistan exited from a decade of US-imposed sanctions. With purchases from US, European, and Chinese vendors, Pakistan has both dramatically increased the number of modern fighter aircraft with beyond-visual-range capability as well as new airborne early warning and control aircraft. Meanwhile, India's fighter modernization effort has been languid over the last decade. India's largest fighter procurement effort—the purchase of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft—began in 2001 and has been slowed considerably by cumbersome defense procurement rules designed to avoid the appearance of corruption. While over the course of a prolonged conflict, there is little doubt that the Indian Air Force would win an air superiority battle, that battle would be hard fought and take time. The longer the fight for air supremacy, the longer it is before the Indian Air Force can focus on supporting ground forces in the event of substantial army-to-army clashes. More limited air strikes against "terrorist training camps" might be attractive to decision-makers in Delhi, but they are poor targets as the camps are likely to be empty following any large-scale terrorist attack on India. Further, such air strikes create the risk of tit-for-tat dynamics where Pakistan feels compelled to give back in kind to demonstrate an ability to protect its territory from India. If the Pakistan Air Force perceives that it cannot successfully use airpower in a reprisal raid following an Indian air strike, Pakistan may use conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles. India's air and missile defenses would not be able to stop a missile attack and might not be able to prevent a Pakistani air strike—thus, breaking an escalatory spiral of dueling air or missile strikes would prove daunting.
[...] After the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian Army was embarrassed by political criticisms that the mobilization to the Indo-Pakistani border took too long to complete. The army worked to speed up mobilization timelines and allow for Indian Army actions against Pakistan prior to a cumbersome full-scale mobilization. The principal difficulty with limited ground options is that they prevent India from taking advantage of its main advantage: its larger ground forces. Simply put, if India chooses to employ only a portion of its army, Pakistan would choose to employ a larger portion of its own forces to stop the attack and perhaps open up other fronts on terrain favorable to Pakistan. Relatedly, because Pakistan's population centers are close the border, it is easier for the Pakistan Army to maintain most of its land forces near the border than it is for India to do likewise. The net result of both factors is that India may have difficulty mobilizing more quickly than Pakistan. Therefore, even a limited ground attack could quickly escalate to being a full-scale clash between armies, with all the incumbent risks.
The net result of this analysis is to conclude that India's limited military options against Pakistan are risky and uncertain. Pakistan has options to respond to limited Indian moves, making counter-escalation likely. At least in the near-term, Pakistan appears to have configured its forces in such a way as to deny India "victory on the cheap." Therefore, India might well have to fight a full-scale war that could destroy large segments of Pakistan's army to achieve its political aims, which would approach Pakistan's stated nuclear redlines. Such a conclusion should induce caution among Indian political elites who are considering military options to punish or coerce Pakistan in a future crisis. In the event of a future terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan, Indian leaders are likely to have few good options and outside observers should remain intensely concerned of the dangers of escalation between these two nuclear-armed states.
Whatever the US mouthpieces say, it should only add to our determination to see to the end of not only Pak, but erasure of everything that is likely to regenerate any future Pak. No compromises, tactical retreats yes - but erasure, complete and total erasure of all foundations as the ultimate target.
PS: This man should be added on to a watchlist of voices that can give us a window on to the section that will maintain, and even become more desperate to preserve the abomination called Pakistan in the immediate future.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
A very amusing, but another line of thinking from the pro neo-Tsarist hopefuls from Pakiland: Nadir Mir uvacha in "pravda"
http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas ... rld_war-0/
http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas ... rld_war-0/
Yes these are signs of specially afflicted brains perhaps, but it is indicative of a certain section of thinking within the Paki jarnail class. There is intense lobbying going on to get a line with the Russians brokered by China.In Afghanistan US seeks to retain a (25000 strong force) SOF/Air Force for denuclearization of Iran - Pakistan. It may seek independence of Baluchistan (with Indian support.) A clash with Pakistan is likely though not inevitable. Delhi wants to use American Power to fight Pakistan (but absurdly believes it can escape the nuclear conflagration). The war with Iran is even nearer 2012. US - NATO may attack Iran followed by Pakistan or both together. An Israeli attack on Iran is even more likely and Indian attack on Pakistan (Cold Start) always remains a possibility.
