Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 21 Feb 2004 21:24

Originally posted by Calvin:
Has Hoodbhoy spent any time at US universities? What is his bio?

I have often read references to his having been trained at MIT. Need to confirm this. Also what level of 'training' he received (i.e. did he get his PhD from there or was he there for something else, postdoc for instance).

Added:
Here's his biography
http://pawss.hampshire.edu/indepth/hoodbhoy.pdf

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy received his bachelor's degrees in electrical engineering and
mathematics, master's in solid state physics, and Ph.D in nuclear physics, all from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

So he got all his post-high school education at MIT. Must have spent 4 + 2 + 5-6 years there = 11-12 years.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 21 Feb 2004 21:44

When was he appointed in QeA?

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 21 Feb 2004 21:54

Calvin:

Web of Science threw up a list of 47 articles from 1977 to date (and large numbers even till 1999 after which he has only 3 publications). Of these, I could identify only three as non-physics articles though one of these was in an academic journal (B. Atom. Sc.). Most of these 45 academic papers seem peer reviewed (though I have no idea of the academic standards of the journals listed). Perhaps P-II and Chagai reoriented his interests - at least if you go by his publishing record (even in 1998-1999 he has a total of 6 physics publications, but these must have already been under review before May 1998 if the lead times in Physics are anywhere close to those in other fields).

Comprehensive list of Journals: Phys Rev, Phys Rev Lett, B. Atom Sc., Z Phys C Part Fields (???), J. Phys G Nucl. Particl, Nucl Phys, Prog Part Nucl Phys, Z Phys A-Hadron Nucl.

The largest numbers are in Phys Rev and Phys Lett.

The three non academic articles I mentioned earlier are
HOODBHOY P
MYTH-BUILDING - THE ISLAMIC BOMB
B ATOM SCI 49 (5): 42-49 JUN 1993

Hoodbhoy P
Fatal friendships: Four decades and four dictators later, Pakistan's stability, as well as the survival of its latest military ruler, have become contingent on United states support
INDEX CENSORSHIP 31 (4): 181-184 OCT 2002

Hoodbhoy P, Mian Z
Sanctions: Lift 'em
B ATOM SCI 54 (5): 20-21 SEP-OCT 1998
(this one is interesting!!!)

In sum, he seems to have an average of two academic publications a year over a 20 year period. My prior belief was that he indulged mostly in activism and less in academic work. I have changed my mind, at least for the period upto 1998 or so. A surprising proportion of these are single-authored papers too.

Acharya: do you have any basis for what you were saying about PH? Anything to suggest that he has been placed there by the Americans?

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 21 Feb 2004 21:58

An excellent OpEd by Leon Hadar of the Cato Institute.

[/quote]

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 21 Feb 2004 22:05

I also did a 'Cited Reference Search' on Web of Science (which refers to citations to his work in other papers). There are a total of 102 citations he has got. About 5 of these were in non-academic publications (the News Intl. - also known as the Dung here;)). Another 7-8 were in possibly academic or semi-academic publications like 'Muslim Science' and 'Islamic Science' but they could well be cites to his non-academic work. About 10 or so I can't identify (unpublished work, publications with only a number and no journal name). The rest (approx. 80) were in academic (mostly physics) journals.

Could one of the physicists here please tell us whether the journals listed above are considered serious / top-rated journals?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 21 Feb 2004 22:45

Spending 10 years getting an education in America, in the 1960s certainly suggests either a particularly wealthy background, or an indulgent UNCLE. Sridhar, these appear to be legit field-leading journals.

Are the 102 cites excluding his articles where he cites earlier work he has done (i.e., incestuous cites)?

Folks, is PH's revelation of Libyan procurement of uranium FOR Pakistan the leading edge of a trial balloon that threatens to expose the institutional involvement in proliferation?

A_Gupta · Post by **A_Gupta** » 21 Feb 2004 22:51

Nuc. Phys. and Phys. Rev. are generally considered top-notch; especially Nuc. Phys. B.

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 21 Feb 2004 23:02

Calvin:

It will probably include a good proportion of self-cites. It will require a meticulous study of all the cites to figure out what is the number of non-incestuous cites, as you termed it.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 21 Feb 2004 23:19

From Muddur's post on another thread:

Bin Laden between a hammer and a hard place
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FB21Ag01.html

Another crucial side to the operation is an overhaul within the Pakistani army "to purge the elements allegedly sexed up with al-Qaeda and the Taliban", the source said, referring to those elements in the army and the intelligence services with sympathies for these groups. The shakeup follows the recent arrest of several militants of Uzbek origin, as well as an Arab named Waleed bin Azmi, in a raid in the eastern district of the Pakistani port city of Karachi. About a dozen militants managed to escape, while the captured ones were handed over to agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, who found during their interrogations that the operators had been besieged near Wana, South Waziristan, but they were given an escape route, allegedly by officers of the Pakistan armed forces. The operators fled to Karachi, but were rounded up thanks to the local police's intelligence network. The US presented these facts to Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf - not the first time such incidents have been reported, but this time with the demands that the officers be taken to task and that US officials be allowed to take part in the inquiries to understand better the nexus between Islamists and officers in the Pakistani army. Several officers are now expected to be arrested.

Could this explain Tenet's visit followed by the air-dash to Karachi and the tete-a-tete with V Corps?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Feb 2004 23:37

From Chicago Tribune subscription site:

Report: Pakistani supplied enriched uranium to Libya

By Raymond Bonner and Craig S. Smith
New York Times News Service

February 21, 2004

ISTANBUL -- The network led by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan shipped partly enriched uranium directly to Libya aboard a Pakistani airplane in 2001, providing the fuel stock in addition to the designs and technology to make a nuclear bomb, according to a report by Malaysian investigators released Friday.

The report provides a wealth of evidence that businessmen and engineers in Turkey, Germany, Switzerland and Britain, as well as Dubai and Malaysia, were closely involved in recent years in Libya's clandestine nuclear program. It is based primarily on the Malaysian authorities' interrogation of B.S.A. Tahir, 44, a key middleman in Khan's global nuclear-trading network.

