We have ourselves to blame for it; most of the anti Indian propaganda aired on media can be traced to the Indians who claim to be marxists/leftists (terms abused in India akin to secularism) , I am yet to find any article from Germany or even west trying to justify what Hitler did, however here we have the whole world merrily describing the events in 1971 as a 'civil war' as if all those people died in fighting a failed system (akin to Somalia or other African countries); I consider all these fagots in the same league as those who gave their silent approval for the genocide.shiv wrote:Certainly fits in with my personal observationssaadhak wrote:I read somewhere that "The Pakistan-based anti-Indian viewpoint seems to be disproportionally represented on the net". It is true.
Genocide Denial: the war against history
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Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
In the original Hindustan Times Article published in 2003, Bibhuti Bhushan Nandy writes:A good rebuttal to Sarmila Bose's recent article in the EPW site : http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2011/03/14/ ... mila-bose/
http://www.hvk.org/articles/1203/49.html
Sarmila (Sharmila) was then with Anbanda Bazaar Patrika - asst. editor I think.A recent article by Sharmila Bose (Ananda Bazaar Patrika, August 3) depicted Ram as an impotent wretch and Sita as a nymphomaniac.
So, her habit of offending people is still with us - now it is supported by all kinds of interested parties - the same ones, that have supported her in the US and now in the UK. Her mission, now is to whitewash the genocide perpetrated by Pakistanis, at the expense of the victims.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
This is from POW on the Western Front, 1971
Even though this is unrelated to the genocide on the Eastern Front, it is relevant as lot of it is still against the rules of War and let not TSPA say this nonsense (of Rashid Qureshi in 1999), of being clean fighters.
Even though this is unrelated to the genocide on the Eastern Front, it is relevant as lot of it is still against the rules of War and let not TSPA say this nonsense (of Rashid Qureshi in 1999), of being clean fighters.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14867A smiling Pethia narrated the tales of torture of getting cigarette burns in between the thighs, being made to sleep naked on a cement floor during cold nights and much more. The inmates had once requested for one more chapati and got just half.
"There is a time when you only hear the sound but not feel the pain. They battered us with everything - rifle butts and lathis to even table tennis rackets," said Pethia. "Imagine if your hands are put below the leg of a cot and someone jumps over it. My scars have gone but the broken bones are still there. I am left with damaged ribs and a lung." By the time he was released, Pethia was declared having tuberculosis.
Three of his colleagues, including Flight Lieutenant Dilip Parulkar of Nagpur, made two unsuccessful attempts to escape but Pethia was too feeble to even make an attempt. "On their second attempt they were caught in Peshawar as they planned to flee through Afghanistan," said Pethia. "Now Parulkar is settled in Pune."
Once the inmates also encountered some Pakistani pilots with whom they had spent time as course mates during a joint training in the US. "We exchanged greetings, they were friends at that time but now enemies," he said.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Bangladesh war crimes: First charges filed
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15147098
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15147098
A senior leader of Bangladesh's largest Islamic party is the first suspect charged by a tribunal probing the 1971 independence struggle against Pakistan.
The war crimes tribunal accused Delawar Hossain Sayedee of mass murder and torture among other crimes. He denies all the allegations.
Mr Sayedee, a leader in Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami party, was arrested last year.
The tribunal was set up in 2010 to try those accused of crimes during the war.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
negi wrote:We have ourselves to blame for it;saadhak wrote:I read somewhere that "The Pakistan-based anti-Indian viewpoint seems to be disproportionally represented on the net". It is true.

http://www.theatlantic.com/internationa ... on/246000/
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
X-posting from Army History thread. (from post by Boreas)
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/
I tried sticking to parts relevant to genocide in East Pakistan which was the prime mover for India for the conflict, though the declassified documents have additional nuggets too. Below is partial listing.
The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79
Edited by Sajit Gandhi
December 16, 2002
________________________________________
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 28, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Consul General Archer Blood reports of "a reign of terror by the Pak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators.
Document 2
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan, March 28, 1971, Secret, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East, Box 625
NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. More significantly, this memorandum acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror.
Document 3
U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 29, 1971, Confidential, 1 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Ambassador Keating expresses his dismay and concern at repression unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality. Washington however, never publicly spoke out against West Pakistan.
Document 4
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University, March 30, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University. The observer indicates that students had been "shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLA set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."
Document 5
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Extent of Casualties in Dacca, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that the West Pakistani objective "to hit hard and terrorize the population" has been fairly successful.
Document 6
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood indicates that Martial Law Administrators are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas. "Congen officer heard steady firing of approximately 1 shot per ten seconds for 30 minutes." Cable also reports that naked female bodies found "with bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans.
Document 7
U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan; April 6, 1971, Confidential, 8 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly asks that "due allowance be made for behavior of Pak officials and others during what had amounted to civil war for a few days," because the "army had to kill people in order to keep country together." Expressing concern over the situation and bloodshed as well as use of U.S. arms in repression, Sisco observed that the US is "keenly sensitive to problems and feelings on developments [in East Pakistan]."
Document 8
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from the Department of State.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535
In one of the first "Dissent Cables," Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the United States is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pak [sic] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."
Document 9
Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Toward Pakistan, April 28, 1971, Secret, 6 pp. Includes Nixon's handwritten Nixon note
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 625
Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."
Document 10
Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry Kissinger and Harold H. Saunders May 10, 1971, (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
U.S. and Pakistani officials discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." He also offers American assistance so as to not compound "the anguish" that Pakistan "is already suffering," as a result of the repression in East Pakistan.
Document 11
Memcon The President, M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders, May 10, 1971, (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Nixon and Pakistani officials discuss a potential political solution in East Pakistan. Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," and seemingly in response to the genocide like repression in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him."
Document 12
Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575.
As early as May 1971 the State Department became aware that a war was possible between India and Pakistan. This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war: (1)continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerillas (the Mukti Bahini).
Document 13
Memcon Kenneth Keating, Henry Kissinger, and Harold Saunders June 3, 1971, (4:00 P.M.). Attached to Cover Sheet Dated June 21, 1971, Secret /NODIS, 6 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files Country Files: Middle East, Box 596.
Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders discuss the situation in Pakistan and American military assistance. Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."
Document 14
Memorandum for RADM Daniel J. Murphy, Dr. Kissinger's Reports of Conversations in New Delhi, July 7, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Haig Chron, Box 983.
Relaying his impressions of his visit to India, Kissinger describes the strong feelings about the heavy burden placed upon India by the refugees from East Pakistan. In his meetings with Indian officials, Kissinger discussed the East Pakistan situation, military assistance to Pakistan, and China. He assures the Indians that the U.S. "would take the gravest view of any unprovoked aggression against India."
Document 15
Memcon, Dr. Sarabhai, Dr. Haksar, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Winston Lord, July 7, 1971, (1:10 - 2:50 p.m.), Secret/Sensitive, 4pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Pres/HAK Memcons, Box 1025
Just days before Kissinger's secret trip to China, Indian and U.S. officials discuss numerous issues, including the Soviet Union, the situation in East Pakistan, arms transfers to Pakistan, and China. During the conversation, Kissinger assures the Indians that "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would back India against any Chinese pressures." He also states that "In any dialogue with China, we would of course not encourage her against India."
Document 16
Department of State, Cable, Indo-Pakistan Situation, July 15, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indian Ambassador to the United States L.K. Jha and Acting Secretary John Irwin discuss the East Pakistan situation, a possible political solution, American military assistance to Pakistan, and the role of the UN in refugee camps.
