Bharat Rakshak

Fai pleads guilty to conspiring with Pakistani spy agency to lobby for Kashmir

By Jason Ukman, Published: December 8

A Northern Virginia man accused of overseeing a front group for the Pakistani intelligence services — and using political contributions to lobby Congress for two decades — pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges Wednesday.

Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, 62, acknowledged receiving funding from the Pakistani government, as well as committing tax violations, according to court documents filed in U.S. District Court in Alexandria.

Since approximately 1990, Fai received at least $3.5 million from the government of Pakistan, including its Inter-Services Intelligence agency, but failed to report the origin of that funding as required by law, according to prosecutors.

“For the last 20 years, Mr. Fai secretly took millions of dollars from Pakistani intelligence and lied about it to the U.S. government,” U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride said in a statement. “As a paid operative of ISI, he did the bidding of his handlers in Pakistan while he met with U.S. elected officials, funded high-profile conferences, and promoted the Kashmiri cause to decision-makers in Washington.” …………………………..

Washington Post

anmol wrote:Wikileaks / Startfor: Osama bin Laden 'was in routine contact with Pakistan's spy agency

By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent

7:35PM GMT 27 Feb 2012

The disclosure was contained in e-mails from the private US security firm, Stratfor, which were published by WikiLeaks website on Monday after being obtained by the Anonymous hacking group.

Stratfor provides analysis of world affairs to major corporations, military officials and government agencies and was once likened by an American business magazine to a "shadow CIA".

According to one of the e-mails, the firm was shown the information papers collected from bin Laden's Abbotabad compound after the US special forces attack last May that resulted in his death.

The e-mail, from a Stratfor analyst, suggested that up to 12 officials in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency knew of the al-Qaeda leader's safe house.

The internal email did not name the Pakistani officials involved but said the US could use the information as a bargaining chip in post raid negotiations with Islamabad.

American officials have always believed it was impossible for the ISI not to have known that Bin Laden was sheltering in a garrison town so close to Islamabad. Pakistan has repeatedly dismissed the charge.

"Mid to senior level ISI and Pak Mil with one retired Pak Mil General that had knowledge of the OBL arrangements and safehouse," the email said of the officers involved. "I get a very clear sense we (US intel) know names and ranks."

WikiLeaks claimed to have 5 million Stratfor emails that it would published in collaboration with media outlets. However only 200 were released in the first lot. {Snipped}.................

pgbhat wrote:Islam named intelligence agency chief

Islamabad Pakistan appointed Lt General Zaheer- ul Islam as the new director-general of the country's powerful spy agency Friday.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's office statement said: "The prime minister has appointed Lt General Zaheer-ul Islam as the new DG ISI", referring to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Islam is the commander of the V Corps, based in Karachi. He takes over from Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who was appointed in 2008, and who oversaw some of the stormiest times in the US-Pakistan relationship.

Khaama Press, April 12, 2012

Infiltration of Pakistan, Iran in Afghan Medias: NDS .....................

He also said, a number of Pakistani spies are also working in Shamshad TV which broadcasts in Pushto language. He said, “Shamshad TV has hired 12 foreigners without informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Information of Afghanistan. The Financial Director and a program maker of this TV is Pakistani nationals and creates Pakistani subjects for display.”

Mr. Mashal said he was 80% sure that the 12 individuals are the spies of ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), and would formally work in this TV if they were not spies.

According to Afghan NDS spokesman Lotfullah Mashal, the presence of foreign workers in Media Agencies without informing the Afghan government indicates that these individuals are following their political targets in this country. …………………..

RAWA

Pakistan's spy agency seeks some credit for bin Laden's death

By Richard Leiby, Published: April 28The Washington Post

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan’s premier spy service, stung by lingering suspicions that it was complicit in sheltering Osama bin Laden, said Friday that it deserves credit for helping U.S. intelligence officials locate the hideout where the al-Qaeda chief was killed by American commandos nearly a year ago.

“The lead and the information actually came from us,” a senior official with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) said in an interview, reviving a push for recognition ahead of the anniversary of the stealth raid in a town about 70 miles by road north of the capital, Islamabad.

Washington has cast serious doubt on the ISI claim — and frequently portrays the agency as a sponsor of Islamist extremists — but a renewed official embrace of the operation that eliminated bin Laden is revealing in itself.

