Managing Chinese Threat

[SSridhar]

India-China Trying to Develop Mechanism to Prevent Faceoffs: Antony

I do not know how and why a new mechanism should be successful when it is indeed China's policy to provoke, occupy and claim.

India and China are trying to develop effective mechanisms to prevent the “embarrassing” face-offs between their troops along the “disputed” points of the Line of Actual Control, Defence Minister A K Antony said here today.

Terming the 21-day stand-off between the two sides in Depsang valley in Daulat Beg Oldi area as an “unusual” incident, the Defence Minister said the two countries will meet soon in Beijing to discuss issues and try to find a solution for such “unpleasant incidents“.

“Till the final settlement of the border issue, we are trying to find out more effective mechanisms to prevent occasional incidents. There are many points in the LAC that are disputed and they are patrolled by both sides. So, sometimes it leads to some face-off,” he told reporters on the 14th anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas. {We are once again 'apologetic'. We are considering the Chinese intrusion as 'embarrassing' while this must be considered as 'aggression' on our land. Unlike how AK Antony terms these incidents, they are not 'occassional'. They are regular and these violations, intrusions and aggressive behaviour run into several hundreds every year. We somehow do not want to speak the truth fearing the Chinese and we seem to be hoping that such 'appeasement' would de-escalate Chinese aggression. We live in a fool's paradise. In fact, such a timid attempt to explain away Chinese strategy as 'occasional embarrassments' would give only wrong signals to China.}

The Minister was asked to comment on the rising incursions by the Chinese troops into the Indian territory along the LAC in Ladakh and Northeastern sectors.

Antony said, “There are disputed points where both sides are going there which sometimes causes some embarrassing situations.”

He said after the Depsang incident in April, India and China had “free and frank” talks and “we are trying to have more border personnel meeting places and have more effective mechanisms to prevent such unpleasant incidents.”

“On the one side, both sides are trying to find a long term solution to the long pending border dispute. {Is he sure that 'both' sides are trying ?} Till that time, our aim is to maintain peace and tranquillity at the border,” Antony said.

On the recent third meeting of the Joint Working Group between the two sides, the Minister said free and frank discussions were held between both sides.

“We are going to have another round of this meeting in Beijing soon on this issue. So, I think we will be able to find out a solutions to such unpleasant incidents on the border,” he said.

In the recent past, there have been several incidents of incursions in Ladakh sector where Chinese troops have entered well within Indian side and stayed there for long hours before returning to their areas.

In one such incident, Chinese troops had entered Chumar area in Ladakh on July 16-17 on horses and ponies and demanded that Indian troops leave the area staking claim over it.

In the last two weeks, there have been at least five incursions in the area and around 150 incidents in the last seven months. {And, AK Antony calls them 'occasional' ?}

[RamaY]

National territorial integrity has become media management and perception management

[SSridhar]

Japan Says Military Buildup Aimed at Regional Peace and Stability - DPA, Business Line

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Saturday assured Asia-Pacific nations that his country’s planned military build-up aims to promote peace and stability in the region {I like this statement} amid concerns over a new proposed defence policy.

“My basic view is that regional peace and stability is the premise for the prosperity not only of Japan but of the Asia-Pacific region,” he said in Manila at the end of a three-country South-East Asian tour.

Abe said the visit allowed him to explain Japan’s military plans “so that the countries in the region will not have any misunderstanding.”

“After World War II, Japan together with the United States has been really contributing to the peace and stability in the region,” he said. “In going forward, we intend to continue to play that role.” Japan’s Defence Ministry has released an interim report on a review of its national defence programme, which calls for the strengthening of its armed forces and the possibility of acquiring capabilities to attack enemy bases.

The report calls for the purchase of unmanned surveillance drones; the creation of a marines unit to protect remote islands, especially those disputed with China; and the strengthening of Japan’s ability to dispatch troops to far-flung isles.

Abe said the review of Japan’s national defence programme and pacifist constitution was continuing and would be guided by the principles of sovereignty, human rights and the right of collective self-defence.

“We are deepening our discussion on what is the appropriate form of the constitution for the present-day Japan based on the changes of the security environment and of the international society as a whole,” he said.

Japan’s constitution, enacted shortly after World War II, contains a clause that outlaws war to settle international disputes.

[SSridhar]

X-Post from 'Indian Foreign Policy' thread

India Offers Vietnam Credit for Military Ware - Sandeep Dikshit, The Hindu

In a first, India has offered a $ 100 million credit line to Vietnam to purchase military equipment. It will be used for purchasing four patrol boats.

The credit line was agreed upon around the time India once again expressed its resolve to remain involved in oil exploration activity in the Phu Kanh basin of the South China Sea. {The patrol boats would help secure the oil exploration area} Vietnam says it is within its rights to invite India to explore for oil in this area.

But China claims that this basin is within the “nine dotted line” or its zone of influence.

The credit line is likely to be finalised by the time the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam visits India towards the end of the year.

Vietnam and India have long enjoyed strategic ties that include cooperation in the civil nuclear sector, training slots for Vietnamese military officers and frequent exchange of visits.

But this is one rare occasion when India is offering a defence-related credit line so far upfield.

Usually, near neighbours squarely in India’s zone of direct influence have been the beneficiaries of New Delhi’s credit lines for the defence sector. For example, Mauritius, whose air force and navy have Indian defence hardware, was given credit lines to buy Indian patrol boats and Dhruv helicopters.

India has wanted to expand its defence ties with Vietnam into military hardware and one of the top most items on the Vietnamese wish-list is the Brahmos missile, jointly produced with Russia, which, however, has close ties with both Vietnam and China and would not want to antagonise either.

Sources in the government wanted the credit line to be seen from the context of the overall drive to improve ties with South East Asian nations of whom Vietnam’s close ties with India predate the Cold War. {The patrol boats are not offensive equipment and therefore not directed against any particular country}

There has been a heavy two-way traffic of high level visitors between the two countries that has led to a $ 45 million credit line for a 200 MW hydel project built by BHEL, offer of export of the Param supercomputer and a breakthrough for the Indian corporate sector though its Vietnamese counterparts have struggled.

The sources pointed out that India was beefing up security ties with all countries beyond its eastern flank as one of the vital components of its Look East policy.

India and navies of some South East Asian countries have for long conducted the Milan series of naval exercises.

The Indian Navy also conducts coordinated patrols with Thailand and holds joint exercises with Singapore and Japan.

Let me add. While Vietnamese military personnel are trained in various facilities in India, the Vietnamese Navy has also been supplied with spare parts for their Russian origin naval assets by India. Through a bilateral agreement signed in September, 2011, India also agreed to train Vietnamese naval personnel to operate its Kilo class submarines which are being inducted by the Vietnamese Navy from Russia. On Oct 12, 2011, during his visit to India, the Vietnamese President, Truong Tan Sang, signed six agreements including an agreement to promote oil exploration in South China Sea along with a slew of pacts, including an extradition treaty, to deepen trade, security and strategic ties between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh said “India and Vietnam are maritime neighbours. We face common security challenges from terrorism, piracy and natural disasters. We believe that it is important to ensure the safety and security of the vital sea lanes of communication. We have agreed to continue and strengthen our exchanges in these fields”. In the field of security cooperation, the two countries instituted a mechanism of a biennial dialogue on security issues between Ministry of Home Affairs and its Vietnamese counterpart.

[SSridhar]

Abe Tells Philippine Leader of Tilt Towards a More Robust Military - Japan Times

MANILA – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Saturday that his government plans to proceed with the debate on whether Japan should exercise the right to collective self-defense — a politically sensitive issue that previous administrations have interpreted as banned by the Constitution.

Abe also briefed Philippine President Benigno Aquino III on discussions in Japan on constitutional changes, as Asian countries are wary about tilt to the right on defense.

“We plan to proceed in considering” whether to exercise the right of collective self-defense, Abe told a news conference in Manila before heading back to Tokyo after a three-day swing through Southeast Asia.

Collective self-defense is the concept of one country coming to the aid of another that has come under armed attack.

Abe said such principles as pacifism, the sovereignty of the people and respect for basic human rights would be preconditions for any such change, and that discussions are now “deepening” about what kind of Constitution best suits modern Japan.