The shipment of uranium was one of many deliveries of nuclear components to Libya that began with a meeting in Istanbul in 1997 between Khan and Libyan officials, the Malaysian report says.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear monitoring group, confirmed in a report that Libya received a shipment in February 2001 that included 1.87 tons of uranium hexaflouride, a form that is a standard raw material for centrifuges. The uranium required major further enrichment to reach bomb-grade quality, nuclear experts said. The amount was ideal for testing centrifuges but also would be sufficient to make one small bomb, they said.

The two reports make clear that Khan and his associates were directly involved in providing Libya the essential weapons component that also is the most difficult to procure: the uranium fuel.

The report from the IAEA was obtained from a Western diplomat. It described a Libyan nuclear weapons effort that was considerably more ambitious than previously known. However, Libya was not close to producing a bomb when it decided to disclose and abandon its nuclear program last year.

The IAEA reported that Libya made a strategic decision in July 1995 to redouble its nuclear efforts. In 1997, it said, "foreign manufacturers" provided 20 preassembled centrifuges of the P-1 type, a model that Khan developed. Libya also obtained components for an additional 200 P-1 centrifuges.

The agency found that from late 2000 to April 2002, much of that gear was made ready for use. But then Libyan officials decided to dismantle it and put into storage "for security reasons."

Starting in 2000, Libya embarked on a parallel effort to acquire more advanced centrifuges with rotors made of maraging steel, a superhard alloy, and known as P-2, also a signature design of Khan's.

Libya received two of the advanced centrifuges in September 2000, the IAEA report said, and ordered 10,000 more, with parts starting to arrive in large quantities in December 2002. All were made outside Libya.

The report said Libya received no more steel rotors--the heart of the advanced machine. It added, however, that Libya acquired a "large stock of maraging steel" to make centrifuge parts and that Libyan technicians trained for such work at foreign sites on at least three occasions.

Private experts said that 10,000 machines, if successfully completed and operated, could make enough highly enriched uranium each year for about 10 nuclear weapons. However, the report said that Libya was only in the planning stages.

Copyright © 2004, Chicago Tribune

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Feb 2004 23:41

Based on a very unscientific survey, I think we have enough cause to shut down ANY military production by Germany.

If TSP has any nuclear capability today, in addition to China, it is Germany that has to be THE other major reason for this capability.

With a troubling history within the past 100 years this trend - specially in the nuclear field - must be enough cause for concern.

Just too many instances of "Germany" in TSP related nuclear proliferation incidents.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 21 Feb 2004 23:42

Originally posted by Sridhar:

Acharya: do you have any basis for what you were saying about PH? Anything to suggest that he has been placed there by the Americans?

THis is based on observation of various organizations. In fact atleast one of India's chairman of AE dept had similar pedigree.
PH came in the media limelight after 1998 and he has been acting as the managed opposiiton in TSP who is under the influence of previous experience.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 21 Feb 2004 23:54

U-235 is about 0.75% of naturally occuring uranium. This means that 1.87 tonnes = 14 kg of U-235 (100%). This gives us an idea of the weapons grade material required by a Pak-nuke (if such a thing actually exists).

The density of Uranium is 19 g/cm3, or approximately 100 liters worth of volume is required to transport this 1.87 tons of material. Roughly half a barrel of volume, or half a 55-gal drum worth of stuff.

Some technical info on Uranium processing:

http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uf6/index.cfm

The gaseous diffusion process used to enrich uranium requires uranium in the form of UF6. In the first step of UF6 production, uranium ore is mined and sent to a mill where uranium oxide (often called "yellowcake") is produced. The uranium oxide is then sent to a UF6 production facility. At the production facility, the uranium oxide is combined with anhydrous HF and fluorine gas in a series of chemical reactions to form the chemical compound UF6. The product UF6 is placed into steel cylinders and shipped as a solid to a gaseous diffusion plant for enrichment.

<img src="http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/ov ... rocess.gif" alt="" />
http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/overview/images/nprocess.gif

Uranium hexafluoride can be a solid, liquid, or gas, depending on its temperature and pressure. At atmospheric pressure (14.7 psia), UF6 is a solid below a temperature of 134°F (57°C) and a gas at temperatures above 134°F. Solid UF6 is a white, dense, crystalline material that resembles rock salt. Liquid UF6 is formed only at temperatures greater than 147°F (64°C) and at pressures greater than 1.5 times atmospheric pressure (about 22 psia). At atmospheric pressure, solid UF6 will transform directly to UF6 gas (sublimation) when the temperature is raised to 134°F (57°C), without going through a liquid phase. These properties are shown in the phase diagram below, which presents the different physical forms of UF6 as a function of temperature and pressure.

<img src="http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uf ... Phase1.gif" alt="" />
http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uf6/propertiesuf6/images/DUF6Phase1.gif

Anantha · Post by **Anantha** » 22 Feb 2004 04:18

Sridhar,

Originally posted by Arun_Gupta:
Nuc. Phys. and Phys. Rev. are generally considered top-notch; especially Nuc. Phys. B.

Also top notch is Phy. Rev. Letters

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 22 Feb 2004 04:34

Nuke Quarantine

AMIR MIR

Pakistan continues to quake under the shockwaves Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan's confession generated three weeks back. Top diplomatic sources in Islamabad say the Bush administration has presented another set of demands to Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf, asking him to agree to a joint Pak-US monitoring of the country's nuclear weapons by installing the US-made Nuclear Weapons Command and Control System (NWCS), sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and allow the UN watchdog—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—to inspect its nuclear sites and missile facilities.

