Managing Chinese Threat

[Samudragupta]

How good the Chinese really are in armoured battle??

[Prem]

is it right to conclude then that if we have 3 MSC to Middle finger the Middle Kingdom Mush then It will cough up Pukes like the muck stuck in its throat? The choice of land link with Poaq or keeping Tibet under control to save face must be presented in nice manner to PRC while simultanously denying them the sea lanes in Hindu MahaSagar. India should be in the position to do this by 2022.

[ramana]

Look at distance of Pindi from Srinagar.

Smerch can handle Pindi from Inside India border

To really get them you need to go and kill them dead in their own lands. All this shooting from far does not change their attitudes. History from Ghazni onwards.
And where is the SMERCH? And how many do we have?

[ramana]

Rohitvats think Sinkiang or East Turkestan liberation.
Thats where all this willlead to. The SU-30MKIs were also for that.

[kumarn]

Won't nukes come into play when we talk of East Turkmenistan? Or, is the intention that just having such a capability would prevent PRC from invading indian territory?

[SSridhar]

ramana, tks.

I wish to make myself clear. I believe that today we are not in a situation where just one silver bullet would serve our purpose against China. 1962 has taught us two lessons, I would assume. One was that the Army must be strong at these heights with manpower, firepower, mobility and more especially that the words must be backed up with muscle. The Samdorung Chu confirmed the lessons. So, nobody can grudge the belated investments into MSC, armoured brigades, light howitzers etc. It is simply not one vs. the other. Money must be spent on both because the adversary is that strong and we cannot depend on alliance partners to come to our help. With due respect to Adm. Raja Menon, his unidimensional line of reasoning is unsustainable in the present situation. However, I also do not believe that Malacca is not to our advantage. It has a crucial and the most major part in our campaign against China when it comes to war. Liberating East Turkestan would need enormous ground work to be done because it is easy to acquire land but difficult to hold it. Our logistics have also got to make a quantum jump and we may have to liberate Gilgit-Baltistan first if we want to do the same to ET. However, Malacca is very simple, straight-forward and we have a strong tri-srvice base quite nearby. The PLAN has not seen naval action and their tactics would certainly be inferior to ours for that reason and also because they do not exercise regularly with those navies who have enormous naval expertise & experience.

On the comparison with Lepanto, there are certain differences. We are not talking of IN vs. PLAN stand-off as it happened at Lepanto between the naval flotilla of the Ottoman and the Christian forces. The two forces were not attacking each others' merchant navy. The percentage volume of trade by sea was nowhere near what we have today to have caused a significant dent. Besides, the Ottoman had a powerful ally in the French who enabled the Caliphate to recover from the defeat and continue as before. The situation around China is very different.

[Philip]

The MSC is non-negotiable,as I said earlier.In fact,I would go further and say that 50,000 troops is not enough and the number of divisions should be increased to give us larger options in striking at locations of choice in Tibet.Here,our air power is also lacking in a key dimension,as we need dedicated long range bombers able to destroy the Tibetan railway and road links from China to Tibet at many places to prevent swift logistic support.The PLA will no doubt stock siginficant suppplies of supplies and war material ahead of any conflict to achieve maximum "shock and awe" firepower.We need about 24 Chinooks and about 12 MI-26s so that missiles,heavy road blg. eqpt.,etc. can be transported simultaneously in both eastern and western/northern sectors should the PLA intrude on all fronts.But before the formation of this new MSC,for heaven and the IA's sake,please GOI order on a war footing basis the much needed artillery for the IA!

What Adm.Menon has tried to point out that the PRC is most vulnerable on the high seas where interdiction and sinking of its tankers and merchantmen will have a huge impact worldwide; if the great Dragon cannot protect its trade and energy supplies,it will suffer a tremendous loss of face and interdicting its energy and raw material supplies and finished goods from transiting to Europe,Africa and the IOR will have huge consequences for its ecomony .Napoleon eventually lost the continental war because the RN was superior at sea.The Battle of the Nile and Trafalgar were turning points,and German lack of support for their U-boats saw them picked off later in WW2 by a combination of air and surface ASW allied efforts.

Taking the war inside the enemy's waters is great if we have the UW capability-which we lack at the moment. This is a very serious deficiency,the most critical ,as we have seen the penetration of PLAN subs last year where 22 contacts including that of a nuclear sub near the A&N islands were made.The PLAN is doing exactly what we are recommending for the IN,taking the battle to the enemy's waters! By this bold strategy,they hope to offset the "Malacca dilemma" and keep the IN preoccupied with ASW defence and not engaged in offensive strike ops and IOR control.Here too the IN needs LRMP aircraft capable of carrying BMos and Nirbhay.Had we had the Backfires,they could make a significant impact in the Indo-China Sea.

In the paper on the PLAN;s maritime strategy,it shows how the Chinese are following the Soviet strategy during the CWar."controlling" the 200nm nautical distance from its shores ,what the PLAN calls the "first island chain",and then the second 1000nm zone which will be "contested".It is here that it has serious deficiencies which the Soviets did not have,just one example as I've mentioned above,Backfires.

The second element in the Soviet’s layered defense
system was land-based long-range aircraft that could
be employed en mass to fire long-range antiship cruise
missiles. The Soviet Backfire bomber remains the prototypical
example of this capability. The Soviet tactic
was to send aerial raids composed of two regiments
(approximately 46 aircraft) against each enemy carrier
battle group to ensure that enough bombers would
survive the defensive screens to get within range to
launch ship-killing cruise missiles

A few excerpts from the excellent paper on the same.

THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
CONTEXT DRIVING PLA NAVY BUILDING
Michael McDevitt

However, while its land frontiers are stable, looking east from Beijing beyond its eastern seaboard the situation is more strategically problematic. The PRC’s maritime approaches are replete with unresolved sovereignty issues and genuine vulnerabilities. Strategic vulnerability from the sea is not a new issue for China. Weakness along its long maritime frontier has been a problem for Beijing since at least 1842, when the Treaty of Nanking ended the first Opium
War. This 3-year conflict with Great Britain exposed Imperial China’s military weakness, and ushered in the so-called “Century of Humiliation.” The repeated military and diplomatic humiliations and defeats that 485 China suffered were inflicted by Western powers, including Japan that came mainly from the sea.9 The difference today, is that the PRC has the resources and political coherence necessary to address the reality that the vast majority of China’s outstanding sovereignty issues and unresolved strategic problems are maritime in nature. For military strategists and planners, this makes establishing the major strategic direction a reasonably straightforward proposition. Consider the following issues, which are aspects of “the focal point of the struggle of contradictions between ourselves and the enemy”:

• With Taiwan being an island, it is the combination of Taiwan’s air defense and the threat of intervention by the U.S. military (primarily the U.S. Navy) that effectively keeps the Taiwan Strait a moat rather than a highway open to the PLA.

• Perhaps as strategically significant to a PLA planner as Taiwan is the geostrategic reality that the PRC’s economic center of gravity is its east coast. Because it is a “seaboard,” it is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea—a military task the United States is uniquely suited to execute.

• Territorial disputes with Japan over islands and seabed resources in the East China Sea have
become more serious, representing a potential flashpoint where Sino-Japanese interests are
contested. Each state is emphasizing its claims by the periodic deployment of naval and coast
guard vessels. The entire issue is maritime in nature.10 486

• Unsettled territorial disputes, and their concomitant resource issues, remain with respect to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. Again, this problem is maritime in nature.

