Bharat Rakshak

shiv wrote:

sudeepj wrote: 1. Its HEU, not weapons grade,

What is the exact meaning of this?

sudeepj wrote:

Even a hundred people being shot (such as in the 26/11 attacks) will slow down the economic output of a city. Why not just deploy jihadis at a larger scale then and call it 'credible minimal NFU...'?

sudeepj wrote:Most Indian cities have large populations compared to the west. Even little towns have populations exceeding 50-100,000. There is a lot of spare capacity in sheer manpower, to apply to a post nuke scenario. Ill posit that let alone neighboring areas, large cities themselves will have the ability/spare capacity to manage a 20KT strike and continue.

sudeepj wrote:You have a singular inability to see the scenario past week 1 of a nuke strike..

sudeepj wrote: Congratualtions! you have discovered that an Idli is flatter than a laddu.

sudeepj wrote: Let it go sir.. your physics is tenuous.

sudeepj wrote:Easily answered.
1. Its HEU, not weapons grade, so the weapon is safer for the user. No chances of accidental criticality.

A possible variation on the staged radiation implosion design is one in which a second fission stage is imploded instead of a thermonuclear one. This was actually the initial concept developed by Stanislaw Ulam before he realized its possible application to thermnuclear weapons. The advantage of this approach is that radiation implosion speeds are hundreds of times higher, and maximum densities tens of times greater, than those achievable through high explosives. This allows achieving higher yields than is practical with high explosive driven fission weapons, and the use of lower grades of fissile material. If some fusion fuel is included in this second fission stage to boost yield, a sort of hybrid two-stage boosted weapon design results that blurs the distinction between two-stage fission and classic Teller-Ulam thermonuclear weapons. The TX-15 "Zombie" developed by the U.S. was originally planned to be a two stage pure fission device, but later evolved into this sort of hybrid boosted system. The Zombie was tested in the Castle Nectar shot (13 May 1954 GMT; Bikini Atoll; 1.69 Mt), and was fielded as the Mk-15.

shiv wrote:

sudeepj wrote: Let it go sir.. your physics is tenuous.

Of course sir. Of course.

Your knowledge of these matters is impressive

sudeepj wrote:Easily answered.
1. Its HEU, not weapons grade, so the weapon is safer for the user. No chances of accidental criticality.

sudeepj wrote:
HEU is 20% enriched, Weapons grade is 85+%. The critical mass of a weapons grade spheroid (which could be imploded) is much much lower than HEU. To get a really large bang from a CE imploded weapons grade pit, you need to put in more material. (Remember the max efficiency of boosted devices..) More material means chances of accidental criticality are higher. An accidental explosion can create local areas of criticality and generate a yield in excess of a KT. Even a levitated pit breaking lose and coming in contact with the surrounding shell can cause criticality. High yield, CE imploded fission weapons are therefore considered unsafe and not used by *any* nuclear power that has the capability to build radiation imploded weapons.

shiv wrote:Ultimately the yield in boosted fission weapons as well as in staged implosion weapons is large mainly because of fission caused by high energy fusion neutrons and not because fusion provides the yield. I repeat that even a design that uses staged implosion to simply compress another mass of fission fuel would also give a very large bang and still not be this magical 'thermonuclear weapon". That is what is meant by the idea that the line between boosted weapons and thermonuclear weapons has been blurred. The true "hydrogen bomb" does not exist. Your anger and irritation do not make anything any more convincing. You and I are reading the same references and that is pretty obvious.

disha wrote:^Once you commission a warhead and an ICBM in., you just do not decommission it overnight. .

ShauryaT wrote:
It is interesting that China conducted a series of tests in 94-96, presumably to validate their future warhead designs!

disha wrote:
Currently the focus should be on delivery platforms and improving the strike back quality. We need at least 3 SSBNs on constant patrol (that means at least 6 SSBNs to be commissioned) each carrying at least 4 rounds of 3-MIRV (or 12 bums) IRBM. A total of 36 50-100 KT warheads. IRBM needs to be very accurate.

Improving the yield or rather the efficiency of the bums is a ongoing process. It needs to be constantly researched and improved and testing strategies need to be kept ready in case a window opens up or a statement needs to be made. But not for the reason for a "big bum" but for the reason of the most "sexy (technically) bum" which a human can achieve and is at the pinnacle of technological achievement.

