Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

[ramana]

Most likely is if TSP starts a conflict in the fog of war US grabs the nooks.

[Amber G.]

Shivji - For your calculation(s) of critical masses, ityadi you may like to take a look at
"Las Alamos Primer" (by Serber). (Book is based on work, based lectures given to physicists and engineers who worked on Manhattan Project to bring them up to speed ).

It shows how to calculate (and how the theoretical ( "simple") value of diameter of 13.5 cm (for U235) = 200 Kg is reduced to much smaller value by innovative ways. (Most of the stuff was classified even a few years ago). The book can give you much more informed calculation for Pak, than, IMO, many of the "experts" which have gotten even the fundamentals wrong.

In any case, IMO, one should keep in mind that it is more complicated (much more complicated) than just plug in a number (55 Kg / 15 Kg / 5Kg) in a spreadsheet.
Neutron reflectors, use of tamper, crystal structure of the fuel used, amount of impurity etc.... can make a *huge* difference. And one can make some educated guesses which will yield more reliable results than guessing the total amount of maal alone. (Though, of course, total amount of maal is important)

Even such axioms as - U235 can have "gun trigger" but it will not work for Pu etc, while in general true, are not some fundamental laws. Keep in mind, that first Pu bomb design was "gun" type which has to change because the slight variation of Pu240 in the initial sample vs the later sample.

Anyway I will recommend the above book. I think you will find it useful, if you have not already seen it.

[ShauryaT]

Shaurya - then their total numbers of devices are correspondingly low - if you look at the figures from the link in my first post.

Probably, as most western analysts do an extrapolation of known HEU capacities and assume that all or nearly all are fashioned into usable warheads or bombs. Unless, TSP goes TN design, the numbers by these western analysts are off by a wide margin.

In my view, to do a straight extrapolation based on any single item such as estimated HEU quantities and/or missiles would be erroneous.

I mean this is TSP we are talking about and to presume that they have the capacity to fashion all these different types of devices and war heads for various delivery mechanisms would be fraught with errors.

What TSP wants is 100+ KT weapon and going BF is their best option, given their technical levels. But even that would not be so straight forward, they first have to build a basic WgPu based fission device.

They have managed the basic ability to fashion some WgPu only after 2004 - not before.

PS: Unfortunately do not have the time now to dig in deep and provide and post all the references. So, the above is from memory of readings.

[shiv]

AmberG and Shaurya - thanks. I realise that there necessarily have to be some assumptions and gross inaccuracies in my estimates - but I believe it is important to start somewhere. One of the approaches I like to use is the "Sauce for Goose is sauce for gander" approach. I have used that in the China mil thread as well. If you have Indian scientists waxing eloquent on how tough it is to actually get a bang right and being scathing about the ability of other Indian scientists to do that - the least that we can do is to apply the same constraints to Pakistan and assume they have the same difficulties.

Taking this line is usually met on this forum buy the "counter argument" - Oh the Pakis have China to give them everything. There are several deep flaws in this line of argument (again on the lines of -"80% of LCA is foreign")

There is a huge difference between, on the one hand, China giving a design - say 30 kg HEU (or some mas of Pu), x cm tamper of say U 238, Y Kg of explosive and the geometry of that along with krytrons or whatever switches they need. On the other hand you do the research. You start with 20 kg, 30, kg, 40 kg HEU - then you vary the tamper material and thickness, you play with the conventional explosive, you vary the design - flying plate, implosion, hollow pit etc

The difference between the first Chinese design and the second Pindigenous design is that the first will have say a 95% confidence that it will work as advertised because it has been tested. Any designs based on your own experimentation minus the testing will not enjoy those high confidence levels. What this means in practice is that the Chinese design would be "sure shot" but restricted to one missile warhead weight. Maybe the 3000 kg one as Rudradev suggested. The other designs could be for other delivery systems but may not work as advertised for lack of testing.

What sort of testing is required short of a nuclear test?

We do know that hydrodynamic testing can be done where youare assemble the whole bomb minus the core - instead of which you use a steel ball. But even for such testing you need a fairly sophisticated set up - and as far as my knowledge goes - you need high speed cameras, high speed X ray and other monitoring equipment and every time you test you need all those high speed switches that get blown apart. If you are not manufacturing this stuff and you need to smuggle them in then every time you test you are blowing up stuff that should used against the kafir Indians. Finally you need banks of high performance computers and a few physicists and mathematicians whose papers should very occasionally appear in journals "Neutron flux around ants following compression in a high explosive sphere" How much Pakistan has of all this is not directly known to me - but indirectly I can tell that Pakistan has not shown much evidence of that level of sophistication (to me). And all these varied and sophisticated warheads for delivery by various means (Nasr/Babur etc) may be so much hot air.

However - one of the reasons I have taken published material about the amounts of missile material seriously is that they could as well be overestimates as they could be under estimates. But they are published estimates. India worries about the bombs but Unkil is more concerned about the fissile material. Given enough fissile material - especially U235 - even a relatively unsophisticated set up can make a working gun type bomb.

I realise the point about the gun type Pu bomb. But here again the level of chemistry has to be higher. You need Pu239 with very little Pu 240 - because the Pu 240 will cause a gun type bomb to explode early with fizzle type results. Mind you even those fizzle results may be big enough to blow up an airbase. But for someone who has little experience with bomb designs - the safest would be 50 kg lump at one end of a gun barrel and a 10 kg shell fired into the center of that lump.

A whole lot of countries will be interested in that 90% enriched Uranium.

I mean - if I was Iran, I would ask "How much is Tel Aviv worth? $1 trillion?" Then how much is 60 kg of HEU to blow up Tel Aviv worth? Paying Pakistan $ 5 billion for 50 kg of HEU would be good business. Real chap. Pay 5 billion and do 1 trillion worth of damage And if Iran can pay $ 5 billion. Why not demand $ 10 billion from the USA to avoid giving that 50 kg to Iran?

So apart from Indian fears of nuclear war - there is this other problem of fissile material. Imagine a situation in which a group of Dawood D company type Paki generals have a pact with KSA . Star war with India - get nuked and use the confusion to remove 200 kg of HEU to some other destination. OK India and Pakistan will be in deep shit, but the "World order" is changed no? And a small group of men become very rich.

[Amber G.]

