
vinaji, ready for crow soup.

vina Guru:vina wrote:Ah. Now you know why the US market tanked last weekwithout any seemingly obvious cause. Fannie and Freddie share holders are going to be wiped out. Expect shock to shoot through the financial markets next week on open.
![]()
Guys . This one is a biggie. Fannie and Freddie going into recievership is like SBI and and UTI and all their investments going bankrupt in the Indian market.
The holders of Fannie and Freddie debt , in significant percentage are foreign central banks. Expect the pain from this to convulse the global financial markets on Monday morning open.
If a typical company gets into this kind of troubleKakkaji wrote:vina Guru:vina wrote:Ah. Now you know why the US market tanked last weekwithout any seemingly obvious cause. Fannie and Freddie share holders are going to be wiped out. Expect shock to shoot through the financial markets next week on open.
![]()
Guys . This one is a biggie. Fannie and Freddie going into recievership is like SBI and and UTI and all their investments going bankrupt in the Indian market.
The holders of Fannie and Freddie debt , in significant percentage are foreign central banks. Expect the pain from this to convulse the global financial markets on Monday morning open.
I don't understand.
The shareholders will be wiped out on Govt takeover, but why should bondholders worry. Isn't the whole idea behind Govt. takeover to guarantee full payments to bondholders?![]()
I think that after the initial convulsion, this move by the GOTUS might help stabilize the market. What am I missing?
vina wrote: Ah. Now you know why the US market tanked last weekwithout any seemingly obvious cause. Fannie and Freddie share holders are going to be wiped out. Expect shock to shoot through the financial markets next week on open.
![]()
Guys . This one is a biggie. Fannie and Freddie going into recievership is like SBI and and UTI and all their investments going bankrupt in the Indian market.
The holders of Fannie and Freddie debt , in significant percentage are foreign central banks. Expect the pain from this to convulse the global financial markets on Monday morning open. Notice how this is announced over the weekend when markets are closed to ease in the shock and allow time for it to attenuate a bit before Monday.
This credit crisis has wiped out all major "mortgage specialists" . Freddie, Fannie, Bear Stearns and Lehman anyway is a goner sooner or later. Now odds are with Freddie and Fannie out, Lehman too will go under.
Is this "BIG" announcement already made?Acharya wrote:
Something 'BIG' will (announcement) happen by 6.P.M. tomorrow ( Sunday) in Financial Mkts. before the Austrian and Japan mkts open!
By 'rescuing 'GSEs Govt will prop up all the already insolvent banks, at least temporarily. It will however affect the credit rating of USA itself. It remains to seen how the outside world react?
Fannie and Freddie were "Govt Companies".. sort of like ALL our PSU banks in India. The public thinks that there is no credit risk associated with them because they are govt owned and that the govt will extend sovereign guarantee. But read the fine print and it is not so. However that "perception" allows Govt Companies to borrow at close to sovereign rates and Freddie and Fannie could borrow enormous amounts because of the low cost of funds.Kakkaji wrote: I don't understand.
The shareholders will be wiped out on Govt takeover, but why should bondholders worry. Isn't the whole idea behind Govt. takeover to guarantee full payments to bondholders?![]()
I think that after the initial convulsion, this move by the GOTUS might help stabilize the market. What am I missing?
The New York Times
Printer Friendly Format Sponsored By
September 8, 2008
As Crisis Grew, a Few Options Shrank to One
By CHARLES DUHIGG, STEPHEN LABATON and ANDREW ROSS SORKIN
This article was reported by Charles Duhigg, Stephen Labaton, and Andrew Ross Sorkin and written by Mr. Duhigg.
For Freddie Mac, the beleaguered mortgage finance giant that was desperately trying to avoid a government takeover, the moment of truth came three weeks ago.
In a last-ditch effort to raise money to offset billions of dollars of losses, Freddie’s chief executive, Richard F. Syron, traveled to New York to huddle with potential investors at the headquarters of Goldman Sachs and a law firm, Davis, Polk & Wardwell.
Over a couple of days, he and his lieutenants made their pitch — only to have every option rejected, people briefed on the discussions said.
