Re: Afghanistan News & Discussion: Part IV
Posted: 15 Oct 2008 12:53
Consortium of Indian Defence Websites
https://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/
Do our diplomats(who have experienced Paki perfidy first hand) believe that a stable Pak is in India's interest and not all Pakis are anti-India?
How to wind down the Afghan war
M.K. Bhadrakumar
While the opinion among American politicians favours a vaguely Afghan variant of the Iraqi “surge,” the silver lining is Washington’s sheer unaffordability of an open-ended war in Afghanistan.
Slowly, imperceptibly, it is becoming official American thinking that a United States “exit strategy” in Afghanistan ought to involve reconciliation with the Taliban. U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates admitted as much recently. He said: “There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of the political outcome to this [war]. That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.” True, he spoke with caveat s but his statement marked a beginning since it was made in the approach to a historic transition of political power in Washington.
Mr. Gates’ admission was long in coming, and was prompted by the cascading opinion among the U.S.’ allies, including close allies such as Britain and Canada, that the war cannot be won. Ironically, this is a “second coming” of sorts. A reconciliation with the Taliban would be essentially based on what Supreme Leader Mullah Omar promised at the eleventh hour in those fateful days of late September 2001 from his Kandahar hideout via Pakistani intermediaries — that, yes, he would verifiably sequester his movement from the al-Qaeda and ask Osama bin Laden to leave the Afghan soil, provided the U.S. acceded to his longstanding request to accord recognition to his regime in Kabul rather than treat it selectively. Of course, the U.S. administration ignored the cleric’s offer and instead pressed ahead with the plans that were already far too advanced to launch a “war on terror” in Afghanistan.
An “exit strategy” must be candid. But there is still ambivalence on the part of the U.S. to admit what, at a comparable point in the trajectory of the 25-year-old Afghan civil war, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did with grace and all humility when he said in 1985 that Afghanistan had become a “bleeding wound” for the USSR. Any number of Soviet ‘experts’ genuinely believed at that time — like their American counterparts today — that if Moscow had given one last push, the war in Afghanistan could have been won. But the Soviet leadership saw that it would be a pyrrhic victory. After all, a point comes during a war when it no longer seems to matter who won or who lost.
Today, Afghanistan is poised on such a threshold. That is why there is a sense of disquiet in the region when powerful American politicians, who include not only Mr. Gates but also Barack Obama and John McCain, still speak about robustly conducting the war. The bipartisan opinion among American politicians seems to favour a vaguely Afghan variant of the Iraqi “surge.” They seem captivated by the new head of the U.S. Central Command and his Roman name — David Petraeus — who claimed “victory” in the war in Iraq.
The silver lining is the sheer unaffordability of an open-ended war in Afghanistan for the U.S. economy. Then, there is a very distinct possibility that like any leading presidential hopeful on the campaign trail, Mr. Obama might not have said the last word on Afghanistan. That is, if we are to believe the compassion and disarming honesty with which he recounted the intellectual journey of his unusual life in his poignant memoir Dreams from My Father.
Ten commandments
Mr. Obama’s new thinking will need a compass of 10 commandments. One, do not allow political instincts to be smothered by spooks, strategists and soldiers who surround statesmen. They don’t see the human condition. They are adept at “managing” conflicts rather than ending them. The Afghans have suffered enough. The pressing question is: how fundamental is the Afghan war to the global struggle against terrorism? Political violence in Afghanistan is primarily rooted in local issues and “warlordism” is an ancient trait.
Two, Taliban is not the problem and it can be made part of the solution provided its variant of “Islamism” is properly understood. Ultimately, the objectives of nation-building and legitimate governance in an environment of overall security that allows economic activities and development can only be realised by accommodating local priorities and interests. Washington has been far too prescriptive, creating and then controlling a regime in Kabul. But such a regime will never command respect among Afghans. Deploying more NATO troops or creating an Afghan army is not the answer. There is a crisis of leadership. Peace is indivisible and must include the vanquished as well.
Three, an inter-Afghan dialogue is urgently needed. The Afghans must be allowed to regenerate their traditional methods of contestation of power in their cultural context and to negotiate their cohabitation in their tribal context.
