Indian NCA formalized

Anaath · Post by **Anaath** » 12 Sep 2003 20:18

BRF has adjudged it prudent not to discuss in detail operational doctrine and tasking patterns for CADA. This is probably very wise.

Can similar discretion not be observed in the case of the IAF's Garuda force? Any exercise to analyze possible connections to Indian deterrence is probably going to be a highly speculative effort anyway, considering the limited information available.

On the other hand, efforts to define Garuda's possible tasking for force protection, a la the RAF Regiment or the USAF SP may be relatively risk-free.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 12 Sep 2003 21:35

Can anyone please post exact exercpt of the Mirage 2000 nuke trials

Dinesh, see pp382-383 of Weapons of Peace.

There is a Gurmeet Kanwal article (IDSA ?) on safety of Indian nuclear weapons. Sorry, I do not have a URL. But, you should be able to search within IDSA site.

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 13 Sep 2003 00:33

A non prolif link:

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationID=437

A recent journalistic account [Raj Chengappa: Weapons of Peace, Harper Collins, 2000] based on interviews with Indian defense and nuclear scientists indicated that a Mirage-2000 aircraft was used in May 1994 to flight-test and explode the core assembly of a gravity nuclear bomb with a dummy assembly. Then, in April 1999, the Agni-II missile was flight-tested using a nuclear weapon assembly without the plutonium core. This test established that all systems worked, including the safety locks. If these contentions are accurate India must be presumed to be technologically capable of weaponizing its nuclear arsenal.

Non prolif jihadi links but mention Chengappas Mirage account as well.

http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMChari.pdf
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/73/73chari.pdf

This is Col Gurmeet Kanwal's IDSA Paper.

Safety and Security of India's N-Weapons

http://www.idsa-india.org/an-apr-1.01.htm

With the experience gained over the half century that nuclear weapons have been in existence, it is now standard practice to incorporate the principal safety features in the design of the warhead itself. "The basic idea of modern safety design, called enhanced nuclear detonation safety system (ENDS), is to protect electrical systems involved in the detonation of the warhead from any unintended sources of energy, primarily heat or electrical current. Two key engineering concepts implement the ENDS approach: strong link-weak link design and environmental sensing devices (ESDs). In simple terms, strong link-weak link means that the internal electronic connections inhibiting detonation are made stronger than those used to detonate the weapon. In an abnormal environment, such as fire or a highly charged atmosphere, the weak links needed to detonate the weapon will fail before the strong links inhibiting the detonation do."16 ESDs compare the environment obtaining with that which is to be expected for an intended launch and are sturdy links that prevent the final arming of the warhead before they detect expected parameters like acceleration and proper spin resembling the intended firing sequences.

These safety features are combined with specially developed insensitive high explosives (IHE) that have high tolerances and are less likely to detonate in an accident. Feaver writes that in the US, the nuclear warheads are designed to achieve what has been called "one-point safety" -that is, the probability that an accidental conventional explosion would produce a nuclear yield exceeding four pounds of TNT is less than one in a million. Combined with electronic PALs, these measures ensure an exceedingly high standard of safety and prevention of unauthorised use. The following "positive" measures were introduced in the US as part of an effort to ensure that minimum safety standards were maintained:17

l Preventing weapons involved in accidents or incidents or jettisoned weapons from producing a nuclear yield.

l Preventing deliberate arming, launching, firing or releasing except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by the competent authority.

l Preventing inadvertent arming, launching, firing or releasing of nuclear weapons.

l Ensuring adequate security.

With the introduction of electronic PALs, "custody" no longer means "physical" possession. It also does not mean that nuclear warheads should be deemed to be under civilian control only if civilian officials (or scientists) are physically present at the storage sites with administrative control over the warheads. Electronic PALs ensure that a nuclear warhead cannot be used without the highest custodian's approval. Hence, nuclear weapons would be in civilian custody even if they were stored in military storage sites spread all over the country. In fact, electronic PALs give civil authorities much greater control than they would exercise if the warheads were merely in their physical possession. Warheads made safe by way of PAL technology are "locked" weapons and can be conceivably projected in a wide variety of operational configurations, including higher states of readiness without the risk of dangerous incidents. The physical custody of nuclear warheads governed by PALs can be safely entrusted to the armed forces without risk of loss of civilian control.

Several models could be evaluated for the custody and storage of India's nuclear warheads. First use doctrines and 'launch on warning' and 'launch through attack' strategies require high levels of alerts to be maintained and almost continuous launch site readiness of a selected number of warheads and delivery systems. Such readiness has the disadvantage of increasing deterrence instability as well as the risks of accidents and inadvertent or unauthorised launch. Since India's nuclear doctrine is one of retaliatory use only, with no particular requirement of immediate retaliation, there is no compelling reason for India to maintain fully assembled nuclear warheads, mated with the delivery systems, with all the attendant risks of accidental or inadvertent and unauthorised launch and heavy maintenance requirements. For reasons of safety, the delivery systems that would be manned by the military units of the (proposed) Strategic Forces Command, must be kept apart from their nuclear warheads at all times till a high level of alert becomes necessary. Even then, final mating of the warhead with the delivery system can and should be withheld till just before the launch.