Empty-handed and crestfallen, Mr. Syron canceled plans to join his family at their weekend home on Cape Cod and returned to Washington to deliver the bad news to Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr.: he still hadn’t found anyone willing to save Freddie Mac.
Mr. Paulson and a team at the Treasury had been working for months on plans to prop up both Freddie and its sister company, Fannie Mae, hoping they would never have to act.
Now a consensus was emerging that they had little choice. If Freddie’s and Fannie’s problems worsened, a crisis of confidence could spread through the worldwide financial system, deepening the difficulties in the housing market and further weakening the economy — in the midst of a hard-fought presidential campaign.
So while Democrats gathered in Denver to nominate Senator Barack Obama two weeks ago and Republicans met last week in St. Paul to nominate Senator John McCain, Mr. Paulson and his top aides worked nonstop — often for 18 hours a day, including Labor Day weekend — to scrutinize possibilities and complete the details of a government takeover of both companies.
Mindful of the high stakes, Mr. Paulson convened a secure video teleconference on Aug. 26 from a bunker under the West Wing of the White House to brief President Bush, who was at his ranch in Crawford, Tex. Fannie’s and Freddie’s situation was deteriorating, he advised the president, and something needed to be done, according to a White House official who was not authorized to speak to the media.
On Sunday, with the president’s blessing, Mr. Paulson announced the solution: a takeover that could turn into the biggest and costliest government bailout ever of private companies.
The action was a huge comedown for two powerful companies that had long held enormous sway in financial boardrooms and government corridors.
“Today’s necessary but likely very expensive action for taxpayers is the consequence of regulatory neglect and of a broader political system’s reluctance to take on what should have been clearly seen as festering problems,” said Lawrence H. Summers, who as Treasury secretary under President Bill Clinton had warned of mounting problems at the companies.
The downfall of Fannie and Freddie stems from a series of miscalculations and deferred decisions, both by their executives and government officials, according to company insiders, regulators, auditors and outside analysts. The companies expanded rapidly in recent years, initially playing down the risks posed by a housing bubble. Then, as the housing slump expanded nationwide, they resisted raising enough new capital that might have provided a financial cushion to weather the storm. Lawmakers, paralyzed by partisan infighting, delayed strengthening regulatory oversight of the politically powerful companies.
Mr. Paulson did not fully recognize the extent of Fannie’s and Freddie’s financial problems until recent months. In July, seeking to avoid a government takeover, he asked Congress for the power to bail out Fannie and Freddie — hoping that gaining such authority would calm markets and make a rescue unnecessary.
But he quickly learned that getting those powers made their execution inevitable. His strategy did not anticipate that investors, already spooked by a year of troubles in the financial markets, might panic any time that rumors of problems at Fannie and Freddie cropped up.
The seizure of Fannie and Freddie is all the more surprising because, as recently as late March, Washington viewed the companies as saviors of the housing market and the economy, rather than as risks to them. Instead of requiring Fannie and Freddie to scale back, regulators gave them a green light to buy and guarantee more and bigger mortgages.
On March 19, James B. Lockhart, their chief regulator, dismissed swirling rumors about their financial health. “The actions we’re taking today,” Mr. Lockhart declared, referring to a decision to ease restrictions on how much capital they were required to hold, “make the idea of a bailout nonsense in my mind. The companies are safe and sound, and they will continue to be safe and sound.”
With this vote of confidence, the battered stocks of the two companies rose sharply, to more than $30 a share, levels they would not reach again.
But within about a month, Mr. Paulson was becoming concerned about the companies. In April, he met with their chief executives and top members of the Senate Banking Committee in a closed-door session.
Over the previous years, as the housing bubble inflated, Fannie and Freddie stepped up their purchases of the risky but profitable subprime and alt-A loans that were at the root of the mortgage crisis. Though Congress had just pushed Freddie and Fannie to accelerate purchases of loans to give the housing market a boost, Mr. Paulson was now urging lawmakers to establish stronger oversight and push the companies to raise more capital.