Four, the U.S. has been proved wrong in believing that imperialism and hubris could trump nationalism. Prolonged foreign occupation is triggering a backlash. It is time for the foreign forces to leave. A timeline is necessary.
Five, the agenda of the war must be transparent. It needs to be appreciated that the U.S. decided to invade Afghanistan. The backdrop of the September 11 attacks and George W. Bush’s dubious election victory in 2000 engendered compulsions. The invasion was avoidable. The war should never have escalated beyond what it ought to have been — a low-intensity fratricidal strife. In other words, a solution to the conflict has to be primarily inter-Afghan, leading to the formation of a broad-based government free of foreign influence, where the international community can be a facilitator and guarantor.
Six, the geopolitics of the region is casting shadows. The war provided a context for the U.S. military presence in Central Asia; NATO’s first-ever “out of area” operation; a turf which overlooks the two South Asian nuclear weapon states, Iran and China’s Xinjiang; and a useful toehold on a potential transportation route for Caspian energy bypassing Russia and Iran.
But Afghanistan is far too fragile to bear the weight of a heavy geopolitical agenda. Quite clearly, the regional consensus is breaking down. That can only prove lethal as time passes and the war increasingly gets viewed in zero-sum terms by the regional protagonists. The incipient signs are appearing — Russia’s warnings about NATO supply routes; creation of a Collective Security Treaty Organisation force in Central Asia; India-Pakistan rivalries; Iran’s activism vis-À-vis the forces of Afghan resistance, etc.
Seven, the war should not have been an American enterprise. Nor should it have space for the arrogance of power. Unfortunately, the U.S. uses the United Nations as a fig-leaf but pretty much decides on the war strategy. Eight, the Afghan problem is linked to wider questions of regional security, especially the situation around Iran. The U.S.’ “Great Central Asia” policy and containment strategy towards Russia, NATO’s expansion, etc. are other factors at work. Therefore, the involvement of the regional powers in any Afghan settlement becomes imperative — a regional summit, for instance. Washington’s contrary approach is needlessly paving the way for competitive politics. The current attempt to get Saudi Arabia to manipulate or splinter the Taliban can only complicate matters.
Nine, the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in it are intertwined. But Gen. Petraeus’ strategy seems to be to hire Pashtun mercenaries to fight the war so that western casualties remain low and western public opinion doesn’t militate against the war. The strategy will take the situation in the Afghan-Pakistan tribal areas to anarchic levels and spread the war into Pakistan. Historically, the tribal areas constituted the buffer for Pakistan’s western marches.
Pakistan problem
Finally, this brings us to the “Pakistan problem.” This is also where Mr. Obama has got his sums seriously wrong. He has said harsh things about Pakistan not doing enough in the war but surprisingly for someone who lived among Pakistanis, he hasn’t introspected why this happened. He’s not seeing why Pakistan is unable to evolve a coherent strategy in the “war on terror.” There is no running away from the fact that it is the U.S.’ “war on terror” in Afghanistan that has destabilised Pakistan. The Pakistani people are not extremists, nor do they clamour for the Shariah law. Their opposition is not per se to their country’s leadership — civilian and military — but to its pusillanimous collaboration with the U.S. war effort.
Yet under American pressure, the Pakistani army, which is the backbone of the state, is launching forth in the tribal areas despite its lack of self-confidence and conviction. If this paradigm is pressed further down the road, a scenario like the one in Iran in the 1970s may well develop. The conditions are slowly ripening, although a charismatic leadership is lacking to capitalise on the groundswell of popular frustration.
Thus, Pakistan’s long-term stability is also linked to the departure of the foreign forces from Afghanistan. In all likelihood, any prospect of Pakistan disengaging from the U.S.’ war itself would have a calming effect on the tribal regions. Meanwhile, the new Pakistani leaders — in Islamabad and especially in Peshawar — would do well to make a reasonably convincing effort to appear to be their own masters in their own house. Equally, Mr. Obama should allow them to do that.
(The writer is a former Ambassador and an Indian Foreign Service officer.)