Should Musharraf succumb to US pressure, it wouldn't be the first instance of his acquiescing to Washington. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Musharraf administration had allowed American nuclear experts, grouped under a US Liaison Committee, to secretly spend millions of dollars to safeguard around 50 nuclear weapons in Pakistan's arsenal. Diplomatic sources say the committee meets every two months and is helping Pakistan develop state-of-the-art security, including secret authorisation codes for the arsenal. "Although the US wants to prevent Pakistani nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands, it can't go over the edge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which prevents a direct involvement with any country's nuclear weapons," one of them said.

Diplomatic sources say the American intelligence community believes Pakistan continues to develop and expand its nuclear weapons capability. It possesses between 600-800 kg of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU); and 1.7-13 kg of separated plutonium. These quantities are sufficient to produce 40-50 nuclear bombs or warheads which with their fissile cores are stored separately from non-nuclear components. Since Musharraf insists on not compromising Pakistan's minimum nuclear deterrence, the Bush administration has expressed its desire for the joint Pak-US monitoring.

Against the backdrop of Dr Khan's confessions, the Bush administration fears a Pakistani nuclear weapon or fissile material could fall into the wrong hands. These sources say that Gen Musharraf's repeated assertions that Pakistan's nuclear assets are 100 per cent secure have already been proved wrong, prompting Washington to demand the installation of NWCS in Pakistan which would bolster security. The Command and Control (C2) system comprises telecommunications lines between command posts, as also early warning information systems involving satellites and radars for detecting enemy launch and millions of lines of computer code for the filtering and correlation of data.

In offering assistance, the US has asked Pakistan that its nuclear weapons be disassembled, with their components stored in separate vaults or locations; that the procedures for accessing these components and assembling them involve several individuals from different parts of the government; and that it should be a fundamental principle that no one person gains access to an assembled nuclear weapon, or all the components for a complete nuclear weapon. But the Pakistani side is understood to have informed the Americans that the country's nuclear weapons are not kept in deployed form. "The bombs are in one location; their delivery systems in another, mating them would take two to three days," the Americans were reportedly told.

In fact, a senior American official told Reuters on February 16 in Washington: "The United States is working with Pakistan to protect its nuclear technology from falling into the hands of extremists. We have had discussions with Islamabad on the need (for the regime there) to safeguard its technology and its nuclear material. We are confident they are taking the necessary steps."

Approached for comments, a Foreign Office spokesman expressed his ignorance about any such American demands, adding that Washington did offer foolproof security arrangements for Pakistan's nuclear installations after Afghanistan was attacked in 2001, but Musharraf turned it down. He also confirmed a US offer to Islamabad to train Pakistani experts for security and protection of the nuclear assets, but said Islamabad wasn't bound to accede to any such demands.

This spokesman recalled Musharraf's interview in The Financial Times last fortnight in which he categorically asserted that Pakistan would never allow foreign inspectors to monitor its nuclear installations. Musharraf told the newspaper, "Why should Pakistan allow anybody to inspect? We are not hiding anything.... What is the need of any inspection? I believe in the army dictum that a commander is responsible for all that happens or does not happen in his command—and to that extent the president is responsible for all that happens in the country."

Responding to the American demand for signing the CTBT, the spokesman said, "Pakistan's nuclear weapons are for deterrence and Islamabad would prefer signing a no-war pact with India rather than sign the CTBT." He further said that, in contrast to India's stand, Pakistan had endorsed the CTBT but reserved its judgement about signing it. He explained, "Since India opposes the treaty, Pakistan maintains it wouldn't sign as long as New Delhi refused to do so. Pakistan can't unilaterally accept obligations which tend to compromise its nuclear programme."

Diplomatic sources in Islamabad say CIA director George Tenet has already created a special unit to monitor Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. The unit reportedly functions in close coordination with America's Weapons Intelligence, Non-proliferation and Arms Control Centre under Alan Foley, a veteran analyst of the Soviet military structure who reports directly to the CIA chief. The special unit monitors Pakistan's nuke installations by acquiring high-resolution images through the most modern satellite technology.

Pakistan's main nuclear sites which the US wants to monitor jointly include, among others, the now infamous Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta (involved in uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon research/development); the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Islamabad (nuclear weapon research); the Chashma Nuclear Power Reactor, Chashma; the Karachi Nuclear Power Reactor (125-mw power reactor); the Khushab Research Reactor and Heavy Water Production Plant; the Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Milling and Conversion Centre; and the Chagai Hills nuclear test site.

Similarly, Pakistan's main missile facilities that the US wants to monitor include the National Defence Complex (NDC), Tarwanah suburb, Rawalpindi; the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DESTO), Chaklala Cantt; the Air Weapon Complex, Wah/Kamra; the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in Topi; the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology in Ormara; the Al Technique Corporation of Pakistan Ltd (ATCOP), Potohar Plateau, Fatehjang; the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission Headquarters (SUPARCO), Karachi; and the Flight Test Range (ftr) at Sonmiani Beach, Karachi, SUPARCO's primary rocket launch facility.

Musharraf has been claiming he would not allow foreign inspection of the country's nuclear installations. But Khan's confession has weakened his ability to withstand the US pressure. There's also a feeling that Washington could twist his arms through threats of imposing sanctions or holding back economic assistance promised to Islamabad.

http://www.outlookindia.com/

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Feb 2004 06:15

Seems like Mush did not play his cards very well and has painted himself into a corner.

However, the above article is confusing. If US wants to nstall US stuff, why then have UN at all?

This NPT is getting to be worse than a joke.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Feb 2004 06:39

Folks: I'm still trying to tie some threads together. Why was De Villepin in ND on 2/13, and what came of the visit?

Also, what are Amir Mir's antecedents?

The man speaks confidently of 600 - 800 kg of HEU and 1.7 (note this!) - 13 kg of Pu. Both of these figures are consistent with previous estimates of Pakistani arsenal. From the comments regarding UF6 transfer to Libya being equal to one bomb, and other OSI we can infer that Pak needs about 15kg/weapon, and the range provided equals 40 - 55 bombs Uranium Bombs.

