Bharat Rakshak

shyamd wrote:Kalantak, correct.

NEW DELHI: Egypt on Tuesday said it would explore the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement with India to boost trade and investment between the two countries.

"An FTA could be the best move to boost trade and investment. This is what we will discuss with India," the Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Rachid Mohamed Rachid, said at a CII meeting here.

Mr Rachid would be meeting the Commerce and Industry Minister, Mr Kamal Nath, today and discuss the possibilities of India-Egypt trade agreement with him. He said if not an FTA, the two countries should have a framework agreement in trade and investment to cater to the need of both sides.

Bilateral trade between India and Egypt currently stands at around $3 billion. Mr Rachid said the two countries need to enhance cooperation in areas of manufacturing goods, pharma, oil and gas, mining, renewable energy, auto, construction materials and t extiles. - PTI

Kalantak wrote:
Iran will eliminate Israel - Iranian senior army commander

Kalantak wrote:

shyamd wrote:Kalantak, correct.

So what is the reason shyam?

Former US President Jimmy Carter has held talks with exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Syria despite US and Israeli opposition.

Hamas spokesmen said Mr Carter had asked for it to stop rocket attacks on Israel and to enter talks for the release of an Israeli captive.

They said any truce must be two-way and there would be a "price" for freeing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Mr Carter earlier met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Gaza boycott

Mr Carter has said he is not trying to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but believes peace will not be achieved without talking to Hamas and Syria.

Israel, the US and the European Union all refuse to deal with the group directly and pursue policies to isolate it.

A spokesman for US President George W Bush described the meeting as "not wise", and said it had given Hamas a credibility it does not deserve.

Mr Carter, awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2002, brokered the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the first between Israel and an Arab state.

He made no comment after the meeting.

But leading Hamas political bureau figure, Mohammed Nazzal, told reporters: "Carter suggested a truce and that Hamas should stop its rockets against Israel.

"We support a truce, but Israel should support it too."

One senior Hamas official in Damascus told Associated Press news agency Mr Carter had also asked Hamas to agree to a meeting with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai to discuss a prisoner exchange for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Mr Nazzal would only say that Hamas leaders were to meet later to discuss the fate of Cpl Shalit, who was captured by Hamas in a raid into Israel from Gaza two years ago.

"They will discuss details related to the price and mechanisms for his release, which will not happen without a price," Mr Nazzal said.

Arab initiative

Hamas gunmen seized control of Gaza in June last year from their rival Palestinian faction Fatah, which has been left in control of the West Bank.

An Israeli boycott of Gaza has isolated the small territory and further deepened the poverty of its 1.4 million residents.

Mr Meshaal has said that Hamas accepts and supports an Arab peace initiative, which offers peace and recognition to Israel in return for a full withdrawal from the land captured in 1967 in the West Bank, the dismantling of Jewish settlements and the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in east Jerusalem.

He says Hamas wants a mutual ceasefire, that would also include the West Bank and which would reopen Gaza's borders - but anything else would be Israel dictating a Palestinian "surrender".

'Risk of misrepresentation'

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and other senior Israeli officials earlier snubbed a meeting with Mr Carter, saying to meet him would create the impression of negotiating with Hamas.

Mr Yishai, however, told Mr Carter he was willing to meet Hamas representatives - including Mr Meshaal - for talks to discuss the release of Cpl Shalit.

Such a meeting involving Mr Yishai - the leader of the orthodox Shas party - would be against Israeli government policy. Shas is an important member of the governing coalition in Israel, holding four cabinet posts.

Washington has played down Mr Carter's trip, saying he is acting in a personal capacity and that there is "some risk" that his talks with Hamas "will be misrepresented" by the group.

Syrian state news agency Sana said Mr Carter and Mr Assad had discussed the peace process and ties between the two countries.

After Syria, Mr Carter is due to travel to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Kati wrote:

Kalantak wrote: So what is the reason shyam?

Special softwares prowl cyberspace for catchy words. Sniffing these words, one can detect the source, the sender, and eventually his/her source of info.

Kati wrote:Remember Omar Sheikh, Daniel Pearl's killer, he never used same spelling of "Daniel" twice, and yet managed to send threatening e-mails regularly, without being detected by NSA following his trails. .........

... on the basis of information gathered during the arrest of a reputed al-Qaeda computer engineer in Pakistan on 13 July.

Captive Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan is described as a communications specialist for the infamous terror network, working out of Pakistan, and using computer technology and the Internet to relay information among the group's players. He served as something of a communications hub, according to reports. Link

Al-Qaeda group claims to have strengthened its encryption security
01/23/2008
An online forum linked to Al-Qaeda claims to be offering strengthened encryption software to its members. The encryption software, "Mujahideen Secrets 2," was announced in the last few days at an Arabic-language site and may well be better than last year's software, "Mujahideen Secrets 1,". Link

JERUSALEM - Former President Jimmy Carter said Monday that Hamas — the Islamic militant group that has called for the destruction of Israel — is prepared to accept the right of the Jewish state to "live as a neighbor next door in peace."