• China’s entire national strategy of reform and opening depends largely upon maritime
commerce—i.e., trade. The PRC’s economy is driven by the combination of exports and
imports which together account for almost 75 percent of PRC gross domestic product (GDP). This trade travels mainly by sea.11

• Finally, there is the issue of energy security—or, as one commentator put it, “energy insecurity.” It has become commonplace to observe that the PRC will increasingly depend upon foreign sources of oil and natural gas, most of which come by sea.12

Beijing’s primary military competitor is the United States, the world’s foremost naval power, which has maintained—for the past 50 years—a significant naval presence on “China’s doorstep.” Should the PRC elect to use force to resolve either the reunification dispute
with Taiwan or outstanding maritime claims, the United States is the one country that could militarily deny success. Also by its air and naval presence in the region, it could stymie any Chinese attempt to use the growing capability of the PLA to settle these issues by force majeure. The United States is also becoming even more closely allied with China’s historical antagonist
Japan, which itself has an excellent navy and a formidable maritime tradition.13 Because of these factors, and especially because China’s economic health depends upon unimpeded access to and use of the high seas, Beijing has been 487 forced to think more seriously about how to deal with its maritime frontier. In the past, China could simply surrender ground to an invader without being defeated. But now, although the threat of invasion is long past, being complacent about its maritime frontier is no longer a viable strategic choice.

Given the maritime nature of all the PRC’s outstanding strategic issues and its dependence upon trade for continued economic development, there is little question that the PRC’s “main strategic direction” is eastward toward the central Pacific Ocean, and southeast toward the South China Sea and the shipping lanes from the Middle East. This judgment is reinforced by the December 2004 Chinese Defense White Paper, which breaks with the tradition of land force dominance, clearly stating that the PLAN, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the ballistic missile force—the Second Artillery—are to receive priority
in funding. Further, it explicitly lays out its ambitions for the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery in these words:

While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, in order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic counter strikes. (emphasis added)14

The author mentions the third element of Soviet naval strategy which the PLAN is following,the use of subs afar,keeping its surface forces closer to home where they can be protected by air support.

The PLAN is adapting this approach. It has focused
on more modern, high-performance, conventionally propelled
submarines, which, while lacking the time
on station and submerged speed of nuclear-powered
submarines, are much more difficult to detect. But
because conventionally-powered submarines do not
have sustained endurance, they depend relatively more
on accurate surveillance to help them locate targetable
ships.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DRIVERS: MARITIME
TRADE AND IMPORTING ENERGY BY SEA

maritime trade and the importation of oil by tankers, PRC reform and opening up have created new Chinese dependencies and therefore new problems that China has not confronted before. These dependencies create a probable requirement for the PLAN to contribute to the safe passage of ships bound for China with oil and natural gas or trade goods in times of crisis or conflict. This is a future requirement, in my judgment, because in a practical sense today the PLAN could not have much effect one way or another on the safety of merchant ships sailing to or from China in time of war with the United States. China never had this problem in a strategically significant way because of its traditional economic “independence.” Until Deng Xiaoping’s decision to reform economically and “open up” China, the economy was largely autarchic. ...... what a unique turn-about China is facing
today, when such a huge amount of its economic life is bound up in international trade.37 Today, about 75 percent of the PRC’s annual GDP is based on international trade (imports and exports, including both goods and services).

Dependence on foreign sources of oil is an irreversible fact of life for China—a fundamental feature of its energy profile and of the global energy market for years to come. West Africa and the Persian Gulf are both natural magnets for China in this regard. Indeed, Gulf suppliers are already vitally important energy partners for China. Since 1996, about 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports have come from the Middle East.41 Because most of this oil comes to China by sea via the Strait of Malacca, the PRC leadership reportedly became concerned about the possibility that in a conflict over Taiwan, the United States might try to block the strait and cut off PRC oil imports that come by that conduit.42 Clearly, PRC leaders who worry that the United States will block the Malacca Strait need to look at a 505 map so they can understand that if this vital strait were closed, there still would be other deep-water passages through the Indonesian archipelago. Even if all these passages were somehow closed, maritime traffic from Africa and the Middile East could sail around Australia and proceed to East Asia via the central Pacific. The point is that the oceans of the world are seamless, and stopping traffic once it is operating on the high seas is very difficult. ... Ironically, Beijing wants to reduce its dependency on foreign flag carriers, and over the next 15 years has set the objective of shipping 75 percent of its oil imports in Chinese flag carriers, making it easier for the United States to determine which ships are carrying oil to Chinese ports. 43 The most successful attempts at cutting off maritime trade have been either at the point of origin or at the destination. (The Royal Navy’s tight 506 blockade of Europe during the Napoleanic Wars or of the United States during the War of 1812 were relevant examples of blockades at the destination, as was the U.S. success in isolating Japan during World War II.)
Although PRC oil dependency has become an issue long after the “first island chain” was described as including the entire South China Sea, sea lane security for oil will now provide an additional driver for PLAN capabilities to exercise control over the sea lane from Singapore to China. At the other end of the oil sea lane, tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil to East Asia, including China, must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf, a choke point the U.S. Navy already dominates. Unlike Malacca, where alternative transit options are available, there are no other alternatives to getting large amounts of oil out of the Gulf except via Hormuz. If the PRC were serious about protecting Gulf oil bound for hina, it either would have to be on the scene with a significant naval capability or would needto depend upon an ally in the area capable of acting efficaciously on Beijing’s behalf. So far, there have been no indications that the PLAN is actively planning to maintain a naval presence in this region, but it would be foolish to rule out the possibility. We should recall that throughout the 1980s the Soviet Union maintained a small naval force of submarines and surface ships in the Northern Arabian Sea, using facilities provided by Yemen. This squadron had the mission of demonstrating a Soviet presence, showing the flag in a region that the Soviets considered important. That the Soviets normally included a submarine in this mix ensured that U.S. Naval units in the area were always in a high state of readiness. One cannot rule out the possibility of similar facilities in 507 either Iran or Pakistan being made available for a PLAN squadron. Such a squadron would be valuable both for a PRC peacetime presence and in crisis situations, but would probably be lost if an all-out conflict with the United States over Taiwan broke out.44 ..... It will be many years before the PLAN is able to operate surface ships independently at sea in the face of a hostile United States. That is not to say that maintaining distant squadrons lacks high utility in peacetime and in periods of crisis. Whether such utility results in a demand for surface ships remains to be seen.

At the time of writing this paper the author had not factored the maritime dimension of an Indo-Sino spat.It would be most interesting to wargame such a scenario.There is an IDR paper on the issue.

China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain
By Cmde Ranjit B Rai
Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec2009 | Date : 19 Feb , 2013

http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/F ... r%2B10.pdf

[harbans]

Excellent article by SD Pradhan in ToI: Recommend read in full!

The justification for the change in the policy towards Tibet is in fact provided by the Chinese themselves. Notwithstanding so many agreements, if the Chinese authorities are not considering the J&K as a part of India, India is fully justified in not treating the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China. What India needs to discuss is the return of the territory illegally occupied by China in J&K. Rest is the border between India and Tibet, which should be discussed with the latter. India should declare that the length of India-China border is only limited to the J&K part that touches China. India at the same time stop policy of accommodating Chinese wishes by not sending officers from J&K or Arunachal Pradesh. Such acts actually go against our national interests by giving the impression that India is prepared to accept such demands. This does not mean that India and China would go to war but would establish that India can react against unjust demands of China. India –China trade, which is highly in favour of China, is yet another leverage against China and can be effectively used. The India-China trade deficit increased by 34% against India in the first five months of this year over the last year. The Chinese PM had recently come to India with a large delegation of the Chinese companies. The Chinese companies should be placed in the category of companies from the countries of concern and should not be given facilities to operate.