Many Pakistani politicians have described the May 2 raid as an assault on Pakistan’s sovereignty and an example of U.S. arrogance. A Pakistani doctor who helped the CIA in the hunt for bin Laden remains in custody on charges of treason, and his associates are barred from working. …………………….

Wa Po

It is commonly believed that Major General Walter Joseph Cawthorne (1896-1970) was the first head of ISI which is not correct.

Sunday, March 18, 2012 is the 60th birthday of the 19th (the present incumbent) chief of of the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. That is also the day of his retirement. The question today is: will he or will he not retire from service to make way for the 20th ISI chief on March 18, 2012? Will Shuja Pasha get an extension once again? It is a question which cannot have any definitive answer owing to the complex nature of the subject. So one can analyse instead the process of the previous ISI chiefs’ appointments, and the development of the office from the time of its inception.

Let us analyse the importance of the ISI chief’s chair in the larger context of South-Asian realpolitik. It began with the nascent ‘religious’ State’s identity crisis as a ‘minority’, occasioned by the proximity of a neighbour with an overwhelming non-Muslim majority that had ‘ruled’ over an extensive area for several centuries in the past. The Pakistani ruling class always had a feeling of deprivation and the sense of a historic mission to reclaim the land over which their “perceived predecessors” had ruled. This gave birth to the ‘martial race’ mentality that, from the beginning, characterized the personnel of Pakistan’s army. The army was smart enough to take early control of the polity, thereby causing the rise to power of the duo comprising the ISI and the army. Colonel Syed Shahid Hamid was the first boss of the ISI. Then came Robert Cawthome,{the fact is that it was Cawthorne who raised the profile of the ISI. He eloquently argued Pakistan's case to the Western powers and sealed their unstinted support. In a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in c. 1948, he said “Whatever the legal position might be, from the political, economic and strategic points of view, Pakistan could not afford to have a hostile India right up to the Western borders of J[ammu] & K[ashmir] : a) It would bring Indian army within 30 miles of the military headquarters of Pakistan and right behind the vital north—south communication line; b) it would give India control over the waterworks of Chenab, Jhelum and Indus; c) it would give India direct contact with Afghanistan and Chitral and Swat in the backdrop of indications that the Indian Congress and the Young Afghan Party were jointly encouraging the Pathanistan idea; d) it would also place India in an almost direct contact with Russia.”} followed by Brigadier Hussain, whose rule began in 1959 and ended in 1966. The motto, “faith, unity, discipline”, was ingrained in the system of the institution. Mohammad Akbar Khan, who served from 1966 to 1971, was the first Indian Muslim to attain the rank of a general in the British Indian army. Major General Ghulam Jilani Khan (1971-1978) was more of a religious fanatic than a professional soldier, as he took a leave of absence from the army to volunteer as a guerrilla-war warrior in Kashmir in 1947-1948, fighting for Kashmir’s “independence and right to join Pakistan”. His posting to Washington in the 1950s as the first Pakistani military attaché and his subsequent command of the 15th Infantry Division in Sialkot, close to the Indian border, made him simultaneously pro-United States of America and rabidly anti-India, thereby sowing the seeds of a destructive, fanatic and clandestine culture in the psyche of the ISI for which it is notorious across the globe. Understandably, Ghulam Jilani Khan could not end his innings without being more virulently anti-India than ever before owing to his soldiers’ wholesale humiliation at the hands of the Indian army in Dhaka in 1971.

It was during the tenure of LieutenantGeneral Akhtar Abdur Rahman (1980-1987), however, that the ISI changed from being an intelligence agency of the State to a virtual omnipresent and omniscient ‘state within a State’. An Afghan migrant from the princely state of Rampur in Uttar Pradesh, Abdur Rahman was the mastermind behind the Afghan mujahideen’s offensive against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Thereafter, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Afghan resistance became synonymous.

