Bharat Rakshak

No Exceptions for a Nuclear India

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD

JUNE 4, 2016


America’s relationship with India has blossomed under President Obama, who will meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi this week. Ideally, Mr. Obama could take advantage of the ties he has built and press for India to adhere to the standards on nuclear proliferation to which other nuclear weapons states adhere.

The problem, however, is that the relationship with India rests on a dangerous bargain. For years, the United States has sought to bend the rules for India’s nuclear program to maintain India’s cooperation on trade and to counter China’s growing influence. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed a civilian nuclear deal with India that allowed it to trade in nuclear materials. This has encouraged Pakistan to keep expanding a nuclear weapons program that is already the fastest growing in the world.

Now, India has Mr. Obama’s strong support in its bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 48-nation body that governs trade in nuclear-related exports and aims to ensure that civilian trade in nuclear materials is not diverted for military uses. Membership would enhance India’s standing as a nuclear weapons state, but it is not merited until the country meets the group’s standards.
Photo
President Obama and Prime Minister Modi meeting last November. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times

All group members have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, either as nuclear weapons states (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China) or as non-nuclear weapons states (everybody else). India has refused, which means it has not accepted legally binding commitments to pursue disarmament negotiations, halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and not test nuclear weapons.

President Bush squandered an opportunity to demand more of India when he signed the 2008 deal, which opened the door to American trade in nuclear technology for civilian energy, something India had insisted was a prerequisite to more cooperation and lucrative business deals.

As part of the 2008 deal, the Indians promised they would be “ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices” as other nations with advanced nuclear technology. But they have fallen far short by continuing to produce fissile material and to expand their nuclear arsenal.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is to discuss India’s application later this month. Mr. Obama is lobbying for India to win membership through a special exception. If he succeeds, India would be in a position to keep Pakistan, which has also applied for membership, from gaining membership because group decisions must be unanimous. That could give Pakistan, which at one time provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran, new incentives to misbehave.

Opposition from China, which is close to Pakistan and views India as a rival, could doom India’s bid for now. But the issue will not go away. India is growing in importance and seeking greater integration into organizations that govern international affairs. If it wants recognition as a nuclear weapons state, it should be required to meet the nuclear group’s standards, including opening negotiations with Pakistan and China on curbing nuclear weapons and halting the production of nuclear fuel for bombs.

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A version of this editorial appears in print on June 5, 2016, on page SR8 of the New York edition with the headline: No Exceptions for a Nuclear India. Today's Paper|

ramana wrote:Nobody will give a break.

We need to deal with it.
Either we break NSG or get China to accept.

ramana wrote:Nobody will give a break.

We need to deal with it.
Either we break NSG or get China to accept.

ramana wrote:Of the ~35 NSG members, how many have agreed to India being in it?

kit wrote:Even without NSG things will happen for India..and probably make it stronger .. NSG would rather *invite * India in a decade if it is not in already . Or risk obsolescence

With the completion of the loading of enriched uranium fuel assemblies into the second unit of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Station, commissioning of the reactor is in the final stages. “We are in the advanced stage of the commissioning of the reactor,” said S.K. Sharma, Chairman and Managing Director, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). The Russian reactor, VVER-1000, built by the NPCIL, has a capacity of 1,000 MWe. The first unit, with a similar capacity, reached criticality on July 13, 2013.

Loading of 163 enriched uranium fuel assemblies into Kudankulam-II began on May 11, 2016 and it was completed on May 19, 2016. Light water is the coolant in the reactor.

ussian atomic power corporation Rosatom is looking forward to participating in the Make in India programme and assembly of fuel rods and control system components appear to be on the cards, an official said.

Oleg A. Grigoryev, Vice President of TVEL, Rosatom's fuel company, told IANS in an interview on the sidelines of the Atomexpo 2016 that it was looking forward to assembling fuel rods in India.