The companies’ thin financial cushions were becoming even more stretched, Mr. Paulson said, according to people with firsthand knowledge of the conversations; and if either company got into trouble, it could threaten the already weakened economy.
In the months after, Fannie Mae managed to raise $7 billion in new capital to offset losses, fulfilling a promise made to regulators. Freddie Mac, however, failed to make good on its pledge to raise $5.5 billion. Still, though the companies’ stock prices continued drifting downward, they continued to borrow money without problem, which is crucial to their ability to buy mortgages.
But in early July, as the housing crisis continued to widen and deepen, confidence in the companies began to evaporate. Rumors spread that Fannie and Freddie were not fully reflecting losses from rising foreclosures on mortgages they held.
The stocks of both companies fell more than 60 percent during the second week of July, to single-digit prices, and the cost of borrowing money rose for both, reflecting anxiety over growing risk. Alarmed, Mr. Paulson asked Congress to give him the authority to rescue the companies if necessary. Congress quickly granted him that power.
At the time, Mr. Paulson said he hoped never to use the authority. “If you’ve got a bazooka and people know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out,” he told one Congressional panel.
Just in case, however, Mr. Paulson began analyzing his options.
In late July, he called John J. Mack, the head of the investment bank Morgan Stanley, and asked his firm to consider advising the Treasury. Within the agency, Mr. Paulson told his deputies to start examining contingency plans.
As those discussions progressed, a mantra emerged among top officials, people with knowledge of the Treasury’s conversations said. The government’s priorities were to maximize market stability, mortgage affordability and taxpayer protection.
Mr. Paulson added a mantra of his own: he privately said he didn’t want to “kick the can down the road” and leave the problems for a future administration and Congress to solve.
Morgan Stanley assigned teams of financial analysts in the United States, Britain and India to review loan data from Fannie and Freddie around the clock, because of concerns that the problems might be worse than the companies had revealed. Bankers estimated that it would take as much as $50 billion to offset the companies’ combined losses.
Throughout August, telephone conferences between officials and advisers often began at 7:30 in the morning and lasted until 11 at night. Mr. Paulson started telling friends that after winning authority to intervene, he “felt like a dog who’d caught the bus and didn’t know what to do with it.”
As possibilities were debated, Treasury officials eventually concluded that if they had to act, the best choice was a conservatorship — a takeover that would make government backing of the companies’ debts and obligations explicit but would remove the companies’ leadership while still keeping them operating.
“They called it ‘sticking the companies in a timeout,’ ” said one person with firsthand knowledge of the conversations. “It protects the safety and soundness of the economy but also gives everyone breathing space.”
Most worrisome, the companies’ cost of borrowing was growing more expensive, and central banks in Asia and Russia were scaling back their purchases of the companies’ debt. Freddie, in particular, was in a bind. Unlike Fannie, it had not raised capital earlier, when markets were less nervous. Mr. Syron figured that the company had one final chance to raise money and signal to debt investors that the company was viable.
However, when he went to New York, potential investors told Mr. Syron there was too much uncertainty around the Treasury’s intentions; if investors acted now, and Freddie was later seized by regulators, they would lose everything they had invested.
Mr. Syron told Mr. Paulson that efforts to raise money had been fruitless, prompting the Treasury secretary to set up the Aug. 26 video conference call with the president.
After briefing the president, the Treasury moved quickly. Over Labor Day weekend, Mr. Paulson convened meetings with Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve; Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor; and Mr. Lockhart, Fannie and Freddie’s regulator.
Meanwhile, advisers from Morgan Stanley contacted Freddie Mac and asked it to provide data on 12 million mortgages. Executives within Freddie Mac viewed the request as a signal that they had won a brief reprieve because it would take weeks to analyze that much information.
Unknown to either company, however, the decision for a takeover had already been made. Mr. Lockhart last week started interviewing potential candidates to replace the top executives. On Thursday, the last day of the Republican convention, Mr. Paulson met with President Bush in the Oval Office. Mr. Bush said the Treasury plan had his support.