Understandably, the Sargodha-born Punjabi, Hamid Gul (1987-1989), of the Armoured Corps, found it easy to diversify further and create the political body, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, which led the “jihad front in Kashmir” against India in 1989. If Hamid Gul is to be considered a “religious warrior” in an army man’s garb, the ISI chief, the Pashtun Lieutenant-General, Javed Nasir (1992-1993), will surely be remembered for mixing an excessive dose of ‘religious potassium cyanide’ with the action plan of the ISI. Nasir hurt India not only in Kashmir but also in other regions of South Asia. He supplied arms to the Arakanese Muslims inhabiting the Bangladesh-Myanmar borders, had direct contact with Tamil extremists and did gun-running and fund-raising in Bangkok. Amongst his other master plans was the Peshawar Accord, which successfully installed the first mujahideen government in Kabul under Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. He also took direct control of Sikh pilgrims during religious functions in Pakistan. In fact, Nasir’s strong anti-US and anti-India programmes created a fanatic following.

It took the time, labour and initiative of two ISI bosses, Javed Ashraf Qazi and Naseem Rana, to de-Islamize the outfit and put some semblance of professionalism into the order. But what happened during Nawaz Sharif’s tenure became a spectacular precedent. Ziauddin Butt, from the Corps of Engineers, a non-fighting arm, was made the ISI chief against the wishes of the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, in October 1998. To make matters worse, he ‘replaced’ the latter as the general of the Pakistani army for a few hours, till the coup by Musharraf nipped the powers of Ziauddin as well as that of his mentor, the premier of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, in the bud.

This is to the credit of the coup master, Pervez Musharraf, whose first act on assumption of the politico-professional office on October 12, 1999 was to appoint the Punjabi Lieutenant-General, Mahmud Ahmed, a confirmed Tablighi Jamaat member and Taliban sympathizer, the director general of the ISI. However, 9/11 spoilt it all, and the ISI chief had to make an inglorious exit on October 8, 2001, just before the US invasion of Afghanistan.

Understandably, a comparatively low-profile Punjabi, Ehsan ul Haq, held the ISI fort for three years thereafter (2001-2004), to be followed by another Punjabi, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (2004-2007), a confirmed US protégé, his unquestionable professional qualifications notwithstanding. His close link with the US subsequently caused him to become the army chief as Musharraf had to hand over the baton in October 2007.

Nadeem Taj, Musharraf’s man Friday, had it good as long as Musharraf survived the turbulence of Pakistan’s politics. Musharraf’s exit in 2008 meant Nadeem Taj’s exit too in October 2008. He left to command the XXX Corps at Gujranwala. Nadeem Taj was accused of ‘double dealing’ with militants to the detriment of US interests in the AfPak sector.

In this historical setting entered the latest ISI chief, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, in 2008. Amongst other qualifications which endeared him to the Americans are Pasha’s hands-on experience of planning operations against the Taliban and al Qaida militants in the federally administered tribal areas and the North-West Frontier Province (Pakhtunkhwa), his anti-India actions in Kashmir and other parts of South Asia notwithstanding. The Kayani-Pasha duo is most useful to the Americans in one of the most dangerous areas of the world. And that is important. Did they not, directly or indirectly, help the clandestine US-led assault to hunt down Osama bin Laden and bring him out of his own lair in 2011? Critics may argue that it was a ‘one-off operation’ and not necessarily a manifestation of pro-America policy. Yet there are too many missing links and too many coincidences here to ignore this as an aberration.

For the post of the next director general of the ISI, five names have cropped up today, in case Shuja Pasha manages to retire on March 18, 2012. In the seniority list there is Lieutenant-General Rashid Masood (of the Baloch regiment like the army chief, Kayani) of the IV Corps Lahore retires on April 9, 2014. Lieutenant-General Mohammad Zahirul Islam (Punjab Regiment) of V Corps Karachi retires on October 1, 2014. Lieutenant-General Muhammad Asif, colonel commandant of the Sind Regiment, retires on April 15, 2015 and does not hold any command job. Lieutenant-General Javed Iqbal — Frontier Force — too is without a command job and retires on April 15, 2015. And finally, there is the Punjabi Major General Naushad Ahmed Kayani — Punjab Regiment — the present director general of the Military Intelligence.

Though a guessing game about the appointment of the ISI chief could be hopelessly off the mark, one feels that the two corps commanders of Lahore and Karachi could be out of the race owing to their advanced age. Moreover, Lahore and Karachi seem to be ‘peace stations’, unlike the Peshawar and Quetta postings for the army commanders at present. As for the other two staff duty lieutenant-generals, although their age could be an advantage, it could get neutralized in the absence of their experience of intelligence postings in the past. The dark horse, despite being the juniormost amongst the five contenders, however, could be Naushad Ahmed Kayani. As the director general of the Military Intelligence, he obviously is the eyes and ears of his chief from the same Kayani clan.

