Well... if you think calm and honest assessment of the Chinese threat constitutes Chicken-Little Syndrome, that is all the more reason why the truth needs to be laid out.
China is not Pakistan. There are two crucial differences:
1. Chinese forces are far more massive, and they have the proven record of not disengaging just because they are taking losses, or that more than 2 weeks have elapsed.
2. In any confrontation with Pakistan we have a very very important and crucial ally - Pakistan. They can be depended on, 600%, to screw themselves very early on, and keep screwing themselves. It does not matter if they have nukes or F-22s or F-35s or hypersonic missiles - they will find a way to screw themselves. Looking at each war with Pakistan, you see very easily that they did as much to defeat themselves, often more, than India was willing to do to them.
No such luck with China.
In response to viv:
N^3, Was the war in Korea not with Soviet help including people and weaponry? Or, was it all China plus North-Korea?
Here is the point I was trying to make there. The Cold War was between US and SU. Both assumed that no one else in the Duniya mattered at all. So the Korean War, and then the Vietnam War, were viewed as manifestations of the Domino Theory, or the COMINTERN plan for global domination, or the Capitalist-Imperialist Plot to continue colonizing the Proletariat, depending on one's pov.
In Korea, the SU provided fighter planes and Soviet pilots, early on. The Chinese had these inferior planes, true, but the Soviets matched US planes quite a bit.
But that was not where the real war occurred. The US assumed that WW-2 tactics of aerial bombing followed by mechanized divisions and Marines sweeping in, would finish the job. The "UN" actually did sweep across North Korea (and if you want to know the record of treatment of civilians etc., check GOOGLE, you can find pictures and all). The US forces went right up to the Chinese border, and they thought that would be the end of the war. So the Soviet intervention was completely ineffective there.
Then the Chinese came across their border. Most of the 55,000+ US deaths occurred somewhere around the Chosin Reservoir and the withdrawal/rout from there. US history claims that 900,000 Chinese died, and the snow around the reservoir was so covered with Chinese corpses that the Americans had to walk on a carpet of Chinese dead to get out of there. The Chinese history of the Korean war laughs:
How could they have counted? They were running as hard as they could...
Point is that the Chinese won that war despite whatever air and ground technological superiority the US/UN had, and the best the UN could do was the standoff at the DMZ. So, yes, it is fair to say that it was the Chinese intervention that made all the difference in the Korean War. In Vietnam, the Chinese avoided directly pouring in massive forces, but they did pour in weapons and teams and logistics. And my point is that I don't see the will or the thinking among any of the desi strategic analysts or military "Befitting Reply" types that conveys any reason for optimism.
The most recent one I read declared all-knowingly that "any Chinese adventurism in Arunachal Pradesh will result in their losing Aksai Chin and Ladakh". Very brave, but I doubt very much whether that is how the Chinese will choose to operate.
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Simple questions:
1. Do you think the Andaman/Nicobar islands can be defended today against a Chinese sea-borne invasion? Think about it honestly. Does India have the resources to take back the islands after finding out one day that Port Blair has the Lal Nishaan on it? I have no doubt that the IAF and IN will fight bravely and mightily to take back the islands, but how much can they spare if there is pressure on other fronts? What if the lone aircraft carrier and a few frigates get knocked out by anti-ship missiles?
2. Much is made of IAF superiority and its impact on Chinese logistics preparation and infrastructure. Has anyone assessed how many sorties it takes to knock out one bridge these days, esp. if the bridge is in a deep valley? How easy was it to hit the Paki bunkers on Tiger Hill etc using air power?
3. How many LGBs / TV-guided missiles does IAF have to take out such infrastructure? This is where the mass production imperative comes in. Kargil stretched Indian resources to the limit. Are the numbers in the inventory so much better now?
4. Any modern war (and I suspect, most ancient wars) is won by logistics. Those who can keep the supply chain operating and pumping, and keep delivering weapons to their targets, win, regardless of how brave the individual soldiers and pilots and seamen are. So the reasoning I see here is that India is better placed because the infrastructure is primitive on the Indian side, and the Chinese "Achilles Heel" is the fact that they have invested massive amounts of money and hard work into building infrastructure on the other side.
5. Now please bring in the other argument cited:
One Su-29 can take out 100 Sopwith Camels. (Actually it cannot, because it won't have enough weapons - the Sopwith camel can also land quickly in a football field and hide until the Su-29 runs out of gas and has to return to base). What happens when Chinese guns and missiles brought up to the border in the past ten years, rain down on the 3 bridges and 2 goat-roads that constitute India's supply lifelines to her soldiers at the border in Arunachal or at Aksai Chin or Ladakh? India will win because the Indian forces use only yaks and not jeeps? Remember what happened when a few Pakis occupied the heights above NH-1, cutting off Siachen? If India had 2 more roads there, and if the roads were fast, modern mountain roads rather than 18th century goat-tracks, the Pakis would never have even tried.
6. It may be difficult for Chinese planes to take off from bases at 10K feet and carry big weapon loads, but if I were General Hong Shin, I would have been transporting weapons to the border systematically, 3 goods trains per week, for the past few years. All the heavy weapons and vehicles I need would be taken across because I would ASSUME hat the lound-eyes would knock out the bridges. Then again, I would have a good large force of Tibetan Splittist slaves from the Lhasa Re-Education Camp to carry everything else across the hills and valleys, on a 1-way trip if needed - they are more expendable than yaks. Also, how long are the runways at 10,000 feet? I would have plenty of rocket-assistend takeoff units available on site to enable heavy takeoffs.
It's all about my preparations in bringing large numbers of weapons to the front, and I know I can out-supply the LoundEyes, 100:1 because of my superior infrastructure.
7. I see the argument that expressing fear of the Chinese on the internet, will encourage China to attack India. But this misses the point completely. The point is that Indian thinking and preparation to deter China are very very seriously hampered by the mindset of the Generals (sorry RayC, ppl hu r enlightened enough to post on BRF are automatically excluded from this category) and the Babus. The Generals still have the infamous "Go up there and bring them down by the scruff of the neck!" attitude of Surinder Singh of Kargil notoriety. The Babus have this "I can ishpeak Angreji with pucca British accent phrom Dun School onlee" attitude towards the Chinese.
These are the real hindrances to Indian preparedness. The statements that they foist on the habitually complacent public, are terrifying in their stupidity. This is whay I was truly amazed to read the blunt assessment from the Admiral, that brought such a refreshing change from the "Befitting Reply" stereotype. Put it together with the earlier Army General's plaintive cries about the delays in procuring mountain guns etc, and you can sense that panic is building in the top tiers of the Indian Armed Forces. Do you think Hong Shin cannot feel that?
Only a massive rise of public demands for better defense preparedness can save India from Chinese aggression, and prevent war. In terms of geopolitics, it must occur to China that an investment in a swift and massive defeat of India in, say, 2010, will leave them unchallenged masters of the the whole world from Japan to Turkey. It can be done as easily as taking over the Andamans, blasting the East coast cities, and simultaneously coming into Arunachal and cutting off Assam, while knocking out enough infrastructure in J&K to allow the Pakis to do what they failed to do in 1999.