..
Pakistan's fourth nuclear reactor

Pakistan is focusing on building low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons which it can use in case of skirmishes at the border with India. After disclosures that Pakistan is building its fourth reactor at the Khushab military facility, fresh estimates made by security and intelligence officials here suggest that Pakistan now has the capability to add 8-10 such weapons in its kitty every year.

The figure is likely to go up considerably once the new reactor becomes operational in less than two years. Latest satellite images revealed recently that Pakistan has expedited work on the fourth reactor, a plutonium producing facility.

[Anujan]

The NoKo tests which were supposedly fizzles. Were they tests of low yield Plutonium warheads?

[ramana]

Yes. Read thethread in the archives.

The thinking is the Chagai May 30 test had Noko observers. Recall the missing Noko Secy in the Embassy at that time.

[Gagan]

Pakistan's Nuclear Reactors


Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) Rawalpindi:

PARR-1 - Research reactor, designed for highly enriched (90% uranium) fuel, designed and built in collaboration with the United States, commissioned in 1965, was raised from 5 MWt to 9 MWt and converted to low-enriched (20%) fuel in 1990. China assisted in fuel fabrication for the rebuilt and upgraded PARR-1 research reactor. PARR-I may have been used clandestinely to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons.
PARR-2 - training reactor, Pool-type, light-water, HEU, 27-30 kWt, designed and built in collaboration with the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (Beijing), went critical in late 1989.
New Labs Reprocessing Plant: Unsafeguarded facility for plutonium reprocessing. Recently doubled in size due to the addition of a new wing.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Chashma Nuclear Complex

CHASHNUPP-1
300MW PWR Commissioned 2000.
Supplied by:
Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute(SNERDI)
China National Nuclear Corporation(CNNC)
East China Electric Power Design Institute(ECEPDI)
CHASNUPP-2
300MW PWR Commissioned 2011.
Both reactors are under IAEA safeguard.





Kundian Fuel Fabrication Plant


Chashma Reprocessing Facility


China has recently pushed through a contract to supply 2 more reactors at this site.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Khushab Nuclear Complex

Pakistan's main Plutonium production reactors. All are unsafeguarded.
Reactors 1 & 2 are operational, estimated capacity of about 22 Kgs of weapons grade plutonium yearly.
Reactors 3 & 4 are under construction.


Khusab Nuclear reactor - K1
50 MWt, heavy water and natural uranium research reactor and Plutonium production reactor. Commissioned in 1998.


There are MANPADS surrounding the old reactor and they seem to have Oerlikon AAA guns deployed. Pakistan seems to have 35mm Oerlikon AAAs.


New Khushab Nuclear Reactors 2, 3 & 4
These are newly built Plutonium production reactors believed to be of 50-100MWte.
As of now, Reactor 2 is functional commissioned in 2010, 3 is in final finishing and testing, and 4 has just begun construction.

Notice steam coming out of the cooling towers of Reactor 2

Heavy Water Production Plant



Water-H2S exchange towers: Notice the shadows too.


Compare the Water-H2S exchange towers with these pictures below.

____________________________________________________________________________________________

Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)

125 MWe PHWR
KANUPP, commissioned in 1972, is a heavy water moderated and cooled natural uranium fueled, horizontal pressure tube reactor.
Due to poor maintenance and fuel shortages, this reactor has extremely poor plant load factors.
The reactor is under IAEA safeguards.

[ramana]

Wonder if PRC is offshoring its Fissile material production to TSP? All those plants look too numerous for TSP needs.

[Amber G.]

The NoKo tests which were supposedly fizzles. Were they tests of low yield Plutonium warheads?

According to fairly well gathered data, 2006 test was less than 0.5% fission, about 400 tons of TNT, second (2009 ?) was larger, one good estimate I saw/calculated (with valid data, IMO) was about 1.6 KT (fission less than 1.5%)....They were Pu, but were duds (compression, even for solid Pu, reduces the critical mass.. guess (actually much more than a guess) was they were not able to compress it.. among other things.
(As you know (or if you do search for data) , it is all, now fairly well known.... and math involved to estimate from the collected data is first year physics.. )

[Amber G.]

Recent article from Newsweek
Khusab .. ityadi

..Photos obtained by NEWSWEEK reveal a more aggressive buildup than previously known. So why does Washington still stay mum?...

Edited later: Already posted before...
[<snipped >

[Rudradev]

The difference between the first Chinese design and the second Pindigenous design is that the first will have say a 95% confidence that it will work as advertised because it has been tested. Any designs based on your own experimentation minus the testing will not enjoy those high confidence levels. What this means in practice is that the Chinese design would be "sure shot" but restricted to one missile warhead weight. Maybe the 3000 kg one as Rudradev suggested. The other designs could be for other delivery systems but may not work as advertised for lack of testing.

I agree.

For a parallel, consider automobiles in India from 1950-1986/87 or thereabouts.

For these three decades the only cars on Indian roads were copies of 1950s (and older) western cars. Ambassador was essentially a Morris, Premier Padmini was an old Fiat model, etc.

It was more important to spend our automobile industry's resources on producing cars (even old-model cars) that worked, than coming up with innovations that would increase engine power, mileage, safety, consumer amenities and so on-- even if the technology required for such innovations was available to other countries. Until the Maruti 800 was introduced, nobody in India thought that anything different was needed badly enough. Cars were a specialized commodity, affordable only by certain economic classes of Indians (and by the government.) It was enough to have cars that did the job of cars in a more-or-less reliable manner, than to invest in research to produce better cars indigenously.

Of course this parallel has many limitations; but in general I think it could be applied to any technology being exploited in a country with limited industrial and research base, poor economy and scarce resources. In the case of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, all they have to rely on are old designs given by other people. How far are these removed from the primitive gun-type HEU and implosion-Pu devices that the US first made 60 years ago?

It may very well be that gun-type Pu devices are possible, that mass-to-core-size ratio can be decreased in innovative ways, or that other technologies are available to squeeze more bang out of less fissile material; I defer to Amber G's opinions on those matters. But researching these techniques is associated with an opportunity cost as well as a resource cost. For Pakistan, these costs come at the expense of producing more "Fiats and Ambassadors" if you will... and in a much more resource-scarce, time-sensitive context than the Indian automobile industry ever faced.

We cannot compare this with a nation that has Lawrence Livermore labs, plenty of fissile material, the best research establishment in the world, advanced industrial base and 100s of millions of USD to throw at the problem of making better, more efficient N-weapons.