Stephen Cohen, the Pakistani expert, has openly stated (link to article in the TSP thread) that Pakistan should be allowed to maintain terrorists/militants as part of its foreign policy -- so the differentiation between "good" and "bad" taliban is being done so that the jihadi movement can be directed away from western interests and towards countries like India and Afghanisthan.Any attempt to label tham as such is an exercise in self-delusion.
They are playing with fire. That is not a problem if you know how to handle fire properly. I am no so sure Unkil has done that or can do that in this case.SSridhar wrote:Mullah Omar should not be part of peace talks: Washington
This is the attempt to identify 'good Taliban' vis-a-vis 'bad' Taliban. Frankly, the proof of the pudding is only when the 'good Taliban' hand over or help track all the 'bad Taliban', not missing even a single one of them,
Their perceptions were formed from the early years after the Partition and dont take inot account the sustained Isalmization that has taken over TSP psyche. A stable non Islamised Pakistan which is not a terrorist state is a good thing but then will have to wait for pigs to fly.Do our diplomats(who have experienced Paki perfidy first hand) believe that a stable Pak is in India's interest and not all Pakis are anti-India?
Security has deteriorated to the point that a growing chorus of Western diplomats, NATO commanders and Afghans has begun to argue that the insurgency cannot be defeated solely by military means. Some officials in Kabul contend that the war against the insurgents cannot be won and are calling for negotiations.
Important parts of the strategy would be to exploit what diplomats here say are fissures in the Taliban, to separate what amounts to day-wage fighters from the movement’s hard-core elements, whom many officials consider to be “irreconcilable,” and to divide the Taliban from Al Qaeda.
But some officials fear that without a turnaround in the security situation, the Afghan government and the international forces here will not be in a strong bargaining position.
Behind the scenes, there has also been quiet work by people like Abdullah Anas, an Algerian who fought in Afghanistan with the mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. For the last two years, in an effort supported by Mr. Karzai, Mr. Anas has been lobbying influential Muslim clerics and international leaders of jihads in an attempt to draw the Taliban away from Al Qaeda and to bring peace to Afghanistan, according to an Afghan military attaché working on the plan.
“The problem is not going to be solved by war,” Mr. Anas said in a telephone interview from London. Neither NATO nor the insurgents could win the war outright, he said, and he predicted that fighting could continue for 10 more years at the cost of some 100,000 casualties.He said that two main issues stand between the sides: the presence of foreign forces and the system of government. Afghans from all sides, all ethnicities, including all the mujahedeen groups, should come together to work it out, he said. {These pathetically and hopelessly divided groups can never reconcile. Past two hundred years of history is proof of that}
The involvement of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was of symbolic importance because of his standing in the Muslim world, diplomats and Afghan government officials said. The king hosted some 50 Afghan representatives in Mecca at an iftar dinner. Among those who attended were Mr. Karzai’s brother, Qayum Karzai, and the head of the Council of Clerics of Afghanistan, Maulvi Fazl Hadi Shinwari. Also present were two former Taliban officials who have remained under government protection in Kabul since their release from United States custody: Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, a former Taliban foreign minister, and Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, who served as the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan.Active representatives of the Taliban were also said to be present.
“Al Qaeda has an international agenda, and Taliban have their own agenda, which is Afghanistan,” said Mr. Muttawakil, who was seen as a moderate member of the Taliban government and now supports peace talks.
At the same time, government and Western officials in Afghanistan say they have had increasing contact from members of the Taliban who want to give up the fight.
“I’m not saying the Taliban is on the brink of fragmenting, I’m just saying that we are seeing fissures, fracture lines, questionings,” one Western diplomat said earlier this year.
Even as Afghans grow increasingly weary of the fighting, some Taliban, like the prominent commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, are likely to remain out of the reach of any negotiation, military officials say. Mr. Haqqani maintains close links with Al Qaeda and has been behind some of the worst attacks in Afghanistan this year.
“There are some that will never be reconciled,” Lt. Col. Rumi Nielson-Green, the United States military spokeswoman at Bagram Air Base, said last week.