India needs to revisit it's Tibet Policy

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>And where is the SMERCH? And how many do we have?

3 Regiments. One each with one of the existing Arty Divisions on western front.

[SSridhar]

In continuation of the Raja Menon article, the response by Zorawar Singh and Philips reference to a Michael McDevitt's article, I would post excerpts from another one by Christopher D Yung on the lessons that PLAN learned from Falklands. The excerpts are from a chapter in the monograph, "Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars" produced by the US Army War College in Nov. 2011. I have no url.

Chinese analysts highlight the following conclusions, which serve as guidance for the operations practiced and executed, doctrine being developed, and weapon systems and platforms procured. These conclusions are: “Know your enemy, know yourself”;
the importance of tactical estimates and correct deployment/ employment of forces; the importance of tactical and war-fighting guidelines (doctrine); the importance of effective systems of command and control; the importance of national mobilization and defense economy; “Take your protection with you”; the importance of bases and access to facilities; the paramount importance of air power; the important role of merchant shipping; the role of amphibious forces; and logistics as force multiplier or “Achilles Heel.”

The PLA will seek to gain access (temporarily or periodically) to a naval support facility farfrom China’s shores, will continue to practice its operations far from Mainland China in conjunction with foreign partners, and will continue to operate “Out of Area” in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and in other foreign locations.

While there is no question that Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Kosovo played an important part in shaping Chinese perspectives on defense transformation, an often overlooked military conflict that had a profound impact on Chinese military thinking is the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Great Britain and Argentina. . . . The lessons that the Chinese can take from the Falklands/Malvinas are directly applicable, then, to the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that the Chinese are said to be preparing for in case of a Taiwan contingency.

Thus far, the Falklands/Malvinas campaign represents the last major naval or maritime campaign ofany tactical or operational significance. No conflict since then has involved so many elements of naval operations in a major theater of war—amphibious ships, submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, and, of course, aircraft carriers. It is thus no wonder that the Chinese have spent some time paying attention to its lessons. In 2000 Vice Admiral Ding Yiping, the former PLA Navy (PLAN) Chief of Staff, wrote that “for the future of military theory, development of military units and of military equipment, [the Falklands/Malvinas] war produced a deep influence.”5 Lyle Goldstein points out that the Nanjing Naval Command College had dispatched research teams to “study naval forces, naval strategy, sea defence, and blockade operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War with the goal of understanding future naval warfare.”6 The Falklands/Malvinas campaign also involves a conflict centered around sovereignty or territorial disputes—something that the Chinese are themselves heavily involved in. Therefore, Chinese commentators have periodically revisited the Falklands/Malvinas conflict not just to derive the military, tactical, and operational lessons that it offers, but also to obtain pearls of wisdom on the political and legal ramifications of the conflict.7

The Importance of Tactical and Warfighting Guidelines (Doctrine).

The Chinese have observed that Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict can, in addition to the factors noted above, be explained by its military following poor tactical guidelines. “[T]he Argentinean military philosophy was passive, its tactics inflexible,
and furthermore lacked real effective aircraft to attack the British defensive capabilities and, still further, to attack Britain’s most important, yet most vulnerable supply shipping; this was Argentina’s greatest mistake.” 15 This failure to observe Great Britain’s glaring weakness in the length of its logistical supply line is a particularly egregious fault of the Argentinean military. “From the perspective of the history of warfare, to not attack a very long and yet very vulnerable supply line, is extremely short-sighted.”16 England, on the other hand, had a correct tactical philosophy. Its “tactics were more agile, and its forces were good at
snatching key links [objectives], and seizing the initiative.” 17 By seizing the southern Malvinas, the British were able to rather quickly inspire the imaginations of the common British citizen, while at the same time establishing a foothold and an advanced base in the operating area. They gave their nuclear attack submarines the freedom to take the initiative and attack the Argentinean navy aggressively. The resulting sinking of the Belgrano by the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror forced the fragile Argentinean navy into staying out of the war.1

The Importance of Bases and Access to Facilities.

Chinese writings cite the importance of access to facilities and bases for British success in the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict. In a recent essay on the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict, one Chinese author noted that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was able to launch air
strikes from Ascension Island against the defenses entrenched on the Falklands/Malvinas.29 Those strikes would not have been possible if the British had not had access to that territory. Chinese authors have also correctly noted that bases and facilities are necessary for military forces to put themselves in order before being dispatched on expeditions and offensive operations. 30 This is akin to the U.S. Navy amphibious doc87 trine concept of Preparation, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault (PERMA). Owing to the fact that the task force had deployed in a hurry, some of the surface combatants and amphibious ships had been incorrectly loaded.31 The task force was forced into reloading equipment and supplies on Ascension Island. The “Preparation” aspect of the operation would not have been possible without access to the advance base on Ascension. The importance of access to a base of operations is not restricted to an established, fully constructed facility. Chinese authors point out that the simple access to a firm and stable piece of territory or land from which to conduct operations is essential to military operations. 32 For the Falklands/Malvinas campaign, one Chinese author writes that the essential factor that enabled the British to attack Argentinean forces from a base of operations was brought about by successfully landing British ground forces on the Falklands/Malvinas
themselves, and the establishment of a beachhead is the crux of the matter.33

The Important Role of Merchant Shipping.

Chinese commentators on the Falklands/Malvinas conflict point out the important role merchant or civilianshipping played. The Royal Navy lacked the sufficient number of ships to transport a steady stream of supplies to the theater of conflict. Chinese military
historians note that the British brought 60 civilian merchant vessels to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.38 The Chinese essay speculates that reliance on merchant vessels, and by extension civilian crews, to conduct naval operations was what caused, in part, the British to have to expend close to 10 million pounds sterling per day over the course of the operation.39 The heavy reliance on merchant shipping can also prove 89 to be a risky course of action. When the merchant vessel (MV) Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by Argentinean aircraft, the Royal Navy lost valuable military assets necessary for the conduct of the landings on the Falklands/
Malvinas.