“a force of around 60 deliverable warheads could meet adequately India’s need for a minimum deterrent.”13 For delivering these 60 warheads, Subrahmanyam advocated the development of 20 Prithvi missiles and 20 Agni missiles. The remaining 20 warheads were slated for delivery by air force bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft. Subrahmanyam argued that “if India were to develop a modest force of 20 Agni missiles, the India-China ratio in deterrence capability will still be higher than the present China-U.S. ratio.”14 He did not visualize the need for SSBNs armed with SLBMs. Nor did he make a major distinction between low-yield fission weapons and those in the thermonuclear class, instead emphasizing the importance of solid-fuel missiles: “Whether the warheads are of fifteen kilotons fission or 120-150 kilotons (thermonuclear warheads), both are bound to have a deterrent effect. . . . What is absolutely crucial for credible deterrence is the solid-fuelled missile of appropriate ranges. That is what India needs to concentrate on.”15

The exact size of the arsenal needed at the end-point will need to be worked out by defence planners based on a series of factors. But at this point it is difficult to visualise an arsenal with anything more than a double-digit quantum of warheads. It may be prudent to even plan on the basis of a lower end figure of say 2–3 dozen (survivable) nuclear warheads by the end of 10–15 years. It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that with the passage of time, deterrence decay factors will lead to the requirement of a smaller arsenal rather than a larger one.16

Maharajkrishna Rasgotra, a former foreign secretary, held the view that “some 30 bombs of Hiroshima strength committed against five major targets in Pakistan, 60 deployed against eight to ten targets in China, and another 30 held in reserve for contingencies and deployment at sea, should adequately meet the needs of minimum deterrence. This number (120 warheads in all) allows for possible losses in an enemy first strike and leaves enough for a devastating counterattack.”17

General K. Sundarji, a former Indian chief of the army staff and a perceptive military thinker, was perhaps the first analyst in India to write about the military aspects of India’s nuclear deterrence. He advocated a nuclear force structure of approximately 150 warheads mounted almost entirely on a Prithvi-Agni missile force.

Brigadier Vijay K. Nair suggested a force level of 132 nuclear warheads of different types, including weapons in the megaton range.19 For delivery, besides bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft, he recommended five SSBNs with sixteen SLBMs on each, and 48 ballistic missiles—twelve SRBMs and 36 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).He wrote: “India must ensure adequate reserves to provide fail safe assurance of her strategy and yet maintain an adequate force structure after hostilities cease. An additional reserve of two weapon systems is required for each planed autonomous strike and a minimum of 20 percent of the entire force structure should be available for post-strike security imperatives.” Out of a total requirement of 111 nuclear warheads for retaliatory strikes against Pakistan (seventeen targets) and China (eight targets), he felt that 37 warheads were required for strikes and an additional 74 as a “65 percent reserve for reliability.” He added another 22 as a “post-war reserve,” taking the total to 132 warheads.20

Menon estimated that the modernized Chinese arsenal would comprise 596 warheads after 2010. He suggested that up to 2030 India should maintain an all-missile, land-based force of five regiments with twelve missiles each (survivability being ensured by concealment and rail-garrison mobility), with 50 percent of the missiles having up to four independently targetable warheads per missile. He felt that this arsenal would suffice to withstand the largest possible first strike launched by China and still leave enough missiles remaining to inflict unacceptable damage on China in a second strike. Menon was of the view that India would need a number of hardened silos “if the rate of degradation of the rail garrison missile force is judged to be too rapid.” Against Pakistan, he proposed a force of 200 cruise missiles, 36 of them nuclear tipped, because cruise missiles are the least provocative. He visualized the “handing over of Indian deterrence from the land-based force to the sea-based force . . . over a ten year period . . . [to be] completed by 2030,” and suggested a nuclear force of six SSBNs, each armed with twelve SLBMs. In his view, each SSBN should carry at least twelve missiles and, as India has ambitions to create multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each missile could, in the future, carry up to ten warheads with yields between 250 and 400 kilotons. Writes Menon, “Such a force would give India a warhead strength of 216 (6 x MIRV) in a pre-launch scenario and probably 380 warheads in a scenario with adequate strategic warning and with five boats deployed.

recommends targeting each location with four warheads, each of which has a 3-kilometer circular error probable (CEP).25 As it would take time to build a plutonium stockpile, and to design and develop both the intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and the SSBNs necessary for this targeting plan, Bharat Karnad suggests that India’s nuclear arsenal be gradually built up over a period of three decades to a total of 328 nuclear warheads, as given in table 1.26

R. R. Subramanian, a senior analyst at IDSA and a physicist by training, is of the view that India needs at least 425 warheads if the combined efficiency of the delivery systems is assumed to be 30 percent. At 30 percent efficiency—30 percent of weapons hit and destroy the targets at which they were fired—approximately 125 to 130 warheads could be counted upon to destroy their intended targets. Of these, he estimates that 25 to 30 would be needed to target Pakistan and about 100 would target China.30 To assume that India’s nuclear force would deliver an overall efficiency of only 30 percent is very pessimistic. However, in the absence of accurate factual information about important components of the nuclear force like the targeting and delivery systems, it is hard to contend that a higher efficiency estimate is any more realistic.31