Looks like Lok Sabha attack.Suicide bomber storms Afghan ministry, kills five
KABUL, Oct 30: Taliban commandos stormed an Afghan ministry in the heart of Kabul on Thursday, shooting their way into the building where one of them blew himself up and killed five people.
The bomb exploded in a conference room underneath the office of the minister, Abdul Karim Khoram, but he was not in the building at the time, ministry spokesman Hameed Nasiri Wardak said.
“I can say that the target was the minister,” he said. Khoram was badly wounded in a suicide blast in Kandahar in May.
President Hamid Karzai condemned the daring attack, calling it an attempt to hinder government efforts to secure dialogue with the militants to end a seven-year resistance movement.
Three assailants opened fire on the police guards outside the ministry of information and culture before entering its cavernous hall, where the suicide bomber launched the attack, said Amir Mohammad, a police guard who was wounded in the blast.
“They (attackers) were running. They opened fire on our guard first and then they entered” the building, Mohammad said from his hospital bed in Kabul.
The powerful blast threw Mohammed onto the street, where he lay unconscious among shattered glass and pools of blood.
Five people were killed in the attack, including a policeman, three ministry employees and another civilian, the interior ministry said in a statement.
Another 21 were wounded, said Abdul Fahim, a spokesman for the health ministry which supervises the hospitals where the injured were taken.
“Our enemies are trying to undermine the recent efforts by the government for a peaceful solution to end the violence,” Karzai said in a statement. Senior Afghan and Pakistani officials vowed on Tuesday to seek dialogue with the Taliban to end violence. The pledge was agreed at a jirga as part of a process initiated by US President George W. Bush and his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts in 2006.
The Afghan government has said it wants talks with Taliban leaders in an effort at reconciliation. The Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan said the two sides recently had contacts in Saudi Arabia.
The ministry that was attacked is in the centre of the city, at a busy intersection lined with shops. One of the side walls of the building collapsed, while glass littered the roads nearby and office equipment was scattered over the area. The light-blue metal gates were twisted from being flung open.
Taliban’s claim
Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, told the AP three militants stormed the building by throwing hand-grenades at the guards at the main gate.
A man named Naqibullah from the Khost province carried out the suicide attack, Mujahid said. The other two men fled, he said.
“The suicide bomber targeted foreign experts,” he said.
It was not possible to confirm if there were any foreign nationals in the building at the time.
Abdul Rahim, a witness, said he heard machine-gun shots and saw a policeman lying on the ground, then saw the explosion that rocked the building.
While militants regularly use suicide attacks against Afghan and foreign forces around the country, they have been rare in Kabul.
On July 7, a suicide attacker set off explosives outside the gates of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 60 people and wounding 146.
Separately, four policemen were killed on Thursday in Panjwayi district of the Kandahar province when their vehicle struck a newly planted mine, said Zulmai Ayubi, the provincial governor’s spokesman. He blamed the Taliban for the attack.—AP/AFP
India does not have civilizational contacts with the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtun. We have lost it.
BRFite
Joined: 27 Sep 2008 04:36 pm
Posts: 149 There is no pro India taliban to talk to. India just needs to firm up its old alliance with NA, Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and uzbeks. Jointly we can smash the paki-taliban nexus even if US runs away from the battle.
The Taliban hold on Afghanistan remained tentative, because the major powers did not recognize them. Secondly the people were not really enthralled by their rule, partly because they could not provide any infrastructure or services. Of course sticks and executions also played a role, but that is a separate issue. So India can provide the Taliban a means of providing their people a more efficient if not necessarily a more benign administration. I am sure the Pushtuns would appreciate that.vavinash wrote:There is no pro India taliban to talk to. India just needs to firm up its old alliance with NA, Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and uzbeks. Jointly we can smash the paki-taliban nexus even if US runs away from the battle.
