dipak wrote:
Regarding TN: Glad that you agree that the TN are desirable. And at that point, the current doctrine (massive strikes on enemy cities with relatively smaller fission warheads) becomes redundant (or due for evolving).
Good, I could make at least one person glad.
However, I am not sure India NEEDS a TN. In fact, after the current revalation about the 300-500 Kt FBF, I doubt India will go down the TN route - ever.
dipak wrote:
So, somewhere down the line if we seek to acquire the TN, current MCD has to pave way for a new doctrine.
All doctrines are fluid - subject to change. They have to be - 'hood is always in flux.
dipak wrote:
In that context, current MCD looks more like stop-gap measure, a doctrine tailored according to current situation. And as recently MMS declared, India not going to sign NPT or CTBT at least in immediate future, situation is open for evolving.
But all is speculation only on my part.
"current situation" = both external + internal.
Note that there is an underground under-current too. Heads of state talk to each other, diplomats talk to each other and via others. Think-tankers are involved. This track and that track. Internal politics, inter-party politics, intra-party politics, university professors, etc, etc, etc. And, do not forget some BRiets.
dipak wrote:
Also its clear that not having TN doesn't mean absence of deterrence.
This is one topic that befuddles me. Why is it that KS took it upon himself to challenge the establishment about a deterrence ONLY through a 200+ Kt TN. I have to think that he was aware of FBF and its capabilities - he may not have known specifics, but that India was capable of a 200+ Kt FBF.
So, why did he feel that there was no deterrence against the MT of China. the answer may lie in the next item below.
dipak wrote:
I would rather say its dilution of deterrence, not complete absence of deterrence - I presume this is what KS wanted to convey.
Deterrence is there or not there. There really cannot be a foggy/gray area called "diluted" deterrence. Deterrence is about scaring the other guy, and more so about making SURE that he is scared to death, nt just scared. There has to be surety, guarantee about deterrence. Else deterrence fails. It is binary.
Remember BOTH sides will have some one, in very high places, who will take huge risks. And, such a person, well placed, could take a risk of calling your bluff. IF the call works, then you fail. IF it does not work, then either you win or more likely both are in a big mess (in a nuclear context).
Bottom line, there cannot be, should not be, a diluted deterrence.
WRT KS, I am really confused. I will wait for another two weeks (based on his self imposed three moratorium) to see what his thinking might be. But right now, based on his articles and interviews, I think he is either absolutely confused or for some odd reason is incapable of communicating what he wants to communicate.
But, for sure, IMHO, as of today, he has made a mess of the whole topic.
dipak wrote:
However, as you quote above, to compute the deterrence value correctly - is a million, not billion dollar question.
And that we have cracked it right - can we be sure, its been correctly gamed to near perfection that 25kt fission will do the job, as KS-Pitamah discussed with an article with VSA, few weeks back.
Deterrence is played on a bigger game field, that is ALL it is - with N number of input that are also in flux.
You, as an individual also are aware and play a game of "deterrence' - just that you call it by another name: risk. You compute risk when going to your office (traffic jams, etc), you compute it when you invest, buy groceries, etc.
Look at "deterrence" as computing dual "risk" (yours and enemies) at a national level, but where you spend a lot of time getting into the mindS of your enemy AND your compatriots. It is a mind game - for you can easily compute the rest.