On similar lines, Andry Butko, Director of Rusatom Automated Control Systems (RASU), said that some components for nuclear power plants can be assembled in India. Gradually, components can be produced in India for use at home, by Russia and for exports.

This comes as an India-Russia joint venture, the nuclear power plant at Kudankulam, which has two of its reactors up and running while four more are in the pipeline. The two countries also plan to build 12 more reactors in the next two decades.

Grigoryev said his company is open to the proposal for localising some production in India, but added that it will be feasible only when more nuclear reactors are commissioned.

"We understand India has a strong desire to localise; we are open for such cooperation. We can localise the assembly," Grigoryev said.

"The fuel rods can be assembled in India using the fuel pellets we supply. We have already developed and signed a roadmap with schedule and specification of what has to be done, but much depends on the number of units," he said.

"A facility for assembly of fuel rods with just two reactors functioning in the present situation will not be profitable," he said.

Butko, on similar lines, said that India and Russia have a programme for localisation of manufacturing in the field of nuclear power.

"The other aspect is that of deep localisation, when we produce in India some components for India, Russia and also other countries," he said.

RASU is official business integrator of comprehensive industrial automation solutions provided by Rosatom for the international market. It builds the control systems for nuclear power plants, which can be called the brain of the plant.

"Currently India and Russia have a programme for localisation of components of nuclear power plants. There is an intergovernmental agreement on localisation and we are ready to become a part of it with our systems as well," Butko said.

A 'Programme of Action' for localisation of manufacturing in India for Russia-designed nuclear plants was signed between India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Rosatom in December 2015.

The programme includes joint machinery production, especially for nuclear power plants, as well as cooperation in the fields of joint development, mastering and technological support for heavy and power engineering industries.

As long as all NSG members reach a consensus over how a non-NPT member could join the NSG, and India promises to comply with stipulations over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while sticking to its policy of independence and self-reliance, China could support New Delhi's path toward the club.

AIR Defence Alerts ‏@airdefencenews 18m18 minutes ago
#Namibia invites #Indian companies to directly mine #uranium from the country.

Examine the issue closely, two facts emerge. One, India’s NSG membership is very unlikely to happen, and, two, it does not matter.

Now, what does NSG membership mean to India’s nuclear programme? Nothing. Two former chairmen of India’s Atomic Energy Commission BusinessLine spoke to, MR Srinivasan and RK Sinha, expressed themselves almost identically: “Heavens are not going to fall if India does not get NSG membership.” India has access to technology, thanks to the waiver granted in 2008. No foreign nuclear reactor supplier is waiting for India to get a NSG membership.

In fact, a long list of deal-breaker challenges hamper progress of foreign companies selling their hi-tech reactors — nuclear liability issue, Japan’s distaste for nuclear (both GE and Westinghouse are today Japanese-owned), local opposition and pricing. ‘NSG membership’ has never shown up in the list.

Indeed, with the sole exception of Russia’s Rosatom, it is difficult to see any foreign companies selling their reactors to India, even assuming that local opposition to nuclear plants could be overcome.

According to an India-briefing document of World Association of Nuclear Operators, Areva was seeking a tariff of ₹9.18 a kWhr, while the Department of Atomic Energy would not go beyond ₹6.50. In contrast, Kudankulam units three and four are expected to sell at ₹3.90 a kWhr. Energy from India-built nuclear plants are much cheaper. For GE-Hitachi and Westinghouse-Toshiba, the liability issue is a big risk, and if they factor the risk in costs, their energy will also be pricey.

It is difficult to see any foreign reactors other than the Russians’ coming up in India. India’s nuclear roll-out will most likely be limited to Nuclear Power Corporation’s 12 Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (including four under construction), a few fast neutron reactors and whatever the Russians supply at Kudankulam.

What NSG can offer
These are the bigger issues in India’s massive expansion of its nuclear capacity, not NSG membership. Nor is NSG likely to matter materially in terms of uranium supply. India has hammered out agreements with Canada (April 2013) and Australia (November 2014), and other countries such as Kazakhstan have been supplying too.