Gulbudin Hekmatyar was reported to have taken part in the Makkah talks recently. It could therefore be the handiwork of Taliban/Al Qaeda group that is opposed to these talks. Hekmatyar has been sidelined for a long time now. The US is trying to drive a wedge between the Taliban. IMHO, they will not be very successful.ramana wrote:Abdul Karim Khoram, the I&B minister is ethnic Pashtun and belongs to H-e-I of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's party. So the attack could be intra-Taliban attack.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karim_Khoram
Indian Embassy Bombing'To Talk To Terrorists Is Like Frying Snowballs'
The Indian ambassador in Afghanistan on why his embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali this year and what it means to stay back after the July 7 bombings
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR ON JAYANT PRASAD
Outlook India
The year 2008 has been one of the most challenging for both Afghanistan as well as India's presence here. For one, the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy killed five of its staff, including two diplomats, shocking the international community as well as the Afghans. Worse, the security situation continues to deteriorate here amidst talk of negotiating with the Taliban, rearming the tribal militia and increasing the presence of international troops. Simultaneously, pressure has been mounted on Pakistan to deal with the sanctuaries of terrorism on its soil.
The Indian embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali to commiserate with their colleagues who lost their lives. On that day, however, Indian ambassador to Afghanistan Jayant Prasad talked to Aunohita Mojumdar. Excerpts:
Democracy in AfghanistanThe Indian government has identified the ISI as the perpetrator or the brains behind the July 7 blasts. What's your assessment about how far Pakistan was complicit in it?
It's not for me to speculate on the details of this event which is still being investigated by concerned agencies here. Suffice it for me to underline what is publicly known: that there was complicity and support, on the basis of which we were alerted before the attack. We had specific warnings on June 23 and July 1 on the imminence of a terrorist strike on the Indian mission. Which is why we were able to take precautionary measures. Unfortunately, we lost five of our colleagues, but the number of Afghans who died in the area contiguous to the embassy was 54 and over 100 seriously injured. But for the protective measures we were able to take, the embassy might have come crashing down that morning. That protective measure was based on specific intelligence inputs from friendly governments.
What impact did the traumatic event have on you and your feelings about being here?
I have thought a great deal about that event and I'm ready to talk freely about the collective impact of this tragic incident on the members of this mission. It had an impact in general, and specifically it had a different impact. The general impact was to make us aware of the fragility of the situation here in Afghanistan and the fragility of life itself.
There was a more immediate impact caused by confronting the process of senseless killing of five of our dear colleagues. All of us were shaken initially because the event challenged our conventional assumptions about human behaviour. We came face to face with the human propensity for evil, death and destruction. But I'd say, paradoxically, the incident had an impact that was opposite to that intended by the perpetrator of the attack. They had sought to weaken our resolve and capacity to work in Afghanistan. Actually, the staff officers rallied around in a most admirable way. Not one official opted to return to India though the option was offered, since posts in the embassy and all consulates are volunteer posts in Afghanistan.
In fact one officer who had earlier sought to return to India for family reasons came to me soon after the incident and asked for a week's leave to go to India. He wanted to explain to his wife that he had decided to stay on in Kabul because he felt impelled to do so by the sacrifice of his colleagues and that he was staying for that reason and not staying away from his family for any other reasons. Mrs Malti Rao and Mrs Sunita Mehta took the remains of their (respective) husbands, Venkat Rao and Brig Mehta, back to India the same day in the evening in the special aircraft that the government had flown in for the purpose. They displayed exemplary courage and dignity. That too was inspiring for the officers and staff of the region.
The Indian government's reaction was that India remained fully committed to its assistance for rebuilding Afghanistan.One final element was the supportive reaction of the Afghan people and government. It provided us great psychological support. The governor of a province I had not met called to say India and Indians were sweating it out in Afghanistan for the development of this country and now that Indian diplomats and official had been killed in a terrorist attack, the bond of sweat had become a bond of blood. And I think this was the sentiment that sustained us.
After every such incident, most of the international community hunkers down and indeed that very day most institutions were on high alert and most international personnel had their movement restricted. Did you consider closing down the embassy at any point?