A nuclear warhead comprises the nuclear core and the conventional high explosive (HE) trigger assembly. These two major parts should be stored separately to ensure against nuclear accidents and to prevent an occurrence of the "mad major" scenario made popular by the Stanley Kubrick film "Dr. Strangelove." Even with electronic PALs and other additional locks and safety features built in, it would be prudent to make the safety arrangement failsafe by keeping the core and the trigger assembly separate. If technical sophistication so permits, the trigger assembly (that forms the bulk of the warhead in weight as well as volume) should be stored close to the launch platforms under the joint custody of the armed forces and the DRDO scientists who would also have the responsibility to maintain it. This will reduce transportation problems and the chances of accidents. It will also increase redundancy - both the trigger assembly and the nuclear core will not be lost together in the case of unforeseen eventualities or mishaps during transportation. The nuclear core should be stored well dispersed at many locations, as discussed above, in the joint custody of DAE scientists and the armed forces. The transportation of the core to the launch platform should be the responsibility of the armed forces. The final assembly of the core with the HE trigger and the mating of the composite warhead with the launch vehicle or aircraft should be done under the supervision of DRDO and DAE scientists by trained personnel of the (proposed) Strategic Forces Command either after release orders have been received or when orders have been received to upgrade preparedness to a higher alert status.

Raj Chengappa has noted that former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had asked Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then scientific advisor to the defence minister and the chairman of the DRDO to establish a command and control system on the following lines:18

l The nuclear core should be stored at several strategic sites across the country and not just at BARC, Trombay.

l An arrangement should be worked out for mating the core with its assembly in the shortest possible time when the need arises.

l It should be ensured that the command to trigger the bomb remains strictly under civilian control.

l The overall system should be so designed that at least three agencies have to combine their efforts if the bomb has to be prepared for a launch.

While the above guidelines have substantial merit, the storage of nuclear warheads in India's nuclear establishments and DRDO laboratories is not the best possible arrangement as it is the obvious thing to do. If deterrence fails, India's adversaries can be expected to launch a counter-force strike that will naturally include all known nuclear storage sites.19 If all the nuclear eggs are placed in easily predictable baskets, India may lose most of its nuclear warheads even before retaliatory strikes can be planned. Also, even if the adversary employs low yield nuclear warheads in a disarming first strike, there will be colossal collateral damage in the civilian areas adjoining the nuclear laboratories and DRDO establishments. Hence, it would be prudent to disperse India's nuclear stockpile over many locations, particularly in central and southern India.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 18 Sep 2003 14:08

Thanks to all of you for prompt help.
Sunil Hi! Ihave complied. Please check your mail.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 22 Sep 2003 10:19

Update from the Wisconsin Project (Milhollin Files)

http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/nuke2003.htm

[...]
By July 2003, the Congressional Research Service estimated that India "is believed to have enough fissile material for 75-100 nuclear weapons."
[...]
In 2002, all three organizations responsible for India's nuclear weapons program–the Department of Atomic Energy, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center and the Defense Research and Development Organization–reportedly asked the Indian government to carry out another round of nuclear tests. According to a report in Nuclear Fuel, Indian sources claimed the request was spurred by the organizations' desire to confirm the reliability of their thermonuclear bomb design.
[...]
In October 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce pared down the "Entity List," a list of approximately 200 institutions to which U.S. companies were prohibited from exporting after the nuclear tests, to only 16 Indian entities. All private and public sector companies except Bharat Dynamics Limited were removed, and only entities associated with the Defense Research and Development Organization (4 entities), Department of Atomic Energy (3 entities, plus those related to reactors) and Indian Space Research Organization (8 entities) remain on the list.
[...]
In addition, in July 2003, Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal told reporters that "the US is no longer asking India to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or Fullscope Safeguards." He expects the United States to liberalize its exports of high-tech, dual-use goods by the next meeting of the Indo-U.S. High Technology Cooperation Group, probably in November 2003.
[...]

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2003 06:18

India to build two nuclear-proof bunkers to shield top leaders -- Detail Story
---------------
NEW DELHI: The Indian government has decided to build two nuclear-proof bunkers to protect top leaders including Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in case of an atomic strike, an Indian daily reported on Monday.

The first shelter would be built in central New Delhi at South Block, a 1931 complex next to the presidential palace that houses the prime minister's office and the foreign and defence ministries, the Hindustan Times reported.

It said the second bunker would be set up within a 400-kilometre (250-mile) radius of the capital. Potential locations in the northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and in the central province of Madhya Pradesh were being studied by the head of the air force, Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy, and the chief of the nuclear forces, Air Marshal Teja Mohan Asthana, the daily said. There was no immediate official confirmation of the report.

The Hindustan Times said the decision to build the bunkers was taken September 1 at the first meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority, which agreed India needed to ensure its leadership would not be wiped out if there were a nuclear strike.