The next day, Mr. Paulson called Mr. Syron and Mr. Mudd to separate meetings at the offices of Mr. Lockhart without saying why. Freddie was still looking for fresh capital and interviewing people for senior positions. But in his meetings, Mr. Paulson said he intended to put both companies into conservatorship. As part of that plan, Mr. Syron and Mr. Mudd would both be required to step down.
Mr. Mudd pleaded with Mr. Paulson to spare Fannie Mae, people with knowledge of the meeting said. He said that he abided last spring with regulators’ demands to raise more capital, adding that the company was in better financial health than Freddie.
Mr. Paulson responded that Freddie was nearing a crisis and that, in the eyes of the markets, the companies were joined at the hip. He would not treat them differently for fear that similar problems, over time, would engulf Fannie Mae, but that time closer to the election. Mr. Paulson told both companies that they had no choice.
President Bush returned from Camp David, the presidential retreat, on Saturday morning. The Treasury secretary told him that the companies had reluctantly agreed to the plan. Shortly before 11 a.m. on Sunday, in a conference room across the hall from Mr. Paulson’s office, the Treasury secretary and Mr. Lockhart signed the documents that give each company access to up to $100 billion in taxpayer money to cover future losses — but also put Fannie and Freddie directly under government control.
Edmund L. Andrews and Gretchen Morgenson contributed reporting.
Why? Because of FReddie/Fennie recap expenses?John Snow wrote:Vina garu. also note what will be fall.
1) Social Security benefits will be drastically curtailed.
1.1 The income test will come for claiming benefits
1.2 The social security benefit age will move to 75yrs.
1.3 The social security tax Income bracket will go past 100,000
1.4 The non citizens Socail security benefits will be axed.
2) Welfare as we know will vanish.
1.1 Medicare gone
1.2 Medicaid gone
etc etc
The New York Times
Printer Friendly Format Sponsored By
September 10, 2008
Wall Street’s Fears on Lehman Bros. Batter Markets
By JENNY ANDERSON and BEN WHITE
Only days after the Bush administration assumed control of the nation’s two largest mortgage finance companies, Wall Street was gripped by fears that another big financial institution, the investment bank Lehman Brothers, might founder — and that this time, the government might not come to the rescue.
Waves of selling wiped out nearly half of Lehman’s value in the stock market on Tuesday, leaving the firm, one of the nation’s oldest and largest investment banks, in an all-out fight for survival.
The plunge fanned worries about the troubles plaguing the broader financial industry and sent the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index tumbling 3.4 percent. The decline more than wiped out the market’s rally on Monday, when stocks surged after the weekend rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered mortgage giants.
Lehman’s future as an independent firm now seems more uncertain than ever, and many analysts fear that the bank is running out of time and options.
Confronting gaping losses stemming from the credit crisis, the once-proud firm is racing to secure a financial lifeline, possibly including the sale of its prized money management division or an investment from an outside investor.
Lehman, which has about 24,700 employees around the world, is expected to announce a big quarterly loss on Wednesday morning, and the bank is expected to discuss its plans at that time.
Lehman has survived for 157 years, through wars, the Depression and the vagaries of the markets, but got into trouble by buying and financing commercial and residential real estate, including subprime mortgages.
On Wall Street, there is a growing sense that Lehman may have to solve its problems on its own, without drastic help from the government, which in March brokered the rescue of another Wall Street bank, Bear Stearns.
“Some may worry that Treasury has taken on so much taxpayer burden they don’t have any remaining capacity more to take on the burdens of Lehman,” said David Trone, an analyst at Fox-Pitt Kelton.
Authorities helped arrange and finance the sale of Bear because they feared that the collapse of that firm might cascade through the financial system.
But unlike Bear Stearns, which seemed to crater overnight, Lehman’s fortunes have been dimming for months. Since February 2007, its stock price has plunged 91 percent, wiping out $40 billion in shareholder value.
On Monday, as other financial shares surged after the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehman’s shares sank. Adding to that sell-off was concern that an investment in Lehman by a government-owned bank in Korea would fall through after Korean regulators threw cold water on the idea.