The Pu is what is interesting. The US report that the designs provided to Libya were "implosion" type similar to the Nagasaki device suggested that the transfer was that of a Pu device. Why would this news be leaked? Particularly when the transfers to Libya are likely uranium-based? Why would this news be leaked particularly when there is so little Pu in Pak hands?

Secondly, the information about the Liaison committee is not consistent. How are these guys securing the weapons if they meet "every two months"? I wonder if the initial deal with Musharraf (9/13/01 - 6/2002) was for US physical control of the nukes, but permitting the nuclear facilities to continue to operate in a limited fashion. Since the nuclear facilities continued proliferation, the US is now demanding that they also be shutdown or subject to intrusive inspection. Look at the list of facilities subject to monitoring - how many of these are likely to have weapon components? This means that the intrusive inspections are intended to prevent proliferation, not to guard the weapons - which must, therefore, already be guarded.

Finally, we must be clear that any US moves in this regard are motivated by (a) to prevent a WMD attack on US forces or citizens; and (b) to force Pakistan to turn Osama Bin Laden over, so that they can make an exit from Afgh, and the US will endeavor to protect Pakistani deterrence against India - if this means a nuclear umbrella for Pakistan, so be it.

Rak · Post by **Rak** » 22 Feb 2004 06:53

Originally posted by Niranjan Rao:However, the above article is confusing. If US wants to nstall US stuff, why then have UN at all?

The US is like a savy business man. They didn't want to bring this proliferation issue out in the open regarding Pakistan. It was the IAEA that brought this out to the world public.

Since TSP talks so much about the UN resolution and going to the UN and wanting a global consensus on all their petty issues, the US is using this pretext to install their goods in TSP. What better way to tackle a rogue ally.

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 22 Feb 2004 07:34

kgoan: I think you are missing my point about Hoodbhoy.

He may appear "liberal" or even sane, but consider the following:

1. He is a nuclear science professor in Pakistan
2. Pakistan is a military-terrorist-bigot dictatorship, not a chaotic democracy.
3. At a time when most Pakis have a tough time going anywhere, Hoodbhoy, a Paki NUCLEAR SCIENCE type, breezes all over the world - America today, WSF booze party in Mumbai last month, booze party with Indian nuclear establishment types in - Bangalore? BARC? - a couple of months ago (per shiv's post), OpEds in newspapers all over the world ....

How come? How does he get to go back to TSP after happily declaring the need for India-Paki bhai-bhai-ness, chitchatting with desi nuke experts, telling them that Paki weapons are under American control (TWO MONTHS ago!!) etc?

Doesn't he have security clearance?

My conclusion:

1. He is as high as they get in the Paki military-industrial goon complex.

2. If says Paki weapons are under American control, then that is because the reality is FAR worse than that. As in "weapons taken away long ago, but we may see them again".

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Feb 2004 08:30

Originally posted by narayanan:
Bangalore? BARC? - a couple of months ago (per shiv's post),

Not Bangalore - it was outside India AFAIK.

But his statements are very intersting in his article:
http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/21/fea.htm#1

as a compromise between allowing some transparency and avoiding the accusation of having sold out to the Americans, it is possible that the government may secretly allow the installation of cameras and various sensing devices in nuclear installations and an audit of fissile materials

hmmmmmm...

and this:

if Pakistan's cooperation with the US in fighting Al Qaeda falters, or if an Islamic group is successful in eliminating General Musharraf and his replacement is considered to be an Islamic radical. One must then expect a determined effort to put Pakistan's nuclear weapons under international (read: United States) control.

Like all RAPEs Hoodbhoy knows his English. He said in person "US security".

He has now spoken of "US control" if something happens.

The truth may lie between those two phrases: US Security" and "US control"

anilK · Post by **anilK** » 22 Feb 2004 08:33

Originally posted by Calvin:
U-235 is about 0.75% of naturally occuring uranium. This means that 1.87 tonnes = 14 kg of U-235 (100%). This gives us an idea of the weapons grade material required by a Pak-nuke (if such a thing actually exists).

The density of Uranium is 19 g/cm3, or approximately 100 liters worth of volume is required to transport this 1.87 tons of material. Roughly half a barrel of volume, or half a 55-gal drum worth of stuff.

Calvin if each of the process steps is only 25% efficient, then at the end of the four steps (refining, UF6, diffusion, UO2) they would be (1/4)^4 = 1/256 efficient. So thy would actually need ~150 of 55-gal drums of ore to process.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Feb 2004 08:40

anil, the schematic above is for reactor fuel. For weapons, from UF6 you go to centrifuges. The separation is >> 25%

shiv, the "US Liaison Group" is supposed to have been providing "security" for the weapons. So perhaps the US has escalated its demand from physical security (to prevent transfer to AlQ) to actual control (i.e., effective defanging).

The 2/13 situation in Karachi was so serious that both Musharraf and Jamali had to make "unscheduled" visits to that city

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2004-daily/21-02-2004/metro/k7.htm

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 22 Feb 2004 08:49

intelonline.

US to safeguard Pak nukes
20 February 2004: While the United States has no intention to denuke Pakistan, it is pressing for installation of safeguard command-and-control systems in all its nuclear facilities, and president George W.Bush has approved a special grant for installations, equipment, salary, and other expenses.

Following a briefing by the senate intelligence committee last Thursday, several US senators wrote to president Bush about the urgent necessity to safeguard Pakistan’s nuclear equipment, and Bush then approved a $560-million grant, which will entirely go into the safeguard systems, their operation, and maintenance.

The command-and-control equipment will comprise locks, codes and software more sophisticated than what the UN has installed in North-Korean atomic installations, but no Pakistani or Muslim contractor would be engaged in putting the devices in place.

Diplomats said that over the last two weeks, Pakistan president Parvez Musharraf has produced a consensus among his corps commanders, the jihadi groups, and bureaucrats in favour of the safeguard equipment.

All the equipment will be controlled by satellite, and the US secretary of state, Collin Powell, has rejected a Pakistani plea to buy the software, locks and codes from Germany.