It may be that Pakistan's N-program has recently designed its equivalent of the "Maruti 800" with Chinese help, some sort of higher-yield Pu device that is tried and tested; and that the feverish efforts to ramp up WGPu production represent a drive to mass-produce this new "Maruti 800" nuke.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^Bitter food for very, very serious thought....

China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets
Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress

Summary
This CRS Report discusses China’s suspected acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets, including that on the W88, the newest U.S. nuclear warhead. This serious controversy became public in early 1999 and raised policy issues about whether U.S. security was further threatened by China’s suspected use of U.S. nuclear weapon secrets in its development of nuclear forces, as well as whether the Administration’s response to the security problems was effective or mishandled and whether it fairly used or abused its investigative and prosecuting authority. The Clinton Administration acknowledged that improved security was needed at the weapons labs but said that it took actions in response to indications in 1995 that China may have obtained U.S. nuclear weapon secrets. Critics in Congress and elsewhere argued that the Administration was slow to respond to security concerns, mishandled the too narrow investigation, downplayed information potentially unfavorable to China and the labs, and failed to notify Congress fully.

On April 7, 1999, President Clinton gave his assurance that partly “because of our engagement, China has, at best, only marginally increased its deployed nuclear threat in the last 15 years” and that the strategic balance with China “remains overwhelmingly in our favor.” On April 21, 1999, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, reported the Intelligence Community’s damage assessment. It confirmed that “China obtained by espionage classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons.” It also revealed that China obtained information on “several” U.S. nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II submarine-launched missile that delivers the W88 nuclear warhead as well as “a variety of” design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb.

On May 25, 1999, the House’s Cox Committee reported that China stole classified information on the W88 and six other U.S. nuclear warheads. On June 15, 1999, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) called the Department of Energy a “dysfunctional bureaucracy” and urged the creation of a semi-autonomous or independent agency to oversee nuclear weapons. In September 1999, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act to create a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within DOE on March 1, 2000. As one result of the W-88 case, the FBI investigated a Taiwan-born U.S. scientist at the Los Alamos lab, Wen Ho Lee. He was never charged with espionage. In December 1999, the Justice Department indicted Lee on 59 felony counts for mishandling nuclear weapons information (not classified at the time). Lee was jailed without bail until a plea agreement on September 13, 2000, when he pleaded guilty to one count of mishandling national defense information (for making copies of his computer files). The judge apologized to Lee. Meanwhile, in April 1999, the FBI expanded its counterintelligence investigation beyond the focus on Los Alamos, and in 2000, the probe shifted to missile secrets and to the Defense Department. In April 2003, an ex-FBI agent, James Smith, and his informant, Katrina Leung, were arrested for allegedly mishandling national defense information related to China.

From page 6 of this PDF report...

“Tiger Trap”. In the first public case, the press reported in 1990 that China had stolen data on the neutron bomb from the Lawrence Livermore lab sometime in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and the FBI began an investigation perhaps in 1986. This case, code-named “Tiger Trap,” reportedly remained open as of 20003 and became tied to later cases. The PRC allegedly used U.S. secrets about the W70 neutron warhead to make an experimental neutron bomb that was tested in 1988 and also passed the information to Pakistan. The U.S. scientist involved was fired after being investigated for two years, but, because of insufficient evidence, was never charged with a crime.4 In late 2000, the suspect’s name was publicly reported to be Gwo-Bao Min.5 Saying he was unaware of the FBI’s investigation at the time, the suspect in the third case, Wen Ho Lee, made a call to this person in 1982.

From page 65 of this PDF report...

In addition to questions about counterintelligence and modernization of PRC weapon designs, there were policy implications posed by China possibly passing U.S. nuclear weapon secrets to other countries. As discussed above, in the late 1970s to 1980s, the PRC reportedly acquired U.S. data on the neutron bomb from Livermore and passed it to Pakistan. The United States and other countries have been concerned about PRC nuclear weapon proliferation, especially in Pakistan and Iran. Advanced U.S. warheads have features of value to would-be nuclear weapon states. These features might permit a nation to develop more efficient warheads, in which case it could build more bombs with its supply of uranium or plutonium. They might solve engineering problems or suggest production shortcuts. If China passed U.S. nuclear weapon information to another country, it could develop and deploy a more potent nuclear force faster.

READ THE WHOLE REPORT HERE...
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL30143.pdf

[Rudradev]

Just flying a kite here, but consider the following deal being made.

The US and China do not want India to be able to prosecute a conventional war on Pakistan, as it wrecks their balance-of-power calculations. This was the thinking all along, as nukes were allowed to be proliferated to Pakistan by China under the US' nose.

However, Pakistan went all out and embarked on a program of making high-yield N-weapons to threaten Indian cities with massive retaliation in the event of any Indian conventional attack. They went further and started using these large N-weapons as cover for terrorist blackmail of India.

This was fine through the 1980s and 1990s. However, after 9/11, BOTH the US and China saw that this was a dangerous development that could just as easily be used to blackmail them.

So the US and China have two problems.

One, they don't want Pakistan to have a large N-weapons industry: because
(a) loose nukes capable of destroying (Western/Chinese) cities could turn up in Islamists' hands-- the most far-fetched reason, but still possible.
(b) such an industry necessarily ends up producing a lot of fissile material that is "improperly safeguarded", and can be proliferated to dirty-bombing Islamists, or to other countries like Iran for incorporation into their own nuclear arsenals.
(c) there is at least a possibility that, if TSP uses city-killing nukes against Indian cities, the Indians will retaliate asymmetrically by nuking Chinese cities. Nobody in DC or Beijing is stupid enough to dismiss this possibility and its implications.
(d) All said and done, it's bad for the US and even the Chinese economies if Indian cities get nuked. Even if India does absolutely nothing in retaliation... globalization has created disincentives for the US and China to see this happen. The US/Chinese objective is balance of power; Pakistan's objective is total destruction and subjugation of India... there is a schism here.

Two: they don't want India to be able to dominate the subcontinent militarily, or punish a conventionally inferior Pakistan at will. This concern still stands.

So what is the solution?