It is apparent that without the simultaneous nod of General Kayani and the US, none can take the chair of the ISI chief as yet, the contrary wishes of the Zardari-Gilani duo notwithstanding. Here one may recall that soon after becoming the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani had, for two months, tried to gain control over the appointment of the director general of the ISI as well as to place the agency under the administrative, financial and operational control of the interior ministry. All that was in vain as General Kayani successfully pushed Shuja Pasha into the ISI chair. Though 2012 is no 2008, the army chief, Kayani, and his US mentors are still not to be ignored. Even if Shuja Pasha, the 19th boss of the ISI, does manage to leave on March 18, 2012, the 20th chief of the ISI could still be anyone but a chosen member of the tottering Zardari-Gilani team.

Jhujar wrote:http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-52728 ... -her:-Asma

Establishment plotting to kill me: Asma

ISLAMABAD: Renowned Pakistani human rights activist Asma Jehangir on Monday night said that the country’s powerful security establishment was planning to get her killed using one of the many jihadi outfits operating in the country. She spoke out on a couple of primetime talk shows; stating that the establishment particularly a sensitive agency – was upset with her for picking up cudgels for the Baloch people and speaking out against the role of the security establishment in the restive province of Balochistan.Ms. Jehangir went public with her fears after an “information-leak from a responsible and highly credible source.” Alarmed by this leak, leading members of Pakistan’s civil society said: “What makes the reported conspiracy to liquidate Asma Jehangir especially serious is, firstly, the environment of target-killings, in which dissident persons’ dead bodies are being dumped all over, and, secondly, the fact that the finger of accusation has been pointed at the extraordinarily privileged state actors.”In a statement issued through the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, they said this is not a conspiracy against one individual alone but a plot against Pakistan’s future as a democratic state. “We wish to make it clear to all and sundry, especially those who preside over the security apparatus, that they must not under-estimate the consequences of any harm being caused to the life of Asma Jehangir.”

DW: You have made some very serious allegations against the Pakistani security agencies, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Are your sources credible?

Asma Jahangir: I am a very responsible person, and I do not usually make these kinds of allegations. I have been threatened many times in my life but I never went to the police and never made any hue and cry about it. I believe now it is my duty to speak up and say what is needed to be said. My sources are extremely reliable.

You have been very critical of the Pakistan Army's role in politics, and also of the military agencies' human rights abuses inside Pakistan. Do you think this could be the reason they would want to eliminate you?

It is true that I have been critical of them but I have never been unduly critical. I am critical of their policies, which I do not agree with. I think that, in whatever I have said - for instance in my role as a lawyer in the missing people's cases - I have repeated what people said in court. I hoped that there would be a change in the mindset of the establishment, which unfortunately doesn't appear to have happened.

You are a prominent human rights activist and lawyer. Do you think the ISI and other security agencies could kill an internationally renowned person like yourself?

Let me remind you of our history. Prominent people have been killed in Pakistan just like in any other country. The difference between Pakistan and other countries is that in Pakistan nobody ever knows who is responsible for these murders. Akbar Bugti (the Baloch nationalist leader) was also a very prominent person. There was a warning that he would be killed. There was a warning that they would go after him. And when he was actually killed, nobody was held responsible. ……………………

Kabul accuses Pakistan over suicide attack

AFP | 2 hours ago

KABUL: Afghan authorities on Tuesday said “regional spy agencies” were behind a rare suicide attack targeting Shia Muslims that killed more than 80 people in a veiled reference to Pakistani intelligence. ………………….

Aloko said the attack was planned in Pakistan’s northwestern city of Peshawar, by “regional spy agencies” aimed at “provoking sectarian violence”.

“Although the Jhangvi group claimed responsibility, it was masterminded by some spy agencies in our neighbouring countries,” Aloko said. …………………….

Dawn

Taliban attacks on US bases in Afghanistan: enabled by Pakistani forces?

The volume of explosives used in attacks on US military bases in Afghanistan in recent days fuels concern that Pakistani security services are taking a stronger hand in backing insurgent groups.

By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer / June 21, 2012
Washington

A recent spate of attacks on US military bases in Afghanistan points to a resilient Taliban with a steady supply of arms. It is a supply stream flowing from Pakistan – one that US troops, try as they might, are proving unable to interrupt.