Carter relayed the message in a speech in Jerusalem after meeting last week with top Hamas leaders in Syria. It capped a nine-day visit to the Mideast aimed at breaking the deadlock between Israel and Hamas militants who rule the Gaza Strip.

Hamas leaders "said that they would accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders" and they would "accept the right of Israel to live as a neighbor next door in peace," Carter said.

The borders he referred to were the frontiers that existed before Israel captured large swaths of Arab lands in the 1967 Mideast war — including the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza.

In the past, Hamas officials have said they would establish a "peace in stages" if Israel were to withdraw to the borders it held before 1967. But it has been evasive about how it sees the final borders of a Palestinian state and has not abandoned its official call for Israel's destruction.

Israel, which evacuated Gaza in 2005, has accepted the idea of a Palestinian state there and in the West Bank. But it has resisted Palestinian demands that it return to its 1967 frontiers.

Carter urged Israel to engage in direct negotiations with Hamas, saying failure to do so was hampering peace efforts.

"We do not believe that peace is likely and certainly that peace is not sustainable unless a way is found to bring Hamas into the discussions in some way," he said. "The present strategy of excluding Hamas and excluding Syria is just not working."

Israel considers Hamas to be a terrorist group and has shunned Carter because of his meetings with Hamas' supreme chief, Khaled Mashaal, and other Hamas figures. Syria harbors Hamas' exiled leadership in its capital, Damascus, and supports the Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas who warred with Israel in the summer of 2006.

Carter said Hamas promised it wouldn't undermine Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to reach a peace deal with Israel, as long as the Palestinian people approved it in a referendum. In such a scenario, he said Hamas would not oppose a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri in Gaza said Hamas' readiness to put a peace deal to a referendum "does not mean that Hamas is going to accept the result of the referendum."

Such a referendum, he said, would have to be voted on by Palestinians living all over the world. They number about 9.3 million, including some 4 million living in the West Bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem.

The only senior Israeli official to meet with Carter during the former president's latest Mideast mission was Israeli President Shimon Peres. During their meeting, Peres scolded Carter for meeting with the Islamic militant group.

Israel says Carter's talks embolden Palestinian extremists and hurt Palestinian moderates as they try to make peace with the Jewish state. Abbas, who rules only the West Bank, is in a bitter rivalry with Hamas.

"The problem is not that I met with Hamas in Syria," Carter said Monday. "The problem is that Israel and the United States refuse to meet with someone who must be involved."

Carter said Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking has "regressed" since a U.S.-hosted Mideast conference in Annapolis, Md., in November. He faulted Israel for continuing to build on disputed land the Palestinians want for a future state and for its network of roadblocks that severely hamper Palestinians traveling in the West Bank.

"The prison around Gaza has been tightened," he said, referring to Israel's blockade of the territory since the Hamas takeover.

Israel has been negotiating directly with Abbas, who heads a moderate government based in the West Bank. Abbas lost control of the Gaza Strip last June, when Hamas violently seized control of that territory.

Carter said Hamas has promised to let a captured Israeli soldier send a letter to his parents.

Direct communication between Israel and Hamas could facilitate the release of Cpl. Gilad Schalit, who has been held in Gaza for nearly two years.

Israel agrees in principle to release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Schalit, but after back-and-forth talks through Egyptian intermediaries, has approved only 71 of the specific prisoners that Hamas wants freed, he said.

However, Carter said Hamas rejected his specific proposal for a monthlong unilateral cease-fire.

Rye wrote:Kalantak, exactly. Analyzing news from public sources is just time-pass, nothing less.

Multiple international press services reported remarks by Israel Prime Minister Ohlmert that Israel is prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for a peace agreement. Earlier this week, Hamas leaders in Damascus indicated they would accept boundaries, without recognizing Israel.


Analyses by the now defunct National Warning Staff proved that in any race to mobilize, Israel could put more combat ready troops on the Golan Heights faster than Syria could generate military power. Worse. The last time Syria attempted to mobilize for war in 1982, it failed to assemble the necessary personnel and failed to reach full combat readiness. From the Heights, the drive to Damascus is down hill with no good defense terrain.



Israel can deploy several combat ready reserve divisions of armor and infantry on the Heights in 72 hours. Syria would require at least 13 days and probably longer now because Syria has not practiced its mobilization doctrine in over 20 years.