1) Completely close down and reboot Pakistan's nuclear industry as it stood from 1976-2001.
2) Completely change the philosophy of the Pakistani N-establishment. From an establishment producing large amounts of HEU aimed at manufacturing city-killing nukes (25 kT plus), change it to an industry that focuses on small "tactical" and battlefield nukes. Such small tactical nukes can be used against advancing Indian columns to severely degrade any conventional Indian move against Pakistan before existential damage is done by the Indian armed forces to Pakistan (no more Bangladesh's are possible.)
3) Provide a quiet "nuclear deal" to Pakistan. Assist Pakistan to acquire enough Pu to make a substantial arsenal of tactical nukes (expand Khushab etc.) Also provide tested designs and engineering facilities to produce such tactical nukes.
4) In exchange, Pakistan winds up its earlier nuclear-program. It turns over all its stocks of fissile material, U-enrichment technology and city-killing nukes to American and Chinese hands for "safe keeping."
5) The US, China and Pakistan let the Indians continue to believe that Pakistan still has city-killing nukes, and is producing more; so that they shiver in their dhotis and do nothing even if provoked.
6) IF matters come to a head, and India invades Pakistan conventionally, warn the Indians that any second-strike against Pakistani targets in response to Pakistan nuking an Indian column on its own soil (this being part of India's nuclear doctrine)... will invite massive nuclear retaliation by the US and China against India.
7) In sum: allow Pakistan a tactical nuclear arsenal to effectively blunt any Indian conventional superiority on the battlefield; and promise Pakistan a strategic nuclear umbrella against any larger-scale Indian nuclear retaliation to Paki use of tactical nukes.

The strategy for the US and China is to create a Pakistan that is fully capable of defending itself against Indian conventional attack by the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but that neither its weapons nor the associated fissile material produced by its nuclear industry can threaten Western or Chinese interests, even indirectly.

So, deterrence against Indian conventional attack remains in Pakistani hands, via tactical nukes, but deterrence against further Indian nuclear retaliation is taken up by US and China directly. Maybe just China directly (we will have to wait on further dissection of what the recent "Attack on Pakistan is an Attack on China" really means.)

One objection to this scenario is "TSPA would never agree"... but I am not sure about that. They agreed to turn against the Talibs in 2001. I think they can be made to agree to a lot of things; the US and China have many levers ranging from IMF to diplomatically supporting India on Cashmere, before one even thinks of B-52s ityadi. Pakjabis are essentially cowards who would rather take a bad deal than risk losing everything. Also, H&D is maintained by not telling India or other Muslim nations about it.

Does this sound completely implausible?

[ramana]

RD, TSP is Alladin with djinn (PRC) technology and Alibaba's forty thieves (KSA & US) financing them!

Totally Arabian tales.

So who knows whats real and whats fantasy with them.

[ramana]

The narrative of blaming PRC for the nuclear arming of TSP is one sided.
<snip>
It ignores the multiple players in Western Europe: Holland, UK, Germany (URENCO), Swiss had in the AQK network.

It ignores the responsibility of US as leader of the West and the NPT community in acquiescing to the PRC transfers. And continued inaction after Cold War was over: PRC test in 1992, Ring Magnets, Nodong, M11 missiles etc.

Also claiming PRC armed TSP as a Cold War action ignores the fact that TSP was in no position to confront the FSU even if it had nukes.

So some thing is not right in this picture.

.....

Therefore, by my estimation, the primary blame should fall on the Americans and not so much on their (sometimes reluctant) proxies, and also on the Chinese, but not so much on their (client-state) proxy North Korea.

The lynch-pin, however, is the US. Objectively, it make no sense for America to enable TSP with nukes -- not even during the height of the cold war. Of course, American foreign and strategic policy is notoriously short-sighted and myopic. The reason the TSP was armed anyway, I think can be traced, at least partially, to the deep influence wielded by Saudi Arabia over the United States. The Saudis, being the protectors of the two mosques, have long wanted a hedge against Isreal's nuclear stockpile. To prove themselves 'egalitarian' in the ME, the Americans looked the other way on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which was funded at least in part by the KSA and probably also the UAE. The Gulf Arabs pay for them, the Pakistanis build them, the Chinese help them, and the American run interference for everyone. If the Americans didn't provide this service, the Chinese would gladly step-in and go it alone, to curry favour in the Gulf and in Pakistan.

The Americans are loath to see this happen, and so they play their part. It started as a ploy to counter the Soviets, and then to counter China -- and now, it's their greatest worry. How ironic!

The two roots of this evil dynamic are petro-politics and suspicion between Arabs and Israelis. Compounding the problem is so-called superpower strategy and the ambitions of a rising China.

.....

The corollary implication of this is that even a completey flattened TSP may have a 'second strike capability' with weapons flown-in from the gulf.

Step back and see the forest. During Cold War US didn't need any allies to take on FSU. The UK and France arsenals were miniscule and more like gentle slaps to the bear. They were more for past glories and to retain the UNSC seat etc... Besides they originated the bomb idea first.

The US perception was that India was allied to the FSU despite what India protested. True the 1974 test showed that India was on its own, for if it was allied, they could have the bomb and eat cake without testing. Yet they tested.

So what are the chances that US allowed the PRC transfers to TSP to check the major FSU non-ally India?

Advantage: Can play superior role of mediator ( like cat in the tale of two monkeys in Panchatantra) to useful idiots, and blame goes to PRC which has bad blood with India anyway after 1962 perfidy. And they deliver F-16s and let the TSP buy the bomb racks from French!

Note it was done after all AQK centrifuge charade turned out to be just that. And PRC kept transferring more and more stuff in the last three decades : production facilities, missile delivery vehicles and production facility, then roped in NoKo (their own PRC/rogue) for Ghauri/NoDong transfers. All the while US slaps on token sanctions to keep the useful idiots in India pleased. Once the Indian market became a boom they want to step in an partake the profits as their mercantile nature kicked in.

This splitting the proliferation game, where PRC provides the nukes and US provides the aircraft delivery vehicles has flummoxed the Indian mind from seeing the whole picture as a jihadi weapon system enablement.

PRC will say we transferred nooks only. They can't be transported.
US will say we transferred planes onlee without bomb racks.

Bad TSP mated the stuff to the planes with imported bomb racks from the bad French who you know will sell anything to anyone!

The proof of this is the US made India sign all kind of things for the IUCNA deal yet allowed the PRC to transfer more nuke reactors to TSP without a whimper or any safeguards!

And we have useful idiots in Indian media who are silent about all this and want India to buy shoddy aircraft to reward the US for the nuke deal!

[shiv]

Wonder if PRC is offshoring its Fissile material production to TSP? All those plants look too numerous for TSP needs.

That is a serendipitous suggestion. Quite possible.