Consideration of exercising the right to collective self-defense involves “the viewpoint of ensuring safety for Japan and contributing to the Japan-U.S. alliance, and regional peace and stability,” Abe was quoted as telling Aquino.

He also touched on this during his meeting with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

Abe avoided the topic of constitutional revision and other right-leaning policies during the Upper House election campaign. Now that the election is over, Abe appears be eager to put the topic on the table.

Abe also said he intends to carefully explain such a stance to avoid “misunderstanding” by other countries in the region, while noting that Japan is simply trying to do some of what almost all the other countries can naturally do.

Abe also said he has instructed diplomats to promote dialogue with China amid souring ties over the Senkaku Islands.

[SSridhar]

A Mountain Strike Corps is not the Only Option - Raja Menon, The Hindu

In the history of Indian strategic thought, the decision to create a mountain strike corps against China will remain a landmark. While the file on the subject has apparently been circulating for a while, the absence of open discussion on so momentous a decision is deeply disappointing. Some commentators are of the view that the Chinese incursion in the Depsang plains swung the decision decisively in favour of the strike corps. If so, it doesn’t make much sense, for, where is Depsang and where is Panagarh — the headquarters of the mountain strike corps?

What irks a strategic commentator about this decision is the question whether our reaction is wiser, more mature and better institutionalised than it was in 1962. At that time, the Prime Minister had “instructed” the army to “throw out” the Chinese following which Brigadier Dalvi’s mountain brigade made its fateful advance across Namka Chu. The big question today is — what were our options? Did we examine more than one option and select the best one? Presumably, it is to guarantee that we go through an intellectual process that we now have a Chiefs of Staff Committee, an Integrated Staff, a National Security Council and Adviser, and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Did they actually look at alternatives, or was it a straightforward case of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for a mountain strike corps?

The first step

The first thought that strikes a strategic thinker is whether any non-military options were first examined. This is an inevitable first step in the long and tortuous process that leads up to military action. The Depsang incident, it will be remembered, took place in a part of the country which, before 1954, was always shown as un-demarcated or undefined. What, for instance, were the arguments in the CCS for and against the Johnson-Ardagh Line and the Macartney line? Those who are unfamiliar with these names can take a look at Wikipedia. It is the essence to understanding a possible settlement of the boundary dispute. The fact is that while our case in Arunachal Pradesh is strong and undisputed, the situation is not quite similar in the west where the recent intrusion took place. Admittedly, the political numbers simply don’t permit the government to commit itself to a grand bargain with China on territory. The Chinese are in a similar position. {I am not sure if the Chinese are in a similar political situation. But, certainly, they have a law that awards only capital punishment to anybody who barters away Chinese land. Like a mandatory deat punishment for Blasphemy in Islam. Chinese leaders always have this law in the back of their minds while dealing with other countries} But if the border problem hinges for a solution on a strong, domestic government, it is indeed better for both countries to postpone the solution to the next generation — as the Chinese suggest. So how did we come to the conclusion that the Chinese may force the border issue now , leading us to raise a mountain strike corps?

It has been argued that China is a continental power with a huge land army. It is making amends by funding its Navy strongly, to change the balance. But its army reforms have converted its land forces into a large armoured and air mobile force capable of rapid redeployment.

Under these conditions, to raise an infantry heavy mountain strike corps has obvious disadvantages. First, it would be geographically confined to one or two axes of movement and capable of being blunted. Secondly, whatever we may do on land, we will remain an asymmetric power vis-à-vis the huge People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose defence budget is thrice ours. Thirdly, a strike corps in the mountains denies us the time and place of a counter offensive, because it is geographically limited. These arguments should have come up during the process of examining options. If they didn’t, it is tragic and shows little improvement from the confusion and bluster of 1962 preceding the disaster.

Infantry heavy

The Indian Army is a fine institution and no one grudges it any funding. But it is also one of the most infantry heavy armies in the world. Its armour-to-infantry ratio is badly skewed, it is not air mobile, its manoeuvre capability is poor and Rs.60,000 crore would have addressed all these deficiencies and more. Instead, with the strike corps it will become even more infantry heavy and Rs.60,000 crore will have been wasted in barely addressing the tremendous disparity with the PLA’s mobility, numbers and manoeuvre capability. It must be remembered that we are addressing mountain warfare, where high altitude acclimatisation is a necessity for soldiers before being deployed. So the mountain strike corps would already be at high altitudes with little possibility of being redeployed without huge air mobility. All this should have been apparent to the Army Aviation Corps whose leaders seem bereft of strategic thinking, having flown light helicopters all their lives. Stopping the advancing Chinese in the mountains strung out through the valleys should have required specialised ground support aircraft like the A-10 Warthog, another strategic choice which was probably ignored by the army aviation branch. By not examining non-army options we seem to be repeating the mistakes of 1962 when the Sino-Indian war became a purely army-to-army affair for reasons that have still not been established.

Strengths & weaknesses

We are not privy to the notings in the file preceding the decision to raise a mountain strike corps, but it would certainly appear that the border issue appears to have been treated purely as an army problem for which only the army can find a solution, with the other arms of the government contributing nothing. Most of all, we appear not to have assessed the Chinese weakness and strengths. Their strength is the huge logistic network that they have built up in Tibet. By creating a one axis strike corps, we have played into their strengths. The Chinese weakness lies in the Indian Ocean, a fact that even Beijing will readily concede. The clash between their political system and economic prosperity requires resources and, increasingly, the Chinese resource pool is Africa, which generates massive sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Today, they are merely SLOCs; tomorrow they will be the Chinese Jugular. Beijing’s paranoia about the Indian Ocean is therefore understandable but the threat according to its strategic commentators comes only from the U.S. Sixty thousand crore spent on strengthening the Indian Navy’s SLOC interdiction capability would have given us a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the Indian Ocean. The Himalayan border, the entire border, could have been held hostage by our strength in the Indian Ocean with an investment of Rs.60,000 crore.

No one minimises the pinpricks that the Chinese are capable of but what we are looking for is an asymmetric capability to balance the Chinese four-fold advantage in GDP over India. Finding the solution requires all arms of the government to debate where our scarce resources should go. A geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA, but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China.

(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral in the Indian Navy)

[Arihant]

The Luo Yan in this article is the same PLA general who was vicious in his recent vitriol against India, and issued "warnings" against Indian "adventurism".

Good cop, bad cop with China's generals

In their public statements the likes of Zhang Zhaozhong, Dai Xu and Luo Yuan may or may not be putting forth their own views, but each has affirmed that they speak in accordance with centralized leadership imperatives. Their bellicose comments appear to be made with more or less explicit authorization, as shown by their sustained presence in centrally controlled media like CCTV and the Global Times.

Each insists they abide by strict military discipline. Most if not all are "external propaganda experts" appointed by central authorities.

[Lalmohan]

at first i thought the rear-admiral had spent too long in retirement, but then perhaps what he is argueing for is a more credible naval force without saying so

[ramana]

Lm, there is a vacuum in the strat ciricles in India. A quiet debate on the roles and responsibilities of the NSA is being actively debated with the incumbent, the previous one and the wise owls.
The big issue is he an adviser or the princicpal secretary for security?

Next govt whoever it is will see changes.

[kit]

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/recogniz ... ic-miracle

Write up by Friedman

[kit]

A Mountain Strike Corps is not the Only Option - Raja Menon, The Hindu

In the history of Indian strategic thought, the decision to create a mountain strike corps against China will remain a landmark. While the file on the subject has apparently been circulating for a while, the absence of open discussion on so momentous a decision is deeply disappointing. Some commentators are of the view that the Chinese incursion in the Depsang plains swung the decision decisively in favour of the strike corps. If so, it doesn’t make much sense, for, where is Depsang and where is Panagarh — the headquarters of the mountain strike corps?

What irks a strategic commentator about this decision is the question whether our reaction is wiser, more mature and better institutionalised than it was in 1962. At that time, the Prime Minister had “instructed” the army to “throw out” the Chinese following which Brigadier Dalvi’s mountain brigade made its fateful advance across Namka Chu. The big question today is — what were our options? Did we examine more than one option and select the best one? Presumably, it is to guarantee that we go through an intellectual process that we now have a Chiefs of Staff Committee, an Integrated Staff, a National Security Council and Adviser, and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Did they actually look at alternatives, or was it a straightforward case of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for a mountain strike corps?