Because the US has no working relations with either Iran or Libya, the United States was compelled to remove their WMDs, but since America has a working relationship with Pakistan, this extreme step is being temporarily put off, diplomats said.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 22 Feb 2004 08:52

In the midst of the usual Paki paranoia, there is this question:

The cost of our N-deterrence
By M. Ziauddin

According to one background briefing by officials, we spent about Rs. 184 billion in the last 26 years on the nuclear programme.

Most of it must have been spent in the 1980s and early 1990s because it was during this period that we were trying to enrich uranium to weapons grade level and refining our bombs. After that we spent most of our clandestine resources on developing delivery systems and of course on the low-intensity wars in Afghanistan on the side of Taliban and in occupied Kashmir.

These resources (Rs. 184 billion), or about $10 billion at the average exchange rate of the late 1980s and according to the same background briefing, were said to have been siphoned off from legitimate sources, that is the defence budget. But most of our defence budget is made up of salaries. Even conventional weapons are bought from sources other than the overt defence budgets. So, the question remains: Where did we get the clandestine billions to make the bomb from?

http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/22/fea.htm#1

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 22 Feb 2004 08:59

Qadeer saga and its fallout
By Karamatullah K. Ghori

As far as the US in particular, and the west in general, is concerned it is not Qadeer alone in the dock but the whole nation of Pakistan.

It would be a huge mistake for anyone in Pakistan to believe that General Musharraf has successfully marketed his indispensability to Bush and raised his stature by offering Dr Qadeer as the fall guy in this sordid episode. The general is as much on a slippery slope as anybody else.

What we have done is that we have handed Washington a loaded revolver which can be used against us at a time of their choosing, and in circumstances of their convenience.

All the ingredients for declaring Pakistan an international pariah have been served on a platter. We may soon be given the choice to either open our nuclear facilities to intrusive inspections or face Iraq-like sanctions. They have us by our tail.

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/encounter/encounter.htm#1

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 22 Feb 2004 10:42

N,

No disagreement there. That was why I used the Sakharov analogy - with apologies to Sakharov. The only way Hoodbhoy can do what he does is if he's right up the top of the Pak world.

His ability to waltz around the world also indicates a certain degree of "insider" privileges that may indicate that Calvin's idea that Hoodbhoy's a US "eye" or "voice" on the inside of the Pak system, may be correct.

Your second point is more than a little disconcerting dude. If the US has "secured" Pak nukes (taken them away or whatever) - what in gawds name makes the Paks think they'll ever get them back/be free of US interference in their use?

i.e. Under what condition would the US tell the Paks that they've released/have no objection/stopped surveillance etc. of Paks nukes?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Feb 2004 12:31

Originally posted by kgoan:

i.e. Under what condition would the US tell the Paks that they've released/have no objection/stopped surveillance etc. of Paks nukes?

Egg-stremely valid point IMO

Lays the question open to all sorts of speculation, but let me speculate specifically on the India context.

If, for example, the US, in its wisdom decided to look away from Paki nukes in an India Pakistan standoff, Pakistan could, in theory, be free to use them against India. However, they would have to use them first, because of India's NFU and they would get nuked back. What unkil's reputation would be regarding "surveillance" after such scenario may be moot.

More likely, US security on Pak nukes could be used to blackmail India - in theory at least. Imagine a "war like" situation in which Pakistan is threatened by India in response to some dire Paki terrorist attack on India. The US then attempts to "defuse" the situation by privately informing India that they are going to take their eyes off Paki nukes. As far as I am concerned - India's response to this is very simple. As long as nukes exist in Pakistan, whether the US has eyes or locks or chains or whatever on them, India as a nation cannot act like Pakistan is nook nood. India has to work for a nuclear war scenario, expecting a Pakistani attack as we have done for decades.

However, that does not leave Pakistan in a comfortable situation, because if the US is going to use "on now", "off now" surveillance on Paki nukes - India can needle Pakistan as much as it wants, staying well below the threshold level that the US would want to stop watching Paki nukes and allow their use on India. Pakistan will not be able to respond to such needling by the usual nuclear threats.

India gets some freedom of action, but not freedom of threat from Pakistani nukes. That is quite OK as far as I am concerned. In fact that scenario is better than a totally nook nood Pakstan - with nukes ostensibly physically removed. For starters - I would never ever believe that is possible - not with perfidious China sitting next door.

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 22 Feb 2004 16:51

Thanks, shiv. Kgoan, analyze the logic of the following statement,please (quote from post above..)

Because the US has no working relations with either Iran or Libya, the United States was compelled to remove their WMDs, but since America has a working relationship with Pakistan, this extreme step is being temporarily put off, diplomats said.

Contrast with the earlier nah-nah-nah-nah declarations from our worthy nookuleer / US Foreign Policy / US Marine Corps Experts here in this context. The claim then was "we cain't remove nukes from a Sovereign Nation because we don't have anywhere NEAR that sort of influence there!!'

So - they can waltz into North Korea, Libya, Iran etc. and just walk out carrying the nukes like so much firewood, hey, BUT - in Pakistan, where they control everything from the "CEO"'s Phundament down to the babes stamping passports at the airports, and the entire airspace and most of the airbases, and they have a few armored and airborne divisions and the eager General Dostum and a fleet of heavy bombers 1 hour away for persuasion purposes, they have NOOOO way to remove the nukes. Hmmmmm!!!!

Shiv states most of the issues above. The other aspect which appears to bother you, kgoan, is that it makes no sense to you that the Americans would be stupid enough to go put the nukes back in TSP after they had the sense to remove them at all.

Now there, kgoan dear, the problem is that standing as you do, upside down as in Australia, you have too much blood flowing to the brain. Here in the US of A, we stand Upright, with our heads proudly pointing Up, as the Lawd Gawd intended us to do, and we make sure that the blood stays where the Lawd intended it to stay - in our phundaments. So these sorts of minor problems don't occur to us when we do our GroupThink.