Thus, Israeli possession of the Golan Heights has not been a national security issue for decades. One important consideration is possession of Mount Hermon where the Israelis have sophisticated sensing equipment. As long as Israel possesses Mount Hermon and the Heights are demilitarized, control of the Golan Heights is not a strategic military obstacle to a peace settlement.



The political issues and status of settlements are other matters. The terms of Ohlmert’s offer are also not known in the public domain. Nevertheless, the security argument is a not an obstacle to a peace agreement, provided the Heights are demilitarized.

Hamas's agreement to a cease-fire with Israel will pave the way for the release of kidnapped IDF Cpl. Gilad Schalit, Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip said Thursday.

Hamas is keen on ending the case of Schalit soon, "to create a better atmosphere" that would consolidate the cease-fire, according to the officials.

"If the cease-fire agreement succeeds, we will see positive developments regarding a prisoner exchange with Israel soon," the officials added. "The ball is now in the Israeli court."

Hamas informed Egypt on Thursday that it was willing to accept a cease-fire with Israel in Gaza on condition that it later be extended to the West Bank. Defense officials in Jerusalem said they were not surprised by Hamas's decision to accept the Egyptian proposal but that it would take some time before Israel formulated its position.

Israel would not agree to a cease-fire in the West Bank - as Hamas has asked - and would agree to the Gaza offer only if Egypt cracked down on smuggling from Sinai under the Philadelphi Corridor and Schalit were released, the defense officials said.

Hamas's decision marks a departure from an earlier position that a cease-fire should be "comprehensive and mutual," that is to include the West Bank as well as the Gaza Strip.

Israeli defense officials said it was likely that Defense Minister Ehud Barak would agree to the cease-fire, since he opposed a large military operation in Gaza, currently Israel's only other viable option in face of the rocket and terror attacks. Egyptian Intelligence Minister Omar Suleiman is scheduled to come to Israel next week to discuss the proposal with Barak and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

"Those who are against a large-scale operation will likely be in favor of a cease-fire," one official said.

On Wednesday, Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh said there would be no cease-fire with Israel unless it included the West Bank.

Sources close to Hamas said the movement agreed to the "Gaza first" cease-fire after receiving assurances from the Egyptians that they would continue to work to extend the truce to the West Bank. They said Hamas was still insisting on a timetable for applying the cease-fire to the West Bank.

Israel continued Thursday to take a hands off approach to the talks between Egypt and Hamas on a Gaza cease-fire, with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's spokesman Mark Regev saying once again that the Jewish state was not holding direct or indirect talks with the Islamist movement.

Regev said Hamas knew that for there to be a cease-fire it had to do three things: stop the rocket fire from Gaza, stop terrorist attacks from the Strip, and stop arms smuggling into Gaza.

One diplomatic official said that despite the increased talk of agreement on the matter between Hamas and the Egyptians, the fact that Hamas officials said they expected a truce to be extended to the West bank according to a fixed timetable indicated that the organization was not genuinely interested in a cease-fire.

If the IDF did not take military action in the West Bank against terrorists and the terrorist infrastructure, the official said, it would be just a matter of time before Hamas took over the West Bank as well.

Diplomatic officials, meanwhile, said that Hamas continued to fabricate a humanitarian crisis in Gaza to place international pressure on Israel, and that a million liters of fuel on the Palestinian side of the Nahal Oz crossing had not been picked up by the Palestinians because they were interested in placing the blame for the crisis at Israel's doorstep.

Hamas has also softened its position regarding control of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Sinai and is prepared to permit the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority to run the terminal, the sources said.

They added that under the terms of the understandings reached with the Egyptians, Hamas would also be allowed to send representatives to the Rafah crossing, which would be reopened as soon as Israel agreed to the new cease-fire proposal.

Hamas leaders Mahmoud Zahar and Said Siam relayed their movement's position to Suleiman during a lengthy meeting in Cairo on Thursday.

The two Gazans arrived in Cairo after holding consultations in Damascus with the top Hamas leadership. Damascus-based Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal flew on Thursday to Qatar to brief Emir Hamad bin Khalifeh al-Thani about Hamas's position on the proposed cease-fire.

Hamas officials said the talks in Qatar also focused on ways of resolving the Schalit case. The Qataris, together with the Egyptians, have been mediating over the past few months between Israel and Hamas to reach a cease-fire agreement and a prisoner swap.

Meanwhile, Hamas called on the Palestinians to storm the border crossings Friday as part of an effort to end the blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Earlier this year, Hamas talked about sending hundreds of thousands of Gazans to the border crossings with Israel.

Ashraf Abu Dayyeh, a Hamas spokesman in the Strip,
called for a "popular uprising" at the border crossings to demand an end to the blockade.