The first step

The first thought that strikes a strategic thinker is whether any non-military options were first examined. This is an inevitable first step in the long and tortuous process that leads up to military action. The Depsang incident, it will be remembered, took place in a part of the country which, before 1954, was always shown as un-demarcated or undefined. What, for instance, were the arguments in the CCS for and against the Johnson-Ardagh Line and the Macartney line? Those who are unfamiliar with these names can take a look at Wikipedia. It is the essence to understanding a possible settlement of the boundary dispute. The fact is that while our case in Arunachal Pradesh is strong and undisputed, the situation is not quite similar in the west where the recent intrusion took place. Admittedly, the political numbers simply don’t permit the government to commit itself to a grand bargain with China on territory. The Chinese are in a similar position. {I am not sure if the Chinese are in a similar political situation. But, certainly, they have a law that awards only capital punishment to anybody who barters away Chinese land. Like a mandatory deat punishment for Blasphemy in Islam. Chinese leaders always have this law in the back of their minds while dealing with other countries} But if the border problem hinges for a solution on a strong, domestic government, it is indeed better for both countries to postpone the solution to the next generation — as the Chinese suggest. So how did we come to the conclusion that the Chinese may force the border issue now , leading us to raise a mountain strike corps?

It has been argued that China is a continental power with a huge land army. It is making amends by funding its Navy strongly, to change the balance. But its army reforms have converted its land forces into a large armoured and air mobile force capable of rapid redeployment.

Under these conditions, to raise an infantry heavy mountain strike corps has obvious disadvantages. First, it would be geographically confined to one or two axes of movement and capable of being blunted. Secondly, whatever we may do on land, we will remain an asymmetric power vis-à-vis the huge People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose defence budget is thrice ours. Thirdly, a strike corps in the mountains denies us the time and place of a counter offensive, because it is geographically limited. These arguments should have come up during the process of examining options. If they didn’t, it is tragic and shows little improvement from the confusion and bluster of 1962 preceding the disaster.

Infantry heavy

The Indian Army is a fine institution and no one grudges it any funding. But it is also one of the most infantry heavy armies in the world. Its armour-to-infantry ratio is badly skewed, it is not air mobile, its manoeuvre capability is poor and Rs.60,000 crore would have addressed all these deficiencies and more. Instead, with the strike corps it will become even more infantry heavy and Rs.60,000 crore will have been wasted in barely addressing the tremendous disparity with the PLA’s mobility, numbers and manoeuvre capability. It must be remembered that we are addressing mountain warfare, where high altitude acclimatisation is a necessity for soldiers before being deployed. So the mountain strike corps would already be at high altitudes with little possibility of being redeployed without huge air mobility. All this should have been apparent to the Army Aviation Corps whose leaders seem bereft of strategic thinking, having flown light helicopters all their lives. Stopping the advancing Chinese in the mountains strung out through the valleys should have required specialised ground support aircraft like the A-10 Warthog, another strategic choice which was probably ignored by the army aviation branch. By not examining non-army options we seem to be repeating the mistakes of 1962 when the Sino-Indian war became a purely army-to-army affair for reasons that have still not been established.

Strengths & weaknesses

We are not privy to the notings in the file preceding the decision to raise a mountain strike corps, but it would certainly appear that the border issue appears to have been treated purely as an army problem for which only the army can find a solution, with the other arms of the government contributing nothing. Most of all, we appear not to have assessed the Chinese weakness and strengths. Their strength is the huge logistic network that they have built up in Tibet. By creating a one axis strike corps, we have played into their strengths. The Chinese weakness lies in the Indian Ocean, a fact that even Beijing will readily concede. The clash between their political system and economic prosperity requires resources and, increasingly, the Chinese resource pool is Africa, which generates massive sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Today, they are merely SLOCs; tomorrow they will be the Chinese Jugular. Beijing’s paranoia about the Indian Ocean is therefore understandable but the threat according to its strategic commentators comes only from the U.S. Sixty thousand crore spent on strengthening the Indian Navy’s SLOC interdiction capability would have given us a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the Indian Ocean. The Himalayan border, the entire border, could have been held hostage by our strength in the Indian Ocean with an investment of Rs.60,000 crore.

No one minimises the pinpricks that the Chinese are capable of but what we are looking for is an asymmetric capability to balance the Chinese four-fold advantage in GDP over India. Finding the solution requires all arms of the government to debate where our scarce resources should go. A geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA, but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China.

(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral in the Indian Navy)

Personally i think the IN is going the way of sea denial vs the chinese navy in IOR as well as ramping up a limited power projection into the south china sea . The number of nuclear subs current and projected seems to indicate this as a possibility.It does not seem to counter the rather exponentially increasing chinese fleet in numbers.

[SSridhar]

Love in the Water, Fear on Land - Vladimir Radyuhin, The Hindu

Earlier this month, Russia and China held their largest joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan. Later this week, the land armies of the two countries will hold a joint drill in the Ural Mountains in Russia. In between these two events, Russia staged its biggest yet military manoeuvres in Siberia and the far eastern region along China’s borders.

The exercises reflect the dual nature of Russia’s relations with its giant neighbour. China is Russia’s strategic partner but also a source of profound security fears.

Series of drills

Code-named Joint Sea 2013, the joint naval drills were the largest in the history of the two countries and saw the Chinese Navy’s “single biggest deployment of military force in any joint foreign exercise,” according to the Chinese Defence Ministry. For three days, seven Chinese and 16 Russian warships gamed off Russia’s Far East with anti-pirate and search-and-rescue operations, escorting ship convoys, ship resupply, and joint anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-surface vessels defences.

The manoeuvres marked a new high in Russian-Chinese defence ties and despite their non-aggressive scenario, they were clearly directed at Japan, which has territorial disputes both with Russia and China, and at the U.S. military pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.

The naval exercises ended on July 12. The Chinese warships had barely left Russian waters when Russia launched unannounced snap military manoeuvres along the border with China. President Vladimir Putin, who watched part of the war games, said they were the largest ever, involving 160,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, 130 aircraft and 70 ships.

Foreseeing nervous reactions in neighbouring countries, the Russian Defence Ministry informed them of the surprise war games some hours in advance and separately provided “more detailed information” to China. Briefing foreign military attachés in Moscow, Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov denied the manoeuvres targeted any country, but admitted that Russia’s neighbours were watching them “warily.”

Warmer ties

China and Japan indeed had reason to feel concerned. While the naval part of the Russian war games took place in the Sea of Okhotsk not far from the Kuril Islands claimed by Japan, the land operations involved massive redeployment of troops, weapons and hardware across several time zones closer to the Russian-Chinese border to repulse a major land attack.

Over the past two decades, Russia and China have dramatically strengthened their ties. They resolved their long-running border disputes, increased bilateral trade from $5 billion in 2000 to nearly $90 billion last year, and speak in one voice on most global issues. Russia has helped China modernise its military with large-scale supplies of weapons and technologies, and the two countries are forging close military-to-military ties.

Russian Far East

However, behind this happy façade of overflowing friendship, Russia harbours ingrained fears of the rising giant next door, fuelled in large measure by its own weaknesses, but also by China’s policies.

The Russian Far East, which constitutes 40 per cent of the country’s territory, has a shrinking population of 6.5 million, whereas three Chinese regions across the border have 140 million people. Demographic pressures and a growing shortage of resources will eventually prompt China to train its sights on its northern neighbour, experts warn, all the more so since China still considers vast territories in the Russian Far East as unfairly annexed from it in the 19th century.

All these territories fall within China’s “strategic borders” that stretch far beyond its geographic border to guarantee “living space” for the country.

Most Russian experts think that China will pursue peaceful economic and demographic expansion, but some do not rule out the military option. Military analyst Alexander Khramchihin last month published a highly provocative scenario of a Chinese blitzkrieg against Russia describing how the multimillion strong Chinese army could overrun the Russian Far East and much of Siberia within only a few weeks.