Document 17
Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking, July 19, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Includes handwritten Kissinger note on bottom of second page.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 574
Saunders discusses U.S. Aid to South Asia, specifically noting the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes, "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship to Pakistan."
Document 18
Memorandum for the Presidents File, President's Meeting with Ambassador Joseph Farland, July 28, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Attached to Cover Memoranda
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 626
Nixon expresses his concern over the South Asian conflict to Ambassador Farland, "not only for its intrinsic tragedy and danger, but also because it could disrupt our steady course in our policy toward China."
Document 19
NSC Paper, South Asia: Cutting of Military and Economic Assistance, July 30, 1971, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570.
The NSC staff discusses Congressional reaction to the conflict in East Pakistan and American military assistance. The Administration has chosen quiet diplomacy as means to motivate Yahya to avert famine and create conditions in which the refugees may return from India. "We have not openly condemned Yahya. He appreciates this."
Document 20
Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, August 7, 1971, 4 pp. Attached to cover page.
Source: RG 59 PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.
Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt." {ha, ha, ha}
Document 21
Memorandum for the Record: The President, Henry Kissinger, John Irwin, Thomas Moorer, Robert Cushman, Maurice Williams, Joseph Sisco, Armistead Seldon, and Harold Saunders, August 11, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578
The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in East Pakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. The President indicates that "the big story is Pakistan," and he expresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering. While Nixon suggests that some Indian and Pakistani interest might be served by war, it is not in American interests as "the new China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyond repair." While stating that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "We will not measure our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan. By that criterion, we would cut off relations with every Communist government in the world because of the slaughter that has taken place in the Communist countries."
Document 22
Department of State, Cable, Letter from Prime Minister Gandhi, August 14, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indira Gandhi, in a letter to President Nixon, notes that the refugee flow has not slowed, and has reached approximately seven million. She questions U.S. efforts to work towards a political solution in East Pakistan as well as American arms transfers to Pakistan.
Document 23
Memorandum for the President, My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 16 pp. Includes Memorandum of Conversation between Huang Chen, Tsao Kuei Sheng, Wei Tung, Henry Kissinger, Vernon Walters, and Winston Lord Dated August 19, 1971.
Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.
Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon describes his talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to the Chinese that the U.S. is prevented from giving any military assistance to Pakistan because of Congress, but supports Chinese assistance by stating that the U.S. would "understand it if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need." He also declares that the U.S. "will do nothing to embarrass the government of Pakistan by any public statements."
Document 24
Memorandum for the President, Implications of the Situation in South Asia, August 18, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570
Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia including Yahya's stand to not grant independence in the East, the serious insurgency movement underway in East Pakistan, and the continued flow of refugees into India. He suggests that American strategy give Yahya a face-saving way of taking the political steps necessary to re-establish normal conditions. While Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "We had no national interest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan," the documents show he believed otherwise. In this record, at a time when rapprochement with China was in the national interest, Kissinger suggests that "a U.S. effort to split off part of Pakistan in the name of self-determination would have implications for Taiwan and Tibet in Peking's eyes." {<---Please re-read this para}
White House, Telephone Conversations (Telcon), Dated December 4 and December 16, 1971, 11 pp. Includes Cover Sheet Dated January 19, 1972
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.
These telcons show Nixon and Kissinger's knowledge of third party transfers of military supplies to Pakistan. Haig summarizes the Telcons to Kissinger by writing that the telcons, "confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," in exchange for providing aircraft to Pakistan. The telcons also show that Kissinger and Nixon, following the advice of Barbara Walters, decide to put out a White House version of the facts involved with the South Asian crisis through John Scali. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out on the- - put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."
Document 30
Background Briefing with Henry Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 14 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572
As a result of American media criticism towards the U.S. position on the India-Pakistan conflict, Kissinger in an attempt to straighten the record conducts a "background" press briefing. Kissinger presents the U.S. position using many questionable facts.
Document 31
United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, U.S. Public Position on Road to War, Secret, December 8, 1971, 3 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.
Responding to a news story based on Kissinger's background briefing, Keating argue that many of Kissinger's statements can not be supported. Specifically, Keating questions Kissinger's reference to Indian requests for a relief program, the Pakistani offer of amnesty to Awami Leaguers, and his claim that Washington has favored autonomy for East Pakistan.
Document 32
Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, December 10, 1971, 7 pp.
Source: George Bush Presidential Library. George H.W. Bush Collection. Series: United Nations File, 1971-1972, Box 4.
UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts in the administration's "Two State Departments thing," and takes issue with Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/
I tried sticking to parts relevant to genocide in East Pakistan which was the prime mover for India for the conflict, though the declassified documents have additional nuggets too. Below is partial listing.
The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79
Edited by Sajit Gandhi
December 16, 2002
________________________________________
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 28, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Consul General Archer Blood reports of "a reign of terror by the Pak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators.
Document 2
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan, March 28, 1971, Secret, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East, Box 625
NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. More significantly, this memorandum acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror.
Document 3
U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 29, 1971, Confidential, 1 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Ambassador Keating expresses his dismay and concern at repression unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality. Washington however, never publicly spoke out against West Pakistan.
Document 4
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University, March 30, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University. The observer indicates that students had been "shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLA set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."
Document 5
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Extent of Casualties in Dacca, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that the West Pakistani objective "to hit hard and terrorize the population" has been fairly successful.
Document 6
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood indicates that Martial Law Administrators are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas. "Congen officer heard steady firing of approximately 1 shot per ten seconds for 30 minutes." Cable also reports that naked female bodies found "with bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans.
Document 7
U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan; April 6, 1971, Confidential, 8 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly asks that "due allowance be made for behavior of Pak officials and others during what had amounted to civil war for a few days," because the "army had to kill people in order to keep country together." Expressing concern over the situation and bloodshed as well as use of U.S. arms in repression, Sisco observed that the US is "keenly sensitive to problems and feelings on developments [in East Pakistan]."
Document 8
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from the Department of State.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535
In one of the first "Dissent Cables," Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the United States is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pak [sic] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."
Document 9
Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Toward Pakistan, April 28, 1971, Secret, 6 pp. Includes Nixon's handwritten Nixon note
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 625
Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."
Document 10
Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry Kissinger and Harold H. Saunders May 10, 1971, (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
U.S. and Pakistani officials discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." He also offers American assistance so as to not compound "the anguish" that Pakistan "is already suffering," as a result of the repression in East Pakistan.
Document 11
Memcon The President, M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders, May 10, 1971, (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Nixon and Pakistani officials discuss a potential political solution in East Pakistan. Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," and seemingly in response to the genocide like repression in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him."
Document 12
Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575.
As early as May 1971 the State Department became aware that a war was possible between India and Pakistan. This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war: (1)continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerillas (the Mukti Bahini).
Document 13
Memcon Kenneth Keating, Henry Kissinger, and Harold Saunders June 3, 1971, (4:00 P.M.). Attached to Cover Sheet Dated June 21, 1971, Secret /NODIS, 6 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files Country Files: Middle East, Box 596.
Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders discuss the situation in Pakistan and American military assistance. Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."
Document 14
Memorandum for RADM Daniel J. Murphy, Dr. Kissinger's Reports of Conversations in New Delhi, July 7, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Haig Chron, Box 983.