Russia - China are Allies against US - NATO Geo strategy (Iran and Pakistan are joining this alliance but also the Battle Space.) China is rising economically, Russia is resurgent strategically. After Iraq, Afghanistan, they have seen Libya humbled by NATO power. The US -NATO model of regime change by sponsoring local militants - Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, in Libya (NATO trained anti Gaddafi Rebels), Syria (Syrian Rebels plus ex Libyan Rebels ) In Iran (non Persian ethnic groups, anti regime Diaspora ) in Pakistan (instead of regime change, keeping pliant puppets in power, or sponsoring Baluch rebels against Pakistan.) In Russia, President Putin himself has accused the US of instigating opponents of United Russia. In China, using India for fermenting trouble in Xinjiang, Tibet etc. All this is unifying the alliance of Heart land powers Russia -China and critical Rim land state actors Iran - Pakistan into an Anti US - NATO alliance. But events are moving too fast. The Mayan Prophesy of 2012 catastrophic year approaches. US - NATO-India clash with Pakistan or US - NATO- Israel clash with Iran will lead by default or design to multi regional war going Global.
The combined Geopolitical space of Pakistan - Afghanistan -Iran - Iraq (backed by) Russia - China is beyond the US - NATO reach (It has already over reached) Putin's reported warning to his generals, 'Prepare for Armageddon', must be taken seriously. Putin is a great leader in the tradition of Russian History. China has already alerted its Navy in the Pacific. North Korea can always do the unpredictable, more so now with the young Kim in power!
US - NATO war against Iran could be catastrophic, but against Pakistan it could be dooms day! US - NATO may have Turkish/Saudi support against Syria but in Pakistan's case both Saudi Arabia - Turkey will support Pakistan. In factWar against Pakistan is very complicated plus suicidal!
[...]
Fourthly There will be no foreign inspired civil war in Pakistan. Pakistanis are united to defend the mother land. Even militants are on the wane or will fight foreign invaders. A few Baluch rebels are being instigated by Delhi - Neocons. (The Baluch should be appeased by Islamabad).![]()
All major and minor political parties and people want an end to the Afghan War and peace in Pakistan.
Fifthly Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia will support Pakistan even for different Geopolitical reasons.
Sixthly A low intensity war in Geopolitical black hole of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq will defeat US - NATO (with war weary public, declining economy at home). A perfect catastrophe! A conventional war, more so on two fronts for Pakistan (US - NATO strike in the west, and Indian Cold Start in the east) will quickly reach nuclear threshold. If Pakistan is being destroyed by enemy fire power plus nukes it will strike back into India and attacking forces / region. Loose nukes from a destroyed Pakistan could explode in Israel - western cities leading to a nuclear retaliation chain cycle. The war going Global, nuclear destructive and radioactive. The Russian view that attack on Pakistan with lead to Thermonuclear War was in this context.
A war the US led NATO cannot win. With hundreds of millions or billions dead only a sick, demented man could term it as a victory.The real winner of the Second World War was USA whose homeland was untouched, and rose to become the sole super power. If there are any victors, it would be Russia - China unless the war involves them directly (something which the globalists hope to achieve - lure Russia - China by attacking Iran).
The Arab Spring - Muslim World would revolt in Anti Americanism as war with Iran - Pakistan and carnage becomes apparent. The western homeland and initiators of attack will be burnt by the flames they help ignite themselves (albeit radioactive fires).![]()
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/05 ... hadow-war/
Was any planned escalation here that triggered the Egyptian and Libyan response as a pre-emptive measure?
In a series of blog posts over the past two weeks, Cenciotti has described in unprecedented detail the powerful aerial force helping wage Washington’s hush-hush campaign of air strikes, naval bombardments and commando raids along the western edge of the Indian Ocean, including terror hot spots Yemen and Somalia. Cenciotti outlined the deployment of eight F-15Es from their home base in Idaho to the international air and naval outpost at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, north of Somalia.