Standard & Poor’s, the ratings agency, warned on Tuesday that it might cut one of Lehman’s primary credit ratings, citing concern about the firm’s ability to raise capital.
Even as Lehman’s stock price plunged anew on Tuesday, however, some questioned whether the government could let a global financial institution like Lehman fail.
Vincent R. Reinhart, a top former Fed official who has repeatedly criticized the shotgun takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, said it would be very difficult for the Federal Reserve to let Lehman collapse.
“The plain fact about financial crises is that policy makers are unwilling to test the resilience of markets,” said Mr. Reinhart, now a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Financial institutions have been closely measuring their exposure to Lehman. On Tuesday, commercial and investment banks said they continued to do business with Lehman, and hedge funds did not appear to be pulling their accounts with the firm, events that helped precipitate the fall of Bear Stearns.
Since March, Lehman has been in a fight for its life, as some investors, including prominent short-sellers betting against the bank’s stock, questioned how the firm was valuing some of its assets. Lehman lost $2.8 billion in the second quarter and was forced to raise $6 billion in new capital. But investors were not placated, and the firm was compelled to explore more extreme measures.
For months, it has tried to raise capital, sell its asset management division and examined spinning off of its commercial mortgage assets into a new company.
Richard S. Fuld Jr., Lehman’s hard-charging chief executive, has replaced virtually every major division head, including the firm’s president and chief financial officer.
During that time he has replaced the global head of fixed income — the division from which most of Lehman’s problems have arisen — twice.
But with every measure taken, Lehman’s stock price has fallen further.
“Clearly the company does not believe that it has a serious balance sheet problem, and it simply refuses to take what it believes are fire sale prices for its key assets,” said Richard X. Bove, an analyst at Ladenburg Thalmann.
While the bank has talked to many prospective investors, its most serious discussions appeared to be with Korea Development Bank, a state-run institution that is moving toward privatization. But on Monday, K.D.B.’s top regulator cast further doubt on prospects of an investment in Lehman.
“It should take a cautious approach toward taking over Lehman, at a time when its privatization is not accomplished, and given the current conditions in domestic and foreign financial markets,” said Jun Kwang Woo, chairman of the Financial Services Commission.
“The focus now should be on stabilizing the Korean markets,” Jun told lawmakers.
He said it would be “inappropriate for a state-owned company to pursue such an acquisition at this time.”
To some observers, Mr. Fuld has waited too long to take the major steps needed to shore up Lehman. A market veteran with almost four decades of experience, he seemed more optimistic than many of his peers that the market had gone too far and would come back, a strong case against selling. Bids for the company’s investment management division are due on Friday.
“It is certainly the case that had Lehman seen this problem evolving as it has, then they could have and should have done something many, many months ago,” said Joseph A. Grundfest, professor of law and businesses at Stanford.
Waiting has proved to be a dangerous gamble. Sovereign wealth funds, once eager to invest in troubled financial companies, have been burned by losses. American investors who bought shares of Lehman in June when it raised $6 billion have also lost billions.
“He is dealing as if he has a whole deck of cards, when he has none,” said one banker who has had recent dealings with Lehman, representing a potential foreign buyer.
Unlike Bear Stearns, which effectively collapsed when customers fled for the exits and the firm could not finance itself, Lehman Brothers has more sources of long-term financing and like other broker-dealers, access to emergency financing from the Federal Reserve. Mr. Fuld said that the existence of that lending facility should take any question of Lehman facing a liquidity crisis “off the table.”
But with the stock price in free fall and the cost of buying protection against Lehman defaulting on its bonds skyrocketing, far surpassing the levels reached when Bear went under, it is clear Lehman is not immune to the kind of panic that can put a financial institution, which depends on confidence, at risk.
“No bank or broker can withstand a strong panic by customers, clients or counterparties,” said Mr. Trone. “Even the best liquidity profile gets you only so far,” though he said that the existence of the emergency lending facility means that Lehman will have more flexibility and time than Bear did.
Turmoil at the firm has led some to question whether Mr. Fuld should remain at the helm.
“He’s been getting a lot of extra credit and good will based on his reputation and disposition as an honorable leader and as a smart, likable guy, but that’s not enough right now,” said Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, associate dean of the Yale School of Management.