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 23 Sep 2003 07:26

chinese source reports same thing
http://english.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper1/1033/class000100003/hwz161205.htm

btw to put the lid on chinese threats with a solid
thunk you'd need guaranteed double hits on each of the top30 PRC cities. and megacities like beijing and shanghai would need 5 each because our nukes and thin and small. A2 isnt a MIRV, kind of implies atleast 60 A2s and say 20 more for CYA against Pak in parallel. the needs of training and some redundancy dictate 40 more.

the inventory can be replaced with A3 as it comes online...leaving us with A1 for the modest bania no threat to the West act and A3 for heart to heart conversations with PRC.

folks please read up on PRCs 2nd Arty org. its a freakin whole army all by itself with lakhs of construction people, tens of thousands of troops to prepare and protect the TELs in all corners.
http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/2ndart/2ndartillery.asp

IA will have to spend top$ building up the cadre.
and imported videshi maal wont help one bit here.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 23 Sep 2003 09:16

<q>Originally posted by Rudra Singha:

btw to put the lid on chinese threats with a solid
thunk you'd need guaranteed double hits on each of the top30 PRC cities. and megacities like beijing and shanghai would need 5 each because our nukes and thin and small. A2 isnt a MIRV, kind of implies atleast 60 A2s and say 20 more for CYA against Pak in parallel. the needs of training and some redundancy dictate 40 more.
</q>

It has been said by some experts, that deterrence levels of China are higher. Possibility of loosing just a city or 2 may not deter them if the stakes are too high and when in the process they can or have a realistic chance to completely wipe out the adversary (which may be the case in Ind0 - China context). So yes the deterrence level against Chinese has to be of a high order.

However it has to be a lot higher than the 60 , if you plan for 30 cities. The larger number is required to ensure that a large number of delivery platforms and the nukes survive for the second strike.

BTW, for training you have set aside nukes?

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 23 Sep 2003 16:51

there is always a high training component to deterrence. dummy nukes and missiles can be issued for training, though some work with the real thing is also common.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 23 Sep 2003 17:01

dummy nukes (minus the core / pit) yes!
real nukes - dunno (strictly in Indian context)

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 23 Sep 2003 17:17

it would be a bad idea to expect our complicated system of BARC cores, DRDO weapons and army missiles work with real nookes only on D-Day.

full firing drills are quite the par for course with adequate physical safeguards to ensure nobody presses the wrong buttons.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 23 Sep 2003 18:01

Gurudev! I am no expert,and would love to stand corrected, but in training what one has to practise is that once the relevant defcon has been sounded :

DRDO scientists mate the core properly to the assembly. </li>
The weapon is mated to the missile / bomber by DRDO /armed forces personnel </li>
on recieving the specific code segments from specified channels and after due authentication - the missiles are targetted and fired and the planes lift-off to deliver the package at the designated place.</li>

Where is the need to have real nukes for the training? If the weapon design is not a proven one or a new weapon has been designed, then yes! tests have to be carried out. But if the design is a proven one, dummies of 'pit' can be used for training the personnel. Similarly dummy nukes could be 'toss run' by IAF and missiles with dummy warheads could be fired by the battalion / missile groups.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 23 Sep 2003 18:37

Was wondering where to post this, perhaps it is OK here:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow?msid=197540

While announcing the country's nuclear command and control structure in January, the government had declared that "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage".

In a significant departure from the earlier stand, the government warned that India would retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons if attacked with chemical or biological weapons by even non-nuclear adversaries. It also said that a WMD attack on Indian forces outside Indian territory would result in a nuclear response.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2003 18:46

Full text of link posted by shiv above:

Army gears up to deploy Agni
RAJAT PANDIT

TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2003 01:59:06 PM ]

NEW DELHI: After raising new units to handle the Agni group of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the Army is now gearing up to deploy Agni-I and Agni-II. Agni I has a range of 800 km while Agni II can cover 2,000 km.

India also plans to test Agni-III, with a range of 3,000 km, by year-end. Read this story in...

Hindi

Though the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), entrusted with handling the country's nuclear assets, was announced in January this year, it is yet to find its feet. Consequently, the Army is raising two Agni units -- 334 Missile Group for Agni-I and 335 Missile Group for Agni-II near Secunderabad -- till the SFC can take concrete shape.

The Agni missiles constitute one crucial leg of the nuclear weapon triad land-based mobile missiles, fighter bombers and sea-based platforms which India hopes to operationalise in the coming years as part of the "credible minimum deterrent" against Pakistan and China.

The speeding up of India's indigenous missile programme has become important since the Pakistan Army inducted the 1,500-km nuclear-capable Ghauri-I missile, considered to be a derivative of the North Korean Nodong missile, into its armoury earlier this year. The Pak Army already has the 750-km Shaheen-I missile of Chinese origin in the Agni-I range.

A 15-metre tall missile which can carry a one-tonne nuclear warhead, the Agni-I can be fired from both rail-based and road-mobile missile launchers.

The armed forces already have the 150-250 km range Prithvi tactical missile in their armoury. The Army, for instance, has the 222 and 333 Prithvi Missile Groups. The government has now also cleared the raising of another two Prithvi groups for the Army, which will be named 444 and 555 Missile Groups.

While announcing the country's nuclear command and control structure in January, the government had declared that "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage".

In a significant departure from the earlier stand, the government warned that India would retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons if attacked with chemical or biological weapons by even non-nuclear adversaries. It also said that a WMD attack on Indian forces outside Indian territory would result in a nuclear response.