The first of these common lessons is the PLA guidance on the role of logistics both in support of PLA power projection operations and in support of the PLA’s efforts to defend its territory in the “near seas.” Jianxiang Bi has written that in
authoritative PLA guidance:

According to PLA assumptions, the most critical center of gravity is a support system located in an opponent’s forward deployed and rear bases, which could not be defended against every attack in every place and at every conceivable time. Today, the military
heavily depends on its logistics support system, so that the system itself becomes bloated, extremely visible and vulnerable.49

As we have noted above, one of the key lessons that Chinese observers have taken away from the Falklands/Malvinas conflict is that the Argentineans failed to recognize the vulnerability of the British logistics system and hence, passed up the opportunity

That the Chinese took to heart the important lesson from the Falklands/Malvinas campaign that an expeditionary force and an anti-access force has to operate in an integrated, self-protected manner is also illustrated in its 2008 Defense White Paper. The Defense White Paper clearly describes a naval force that is meant to create a protective bubble around a task force:

Efforts are being made to build new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone. The submarine
force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counter-attack capabilities. The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and possesses maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying, and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and air-defense capabilities.52

Another doctrinal lesson taken from the Falklands/ Malvinas and that applies both to a Taiwan contingency and an out of area military campaign is the importance of establishing a firm strategic policy. Mark Stokes, in his observations of how China would
undertake an air war, observes that:

reparations for a campaign begin with issuance of strategic direction in the form of a strategic policy development process called the juece . . . the juece first establishes a general game plan . . . for military action that explores all possible outcomes, develops stratagems . . . and analyzes centers of gravity.53

Finally, as far as doctrine goes, the PLAN’s statements about what it expects future naval campaignswill look like seems to be a direct reflection of what they observed in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. In China’s 2008 Defense White Paper, the PLAN expects intense conflict over control of the sea.55 This means that the PLAN must strive for control of surface, subsurface, and air. The difficulty the Argentineans faced in integrating the different parts of the military to fight a comprehensive campaign suggests a Falklands/ Malvinas influence upon Chinese doctrinal thinkers when in this same document, the PLAN argues that the naval campaign both in projecting power and in denying access to an invading force must involve the integration of sea, air space, and land operations. The PLAN’s emphasis on the importance of high-tech, long-range, precision weapons may also be traced to the Falklands/Malvinas campaign if also reinforced by PLA observations of Operation DESERT STORM and the Kosovo Campaign. Despite all of the shortcomings of the Argentinean military, the Argentinean Air Force’s successful use of the Exocet missile to sink
the Sheffield is an immediate example of the power and effectiveness of high-tech, long-range, precision weaponry on the battlefield.

[Lalmohan]

i would have thought that the Argentinians lacked the means to interdict british merchant shipping at long range as being the main reason as well as lack of strategic recon, but when british assets were in reasonable range of airstrike (even at the outer edge of operating range), they did attack and did so very effectively - the atlantic conveyer loss was very significant. the hits on the troop carriers was also very effective - with full element of tactical surprise and in a well defended airspace

the mistake argentina made was not to build a major airbase on port stanley and base mirages on it and to doubt british intentions/seriousness

[kit]

I would suggest deploying a large number of Brahmos with the Su mki fleet based in Andaman .A couple of these beasts will take out any Chinese tanker or super carrier. Unleash them in the first few days of war and the Chinese mercantile fleet will be at a literal stand still ! The beast will rip through any commercial vessel like a hot knife on butter.The war would be over sooner with less loss on the Indian side

[harbans]

^ Not so easy. Hitting a supertanker is akin to ecological warfare with all it's repercussions. Neither is it necessary the the tanker is Chinese, even though it's cargo might be. Hitting flag vessels of other countries might launch retaliatory measures not from the target nation one intends or is prepared for. Ecological spills spilling over shores of a 3rd nation again is not exactly going to hurt China at all.

[Garooda]

Beer_And_Rasgullas

New Delhi: Indian and Chinese troops had a face-off in Sikkim earlier this week which, however, ended in a friendly exchange of beer and rasgullas.

The face-off happened near the Tangkar La pass at the height of over 16,000 feet in eastern Sikkim after a Chinese patrol entered into territory claimed by India, sources told PTI here.

The Chinese patrol, which was travelling in two light vehicles, was monitored by the Indian team comprising a young Lieutenant and nine jawans there, they said. The Indian patrol intercepted the Chinese patrol at the Tangkar La pass and after that, they showed banners to each other asking to leave the area and go back into their respective territories.

At the time of parting, the Chinese troops presented cans of Budweiser beer to the Indian patrol while our troops gifted them a pack of rasgullas, they said.

In the recent past, there have been a spate of incursions from the Chinese side into the Indian territory all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two sides stretching from Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir in north to Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast.

On the transgressions by Chinese troops, Defence Minister A.K. Antony had recently said that "there is no commonly delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. There are areas along the border where India and China have different perceptions of the LAC and both sides undertake patrols up to their respective positions there... No shite Its about time a common delineated LAC is derived.
"On account of differences in perception of LAC, certain transgression incidents do take place on ground. Government regularly takes up any transgression with the Chinese side through established mechanisms," he had said.

[Kati]

...Not sure if our babudom is aware of this latest trend, but this is something alarming.
Chinkus are sending their young recruits across border to nepal who settle there for several years, pick up local language, take nepali identity, and then slowly migrate to hindustan posing as nepali businessmen. lately some of them are concentrating in north bengal. Not sure the exact motive. Could be either to instigate the Gorkhaland agitation, and/or get recruited as gurkha sainiks in one of the several IA camps scattered in north bengal.....
Are our BRFites keeping up with this developments?

[Samudragupta]

Japan’s security dilemma

S – Japan’s alliance with the United States remains the centerpiece of its strategic policy, yet Washington appears increasingly reluctant to get drawn into Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. If anything, the U.S. seems concerned that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may view U.S. treaty guarantees as a shield for Japan to confront an increasingly assertive China in the East China Sea.

The hard fact is that Washington seems as concerned about a muscular China as it is about a revisionist Japan.

The U.S. has a major stake in maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with both Japan and China. Although Japan remains under the U.S. security umbrella, China — as a permanent U.N. Security Council member, an emerging great power, and the biggest buyer of U.S. Treasuries — matters more to U.S. interest now than possibly any other Asian county.

In fact, the more geopolitical heft China has accumulated and the more assertive it has become in pushing its territorial claims with its neighbors, the more reluctant the U.S. appears to be to take sides in the Asian territorial disputes, although they involve its strategic allies or partners, with Beijing seeking to change the status quo by force.

Washington has made it amply clear that despite its “pivot” toward Asia, it will be neither willing to put Americans at risk to defend its allies’ territorial claims against China nor act in ways that could damage its close political and economic engagement with Beijing.

After all, the “pivot” is intended not to contain China but to undergird the permanence of America’s role as Asia’s balancing power — an objective that has led Washington to tread a course of tacit neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. The U.S. has been willing to speak up only when Chinese actions threaten to impinge on its interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

To be sure, the U.S. has an interest in preventing the emergence of a Sino-centric Asia. But it has no interest in getting entangled in Asia’s territorial feuds. If it can, it would like to find a way to support Japan without alienating China, a tough balancing act.

America’s tightrope-walk imperative seemingly has encouraged China to up the ante against Japan through a campaign of attrition over the control of the Senkakus. Incursions by Chinese ships into the five uninhabited islands’ territorial waters have become almost a daily affair, raising the risks of unintended military escalation. Yet China is unlikely to back off from this confrontation.

Chinese military planners have probably calculated that in a conflict confined to China and Japan in the East China Sea, with U.S. interests not directly at stake, America is unlikely to threaten devastation of China.

The dilemma for the U.S., however, is that if it did little to come to the aid of Japan in this scenario, it would seriously damage the credibility of American “extended deterrence” globally. That is why Washington is intent on averting a Sino-Japanese military conflict.

America’s dilemma, however, means that Japan must assume greater responsibility to protect itself, without being unduly dependent on the U.S. After a decade in which Japanese military spending slumped more than 5 percent while China’s jumped 270 percent, this means making investments to build requisite defense capabilities to ward off aggression.

In addition to mitigating its structural economic problems, this task, paradoxically, entails recourse to the very factor that has instilled disquiet in some quarters — Japanese revisionism. Japan’s U.S.-imposed antiwar Constitution must be changed to allow its “Self-Defense Forces” to become a full-fledged military and to acquire offensive weapon systems.