Equally troubling for the Pentagon, analysts warn that these attacks serve as growing evidence that Pakistani security services (ISI) is stepping up its support of insurgent groups to jockey for position ahead of the scheduled 2014 departure of US combat troops from the country. …………………..

The sheer volume of explosives involved in the attack points to ISI links with an insurgency “that’s proving to be a continuous challenge” for US forces in eastern Afghanistan, Mr. Dressler says.

In eastern Afghan provinces such as Khost, Taliban-affiliated insurgent groups, such as the Haqqani network, maintain safe haven and logistical lines that run all the way to Pakistan – and use these places to project their power into neighboring provinces even closer to Kabul.

“The fact that these guys can move trucks full of explosives across the border” is troubling, Dressler adds. “By not taking action, Pakistani forces “are signaling their tacit approval of this stuff.”

These sorts of behaviors – including “increased collusion” between the ISI and Pakistani-based insurgent groups – “are likely to increase” with the drawdown of US forces, Dressler warns, “unless you can get into these places [in eastern Afghanistan] and go on the offensive like we did in Helmand and Kandahar [provinces of southern Afghanistan]." …………………

CSM

Senator Farhatullah Babar (PPP) has drafted a bill to bring the ISI under civilian control and stop it from manufacturing public opinion, formulating foreign policy and manipulating politics like "a state within a state". The proposed bill also aims to empower the ISI to deal with terrorism, separatism and other anti-state activities in a legally effective manner.

The bill has not yet been tabled in the Senate. But even if it is put up as a private member's bill at some stage, it is highly unlikely that it will go any further. The PPP leadership is so besieged by the courts and opposition at the moment that it would be foolish to step on the toes of the powerful military and provoke it to heave it out of office.

The ISI's reputation as a state within a state is well established. It became an autonomous and powerful arm of the Gen Zia state during the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the1980s when its DG was upgraded from a Brigadier to a Major General and organized the multi-billion dollar arms and funds pipeline from the USA and Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, after the restoration of democracy in 1988, DG-ISI Gen Hameed Gul helped form the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad to try and stop Benazir Bhutto's PPP from sweeping into power and, failing that, later conspired to destabilize and topple her government through various strategies, including Operation Midnight Jackals. The ISI under General Asad Durrani helped bring Nawaz Sharif to power in 1990, courtesy Mehrangate, and under General Javed Ashraf Qazi nudged him out of office in 1993. In 1999, two pro-ISI generals, Mohammad Aziz, CGS, and Mahmood Ahmed, Corps Commander Pindi, the former an ex-ISI man and the latter a future DG, carried out a coup against Nawaz Sharif, installed General Pervez Musharraf in office and interviewed and hand picked members of his new cabinet. In due course, the elevation of Gen Ashfaq Kayani to DG-ISI and then army chief, an unprecedented act, opened the route for a complete merger of the ISI with GHQ, with officers routinely to-ing and fro-ing from one headquarter to the other. Henceforth, the right of the prime minister to nominate the DG-ISI was negated by the right of the army chief to nominate his own man to such a sensitive job. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (DG-ISI 2009-2012) was nominated by Gen Kayani, promoted by him to the rank of Lt General and given an extension in tenure.

To be sure, the civilians have tried and failed to seize control of, or reform, the ISI. Benazir Bhutto replaced Gen Gul with Gen (retd) Kallu. But the ISI rank and file rendered him ineffective. Nawaz Sharif sent DG-ISI Gen Asad Durrani back to GHQ, handpicking Gen Javed Nasir as DG-ISI over the head of COAS Gen Asif Nawaz. But Mr Sharif didn't stay long enough in office to make the change stick institutionally. When he returned to power in 1999, he handpicked General Musharraf as the army chief and Gen Ziauddin Butt as DG-ISI. But General Musharraf made Gen Butt ineffective by packing the ISI with his loyalists. When Asif Zardari set up the PPP government in 2008, he tried to seize control of the internal political wing of the ISI by proposing its command and control in the interior ministry. But GHQ and ISI manipulated the media and opposition to thwart his move. Under Gen Pasha, the ISI became larger than life, at home and abroad, formulating foreign policy, disobeying, embarrassing and even destabilising the Zardari government on many occasions, until the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, a self-avowed benefactor of the ISI and GHQ, was provoked to bitterly decry the existence of a "state within a state".