Over the years there have been hints of the F-15s’ presence in East Africa, but “their actual mission remains a (sort-of) mystery,” Cenciotti writes. Based on the evidence, he proposes that the twin-seat fighter-bombers — one of the Air Force’s mainstay weapon systems in Afghanistan — are dropping bombs on al-Qaida-affiliated militants in Yemen. If true, that means the U.S. intervention in the western Indian Ocean is far more forceful, and risky, than previously suggested.
Ten years ago the Air Force openly acknowledged the initial F-15E rotation in Djibouti, but since then the flying branch has released few details. New official information on the Indian Ocean aerial armada has emerged only after airplanes crashed. An accident involving an Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone in the Seychelles late last year forced the Pentagon to admit it was building a drone base on the island nation. Reporters followed the Seychelles lead to uncover additional Reaper bases in Yemen and Ethiopia. Armed drones operated by the CIA and the military have killed scores of militants in Somalia and Yemen under steadily loosening rules of engagement.
Was any planned escalation here that triggered the Egyptian and Libyan response as a pre-emptive measure?
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Notwithstanding B.Raman garu's singleminded focus on China as the "threat" while underplaying AFPAK,
http://www.firstpost.com/world/can-chin ... 58248.html
http://www.firstpost.com/world/can-chin ... 58248.html
My assessment of the present position regarding these factors is as follows:
(a) Our intelligence collection capability in Tibet has improved. Our intelligence agencies are unlikely to miss war indicators in Tibet as badly as they did in 1962. [no confidence however]
(b) Our analysis and assessment capability has improved over what it was in 1962, but continues to be inadequate. The Chinese language capability of our national security community is worse than what it was in 1962 and in the years immediately thereafter. Our ability to understand and analyse the Chinese military mindset and thinking continues to be poor. Whatever capability we have built up in this regard has been largely influenced by Western thinking and analysis without an independent application of our mind. Our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of China-related intelligence lags behind our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of Pakistan-related intelligence. We can anticipate, analyse and counter Pakistan better than we can China. [Yes, but I don't like your underplaying of Pakistan and separating it from China as a problem] There are wild swings in our assessments on China—from alarmism on the one side to total complacency on the other.
(c) The professionalism of our armed forces has improved. They are better equipped, better trained and better led for a trans-Himalayan warfare today. But there is a lack of convergence of thinking between the Army and the Air Force on the one side and the Navy on the other as to what China implies for our national security and armed forces. There is inadequate integrated joint staff thinking in the armed forces as a whole on China. There is a newly-acquired fascination for naval power and an inadequate appreciation of the continuing importance of military (Army related) and air power.
(d) The understanding of our political class in matters relating to strategic decision-making on China is inadequate though it is better than what it was in 1962 and the years before. There is a clear understanding in our political class of China as a political and economic competitor, but inadequate comprehension of China as a military factor. [well how is that much different from 1962? Can you please look at speches of the PM about China's role as a compeitor from 1958, and even in May, 1962?]
Two new factors that have made their appearance since 1962 have not received adequate attention in our national security community:
(a) The Chinese search for alternative means of taking India by surprise. In 1962, they took us by surprise because our intelligence agencies had little capability for collecting war indictors from the ground in Tibet. The Chinese no longer enjoy this advantage. The increasing Chinese emphasis on the role of the helicopter-borne operations of their Army has to be seen in the context of their search for new means of taking India by surprise—particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. The equipping and training of the copter wing of their Army is receiving increasing attention with some major exercises already noticed.
(b) The Chinese testing and fine-tuning of integrated techniques of an Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external threats and in asserting their will trans-Himalayas. There has been an increase in the number of Air Force exercises in Tibet. There is inadequate knowledge of Chinese Air Force exercises in Yunnan, but my surmise is that in any future military confrontation with India, the Chinese will use their Air Force defensively from Tibet and offensively from Yunnan. [or reverse : not sure he has been on foot in far SE of NE]
In 1962, the entire North Myanmar was a political, administrative and military vacuum. The Myanmar government presence has since improved in the Rakhine (old Arakan) and Chin areas bordering Bangladesh, but remains the same in the Kachin State bordering Yunnan. The Kachin State and Yunnan are very important in any trans-Himalayan military strategy. We continue to neglect these two important regions from the point of view of our intelligence coverage as we were doing before 1962. Kachin State is important for defending our North-East in any new confrontation with China. Rakhine State is important for our Indian Ocean objectives and our energy security. [both beyond you now : one in Christian hands and has international EJ connection, while the other is in Sunni pockets firmly.]