Edmund L. Andrews contributed reporting from Washington.
RaviBg wrote:Report sees change in Finance Minister
Report sees change in Finance Minister
K.R. Srivats
Barclays Capital says in its research report that the current Finance Minister, Mr P. Chidambaram, will be replaced by Dr C. Rangarajan, the ex-chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, in the next few weeks.
“The appointment of Dr Subbarao (as RBI Governor) and the possibility of Dr Rangarajan being made the new finance minister, is a response, in our view, by the Prime Minister to embark with a fresh economics team to address the inflation problem and large off-budget subsidies…”, says the research report.
When contacted over telephone, the author of the report, Mr Sailesh K. Jha, Senior Regional Economist with Barclays Capital, told Business Line that “the change is imminent” and this was what he had gathered from his discussions with various policy makers in top echelon of the Government before he authored the report.
How does fall in crude prices spur demand for dollars? Isn't it the other way around? Can you please explain what you mean?Suraj wrote:The Rupee is being hit by the surge in demand for dollars due to the fall in price of crude
Sure, sure, its always fun doing bizness with fireworks and IEDs going off around you. Just adds to the festive environmentIndia may be shining with BRIC partners Brazil, Russia and China in the high-growth game, but when it comes to ease of doing business, it ranks below Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal,
I suspect something else also is going on here. Increased buying should nullify lower payments we make for our current purchases (although I presume, buyers will enter futures contracts rather than buy in spot market).Suraj wrote:The domestic oil players need dollars to pay for the crude. When the crude prices fall, they try to take advantage of it by buying more, for which they need more dollars, which in turn makes the dollar dearer relative to the Rupee locally. This is just one part of a broad exchange rate equation, though.
The council in a briefing to the media here today said, the net investment by life insurance companies in the equity markets during 2007-08 was Rs 55,000 crore, against an investment of Rs 53,400 crore by foreign institutional investors.
Chidambaram a hurdle to exports growth: Kamal Nath
A Correspondent in New Delhi | September 11, 2008
Who would you blame for India not achieving its exports target for the second consecutive year now?
Well, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath has laid the blame squarely at the doorstop of Finance Minister P Chidambaram and his ministry for the roadblocks that will see India miss its exports target yet again.
The government had set the export target of $200 billion for 2008-09, an increase of over 28 per cent over the last year. The target of $160 billion set for the last year had fallen short by $5 billion.
Kamal Nath has written a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh seeking his intervention to resolve over 50 issues which, because of the finance minister's hurdles, have posed many a problem. Nath has stressed that if these issues were resolved in time, "we can achieve growth targets set for industrial production and exports in the remaining months."
His complaint is, ". . . unfortunately a number of issues are still pending clearance with the ministry of finance," and he has sought the prime minister's intervention since "despite efforts at various levels, we have not been able to resolve these issues."
Pointing out that extra efforts would be needed this regard, considering the slowdown in the global economy, Kamal Nath has pleaded with the prime minister that "we need the support of every arm of the government in our efforts."
The issues on which he has sought the prime minister's intervention include exemptions under the Income Tax Act in various fields and various other forms of relief that his ministry has been seeking for different sectors.
Finance Minister P Chidambaram held informal consultations on Wednesday on possible candidates for the Reserve Bank deputy governor's post.
Former International Monetary Fund chief economist Raghuram Rajan, 45, and the finance ministry's chief economic adviser Arvind Virmani, 59, are said to be in contention.
The position may fall vacant if current Deputy Governor Rakesh Mohan were to move on to a teaching assignment or join a multilateral institution overseas. Of the four deputies at Mint Road, one position is meant for a monetary economist.
Rajan is currently professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago and considered one of the most promising of economists of his generation. He has a doctorate in economics from MIT.
Earlier this April, a committee headed by Rajan had submitted a detailed roadmap on financial sector reforms to the Planning Commission.
Virmani, who joined the government in 1987 from the World Bank, has held a number of assignments since. Among these was a stint as adviser to Manmohan Singh, when the latter was finance minister, between 1991 and 1993.