Whatever China’s intentions, it is its capabilities that count, according to military experts. They are concerned that China’s two military regions bordering Russia, Shenyang and Beijing, have more troops and firepower than all Russian land forces and have conducted several large-scale manoeuvres of land forces in recent years that involved the relocation of troops across 2,000 km. Such operations are only possible against Russia and Kazakhstan, experts said.

“The Chinese threat, while being highly hypothetic, is one of the main factors defining Russia’s foreign policy and military build-up,” said Vasily Kashin, a China expert with the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

Under a sweeping military reform currently under way in Russia, the Defence Ministry has taken extra efforts to beef up its forces in the East. When Russia’s seven military districts were pared down to four commands in 2010, the Eastern District was redrawn so as to hand it responsibility for the entire 4,300-km border with China. Today it is the largest military command and it is being rearmed on a priority basis.

The July manoeuvres put to test the overhauled command and control structure of the Eastern Military District and its ability to respond to a sudden attack.

“The manoeuvres showed that we can accomplish a necessary force build-up on the border with China,” said Alexander Sharavin of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis.

Non-military strategy

However, Moscow’s main strategy in dealing with the potential Chinese threat lies outside the military sphere. Judo black belt Putin is trying to lock China in a tight friendly embrace of economic, political and strategic interdependence that would make conflict inconceivable. Russia is on the way to become an indispensable source of oil, gas and other resources for China’s economic powerhouse; it is cementing close defence ties and is engaging China in multilateral cooperative arrangements, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

When China’s new President Xi Jinping paid his first visit abroad to Moscow earlier this year, Mr. Putin said that relations between Russia and China are “the best in their centuries-long history,” while the Chinese leader called Russia China’s “major and most important” strategic partner.

Mr. Putin’s strategy enjoys overwhelming approval in the Russian expert community, but even its ardent supporters admit it is fraught with a risk that the Russian bear may be strangled in the Chinese dragon’s embrace.

[SSridhar]

Myanmar Pipeline to Diversify China's Energy Supply - Ananth krishnan, The Hindu

China has started receiving natural gas from Myanmar through an 800 km-long pipeline project. The opening of the pipeline on Sunday was hailed by State media here [Beijing] as a landmark step towards diversifying China’s energy supply routes.

The gas pipeline, which can transport 12 billion cubic metres annually, runs from Kyaukpyu to Ruili in southwestern Yunnan province, which borders Myanmar. China is also building an oil pipeline that will bring 22 million tons annually to Yunnan when completed.

Strategic map

The official Xinhua news agency said the opening of the gas pipeline had “substantially changed the strategic map of China’s energy supply channels” by alleviating what officials have described as the “Malacca dilemma” of being dependant on an energy route through the narrow straits.

“At present, as many as 80 per cent of China’s oil imports depend on the supply line going through the Malacca and Singapore straits, while the maritime route is patrolled by fleets headed by the U.S. navy,” the Xinhua commentary said.

Six companies, including India’s GAIL and firms from South Korea and Myanmar, were involved in the construction of the pipeline.

Chinese State media hit out at the criticism levelled at the project, which passes through areas of Myanmar that have seen ethnic unrest.

Concerns about its impact on local communities have also been raised by several environmental groups, who fear that the benefits of the project will not be seen on the ground.

Criticism

Xinhua, however, rejected what it described as “Western criticism” of the project as “totally irresponsible and ill-disposed”. The Communist Party-run tabloid, The Global Times , went as far as accusing the West of using non-governmental organisations to derail Chinese projects in the country, such as the construction of the Myitsone dam, suspended in 2011 on account of environmental concerns.

“The West has played a role in interfering in these projects through NGOs,” the newspaper said, adding that “this extra cost is something China has to bear when investing in Myanmar in the future”.

[SSridhar]

Japanese Dy Foreign Min. Dispatched to China to Ease Tensions - Japan Times

The government dispatched Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki to Beijing on Monday for two days of talks aimed at easing tensions being caused by the Senkaku Islands dispute.

Saiki is scheduled to meet with his counterpart, Zhang Yesui. The two may exchange views on the timing for a potential summit between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping, sources said.

China has said there will be no summit as long as Japan refuses to officially admit the existence of the territorial dispute involving the Senkakus. Japan argues the summit should be held without preconditions.

Japan put the uninhabited isles in the East China Sea under state control last September, despite fierce criticism from China.

“A summit is not in sight yet,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said at a press conference. “Both Japan and China are responsible for contributing to world peace and prosperity, so we should have frank discussions.”

Another Japanese official said: “We stand firm in our stance of not recognizing a territorial dispute, but we believe it’s possible for the two countries to avert a crisis through dialogue.”

Saiki hopes to confirm that the two countries will calmly address the row. The Senkakus are claimed as Diaoyu by China and as Tiaoyutai by Taiwan.

The nominal purpose of his visit is to pay courtesy calls on senior Chinese officials as the new vice foreign minister. Saiki assumed the post in late June.

[Christopher Sidor]

Love in the Water, Fear on Land - Vladimir Radyuhin, The Hindu

Whatever China’s intentions, it is its capabilities that count, according to military experts. They are concerned that China’s two military regions bordering Russia, Shenyang and Beijing, have more troops and firepower than all Russian land forces and have conducted several large-scale manoeuvres of land forces in recent years that involved the relocation of troops across 2,000 km. Such operations are only possible against Russia and Kazakhstan, experts said.

The same manoeuvres can be used against India and other South East nations.

Non-military strategy

However, Moscow’s main strategy in dealing with the potential Chinese threat lies outside the military sphere. Judo black belt Putin is trying to lock China in a tight friendly embrace of economic, political and strategic interdependence that would make conflict inconceivable. Russia is on the way to become an indispensable source of oil, gas and other resources for China’s economic powerhouse; it is cementing close defence ties and is engaging China in multilateral cooperative arrangements, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

When China’s new President Xi Jinping paid his first visit abroad to Moscow earlier this year, Mr. Putin said that relations between Russia and China are “the best in their centuries-long history,” while the Chinese leader called Russia China’s “major and most important” strategic partner.

Mr. Putin’s strategy enjoys overwhelming approval in the Russian expert community, but even its ardent supporters admit it is fraught with a risk that the Russian bear may be strangled in the Chinese dragon’s embrace.

The soviet union sought the same tactic with the Nazis. So much so that despite the British blockade, the Nazis were able to invade practically the whole of Europe. The British tried the similar tactic again with the Nazis. And what they got in return was invasion of Poland and the ignominious offer of having their empire guaranteed by the crazed single-testicle imbecile.

Wonder how will this embrace play out.

[RoyG]

Russia will eventually be consumed by Islam and Dragon. It's only a matter of time. The bear isn't procreating fast enough.

[Prem]

By George Friedman, Founder and Chairman of Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm
Identifying China's Successors
( True to his nature , no mention of India ;japanese must be crazy,planning hundreds of Billions to be poured in India)

China has become a metaphor. It represents a certain phase of economic development, which is driven by low wages, foreign appetite for investment and a chaotic and disorderly development, magnificent in scale but deeply flawed in many ways. Its magnificence spawned the flaws, and the flaws helped create the magnificence.The arcs along which nations rise and fall vary in length and slope. China’s has been long, as far as these things go, lasting for more than 30 years. The country will continue to exist and perhaps prosper, but this era of Chinese development — pyramiding on low wages to conquer global markets — is ending simply because there are now other nations with even lower wages and other advantages. China will have to behave differently from the way it does now, and thus other countries are poised to take its place.
Reshaping International OrderSince the Industrial Revolution, there have always been countries where comparative advantage in international trade has been rooted in low wages and a large work force. If these countries can capitalize on their advantages, they can transform themselves dramatically. These transformations, in turn, reorganize global power structures. Karl Kautsky, a German socialist in the early 1900s, wrote: “Half a century ago, Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her strength is compared with that of the Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia in the same way. Is it conceivable that in 10 or 20 years’ time the relative strength will have remained unchanged?” Lenin also saw these changes, viewing them as both progressive and eventually revolutionary. When Kautsky and Lenin described the world, they did so to change it. But the world proved difficult to change. (It is ironic that two of the four BRIC countries had been or still are Communist countries.)
The process is fraught with challenges. At the beginning of the process, what these countries have to sell to their customers is their relative poverty. Their poverty allows them to sell labor cheaply. If the process works and the workers are disciplined, investment pours in to take advantage of the opportunities. Like the investors, local entrepreneurs prosper, but they do so at the expense of the workers, whose lives are hard and brutal.It’s not just their work; it’s their way of life. As workers move to factories, the social fabric is torn apart. But that rending of life opens the door for a mobile workforce able to take advantage of new opportunities. Traditional life disappears; in its place stand the efficiencies of capitalism. Yet still the workers come, knowing that as bad as their lot is, it is better than it once was. American immigration was built on this knowledge. The workers bought their willingness to work for long hours and low wages. They knew that life was hard but better than it had been at home, and they harbored hopes for their children and with some luck, for themselves.As the process matures, low wages rise — producing simple products for the world market is not as profitable as producing more sophisticated products — and the rate of growth slows down in favor of more predictable profits from more complex goods and services. All nations undergo this process, and China is no exception. This is always a dangerous time for a country. Japan handled it well. China has more complex challenges.