Mudy · Post by **Mudy** » 06 Oct 2003 01:05

India's nuke command chain is in place: Fernandes

Press Trust of India
New Delhi, October 5

Declaring that both short and medium-range nuclear-capable Agni ballistic missiles were ready for deployment, Defence Minister George Fernandes on Sunday said the country's nuclear command chain, including alternative "nerve centres," was in place, giving India an effective retaliatory capability.

"We have established more than one (nuclear control) nerve centre," he said in an interview in which he disclosed that other nuclear command and control structures like nuclear command shelters and VVIP shelters have also been established.

To a question whether action has been taken to safeguard the country's nerve centres like North Block, South Block and Parliament, Fernandes said "all necessary steps to provide these vital places protection" have been taken.

On the possibility of the use of Delhi Metro underground tunneling as nuclear shelter, he merely said "some countries have modified underground railway network to turn into shelters".

Elaborating on the process of deployment of 700 km-range Agni-I and 1500 to 2000 km-range Agni-II missiles, Fernandes said "these have been handed over to the Army for deployment". He said the production of longer-range variant of the missile -- Agni-III --was under production and its exact timing for its test firing were being finalised.

In the interview, the Defence Minister said that Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) set up would be in place within a "few months" and that pace of modernisation of armed forces had been accelerated.

Expanding on the Nuclear Command authority, Fernandes said that any nuclear power has to take care of issues like having a credible second strike capability and setting up of nuclear command and nerve centres.

"India as a declared nuclear weapon state has been on this job from day one" (after 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests), the Defence Minister said, adding that this just did not entail nuclear nerve centres, but also dealt with educating people about nuclear dangers, making hospitals ready for nuclear emergencies and other connected issues.

Though Agni-I and Agni-II along with surface-to-surface Prithvi missiles have been handed to the Army, Fernandes said the newly-raised strategic forces command has its responsibilities and would fulfil them.

Asked if possession of nuclear weapons had emboldened Pakistan to indulge in adventurism, the minister said a number of countries possessed nuclear weapons and everyone looked at deterrent and not as something they should use.

In this connection, he said most of the nuclear doctrines took no first strike position.

On the CDS system, which has been hanging fire for considerable time, Fernandes said the appointment of CDS was being discussed. "I am looking forward to putting it in place within a few months," he said.

Denis · Post by **Denis** » 10 Oct 2003 09:40

Top secret DRDO computers stolen -
encryption back-up for protecting strategic communications in the context of India's nuclear arsenal may also be compromised

How can this be allowed to happen? This is a security breach of the highest order. Words fail me at this moment. How can f###ing 19 computers containing invaluable data about our strategic security be just stolen from the heart of Nation's capital?

Sridhar · Post by **Sridhar** » 10 Oct 2003 21:03

Josy Joseph in Rediff about the nuclear infrastructure.

http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/10spec.htm

Interesting nuggets

This October-November are crucial days for the ATV (Advanced Technology Vessel) project as its team assembles in Chennai to carry out land tests of a scaled down reactor for the submarine.

One such facility for emergency evacuation of the prime minister and his Cabinet is being created in New Delhi just behind South Block near the prime minister's office.

Similar facilities are also being created at the prime minister's Race Course Road home and "elsewhere in the country," an officer said.

The nerve centres for retaliation and protection of the chain of command would be scattered across the north and south of the country. "We are taking into consideration all eventualities," an NBC expert said.

Some facilities would be nuclear command shelters and other VVIP shelters. But how elaborate the structures would be, the number of these shelters etc "would be revised as we go along," he added

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 10 Oct 2003 23:15

Originally posted by Dinesh Mannan:
Top secret DRDO computers stolen -
encryption back-up for protecting strategic communications in the context of India's nuclear arsenal may also be compromised

How can this be allowed to happen? This is a security breach of the highest order. Words fail me at this moment. How can f###ing 19 computers containing invaluable data about our strategic security be just stolen from the heart of Nation's capital?

Dr Aatre notes they contained HRD and personnel files,plus training programs on HRD lines.
They flicked hard disks - easier to tote off than comps.Agree about security lapse.Idiotic breach of security to say the least.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 02 Nov 2003 21:46

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Nov 2003 07:04

Experts please check this out

Unveiling Pokhran With Satellite Images

Francis C. Assisi
This is the story of two Indian American scientists - a father and a son. But it will be mostly about the son.
To begin with, the Guptas -- father Chaitan, 62, and son Vipin, 32, -- are experts in their respective fields: Mathematics and Physics.

The father, who earned his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, has been teaching mathematics at U.S. universities for nearly 40 years. The son, a physicist trained at the Imperial College in London, is a pioneer in the application of civilian and commercial satellite imagery to international security problems. He is a senior member of the technical staff at a US weapons lab since 1996.

The father, a professor at the University of Nevada in Reno, is an expert in mathematical modeling, which he currently shares with his students. The son is currently working on assignment in the Advanced Concepts Group at the Livermore branch of Sandia National Laboratories where he is focusing on U.S.- Mexico border security.