Lieutenant General Pran Pahwa (retired) recommended in a study for the United Service Institution of India (USI) that India’s deterrence should be based on 182 warheads.32 He based his calculations on the assumption that China is likely to employ two warheads each to destroy every Indian warhead, with efficiency as high as 70 to 90 percent.33 10 to 30 percent of Indian warheads would survive a Chinese counterforce first strike. If India had 182 warheads, China would need to fire 364 warheads to eliminate India’s arsenal. Given a Chinese arsenal of about 200–250 warheads, a Chinese first strike would leave about 36 Indian missiles unharmed and an equal number of Chinese missiles unlaunched. Since the numbers remaining would be matched, China would be deterred from launching a first strike in the first place. This argument assumes a generous 80 percent success rate for China, and does not take into account the possibility that a Chinese first strike is likely to combine countervalue with counterforce targets.34

disha wrote:IUCNA was important., all the shitty-bitty/emptyPT/yenyessJi 3-4 letter word treaties had curtailed our economic growth and made us dependent on oil. The dolt nehru dynasty did not realize that cheap energy is basis for a civilization. Any civilization. They forgot the story of agni or prometheus. They forgot that to make textile, grow food, supply clean water, build roads, transport goods, provide services, produce medicines, educate people - all of it requires cheap energy. Till 1974 they did nothing and from 1975-95 India had 2 lost decades.

Now Menon, in his recent book entitled “Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy”, indicates that India’s threat of “massive retaliation” need not involve nuclear strikes against Pakistani urban centres (“counter-value”, or CV strikes). Instead, India’s “massive response” could take the form of targeting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (“counter-force”, or CF strikes), leaving that adversary with a greatly diminished capability of striking back at India.

In a key paragraph in his book, Menon --- who, as NSA, oversaw nuclear targeting policy --- analyses the meaning of a “massive” strike. He says: “There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”

Ajai Shukla‏ @ajaishukla
Former NSA @ShivshankaMenon says "massive response" after Pak TNW strike could be directed again Pak nuclear arsenal http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2017/03/a ... -will.html …

Rajesh Rajagopalan‏ @RRajagopalanJNU Mar 18
@ajaishukla Possible that too much is being read into a stray, wrongly worded sentence. Remember his 2010 NDC lecture controversy?

Vipin Narang‏ @NarangVipin Mar 18
@RRajagopalanJNU @ajaishukla I read the para many times--it is not an error. He lays out the logic, and it is strong. But execution is prob

Shashank Joshi‏Verified account @shashj Mar 18
@NarangVipin I agree it's not an error. But I don't think this suggests it is now Indian policy. @RRajagopalanJNU @ajaishukla

Vipin Narang‏ @NarangVipin Mar 18
@shashj @RRajagopalanJNU @ajaishukla i don't think it can be. But suggestion that it should be from such an authoritative voice is important

Shashank Joshi‏Verified account @shashj Mar 18
@NarangVipin Yes, completely agree there. More than that, it's a suggestion it should *and might* be. @RRajagopalanJNU @ajaishukla

Gurmeet Kanwal‏ @gurmeetkanwal Mar 18
@shashj @NarangVipin @RRajagopalanJNU @ajaishukla Pakistani view: No Indian PM will launch MR for Pak use of TNWs agnst Ind army on Pak soil

Ajai Shukla‏ @ajaishukla Mar 18
@gurmeetkanwal Not just Pakistan's view. Mine too. And probably anyone's who's seen India's reactions @shashj @NarangVipin @RRajagopalanJNU

Rajesh Rajagopalan‏ @RRajagopalanJNU Mar 19
@ajaishukla @gurmeetkanwal @shashj @NarangVipin +1!

EnerStrat Consulting‏ @enerstrat Mar 18
@ajaishukla @ShivshankaMenon As an A-Corps offr, How will a tac attack be identified and relayed? How long do you think this will take? Tank rad protection adequate?

Ajai Shukla‏ @ajaishukla Mar 18
@enerstrat As part of an advancing Indian combat command, just about a squadron of tanks would be K-killed by a Pak TNW. @ShivshankaMenon

EnerStrat Consulting‏ @enerstrat Mar 18
@ajaishukla @ShivshankaMenon "just about"- that's 14 tanks isn't it? Do all tanks have Geiger counters? I read that only the T-90s do? I enjoy your writing btw .

Gen_Chohan‏ @strat_one Mar 18
@ajaishukla A counter force strike howsoever massive is bound leave residual capability with Pak. A mixed response best. @ShivshankaMenon

Ajai Shukla‏ @ajaishukla Mar 18
@strat_one So have your choice. You'd want them to strike back with full capability or residual capability only? @ShivshankaMenon

D Luther‏ @ldev2007 Mar 19
@ajaishukla @strat_one @ShivshankaMenon An Indian CF strike in response to Pak TNW will leave only a residual Pak capability for Indian BMD.