As far as we are concerned, our Al-Lie, President Musharraf The Charismatic, has assured us 400% that his newclear detergent establishment is 125% clean, with the evil Abdul Xerox removed, and he has shown ge-noo-whine Repentance, too. Didn't you see that on TV? That's it. Problem solved. Al Qaeda is on the run. OTOH, poor President Musharraf is threatened by the evil Soviet-buddies, the Injuns, and so he needs to protect against their evil nukes. Q.E.D.

Lets give $500M and a few nukes (under solid control of course, from the same worthies who controlled the designs at Los Alamos) to President Mush.

Re: HoodBhoy. Sakharov did win a Nobel Prize, and was under house arrest a lot of the time. Hoodbhoy, if you notice, NEVER criticizes Our Leader, President Mush. As for Hoodbhoy representing American interests, well, I would say he does that just as well as Mush represents them.

So yes, I AM saying that the ENTIRE current hoopla of Revelations and Apologies and Forgiveness and Security Discussions, is all intended to cover the RETURN of nukes to Pakistan.

shynee · Post by **shynee** » 22 Feb 2004 18:23

Is America targeting our bomb ? - Dung Editorial

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 22 Feb 2004 18:28

N, so we're in agreement . . . except for one crucial area where you've made a fundamental error. try this link, you'll see what I mean.

Now that link actually introduces another interesting question: US constraints on India is a given (or any potential peer competitor for that matter). So is US use of Pakistan as *one* element of their potential "constraint-regime".

But; why would the US risk turning the US-Pak relationship "upside-down" by giving Pak *any* room for manouver via the nukes? If they have some level of control on the nukes, why not simply tell the Paks "here's a few dozen F-16's, you keep your mouth shut and we'll keep our mouths shut about your nukes". That would equally fit in with Shiv's post.

Point is: I grok the US using Pak land for whatever, what I don't get, is how the US thinks it can ensure proper *control* of the Paks ever again? (I don't mean *overt* stuff like the IMF etc, I mean *real* control.

That's the key bit. If we can figure out what the mechanism is, what leverage the US uses on Pak *and*, what Pak uses on the US, we hit big time.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 22 Feb 2004 19:25

The cost of our N-deterrence
By M. Ziauddin

According to one background briefing by officials, we spent about Rs. 184 billion in the last 26 years on the nuclear programme.

Most of it must have been spent in the 1980s and early 1990s because it was during this period that we were trying to enrich uranium to weapons grade level and refining our bombs. After that we spent most of our clandestine resources on developing delivery systems and of course on the low-intensity wars in Afghanistan on the side of Taliban and in occupied Kashmir.

These resources (Rs. 184 billion), or about $10 billion at the average exchange rate of the late 1980s and according to the same background briefing, were said to have been siphoned off from legitimate sources, that is the defence budget. But most of our defence budget is made up of salaries. Even conventional weapons are bought from sources other than the overt defence budgets. So, the question remains: Where did we get the clandestine billions to make the bomb from? http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/22/fea.htm#1

The money for Pakistani National Pride - Nuclear Program and Jihad - comes from heroin sales and making your own citizens starve.

Kgoan,

MacArthur is a genius!!! My roomate says that Pakistan looks exactly identical in that other map also.

> How does the US feel that it is going to keep Pakistan under control ever again. I don't mean IMF etc... I mean *real* control.

Thank You Boss!! this the question I was hoping someone was going to ask. Where are the Marines when we need them?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Feb 2004 19:41

Originally posted by kgoan:

But; why would the US risk turning the US-Pak relationship "upside-down" by giving Pak *any* room for manouver via the nukes? If they have some level of control on the nukes, why not simply tell the Paks "here's a few dozen F-16's, you keep your mouth shut and we'll keep our mouths shut about your nukes". That would equally fit in with Shiv's post.

One possible answer is that no group in Pakistan is in total control of ANYTHING.

With loose informal rules having been applied to exactly how nuke knowhow was obtained, I suspect that nobody has really accounted for exactly how much Uranium was made.

Nobody knows anything exactly, but a huge number of people know little bits and many of those people are on the loose. Furthermore even Musharraf and the army are liars. In some ways Uneven may be right. Even if Musharraf swears that he knows where every single warhead is - he may stil be lying, or even he may not know exactly.

There are too many unknowns, too many unanswered, unanswerable questions. The best that can be done is probably to maintain a tight grip on what is known and maintain that grip forever. The US ABSOLUTELY WILL need India's help and cooperation is this game. I am certain that India will get virtual nook nood guarantees to the extent that locations and numbers are known, but Indian cooperation will be sought for keeping Pakland in check for the foreseeable future, in exchange for India not reacting to take Pak out.

Googling for something entirely different today I came across a link for a formula to bathe your cat or dog to get rid of the stink from an encounter with a skunk. An interesting side-note was that dogs can be expected to tolerate baths with stoic resignation, while cats feel that they may die and act like if they are going to die they might as well take you with them.

Pakistan can be expected to act like a cat reacting to the US nuke-clear detergent cleaning out Pak's skunk-works. They will go wild at the double humiliation of US control and gloating Indian cooperation.

On a more philosophical note, if a young husband allows virile young men into his house expecting them to protect him against his neighbour, hanky-panky is always a possibility. Pakistan IS a weak state. No powerful state will openly welcome a foreign power into their house so easily.

Kati · Post by **Kati** » 22 Feb 2004 20:20

To Sridhar and others:

Parvaiz Hoodboy (or Hoodbhoy) is a qualified researcher, and above all he is on uncle's payroll. Recruiting top scientists (by uncle) in developing countries (at advanced research centers) is a result of cold war, and started in sixties. Several bharatiya deshi vignyanis are on the pay roll too. Lekin, samashya yeh hai ki bharat me bohut sarey vigyani-log hai. bharat sarkar ko yeh bhi maloom hai koun koun vigyani...., our issiye liye.........

In countries like TSP, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, top scientists (and intellectuals too) are well marked and paid handsomely to get inside info.