The father, with top-secret security clearance, uses his expertise in mathematical modeling to engage in classified work for the Bureau of Verification and Compliance at the U.S. State Department. Specifically, he used mathematics to help the U.S. in its disarmament programs and nuclear war projections. The son has used his expertise in Applied Physics to probe covert nuclear testing activities in India and China

If Vipin Gupta were to give you an "intelligence briefing", he might very well pinpoint the exact location of Indian nuclear test sites of 1974 and 1998 on a satellite image, name the villages in its periphery, point to the roads that lead to the site, the tracks made by military vehicles, the houses nearby and the animal shelters.

Mind you, this is not classified information. Gupta used his expertise to simply extract information from the public domain by sifting through commercial satellite data. He then filtered out the noise, and blended logic, official accounts, and hard evidence to make available the kind of detailed information that becomes necessary for arms control and verification. Even though he uses only public-domain information, those who are familiar with military intelligence admit that Gupta’s briefing is usually better than most based on classified sources.

As far as Vipin is concerned, his foray into the exciting world of remote sensing began ten years ago when he started tracking China’s nuclear program, for his dissertation project, by using commercial satellite imagery, seismic data, and computer programs. That project at Imperial College, he recalls, turned out to be “a mixed bag of techno-detective work, policy inference, bureaucratic hassles, and electromechanical glitches.”

But it also paved the way for a pioneering study with Frank Pabian at the Lawrence Livermore National Lab. A key finding in their 1996 report, "Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations in the Rajasthan Desert," was that commercial satellite imagery, when used in concert with data from other sources, is an effective tool for monitoring compliance with the CTBT. The work was submitted as an invited paper for the international symposium on "Global Security & Global Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions," and received one of 10 "Golden Candle" awards for making the most of open sources outside traditional intelligence applications.

The point is, together with US military spy satellite data, we can now be certain that the U.S. had intimate knowledge of India’s nuclear test plans, though it was widely acknowledged that the tests in 1998 came as a surprise. And much of the hard evidence came from the analytical work of Gupta.

Gupta’s research has proven that commercial imaging satellites have added a new dimension to nuclear test monitoring from space. These satellites, currently provide imagery at one to four meters resolution, are sold on the open market for $30 to $300 per square mile of mapped surface, and provide a unique space-based capability of remotely verifying compliance with the CTBT.

For example, the most precise imagery now available on the commercial market has a resolution of one or two meters. It is made by the American system Ikonos, which recently provided evidence of nuclear weapons being stored in the U.S. Naval Base in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.

Since satellite imaging is a form of non-intrusive remote sensing, Gupta says it can be done without the consent of the observed. Furthermore, because satellite imaging can be used to detect “pre-test” as well as “post-test” activities, it is useful for watching nuclear test preparations -- which are not prohibited under the CTBT-- and making sure the observed state does not cross the threshold from allowed to illicit activity. If images reveal possible or probable nuclear test preparations, such a revelation could trigger intensified monitoring of the suspect site with the “post-test” technologies (e.g., seismic, radionuclide sensors) best suited for determining if and when the line of legality has been crossed.

There is a considerable potential for detecting changes in a scene owing to nuclear tests both by eye and with the use of mathematical techniques using computers. The latter are most useful for detecting spectral changes in a scene. It has often been argued that optical sensors are very limited because clouds frequently cover the earth´s surface. Civil radar satellites that have day and night and all-weather capabilities now overcome this obstacle and can be used to detect changes, by interferometric methods, before and after a test. More recently, in an article in ‘Science and Global Security’, Gupta discovered that antineutrino detection could be an important tool for monitoring nuclear explosions.

The key to satellite imagery is that it offers the possibility of monitoring a large area of the Earth quickly and repeatedly. They could also provide an improved factor of at least 7, in terms of area coverage, compared with that obtained from aerial surveillance by aircraft. And unlike over-flights by aircraft, no permission would be required from States over which satellites pass. Furthermore, since a satellite orbits at an altitude of at least 150km, well beyond national airspace, and since it is unmanned, humans are not exposed to retaliation from an adversary, unlike reconnaissance aircraft pilots. Moreover, the quality of data from commercial observation satellites has improved some 100 fold since 1972 when the first such spacecraft was launched by the US.

Gupta argues that there are two important aspects of monitoring from space; it is non intrusive and it could be used by anyone because satellite imageries can be acquired commercially. For example, he used satellite imagery data in conjunction with other open sources to help unveil India’s nuclear activities since 1995.

According to Gupta’s report for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Khetolai military range at Pokhran, where the tests were conducted, is an active military exercise and testing area. He noted: ‘there have been reports that shafts may have been constructed in the early 1980s for two additional tests. Vigorous preparatory activity between March 1995 and March 1996 near the site of the 1974 nuclear test was analyzed and it appeared to be consistent with nuclear test preparations, missile tests, or both.’ He also suggests that transferring India´s test-control center to an underground location and missile test preparations in another part of India had been used deliberately to lure U.S. satellites away from focusing on the Khetolai site.

Gupta gathered evidence into sets and used a logic tool called a Venn diagram to group the sets into overlapping circles that show relationships between them. This turned out to be a "very effective" tool that hadn´t been used in remote-sensing analysis, says Gupta.

The analysis concluded that activity in the Rajasthan Desert could be consistent with planned Prithvi missile field-testing, or nuclear test preparations, or a combination of both. Gupta was also able to locate India´s first nuclear test site with pinpoint accuracy. Beside the subsidence crater, he discovered a military range near the Khetolai village.