Relaying his impressions of his visit to India, Kissinger describes the strong feelings about the heavy burden placed upon India by the refugees from East Pakistan. In his meetings with Indian officials, Kissinger discussed the East Pakistan situation, military assistance to Pakistan, and China. He assures the Indians that the U.S. "would take the gravest view of any unprovoked aggression against India."
Document 15
Memcon, Dr. Sarabhai, Dr. Haksar, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Winston Lord, July 7, 1971, (1:10 - 2:50 p.m.), Secret/Sensitive, 4pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Pres/HAK Memcons, Box 1025
Just days before Kissinger's secret trip to China, Indian and U.S. officials discuss numerous issues, including the Soviet Union, the situation in East Pakistan, arms transfers to Pakistan, and China. During the conversation, Kissinger assures the Indians that "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would back India against any Chinese pressures." He also states that "In any dialogue with China, we would of course not encourage her against India."
Document 16
Department of State, Cable, Indo-Pakistan Situation, July 15, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indian Ambassador to the United States L.K. Jha and Acting Secretary John Irwin discuss the East Pakistan situation, a possible political solution, American military assistance to Pakistan, and the role of the UN in refugee camps.
Document 17
Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking, July 19, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Includes handwritten Kissinger note on bottom of second page.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 574
Saunders discusses U.S. Aid to South Asia, specifically noting the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes, "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship to Pakistan."
Document 18
Memorandum for the Presidents File, President's Meeting with Ambassador Joseph Farland, July 28, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Attached to Cover Memoranda
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 626
Nixon expresses his concern over the South Asian conflict to Ambassador Farland, "not only for its intrinsic tragedy and danger, but also because it could disrupt our steady course in our policy toward China."
Document 19
NSC Paper, South Asia: Cutting of Military and Economic Assistance, July 30, 1971, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570.
The NSC staff discusses Congressional reaction to the conflict in East Pakistan and American military assistance. The Administration has chosen quiet diplomacy as means to motivate Yahya to avert famine and create conditions in which the refugees may return from India. "We have not openly condemned Yahya. He appreciates this."
Document 20
Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, August 7, 1971, 4 pp. Attached to cover page.
Source: RG 59 PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.
Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt." {ha, ha, ha}
Document 21
Memorandum for the Record: The President, Henry Kissinger, John Irwin, Thomas Moorer, Robert Cushman, Maurice Williams, Joseph Sisco, Armistead Seldon, and Harold Saunders, August 11, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578
The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in East Pakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. The President indicates that "the big story is Pakistan," and he expresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering. While Nixon suggests that some Indian and Pakistani interest might be served by war, it is not in American interests as "the new China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyond repair." While stating that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "We will not measure our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan. By that criterion, we would cut off relations with every Communist government in the world because of the slaughter that has taken place in the Communist countries."
Document 22
Department of State, Cable, Letter from Prime Minister Gandhi, August 14, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indira Gandhi, in a letter to President Nixon, notes that the refugee flow has not slowed, and has reached approximately seven million. She questions U.S. efforts to work towards a political solution in East Pakistan as well as American arms transfers to Pakistan.
Document 23
Memorandum for the President, My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 16 pp. Includes Memorandum of Conversation between Huang Chen, Tsao Kuei Sheng, Wei Tung, Henry Kissinger, Vernon Walters, and Winston Lord Dated August 19, 1971.
Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.
Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon describes his talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to the Chinese that the U.S. is prevented from giving any military assistance to Pakistan because of Congress, but supports Chinese assistance by stating that the U.S. would "understand it if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need." He also declares that the U.S. "will do nothing to embarrass the government of Pakistan by any public statements."
Document 24
Memorandum for the President, Implications of the Situation in South Asia, August 18, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570
Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia including Yahya's stand to not grant independence in the East, the serious insurgency movement underway in East Pakistan, and the continued flow of refugees into India. He suggests that American strategy give Yahya a face-saving way of taking the political steps necessary to re-establish normal conditions. While Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "We had no national interest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan," the documents show he believed otherwise. In this record, at a time when rapprochement with China was in the national interest, Kissinger suggests that "a U.S. effort to split off part of Pakistan in the name of self-determination would have implications for Taiwan and Tibet in Peking's eyes." {<---Please re-read this para}
White House, Telephone Conversations (Telcon), Dated December 4 and December 16, 1971, 11 pp. Includes Cover Sheet Dated January 19, 1972
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.
These telcons show Nixon and Kissinger's knowledge of third party transfers of military supplies to Pakistan. Haig summarizes the Telcons to Kissinger by writing that the telcons, "confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," in exchange for providing aircraft to Pakistan. The telcons also show that Kissinger and Nixon, following the advice of Barbara Walters, decide to put out a White House version of the facts involved with the South Asian crisis through John Scali. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out on the- - put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."
Document 30
Background Briefing with Henry Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 14 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572
As a result of American media criticism towards the U.S. position on the India-Pakistan conflict, Kissinger in an attempt to straighten the record conducts a "background" press briefing. Kissinger presents the U.S. position using many questionable facts.
Document 31
United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, U.S. Public Position on Road to War, Secret, December 8, 1971, 3 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.
Responding to a news story based on Kissinger's background briefing, Keating argue that many of Kissinger's statements can not be supported. Specifically, Keating questions Kissinger's reference to Indian requests for a relief program, the Pakistani offer of amnesty to Awami Leaguers, and his claim that Washington has favored autonomy for East Pakistan.
Document 32
Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, December 10, 1971, 7 pp.
Source: George Bush Presidential Library. George H.W. Bush Collection. Series: United Nations File, 1971-1972, Box 4.
UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts in the administration's "Two State Departments thing," and takes issue with Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.
The prime example of Pakisaniyat on its fellow Muslims.
http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/In ... ction.shtm
Introduction
This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, 1971.
Chapter1 : The Moral Aspect
The prime example of Pakisaniyat on its fellow Muslims.
http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/In ... ction.shtm
Introduction
This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, 1971.
Chapter1 : The Moral Aspect
2. After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and that there was indeed substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
11. A new aggravating factor made its appearance in East Pakistan in the wake of the military action of the 25th of March 1971, when units of the Pakistan Army undertook "sweep operations" throughout the Province to deal with the Awami League insurgents. The Army had to go out into the countryside without adequate logistic arrangements, and was compelled, at least in the early stages of its operations to take its requirements of foodgrains and other essential supplies from civilian sources. Unfortunately, however, the practice appears to have persisted even when it became possible to make proper logistic arrangements. There is evidence to the effect that civilian shops and stores were broken into by the troops without preparing any record of what was taken and from where. The need for commandeering vehicles, foodstuffs, medicines and other essential supplies can certainly be appreciated, but this should have been done under a proper method of accounting so that compensation could be paid on return of normal conditions. As no such procedure was adopted, it led to a general feeling among the troops, including their officers that they were entitled to take whatever they wanted from wherever they liked. This appears to us to be the genesis of the looting alleged to have been indulged in by the Army in East Pakistan.
Chapter 2 : Alleged atrocities by the Pakistan Army(1) Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi
14. In the Main Report we have mentioned the allegations, and the evidence relating thereto as regards the personal conduct of Gen. Yahya Khan, Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan the late Maj Gen (Retd) Khuda Dad Khan, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Maj Gen. Jehanzeb and Brig Hayatullah. We wish to supplement those observations as regards Lt. Gen Niazi.