"We decided to declare a popular uprising in light of the continued siege imposed on the Palestinians and the growing suffering of our people, especially in the Gaza Strip," he said. "The angry masses will march toward the Beit Hanun [Erez] checkpoint with Israel and the Rafah border crossing with Egypt immediately after Friday prayers in the mosques."

Abu Dayyeh said the Palestinians had no choice but to "erupt" against the continued closure of the Gaza Strip.

"The Palestinians, who are deprived of the basic elements of life, are going to march toward the border crossings to say that they want to live," he said, adding that the demonstrations were aimed at sending a message to the world that the Palestinians could no longer tolerate the blockade.

Also on Thursday, a Palestinian civilian was killed and three Islamic Jihad gunmen were wounded by an IAF strike in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip.

The consensus among Israel's political and military leaders as we near our 60th anniversary of independence is that modern Israel has never been as threatened as it is today. Given the wars of survival it had to fight in its first quarter century, that's a profoundly troubling assessment.

Although Syria has all of Israel within missile range, Hizbullah has rearmed and the quantities of weaponry flowing into Gaza risk turning a major irritant into a grave concern, the key focus of potentially devastating confrontation is the Islamist regime in Iran - itself, of course, the key state player behind Hizbullah and the Gaza Islamic radicals.

One might be tempted to disregard the annihilatory rhetoric from Teheran were it not accompanied by the relentless drive for a nuclear bomb. One might seek to downplay the nuclear drive were it not for the rhetoric. But the combination of Iran's incitement to genocide and its determined acquisition of the tools to carry out the deed has created a consensus in leadership here - not absolute unanimity, but certainly a strong majority view - that Israel's future well-being necessitates the thwarting of this Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations.

The widespread belief among Israel's leaders as recently as Israel's 59th birthday was that, one way or another, the Bush administration would halt the mullahs - either by galvanizing concerted, biting international sanctions or by force. Some of Israel's most highly placed officials, only too aware of the negligible impact sanctions were having on Iran, indeed, believed until a few months ago that the US might be resorting to military action right about now - late spring to early summer of 2008.

That the sanctions are not hurting Iran is plainly still the case, notably with oil prices at $100 a barrel compared to $25 just a few short years ago. Every small rise in oil prices yields hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian exchequer. Thus the quadrupling in price massively outweighs the limited impact of international sanctions - sanctions that the presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain described in his interview with The Jerusalem Post last month as "remarkable" in their weakness.

But the notion of a Bush presidency's resort to military action was shattered by the US National Intelligence Estimate late last year that highlighted an asserted halt in the Iranian nuclear weapons program dating back to 2003.

That report prompted a hurried visit to the US by leading Israeli intelligence personnel. Misgivings over its thrust have been expressed by the man under whose watch it was compiled, Michael McConnell. And it may be that a revised document is issued a few months from now.

But the effect of the NIE was to deny the Bush administration legitimacy for military action. President Bush, it has been belatedly accepted in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, will almost certainly not hit Iran.

The sense in Israel is that McCain recognizes the gravity of the Iranian threat, and that if he is elected, Israel will not be left alone to meet a global challenge that much of the globe refuses to internalize, in which Israel is only the most directly and urgently affected.

The belief, further, is that the US, if all else fails, could set back Iran's nuclear program by two to five years by striking at several dozen key targets in a daylong air offensive.

There is no such assessment as regards a Democratic president. Indeed, there is concern that a Democratic administration would neither use military action against Iran nor support Israel in so doing. This constitutes a major complication for Israel since the IAF would need to overfly Iraq if it felt it had no alternative but to act.

Israel does believe that it, too, has the military capabilities to set back the Iranian program by two or more years, but such intervention would be more complex for Israel than for the US, and its feasibility depends on a safe and efficient route to and from the target areas.

THE PLETHORA of assessments in recent years as to when, precisely, Iran will attain the capability to build one or more nuclear devices has led to derision in some quarters, with critics accusing intelligence analysts of crying wolf as landmark dates came and went and the Iranian program was still plainly incomplete.

In truth, Iran has had to grapple with various unexpected difficulties. But it is now able to surmount such obstacles, and by most estimates, including that of the NIE, will have enough enriched uranium for a bomb in 2009-2010. It will also have the surface-to-surface missile capability to deliver such a bomb anywhere in Israel and, assuming continued steady progress on its solid-fuel missiles, across Europe too.

Iran's strikingly undeterred progress is, ironically, being made despite President Bush's explicit determination to prevent judgment day weapons reaching regimes that cannot be trusted not to use them. It is being made despite the heightened awareness, after 9/11, of the degree of ruthlessness to which Islamic extremists will sink. And it is being made in contrast to the success that the international community had been having in curbing proliferation with the likes of Ukraine, South Africa and Libya.