With 6,800 far-flung islands, Japan needs a more credible air-sea deterrent capability, including first-strike weapon systems like cruise missiles and strategic bombers as well as amphibious infantry forces that can defend the outlying islands. Japan also must accelerate moves to create a single, unified command for its army — the Ground Self-Defense Forces — which, during U.S. occupation, were deliberately divided into several regional commands to keep them institutionally weak as a voice in policymaking.

The U.S. — to help undergird its long-standing role in Asia — has an important stake in maintaining forward military deployments in Japan, especially in Okinawa. Yet Tokyo has legitimate reasons to worry that the U.S. might hesitate to militarily defend Japan if it is attacked by China over the Senkaku dispute.

Then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s declaration that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands does not mean that if China employs military force in the dispute, the U.S. would take all necessary actions, including the use of its military capability, to repulse the Chinese action.

After the staggering cost in blood and treasure exacted by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a war-weary U.S. has absolutely no desire to get involved in another war, especially one where its interests are not directly at stake.

Indeed, Americans are not just war-weary, they are also war-wary. Significantly, the U.S. has taken no position on the Senkaku sovereignty issue.

Put bluntly, Japan must not overly rely on America for protection against China. In fact, the more powerful China grows, the less Japan can depend on U.S. security guarantees. The logical response to its security predicament is for Japan to strengthen its own conventional deterrent capability.

Japan, territorially, is a status quo power vis-a-vis China. Given that defense is always easier than offense, Japan, with more robust air and sea assets, can give China a bloody nose if it were attacked.

As for the U.S., the changing geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific is diminishing the importance of its security alliance with Japan. With the U.S.-China equation at the center of the geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific, the obsolescence of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the strategic anchor of regional stability is now conspicuous, despite occasional claims to the contrary. In the coming years, Japan will find itself increasingly buffeted by developments in the U.S.-China relationship.

China will clearly prefer a Japan that remains dependent on America for its security than a Japan that plays a more independent role. The fact, however, is that the post-1945 system erected by the U.S. is more suited to keep Japan as an American protectorate than to allow Japan to effectively aid the central U.S. objective in the Asia-Pacific — a stable balance of power.

A subtle U.S. policy shift that encourages Tokyo to cut its dependence on America and do more for its own security can assist Japan in building a more secure future for itself that helps block the rise of a Sino-centric Asia.

Whatever Washington decides, it is past time for Japan to get serious about bolstering its defenses, reasserting the right to collective self-defense as permitted under international law, and forging countervailing geostrategic partnerships with like-minded Asian states.

[svinayak]

Providing link would help us all

After all, the “pivot” is intended not to contain China but to undergird the permanence of America’s role as Asia’s balancing power — an objective that has led Washington to tread a course of tacit neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. The U.S. has been willing to speak up only when Chinese actions threaten to impinge on its interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

This should take away all doubts about India having strategic relationship to contain PRC

[harbans]

^ I don't see any harm in US retaining a power position in Asia as long as it helps in getting the Chinese out of Tibet and blocking Han expansionism. It gives a massive leeway to India to develop to a 30 T USD economy in a decade and half. That buys enough firepower and influence to tame the US future ambitions wrt India. But India being so large, i guess US will become more Indian than the other way round. One must start looking at geostrategic equations from the inertial point of view. For us it's important to curtail/ contain the inertial mass that Islamism has gathered withing us and our neighborhood. We must break the bonds this virus has with the Han domination that is gathering steam. If we don't break that we are doomed completely..except some pockets that remain in the US or move away to the West. Dharmic India is finished. We do have a chance if we contain the Han bubble that is sniping away at our borders when they should be 3000 miles away. We need to know our priorities better.

[svinayak]

^ I don't see any harm in US retaining a power position in Asia as long as it helps in getting the Chinese out of Tibet and blocking Han expansionism.

This is in doubt!

[harbans]

This is in doubt!

It's lesser in doubt than the present Indian establishment wanting them (Han out of Tibet or KM). If the present Indian establishment is bought out by vested interests in Islamabad or Beijing..maybe we do need the US to fight that kind of Indian establishment too one day.

[KrishnaK]

Providing link would help us all

After all, the “pivot” is intended not to contain China but to undergird the permanence of America’s role as Asia’s balancing power — an objective that has led Washington to tread a course of tacit neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. The U.S. has been willing to speak up only when Chinese actions threaten to impinge on its interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

This should take away all doubts about India having strategic relationship to contain PRC

One article to "take away all doubts" ? The only way the US can afford to not have a strategic relationship , is if the US choses to flee and turn inwards.

[Prem]

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/08 ... y-experts/
Taiwan not likely to dig China's plan for $80B tunnel connection, say experts

China's latest plan to link the mainland to Taiwan, either by bridge or via a tunnel that would be triple the size of the one under the English Channel, is sure to heighten long-simmering tensions between the two countries.China, which has always claimed dominion over Taiwan, recently approved a State Council plan for a highway that would connect Beijing to Taipei, which would stretch 1,200 miles, including a 111-mile span over or under the straits that separate the nations. Such a project has been discussed for at least a decade, but was recently approved as part of China's National Highway Network Plan for 2013-2030, according to the South China Morning Post."The government and most of the people in Taiwan are less enthusiastic.”
-“Construction of such a bridge would increase the anxiety in Taiwan about the potential for greater pressure from Beijing to engage in political talks about reunification,” Bonnie Glaser, a senior advisor and China Studies Chair for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told FoxNews.com. It’s not clear whether the span across the Taiwan Strait would be a bridge or tunnel, but the latter is the more likely option, according to a report from Stratfor. It could cost as much as $80 billion and would be three times the length of the Channel Tunnel connecting the United Kingdom and France.Taiwan has been estranged from China since the 1950s, and the Taiwan Strait "represents the most physically formidable and symbolically inaccessible barrier to Beijing's objective of eventual reunification with the island," according to Stratfor. At times, military tensions between China and the U.S. allied Taiwan have reached the point where fears of war breaking out were legitimate.
But tensions have eased in recent years, with Taiwan taking an “economic first, politics later” approach with the mainland while Beijing has struck a conciliatory tone. In July, the two nations agreed to a plan to supply water from the mainland to Kinmen with a new pipeline. But a span between the two countries could give China a beachhead that would allow it to more easily force unification, say experts.
"The plan has been considered by Beijing for several years,” Glaser said. “It is envisioned as a means to promote further economic integration, which the mainland hopes will enable eventual political unification. The government and most of the people in Taiwan are less enthusiastic.”An undersea tunnel connects the mainland’s Fujian province with northern Taiwan. The part of the strait chosen for the crossing was due to the short distance across the strait. However, due to a staggering price tag and unresolved technical problems, it could take the next 20-30 years to come to fruition, experts say

[SSridhar]

Border Spats with India Easier to Manage, Chinese Scholar - Ananth Krishnan, The Hindu

The boundary disputes with India were a lesser bane for Beijing than were its territorial tensions with other nations, according to a leading strategic scholar who has ties with the Foreign Ministry.