Therefore, the motive behind the proposed bill - that there can be no state within the state in a democracy - is justified. Indeed, there is a civilian consensus on the issue, Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi who has been stung twice, being the most ardent advocate of civilian supremacy over the Punjabi-dominated military. But the PPP is too weak and discredited to bring the military to heel. More significantly, the media and judiciary have also made common cause with the military against the discredited politicians whose popularity ratings in the polls are far below theirs.

The proposed bill is, however, relevant in other ways too. It would enable the ISI to get legal cover to detain and act against terrorists and other anti-state elements without running foul of the courts and constitution by making people "disappear" - an Ombudsman and bipartisan parliamentary policy-making and review committee is built into the bill. This would truly strengthen the ISI to defend the national interest as defined by elected and accountable civilians. But, given the electoral probability that Pakistan is likely to be ruled by weak and bumbling civil-coalition governments in the face of a powerful military, the ISI is fated to remain a state within a state in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan People's Party has risked its own safety in trying to exorcise the demon of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) from national politics. Several such efforts have failed in the past, and each failed attempt has increased the ISI's resilience.

The agency continues to enjoy a unique status in Pakistan. It is seen as untouchable by other institutions and it believes that it is indispensable for Pakistan's national security. Over the last few decades, it has attained a kind of a mythical reputation, more negative than positive.

Recently, presidential spokesman Senator Farhatullah Khan Babar submitted a private-member bill in the Senate to regulate the ISI's affairs. Babar insisted he had moved the bill in his individual capacity, but it is in line with his party's policy.

The senator is known for his integrity and loyalty with the People's Party. Despite holding the important office of presidential spokesman, he drives his own second-hand car, works regularly from a modest party office, and never takes the slightest undue advantage of his influence and access.

Once the ISI started interfering in the civilian domain, there was no going back. It took it upon itself to safeguard 'national interests' that were solely defined by itself

The proposed Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (Functions, Powers and Regulation) Act, 2012 holds the ISI answerable to the parliament and the prime minister. It proposes an internal accountability system in the agency to put an end to forced disappearances and victimization of political parties. The bill emphasizes the agency should work directly under the prime minister.

It proposes the formation of an Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to oversee matters relating to expenditure, administration and policy of the agency. The bill also recommends the appointment of an ombudsman to address service complaints of the employees of the ISI.

The ISI, which was first mandated to monitor activities of the political parties in the aftermath of the 1971 Fall of Dhaka, earned notoriety for massive interference in national political affairs. Coercion, blackmailing and bribery were seen as the forte of the ISI. It took it upon itself to safeguard 'national interests' that were solely defined by itself. The agency's power increased significantly during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, when it received billions of dollars in funds and weapons to funnel into Afghanistan. Its policies since then have resulted, according to its critics, in international isolation and domestic political instability.

Officials now admit the IJI, an alliance of religious and political parties who opposed Benazir Bhutto, was put together and funded by the ISI

The military establishment has especially been wary of Benazir Bhutto. Her final meetings with father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the gallows of Rawalpindi jail had a lasting impact on her. The military regime of General Zia orchestrated Bhutto's judicial murder, and the remnants of his brutal regime were fearful that Benazir would avenge her father's murder.

After she humiliated the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in the 1988 general elections, straightening of the ISI was one of her priorities. Officials now admit the IJI, an alliance of religious and political parties who opposed Benazir Bhutto, was put together and funded by the ISI, and the agency is also accused of election rigging. After becoming prime minister, Benazir appointed Lt Gen (r) Shamsur Rehman Kallu as the ISI director general. Serving military officials refused to accept the move and started bypassing the director general on important matters.

In 1989, the civilian Intelligence Bureau obtained an audio tape of two active-duty army officers from the ISI about toppling the Benazir Bhutto government. The covert operation to carry out a coup had been called Operation Midnight Jackal. The establishment continued to plot against the PPP government until it was ousted in 1990.

"The military establishment was afraid of working with the PPP and it never reconciled with the reality," says Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, author of Military Inc.

Once the ISI started interfering in the civilian domain, there was no going back. It masterminded conspiracies, toppled governments, staged political events and justified all its misdeeds. Throughout the 1990s, it acted like an unbridled horse or a misguided missile.