Gen_Chohan‏ @strat_one Mar 19
@ldev2007
Enemy needs to be punished too. CF must be mixed with some CV retaining some assets for later.
@ajaishukla @ShivshankaMenon

D Luther‏ @ldev2007 Mar 19
@strat_one @ajaishukla @ShivshankaMenon That is true but priority must be to eliminate/reduce Pak strike capability so Indian BMD can handle

RAJ‏ @rajfortyseven Mar 18
@ajaishukla No. "Comprehensive first strike" & rest of the para very carefully worded by @ShivshankaMenon And it is NOT only CF strike!

India may abandon its 'no first use' nuclear policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it feared that Islamabad was likely to use the weapons first, a top nuclear expert on South Asia has claimed.

The remarks by Vipin Narang, an expert on South Asian nuclear strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, before a Washington audience was though a negation of India's stated policy of 'no first use'.

During the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Narang said, "There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first".

He said India "may" abandon the policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it believed that Pakistan was going to use nuclear weapons or most likely the tactical nuclear weapons against it.

But, he pointed out, India's preemptive strike may not be conventional strikes and would also be aimed at Pakistan's missiles launchers for tactical battlefield nuclear warheads.

"India's opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full 'comprehensive counterforce strike' that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction," Narang said.

He said this thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Commander of India's Strategic Forces, Lt Gen BS Nagal.

It also comes perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly-respected and influential former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon in his 2016 book 'Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy', the nuclear strategist said.

"Serious voices, who cannot be ignored, seem to suggest that this is where India may be heading, and certainly wants to head," Narang said.

"So our conventional understanding of South Asia's nuclear dynamics and who, in fact, might use nuclear weapons first and in what mode may need a hard rethink given these emerging authoritative voices in India who are not content to cede the nuclear initiative to Pakistan," he said, adding that this would mark a major shift in Indian strategy if implemented.

"In short, we may be witnessing what I call a 'decoupling' of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan."

Sameer Lalwani, senior associate and deputy director South Asia at the Stimson Center, an American think-tank, said Narang's remarks challenged the conventional wisdom of South Asia's strategic stability problem.

Based on recent statements and writings of high-level national security officials (serving and retired), Narang argued that India may be exhibiting a "seismic shift" in its nuclear strategy from 'no first use' to a preemptive nuclear counterforce allowing for escalation dominance or a "splendid first strike" against Pakistan, Lalwani said.

SSridhar wrote:India may abandon its 'no first use' nuclear policy: Expert - PTI

India may abandon its 'no first use' nuclear policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it feared that Islamabad was likely to use the weapons first, a top nuclear expert on South Asia has claimed.

The remarks by Vipin Narang, an expert on South Asian nuclear strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, before a Washington audience was though a negation of India's stated policy of 'no first use'.

During the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Narang said, "There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first".

He said India "may" abandon the policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it believed that Pakistan was going to use nuclear weapons or most likely the tactical nuclear weapons against it.

But, he pointed out, India's preemptive strike may not be conventional strikes and would also be aimed at Pakistan's missiles launchers for tactical battlefield nuclear warheads.

"India's opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full 'comprehensive counterforce strike' that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction," Narang said.

He said this thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Commander of India's Strategic Forces, Lt Gen BS Nagal.

It also comes perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly-respected and influential former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon in his 2016 book 'Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy', the nuclear strategist said.

"Serious voices, who cannot be ignored, seem to suggest that this is where India may be heading, and certainly wants to head," Narang said.

"So our conventional understanding of South Asia's nuclear dynamics and who, in fact, might use nuclear weapons first and in what mode may need a hard rethink given these emerging authoritative voices in India who are not content to cede the nuclear initiative to Pakistan," he said, adding that this would mark a major shift in Indian strategy if implemented.

"In short, we may be witnessing what I call a 'decoupling' of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan."

Sameer Lalwani, senior associate and deputy director South Asia at the Stimson Center, an American think-tank, said Narang's remarks challenged the conventional wisdom of South Asia's strategic stability problem.

Based on recent statements and writings of high-level national security officials (serving and retired), Narang argued that India may be exhibiting a "seismic shift" in its nuclear strategy from 'no first use' to a preemptive nuclear counter force allowing for escalation dominance or a "splendid first strike" against Pakistan, Lalwani said.

Gagan wrote:Pakistan has a desperate need to refine it N weapons technology, after the failure of its tests. They are desperately looking to China to help them out with this. They are expanding their program to include Poo warheads, even try out boosting them.