In general, we are seeing a continual flow of companies leaving China, or choosing not to invest in China, and going to these countries. This flow is now quickening. The first impetus is the desire of global entrepreneurs, usually fairly small businesses themselves, to escape the increasingly non-competitive wages and business environment of the previous growth giant. Large, complex enterprises can’t move fast and can’t use the labor force of the emerging countries because it is untrained in every way. In looking at this historically, two markers showed themselves. One is a historical first step: garment and footwear manufacturing, a highly competitive area that demands low wages but provides work opportunities that the population, particularly women, understand in principle. A second marker is mobile phone assembly, which requires a work force that can master relatively simple operations. . Some things are not necessary or expected. The rule of law, understood in Anglo-Saxon terms of the written law, isn’t there at this stage. Things are managed through custom and relationships with the elite. Partnerships are established. Frequently there is political uncertainty, and violence may have recently occurred. These are places that are at the beginning of their development cycle, and they may not develop successfully. Investors here are risk takers — otherwise they wouldn’t be here.The beginning of China’s boom is normally thought of as 1978-1980. The Cultural Revolution had ended a few years before. It was a national upheaval of violence with few precedents. Mao Zedong died in 1976, and there had been an intense power struggle, with Deng Xiaoping consolidating power in 1977. China was politically unstable, had no clear legal system, sporadic violence and everything else that would make it appear economically hopeless.“

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/20 ... uccessors/

[ramana]

Looks like a fatuous article!

[Philip]

"Keep your friends close,your enemies closer",a famous saying that Putin is using in Russia's relations with China.The only nation that can counter China in manpower is India,hence the West/US's keen desire that India orients its geo-political ambitions along with western interests.A key factor in this is countering a belligerent China.

R.Adm.Menon's article and thesis is well put.It was just a short time ago that I was debating the same with a former ambassador and veteran diplomat abroad,on India's relations with that country ,the Chinese surge in influence and the pitfalls.The "Malacca Dilemma" and the vulnerability of the Chinese logistic chain as it expanded its search further for raw materials from Africa and beyond.It is no coincidence that the spate of Chines sub contacts last year was due to the fact that the PLAN realises its vulnerability and is suing its strongest asset,its large sub fleet to counter any moves that India might make against Chinese shipping in any spat. The Chinese sub threat will be primarily targeted against India's carrier task forces,of which as the good Adm. pointed out,needs to be at least 3.As I mentioned in other threads,we also need several amphib/multi-role flat tops of the Mistral/Juan Carlos size which will be able to also undertake vigorous ASW warfare in coordination with carrier/surface forces. The large number of intended coastal ASW corvettes is another good step in defence of our naval bases and ports.Furthermore,we must seize the opportunity without any delay in assisting the Burmese in developing their own navy as requested.This is extremely vital as it will enable us to seal Burmese ports from Chinese military use in any spat,even though Chinese petro-products will now be piped via Burma,with their tankers offloading their contents at Burmese ports,thus avoiding the choke-point of the Malacca Straits.China is building a whole new "Port City" in Colombo,with a 99 yr. lease by a Chinese company of a vast area of reclaimed land adjoining the new harbour extn.An Indian venture to build the tallest towers (by Krrish) is mired in a major kickback scandal.

[manjgu]

in addition to fuel from Myanmar..there is supply of gas and oil from russia..

how will we interdict shipping flying foreign flags and heading for china??

[SSridhar]

As in the case of Pakistan, so in China, there cannot be one single silver bullet that will help us keep at bay the Chinese threat.

I am convinced that the Chinese are quite vulnerable all along the LAC, for various reasons. Yet, they have a massive infrastructual and hence logistical advantage over us, they have a huge military manpower and equipment available there which should make us invest enough to make them think many times before starting an adventure there. The 'Malacca Dilemma' would come much later in the war and when that happens the war envelope would have grown significantly. However, the Chinese may not plan for such an escalation and they may have something like our own 'Cold Start'. Unlike 1962, this time around, they may proclaim a ceasefire after achieving their objectives but *not* withdraw. It may be a swift and massive attack.

We are in an unfortunate situation where we have to upgrade infrastructure, add manpower, induct new sensors and platforms, weapons and delivery systems because the focus has shifted dramatically from the western to the eastern front in the last few years. We have to be at a level where the enemy fears our significant assets facing him even though we may not match him weapon-to-weapon or man-to-man. So, IMO, MSC is not a wasteful investment but we have to invest significantly in other resources as well.

[SSridhar]

in addition to fuel from Myanmar..there is supply of gas and oil from russia..

how will we interdict shipping flying foreign flags and heading for china??

And, there is supply of oil & gas from Kazakhastan too. China is building the Gwadar -Kashgar corridor for the same purpose. They also have built up a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR). Yet, nearly 80% of the Chinese fuel goes through Malacca. Even if they bring it down to 50%, it is still a significant vulnerability. They may be able to supply their war-fighting machinery, but their economy will suffer and CPC would not like that at all.

[manjgu]

a) well said SSridhar..i have argued similarly in another thread that we have to deter chinese in the mountains..though it does not mean we have to ignore the navy.. on the land and in the sea..but land if lost will be hard to reclaim b) when war starts everyones economy suffers ie both india and china..what matters is who will emerge out it with less trauma. c) 80% may be thru Malacca but how much of that is carried by ships flying chinese flag is the moot question?

[svinayak]

a) well said SSridhar..i have argued similarly in another thread that we have to deter chinese in the mountains..though it does not mean we have to ignore the navy.. on the land and in the sea..but land if lost will be hard to reclaim b) when war starts everyones economy suffers ie both india and china..what matters is who will emerge out it with less trauma. c) 80% may be thru Malacca but how much of that is carried by ships flying chinese flag is the moot question?

It is both we need. The mountain block and the sea denial.

[SSridhar]

From NightWatch dated July 30

India: Update.

India's indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant (trans. slayer of enemies), is almost ready to commence its first sea trials, four years after it was launched by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his wife Gursharan Kaur at Visakhapatnam in 2009. The 6,000-ton submarine has completed its harbor trials. Its nuclear reactor is ready to go critical. This submarine will be armed with K-4 and K-15 submarine-launched nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (SLBM), which are still under development. It will be India's second nuclear-powered submarine, joining the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine, INS Chakra, leased from Russia. India reportedly is interested in leasing a second Akula-class hunter-killer submarine.

Comment: The navy is the leading edge of India's assertion of strategic dominance in the Indian Ocean region against China. There is a grudge match to be fought between India and China over the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Neither side is ready for that contest, but both know it is coming and are preparing for it.{That is why we need to be prepared everywhere, land, sea and air but most especially in land and sea. We cannot negelct one for the other. There is no option for us. Slowdown in economy is therefore a cause for concern. Delays in Scorpene, Tejas, Vikramaditya, IAC, MMRCA, Light Howitzers are all causes for concern. A5 must be inducted with MIRV.}

[SSridhar]

c) 80% may be thru Malacca but how much of that is carried by ships flying chinese flag is the moot question?