In March 2012, then defence minister Ahmed Mukhtar admitted the ISI always had a political cell. The cell arm-twisted political rivals while facilitating the pro-establishment politicians.

The agency was handy for General Musharraf, who desperately needed to garner political support to legitimize his unconstitutional rule. The ISI resorted to its traditional scheming and ended up creating the PML-Q. Maj Gen Ehtasham Zamir, a senior ISI official, repeatedly admitted his role in creating the king's party and manipulating the 2002 general elections.

Two months before her assassination, Benazir Bhutto had publically discussed the restructuring of the ISI. She knew there was risk in pursuing such an ambitious agenda. In 2008, the People's Party came to power. It tried to pursue the policy she had envisioned, but her successors failed to match the acumen she was blessed with. Consequently, two separate moves to tame the ISI failed.

The agency's power increased significantly during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, when it received billions of dollars in funds and weapons to funnel into Afghanistan

In July 2008, the Gilani-led government issued a notification placing the ISI under the administrative control of the interior ministry. But Rehman Malik's dreams of controlling the strongest entity in Pakistan were soon shattered. The presidency could not sustain the shockwaves coming from the GHQ, and with its tail between its legs, the government withdrew the notification.

In theory the ISI is answerable to the prime minister, but in practice it is not. Politicians from across the spectrum agree more or less that the ISI's shenanigans weakened the political structure and democracy in Pakistan. But the politicians too have been accused of hypocrisy.

For instance, it was former prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani who called army chief General Ashfaq Kayani 'a pro-democracy general'. Why was it necessary for a unanimously-elected prime minister to praise a general who in ideal circumstances should report to a 22-grade civil servant?

When the Memogate scandal was shaking the foundations of the Zardari-Gilani dispensation, the same Gilani announced that his party's government would not accept 'a state within the state'. It was an obvious reference to the powerful ISI, which according to cynics cannot now be controlled even by the army chief.

The politicians walk a tight rope. Many would leave the challenge midway, while some simply bail the agencies out in the end.

Analysts say General Kayani exercised restraint in following the footsteps of his predecessor, General Musharraf, probably because the circumstances were not conducive for another military takeover. However, Gen Pasha was often accused of reviving the traditional ISI tactics.

Mainstream opposition party PML-Nawaz blamed Gen Pasha of being behind the sudden rise of rival Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf. The Imran Khan-led party rubbished the allegation. Pakistan Defence Council - an anti-American alliance of religious and Jihadi parties - is also said to be the handiwork of the ISI. The DPC rejected the accusation as well.

Some political analysts think otherwise. According to Brig (r) Shaukat Qadir, the ISI under Lt Gen Zaheerul Islam would not intervene in political affairs. But how it would deal with an empowered judiciary is an interesting question.

People may have forgotten the protest marches and fiery speeches of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, but two of his actions will be remembered for times to come. First, he wrote an infamous letter to the members of armed forces, in 1977, to topple the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government. Second, he took the matter of the ISI funding anti-PPP politicians to the Supreme Court.

In 1996, he sent a letter to then chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah seeking action against the ISI officials who doled out millions of rupees to politicians who were against the Pakistan People's Party, and the politicians who accepted the money.

The apex court was silent on Asghar Khan's petition for years, prompting the retired air marshal to write over a dozen letters to the court. He never got a favourable response until Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry took up the case.

Former ISI chief Lt Gen Asad Durrani has repeatedly confessed his agency distributed money among the politicians - including Nawaz Sharif. Former army chief General Aslam Beg has corroborated that. The politicians have denied vehemently.

But for the Supreme Court, taking action against the ISI may not be as easy as sending an elected prime minister packing. Mehrangate is a test case.