15. From a perusal of Paragraphs 30 to 34 of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, it will be seen that the graveness of the allegations made against Lt. Gen. Niazi is that he was making money in the handling of Martial Law cases while posted as G.O.C Sialkot and later as G.O.C and Martial Law Administrator at Lahore; that he was on intimate terms with one Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore, who was running a brothel under the name of Senorita Home, and was also acting as the General's tout for receiving bribes and getting things done; that he was also friendly with another woman called Shamini Firdaus of Sialkot who was said to be playing the same role as Mrs. Saeeda Bukhari of Lahore; that during his stay in East Pakistan he came to acquire a stinking reputation owing to his association with women of bad repute, and his nocturnal visits to places also frequented by several junior officers under his command; and that he indulged in the smuggling of Pan from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. These allegations were made before the Commission by Abdul Qayyum Arif (witness No. 6), Munawar Hussain, Advocate of Sialkot (Witness No. 13), Abdul Hafiz Kardar (Witness No. 25), Maj Sajjadul Haq (Witness No. 164), Squadron Leader C.A Wahid (Witness No. 57) and Lt. Col Haliz Ahmad (Witness NO. 147).
16. During the present phase of our inquiry damaging evidence has come on the record regarding the ill repute of General Niazi in sex matters, and his indulgence in the smuggling of Pan. A mention may be made in this behalf of the statements made before us by Lt. Col. Mansoorul Haq (Witness No. 260), ex GSO-I, 9 div. Lt Cdr. A.A. Khan (Witness No. 262), of Pakistan navy, Brig I.R Shariff (Witness No. 269) former Comd. Engrs. Eastern Command, Mr. Mohammad Ashraf (Witness No. 275) former Addl. D.C. Dacca, and Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan (Witness No. 276). The remarks made by this last witness are highly significant: "The troops used to say that when the Commander (Lt. Gen. Niazi) was himself a raper, how could they be stopped. Gen. Niazi enjoyed the same reputation at Sialkot and Lahore."
Magnitude of Atrocities
31. In the circumstances that prevailed in East Pakistan from the 1st of March to the 16th of December 1971, it was hardly possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the toll of death and destruction caused by the Awami League militants and later by the Pakistan Army. It must also be remembered that even after the military action of the 25th of march 1971, Indian infiltrators and members of the Mukti Bahini sponsored by the Awami League continued to indulge in killings, rape and arson during their raids on peaceful villages in East Pakistan, not only in order to cause panic and disruption and carry out their plans of subversion, but also to punish those East Pakistanis who were not willing to go along with them. In any estimate of the extent of atrocities alleged to have been committed on the East Pakistani people, the death and destruction caused by the Awami League militants throughout this period and the atrocities committed by them on their own brothers and sisters must, therefore, be always be kept in view.
32. According to the Bangladesh authorities, the Pakistan Army was responsible for killing three million Bengalis and raping 200,000 East Pakistani women. It does not need any elaborate argument to see that these figures are obviously highly exaggerated. So much damage could not have been caused by the entire strength of the Pakistan Army then stationed in East Pakistan even if it had nothing else to do. In fact, however, the army was constantly engaged in fighting the Mukti Bahini, the Indian infiltrators, and later the Indian army. It has also the task of running the civil administration, maintaining communications and feeding 70 million people of East Pakistan. It is, therefore, clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful.
33. Different figures were mentioned by different persons in authority but the latest statement supplied to us by the GHQ shows approximately 26,000 persons killed during the action by the Pakistan Army. This figure is based on situation reports submitted from time to time by the Eastern Command to the General Headquarters. It is possible that even these figures may contain an element of exaggeration as the lower formations may have magnified their own achievements in quelling the rebellion. However, in the absence of any other reliable date, the Commission is of the view that the latest figure supplied by the GHQ should be accepted. An important consideration which has influenced us in accepting this figure as reasonably correct is the fact that the reports were sent from East Pakistan to GHQ at a time when the Army Officers in East Pakistan could have had no notion whatsoever of any accountability in this behalf.
34. The falsity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's repeated allegation that Pakistani troops had raped 200,000 Bengali girls in 1971 was borne out when the abortion team he had commissioned from Britain in early 1972 found that its workload involved the termination of only a hundred or more pregnancies.
Question of Responsibility
35. For almost three years now, the world has repeatedly heard a list of 195 names said to have been prepared by the Dacca authorities in connection with the commission of these atrocities and crimes. As the Commission has not been supplied with a copy of this list, it is not possible for us to comment upon the justification or otherwise of the inclusion of any particular names therein. It is, however, clear that the final and overall responsibility must rest on General Yahya Khan, Lt. Gen. Pirazada, Maj Gen. Umar, Lt. Gen. Mitha. It has been brought out in evidence that Maj. Gen. Mitha was particularly active in East Pakistan in the days preceding the military action of the 25th of March 1971, and even the other Generals just mentioned were present in Dacca along with Yahya Khan, and secretly departed there on the evening of that fateful day after fixing the deadline for the military action. Maj. Gen. Mitha is said to have remained behind. There is also evidence that Lt. Gen Tikka Khan, Major Gen. Farman Ali and Maj. Gen Khadim Hussain were associated with the planning of the military action. There is, however, nothing to show that they contemplated the use of excessive force or the Commission of atrocities and excesses on the people of East Pakistan.
36. The immediate responsibility for executing the plan of this action fell on Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan who succeeded Lt. Gen. Mohammad Yakub on the 7th of March 1971 as Zonal Administrator, Martial Law, as well as Commander Eastern Command. This last responsibility was passed on by him to Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi on the 7th of April 1971. From that day until the day of surrender the troops in East Pakistan remained under the operational control of Lt. Gen. Niazi who also assumed powers of the Martial Law administrator on the appointment of a civilian Governor in August 1971. It is a question for determination as to what share of responsibility must rest on these commanders for the excesses allegedly committed by the troops under their Command. It is in evidence that Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan was always willing to redress grievances and take disciplinary action whenever complaints of excesses were brought to his notice. It has also to be said that both these Generals had issued repeated warnings to troops to refrain from acts of violence and immorality. At the same time there is some evidence to suggest that the words and personal actions of Lt. Gen. Niazi were calculated to encourage the killings and rape.
37. The direct responsibility of the alleged excesses and atrocities must, of course, rest on those officers and men who physically perpetuated them or knowingly and deliberately allowed them to be so perpetuated. These officers and men not only showed lack of discipline in disobeying the directives of the Eastern Command and Zonal Martial Law Administrator, but also indulged in criminal acts punishable under the Army Act as well as the ordinary law of the land.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP8.HTM
STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE
Chapter 8
Statistics Of Pakistan's Democide
Estimates, Calculations, And Sources*
By R.J. Rummel
STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE
Chapter 8
Statistics Of Pakistan's Democide
Estimates, Calculations, And Sources*
By R.J. Rummel
../genocide should ordinarily be understood as the government murder of people because of their indelible group membership (let the international lawyers struggle with the legal meaning) and democide as any murder by government, including this form of genocide.
In 1971 the self-appointed President of Pakistan and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan and his top generals prepared a careful and systematic military, economic, and political operation in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). They also planned to murder its Bengali intellectual, cultural, and political elite. They also planned to indiscriminately murder hundreds of thousands of its Hindus and drive the rest into India. And they planned to destroy its economic base to insure that it would be subordinate to West Pakistan for at least a generation to come. This despicable and cutthroat plan was outright genocide.