It doesn't matter even if only 4 out of 10 ships carry Chinese flag. A naval blockade will have a significant impact overall and in multiple ways, like for example insurance charges or refusal to operate ships through Malacca, or a straits blocked by shipwreck etc.

[habal]

One also need to see the China threat thing from the recent 'China-Russia to prepare for WWIII' angle. India, the perpetually undecided weakling damsel is being weaned away from this duo under able leadership and guidance from Rhodes Scholars and ex-harvard & world bank mercenaries.

[Arihant]

c) 80% may be thru Malacca but how much of that is carried by ships flying chinese flag is the moot question?

It doesn't matter even if only 4 out of 10 ships carry Chinese flag. A naval blockade will have a significant impact overall and in multiple ways, like for example insurance charges or refusal to operate ships through Malacca, or a straits blocked by shipwreck etc.

The insurance charges are a particularly interesting opportunity. Merely changing the actuarial picture for shipping in those waters can serve as a crippling blow....

[Christopher Sidor]

PRC is steadily decreasing its dependence on ship borne oil & gas. The recent agreement with Russia along with the pipelines to central asia and eventually to Iran should be seen in this light. PRC would be very wary of building a oil & gas transport corridor in Pakistan. Part of that infra will lie through land which is Indian and is currently occupied by Pakistan. So a corridor going through Pakistan is going to be extremely vulnerable to Indian interdiction.

Recently a train carrying consignment of electronics products from central PRC, mind you not coastal PRC but heartland of PRC, reached Eastern Europe via Central Asia and Russia. Reducing travel time by approximately 30-40%. The traditional route is via Mallaca straits and it takes a lot of time.

Further by the end of this decade the Northern route via Arctic circle will become navigable if not round the year then definitely for significant period. Also by 2050 time frame it is expected that the Northern route would be ice free, thereby eliminating the need of ice breakers all together.

PRC gets a significant amount or raw resources from Australia and South East Asia. Blockading Mallaca straits is not going to impact this trade in any way. Similarly PRC buys a lot of raw materials from South America particularly brazil and other countries of Latin America. Again blockading the mallaca straits will not impact this trade.

PRC's Markets are in the North Atlantic region. So its finished goods have to reach these markets. That will not change for significant amount of time. At least 2-3 decades. These markets can be reached via Pacific or overland through Russia+central Asia or eventually the northern route. As long as that happens, i.e. PRC's finished goods reach its intended customers, PRC would be able to keep its economy humming and keep on earning to fight any war with India.

If we add all this up we see that whether deliberately or not PRC's dependence on the mallaca straits is going to go down. It is not inconceivable that our policy of interdicting the Chinese SLOC at mallac straits and other 4 points in Indian ocean is not going to work going down the line. This policy will work till 2020 or max till 2025. Beyond that this policy would loose all its effectiveness.

Do not forget our political class has no spine, as was amply demonstrated in Kargil and in the so called operation Parakaram. When against a pigmy like Pakistan we were deterred from crossing the LoC and the Radcliffe line we can forget about blockading Burmese ports.

The only way IN and ICG can play a part in the coming conflict with PRC would be their ability to go into Western Pacific and disrupt the trade of PRC. After all blockading the Mallaca straits is a blunt instrument. It will impact other countries of North-East Asia and South East Asia. Countries which we would hardly want to antagonize in event of a conflict with PRC. But going into Western Pacific, i.e South China Sea, Taiwan Straits and East Sea would allow us to target only shipping bound for PRC and hurt it.

There is this story from Mahabharata. Drona was asked by his son why he considered Kunti's 4th born as the best archer in the universe. To prove him why Kunti's fourth born son was the best archer Drona carried out a test. He hung a bird high up in a tree. He asked all of his students including his son to target the bird's eye. When everybody took aim he asked each of his students what they saw. All of them said, something like trees, or the leaves or the sky or nothing. When it was the turn of Kunti's fourth born son, he was asked by Drona what he saw. Kunti's fourth born son first replied "the bird". Then Drona asked him to aim again, which he dutifully did. Drona then again asked the Kunit's fourth born what he saw, this time the reply was "eye of the bird".
If we want to blockade PRC's trade we need to go mouth of the dragon and blockade it there. Sitting pretty in Indian ocean is not going to cut it. Like the famed fourth son of Kunti, we have to be clear and aim for our target. Otherwise we are doing our motherland a disservice.

And oh one more thing, Kunti's first born was Radheya and not Yudhister.

[Philip]

Chris has made a valuable point.First the MSC is "non-negotiable",It is essential,as even if China chews off a vital part of Indian territory in the Himalayas,we should be able to do the same.secondly,and vitally,this force is also a very useful force to have in relation to our other mortal enemy,Pak,whose independent adventurism of the "Mushar-rat" mentality ,has in the past kept the Chinese off-balance and unable to muster a significant simultaneous threat ,leaving us with extra forces to deploy at will,especially in J&K,where we can chew off parts of or strike deep into POK.

The Chinese vulnerability on the high seas is going to grow even as its economy grows ,as both raw material,fuel supplies,etc. and finished products all have to use the sea lanes ,esp. the IOR and Pacific.The new Arctic route will ease matters a bit,but not substantiallly.Pipelines are extremely vulnerable,especially when located through inhospitable mountain terrain.The German navy in WW2 conducted a huge campaign against merchantmen right off the US coast.It is why the sub crisis in the IN should be accorded the highest priority and urgent acquisitiions of extra subs made asap.The IN should plan for a sustainable sub campaign against the PLAN and China's merchant fleet in the Indo-China Sea ,taking the fight to the enemy's waterfront! As it is,the PLAN has some stormy weather ahead in its maritime relations with Japan,judging from this Chinese report.

Ties With Japan Face ‘Grim Test,’ China Naval Researcher Writes
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-3 ... rites.html

Ties between Japan and China face a “grim test” in the coming years amid signs that Japan is making preparations to occupy disputed islands in the East China Sea, a Chinese naval researcher wrote today.

The holding of regular U.S.-Japanese military exercises, deployment of troops to the southwest of the country and improvements in military intelligence indicate Japan is preparing to occupy the Diaoyu islands, Xing Guangmei, a law researcher with the Naval Research Institute of the People’s Liberation Army, wrote in the China Daily newspaper.

Japan, which administers the islands, has no official plan to station troops there. The government has said it is prepared to defend the uninhabited islets, known as Senkaku in Japanese, against foreign invasion.

“Japan, of course, wants to have it both ways; it wants to share in the dividends from China’s economic growth, while maintaining a hardline stance in its relations with China,” Xing wrote. “It is therefore extremely unlikely that there will be any detente in bilateral relations during Abe’s term in office. Sino-Japanese relations face a grim test in the coming years.”

The comments come after Abe aide Isao Iijima and Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki each visited China in quick succession this month, amid signs of a more conciliatory tone following a decisive victory for Abe’s party in upper house elections. Saiki, who arrived July 29 for a two-day visit, held a short meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the official Xinhua News Agency reported today.
Summit Possible

Iijima said after his visit that a summit meeting was possible in the not-so-distant future, Kyodo news agency reported July 29.

A meeting between China and Japan’s leaders is “extraneous” and Abe’s efforts to seek a meeting are a “show” serving political interests, China’s state-owned Global Times newspaper said in an editorial yesterday.

Abe, who has pledged to strengthen national security, stepped up his rhetoric in the run-up to the July 21 election, accusing China of trying to change the regional status quo by force.

His victory has caused anxiety in East Asia as he has made it clear he wants to revise the country’s pacifist constitution and bolster the military, Xing wrote today. Abe will actively leverage economic and trade cooperation with China and “get tough” over territorial disputes in the East China Sea, Xing said.

Relations between the two largest economies in Asia turned frostier last September than any point since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1972, with Japan buying three islands also claimed by China from a private Japanese owner, setting off protests across China.

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Henry Sanderson in Beijing at [email protected]

Most interesting to note that Japan intends to "occupy" the disputed islands.It is doing at sea what India should be doing in Tibet.

[manjgu]

@Arihant...the insurance charges will also impact Indians... dont think its going to impact china only !! i dont think a country of indias stature can stop ships flying non chinese flags ... indian naval action is going to affect the chinese but not in any material way to make a difference to a land battle !! this is the basic thrust of my argument. there will be a price which will be paid by both chinese and indians but not in any way to impact the land war.

what prevents paki subs shooting indian shippin passing in arabian seas??