Iran has been emboldened by the spinelessness of the international response to its program and to the accompanying threats it has made. And it has been emboldened by the faltering handling of North Korea's program, which has encouraged it to believe that it faces no immediate danger even as it proceeds to defy the international community.

The sense in Israel is not that time has already run out, but that time is certainly running short. There is a strong body of opinion, in the political, military and intelligence echelons, that Damascus offers a potential means to deter Iran: If Israel can seriously engage Syria, and ultimately weaken the Syrian-Iranian alliance, a lonelier Iran may be less inclined to risk a full-speed-ahead approach to the nuclear program, and could potentially suspend some of its activity.
It is at least partially in this context that intermittent comments by the prime minister, defense minister and others about a desire for a dialogue with Syria should be understood. A peace treaty with Syria, of course, would involve relinquishing the Golan Heights. But those who favor the attempt at a dialogue believe viable terms could be reached as regards Israel's security on that front, and that given the alternatives, an accommodation with Syria that curbs Iran is well worth exploring.

But the Bush administration is opposed to Israel's legitimating of an axis-of-evil state, Syria, via direct negotiations. To date, evidently, Israel has been disinclined to defy that opposition. In the light of the Iranian threat, runs the counterargument, Israel should be making plain that it cannot hold to a Washington veto on talks with Damascus.

SOME YEARS ago, Israeli intelligence received word of a North Korean shipment heading to Iran with material related to the nuclear drive. In turn, it alerted its British counterparts, and the ship was intercepted. It turned out to be carrying a cargo of relevance not to the bombmaking program, as Israel had believed, but rather to the second-stage Iranian missile program, the delivery system that brings Europe into range. In other words, Israel had alerted a European ally to a shipment that turned out to constitute no direct threat to Israel at all, but a very potent threat to Europe.

Such specific intelligence contributions, together with Israel's credible information on the overall Iranian program, have gradually helped persuade key international players of the extent of the Iranian danger. Senior Israeli intelligence officials have frequently briefed prominent allied leaders in intricate detail. Nonetheless, the inadequate international response, immensely exacerbated by the shock of the NIE, has left Israel feeling more keenly than ever that if Iran is to be stopped, it may fall to us to do so.

Because of the speed of Iran's progress toward it goal, and the complexities of a military strike over Iraq if this is deemed necessary, however, the narrow timetable for action can be readily discerned. If Iran is able to proceed with the program for another year, runs the thinking here, it will then be able to declare that it is a nuclear power. And if the Democrats win the US presidency, they may neither act against Iran nor enable Israel to do so via Iraq.
At some point in the months after Israel marks its 60th anniversary of independence, therefore, the government may have to take a decision that many leaders here consider to be the most significant the modern state has ever had to make. Does this government have the wisdom to make the right choices - to judge correctly whether military intervention is premature and irresponsible or critical to Israel's very survival? We may all find out fairly soon.

There is little doubt that Iran, if attacked by Israel, would hit back - with missile fire, with terrorism. Scenarios predict possible war with Syria and with Lebanon, and upsurges of violence on other fronts, too. Some speak of dozens of fatalities. Others are much bleaker.

But the alternative, runs some of the thinking, would be far worse. Iran, if it goes nuclear, might fire on Israel. And it might not. It might be deterred. And it might not. It might think it could get away with supplying a nuclear device to a third party to use against Israel. And it might not.

But, as a particularly well-informed Israeli put it to me last week, "One nuclear missile on Tel Aviv, and it's over." Then he added: "Did we all gather here after the Holocaust to be wiped out by one bomb?"

Philip wrote:Jimmy Carter,is perhaps the US's best export,as whatever the odds,he valiantly soldiers on apound the globe for brokering peace between enemies.Long may he live.

Last week, the Middle East woke up to new hopes for peace. Both Syria and Israel showed signs of accepting a year-long mediation by Turkey. If things go according to Turkish plans, 2008 will become the year of peace in the region. But talking peace while the drums of war are being beaten seems strange.

After the flare-up last September, when Israel attacked an alleged Syrian nuclear installation in the north-east of the country, relations between the two hostile nations seem to be improving a bit.

Analysts with little knowledge about the history of the conflict between Syria and Israel find it difficult to believe that there can be such a dramatic change - from talk of war to talk of peace.

But Turkish diplomats have been very active in negotiations between the two countries. It is worth remembering that Turkish officials launched their mediation efforts in April 2007 - five months before Israel's attack on Syria last year. And the incident did not hinder their efforts.

In an interview with a Qatari newspaper to be published today, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, who assumed power in July 2000 following the death of his father Hafez, confirms that he has received encouraging signals from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and it is up to Israel to translate its words into actions in the near future.

Those close to decision-makers in Damascus said that the preparations are being made in Syria to end six decades of hostility with the Jewish state.