After a well organized military buildup in East Pakistan the military launched its campaign. No more than 267 days later they had succeeded in killing perhaps 1,500,000 people, created 10,000,000 refugees who had fled to India, provoked a war with India, incited a counter-genocide of 150,000 non-Bengalis, and lost East Pakistan.
This democide is listed in Table 8.1 (lines 26 to 30), which gives an overview of Pakistan's war-dead and democide from 1958 to 1987, the period over which Pakistan has had authoritarian rule, usually military governments. There have been periods without martial law, constitutions have been drawn up, and elections have been held. But these were hardly open and fair, democratic rights and liberties were still absent, and the military still largely controlled major policy from behind the scenes. In Table 8.2 I detail the sources and calculations for the 1971 West Pakistan genocide.
Table 8.1 lists several estimates of other democide during the period of military rule (lines 26-30). It also gives the population figures and final democide rates (lines 82 to 92). I calculate the latter for Pakistan as a whole (lines 84 to 85), East Pakistan (line 88), and for the Awami League in East Pakistan (line 91). Although it would be useful to calculate how the proportion of the different ethnic or religious groups were killed, such as the Hindus or Biharis, there is not enough information in the sources for me to determine a reasonably credible figure.
Turning now to Table 8.2, it begins with estimates of war-dead (lines 1 to 21). While the estimates for the largely military war-dead in the Indo-Pakistan War are reasonable, given the size of the forces and the rapidity of the Indian advance (the war was over in two-weeks), some of those for the civil war or military dead must include democide as well. The Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces numbered about 100,000, the Pakistan army about the same. Some estimates give the civil war or overall military death toll as equal to or even two times the combined armed forces involved (lines 14, 15, 19, and 20). This is not credible, even considering that many civilians were caught up in the war and guerrillas were rapidly replaced by volunteers when they were killed. Accordingly, I have consolidated the civil war estimates at a much more sensible level (line 16) and summed this (line 21) with that for those killed in the Indo-Pakistan War, ignoring the two overly inflated military dead estimates (lines 19 and 20).
In the table I next list a variety of democide estimates (lines 23 to 158). Some of these have to be read carefully.There were two major democides in East Pakistan, one of the Hindu and Moslem Bengalis by Pakistan; the other of the non-Bengalis (largely Urdu speaking Biharis) by the Bengalis. Estimates often do not indicate whether they cover both democides, although the source and context of an estimate may suggest that it is only for that by the Pakistan army. Moreover, some overall estimates may also include combat deaths. With this in mind, I have used various subclassifications for the estimates, including putting those that may include combat deaths under a war and democide heading (lines 170 to 178).
The sources give a number of estimates covering only part of the democide period (lines 47 to 55). I have proportionally projected these to the whole period of nine months [(9 x estimate)/(months covered by estimate)], except for two estimates that are for two months (lines 53 and 53a). Their result would have been 4,500,000 killed, obviously much too high. In any case, these I simply and conservatively tripled to cover the whole period. Regardless, the resulting low and high values (line 56) do not depend on them. The mid-value, however, is the average of all the projected estimates.
Malnutrition, disease, and exposure deaths among the refugees constituted democide. These deaths resulted directly from these pitiful people, largely Hindus, fleeing for their lives before the murderous Pakistan Army. In the table (lines 59 to 62) I give some clearly incomplete estimates of these deaths. They are low enough that I can assume they are included in the estimates of the overall democide.
Turning now to the overall estimates of the Pakistan democide (lines 65 to 79), there are two that are clearly excessively low or high (lines 65 and 79) and that I ignore in the consolidation (line 80). While any leader's admission that his country killed 50,000 people is to confess to a terrible crime, some estimate this number were killed in the first two days of massacres in Dacca alone (line 31). Casting out the unique estimate of 8,000,000 dead hardly need be defended.
Beneath the consolidated overall toll I show my calculation from the partial estimates (line 81). These are rather close. Consolidating both ranges, I give a final estimate of Pakistan's democide to be 300,000 to 3,000,000, or a prudent 1,500,000 (line 82).
Then there is Bengali massacres of non-Bengalis, primarily the Biharis (lines 84 to 158). How much of this was democide (intentional killing by government or its agents) is a question. In this part of the world there is a history of ethnic communal violence and massacres between Hindu and Moslems, and Biharis and Bengalis. However, for the reasons given in Death By Government[1] I will treat these massacres as democide.
The first set of estimates (line 86 to 93) cover only part of the period. And these cannot be projected to cover the whole period, since most of the killing took place in the first two months. Accordingly I simply consolidate them into a minimum of 50,000. Note that two of the lowest estimates are limited in place (lines 86 and 87) and to a body count (line 86).
Many of those who collaborated with the Pakistan Army were killed by the Awami League and its supporters during the civil war and after. Only one estimate is available of this number (line 97), which seems very low given the deep hatred on both sides and the pervasive killing. Accordingly, I give an estimated low of 5,000 murdered (line 99). This is probably very conservative, but I do not have enough information to estimate how much to increase it.
A number of estimates of specific massacres are listed by town, city, or district (lines 102 to 152). Most of these come directly from or are based on the reports of survivors. Some of these are from different sources apparently covering the same massacre (e.g., lines 105 and 106); the great difference in the estimated number of victims is a warning as to how seriously to take them. Since all are from two sources, I summed the estimates for each source (lines 153 and 154), and will use these sums below to derive an overall democide (lines 164 and 165).
There are two overall estimates (lines 157 and 158). One of 500,000 dead is an "impression" Aziz got from interviewing hundreds of repatriates who survived the massacres (line 157). This is my high for the two estimates (line 159).
I can now put together the various estimates of the Bengali--Awami League--democide (lines 162 to 166). Consolidating these, I get a range of 50,000 to 500,000 killed, more likely 150,000.
Finally we can turn to the overall results. First are those estimates in the sources that appear to be covering both war and democide dead (lines 171 to 178), which I consolidate (line 179). Then, we have the various subtotals arrived at previously, which I can now bring together (lines 182 to 184). From these I calculate the total democide (185) and the sum of this and the war-dead figures (186). Then for comparison I show the consolidated total previously determined from the estimates (line 187). The two are close enough such that I can take the sum total (line 186) as the final total (line 188) for this period. Note that its low is lower and its high higher than the estimated total (line 187). I cannot average the two mid-values or take the lower one from the estimate total, because then the subtotals (lines 182 to 184) would not add up to the final total. Were the mid-values radically different, I would have to readjust my previous consolidations and calculation (such as for lines 21 and 167), but the difference does not justify that here.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Bangladesh war: The article that changed history
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16207201
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16207201
Written by Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani reporter, and printed in the UK's Sunday Times, it exposed for the first time the scale of the Pakistan army's brutal campaign to suppress its breakaway eastern province in 1971.
Nobody knows exactly how many people were killed, but certainly a huge number of people lost their lives. Independent researchers think that between 300,000 and 500,000 died. The Bangladesh government puts the figure at three million.
The strategy failed, and Bangladeshis are now celebrating the 40th anniversary of the birth of their country. Meanwhile, the first trial of those accused of committing war crimes has recently begun in Dhaka.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the then editor of the Sunday Times, Harold Evans, that the article had shocked her so deeply it had set her "on a campaign of personal diplomacy in the European capitals and Moscow to prepare the ground for India's armed intervention," he recalled.
Not that this was ever Mascarenhas' intention. He was, Evans wrote in his memoirs, "just a very good reporter doing an honest job".