[Muppalla]

Step back and see the forest. During Cold War US didn't need any allies to take on FSU. The UK and France arsenals were miniscule and more like gentle slaps to the bear. They were more for past glories and to retain the UNSC seat etc... Besides they originated the bomb idea first.

The US perception was that India was allied to the FSU despite what India protested. True the 1974 test showed that India was on its own, for if it was allied, they could have the bomb and eat cake without testing. Yet they tested.

So what are the chances that US allowed the PRC transfers to TSP to check the major FSU non-ally India?

India being poor and hence US or the west did not bother to consider India in the great game theories is IMVHO an intellectually dishonest argument. (No offence to any individual on the forum). This is the same line that is very gently being perpetuated by several western analysts and throw the entire blame on China (that too privately). Paki Nukes are 100% creation of Uncle and China is just the railway coolie (no offence to the hardworkers) that carried them to Pak.

India may be shit poor but 1971 Bangla formation has changed the equations and the thoughts of making Pakistan self reliant has taken a precedence. China has tacit approval from US to tranfer to TSP. The idea of splitting the western Pakistan into mini Pakistans is a BIG no no for US futuristic games.

[Gagan]

Pakistan's Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Pakistan acquired uranium enrichment tech illicitly when A Q Khan stole the Dutch 'CNOR' & 'SNOR' designs, and the German 'G1'& 'G2' centrifuge designs from URENCO Almelo, where he was employed from 1973-1975. Under ZA Bhutto's instructions, he headed the committee that set up the ERL (Renamed by Zia to A Q Khan Research Laboratories) at Kahuta. Khan developed four series of centrifuges P1-P4 with improving Separative Work Units with P4 capable of over 20 SWU/year.
Zia instructed them to not only enrich uranium, but to also work on procuring a uranium based weapon design. This work was in parallel to Samar Mubarkmand's PAEC's efforts which had come to a standstill.
PAEC's work involved the Plutonium route, using Plutonium illicitly obtained from KANUPP, Karachi. Although KANUPP was under IAEA safeguards, between 1980-81 Pakistan refused to increase monitoring and security. As it is the plant has always worked on unusually low plant load factors, indicating perhaps that fuel was being diverted elsewhere. The other point to note is that the amount of Pu produced by KANUPP was very marginal, and Pakistan probably obtained it from one of its allies. They now produce Pu from the plants in Khushab.

Uranium Enrichment Facilities: Some of these facilities might not be operational currently, because pakistan has under US pressure shut down or slowed down production at these facilities from time to time.
Google Earth placemarks of some of these facilities is unverified at present, and I will be happy to correct these if further information is available, but there are strong reasons to believe that these are indeed the facilities as described.

Around 2007, Pakistan announced that it will finally set up a uranium enrichment facility for civilian purposes. They plan to set this up at Kundian, Chashma.

Pakistan has the following Uranium Enrichment Facilities:
1. Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta
2. Gadwal Uranium Enrichment Plant, Wah
3. Uranium Enrichment Plant, Gorla Sharif, Rawalpindi
4. Uranium Enrichment Plant, Sihala, Rawalpindi
5. Kundian Uranium Enrichment Plant, Chashma (Announced)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Gadwal Uranium Enrichment Plant

Set up with Chinese assistance this plant was built around 1990 and is still believed to be operational. This plant is part of the ordinance factories at Wah.


_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Uranium Enrichment Facility, Sihala

This is a pilot scale enrichment facility. The facility as seen on a 2003 image.


This facility has undergone modernization and new structures are now under construction. The same facility as seen in 2010

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Uranium Enrichment Facility, Gorla Sharif

This is a pilot scale enrichment facility, and is located within the premises of the Central Mechanical Transport and Stores Depot at Rawalpindi.






_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta

The main center of Pakistan's uranium enrichment efforts. The facility houses upto 3000 centrifuges of the earlier P2 design, capable of producing 45-60Kgs of HEU / year, enough for 2-3 weapons annually.
KRL also has a Nodong / Ghauri missile production factory that was set up with North Korean help. The presence of North Koreans co located at this facility is indicative of the missiles for centrifuges barter deal between Pakistan and North Korea.
KRL also has a facility where small defence ordinance and electronics related to various weapons systems are manufactured. Some of the items manufactured / assembled here are:
1. Nodong/Ghauri series of MRBMs
2. HJ-9 / Bhaktar-Shikan ATGM
3. Anza Series of Shoulder Launched SAMs - copies of Chinese HN-5, QW-1&2 MANPADS
4. Electronics such as Laser Range Finders and Digital Goniometers
5. Skyguard Pulse Doppler Radar (For use with 35mm Oerlikon AAAs)



Area 1, Gas Centrifuge Facility:


As per the work done by Jagan et.al. a gas centrifuge facitlity needs two important things to function. The most important of these is cooling. Since the gas centrifuges spin at very high speeds, they produce a lot of heat, so adequate measures to cool the centrifuges are needed. Usually cooling is achieved with water, and so a water source located nearby is needed. Using these two criteria, it is possible to locate a possible cascade hall in a suspected centrifuge site.


Cooling Tower:


Area 2, Ordinance Factory and Final Missile Assembly.


The buildings here probably fit out the TELARs to carry the Nodong/Ghauri missiles


Schematic of the tall Missile-TELAR integration and testing building


Area 3, Nodong / Ghauri Missile Factory


Dynamic test facility: Located Adjacent to the Missile factory. Tests the final integration of the rocket and it engines.


Liquid Motor Test Facility: Located at the eastern end of the KRL.


AAA/SAM and Radar sites around KRL


Zoomed out view showing additional SAM sites and batteries.


Crotale SAM & Radar Site


These are believed to be L-88 radars mounted on Aerostats. They are co-located with the Crotale SAMs


Credits:
1. Jagan et.al
2. IMINT & Analysis

[GuruPrabhu]

Talk of "nuke deal for TSP" confuses me. What will TSP do with a deal? A deal is not a laddoo that they can savor. As is clear from Indian nuke deal, it is a license to purchase reactors at $4B apiece.

Where will TSP come up with this kind of money unless it starts begging with double the effort?

So a "nuke deal" for TSP will need to be followed by a "nuke baksheesh" -- this must make uncle queasy.

[ramana]

TSP is claiming a nuke deal to assert parity with India.

US knows that such a deal is like providing petrol to an arsonist.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

...a gas centrifuge facitlity needs two important things to function. The most important of these is cooling. Since the gas centrifuges spin at very high speeds, they produce a lot of heat, so adequate measures to cool the centrifuges are needed. Usually cooling is achieved with water, and so a water source located nearby is needed. Using these two criteria, it is possible to locate a possible cascade hall in a suspected centrifuge site.