Interpreting the images required a certain amount of common sense and deduction, says Gupta. For instance, he found clues that the land around the area of the alleged nuclear test preparations had been taken out of farm production because it was converted to military activities. A rural village was found to be abandoned because the dwellings had dark spaces where roofs should be. The village also lacked adjoining animal pens. A nearby village, that is known to be occupied, showed white intact roofs alongside rectangular animal pens.

"It really took time to sift through the information," Vipin recalls. "It was complicated, very challenging from a technical standpoint. I couldn´t stop thinking about it; it was a blast."

Gupta’s technical inquiry was the first to produce a series of findings on India´s nuclear testing history. These findings included the exact location of the subsidence crater created by the May 18, 1974 nuclear test, the discovery of an adjacent military range near Khetolai village, and the observation of large-scale, unusual activity at this military range in the immediate vicinity of the 1974 test site. The image-derived information was used to sift fact from fiction in the conflicting media reports. It was then integrated into the collection of credible evidence and analyzed to determine whether the observed activity at the Khetolai military range was conventional, missile testing, nuclear, or innocuous.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recipient of the 1990 Outstanding Journalist award from the NFIA, Francis C. Assisi is a scientist and journalist. Most recently he used archival sources to unravel the history of the earliest South Asians in America which can be accessed online:http://www.asianamerican.net/article10.html

Yugandhar · Post by **Yugandhar** » 07 Nov 2003 18:42

I dont think this has been posted here before, if it has then I apologise, The evolution of india`s nuclear policies

The nias website also contains an update to this article which I haven`t checked.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 25 Jan 2004 23:34

From the link above:

So what then is to be done? Let us look at some of the options.

1. As far as the parties to the Treaty are concerned, they may well go on as usual, with 5-year reviews which are basically non-events, ignoring Indias reservations. This would rely on India continuing to show the restraint that has been characteristic of its nuclear policies [34], and concluding that India outside NPT does not present a serious disruptive threat to the global order now frozen into the Treaty.

2. The forces behind the New Agenda Coalition may multiply, and, if one or more nuclear weapon states like India support it, a vigorous movement could be built up towards: de-mating and de-targeting of all nuclear weapons; a declaration of no-first-use by all nuclear weapon states; and the constitution of a representative and respected international jury that investigates all reported instances of nuclear compellance. If these moves gain strength, or if there is what Frank Blackaby, former director of the Swedish Peace Research Institute SIPRI, has called a peasants revolt [35], the contemplation of global nuclear disarmament may begin to look less unrealistic, and a nuclear weapons convention may become practical.

3. The richer non-nuclear countries make common cause with some of the restless signatories of the NPT, and force revisions in the Treaty.

It appears, with Bush's recent formalization of a strategic partnership, in conjunction with the PSI that we might have a new-age-NPT, one with muscle.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 19 Feb 2004 20:30

http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/19guest.htm

Auditing India's Strategic Sector.

----

There is a westernized influence in this article. Further, I can't understand the logic of auditing-the-wrong-and-right, viz, national patriotism and the processes. One audits a process, and not a person's standings-name, sex, religion, caste or nationality. This is a absurd analysis.

National heros are made by their actions.. that includes the wrong and rights. In a sense, auditing will happen for their actions and not by the icon-figure. A failure is measured, by the process.

I think, the author is writing this with a biased look after pakistan's exposure of their national hero, and internalized feeling that Indian heros are of the same calibre.

This equating concepts in the mind is dangerous!!.. rediff is overstocked by CIA!.

--

How in the world, they can think of India can do what Nuclear nations can do. our processes are different. so, is the audit.

--

If chidambram has said it, means he is representing the team which has the strategic data to substantiate, and well audited by the strategic forces by themselves.

yes, its hard to get information, but why in the world can't they feel safe..

may be, they feel we have a bettered the process, and the western folks wants to really know, how we made the bomb.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Feb 2004 22:01

Now a Oracle operator takes up nonprolif studies and aims at India...

Sundara Vadlamudi- Resume

Something is not right here cant put my finger on it.

rgosain · Post by **rgosain** » 19 Feb 2004 22:15

This is from his CV:

LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE
Senior Editor for the Students Advocates for Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Security (SANPACS)
online magazine.
Joint Secretary for a National Level Symposium
Vice-President of the Rotaract Club
Editor of the Computer Science Engineering Department internal magazine
Secretary for QUEST Society, a society for Energizing & Empowering the youth of India
Represented college at Rotary Youth Leadership Award in 1999, won the award for the best journal
preparation

'SANPACS'

Sounds like an agenda based program. This chap doesn't have the experience in diplomacy, physics, engineering, economics etc, yet he his dispensing bromides to Chidamabaram etc. Looks like a pliant non-entity who feels that he can influence opinion.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 19 Feb 2004 22:19

Originally posted by ramana:
Something is not right here cant put my finger on it.

This guy has been offered a grant by a non prolif academy and I am guessing that looking at India's nuke program was his first assignment/project suggested by his mentor.