To avoid suspicion, Mascarenhas had to return to Pakistan before his family could leave. But as Pakistanis were only allowed one foreign flight a year, he then had to sneak out of the country by himself, crossing by land into Afghanistan.
The day after the family was reunited in their new home in London, the Sunday Times published his article, under the headline "Genocide".
'Betrayal'
It is such a powerful piece of reporting because Mascarenhas was clearly so well trusted by the Pakistani officers he spent time with.
I have witnessed the brutality of 'kill and burn missions' as the army units, after clearing out the rebels, pursued the pogrom in the towns and villages.
I have seen whole villages devastated by 'punitive action'.
And in the officer's mess at night I have listened incredulously as otherwise brave and honourable men proudly chewed over the day's kill.
'How many did you get?' The answers are seared in my memory.
His article was - from Pakistan's point of view - a huge betrayal and he was accused of being an enemy agent. It still denies its forces were behind such atrocities as those described by Mascarenhas, and blames Indian propaganda.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
the pakistan army is as bad as anything the nazis and their various collaborators got upto
and
america shielded them
and praised them
...
and
america shielded them
and praised them
...
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
India can borrow from German/EU and French precedence, and make Bangladesh genocide denial a crime. This should find support from both Congress and BJP given the demographics of Bangladesh and who was affected.
Laws against Holocaust denial
France genocide law angers Turkey
Laws against Holocaust denial
France genocide law angers Turkey
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Turkey and France in diplomatic row over Armenian genocide bill
Turkey halted military co-operation with France and suspended political visits in retaliation for a French bill making it a criminal offence to deny the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks was genocide.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... -bill.html
Turkey halted military co-operation with France and suspended political visits in retaliation for a French bill making it a criminal offence to deny the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks was genocide.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... -bill.html
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
The Turks have reacted predictably.Their lack of memory about the genocide of Armenians,briefly seen in that classic film "Mayrig" strring Omar Sharif,is now coming back to haunt them as their imperial dreams and sabre-rattling against Syria is dusting off the hisrtory and legacy of the Ottoman Empire warts and all.
The egalitarian FRench,hacve done yeoman service to the world community by reminding the Turks about it in typically Gallic fashion,equating it with the horrors of the Holocaust,denial of which is a rime in France! Not becoz I have a few wee drops of Armenian blood as well,but the French do deserve our global praise and acclamation for their stand on the issue,especially at a time of Turkish imperiousness.Vive la France!
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/de ... r-genocide
Turkey freezes all political relations with France over genocide rowRecep Tayyip Erdogan recalls ambassador after Paris's decision to prosecute people who deny killing of Armenians was genocide
The egalitarian FRench,hacve done yeoman service to the world community by reminding the Turks about it in typically Gallic fashion,equating it with the horrors of the Holocaust,denial of which is a rime in France! Not becoz I have a few wee drops of Armenian blood as well,but the French do deserve our global praise and acclamation for their stand on the issue,especially at a time of Turkish imperiousness.Vive la France!
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/de ... r-genocide
Turkey freezes all political relations with France over genocide rowRecep Tayyip Erdogan recalls ambassador after Paris's decision to prosecute people who deny killing of Armenians was genocide
Turkey freezes all political relations with France over genocide rowRecep Tayyip Erdogan recalls ambassador after Paris's decision to prosecute people who deny killing of Armenians was genocide
Angelique Chrisafis in Paris and Nick Hopkins
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 22 December 2011
Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said the French decision, to prosecute people denying the killing of Armenians was genocide, amounted to Islamophobia. Photograph: Burhan Ozbilici/AP
Turkey has frozen relations with France, recalling its ambassador and suspending all economic, political and military meetings in response to French MPs' approval of a law that would make it a crime to deny that the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 by Ottoman Turks was genocide.
The furious Turkish reaction to Paris's parliamentary vote marked an unprecedented low between the Nato partners.
The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, cancelled permission for French military planes to land and warships to dock in Turkey, annulled all joint military exercises, recalled the Turkish ambassador to France for consultations and said he would decide case by case whether to let the French military use Turkish airspace.
He said this was just the start and "gradually" but "decisively" other retaliation measures would be taken against France. He warned of heavy diplomatic "wounds" that would be "difficult to heal".
A majority of the 50 MPs present in France's lower chamber approved the bill which would make denying any genocide – but implicitly the Armenian genocide – a criminal offence punishable by a one-year prison sentence and a fine of €45,000 (£37,500). The bill was put forward by an MP from Sarkozy's rightwing UMP party, but the issue was supported by socialists.
"This is politics based on racism, discrimination and xenophobia. This is using Turkophobia and Islamophobia to gain votes, it raises concerns regarding these issues not only in France but all over Europe," Erdogan said, accusing the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, of deliberately courting the large Armenian-French vote ahead of next year's election.
The French foreign minister Alain Juppé said he didn't want "our Turkish friends" to "overreact". Earlier, trying to smooth the row with Turkey, he dismissed the bill as "useless and counterproductive". He said Turkey, "a proud nation", should work on its issues of history and memory, but threatening French criminal sanctions was not the right way to make them do it.
Under Sarkozy, who opposes Turkish entry to the European Union, relations between Paris and Ankara have been difficult. But the Nato allies had been working together on key issues such as the Syria uprising. Erdogan said Turkey was now "suspending all kinds of political consultations with France".
A Turkish official indicated the freeze would not affect the country's membership of Nato, and that the withdrawal of military co-operation would be at a bilateral level.
Armenia, backed by many historians and parliaments, says about 1.5 million Christian Armenians were killed in what is now eastern Turkey during the first world war in a deliberate policy of genocide ordered by the Ottoman government. Ankara denies the killings constitute genocide and says many Muslim Turks and Kurds were also put to death as Russian troops invaded eastern Anatolia, often aided by Armenian militias.
The French bill criminalising genocide denial must now be put to the French senate for debate next year.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
You're havin' a laff mate. That is one thing that will NEVER happen. Why? Because once a bill to this effect is brought into the parliament, it takes but one vile MP (from either of the sickular parties) to call for extending the resolution to Gujrat riots of 2002.vera_k wrote:India can borrow from German/EU and French precedence, and make Bangladesh genocide denial a crime. This should find support from both Congress and BJP given the demographics of Bangladesh and who was affected.
A furious BJP will hit back with demands that 1984 anti-Sikh riots be included before Gujrat is even considered. The Dravidian parties in an attempt to do one over their rivals will ask for the Eelam War IV and the Black July anti-Tamil riots of 1983 to be included as well.
End result? A free for all bedlam will ensue.
I am surprised that Bangladesh government (to the best of my knowledge) has not passed a law criminalising the denial of the 1971 genocide. Perhaps we could Shekh Hasina in that direction.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
The full article by Anthony Mascarenhas referred to above.. makes a chilling reading. It is very important that the war crimes trial in Bangladesh be completed successfully and the genocidal Islamist maniacs be brought to justice.
http://www.profile-of-bengal.com/p-b/ww ... nocide.htm
http://www.profile-of-bengal.com/p-b/ww ... nocide.htm
"Of course," he added hastily, "we are only killing the Hindu men. We are soldiers, not cowards like the rebels. They kill our women and children."
Reacting to the almost successful breakaway of the province, which has more than half the country's population, General Yahya Khan's military Government is pushing through its own "final solution" of the East Bengal problem.