Well, everything was shattered in the mission and all the windows and doors had broken. Luckily there was no major structural damage. The consular wing, which was our public dealing wing, had completely come down. We couldn’t use the embassy building for two days, so we were functioning from the courtyard. But I must say that even the local people did not hunker down. The foreign minister, Dr (Rangir Dadfar) Spanta, was on the spot 20 minutes after the incident when he was told by the security there could be a follow-on attack and he was told not to come. But he was still there. The defence minister General (Rahim)Wardak was there soon thereafter at Brigadier Ravi Mehta’s residence together with the National Security Adviser. The French ambassador walked into the broken chancery soon after, showing great courage and completely disregarding his own security instructions. So I think there was tremendous solidarity. Members of parliament walked into the chancery that evening while the special team from India was still there. The deputy speaker of the Wolesi jirga walked across. He is a neighbour. So it was not as if we hunkered down because Indians don’t hunker down and terrorists incidents are not new to us so we have a normal way of dealing with the situation and I would say that there is nothing special about the officers and men of the Indian mission and that this is the way any other Indian mission would have reacted.
India-Afghanistan
How do you view the situation here today? The concept of building democracy in Afghanistan -- there are some things very different from the way we would build democracy. You have a Parliament without political parties, and now the concept of rearming the militias because you cannot build a national army very fast. Is this what is needed here now? Does this need a change of direction?
We have a very well established of Indian diplomacy: we do not really believe that a democratic model can be exported to another environment. It is sui generis to societal structure and historical traditions of every society. It is really for the Afghan people to sit and decide as to what constitutional make up they should have and what kind of accommodations they should experiment with. After all, the Afghan Constitution was evolved through a process of the loya jirga and it is a fledgling democracy--it is very new. It has to develop the conventions and practices over a period of time. If you look at our own experiment -- the decentralisation to the third tier of government -- that came 50 years after our Constitution. So you’ll have to give this experiment more time.
There's a general assumption shared across the spectrum that the situation has become much worse than it was in previous years, that there has been progressive deterioration. Still, people have not lost hope. I feel there's a silver lining to the situation today. That there was an incremental deterioration in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and now you have a precipitate decline in security.There's a crisis now on our hands. But a crisis tends to concentrate the mind. There is a lot of churning, thinking and consultation and something good might come out of the process.
International Presence in AfghanistanCan you define the special relationship between Afghanistan and India and how this has changed?
There was a hiatus in the India-Afghanistan relationship which has been a strong relationship since independence. From the period 1979 onwards, we lost contact with the Afghan people though there were government to government relations. Then there was the period from 1992-96 when there was a gap -- the mujahideen were fighting amongst themselves -- and then the Taliban came between 1996 and 2001. So in the present context we are looking at end 2001 and beginning 2002.
The relationship between India and Afghanistan goes back to cultural and civilization ties but the essence of it today is to build a modern partnership. Our expectations of our involvement in Afghanistan are fairly simple and straightforward. We want the unity, integrity, stability and prosperity of Afghan people and Afghan society. There is absolutely a full consonance of interests between India and Afghanistan.
You mentioned the period between 1996 and 2001. At that time also, India had close relations in trying to help the Afghan people counter the Taliban...
Yes, indeed. We were one of the few voices which wanted a more active support for those who had the vision of a democratic and pluralist Afghanistan and we did provide assistance to Commander Masood at that time and in that context links had not been broken off completely. But we were not able to be present in all parts of Afghanistan as we were earlier and as we are today.
India-Afghanistan != India-Pakistan-AfghanistanWhat is our view of the huge international presence here--both the military and non military?
The international presence here is based on successive annual UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and India is happy that countries involved here are working within the UN mandate. The only supplement is that this process has to be much more Afghan-led. This realisation is now there in the commitment to build the Afghan army and has to reflect itself in other domains.
Another supplement to the international engagement would be that a prerequisite for success in Afghanistan is greater regional cooperation. Afghanistan as a landlocked country has always done well when it has served as a trade hub between central and south Asia and between Iran and South Asia. And now, of course, given the importance of energy, Afghanistan should ideally become a trade energy and transportation hub between two different parts of Asia. It would be a duty of all Afghanistan’s neighbours to be helpful and supportive in achieving this objective.
What India is doing in AfghanistanHow concerned are you about the stability of the region, especially what we have seen over the last one year?