Ruan Zongze — vice president, China Institute of International Studies, and recently a senior diplomat in the Chinese Embassy in Washington — said that unlike in the disputes with “strategically autonomous” India, the hand of the United States was evident in China’s recent altercations with Japan and the Philippines. “If we compare the three scenarios — the India-China border [dispute], what happened between China and Philippines at Huangyan Island [where ships were involved in a stand-off in April], and the China-Japan Diaoyu Islands issue — I think [the issue with India] is quite different as China and India have reached a certain understanding very quickly and the two sides [have] made joint efforts to make the border peaceful and tranquil again,” Mr. Ruan said, speaking at a briefing held here this week to introduce China’s foreign policy under the new Xi Jinping leadership, which took over in March.

“Since the Huangyan Island incident, the U.S. sold weapons to the Philippines, intentionally or unintentionally boosting the confidence of the Philippines to challenge China. The U.S. is clearly aware that it is also responsible for the conflict between China and Japan on the Diaoyu Islands issue,” he said.

“I think India emphasises its own strategic independence and will not become part of any other big country’s strategy. The strategic autonomy of India is very important,” {Clearly, China is on an overdrive to prevent India from joining hands with others. The statements made by China during Man Mohan Singh's recent trip to Tokyo and now this one confirm the Chinese game plan} said Mr. Ruan, whose views are in sync with a number of commentaries in recent times in the Chinese media about whether India would play a more significant role as the U.S. attempted to shift its “pivot” to Asia.

The general consensus in the Chinese media has been that India will maintain its “independent” foreign policy and seek to “balance” its relations with the U.S. and China according to its interests.

The commentaries reflect the increasing anxiety in China as its neighbours — including Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam — seek closer ties with Washington amid concerns over China’s “increasingly assertive” approach to disputes.

The rising tensions in the South and East China Seas come amid increasingly frequent reports of aggressive patrolling on the part of China along the disputed Line of Actual Control — most notably evident during the April stand-off in Depsang.

Mr. Ruan, however, isolated India-China border problems from the other disputes: “I think the border issues between China and India are very complicated. One very good way is to smartly and wisely manage the issue in the foreseeable future. Without the development of India, there is not a bright future for Asia. In the future, both countries will have a lot more in common and share more interests.”

Striking a less optimistic tone regarding the Philippines and Japan, Mr. Ruan said: “Since the U.S. adopted its new strategy of returning to the Asia Pacific, some countries have made the wrong judgement that the U.S. will encourage them to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China,” he said. “This is a misjudgement on their part”.

[Samudragupta]

Providing link would help us all

After all, the “pivot” is intended not to contain China but to undergird the permanence of America’s role as Asia’s balancing power — an objective that has led Washington to tread a course of tacit neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. The U.S. has been willing to speak up only when Chinese actions threaten to impinge on its interests, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

This should take away all doubts about India having strategic relationship to contain PRC

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/201 ... gUiatLWWHO

[Philip]

Tx Sridhar for posting the Chinese viewpoint and their take on the issue of maritime vulnerability.If you recollect,I recently posted details of the new PLAN patrol regime in the Indo-China Sea,linking all the small islands/atolls where the PLAN have occupied these disputed islands and established miniscule bases on them,as if to draw a connecting line,"joining the dots" to legalise their false claim through possession. This line has been pushed so far out side the Chinese coastline and overruns the 200 nm EEZ of the littoral nations of the I-CSea.
By this,the PRC/PLAN hope to kill two birds with one action,sovereignty over the territory and its valuable offshore wealth,plus staging points and supply points for the PLAN in its blue-water ambitions.

[SSridhar]

Chinese Ships Enter Disputed Waters in East Asia Sea - Business Line

Four Chinese Government ships today entered the disputed waters in East Asia Sea at the centre of a bitter row with Tokyo, the Japanese coastguard said.

“We are telling them to leave the area,” a coastguard spokesman said, after the ships sailed into waters around the Senkaku islands — known in Chinese as the Diaoyu islands — shortly after 9:00 am (0000 GMT).

The ships were among five vessels that have been sailing in and out of the disputed zone since last week.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry had summoned Beijing’s envoy on Thursday after the ships spent more than a day in Japanese territorial waters, marking their longest such incursion since the long-simmering dispute erupted again last year.

The islands are regarded as a potential flashpoint that some observers fear could lead to armed conflict between the two nations.

[SSridhar]

Chinese Hand Seen in Recent Attacks on Indian Web Sites - Business Line

Even as the number of attacks on Indian cyber space have increased in the past five years, security experts have detected that a significant number of them are being carried out from China.

According to a report prepared by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) along with Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC), the number of Indian Web sites that have been hacked has gone up from 5,211 in 2006 to 17,306 in 2011.

The recent ‘Travent’ attack, for example, is now believed to have been carried out from China. In this attack, phishing mails were sent to individuals, with documents as attachments. These documents exploited previously known vulnerabilities to drop the ‘Travnet’ malware into the system. Once Travnet infects a machine, it searches for all document files, such as pdf, ppt and doc and uploads this data to remote servers. Rajshekhar Murthy – Director, CERT-ISAC, said, “It’s interesting to note that the domain was recently registered, is locked and expires in 2014. Guangdong province from China seems to pop up everywhere.”

Same server

According to the report, 21 domains were being hosted on the same server (WHOIS server, domaincontrol.com) and all of them were active.

With Independence Day round the corner, the number of attacks from the neighbouring countries could increase, experts say. According to a report by Symantec, 42 million cyber crimes happen in India every year. However, experts say that India has adequate steps in place for such attacks. “We have the IT Act, Cyber law and now with Cyber Security Policy in place, steps will be taken up for dealing with such issues,” M.S. Vijayragahavan, advisor to the National Technical Research Organisation said. The number of security attacks thwarted by Indian agencies has increased from 552 in 2006 to 13,301 in 2011

The Government is investing Rs 300 crore on cyber security initiatives including building an army of cyber warriors.

To start with, four pilot projects have been identified, including setting up of a testing lab, conducting a test audit, study of vulnerabilities and establishment of a multi-disciplinary centre of excellence.

[SSridhar]

Launch of INS Vikrant Raises hackles in China - ToI

The launch of INS Vikrant has raised hackles in China, with Chinese defence experts saying the aircraft carrier would have great significance for India as it would allow the Indian Navy to wade into the Pacific Ocean - which Beijing considers as its backyard.

"This bears great significance to Indian Navy. It makes India only the fifth country after the US, Russia, Britain and France to have such capabilities," senior captain Zhang Junshe, vice-president of China's Naval Research Institute, told the state-run CCTV on Monday.

The Indian Navy will have lead over China as it will have two aircraft carriers by the end of this year with INS Vikramaditya, the refitted carrier from Russia joining INS Viraat, which is already in service even though Vikrant was expected to be operational by 2018, he said.

"Which means by the end of this year India will become the only country in Asia to have two aircraft carriers. This will enhance the overall capabilities especially the power projection capabilities of the Indian Navy," Zhang said.

Ruling out any race for more carriers in the region, Zhang defended India and China having more carriers since they have vast coasts and huge populations and the importance of defending the sea lanes far from home due to dependence on external trade.

Last year China has launched its first aircraft carrier, Lioning. Its hull was imported from Ukraine and refurbished in China.

China also subsequently launched J-15 aircraft to operate from its deck. The ship with over 50,000 tonnes displacement will have about 30 aircraft on its deck.

China is reportedly building two more aircraft carriers but their schedules are not known yet.

Zhang earlier told the state-run China Daily that with Vikrant, the Indian Navy will be more capable of patrolling distant oceans.