"We are determined to cleanse East Pakistan once and for all of the threat of secession, even if it means killing of two million people and ruling the province as a colony for 30 years," I was repeatedly told by senior military and civil officers in Dacca and Comilla.
The West Pakistan army in East Bengal is doing exactly that with a terrifying thoroughness.
"The Hindus had completely undermined the Muslim masses with their money," Col. Naim, of 9th Division headquarters, told me in the officers mess at Comilla. They bled the province white. Money, food and produce flowed across the borders to India. In some cases they made up more than half the teaching staff in the colleges and schools, and sent their own children to be educated in Calcutta. It had reached the point where Bengali culture was in fact Hindu culture, and East Pakistan was virtually under the control of the Marwari businessmen in Calcutta. We have to sort them out to restore the land to the people, and the people to their Faith."
Or take Major Bashir. He came up from the ranks. He is SSO of the 9th Division at Comilla and he boasts of a personal bodycount of 28. He had his own reasons for what has happened. "This is a war between the pure and the impure," he informed me over a cup of green tea. "The people here may have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindus at heart. You won't believe that the maulvi (mulla) of the Cantonment mosque here issued a fathwa (edict) during Friday prayers that the people would attain ,janat (paradise) if they killed West Pakistanis. We sorted the ******** out and we are now sorting out the others. Those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu."
In one of the most crowded areas of the entire world-Comilla district has a population density of 1,900 to the square mile-only man was nowhere to be seen.
" Where are the Bengalis ?" I had asked my escorts in the strangely empty streets of Dacca a few days earlier." They have gone to the villages, - was the stock reply. Now, in the countryside, there were still no Bengalis. Comilla town. like Dacca was heavily shuttered. And in ten miles on the road to Laksham. past silent villages, the peasants I saw could have been counted on the fingers of both hands.
In one sentence, the Government is too far committed militarily to abandon the East Bengal operation, which it would have to do if it sincerely wanted a political solution. President Yahya Khan is riding on the back of a tiger. But he took a calculated decision to climb up there. SO THE ARMY is not going to pull out. The Government's policy for East Bengal was spelled out to me in the Eastern Command headquarters at Dacca. It has three elements:
(I) The Bengalis have proved themselves "unreliable" and must be ruled by West Pakistanis;
(2) The Bengalis will have to be re-educated along proper Islamic lines. The " Islamisation of the masses "-this is the official jargon-is intended to eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide a strong religious bond with West Pakistan;
(3) When the Hindus have been eliminated by death and flight, their property will be used as a golden carrot to win over the under-privileged Muslim middleclass. This will provide the base for erecting administrative and political structure--, in the future.
This policy is being pursued with the utmost blatancy.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Shouldnt this thread be in the Military Forum? (71 war related, Bangladesh and all that)
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
The (Ottoman) Empire strikes back!
Your genocide is worse than mine....!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... lates.html
Turkey accuses France of Algerian genocide as row escalates
Turkey’s prime minister accused France of conducting a “merciless” genocide in Algeria as he responded furiously to a vote in the French parliament concerning the mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire.
Your genocide is worse than mine....!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... lates.html
Turkey accuses France of Algerian genocide as row escalates
Turkey’s prime minister accused France of conducting a “merciless” genocide in Algeria as he responded furiously to a vote in the French parliament concerning the mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire.
Mr Erdogan turned to France’s colonial record in Algeria, where an eight-year war was waged for independence between 1954 and 1962. “What the French did in Algeria was genocide,” said the prime minister, alleging that French forces had “mercilessly martyred” about 15 per cent of the entire Algerian population.
Related Articles
Armenians pleased by genocide ruling
22 Dec 2011
Turkey and France in diplomatic row over genocide bill
22 Dec 2011
Delivering a remarkably personal - if inaccurate - attack, Mr Erdogan added: "If Mr Sarkozy doesn't know about this genocide, he should go and ask his father, Paul Sarkozy. His father served in the French Legion in Algeria in the 1940s. I am sure he would have lots to tell his son about the French massacres in Algeria."
In fact, Mr Sarkozy's father, actually called Pal, never served in Algeria during his four months in the French Foreign Legion.
The figure for the total number of Muslim dead in Algeria is placed at around one million in “A Savage War of Peace”, the most authoritative history of the war written by Alistair Horne, a British historian. The total Muslim population during this period was about 10 million. About 1 million French settlers were also expelled from Algeria when independence came in 1962.
Mr Sarkozy opposes Turkey’s application to join the European Union and relations between the two countries have been tense since he won office in 2007. Turkey blames France for obstructing the negotiations on membership that have been proceeding at a snail’s pace since 2005.
Mr Sarkozy offered a relatively conciliatory response to Turkey’s accusation, saying: “France doesn’t give lessons to anyone, but France also doesn’t plan on taking them.” The president added: “I respect the convictions of our Turkish friends - it’s a grand country, a grand civilisation - and they must respect ours.”
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Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Why stop there?vera_k wrote:India can borrow from German/EU and French precedence, and make Bangladesh genocide denial a crime. This should find support from both Congress and BJP given the demographics of Bangladesh and who was affected.
Laws against Holocaust denial
France genocide law angers Turkey
Make the genocide of 20 million Indians during the 1857-58 war a crime. Make the denial of ethnic cleansing of non-Muslims from pakistan a crime. Make the denial of genocide of 400 million Hindus by muslim rulers a crime too. Make the annual genocide of Indians during British rakshas raj a crime too.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
Jagan, merging it with the war will confuse the issue killings that happened in 1971.
In the soundbites of Paki grievences, India's involvement in Bangadesh and arming of Mukti Bahini (1971) somehow justifies its involvement since 1947.
I see a lot of own goals on this thread. In itself, it is a crime that should be remembered for humanity's sake.
Just to get a sense if we take the date of 26 mar 1971 and date of 16 dec 1971, as its period, it is a total of 265 days. In this Pakistani Army was unchecked only in the last 15 days. Even if we take the smallest figure from HRC Report of 26,000, it is an average of 98 civilians killed by Pakistani Army per day for the 265 days. At 200,000 the average jumps to 754. At 3 million it would be 11,321 per day.
In the soundbites of Paki grievences, India's involvement in Bangadesh and arming of Mukti Bahini (1971) somehow justifies its involvement since 1947.
I see a lot of own goals on this thread. In itself, it is a crime that should be remembered for humanity's sake.
Just to get a sense if we take the date of 26 mar 1971 and date of 16 dec 1971, as its period, it is a total of 265 days. In this Pakistani Army was unchecked only in the last 15 days. Even if we take the smallest figure from HRC Report of 26,000, it is an average of 98 civilians killed by Pakistani Army per day for the 265 days. At 200,000 the average jumps to 754. At 3 million it would be 11,321 per day.
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Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
ManuT,
you seriously underestimate the number of people one can kill, if he has power and wants to kill. Simple, send a battalion and kill all its villagers, deaths > 1000-5000. and this is without the help of their ubiquitous razakars.
if your logic is applied then 93000 "trained to kill" pakistan army men surrendered in 16 days, i.e. 8000 per day.
But this is not how it works out. You are simply falling to the propaganda that there is an inherent humanism which makes the above impossible.
there were around 1 lakh pakistani troops + many mullahs and their assosciated murderers to achieve your numbers which works out to less than 1 person killed by each of them every two weeks. Does this number seem plausible to you?
you seriously underestimate the number of people one can kill, if he has power and wants to kill. Simple, send a battalion and kill all its villagers, deaths > 1000-5000. and this is without the help of their ubiquitous razakars.
if your logic is applied then 93000 "trained to kill" pakistan army men surrendered in 16 days, i.e. 8000 per day.