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 22 Feb 2004 20:51

There's an interview with of Najam Sethi here in SAT, http://www.satribune.com/archives/feb22_28_04/P1_sethi.htm

I think he gives away more than he intended to, but at any rate this quote is worth noting:

Q: Are the Americans safeguarding Pakistani nuclear installations to ensure that nuclear arms do not land in the hands of terror groups?

Ans: Let me clarify that the Americans are not safeguarding Pakistani nuclear installations. There is no question of letting the Americans do that job for us.

There is absolutely no chance of any nuclear weapon falling into wrong hands. Nobody should have such inhibitions because, first of all, there are no assembled nuclear weapons. Neither India nor Pakistan has bombs in assembled mode. Various elements of the bombs are separated and there is no way any terror group can assemble a bomb in Pakistan within 24 hours. Pakistani installations are under strict vigil under a new command and control system which Musharraf set up in 2000. That is why we know what Dr AQ Khan was doing.

For 10 years the US did not allow Pakistan to buy equipment that would ensure the safety of Pakistani nuclear weapons. They have now agreed to send us this equipment.

Anindya · Post by **Anindya** » 22 Feb 2004 20:55

Pervez responsible for N-proliferation: Benazir

Declaring a virtual jihad against the present Musharraf regime, Benazir Bhutto blamed the General for the crisis over the export of nuclear weapons technology and demanded he must be held accountable. " He must go," she said.

She also doubted whether he was genuinely interested in peace with India. He believes in commando tactics of camouflage, of saying one thing and doing something else. There is "disconnect between what Musharraf says and what he does".

But Pakistan's nuclear program was alive and healthy under cover of Benazir's "democracy" Musharraf has done a far better job of letting the world know - and to that extent I am a fan of Musharraf's - rather than Benazir.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 22 Feb 2004 21:11

Excerpts from a long story on the the front page of the LA Times today(requires free registration):

For Sale: Nuclear Expertise

Emerging details of a Pakistani scientist's network raise questions about how far it spread technology and why it wasn't stopped sooner.

Top diplomats in Vienna and senior U.S. officials say they are urgently trying to determine whether blueprints for a nuclear warhead and designs to build the device, which were sold to Libya, and highly sensitive data and equipment shipped to Iran and North Korea, might have spread beyond those countries. In addition, investigators have not been able to account for much of the equipment the network bought.

"Who knows where it has gone?" said a senior U.S. intelligence official, who described the Bush administration as deeply worried. "How many other people are there? How widespread was it, and how much information has spread?"

CIA director George J. Tenet said this month that the agency penetrated elements of the smuggling ring in recent years, but needed proof to stop it. Other administration officials and outside experts suggested, however, that at least parts of the enterprise could have been shut down.

"If you have penetrated the system, why not stop it before Libya got the weapons design?" a senior European diplomat based in Vienna asked. "There is no limitation on a copying machine."

Among the new details that have emerged:

• Sensitive equipment discovered at nuclear-related sites in Libya carried the name of Khan Research Laboratories, adding to what authorities described as irrefutable evidence that his center illicitly shared its technology with a country under United Nations sanctions for supporting terrorism.

• Evidence indicates that Khan provided Pakistan's state-of-the-art centrifuge machines to North Korea in the late 1990s. Two Western diplomats described the information as preliminary, but they said it deepens concerns about North Korea's progress in enriching uranium for atomic weapons.

• Authorities at the IAEA last week reopened an investigation of an alleged offer by Khan to sell nuclear technology and a weapons design to Saddam Hussein in 1990. The inquiry started in 1995 with the discovery of memos in Iraq, but it hit a roadblock when Pakistan called the offer a hoax. 

Three times from 1998 to 2000, President Clinton raised concerns about nuclear technology leaking from Pakistan to North Korea during private meetings with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Pervez Musharraf, the general who replaced him in a 1999 coup.

"In each case, President Clinton was assured that these concerns would be looked into and would be dealt with appropriately," recalls Karl Inderfurth, who as assistant secretary of State was Clinton's chief South Asia troubleshooter. "To my knowledge, we did not receive any satisfactory responses to our concerns. It is now clear the smoke we saw at the time was indeed the fires being set by A.Q. Khan."

The denials finally collapsed late last year after Iran was forced to open portions of its nuclear program to IAEA inspectors and Libya voluntarily renounced its weapons program.

Although the Iranian disclosures provided strong hints, reams of documents and nuclear hardware turned over to the U.S. and IAEA by Libya pointed the finger squarely at Khan.

The most alarming documents were blueprints for the nuclear warhead, said diplomats and U.S. officials involved in the process. The plans were for a warhead developed in the 1960s by China, which provided early help to Pakistan's nuclear program. Two diplomats in Vienna said Khan sold the blueprints to Libya in late 2001 or early 2002 for as much as $20 million.


Inspectors in Libya also found the equipment from Khan's laboratory and components for two generations of Pakistani centrifuges. Diplomats in Vienna said complete versions of the earliest type of centrifuge, known as the P1, were obtained directly from Pakistan and components for the next generation P2, which was faster and more efficient, were manufactured for the network at a Malaysian plant.

Weeks before Libya gave up its secrets, Iran had made a more limited disclosure to the IAEA of how it obtained drawings and components for 500 P1 machines through middlemen associated with Khan's network. Iran acknowledged this month that it also had received plans for the more advanced P2 from Pakistan. Diplomats said Tehran had taken halting steps to develop those machines.

By the time Pakistan was forced to move against Khan, however, Iran had used his technology to develop its own uranium enrichment cycle, moving closer to what the United States says is an effort to build a nuclear bomb. And Libya had the warhead designs for more than a year.

U.S. officials said they regard Khan's claim that he had acted alone as a move to protect military leaders who oversaw Pakistan's nuclear program. Some acknowledged, however, that Khan's popularity as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb gave him a high degree of autonomy and made it hard for any Pakistani leader to move against him.