From what little I understand of gas centrifuges, this does not jive.

For starters, the actual rotors, when operating at full speed/power, will not generate very much heat in and of themselves. This is because they are designed to float in magnetic suspension, and they rotate within a near vacuum, so that friction is not a factor. The rotating action is imparted by the application of an electronically switched, rotating magnetic field at the top and bottom of the rotors, in the bracket. Only when the rotors are powering up or powering down, do they actually rotate on roller bearings (which might generate some heat, but not very much, because they are not run at these low speeds intentionally, except when powering up or powering down).

As for the actual gasification; UF6 is a soft crystaline solid at room temperature, and it needs to be heated in order to convert to the gaseous phase. This does not require a lot of heat, but it certainly does not require cooling either. When the gas is actually in the cascade of centrifuge rotors, they intentionally heat one end of the rotor, to help further differentiate between the heavier U238F6 and the lighter U235F6 -- so again, heating is required, and not so much the cooling.

Perhaps the cooling towers have more to do with the conversion of U235F6 into metallic U235? I don't know, but I just can't imagine much need for abundant cooling during gas-phase separation operations. Also, where's the body of water, if cooling is the purpose of those towers? I am more inclined to believe that those towers are for cryogenic helium storage, or for some other inert gas, used to flush the cascades. Furthermore, fans aren't used on cooling towers - water is. Fans are used on radiators, not on towers. Also, industrial-scale conversion from yellowcake to UF6 invariably involves tailings ponds, so where are they?

Check out this YouTube video from the FAS, explaining a bit more, with graphics (it's a good video).


If I were a betting man, I would guess that the critical components of the TSP's nuclear infrastructure -- all of the hard-to-replace equipment, like gas centrifuge cascades -- these are likely burried deep underground, in hardened bunkers, and all those buildings on the surface are little more than decoys for the 'rawgints'. I am also suspicious of there being a rocket motor test range being located so close to buildings operating highly delicate equipement running at super-sonic speeds under enormous loads, funnelling corrosive and radioactive gas. This doesn't make very much sense to me either -- but then again, I must admit that I am no expert, not by any stretch. JMT

[shiv]

Pakistan's nuclear sites are within Prithvi II (250 km) range of the Indian border. One 20 kt device on each and every one of these sites should make them unusable for the duration of a short war. This sets up an interesting dynamic.

We (India) have some kind of agreement with Pakistan not to take out each other's nuclear sites. Agreements with Pakistan are worth less than the turd my dog created this morning when I let her out, but that is a different issue.

If we do not destroy these Paki sites in peacetime. they will be taken out in any nuclear exchange - soon after Pakistan launches their first Hatf/Nasr in their "planned escalation to thwart cold start". The Paki army realises how vulnerable they are and one can predict the likely solutions they will reach to prevent a total devastation of their warheads and nuclear material.

The best compromise solution is wide dispersal, preferably in deep underground storage areas. But the number of nuclear material storage sites cannot be very high because the larger the number, the more easily the security around the site will be picked up by prying eyes. Whatever the number of storage sites the warheads will have to be mated with delivery systems in case they are to be used.

Finally this business of "mating warheads when needed" is very very iffy business. Clearly at a time of increased tension one has to be able to predict beforehand whether the crisis may turn nuclear or not. But the minute the crisis starts there will be increased surveillance from every country on earth - so any movement of suspected nuclear material for "mating with delivery system" will be picked up and intel agencies will start sending warning signals to each other. In other words waiting until a crisis occurs to mate warheads may be too late.

What this means to me is as follows. Pakistanis are habitual liars. It is wrong to believe the usually published claptrap that Pakistani warheads are not kept mated with delivery systems. Pakis are saying that only because it will reassure idiot Indians and others. I am sure that a certain number of warheads are kept in a ready-to-deliver state. That is the only way Pakistan can start nuclear war before being flattened.

Keeping ready-to-launch missiles or ready to drop bombs involves extra security. Such security may be picked up - so perhaps Pakistan does not keep more than 20 to 30 warheads ready to use. The rest will be (in my view) a mix of warheads waiting to be mated and just plain fissile material.

If I was America, what would I worry about? First I would be less worried about warheads mated and ready to use against India. These would be "usable warheads" but usable against India because Pakistan cannot physically reach America. The US would be interested in placing PALs on these ready to use weapons, and I am certain this is where PALs have been placed. I am certain that Musharraf allowed American PAL systems/American advice because there was tacit acceptance that ready warheads would be needed against India.

But as an American I would worry about the loose fissile material, either in the form of un mated warhads or stored fissile material waiting to be shaped into warheads. These are a bigger risk to America and the west in general, including Israel The US would not even need "PAL"s for these because PALs are for ready to use warheads. Not for lumps of Pu or Uranium.

These conclusions of mine I believe are fully consistent with the national aims of the Pakistani am as well as that of the US and China, but the idea that Pakistan has ready to use warheads with American PALs that can be used against India at short notice and no prior warning (such as suspicious movement of nuclear material from known sites) has two implications

1) It will not be possible to do a de nuking of Pakistan by anyone. Not the Americans. Not the Chinese
2) India's doctrine of destroying Pakistan at the first hint of nuclear war is the correct doctrine. They can use some warheads on India - but Pakistan has to be taken out before other warheads an be mated and all nuclear production facilities destroyed if the Pakistanis launch just one nuke.

[GuruPrabhu]

Machining the maal is non-trivial. AQ chor khan stole the tech for enrichment, but he could not have stolen the tech for metallization and machining, simply because Holland does not make nuke pits.

So, the question is this:

1. Did Pakis invent U and Pu handling tech?
2. Or, did ChiPanda install the tech for them?

Knowing mango Paki abduls, I would love to find out who thinks #1 above is true.

[shiv]

I am guessing that once a design is known - say a design previously tested in China or the drawings supplied - the actual machining of bomb grade fissile can be done by China supplied CNC milling machines. It is of course "non trivial" - especially Pu if I am not mistaken. But that means that the design is frozen - meaning the yield and warhead weight are tied to that design.