But this is not how it works out. You are simply falling to the propaganda that there is an inherent humanism which makes the above impossible.
there were around 1 lakh pakistani troops + many mullahs and their assosciated murderers to achieve your numbers which works out to less than 1 person killed by each of them every two weeks. Does this number seem plausible to you?
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
^^
Ah, the joys of internet, I think, you might be misreading my post.
If you read my other posts on this thread, all I have posted is evidence of the crime.
(If it is the 'own goals' part, it is a lament not to dilute the seriousness of the crime)
(I am just amazed that Pakistan has made this part of its 'revenge' policy in J&K. It is a myth that needs to be demolished. For that, India has to be blamed for letting it slip out of mind)
Ah, the joys of internet, I think, you might be misreading my post.
If you read my other posts on this thread, all I have posted is evidence of the crime.
(If it is the 'own goals' part, it is a lament not to dilute the seriousness of the crime)
(I am just amazed that Pakistan has made this part of its 'revenge' policy in J&K. It is a myth that needs to be demolished. For that, India has to be blamed for letting it slip out of mind)
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Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
The ideology of Pakistan is so well captured in the above quote. I guess the same cannot escape West Pakistan and a never ending state of purification will start.sudeepj wrote:The full article by Anthony Mascarenhas referred to above.. makes a chilling reading. It is very important that the war crimes trial in Bangladesh be completed successfully and the genocidal Islamist maniacs be brought to justice.
http://www.profile-of-bengal.com/p-b/ww ... nocide.htm
Or take Major Bashir. He came up from the ranks. He is SSO of the 9th Division at Comilla and he boasts of a personal bodycount of 28. He had his own reasons for what has happened. "This is a war between the pure and the impure," he informed me over a cup of green tea. "The people here may have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindus at heart. You won't believe that the maulvi (mulla) of the Cantonment mosque here issued a fathwa (edict) during Friday prayers that the people would attain ,janat (paradise) if they killed West Pakistanis. We sorted the ******** out and we are now sorting out the others. Those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu."
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
American Indian Genocide. Museum.
http://www.aigenom.com/
Hands of statue of liberty are soaked in blood of innocents. A superpower who preaches other nation about Human Rights and religious freedom is yet to give justice to the victims of their own ihuman doings.
an excerpt from one of the documents:
In god we trust. E pluribus unum
Also the acts of genocides were enjoyable
http://www.aigenom.com/
Hands of statue of liberty are soaked in blood of innocents. A superpower who preaches other nation about Human Rights and religious freedom is yet to give justice to the victims of their own ihuman doings.
an excerpt from one of the documents:
Neech people did not spare a child. 10 pound for a child under the age of 10. 50 pounds for 10+ adult.The Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay Vol. I 1692-1714 Pg.
292
Fifty pounds reward for an Indian scalp.
(Sec.1.) That there shall be paid out of the publick treasury of this province unto any party or
parties that shall voluntarily go forth at their own charge, by commission as aforesaid, in the
discovery and pursuit of the said Indian enemy and rebels, for every man or woman of the said
enemy that shall be by them slain, the sum of fifty pounds; and for every child of the said
enemy under the age of ten years that shall be by them slain, the sum of ten pounds; and that
such party or parties shall also have and keep unto their own use all plunder and prisoners by
them taken of the enemy; and that there shall be likewise paid out of the publick treasury for
every man or woman of the said enemy that shall be slain in the defence of any house or
garrison attacked or otherwise, the sum of five pounds; all which aforesaid payments shall be
made by order of the goverour and council, upon producing before them the scalp of any
Indian slain as aforesaid, and upon oath made of the time, place and other circumstances
relating thereto , and that it is the scalp of the Indian that was then so slain. And in case any
person or persons shall be wounded in the aforesaid service, he or they shall be cured at the
charge of the publick; and if maimed or otherwise disabled shall have such stipend or pension
allowed unto him or them as the general court or assembly shall think meet. And the reward
herein before granted shall be equally shared and distributed to and among all the persons of
any party or parties that shall be in company at the killing any Indian as aforesaid, only the
captain to have two shares and the lieutenant one share and halfe thereof; and the plunder and
prisoners that shall be taken to be distributed in like shares and proportion, unless where any
party or parties shall otherwise agree among themselves.
In god we trust. E pluribus unum
Also the acts of genocides were enjoyable
Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman Vol. 2 Pgs. 413 & 414
…They naturally looked for new homes to the great West, to the new
Territories and States as far as the Pacific coast, and we realize to-day
that the vigorous men who control Kansas, Nebraska, Dakota,
Montana, Colorado, etc., etc., were soldiers of the civil war. These men
flocked to the plains, and were rather stimulated than retarded by the
danger of an Indian war. This was another potent agency in producing
the result we enjoy to-day, in having in so short a time replaced the wild
buffaloes by more numerous herds of tame cattle, and by; substituting for
the useless Indians the intelligent owners of productive farms and cattle-
ranches.
Re: Genocide Denial: the war against history
By Ajmal Kamal
'Them’ and ‘us’
http://tribune.com.pk/story/317609/them-and-us/
http://tribune.com.pk/story/321072/padma-turns-red/
The flight from Rajshahi
http://tribune.com.pk/story/328101/the- ... -rajshahi/
The sack of Rajshahi
http://tribune.com.pk/story/331419/the- ... -rajshahi/
Of blood and fire
http://tribune.com.pk/story/334537/of-blood-and-fire/
'Them’ and ‘us’
http://tribune.com.pk/story/317609/them-and-us/
‘Padma turns red’I came across on such atypical narrative in a diary of a Dhaka University student belonging to Lahore that records his personal experiences from March to June 1971. Anwer Shahid, who went on to become a journalist, wrote and managed to smuggle his diary to West Pakistan when he returned to Lahore in July 1971. I was surprised to learn that his diary, titled Padma Surkh Hai, was published as a series – under a pseudonym “Shaakh” – in the Lahore daily Musawat in November 1971; a journalist decided to translate and publish its installments in Karachi’s Gujarati daily Dawn.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/321072/padma-turns-red/
The flight from Rajshahi
http://tribune.com.pk/story/328101/the- ... -rajshahi/
The sack of Rajshahi
http://tribune.com.pk/story/331419/the- ... -rajshahi/
Of blood and fire
http://tribune.com.pk/story/334537/of-blood-and-fire/
Apart from the fighting among the several armed groups, the civilian population of different ethnic and political backgrounds was considered fair game and was being treated with arson, killing, torture and rape on a large scale. The younger son of Shahid’s host family was hospitalised for an ailment. He narrates in his diary how, when he went to the hospital to visit him, a doctor told him that the hospital had received two victims of rape who were almost dead. On another visit to the hospital, he looked into the children’s ward and saw many children younger than 10 years. All of them had wounds on their throats — they were survivors of attacks on civilian neighbourhoods. Many of them had lost every single member of their families.
Shahid finally decided to return to Lahore, via Dhaka, in August 1971, but he was greatly troubled about what he had seen and felt during the continuing civil war. As a responsible witness, he got his diary published — unavoidably censored — in the daily Musawat, Lahore, during November. Hanif Ramay and Shafqat Tanveer Mirza were instrumental in bringing this account to light. But the diary was, regretfully, all but ignored.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 11th, 2012.