"India's first self-made carrier, along with reinforced naval strength, will further disrupt the military balance in South Asia," he said.

India is very likely to quicken its pace to steer eastward to the Pacific, where the US and China are competing to dominate.

The launch of the Vikrant as well as the first nuclear submarine Arihant also aroused the curiosity and concerns among analysts from different state-run thinktanks in China.

"The new indigenous carrier will further strengthen India's naval power and also add some bargaining chips with the world's major military vendors such as Russia," Wang Daguang, a researcher of military equipment based in Beijing said.

Song Xiaojun, a military commentator in Beijing, said the Vikrant uses technology from the 1980s and thus serves as an experiment for the Indian Navy to set technical standards for future vessels.

[SSridhar]

China Okays 3 Dams on the Brahmaputra - Business Line

Three dam projects have been cleared by China on the Brahmaputra mainstream in Tibet, Water Resources Minister Harish Rawat said here on Monday.

In a written reply to the Rajya Sabha, Rawat said India had conveyed its views to China and had urged it to ensure that the interests of downstream States were not harmed by any activity in the upstream area.

According to the recently released ‘Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China’, there are indications that three dam projects on the mainstream of the Brahmaputra river in Tibet Autonomous Region have been approved for implementation by Chinese authorities, he said.

The Minister said as per information available, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh had written to the External Affairs Minister on October 11, 2010 regarding the Chinese project. This was followed by a letter by the Assam Chief Minister on June 15, 2011 conveying concerns of the people of Assam.

The Bihar Governor too had written to the Prime Minister on February 27, 2012, expressing concern over construction activity by China on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra river in Tibet.

[Shanmukh]

http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/1873228/ ... rspectives

A different perspective on China? Or is it the perspective of a bought journo?

[Suraj]

I've posted this site before, but it's fallen under the radar. It pays to read (even google translated) articles from Huanqiu, which is owned by the People's Daily, the main newspaper in China. People's Daily is of course the party mouthpiece, while Huanqiu is more of the sensationalist tabloid not constrained to sound measured. Therefore its opinions are more outspoken.

Here's the opinion piece on the INS Vikrant launch:
Indian domestic carrier into the water, do not be backward China

India's first domestic aircraft carrier "Vikrant" Yesterday the water, it displaces 37,500 tons, capable of carrying a total of 36 aircraft. Despite its actual fielded to 2018 can be achieved, but the Indian media will be August 12 as "historic day."

　　Indian aircraft carrier into the water than the recent Japanese quasi-carrier "Izumo" was launched in China caused by the shock to be small. Although India's land-Japan maritime territorial disputes than disputes relaxed, India's attitude is very open arms, but it is more moderate in recent years, Sino-Indian relations on the practice of forming a comparison with Japan, coupled with China, India has a great distance national the Chinese people feel inside, the Japanese are the biggest threat from the periphery, ordinary Chinese people often think of India.

India's domestic carrier launched to bring our main touch is that China-made aircraft carrier program needs to accelerate. This is not to compete with India, but India do remind us that the development of the strategic significance of the aircraft carrier in Asia remains undiminished, the carrier is still safeguarding national maritime interests is one of the most effective strategic tool. China has built in a day early scale aircraft carrier force, it will get one day earlier with the corresponding unique strategic initiative.

　　The emergence of domestic carriers that will exacerbate the China threat theory, such concerns should not interfere with our ideas come up. For China threat theory elusive many factors, but these years of experience tells us that it has China's actual damage is very limited, if it is not intimidated by others, but first intimidated by ourselves, it only shows that this generation of Chinese people not sterile.

　　21st Century "carrier useless", "carrier target theory" have kept coming out, they are not without reason. From the ultimate antidote to big country, it is very likely indeed so. But the international political friction and full of different intensity game, a lot of conflict is not one up on the "stab" the. In addition to low inter-State supplies information warfare, and strategic missiles and even nuclear deterrent forces still occupy carrier strategic deterrence play a lot of space. No aircraft carriers, the major powers of intuition can be found in strategic systems have vulnerabilities.

　　China launches aircraft carrier localization of the time is a relatively large country late. Even in India have come in front of us is very telling. China got nuclear weapons technology, strategic missile technology, nuclear submarines technology, but China these strategic forces are limited in scale, China is indeed proved himself to implement "strategic defense" of the country.

　　But China's strategic forces for the maintenance of existing national security interests gradually stretched. China fast rising international status, national commercial interests face in the world jump start world powers and regional powers are readjusting policy towards China. They are based on what? Which will include an assessment of China's strategic forces.

　　Russia's nuclear weapons has never been used, it is said they are aging, obsolete. But until today, the huge Russian state nuclear arsenal remains a pillar of strength. World intelligence community believe that China's Dongfeng 21D missile attack aircraft carrier is a reliable nemesis, but the U.S. aircraft carrier in the vicinity of sensitive time to turn around the first island chain, is still valuable action. Carrier strength is proven, but as a "carrier killer" in the east 21D yet.

　　China to establish a reliable strategic deterrent very long road, we need to spend a lot of money, but money can not guarantee each are used very accurate. China's strategic deterrent beneficiaries of all Chinese people, including the Chinese star, Chinese businessmen, Chinese workers overseas output, as well as online shouting "national strength has nothing to do with me," any person.

　　We wish to see China-made aircraft carrier into the water that day. We believe it will not be a "historic day," it will be China's real revival of a typical day on the road.

Note that Global Times, the English language version of Huanqiu, does not print a literal translation of the original articles. The English language paper is much more toned down and moderate. The Chinese language papers are always the more explicit sources.

[KrishnaK]

Suraj,

We wish to see China-made aircraft carrier into the water that day. We believe it will not be a "historic day," it will be China's real revival of a typical day on the road.

What does this mean ? This article (from what little I can glean), seems to be a very realistic take on the whole situation.

21st Century "carrier useless", "carrier target theory" have kept coming out, they are not without reason. From the ultimate antidote to big country, it is very likely indeed so. But the international political friction and full of different intensity game, a lot of conflict is not one up on the "stab" the. In addition to low inter-State supplies information warfare, and strategic missiles and even nuclear deterrent forces still occupy carrier strategic deterrence play a lot of space. No aircraft carriers, the major powers of intuition can be found in strategic systems have vulnerabilities.

This seems to convey, the carriers are now indeed more vulnerable and could possibly be taken out, but that doesn't take away a lot of the coercive power. Indeed all strategic systems have vulnerabilities.

Would I be right ?

[SSridhar]

China Should Speed Up Aircraft Carrier Construction: Daily Times - Ananth Krishnan, The Hindu

India’s launch of its first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant should spur China to speed up construction of its domestic aircraft carriers, the Global Times newspaper said in an editorial on Tuesday.

“India’s actions remind us that the strategic significance of developing aircraft carriers in Asia is not declining. Rather, they are one of the most effective strategic tools in maintaining national maritime interests,” said the Communist Party-run tabloid, which is a widely read newspaper known here for its hard-line views.

“The earlier China establishes its own aircraft carrier capabilities,” the editorial said, the earlier it will gain the strategic initiative.”

The newspaper, did however, add that there was "no arms race" between India and China, pointing out that Beijing had been more concerned by the recent unveiling of Japan’s Izumo light carrier, rather than by the launch of Vikrant.

“India has adopted a different attitude than Japan toward territorial disputes with China. Meanwhile, India's overall national strength lags behind that of China. Therefore, China perceives Japan rather than India as its biggest neighbouring threat,” the editorial said.