I do not consider it necessary to touch upon the nuclear aspect in this analysis. It has to be discussed in camera.[nothing much to hide, why play like this!]
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I think there is a very high probablility for a chinese attack on sikkim/arunachal in a multi pronged strike. The one way for the chinese leadership to control its populace is its defacto religion buddhism and what better to control the holiest shrines of buddhism and thus control potential unrest., this has been one of the main objectives of the politburo.The timing would be interesting ., could be the time of indian general elections,
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
I don't think he is an objective commentator on 1962 issues. He blames the professionalism of the Indian Army! And just before that he blames the intel agencies for not picking up war signals/indicators!
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
ramana ji,
the primary problem is, and always was
(1) lack of political vision for what to do with Tibet
(2) confusion over loyalty to leftism, and fear of connected ideologies like islam - and their linked impact internally
(3) use of HHDL as a virtual political hostage for Chinese good behaviour but not really being decisive about Tibet
(4) confusion over what to do with the western borders spilling obver into what tod o with the eastern border
All of this fits in of course with British perception of what should be in "Republican Indian interest". Preservation of communist China and Islamic pakistan as two fences to hedge "Hindu" India in. Keep the communist China and Islamic Pakistani drugs/moneyflow corridor intact by allowing them common land borders. The drugs and offshore British capital can flow around smoothly in a multiple redundancy network - along both land and sea routes.
Nothing has really changed from 1948.
the primary problem is, and always was
(1) lack of political vision for what to do with Tibet
(2) confusion over loyalty to leftism, and fear of connected ideologies like islam - and their linked impact internally
(3) use of HHDL as a virtual political hostage for Chinese good behaviour but not really being decisive about Tibet
(4) confusion over what to do with the western borders spilling obver into what tod o with the eastern border
All of this fits in of course with British perception of what should be in "Republican Indian interest". Preservation of communist China and Islamic pakistan as two fences to hedge "Hindu" India in. Keep the communist China and Islamic Pakistani drugs/moneyflow corridor intact by allowing them common land borders. The drugs and offshore British capital can flow around smoothly in a multiple redundancy network - along both land and sea routes.
Nothing has really changed from 1948.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Is this the reason of the red flag with hakencruz in it...ie to digest the Hindu through Aryan??India has undeniable "soft power". The spiritual, cultural or culinary appeal is reinstated not only by
its film industry (Bollywood) but also through yoga, literature, classical dance and art forms.
Is this the dominant thinking of the German elite about India???Nonetheless in real and actual terms Indo-mania does not necessarily imply that India has arrived on
the global scene. Great power status would be meaningless if India does not deal with its domestic
problems.
Will India be able to come out on its own? Deficiencies in foreign policy, political instability, external
aggression and internal affairs, may hinder India’s path to positive progression and development. It
would indeed by a sad day for the country if its own political leaders damage the chances of India
becoming a great power.
India needs to do more than just walking in the global power corridors and making the right noises. It
must put its house in order. On the basis of its large army, military and economic muscle it cannot
ride the bandwagon of being a global great power. The large population and elements that threaten
the social fabric of the country such as poverty, Maoism, corruption and religious fundamentalism
need to be effectively countered.
And what is the meaninig of this statement...
http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/068db8 ... 96/147.pdfIt would be premature to call India a great power as yet, but, it certainly displays qualities of being
one in the near future.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
German elite thinking about India essentially remains a mixture of extreme assessments - the romantic pure uhrheimat and the pure uhrheimat contaminated racially/theologically. But on top of it all is the post war pressure to appear the exact opposite of National socialists. Underneath, however, lies the same old political ambitions and perceptions that in its most extreme form supported Nazis.