What I am wondering is "how did this non entity get his so-called research published on rediff.com"? How come rediff.com, which is notorious for "leaked american reports" and Josy Joseph canards, always happen to publish authors who are working for american interests. Something smells about rediff.com

parusarama · Post by **parusarama** » 19 Feb 2004 22:23

ramana:
Something is not right here cant put my finger on it

I read the article and i had same thoughts but afterwhile it slowly began unravel. i could be wrong but i think this is what it is.

Instead of saying let us review your audit process wrt international ( which are nothing but standards developed by west) standards for Nuclear weapons directly this guy wants to incorporate thought process saying the we need accountability in strategic sector thus when india says ok we will follow then experts from west will be there to "consult" and "guide".That is the reason why he quoted ex of LCA about the budger over runs hence no accountability. This is part of pure psy ops trying to say that we think you(India) are actually losing a lot by the way your are right now so let us help you out in fixing your problems.

so sometimes rediff entertains ppl who actually doesn't have best interests of India at their hearts.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 19 Feb 2004 22:41

This is the latest in the example how more and more the native informant is being used to deride the homeland policies and personalities. THis way the western think tanks and other entities are not identified in the attack.

DOO after the IT slump have become the latest recruiting groups for such topics.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 19 Feb 2004 22:44

Originally posted by Rye:
Something smells about rediff.com

Rediff has been bought by powerful groups for a long term indoctrination of DOOs and new generation of Indians.

parusarama · Post by **parusarama** » 19 Feb 2004 22:54

Rediff should appoint ppl like Rajeev srinivasan ,Subash Kak in respective fields to the editorial board (if they have one) so that they can review articles( like these from sundara) before posting them. I think rediff is trying to proclaim that we present all sides(which is what news organisations like CNN, BBC cliam ) where as in reality they only pick and choose what they want to report on any given topic.

AJay · Post by **AJay** » 19 Feb 2004 23:09

Originally posted by ramana:
NSomething is not right here cant put my finger on it.

The resume is so very underwhelming that I am surprised that redif choose to print his/her article.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Feb 2004 23:29

Rediff might have printed it based on the MIIS connection. Rememeber Gaurav Kampani was also from there and often published in ReDiff.
My surprise is how did a DOO get on Senate committee and most probably he doesnt have citizenship. He just doesnt have the required time in the US. Could be due to his institute(MIIS).

Long time ago I had coined the acronym De racinated Indian Elite (DIE). MIIS is attracting a lot of those. The amazing thisn about most Indians is they will be cirumspect about waht they dont know but this is not a DIE failing.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 19 Feb 2004 23:49

hey! what do we know!!!.. the rediff link has disappeared. Apparently, they read us >here<.

die-casted out!

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 20 Feb 2004 00:00

SOmebody can get it form the cache and post the entire article before it disappears from the net.

parusarama · Post by **parusarama** » 20 Feb 2004 00:07

SOmebody can get it from the cache and post the entire article before it disappears from the net.

Here we go. It is not disappeared from the rediff yet. just search for sundara on rediff.com

Auditing India's Strategic Sector
February 18, 2004

The defence reforms initiated by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance in the late 1990s produced several welcome changes in the defence policy making process. It led to the creation of a National Security Council to facilitate long-term strategic planning and ensure continuity in the formulation and implementation of security policies. The Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998 and the subsequent decision to pursue weaponisation led to further changes.

The government formed a Nuclear Command Authority to manage India's nuclear arsenal. The NCA is the umbrella organisation comprising the civilian leadership and the military infrastructure needed to design and implement India's nuclear policies. The government also created a Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to serve as a single point interface between the armed forces and the civilian leadership.

However, the strategic sector comprising of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Department of Atomic Energy has been largely untouched by the reforms process. The first step towards addressing this deficiency is to institute a periodic and systematic audit mechanism for the strategic sector. The audit must investigate the economic and technical aspects of the projects currently handled by the strategic sector. Not surprisingly, the defence reforms package did not broach such a concept.

The reasons for avoiding such a delicate issue are not hard to fathom. The initial projects undertaken by the strategic sector, especially by the DRDO, ended in failures and such failures were couched in euphemistic terms like 'technology gathering' to cover them up. Naturally the civilian leadership and the strategic sector did not consider the concept of an audit mechanism since it would have opened a can of worms regarding the functioning of the strategic sector. Second, the secrecy surrounding the projects handled by the strategic sector precluded any public scrutiny.

Third, top scientists from the strategic sector have served as scientific advisors to the civilian leadership and wielded significant influence on decisions regarding strategic projects. It is therefore possible that successive scientific advisors used their influence to discourage proposals for implementing a comprehensive audit mechanism since it would have been potentially harmful to their interests.

Fourth, the DRDO and the DAE are placed on the high pedestal of patriotism and questioning their capabilities is considered tantamount to undermining India's technical competence. Homi Bhabha, A P J Abdul Kalam, R Chidambaram are considered national icons who could do no wrong.

The lack of proper oversight over the strategic sector has resulted in the domination of the policy making process by key members of the community involved in the nuclear weapons program and the strategic missile projects. Managers from the strategic sector have become both the advisors and implementers of strategic projects. The civilian leadership therefore receives inputs from the scientists within the strategic sector and does not possess any mechanism to verify the evidence presented by the scientists. The lack of any feedback from independent analysts confines the defence policy-making process to a closed loop. The decision-making process regarding these strategic projects is at best ad hoc and personalised.