The launch of Vikrant had underscored that India was “moving faster in terms of developing armaments such as aircraft carriers” while China was “a latecomer among big powers in terms of developing domestic aircraft carriers”. “Even India has moved ahead of us,” added the editorial.

China’s first aircraft carrier the Liaoning, a refurbished and upgraded version of the Soviet carrier the Varyag, was put into sea-trials last year. China is also constructing its own first indigenous carrier, with defence analysts quoted as saying China would require at least three carriers in service considering the naval strengths of countries such as India and Japan.

[svinayak]

India's overall national strength lags behind that of China.

This comparison has been going on since 80s. They have use this to make decision in their economy and global strategy

[SSridhar]

Acharya, I think they are referring to the CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) which is a composite measure of several parameters such as production of steel etc. In this measure, India *does* lag far behind. See this.

[Suraj]

Suraj,
What does this mean ? This article (from what little I can glean), seems to be a very realistic take on the whole situation.

This seems to convey, the carriers are now indeed more vulnerable and could possibly be taken out, but that doesn't take away a lot of the coercive power. Indeed all strategic systems have vulnerabilities.

Would I be right ?

I can't read Chinese, I'm afraid. The article seems disjointed in translation. But here's my take:

They're simultaneously wrestling with the concept of carrier killing as a strategic defensive posture against USN (and, based on the article, IN), vs the need to have carriers to project power. They understand that they can't talk away the fact that they (until months ago) neither had a carrier, nor built one. That India of all countries built one before them will spur them to build one, just to maintain face.

One should also expect PLAN windbags to talk about the DF-21 carrier killers in the context of IN and it's moves to have a presence in the South China Sea. For this, huanqiu is the best source, because the shrillest statements are not reported by People's Daily or Global Times, both of which present a sober face to the world.

[ramana]

DNA:

Report on China and India

China and India Different Prespectives

R. Bhaskar

Within the next two months, one more delegation of senior educationists from India will travel through China, to work out modalities for having student-exchange-programmes between educational institutions from both countries [disclosure: the author will also be part of this delegation, not as a journalist, but as an educationist]. The initiative is more from the Chinese side than from the Indian.

The reason is obvious — China is trying to seek out more ways to strengthen ties between the two countries. It has watched two-way trade between the two countries blossom to over $60 billion a year — making China India’s largest trading partner. And it sees no reason why this volume should not exceed $100 billion in five years’ time.

After all, for almost 3,000 years, India and China together accounted for almost two-thirds of global GDP. Both saw a decline in their fortunes since 1640, thanks to colonisation as well as the industrial revolution.

That shifted the economic centre of gravity from the east to the west. Both India and China are rediscovering their strengths again. Both now aspire to become global once again, China more sure-footedly than India. Businessmen on both sides of the border are discovering mutually beneficial opportunities.

At the same time, in an effort to promote better awareness of its people and its culture, and to understand India’s cultural heritage, China has been encouraging more tourists from its country to visit India. But issuance of visas to Chinese by Indian authorities has been a lot more difficult than getting a visa from Chinese embassies for Indian visitors, point out India-China watchers.

Yet, there is no denying that India will have to work out its own ways to build better relations with its largest neighbour with whom it also has a very long international border.

That could be another reason why China is keen on settling its border disputes with India. At recent meetings, where Indian journalists were given unprecedented access to the top generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), this message was reiterated several times.

According to Major General Chen Zhou, director of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), the leading think-tank of China’s defence forces, “China has settled its land border disputes with 12 of its 14 neighbours. We now need to amicably finalise our borders with both India and Bhutan.”

When asked about the border incursions, spokesperson after spokesperson of the PLA said that the incident was blown out of proportion. “Please note, the borders have still not been either defined or demarcated,” says one.

“Do bear in mind that none of the so called ‘conflicts’ involved the firing of even a single bullet,” says another, implying thereby that unlike other border skirmishes India has witnessed with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the recent skirmishes with China have been the most benign.

What about the strategic ties China enjoys with Pakistan? Off the record, spokespersons of the China military think-tanks admit that they are vexed at the flare-ups between India and Pakistan, and have been using their goodwill to pressure Pakistan to normalise ties with India. “It does not help us in any way to have a volatile and unstable neighbourhood,” says another senior colonel of the army.

During the discussions and the interactions that this correspondent had with local people, it was clear that India was in no way perceived as a threat. For the Chinese, India is a neighbour with which it has enjoyed centuries of good relations and remains the source of Buddhism.

Clearly, India will have to exploit this wellspring of goodwill to mutual advantage.

The author is consulting editor with dna.

Unfortunately in PRC its not the people who decide the nature of the toes with India. Wish the authro has achance to talk to the leaders in political and military circles.

The highest person seems ot be the Maj Gen who is an academic.
Still its data.

[KrishnaK]

They're simultaneously wrestling with the concept of carrier killing as a strategic defensive posture against USN (and, based on the article, IN), vs the need to have carriers to project power. They understand that they can't talk away the fact that they (until months ago) neither had a carrier, nor built one. That India of all countries built one before them will spur them to build one, just to maintain face.

Aah ! If they have tomtomed bout how their carrier killer has stopped the mighty USN dead in it's tracks, they'd have trouble tomtoming their carriers too.

[SSridhar]

DNA:Report on China and India

The highest person seems ot be the Maj Gen who is an academic.
Still its data.

Ramana, the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) is the chief think tank for the PLA. Most of the top positions are held by Maj. Gen. types, the most famous of whom is Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan who is he Dy. Director General who said he had the eyes and claws of a hawk but the head and heart of a dove. The policy inputs by the AMS are important for the PLA. But, what the author (of that article) says may be only a superficial impression. The author himself might not be deeply aware of the issues and the Chinese may have chosen to be effusive to a bunch of educators. These cannot be taken as a defintive view of the AMS. Various commentaries by the AMS through their journals or newspapers are the yardstick.

[SSridhar]

Now, Chinese intrude 30 Kms into Arunachal Pradesh - New Indian Express

Focus has shifted from Ladakh to Arunachal

After several recent incursions in Ladakh, China has now flexed its muscles in Arunachal Pradesh, transgressing about 30 km inside Indian territory in Chaglagam sector in Anjaw district. Sources told Express that a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrol crossed the border and came face-to-face with an Indian Army patrol.

“They transgressed into about 30 km in our territory. Both the patrol team showed banners to each other claiming rights. The Indian Army asked the PLA to leave the area and return to their territory. So far both the Army and PLA are staying put at their respective positions in Chaglagam sector,” sources said.

An official said the Deputy GoC went on a recce sortie with two choppers to assess the ground situation. “We are hoping the PLA will retreat by Tuesday night or Wednesday as no tents were erected by them,” the official said, adding that due to lack of proper boundary demarcation such incidents were observed in the past too.

Last week, a Chinese patrol team entered the Indian territory near Tangkar La pass in Sikkim. Both the Indian and Chinese troops had then showed banners to each others claiming rights. However, the Chinese had retreated after sharing beers with the Indians.

Although the issue of Chinese incursions had rocked the first day of Parliament’s Monsoon session, Defence Minister A K Antony had played down the incidents and told the House that there was no commonly delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China and there were areas where both nations have different perceptions of the LAC.

“On account of differences in perception of LAC, transgressions do take place. The government regularly takes up any such incident with the Chinese,” Antony had said.