Clearly - looking at reports of the Pakistani "tests" of 28 May 1998 and the later Korean tests it makes me wonder if anything was learned at all even if North Korean observers were on site in Pakistan. I will be having a re look at Pakistan's "tests" soon. It is really curious that so much attention has been lavished by the media and BRF about the Indian tests - analysing every pixel in every photograph and every nuance in statements, but Pakistani statements of tests have been taken as a matter if course. We on BRF have found a way of rationalizing the Pakistani tests by saying "Oh - the Chinese have given them the knowhow and the design". Like I said earlier that argument has some holes that we need to look inside if we attempt to get an idea of wtf the Pakistanians are doing.

A few things are clear - to reiterate. Uranium designs using large near critical masses of U 235 are sure shot designs that almost anyone can get right given 1940s USA level engineering tech (not to be sniffed at) . Untested Plutonium designs can produce useful fizzles of up to (and exceeding) 1 kiloton. The greater the amount of fissile material you use - the more sure you can be of some sort of bang. It is the production of a big bang with a small amount of material that causes all the problems. Useful bombs and fizzles can be achieved by using up more fissile material but you end up with fewer bombs overall. Pakistan has something. The real question to me is how much damage they can do before they are obliterated.

[Amber G.]

GP et el-
Similar questions has been raised before, and old brf discussion may be interesting..(if for nothing else, just to see where we were

Some of the messages from 2004 may look familiar .. checkout
previous and following messages from
here
Don't know what to make out of this..

OK, I will bite. Of course, unlike Tim, I would only give facts (and not opinions) based upon solid evidence. Since, unlike N^3 some of the evidence may not be as reliable as being told by an alien, I would present the evidence, and the rational for reaching the conclusion I am reaching. So you can make up your own mind. Also keep in mind, that some of the information here is still classified, so please do not discuss it outside of BRF.

>>> 1. Pakistan had developed an indigenous nuclear weapon capability by 1980.

NO , In Dec 1982 when I was returning from a visiting professorship from Islamabad, I stopped in Saclay (in Gif-Sur_Yvette in France) and ran into French Nuclear Scientist Michael Gaudin (who was assistant to the renowned Prof. Claude Bloch). Michael has just returned from Princeton, and narrated an incident about Professor Freeman Dyson who (FD) was commenting on his undergraduate student’s paper about how to construct a fission bomb. It was clear from the comments of F. Dyson, Michael told me, that Pakistani embassy was unable to buy that undergraduate paper for the details. (And FD, told them (Paki diplomats who drove in droves to New Jersey) to take a hike)

It is true that they (Pakistanis) were able to obtained a copy of the ‘Text Book of Nuclear physics” (By Roy and Nigam - NY Academy Press) by stealing it from an Indian graduate student from the Roth Quad of the NY State University at Stony Brook, and were able to ‘indigenously’ discover the scattering cross section area of U235 (Equal to 24.1 barns) but by that time Abdus Salaam was mad of being declared a non-Muslim and would not tell them how much was a ‘barn’ . (This also explains why, when I was in Pakistan, every government scientist I met kept quizzing me ‘how much is a barn’ - .. Any way it was only in 1982 that they learned that a barn = 10^(-24) sq cm. .. so in some way I may be more responsible for Pak nuclear bums than people realize).

2. Pakistan had access to nuclear weapons in 1980.

>>> No. They had tried to buy Uranium from French Congo but they did not know the specific gravity of U (let alone what is a ‘barn’) so the middle-man Michael (Why All Frenchmen I know are named Michael?) made quite some money selling them pure sand instead of U235-U238 Mix. ..

>>>3. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon (probably as part of a Chinese export deal) in 1987 (Lop Nor.. wherever that is)

No, Mausbour-Zeeman radio-active interferometer conclusively proved that.

>>>4. Kahuta (Xerox Khan) Labs never managed to develop a production-grade process to make weapons-grade enriched uranium.

NO. (Strictly speaking yes, because some U235 was produced when Cosmic rays hit Kahuta, but it had nothing to do with centrifuges .. and the amount was in femto-grams)

5. The PAEA managed to get a nuclear power plant operating.
>>> True. (Critical point is when?)

>>>6. PAEA produced plutonium in its reactors.
Producing Pu is not a big deal – separating it is. So yes Pu was produced but could not be used unless the fuel is sent to some reprocessing plant.

7. Pakistan, by 2002, had generated enough weapons-grade fissile material to produce 50 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size.

>>> Depends on what you mean by size, .. Sure if you consider the volume of the outer shell. .. Not , even by a long shot.. if you consider destructive power …. Gun type of detonators (designs) can be less than 1% efficient (compared to implosion devices) and even 15 kg of HEU is no guarantee that it will not fizzle out.

8. North Korea, as of 1994, had an operating nuclear power plant.
>>> never been to NK.

>>> 9. North Korea was producing plutonium from its reactors.
Yes – again separator is critical.

>>>10. North Korea needed centrifuges to enrich uranium.
Any country would need centrifuge (or similar technology) to enrich uranium.

>>>11. Kahuta Labs' centrifuges were strictly for export only.
No, only when they did not work.. they try to cut the losses.

.>12. The US knew as of 1980 that Pakistan was developing or otherwise acquiring / had acquired nuclear weapons.
Yes they were developing it, US certainly knew it. I know all my letters were intercepted and if I knew, they certainly did.

Ok guys .. if you are still with me.. you deserve all this.

Regards,

Ducking for cover

[shiv]

Folks here is a must read paper on Pakistani nukes from 2009
http://www.boell-pakistan.org/downloads ... _Power.pdf

It was reported in Frontier India. How did I miss it?

http://frontierindia.net/wa/german-rese ... ility/347/

A research paper by German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung wissenschaft und Politik) questions the yield pertaining to Pakistani Nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. As per the paper “ Seismological data indicates that Pakistan gave inflated figures on the explosive power of weapons it used. Some detonations may even have been partial failures. It is furthermore debatable whether some of the tests involved plutonium in addition to those with highly enriched uranium.”

On the plutonium weapons the researchers write “Reports that Pakistan has already succeeded in developing such devices (plutonium bombs) which are technologically more demanding than the uranium bomb, have not been confirmed. In spite of this, claims are repeatedly made in international press about the existence of three to five plutonium bombs.”

The authors Oliver Thränert and Christian Wagner write that Pakistan started its nuclear-weapons programme from a very low level and was dependent on international support from day one. The project was supported financially by other Islamic countries like Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

On China’s role the paper writes “China’s aid, which began as early as 1960′s was greatly significant in technological terms. Beijing seems to have aided Pakistan in overcoming problems that arose in uranium enrichment. Beijing delivered two nuclear warhead designs used by Pakistan.”