The lack of an oversight mechanism has also resulted in a highly centralised style of management within the strategic sector. Top managers within the strategic sector tend to take decisions without proper consultations and dissent against the top management is usually stifled. For example, the government has declared a moratorium on further testing based on the advice from former Atomic Energy Commission chairman R Chidambaram.

Chidambaram has indicated that the tests in May 1998 yielded sufficient data to preclude any further testing. Several scientists, however, have stated that the safety of India's nuclear weapons stockpile might necessitate further testing. The government declared the moratorium on further testing even before the scientists had a chance to study crater morphology and conduct radiochemical analysis of the nuclear test site.

The question that we need to be asking ourselves is whether this lack of accountability of the strategic sector will enhance or hamper India's national security. Budgetary and technical oversight of the strategic sector will greatly assist in improving indigenous defence production in India. An option for increasing such an oversight is to institute a systematic and periodic audit for the projects undertaken by the DRDO and the DAE. Several factors indicate that a periodic and systematic audit process will be beneficial for India's national security.

First, any audit process is likely to assist the policy makers in analysing the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a specific strategic project. Quite often policy makers face the 'Make or Buy' dilemma. Crucial choices have to be made between indigenous production and foreign procurement. The strategic sector has done a good job in linking indigenous defence production with a sense of patriotism. As a result, the civilian leadership and the bureaucracy have repeatedly endorsed the claims of the strategic sector regarding its capacity to indigenously produce any item for the armed forces. Although the aim of achieving total indigenous production is a noble one, it is also critical to identify our strengths and weaknesses and develop a more effective defence procurement strategy.

Second, an audit will reveal the inconsistencies within the existing strategic programs and will provide means to streamline the system. India's defence projects have long been associated with missed deadlines, excess budget costs, and long development periods. Projects such as the Advanced Technology Vehicle, the Sagarika ballistic missile, and the Light Combat Aircraft have faced chronic delays. An audit mechanism will serve to identify potential weaknesses in the current development cycles. According to an audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of important DRDO projects for the period till 1998, the Light Combat Aircraft project incurred a whopping Rs 20 billion expenditure without any significant progress towards completion.

Please read: *****s in the Armour

Third, such an audit will provide an effective system of checks and balances to prevent the hijacking of decisions concerning strategic projects by a particular entity. Despite the absence of an extensive US style military industrial complex, the history of India's indigenous defence projects reveals the influence of special interest groups in the decision-making process. A periodic audit of the strategic sector will prevent the manipulation of policies by any special interest groups and will provide an effective oversight to curb such activities.

Fourth, constituting an audit mechanism will ensure greater transparency regarding government policies and will instill confidence among the public on the proper use of funds. India prides itself in being the world's largest democracy and it behooves the nation to act in a manner that justifies the label.

In the past, critics of India's defence policies have pointed to several shortcomings in the policy making process. The non-involvement of the military in policy planning, the lack of institutional processes, and ad hoc and personalised style of management are some of the weaknesses pointed out by critics. The defence reforms initiated in the late 1990s have begun to address some of the shortcomings. The military is getting involved in the decision making process, strategic threats are being analysed in a systematic manner, and the management of defence policies is becoming more institutionalised.

Oversight of the strategic sector is an issue that has not received the attention it deserves. Instituting an audit mechanism for the strategic sector should not be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the efforts of the strategic sector. Rather, it is an attempt to identify potential weaknesses and rectify them. Auditing of costs will check runaway expenses and keep the costs from spinning out of control. A technical audit will ensure that the projects meet the Quality Requirements of the end user, i e, the Indian armed forces.

It is highly unlikely that India will meet the target of Plan 2005, a ten year plan initiated by A P J Abdul Kalam to strengthen India's military industrial base. However, adopting the right set of steps like instituting a strategic audit will help to strengthen India's defence production capability at least by 2015.

Sundara Vadlamudi works at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California

Anaath · Post by **Anaath** » 20 Feb 2004 04:06

People like Pavel Felgenhauer and Yevgeny Volk took a long time to cultivate. In comparison, Vadlamudigaaru has had a phenomenally quick growth spurt.

Of course weeds hardly need cultivation.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Feb 2004 04:35

AD good catch! I still dont get it. Why specialize on India while there is a whole world out there?
SV could be a Japan scholar or Europe scholar why India?

Saurav · Post by **Saurav** » 20 Feb 2004 04:42

Why put this note in the first place?

"Sundara Vadlamudi works at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California"

If you check other Rediff Guest Columns, such disclaimer is not mandatory.

-Saurav

parusarama · Post by **parusarama** » 20 Feb 2004 05:40

Why specialize on India while there is a whole world out there? SV could be a Japan scholar or Europe scholar why India?

becasue his masters want him to do that and i don't think he has much choice plus guys like these really don't fell any loyalty towards India and will do anything to please their masters.
Plus i seriously question how they identify themselves. There are lot of weeds india produces with different idealogy and how they want to see india move forward. i can go on but sometimes less said the better.

Nikhil Shah · Post by **Nikhil Shah** » 20 Feb 2004 06:24

Originally posted by Rye:

Something smells about rediff.com

Do some research on members of Asia Society and owners of Rediff's parent company.