Geostrategic imperatives never die - as long as identities essentially do not change.
There has been a rethink going on for some time deep inside, but deliberately not always expressed overtly, within nordics. The rethink is different from what is officially maintained about islam, and hitherto "racially undesirable" regions. Indians may need to walk a long way to gain the type of respect that nordics understand - its more about hard power + demonstrated willingness and actual eveidence on ground to impose hard power. But some of the key underlying centres of thinking that drive German and Norwegian and Dutch politics now, do hold India as a potential political investment.UK has a very deep financial penetration in much of these places - and political networks too . it is primarily the Brit sourced opinion-mobilizers, academics, who keep pressure on within Euroland for India to be kept "leftist+silkular". It is in Brit interest to maintain the Chinese and Paki pressure on.
Germany however is negotiating intensely with PRC. The iron lady remains popular and Adenauer's basic thrust must be understood : anti-Russian, anti-communist, strongly reliant on Christianism, would prefer the alliance of Vatican and protestants to anything else, and the late Romantic "Germanism". They may appear to have taken on the mantle of centre-left policies but undeneath its still the spirit of Adenauer.
Germans, in a sense want Bismarck's unfinished project taken forward. Both wars were mere steps towards that dream frustrated by UK. From Indian point of view, it should think in terms of rollback of British nuisance value on the subcontinent and help any force that distracts the Brits - including the EU arena.
Geostrategic imperatives never die - as long as identities essentially do not change.
There has been a rethink going on for some time deep inside, but deliberately not always expressed overtly, within nordics. The rethink is different from what is officially maintained about islam, and hitherto "racially undesirable" regions. Indians may need to walk a long way to gain the type of respect that nordics understand - its more about hard power + demonstrated willingness and actual eveidence on ground to impose hard power. But some of the key underlying centres of thinking that drive German and Norwegian and Dutch politics now, do hold India as a potential political investment.UK has a very deep financial penetration in much of these places - and political networks too . it is primarily the Brit sourced opinion-mobilizers, academics, who keep pressure on within Euroland for India to be kept "leftist+silkular". It is in Brit interest to maintain the Chinese and Paki pressure on.
Germany however is negotiating intensely with PRC. The iron lady remains popular and Adenauer's basic thrust must be understood : anti-Russian, anti-communist, strongly reliant on Christianism, would prefer the alliance of Vatican and protestants to anything else, and the late Romantic "Germanism". They may appear to have taken on the mantle of centre-left policies but undeneath its still the spirit of Adenauer.
Germans, in a sense want Bismarck's unfinished project taken forward. Both wars were mere steps towards that dream frustrated by UK. From Indian point of view, it should think in terms of rollback of British nuisance value on the subcontinent and help any force that distracts the Brits - including the EU arena.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Papers report
No 1962 repeat says IA chief Gen Bikram Singh
All I can say is it better not be for this time there will be a court martial.
No 1962 repeat says IA chief Gen Bikram Singh
All I can say is it better not be for this time there will be a court martial.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
People think that they can stop China by a defensive war? China has a concrete plan of expansion, India has none. China has been militarily investing in Nepal, Myanmar, BD and Pak. India pursuing panchsheel. Chinese military connection to Nepal is now bypassing the main Kathmandu ruling elite command of the military. Chinese military police and intel are directly manning the Tibetan border from inside Nepal. They are slowly but surely sealing off the access that Tibetans use through Nepal to keep in touch with India. India puts no counter pressure to keep the escape route open. Should we not doubt the real role in holding HHDL?
Many people go gaga here over supposed Indian "influence" in Nepal. I wish I could send them to a trip along the usual routes. If my meagre friends can show me the real picture on the ground, profoundly deep chankyan intel must be knowing the truth to a profoundly deeper level than me.