Let me not mince words to say that we are happy that Afghanistan and Pakistan are now engaged in some kind of revival of Track-II diplomacy. With the return of democracy in Pakistan, we hope it will have a good impact in tackling problems. Currently, a mini jirga is taking place between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
These are positive signs in the sense that if the parameters under discussion are what were decided earlier, it might have a positive impact. The loya jirga itself in its major decision last year talked about not allowing sanctuaries and training centres for terrorists and that would be the key to resolving the problems being faced by Afghanistan.
Is there anything to indicate that Pakistan is changing its attitude?
This has to be tested against actual performance.Expression of intent, I'm afraid, is not going to be enough.h.
There are some who think the relationship between India and Pakistan is intricately linked to that between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that movement on the Indo-Pak relationship is necessary for movement on Afghan-Pak relations.
Absolutely not. India does not view its relationship with any third country predicated on, or in reaction to, or refraction of its relationship to any other country.
Improvement in the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan and India will have a positive resonance but that doesn't mean they are linked. We are conducting our own composite dialogue with Pakistan which came under a certain strain after the July 7 attack on the embassy. We are hoping that the conducive atmosphere for resuming our dialogue with Pakistan is in the process of being created. We have already engaged in a full dialogue with Pakistan across the spectrum for that reason.
The basic issue is we don't see how that (Indo-Pak relations) is related to the problem of dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan or how that's related to improvement in Pak-Afghan relations.
But Pakistan seems to think so.
Pakistan seems paranoid about our development activity here and we have, at different levels, tried to tell them about what we are doing here. Pakistan has a mission here and it must be reporting on what we are doing here. What we are doing is very transparent and open. We have modest-sized consulates overseeing development activity and we have a medium-sized embassy in Kabul. Most of my diplomatic colleagues here marvel at how we manage with so few people running a development assistance programme, the envelope of which is over a billion dollars today.
What are the implications of the talks that the Afghan government is initiating with the Taliban?
Our view is that it is unexceptionable for all governments to talk to all alienated individuals and groups. We do that too. But we have to be circumspect about the circumstances in which we talk and with whom we talk. Evidently, you cannot talk with anyone outside the pale. For instance, terrorists who believe in settling political issues with violence. Or with those who do not accept democracy and political pluralism. Or do not believe in human rights and fundamental freedoms and those that don't operate within constitutional bounds. If you do, then it is to accept that you can fry snowballs.
How is the Indian assistance different from that of others?
Indian presence and Indian support are different from how other countries approach Afghanistan in many significant ways. We are present all over Afghanistan and we are in all major domains of activity: humanitarian assistance, infrastructure projects, small development projects with quick gestation and capacity building in government.
We came in with humanitarian assistance which meant, for example, setting up camps for putting the Jaipur limb on disabled people, providing food assistance and medical services. We set up five medical missions which still continue and we promised a million tonnes of foodgrain assistance which we unfortunately could not ship across to Afghanistan through Pakistan because of objections and then we decided to convert it into high protein biscuits.
The second part of our program includes the three major infrastructure projects -- the Nimroz project connecting Seistan province in Iran to the Kandahar-Herat highway, the Pul-e-Khumri transmission line and the Chimtala sub station which is part of a scheme we are working together with the World Bank and ADB to bring Uzbek electricity to Kabul which will be completed and handed over by end-November this year.The third big project in this sector is in the Western province of Herat where we are building the 42 mw Salma dam on the Hari Rud river.
The third element is something we introduced three years ago when Dr Manmohan Singh came here. He wanted us to think of inventive schemes where we had quick gestation projects, not executed by Indian agencies but by the local provinces. And in the social sector, setting up clinics and schools, even small irrigation works, electrification, micro hydel or putting in an array of solar cells for powering institutions. This is called the small development project program. We had 50 such projects -- typically less than $1 million each -- in all parts of Afghanistan, conceived and executed by local and provincial governance. This has been a great success. The first part of this program is over. In fact, the projects are spread all over Afghanistan and this is the second major aspect of our assistance that, unlike other donors who have their provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in particular areas, or who have concentrated in certain areas, we are located in terms of development assistance all over the entire territory of Afghanistan. We have projects in every part of Afghanistan from the solar power of a teacher’s training institute in Badakshan in the Northeast to a cold storage for fresh fruit in Kandahar in the South. We have in the South West this unique road construction project in Nimroz which has been completed and handed over. In the heart of Afghanistan, which is Kabul, we supplied Tata buses, we have set up the Sulabh shauchalaya (public conveniences) which are extremely popular and the Pul e Khumri transmission line to bring electricity to Kabul.