Virmani's name has also been mentioned as one of the contenders to chair the powerful Competition Commission of India.
India's industrial production growth accelerated to a five-month high in July, before higher interest rates had a chance to damp consumer spending. Output at factories, utilities and mines rose 7.1 percent from a year earlier after a 5.4 percent gain in June, the Central Statistical Organisation said in New Delhi today. Economists expected an increase of 6 percent.
Manufacturing, which accounts for about 80 percent of Indian production, gained 7.5 percent in July from 6.1 percent in June, today's report showed. Electricity output rose 4.5 percent in July from 2.6 percent, mining grew 5 percent and consumer-goods production increased 7.3 percent. Capital goods production rose 21.9 percent in the month, compared with 12.3 percent in June.
Concerns that a slowdown in industrial growth may hurt corporate profits have resulted in the Bombay Stock Exchange's benchmark index declining 26 percent this year. The Sensitive Index pared losses today after industrial production for July beat expectations.
Bonds were little changed. The yield on the benchmark 8.24 percent security maturing in April 2018 was at 8.27 percent as of 12:10 p.m. in Mumbai, from 8.28 percent before the data, according to the central bank's trading system.
Since end-March, its forex kitty has shrunk by almost $21 billion. The dollar demand, particularly from oil producers, has risen sharply since early March, as global crude prices have been spiralling. Also, rising commodity prices have resulted in higher dollar demand from importers.
The New York Times
Printer Friendly Format Sponsored By
September 15, 2008
Lehman Heads Toward Brink as Barclays Ends Talks
By BEN WHITE and JENNY ANDERSON
Unable to find a savior, the troubled investment bank Lehman Brothers appeared headed toward liquidation on Sunday, in what would be one of the biggest failures in Wall Street history.
The fate of Lehman hung in the balance as Federal Reserve officials and the leaders of major financial institutions continued to gather in emergency meetings on Sunday trying to complete a plan to rescue the stricken bank.
But Barclays, considered the leading contender to buy all or part of Lehman, said Sunday that it could not reach a deal without financial support from the federal government or other banks, making a liquidation more likely.
The leading proposal had been to divide Lehman into two entities, a “good bank” and a “bad bank.” Under that scenario, Barclays would have bought the parts of Lehman that have been performing well, while a group of 10 to 15 Wall Street companies would agree to absorb losses from the bank’s troubled assets, according to two people briefed on the proposal. Taxpayer money would not be included in such a deal, they said.
But that plan fell apart on Sunday, making it likely that Lehman would be forced to liquidate.
What remained unclear was how a liquidation might proceed. One option that was discussed on Saturday would have major banks and brokerage firms continue to do business with Lehman as it unwinds its assets and liquidates over a period of months, according to several people briefed on the discussions. That would buy Lehman time to sell those assets in an orderly way and avoid a fire sale that could depress prices of similar assets held by other banks.
The overarching goal of the weekend talks was to prevent a quick liquidation of Lehman, a bank that is so big and so interconnected with others that its abrupt failure would send shock waves through the financial world. Of deep concern is what impact a Lehman failure would have on other securities firms, insurance companies and banks, notably Merrill Lynch and the American International Group, both of which have come under mounting pressure in the markets.
A.I.G., one of the world’s largest insurers, may need to raise $30 billion to $40 billion to avoid a severe downgrade to its credit rating, according to people briefed on the situation. An A.I.G. spokesman, Nicholas J. Ashooh, called that estimate speculative and declined to comment further.
Some considered the weekend talks as high-stakes brinksmanship.
Both Barclays and Bank of America expressed interest in buying Lehman and were negotiating hard, initially insisting that the government provide financial support. But federal officials were adamant that no public money be used — a big point of contention because many of the top Wall Street executives believe that their banks, which have each written down tens of billions of dollars in assets, do not have the capacity to lead the rescue on their own.
The prospects of a deal involving Bank of America appeared to fade as talks progressed Saturday and it became clear that the government would not stray from its position.