[svinayak]

what prevents paki subs shooting indian shippin passing in arabian seas??

End of Pakistan as a nation

[SSridhar]

what prevents paki subs shooting indian shippin passing in arabian seas??

End of Pakistan as a nation

Acharya, well said.

Manjgu, do not labour under false impression. I hope you are only playing a devil's advocate here.

[Samudragupta]

All the discussions that are happening between the different posters basically centered on the basic strategic question about India...whether India is a continental power or a maritime power or exactly what future does it see for itself.....answering this basic question will answer the confusion regarding Mahan and Mackinder....

[SSridhar]

NightWatch for the night of July 31

Xinhua reported today that at a study session with members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on Tuesday, President Xi Jinping called for efforts to learn more about and further manage maritime development. Xi said China will adhere to the path of peaceful development, but "in no way will the country abandon its legitimate rights and interests, nor will it give up its core national interests." The president said China will "use peaceful means and negotiations to settle disputes and strive to safeguard peace and stability." Meanwhile, he stressed that China will prepare to cope with complexities, enhance its capacity in safeguarding maritime rights and interests, and resolutely safeguard its maritime rights and interests. In the 21st century, oceans and seas have an increasingly important role to play in a country's economic development and opening up to the outside world, he said. Their status has become more prominent in regards to safeguarding state sovereignty, national security and development interests, as well as the advancement of a country's ecological civilization. The oceans and seas have an increasingly important strategic status concerning global competition in the spheres of politics, economic development, military, and technology, he said. The key report to the 18th National Congress of the CPC held last November outlined the "maritime power" strategy, calling for enhanced capacity for exploiting marine resources, protecting the marine environment and safeguarding China's maritime rights and interests. At the study session, Xi underscored efforts to make marine industries a pillar of China's national economy. Relevant parties should improve the capability and enlarge the fields for exploiting marine resources so as to "cultivate the marine economy into a new growth point of the country," he said.

Comment: The Chinese leadership appears to have embraced Alfred Thayer Mahan with a Chinese communist twist. The implications of Xi's comments are that Chinese maritime ambitions extend far beyond assertions and defense of sea claims in Asia.

[Arihant]

Reading China On Sino-Indian Border Issue

A useful read, and worrying, when coupled with article I posted a couple of days back arguing that anti-India tirades by the likes of PLA General Luo Yuan had the approval of Zhongnanhai.

The Chinese Communist leadership has perfected the art of saying things and giving signals leaving it to the other side to decipher and understand.

China would want to describe the intrusions across the LAC with India as local incidents with little or no consequence. Where China or even India is concerned, military adventurism is not of local making. The Depsung (Daulat Beg Oldi) intrusions by the PLA was well crafted to send a message to India in the run up to their premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India. The Chumar incident when the Chinese took away the Indian army’s surveillance equipment has relevance to Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s China visit. The more recent Chinese intrusion in the Spanggur area with banners claiming Chinese territory was aimed to pressure India to sign the Chinese proposed new Border Management Agreement. Neither government has disclosed what the Chinese proposal is. But from Chinese behaviour it appears China means to prevent any further strengthening of Indian military infrastructure along the LAC, because the Chinese have a huge advantage by building excellent infrastructure while India was dithering for more than two decades.

To interpret that no Chinese protest to the recent Indian Cabinet to raise a 50,000 mountain strike corps in the Eastern Sector as comfort is no solace. They registered their protests earlier when the discussions were on in India. In response, they have already fortified their position and laid railway lines to the Eastern Sector. If India agrees to the Chinese proposal on the border agreement, then they will have their cake and eat it too.

On recent Indian media reports and discussions on the Chinese intrusions, the official China news agency Xinhua (July 23) accused the Indian media of sensational reporting harmful to India-China relations. Yet, they had amnesia about Maj. Gen (rtd.) Luo Yuan’s warning on the eve of Defence Minister Antony’s visit to China. The Xinhua article pontificated of India-China trade and accused the Indian media of souring the atmosphere before Li Keqing’s visit to India (over the Depsung intrusion by the PLA).

This was a “talking to” to India, charging that the Indian media was sowing misunderstanding between the two countries. It is well known that what the Xinhua puts out is not independent but on the lines dictated by the party and the government. The message, therefore, is that of the Chinese government.

The aim is to constrict Indian views and opinions. Though the Indian media is free, Indian officials have fallen into this trap by unofficially advising Indian journalists to desist from bringing out the truth. If Indian free voices are silenced, China has won its game.

[Arihant]

China’s game plan to keep India on the back foot

A key defining event has been the three-week Chinese military incursion into Ladakh’s Depsang plateau, which ended on 7 May only after India virtually capitulated by demolishing a line of new defensive fortifications in the Chumar region, 400km to the south, and agreeing to consider a Chinese-drafted border defence cooperation agreement. Since then, an emboldened China has escalated its military pressure on India.

Yet this spate of incursions has received little attention as the Indian state, mired in petty politics, remains woefully adrift. Indeed, the government kept the 17 June Chinese raid under wraps for three weeks for fear that news about it would provoke public pressure to cancel the impending separate visits to Beijing of the national security adviser and the defence minister. Similarly, to safeguard the Chinese Premier’s visit earlier, New Delhi—as if reading from the aggressor’s script in Chinglish—tried to pass off the watershed event at Depsang as a “small little spot” of “acne” treatable with “an ointment”.

China’s newest provocations, in fact, draw encouragement from its bloodless victory when it sneaked troops into Depsang and then, employing the threat of escalation, extracted Indian concessions. One of the concessions—suspension of forward patrolling in Chumar—has created the opening for stepped-up Chinese intrusions, designed to assert claims to that highly strategic area overlooking the Tibet-Xinjiang highway.

By making India remove fortifications and halt forward patrolling in Chumar, China accomplished two objectives—secure India’s acquiescence to Chinese-defined constraints on deployment and surveillance and an Indian acknowledgment, even if tacit, that the area is disputed. Pursuit of the next objective will likely witness Beijing’s call for “mutual accommodation” and “mutual respect” to achieve a dispute resolution on the basis of a now-familiar Chinese dictum—“what is ours is ours to keep, but what is yours must be on the negotiating table to be settled through give and take”.
To cover up its entrenched strategic timidity, however, New Delhi has flaunted its go-ahead for establishing a new mountain strike corps—a clearance that should have come several years earlier and without media hype. Yawning gaps in India’s Himalayan defences remain unplugged owing to sluggish decision-making. Even as China develops and deploys capabilities quietly, New Delhi advertises any deterrence move, however nascent.

It will take India probably up to seven years to establish and fully deploy the new strike corps. But the government has already betrayed its trademark meekness by deciding to deploy the corps, or any of its formations, not where most needed—Arunachal Pradesh—but in West Bengal and elsewhere so as not to raise the hackles of Beijing, which calls Arunachal “disputed territory”. This is just one example of how New Delhi allows Beijing to dictate terms to it.

Consider another, more mortifying example: China’s draft border defence cooperation agreement is receiving India’s fullest consideration. The draft was handed to India in circumstances that amounted to holding a gun to its head and demanding that it enter into discussions on concluding the agreement. It was given on 4 May before Beijing agreed to dismantle its Depsang encampment.
China’s intent is to keep India at a strategic disadvantage and thus vulnerable to Chinese military pre-emption through an agreed freeze on the build-up of border defences and troop levels. The aim is clearly to stymie India’s belated and still-bumbling efforts to enhance its defences and military logistics support.

China has a knack of defining important principles in an accord so as to bind the other party to them by fostering a belief that their mere enunciation represents progress, even as Beijing pays lip service to those principles. In the face of belligerent Chinese actions, however, it has become difficult to keep up the pretence of progress. The Depsang encampment represented a shot through the heart of the border peace concept central to the existing accords concluded in 1993, 1996 and 2005. China thus wants these accords replaced with a new lopsided agreement to aid its containment-behind-engagement strategy.