Many people go gaga here over supposed Indian "influence" in Nepal. I wish I could send them to a trip along the usual routes. If my meagre friends can show me the real picture on the ground, profoundly deep chankyan intel must be knowing the truth to a profoundly deeper level than me.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Some public domain comfirmation :
http://world.time.com/2012/07/17/as-chi ... e-narrows/
There should be a policy to systematically have such countries cease to exist anymore.
http://world.time.com/2012/07/17/as-chi ... e-narrows/
The question is, if Nepali regime turns Chinese, with China a given enemy of India as long as CPC and PLA remains intact, does Nepal have the right to remain sovereign? Any country along India's borders that licks Chinese boots, should cease to exist as a separate nation. Becoming China's military friend - in India's immediate neighbourhood - means becoming India's military enemy, and a collaborator in Chinese imperialism against India, as well as directly or indirectly a supporter of islamist jihad [through China's bolstering of TSP and jihad against India].China’s foray in Nepal appears to be a classic example of the Asian giant’s much-touted checkbook diplomacy, a strategy Beijing has employed across the globe to expand its influence by opening up seemingly endless pipelines of aid and investment. But China’s diplomatic push in Nepal over the past few years takes this tack a step further, says Robbie Barnett, director of Columbia University’s Modern Tibetan Studies Program. “In many respects, China now determines Nepal’s local and foreign policy,” he says.
Eager to appease China, Nepal is distancing itself from Tibetan refugees, many of whom have lived in Nepal for decades. According to a report by the International Campaign for Tibet to be released later this month, Beijing has “sought to delegitimize the Tibetan community in Nepal.” Since 1998, when the Nepalese stopped issuing refugee identity certificates, many young Tibetans who’ve spent their lives in Nepal have become effectively stateless, unable to attend schools or apply for jobs, and are exposed to exploitation and even deportation. In 2010, Nepalese authorities confiscated hundreds of ballot boxes during the prime-ministerial elections held by Tibet’s exiled government, which is headquartered in Dharamsala, India. Last year, Tibetans in Nepal commemorating the 52nd anniversary of the Tibetan revolt, were violently dispersed by Nepalese police; the police cracked down on Tibetan protesters this year too.
There should be a policy to systematically have such countries cease to exist anymore.
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
Bji,
We hear million and eight escapist reasons for not recapturing PoK, which is a legitimate part of India. What is the probability of pursuing such forward looking national interests policy?
The system has to be revamped first.
We hear million and eight escapist reasons for not recapturing PoK, which is a legitimate part of India. What is the probability of pursuing such forward looking national interests policy?
The system has to be revamped first.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
one thing is clear though. it's not just the Islamics breathing down on GV anymore. Panda has secured the Northern Frontier (for us) and is looking eagerly down on the shortsighted morons who are in charge in GV. people are not even realizing this. even at the height of Islamic power in India, the GV never faced anything like this. there was always the "strategic depth" of the far East. now even that sector is threatened by BD. to the West, Pakjab and its Jihadi designs are also continuing without any possibility of "intervention" in near future. Nepal and Tibet are also gone over to Panda now. are the GV leaders realizing the scenario?! surrounded on all sides by hostile forces, with all avenues of "outside" contact closed off by said forces.
Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I
^^^
You and I may be seeing this as a threat, but is the ruling dispensation of the nation in agreement with us?
I don't think so. To them it is more important that they continue to rule, development can go to hell. They have a vested interested in keeping India poor and underdeveloped. So that they can satisfy their left liberal fantasy and succeed where they have failed around the world. It is more important for them to keep India poor.
Being wealthy is a sin, as is being independent of state power. Unless a way can be found, to vote out this dispensation in 2014. Along with them being kept out of power for the next at least 20 years. India will never / ever realize its potential.
You and I may be seeing this as a threat, but is the ruling dispensation of the nation in agreement with us?
I don't think so. To them it is more important that they continue to rule, development can go to hell. They have a vested interested in keeping India poor and underdeveloped. So that they can satisfy their left liberal fantasy and succeed where they have failed around the world. It is more important for them to keep India poor.
Being wealthy is a sin, as is being independent of state power. Unless a way can be found, to vote out this dispensation in 2014. Along with them being kept out of power for the next at least 20 years. India will never / ever realize its potential.