Damascus says Tel Aviv has accepted its one main condition for peace - the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the land that they have occupied since June 1967.
This is not a new condition for peace set by Syria. It has been on the agenda since the launch of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. On the other hand, the fact that the two countries are very close to achieving peace is not new either.

Assurances

In fact, Syria and Israel have been very close to achieving peace at least twice in the past 18 years. The late Hafez Al Assad was about to sign a peace deal with Israel in Wye Plantation, US in August 1993, after he received assurances on Yitzhaq Rabin's readiness for peace with Syria from then US secretary of state Warren Christopher.

However, the hope for peace died quickly, with Israel's subsequent conditions about the gradual hand-over of territory and the request to the Syrian president to meet Israeli leaders publicly in what they said would be a public commitment to peace.

The hope for peace rose again in 1995 with the Israeli prime minister Rabin again accepting a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. But the assassination of Rabin in November 1995 and the emergence of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister eight months later, froze the peace process once again.

So, the question arises: Would Turks succeed in bringing the old enemies to the peace table by encouraging the leaders of the two nations to move forward on the path of peace?

The answer to this question is not simple. The history of the region shows that every time Syria and Israel are close to peace something happens somewhere that changes the course of events for the worse. As a result, there is little cause for optimism.

But can things be different this time? Yes, if the political difficulties faced by both Syria and Israel are taken into account by the Turkish mediators.

Expecting the worse

Although it is not in a desperate situation, Syria is expecting the worse this year - and is preparing for it. Syria is not on good terms with at least half of its neighbours in Lebanon, and the political crisis in Lebanon might easily spill over into Syria.

In addition, Bashar is not on good terms with the leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, and there is still a great deal of suspicion about how the developments in Iraq will affect Syria.

He is also not comfortable with the direction of US policy in the region and there is a general feeling in Syria that the international probe into the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri will be politicised against Syria.

On the one hand, Syrians feel strongly about their alliance with Iran and about the lessons they learned from the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Syria feels that the policy of supporting Hamas has been successful. In addition to this, the 2006 war has inspired Bashar and shown him the weaknesses of the Jewish state.

However, a war with Israel has never been an option for Syria's leaders. But no one can rule out the possibility of a war between two countries that have a history of conflict.

On the other hand, Olmert has been weakened after the 2006 war with Hezbollah, and was about to lose his post following the publication of the Winograd Commission report.

A year later, Olmert is not any stronger and is facing genuine problems in Gaza.

Turkish mediators can do all they can for peace in the region, but they will definitely fail if they ignore the different voices in the Middle East. Turkey cannot succeed in its mediation efforts without the blessing of the Americans.
Turkey must look seriously into the forces against peace outside Syria and Israel, and try to tackle them instead of falling prey to them.

One of the important developments in Middle Eastern diplomacy that becomes more obvious with every passing month is the continued marginalization of the United States. As the Bush administration and the American presidential candidates find themselves focusing most of their Middle East-related attention on the complex challenges the US invasion of Iraq has created, other important regional issues seem to be moving into the hands of local players and mediators.
The more the US is marginalized diplomatically as a would-be mediator because of its shortsighted tendency to nearly blindly support Israel's positions, buttress Arab autocrats, and oppose the large, populist Islamo-nationalist movements, the more the other mediators from the Middle East make progress in resolving or reducing the intensity of conflicts.

Two cases in particular are noteworthy: the indirect Hamas-Israel negotiations for a cease-fire in Gaza (mediated by Egypt), and the indirect Israeli-Syrian contacts to achieve a full peace treaty (mediated by Turkey). Both are enormously important developments. If consummated, they would represent solid, even historic, steps toward a resolution of the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict. The chances of success are slim, but they are not zero, and that in itself is noteworthy.

I find it striking that the four most significant or dynamic mediators on major regional problems in the past year have been four regional players: Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa. President George W. Bush's effort to prod Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, on the other hand, seems hapless and lacking in credibility, because it is aimed more at pleasing Israel than at meeting the minimal demands and rights of both Israelis and Palestinians.

Egypt is trying to arrange a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel; Turkey is the channel for serious diplomatic feelers between Syria and Israel; Saudi Arabia brokered the Fatah-Hamas unity government agreement last year that later collapsed; and the Arab League continues to seek a resolution of intra-Lebanese and Lebanese-Syrian tensions. This is good news, because it signals both a willingness and a capacity of regional actors to act as diplomatic mediators, rather than to constantly look toward foreign powers to nudge the warring parties toward negotiated accords.

The US, on the other hand, seems often to want to stoke the fires of ideological tension and military conflict by supporting, arming, financing and training one side in domestic political contests such as those in Lebanon and Palestine. The US (and Europe in some cases) is also severely hampered by its decision to boycott or heavily downgrade contacts with key players like Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran. The combination of boycotting legitimate actors while actively promoting local confrontations with them is a recipe for what we are witnessing in the Middle East these days: a growing number of political conflicts within countries, and strong linkages between warring actors across the region.