The authors say that both warhead types in pakistan’s arsenal are implosion-type weapons. According to the information available, amount of highly enriched uranium per warhead varies from 5 to 20 kg. The first type is designed exclusively for aircraft bombs, while the second can be mounted on ballistic missiles as well.

The total number of nuclear weapons already produced by Pakistan is difficult to estimate. Forty to fifty is likely number.

Pakistan’s heavy water reactor Kushab I intended for plutonium production only operates sporadically. The Kushab II reactor seems to be finished and may be intended to replace it. The construction of Kushab II has progressed more quickly than anticipated by international experts.

The paper warns that the (Pakistani) nuclear complex with its total of around 70,000 staff, including 7-8000 scientists is not immune to Islamist ideas.

[shiv]

Regards
Ducking for cover

Thanks "someone"

[Amber G.]

Shivji - You may already have seen these, but I think, for good approximation (with your knowledge of Pak etc) look at these resources ..
- (Already given - Los Alamos Primer Robert Serber)
- Richard Garwin (paper - Maintaining Nuclear Weapons..etc...under CTBT
- Historic book (Making of Bomb or something like that by Rhodes.

Some comments -
"Gun" in gun type design (specially primitive) is more like a "top" (cannon).. heavy.. delivery weight. may be interesting..

Hamza ( chief weapons designer for Sadam) wrote a book (after he defected - he now lives in US) among other things he says that implosion type device was designed for Uranium bomb..

For Pu, (when one has a reactor) one can separate chemically (from U etc), but still removing Pu240 (from Pu239) is difficult for Paki technology...(small amount of Pu240 may make critical mass fairly large.. or make the whole thing fizzle..)

Just some random bits /speculation etc..

[shiv]

Shivji - You may already have seen these, but I think, for good approximation (with your knowledge of Pak etc) look at these resources ..
- (Already given - Los Alamos Primer Robert Serber)
- Richard Garwin (paper - Maintaining Nuclear Weapons..etc...under CTBT
- Historic book (Making of Bomb or something like that by Rhodes.

Amber - thanks - I need these refs to be preserved because I am currently well behind on my reading. I have to plough through several l books I have already bought before claiming that I can take on more reading.

[shiv]

From Carey Sublette re 1998 tests
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html

According to the Azam the nuclear devices - in sub-assembly form - were flown from Rawalpindi to a designated airfield in Baluchistan (Quetta?) on a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (it is curious that so many would all be entrusted to a single aircraft though). Four PAF F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles provided escort, with secret orders to shoot the C-130 down if it tried to fly out of Pakistani airspace. The F-16s were ordered to keep their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim, could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders originated from Air Headquarters.

[Gagan]

I think that airfield would have been Dalbandin.

It is very close to the Ras Koh hills, and there are mud tracks that would be used by military trucks to transport personnel.
They also would have several helicopters deployed to provide the last mile connectivity to the test sites.

Quetta is far off, and then you have to travel through bad lands with the fearsome BLA guys lying in between.

[Gagan]

So I have identified 6 sites where the Pakistanis house missile regiments. There must be a few more, am still on the look out.
Will post pictures very soon.

[Altair]

Pakistan is a country who will NOT stop, NOR slowdown their nuclear program. It is a show of defiance to Unkil for his insults like Abbottabad and warnings of more such raids. Americans would accept the deal to turn blind to more production of fissile material by pakis in return for more croud pleasing heroic action stunts by Seal Team 6.Eventually Pakis will have more weapons than what Unkil desires them to have. Pakistan would then bargain Americans to give them more weapons or radio active could fall into wrong hands. Its the standard myopic foreign policy blunders which America has been doing for the past 60 years.

[shiv]

Pakistan claims to be the custodian of the Islamic bomb. If that is the case they have an obligation not to lose it all - which they will if they decide to attack India. No Islamic bomb after that. They must proliferate right now, before it is too late to all the biratherly countries.

[Gagan]

One question I have, I wonder if some guru would enlighten us all.

On looking at Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, I see either uranium enrichment and uranium handling plants, or I see nuclear reactors that generate a lot of reactor grade plutonium.

But I don't see any military reprocessing plants.

The only reprocessing plant that we know of is at Chashma, is at an IAEA inspection zone, and I wonder if that reprocessing plant is functional. The french walked out of that project after the presseler amendment was enforced, and the site lay bare before the chinese stepped in to complete it. And there are no reprocessing plants at Khushab, where they have those Pu producing reactors.

How do they get weapons grade Plutonium? China can't be giving them that.

The bomb that they tested was Plutonium based, the Uranium one failed miserably.

The only conclusion one can draw is that China based some Pu based bombs temporarily there, which they've withdrawn after 9/11.
The only stuff they have are Enriched Uranium based ones (and these are still far off from weapons grade enrichment levels).
The Uranium based ones that they have are low yield fizzles. They will be more of dirty polluting bombs with little to show in terms of nuclear reaction when they go off.

Correct me if I am wrong, but they are in effect nuke nude with only a tiny rag to cover the H&D part, and then not too much cover either.

[shiv]

Interesting question Gagan. I am currently searching for some info.

In the meantime I post a link here for my own ref

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125954.pdf

[Gagan]

I guess the New Labs plant at PINSTECH Nilore, Rawalpindi does the reprocessing?

[Gagan]

Another question:
Where are the bums assembled?
Air Weapons Complex at Wah? (It says Kamra, but it is just outside of Wah)
And this facility has been attacked once in the past, the Jihadis attacked and destroyed the main gate.
So the Jihadis know where the bums are assembled - probably the best place where they can get all the components together.
If they are lucky, they'll get one without the PALs in place, a clean bomb without all the messy electronic locks.

The other possible place they could get one from would be an operational airbase, just as they are about to be loaded onto a fighter or a designated nuclear bomber or a missile. That is the point at which a fully assembled bomb will be available and will be amenable to be stolen in a swift, surprise attack.

And going by what the TTP is upto these days, their first target for a Nuclear IED mubarak will be a major pakistani city. Their reasoning for these attacks currently underway is to completely demoralize the state's apparatus, the law enforcement, armed forces etc. When the time comes, the other jihadis will fall in line and their takeover will be complete.

[Altair]

So, if they detonate a bum on their own soil what would Pakistan's response be under present circumstances? Will they attack India accusing R&AW of conspiracy?