NSG membership is an assertion of right. When the one-time NSG waiver was granted to India in 2008, India agreed that it would abide by any rules that NSG may make in the future. Being inside would mean participating in that rule-making.

Besides, NSG membership will give India a chance to expose Pakistan’s terrible proliferation record.

In a recent editorial, the New York Times observed that if India gets the membership, it will forever block Pakistan. It observed that Pakistan once provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran, and giving India a membership and denying it to Pakistan will give “new incentives to misbehave”. Now, such talks are reward enough for India.

In the unlikely event of India getting in, it will be in a position to use its veto to hamper Pakistan. If it doesn’t get in, India can keep the spotlight shining on Pakistan and show China as a supporter of it. Either way, it is a victory.

Kakkaji wrote:Why India’s NSG entry is no big deal

I disagree with the author. He says that NSG membership does not materially alter our nuclear power generation as we have the waiver and foreign companies are willing to set up in India. This is true but we must remember that it is just a one-time waiver and what future holds we cannot predict now and therefore it is better to be inside NSG as a full member. While we need to quickly & massively expand nuclear power generation, NSG membership is also needed simultaneously. It is a political instrument for India which will de-facto establish us as a nuke power, something denied to us de-jure by NPT. After all, NSG was created solely to target us! As we take its our legitimate place in the high table among nations, these positions matter. Pakistan is no longer in our larger scheme of things. It is China and it knows it and therefore wants to bog us down within the quagmire of Indian subcontinent by equating with Pakistan. We cannot be like Hanuman oblivious to our own strength.

There are several disturbing aspects to this agreement that deserve close public scrutiny. These include the arbitrary use of executive authority in selecting Westinghouse as a supplier, the international legal commitment made by the government to indemnify Westinghouse in the event of an accident, and the high expected cost of electricity from these reactors.

In April, Toshiba, which acquired Westinghouse in 2006, announced a $2.3 billion write-down in its value, largely because of persistent concerns about the economic viability of Westinghouse’s AP1000 design. Of more than a dozen orders that Westinghouse expected from within the U.S. a decade ago, only four have materialised. Just last month, a utility called Florida Power and Light postponed its plans for two AP1000 reactors by at least four years. And in February, the Tennessee Valley Authority, a U.S. government company, cancelled its plans for two AP1000 reactors explaining that this was “the fiscally responsible action”.

SSridhar wrote:

Kakkaji wrote:Why India’s NSG entry is no big deal

There are a few comments rebutting that author and I post one of them here:

I disagree with the author. He says that NSG membership does not materially alter our nuclear power generation as we have the waiver and foreign companies are willing to set up in India. This is true but we must remember that it is just a one-time waiver and what future holds we cannot predict now and therefore it is better to be inside NSG as a full member. While we need to quickly & massively expand nuclear power generation, NSG membership is also needed simultaneously. It is a political instrument for India which will de-facto establish us as a nuke power, something denied to us de-jure by NPT. After all, NSG was created solely to target us! As we take its our legitimate place in the high table among nations, these positions matter. Pakistan is no longer in our larger scheme of things. It is China and it knows it and therefore wants to bog us down within the quagmire of Indian subcontinent by equating with Pakistan. We cannot be like Hanuman oblivious to our own strength.

Anujan wrote:


Secondly, I think it is a net positive if Pakistan joins NSG. So far, they have not faced consequences (and indeed they had no incentive) to behave well. If joining NSG holds them to a higher standard of non-proliferation, it squeezes them strategically (no free nukes to Saudia for example, their mischief potential for nuke cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma etc get gets stymied). As if now, they are happily proliferating, happily building more nukes. Let them get into NSG and show everyone what a farce this whole non-proliferation regime is.

Every outcome is favorable for India, if India gets into NSG. If NSG gets strengthened, gets serious and excludes Pakistan, its a win. If NSG gets demolished because Pakistan gets in and makes a mockery of international non-proliferation regime, that is a win too.