Two Vienna-based diplomats said evidence surfacing from participants in Khan's network indicated that the North Koreans bought designs and components for Pakistan's most advanced centrifuge, the P3. 

Birth of a System

Iran apparently was the first outside customer. Khan told Pakistani authorities that he sold drawings for the P1 centrifuge to Tehran in 1987. By then, Pakistan had abandoned the earlier design in favor of a more advanced machine.

The Iranians wanted to produce all of the components and equipment for a huge centrifuge operation themselves, but found it impossible even with Khan's drawings.

A centrifuge requires about 100 components, many manufactured from special material to precise tolerances. The machines spin at enormous speeds to separate the enriched uranium, and the slightest deviation can lead to catastrophic failure.

"When they realized how difficult it was, they went back and bought components for 500 centrifuges from Pakistan to learn more about their behavior and create their own indigenous industry," one diplomat said. The equipment was shipped by freighter to Iran in 1994 or 1995, diplomats said. Khan also provided what one diplomat called "a shopping list" of where to go for other equipment.

By 2002, Iran had succeeded in perfecting the centrifuges, even improving on the P1 design. It also had secretly started work on an underground plant capable of holding 50,000 of the centrifuges to start an enrichment program.

Suspicious Memos

In autumn 1990, a Greek approached Iraq's secret intelligence service with a putative offer from Khan to provide help building centrifuges and designs for a nuclear bomb, according to documents and two diplomats.

"We have enclosed for you the following proposal from Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan regarding the possibility of helping Iraq establish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture a nuclear weapon," said a memo dated Oct. 6, 1990, which was written by Iraq's intelligence service to a contact in its nuclear weapons program.

Another document said the initial cost would be $5 million, plus a 10% commission for Khan on everything purchased. Iraq already had spent billions of dollars trying to enrich uranium for an atomic bomb, with mixed results.

IAEA officials turned to Pakistan for help, but were told that the offer was a hoax.

The Iraq memo was not the only red flag that Pakistan was exporting nuclear secrets. In May 1995, the Washington Post reported that Pakistan had helped Iran with a "blueprint" for acquiring nuclear weapons at least four years earlier. The State Department dismissed the story.

Libyan Evidence
...
...
...
Khan initially sold Libya 20 assembled P1 centrifuges, which were flown directly to Libya from Pakistan, diplomats said. With technical help provided by the network, the Libyans set up a single array of centrifuges, called a cascade, and had their first successful test in late 2000.

But diplomats said Khan did not have enough P1 components to equip an enrichment plant, so he persuaded Libya to switch to the more advanced P2 machines with the promise of better prices in September 2000. By this time, Pakistan had moved on to a more efficient centrifuge, the P3.

"The Libyans told us, 'We got a deal and grabbed it,' " a diplomat in Vienna said.

They also bought plans for the Chinese-designed warhead and drawings for fabricating the weapon, according to two diplomats and an IAEA report issued Friday.

The flow was huge. From 2001 to late last year, several thousand components arrived in Libya along with a shipment from Pakistan of uranium hexafluoride, the gas used as feedstock for centrifuges, diplomats involved in reviewing the material said.

What remains unclear and alarming, said U.S. officials and diplomats, is who else got help.

"Names are floating around," said a diplomat involved in the inquiry. "It's only a question of time until we find them."

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 22 Feb 2004 21:19

Nabendu:

I can guess who you are talking about. Some things are however best left unsaid.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 22 Feb 2004 21:26

FWIW. SFChronicle gives a summary:

The dangerous world of nuclear weapons

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 22 Feb 2004 22:47

kgoan:

is how the US thinks it can ensure proper *control* of the Paks ever again? (I don't mean *overt* stuff like the IMF etc, I mean *real* control.

Before I deal with that, let me extend shiv's colorful-as-ever anal-ogy one step further, using my vast and impeccable knowledge of western history.

In the Age of Chivalry, when Knights Errant (why were they called "errant" I wonder, and why did they consider that a compliment??) went off on their poor horses, wearing armor etc., they took failsafe precautions against the sort of irresponsible and proliferation-prone behavior to which shiv alludes.

Totally technical, state-of-the art, failsafe, flawless, 400% secure solution.

Chastity belts.

However, despite this, I believe that "proliferation" occurred quite a bit. So much for "safety devices", "codes", "distributed components", "distributed access to keys" etc.

OK, with that historical wisdom out of the way, lets get back to the point you raise.

I am not (yet) saying that the US HAS actually returned the nukes. They are "negotiating the conditions under which they may be returned". Just like we are "negotiating the Kashmir Valley".

My fear is that in both cases, there are powerful lobbies which argue for giving the bloody things to TSP outright. And the more sensible side may simply not want success as badly as the other side.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Feb 2004 23:39

Folks, do we know anythign about Kamran Rajput? His latest article in the Weekly Independent (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004), lays the case for complete FBI control of Pakistan.

9/11/2001 - Attack on WTC/Pentagon
9/16 - 66 FBI/CIA agents land at I'bad, go to Quetta, Peshawar (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)

9/25/2002 - Francis Taylor (Dir FBI) visit I'bad, cameras installed at 156 sensitive points in K'chi. FBI office set up at Midway House near K'chi Airport. FBI monitoring phones, faxes and intenret. In other cities, FBI reported to be using offices of Soft-Drink MNC and transportation of UN. By October 2002 reported to have 44 offices in Pak, and 12 in Afgh. (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004).

10/2002 - Special Investigation Group (SIG) set up to help FBI. 117 officers to be trained in US over next 3-4 months (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)

2/22 - FBI reported to have HQ at Jalalabad, regional offices at Lahore, I'bad, Karachi, F'bad, Pindi. $4billion worth of sensor eqpt, including NVRadar, UAV, Satellite d'base. Reported checking all immigration, passports, airport security, cyber crimes, and phone conversations. They are now working independently of Pak Intelligence (Weekly Independent 35 (3) Feb 19-25, 2004)

http://www.weeklyindependent.com/news1.htm