But why is New Delhi furthering China’s game plan? Can a draft thrust by China at gunpoint be the basis for negotiating an agreement? As if content to play second fiddle to China, India is offering its comments and suggestions on the Chinese draft. In a 6 July joint statement with his Chinese counterpart, general Chang Wanquan, defence minister A.K. Antony even “agreed to the early conclusion of negotiations” on the proposed agreement. Is India a vanquished nation that had little choice but to embrace an imposed draft as the basis for negotiations?

[manjgu]

Ssridhar.. I would say both Yes and No to the devils advocate construct.

this naval blockade is being played too much IMHO. I dont see india having in the next 10 - 15 yrs the wherewithal to raise a navy which can blockade shipping lines for the enemy and also protect its own shipping !! Do u think paki subs taking potshots at indian shipping during a India-China shooting match as being improbable.. and who will identify if it was a paki or a chinese sub?? or helping the Chinese navy in tracking indian navy. we should be realistic of what we can do in the oceans and deter the chinese in a big way in the mountains. Raising a suitable land force, improving infrastructure is a much more doable / practical/ economically feasible and faster way of dealing with the chinese. Do check with naval officers how many ships can we put to sea for any extended period of time even as of today !!

[SSridhar]

Ssridhar.. I would say both Yes and No to the devils advocate construct.

this naval blockade is being played too much IMHO. I dont see india having in the next 10 - 15 yrs the wherewithal to raise a navy which can blockade shipping lines for the enemy and also protect its own shipping !! Do u think paki subs taking potshots at indian shipping during a India-China shooting match as being improbable.. and who will identify if it was a paki or a chinese sub?? or helping the Chinese navy in tracking indian navy. we should be realistic of what we can do in the oceans and deter the chinese in a big way in the mountains. Raising a suitable land force, improving infrastructure is a much more doable / practical/ economically feasible and faster way of dealing with the chinese. Do check with naval officers how many ships can we put to sea for any extended period of time even as of today !!

We do not start any discussion with a premise that China and Pakistan are awesome and somehow India lacks capabilities.I get that sense when I read your posts.

I do not see why you feel that India would take 10 or 15 years to constrict the choke points. Today, India has potent platforms in its naval assets to do so. Unfortunately, even when the PLAN is bigger than the IN, its numerical strength is nullified by its geographical disadvantage and the overwhelming geographical advantage that India possesses in this area between Hormuz to Malacca or Cape of Good Hope to Malacca. In a war situation, certainly India will take a bad hit economically, sinking of its maritime vessels by PLAN etc. but India will give back in a bigger measure. Even if PLAN is able to slip some assets into these SLOCs, they have to first protect themselves against IN before they can provide protection to Chinese merchant ships. Not only IN, but IAF can and will be also deployed against Chinese naval platforms, something that China cannot do. Protection always needs a much bigger number of naval platforms than attack and that is the asymmetrical advantage that India will possess.

What about fuel and supplies for the Chinese task force deployed far away from its bases ? Will they sneak through the same choke point ? Or, will the Chinese get supplies from the 'String of Pearls' bases ? Absolutely not. These are not Chinese bases in mainland China where supplies in large quantities can be pre-staged. Even the limited quantities there have to be constantly replenished. Nobody expects Myanmar or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka to actively assist China in its war with India. India will be at liberty to attack these ports if it becomes staging points for PLAN and India does not even have to deploy naval assets to do so, concentrating all its naval assets instead on the SLOCs, attacking Chinese PLAN task forces or protecting its own shipping, or destroying Manara, Karachi and Gwadar if Pakistan foolishly tries to punch far above its weight. A port like Gwadar has other threats from the Balochis as well as the 'bad Taliban'.

AFAIK, the IN is confident that almost all assets can be deployed, especially if war clouds start to gather. Never compare a situation at peace time with war time. PLAN vessels have also got to go for periodic maintenance, refit etc. This is nothing unusual. This is where I get suspicious why anyone should talk about such normal, routine matters as though it is all peculiar to only India.

As for Pakistan taking advantage of the situation and firing at Indian ships, well, it may happen and India will have to be (and is) ready for that. Again, do not be overawed by PN capabilities. Why do you think that only PN will monitor IN ? India has more potent platforms to track PN assets all over the place. Again, why do we overestimate enemy's (and that too an enemy who has been thoroughly defeated in outing after outing with increasing margins) strength and underestimate our own ? While it is foolish to be smug, it is also foolish to be unduly diffident due to improper assessments. India will probably take a few hits but India will destroy PN in the process, if PN was foolish enough to insert itself in a war that does not concern it. China never came to its help in its wars with India and on the contrary advised it to resolve the disputes peacefully. But, knowing Pakistan, it may well not heed history and pay a bigger price.

An India-China war of that significance where it escalates into naval confrontation, would no longer be limited to just the two of them. China has no more than two or three friends in the region. Besides, the Chinese are astute enough to realize that an economically debilitating war is not their priority especially when they have serious conflicts with every neighbour and there is an American pivot in this region. All analyses point to at least a decade for a serious war of that magnitude to develop. There may be incursions, skirmishes etc in the meanwhile.

[Philip]

The "war"with China must be conducted at many levels.First,the economic trade imbalance must be countered by banning or making cheap Chinese wares unaffordanble to Indians.Secondlt,Chines etelecom and electronic gadgets like cell phones,computers,etc. must be banned.See what the US is doing.Indian corporate entities should be warned against using all Chinese made electronic office and commn. eqpt. and employing Chinese in IT firms.

http://www.internetevolution.com/author ... tion_gnews

Spy Agencies Ban Lenovo PCs Over Hacking Fears
Written by Mitch Wagner
7/31/2013 12
Intelligence and defense services in the US, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand blocked Lenovo PCs from their "secret" and "top secret" networks over concerns that the systems are vulnerable to being hacked, according to reports.

The agencies banned the computers in the mid–2000s after discovering alleged back-door hardware and firmware vulnerabilities, according to the Australian Financial Review.

Lenovo, headquartered in Beijing, has become the world's largest PC vendor. It acquired IBM's PC business in 2005. IBM, which is the exclusive sponsor of Internet Evolution, continues to sell servers and mainframes approved for secret and top-secret networks.

"The classified ban highlights concerns about security threats posed by 'malicious circuits' and insecure firmware in chips produced in China by companies with close government ties," AFR says. "The Chinese Academy of Sciences, a government entity, owns 38 percent of Legend Holdings, which in turn owns 34 percent of Lenovo and is its largest shareholder."

The hardware vulnerabilities could allow people to remotely access devices without user knowledge, AFR reported.

The vendor continues to supply computers in quantity for unclassified networks in many Western nations.

Lenovo told AFR that it's unaware of the ban, adding its "products have been found time and time again to be reliable and secure by our enterprise and public sector customers and we always welcome their engagement to ensure we are meeting their security needs."

The US State Department bought 16,000 Lenovo PCs in 2006, at least 900 of which were to be used on classified networks. Then Congress applied pressure, and the State Department said it would restrict the devices' use of unclassified networks and alter future procurement policies to reflect that change, InformationWeek reported.

The US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand comprise the "five eyes" electronic eavesdropping alliance, InformationWeek says. They've reportedly configured their networks to handle classified data similarly, to allow communication between them.

The revelation about the Lenovo ban comes amid mounting concerns that the Chinese government is using equipment manufactured by Huawei or ZTE to spy on Western businesses and government agencies, InformationWeek noted. The House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report last year prohibiting US government agencies from purchasing or using equipment from either vendor, and urged US business to rethink their use of equipment from the companies.

General Michael Hayden, former head of the US Central Intelligence Agency and of the National Security Agency, told the Financial Review, "No, it is simply not acceptable for Huawei to be creating the backbone of the domestic telecommunications network in the United States, period." Asked whether Huawei "represent[s] an unambiguous national security threat to the US and Australia," Hayden replied, "Yes, I believe it does."

The Australian Department of Defence issued an official statement today denying it banned the use of Lenovo computers, according to The Register. But The Register goes on to note there have been no claims that there was a department-wide ban on the machines. The reported ban only extends to the secret intelligence and security agencies of the five nations, many of which aren't a part of their nations' defense departments.

Should Western nations use equipment from Huawei, Lenovo, and other companies with close ties to the US government? Should private businesses do so?