Episodic local tensions have now been transformed into a major and chronic cycle of region-wide political battles, pitting US- and Israeli-backed "moderates" against a wide array of Islamists, "extremists" and "militants" in the Arab world and Iran.

The most important diplomatic process these days is the Syrian-Israeli one. Israelis and Syrians alike have made it clear that something serious is taking place behind the scenes. A negotiated, comprehensive Israeli-Syrian peace agreement is not very difficult at the practical level, for it would follow the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Jordanian pattern of full peace and normalization for full Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967. Israel will have to remove its settlements, but such is the price of abiding by international law and UN Security Council resolutions.

A Syrian-Israeli peace agreement would impact heavily on every major issue in the vicinity, because Syria has strategic and tactical relations with every nearby major player and country: Iran, Lebanon, Hizbullah, Iraq, Palestine and Hamas. Syria would have to decide if the gains of a peace treaty - regime stability, cash aid, and international economic integration - were worth the inevitable price that will be demanded from it: breaking or significantly reducing strategic ties with Iran, Hamas and Hizbullah.

Syria for its part will also want direct or indirect influence over Lebanon, and a downgrading of the international tribunal that will prosecute those to be indicted for the Hariri and other murders in Lebanon since February 2005. Lebanon and the international community are reluctant to offer these to Syria, but probably do not totally rule out a reasonable, face-saving compromise. Many Lebanese will be rightly worried that they are about to be sold out.

Syrian-Israeli peace would totally change the political equation in the region, and probably lead to historic changes in Lebanon, Hizbullah's standing, Iran's regional role, the Iraqi situation, and political conditions in Palestine. It is telling of the damage that the US has done to its own role and impact in the Middle East that the potentially most important diplomatic development in the past generation seems to be taking place without any significant American role.

shyamd wrote:Lebanon is fast emerging as a major terrorist training hub.

Recruits Suicide bombers for Iraq in Lebanon, sends them through Syria, Recruits are processed at two Lebanese facilities; prospective suicides are scattered in Syrian safe houses before local guides lead them to the border to crossover into Iraq.
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During Cheney's ME trip last month. One of the topics of discussion with all Gulf rulers were:

Encouraging the rulers to sign off long-term accords with India, including nuclear cooperation. Without saying so openly, the VP let his hosts know that Washington would not object to the Gulf nations and India concluding mutual defense pacts extending India’s nuclear shield to their region.

The brief working visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Delhi on April 29 has led to considerable comment -- both before and after the visit -- and this has more to do with the manner in which Iran has become a litmus test for the 'autonomy' of India's foreign policy in the light of the India-US civilian nuclear co-operation agreement of July 2005.

At the outset it merits recall that in the lexicon of international relations, no nation has a truly pristine autonomous or independent foreign policy. A nation's foreign policy is crafted to advance or protect one of the many strands of the complex but abiding national interest (often economic or security related ) -- and to that extent adopting any foreign policy orientation is in itself an exercise in making the most viable of multiple choices in a given strategic context. Thus the normative objective of foreign policy is not about displaying defiance or merely seeking cordiality -- but to sub-serve a national interest determinant.

The man the West loves to hate

Iran has loomed large in the Indian debate due to the divergence between New Delhi and Washington, DC over the manner in which each has perceived Tehran -- particularly after the election of Ahmadinejad as the Iranian President in 2005. Seen as a hardliner in the context of domestic Iranian politics, Ahmadinejad has been very critical of the West as an entity and the intimidation by the US for its characterisation of Iran as being part of 'an axis of evil' apropos its weapons of mass destruction profile.

India does not share this view of Iran and has conveyed as much to the US -- though it does have its own assessment of the nuclear issue in the regional and global context. Paradoxically, India and Iran have held divergent positions in the nuclear domain ever since the inception of the NPT. Iran signed the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state while India has remained outside the NPT -- as it does today in 2008. Traditionally Iran has neither been helpful nor empathetic to the Indian position on the nuclear issue and this was evident during the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and in the immediate aftermath of the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests. In short -- India and Iran have differed on the nuclear nettle -- but this did not prevent engagement in trade -- specifically in the hydrocarbon sector. Thus India imports up to 8 percent of its oil from Iran and is exploring the possibility of increasing this to include gas -- which is where the current Ahmadinejad visit becomes relevant.