The fourth element of our aid, which I consider the most important, is to rebuild the state structure in Afghanistan and here let me say that we have the biggest state building program in Afghanistan compared to any other country and these are the biggest programs that India has for any third country. From both ends, it is a first. We offer 500 placements in our institutions under the ITEC program.
Another element is the 500 undergraduate and graduate scholarships that we are giving to Afghan nationals to study in India. Apart from this we have specially conceived programs for special people. Right now, in Kabul, we have two programs -- one of which is being run by SEWA to train 1000 war widows and destitute and orphans. They are being trained in four different types of occupations so that they can stand on their own feet. Then the CII is executing another development program here to train 1000 Afghan youngsters in different trades like masonry, plumbing, machining electric work and women in industrial stitching and tailoring.
If these programs are successful then they can be replicated in other parts of Afghanistan. Without spreading our personnel all over Afghanistan, because we have done these programmes smartly. The Afghan trainers in these programs have been trained by us and they are the ones who are imparting training. We are developing a local capacity for Afghans to train themselves. We have also conceived a system of capacity development within Afghan national institutions, especially the central ministries where we have some middle rank officials from India on deputation here in a trilateral agreement in cooperation with UNDP.
Unlike consultants who are placed by other foreign governments in ministries, here we have made clear that our personnel are strictly there as mentors and guides and for developing training modules for maximising the output of Afghan pubic servants. This has been a great success because there is a demand for more such mentors and guides to be brought from India.Currently, we have 25 of them working in different departments in Kabul. They are strongly discouraged from giving advice on taking decisions. Their terms of reference preclude them from this type of activity. The ministries and departments who do not have CAP officers are asking for them which is a good sign.
All our projects and programmes are completely Afghan-led in the sense that we are not executing a single project or providing any type of assistance that the Afghan government has not asked us for.
And if I may say so, it may sound like a boast but we have taken on some of the most difficult projects that have been executed here. Take, for example, the Nimroz road project handed over last month. This was a 218 km road which is different from the tremendous road resurfacing program undertaken by many western donors all over Afghanistan. This is a completely brand new road which has been built in a desert area without any previous foundation.
The Salma dam project is being constructed in an inhospitable terrain, 170 kms away from any road head. Also power transmission lines being built in collaboration with the World Bank and the ADB. The hardest part of the project was to bring the power lines over the Salang pass and this was higher than any place the power grid corporation has built such lines anywhere, and this was successfully done. The most difficult part of the line construction came our way, so we are very proud of having successfully executed these projects. Of the three infrastructure projects, one is complete; the second will be completed in two months time and the third, where we have some real serious logistical difficulties, is somewhat behind schedule, i.e. the Salma dam.
Is there also a different perception of viewing assistance to this country that is different from other donors?
What I feel is that we are doing things in this domain that are natural to us, which we have done in our neighbourhood earlier and we can’t actually think of doing things in a different way. Because, many countries -- who are unfamiliar with south Asian culture topography, society -- bring their foreign models here and they go through a process of learning. Our advantage is that we didn’t have to have a long learning curve here.
Am certain that there will be amny more which he wouldn't have outlined for obvious reasons!!!RajeshA wrote:Good to read about the various programs, that India is carrying on in Afghanistan.
India gifted Airbus aircraft to Ariana and has also been training ANA officers in Indian military schools apart from imparting training to Afghan Police personnel and Administration staff in Mussorie. India also revived the Indira Gandhi Hospital in Kabul after the Taliban were evicted and also rebilt a school that we were running there. Truly, India's involvement in Afghanistan has been tremendous.sum wrote:Am certain that there will be amny more which he wouldn't have outlined for obvious reasons!!!RajeshA wrote:Good to read about the various programs, that India is carrying on in Afghanistan.![]()
(as a jingo,atleast i hope so)