Well, before we laugh too soon, I'm wondering what the spillover impact on the Indian market will be. Which Indian players have significant exposure to the US asset-bubble mess?vina wrote:Now everyone will have to fess up and declare the bad assets on their books. If Lehman liquidates and flood the markets with fire sale priced assets, then everyone will have to mark their books. Would love to see the look in the faces of he soverign wealth funds and Panda , sitting on all those MBS assets!!![]()
![]()
e.AshokS wrote:One of my prof, also heads alternative investment group at GS, said that the sovereign funds are getting more sophisticated. no longer run by bureaucrats but hiring MBAs from top schools. look at what Dubai's "sovereign fund" is doing.... they are competition for PE funds and both PE / Sovereign were able to outspend corporate houses. The only thing now is that a very large section of liquidity for PE (30% to 40%) has simply vanished.... and will not reappear for a while.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/busin ... 30989.htmlMeltdown as bank collapses
By Stephen Foley in New York
Monday, 15 September 2008
Wall Street banks were preparing for one of the most dramatic shake-ups in the finance industry's history last night as it emerged that Lehman Brothers, an investment bank with a 158-year history, was working on a plan to declare bankruptcy.
As a marathon session of weekend talks went into its final hours, an even bigger rival, Merrill Lynch, also assembled its board to vote on a takeover offer. With the opening of Asian markets as a deadline, the signs were that two of the most powerful corporations in global finance could disappear. Insiders said other financial institutions were examining the creation of a massive fund, perhaps as large as $50bn (£28bn), which would be used to prop up other firms that get into difficulty.
Whatever the exact shape of the deal, it was clear that it would have profound – and unpredictable – consequences for the world economy. The events represent a crescendo for the year-long credit crisis, which has wiped out half-a-trillion dollars in investments held by Wall Street's biggest firms, forced governments to nationalise once-proud financial institutions and has made it ever harder for ordinary people and businesses to get loans. Failure to end the crisis soon could tip the world into a severe recession, say economists.
For that reason, the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, had called in the chief executives of Wall Street's biggest banks for crisis talks over the future of Lehman Brothers on Friday night, but few expected such dramatic action would be necessary.
One by one, the major players revealed that the credit crisis had so weakened their finances that they would not be able to fund a rescue deal for Lehman. When the UK bank Barclays walked out of negotiations to buy the company yesterday, there seemed no option left but a liquidation of Lehman.
Fears grew over the weekend that Lehman's failure could trigger a crash when Asian markets resumed trading. The Fed and the US Treasury refused to hand over government money to prop up firms brought low by their own bad mortgage investments.
There were signs, however, that the Fed was considering taking some action to aid markets by loosening conditions for lending money to Wall Street firms.
The question is whether a once-in-a-generation shake-up on Wall Street will bring stability and help restore confidence, or presage a new leg-down in the credit markets that are the lifeblood of the global economy.
It is certain to throw thousands more bankers out of work. Lehman employs 25,000 people around the world, including 4,500 in London, where it has its European headquarters.
Coming on the heels of the fire sale of the government-backed Bear Stearns in March, the disappearance of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch would mean the Big Five investment banks will become just two.
Bank of America was cajoled by the Fed into talks to buy Merrill Lynch after walking away from negotiations with Lehman Brothers yesterday. It will pay $40bn, but not in cash, issuing Merrill Lynch investors instead with new BofA shares. If the takeover is consummated, it will spare Merrill Lynch, one of the most famous brands on Wall Street, from the ignominious fate of Lehman Brothers, which declined to accept cut-price offers to refinance the firm earlier in the year, only to find that its value continued to plummet and its business began to wither.
Dealers across Wall Street were called in for an unprecedented shadow trading session, supervised by the derivatives industry regulator, aimed at reducing exposure to Lehman. The trades would only go into effect if Lehman filed for bankruptcy before midnight, NY time.
Such a liquidation has not been tried since the explosion of derivatives trading, which meant the collapse of one institution could mean unpredictable losses elsewhere. Bill Gross, of Pimco, one of the most outspoken fund managers, predicted an "immediate tsunami" if Lehman fails.