US is collapsing: Iran president

India and Iran have been engaged in sporadic negotiations over the supply of gas since the late 1980's and the transit through Pakistan has given this project a trilateral IPI contour. However there was little meaningful progress due to lack of consensus on the techno-commercial aspects that included pricing of the gas and transit fees, as also the physical security of the pipeline that will extend over 2,600 kms from Iran through Pakistan to India. The latter aspect has become central since three quarters of the transit route will be through the Baluchistan province in Pakistan which has a history of local opposition to gas pipelines and Islamabad has not been able to prevent attacks by Baluch rebels on Pakistan's domestic gas pipelines.

It was this complex ground reality that compelled Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images] to note in July 2005 when asked about the viability of the IPI pipeline: "I am realistic enough to realise that there are many risks, because considering all the uncertainties of the situation� I don't know if any international consortium of bankers would probably underwrite this project." The project will call for an investment of almost $7 billion (about Rs 28,000 crore). Since 2005, the IPI stalled over price negotiations -- both for the gas with Iran and the transit with Pakistan -- and in the interim, political and strategic developments further muddied the waters.

IPI pipeline doable: India

India's domestic debate over the US nuclear deal became more contested -- with the Iran policy becoming a lightning rod; Pakistan had not yet overcome its animosity towards India and the fixation that Kashmir must be resolved before there could be any progress on trade; and Iran was going through its own domestic convulsions as regards its nuclear program and its purported breach of commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency resulting from the revelation about the AQ Khan network It was in this context that India had voted along with the majority against Iran in the IAEA -- a position that has not changed. Here India's stand has been consistent -- that Iran should meet its obligations as a NNWS and satisfy the IAEA over its covert nuclear program -- and again it merits reiteration that India has not arrived at a determination or passed judgment over Iran's nuclear weapon status -- which is a departure from the US position.

It was significant that during the current visit, the Iranian President asserted that the Indian vote at the IAEA was no longer an issue of contention between the two countries and that he hoped that the IPI deal would be finalised in the next 45 days. This is a very optimistic assessment and highly desirable -- given India's growing energy needs and the market reality that oil is now trading at $120 a barrel -- but one would still urge a note of caution. None of the complex constraints that had eluded consensus -- techno-commercial and pipeline security aspects -- have disappeared. The political intent is there in all three countries and the change of stance in Pakistan is to be welcomed. But here again, the transit fee negotiations have not been concluded and fluctuations in the hydrocarbon market add greater complexity to the negotiations.

India should choose Iran, not US

India -- like China -- needs energy from any and every source to sustain its GDP growth and related developmental goals and Iran's importance cannot be ignored. The choice for India is not an 'either-or' option in relation to the US/Iran and the nuclear/oil sector. India needs both and the challenge for Indian foreign policy will be to realise both objectives. As of now India will have to engage with the US through quiet diplomacy as opposed to emotive public statements that stoke inflamed domestic opinion. With oil prices climbing, the compulsions of geo-politics and geo-economics are converging in the energy domain and some very unlikely political accommodations are being initiated.

Central Asia with Iran as a major gas supplier is the arena where the new 'great-game' is being played out and China, India and Japan [Images] are all seeking to protect their respective energy interests for the medium term -- and pipeline politics is the new instrumentality. The Ahmadinejad visit is part of this 21st century strategic chess-game but the fruition of the IPI gas pipeline will be a long haul. The desirability is not in doubt but the feasibility cannot be exaggerated.

Exclusive: S P Hinduja on Indo-Iran ties

Commodore Uday Bhaskar an independent security analyst is a former director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi. He can be contacted at [email protected]

Turkish warplanes bombed Kurdish rebel bases deep inside Iraq in a three-hour overnight operation, rebel officials said today.

The aircraft attacked Iraq's Qandil region, dozens of miles from the border with Turkey, the spokesman Ahmed Danas claimed.

Bombers also hit 10 other sites near the northern Iraqi towns of Khnezah and Lowlan close to the Iranian border, in an operation that started late yesterday.

No members of the rebel Kurdish group, known as the PKK, were killed or injured in the raids, Danas said.

Today, both Turkey's state-run media and Firat, a pro-Kurdish news agency based in Europe, carried full coverage of the air strikes. Turkey's military, however, has yet to confirm or deny the attacks.

The latest attacks come as Istanbul continues its ongoing battle with the PKK, who took up arms against the Turkish government in 1984.

The rebel group has fought for self-rule in the country's mainly Kurdish south-east region in a conflict that has claimed tens of thousands of lives.

The PKK's leadership is thought to be hiding in the Mt Qandil area, which straddles the Iraq-Iran border and is 60 miles from the border between Iraq and Turkey.

In recent months, Turkey has launched several air assaults on PKK targets in northern Iraq. In February, it staged a major ground offensive which lasted eight days.

Since then, clashes between rebels and Turkish troops have continued to erupt along Turkey's border with Iraq.

Turkey, like the United States and the European Union, lists the PKK as a terrorist group.