After taking up a 1996 petition of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan, the Supreme Court has categorically stated that a political cell in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and any extra-constitutional interference in Pakistan’s democracy is unacceptable. In his petition, Asghar Khan accused the ISI of dishing out over Rs 140 million to various right-wing politicians and parties during the 1990 elections to create the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) alliance to defeat the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). A prickly truth that has surfaced during the hearings is that the political cell was created during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure. In 1973, when Mr Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government of Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) government led by Mufti Mahmud of JUI resigned in protest. This was followed by the start of an insurgency in Balochistan, during which the ISI was carrying out political actions as well as black operations. Mr Bhutto’s idea of creating a cell was simple: The ISI, in the aftermath of the breakaway of what is now called Bangladesh, needed some teeth to manage the politics of an unstable Pakistan. But the chickens have come home to roost by now. During the Afghan war, under General Ziaul Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, the ISI and its political cell swelled to become the Frankenstein’s monster that it has become today. Today, the cell and its mother organisation stand accused of interfering in political matters and carrying out covert operations left, right, and centre while operating with absolute impunity and terror. As most things are when it comes to the agencies, this issue is murky and perhaps deliberately shrouded in secrecy. The notification that was issued to set up the cell in the first place in 1975 has not yet been located according to Defence Secretary Nargis Sethi. Regardless of the circumstances or context of the creation of the cell, the time has come to abolish it. There is no place for such subversive cells in a democratic polity. If the cell continues to function, then the democratic political process is in grave danger of being manipulated and distorted as in the past.

Another issue to note is that a 2009 judgment of the apex court observed that a political cell cannot operate in the intelligence agency, so why has the court not insisted on the implementation of its verdict as it has in other high profile cases against civilian politicians? All over Pakistan, but especially in Balochistan, corpses bearing the signs of torture keep turning up, among them lawyers, activists, journalists, students and farm workers. Why is no one investigating what has come to be known as Pakistan’s Dirty War? The forces of law and order appear to remain indifferent with not a single person being arrested, investigated or prosecuted. The country’s powerful military and its intelligence agencies must be held accountable.

There is a dire need for civilian oversight here. The ISI must report to the Prime Minister instead of operating with the impunity it is currently enjoying. Although Yousaf Raza Gilani and Farhatullah Babar’s attempts in this regard proved stillborn, the government must continue to press for it regardless.

SSridhar wrote:
The ISI coming under a civilian oversight will never happen in Pakistan. The PA will never agree to part with its ISI and no politician can forcibly yank the ISI away from the PA.

The abolition of the 'political cell' within the ISI also will not happen because all politicians have turned to it at different times for their own requirements, including the PPP.

Pakistan: The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate reportedly is planning to hold a meeting with 1,500 imams and the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, Afghan newspaper Arman-e Melli reported 8 August.

Comment: The news services provided no explanation of the purpose of this planned meeting. What is important for Readers to note is the public statement that Pakistani intelligence knows how to contact the Afghan Taliban in Quetta.

In the past 12 years the US has insisted the Pakistanis do more to suppress anti-Afghan insurgents, but never the extradition or assassination of Afghan Mullah Omar's shura in Quetta. The Pakistanis tended to deny they knew where Omar was residing. Musharraf insisted he remained in Afghanistan. Today's announcement indicates Pakistani military intelligence always has known where he resides, with his in-laws on the outskirts of Quetta, most likely.

Eleven years into the fight Pakistani intelligence lets slip in public that it knows where Mullah Omar and his senior followers are. American leaders should be outraged by the pattern of Pakistani intelligence protecting Mullah Omar the same way it protected Osama bin Laden.

Without Omar and the Quetta/Karachi shura, the Taliban fighting groups in Afghanistan would run out of money to pay fighters and pay for ammunition and would devolve into local Pashtun hotheads and malcontents. The Pakistanis apparently have had the ability to stop Omar at any time in the past eleven years.

ramana wrote:Nightwatch fulminates:

Pakistan: The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate reportedly is planning to hold a meeting with 1,500 imams and the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, Afghan newspaper Arman-e Melli reported 8 August.

ramana wrote:Nightwatch fulminates:

Comment: What is important for Readers to note is the public statement that Pakistani intelligence knows how to contact the Afghan Taliban in Quetta. . . . Eleven years into the fight Pakistani intelligence lets slip in public that it knows where Mullah Omar and his senior followers are. American leaders should be outraged by the pattern of Pakistani intelligence protecting Mullah Omar the same way it protected Osama bin Laden.

ramana wrote:Wasnt OBL also a son-in-law of Mullah Omar? So what happened to that wife? Or is it just a myth?

“The pro-independent political parties think that in abduction of Hindus for ransom and looting their shops is no doubt, move of a Pakistani patronized criminal groups who are being used to counter Baloch freedom movement ; therefore, they have been given free hand to kidnap Hindus in Balochistan. These professional criminals also collaborate with FC and intelligence agencies in “Abduct, kill and dump” of Baloch political activists.”

pgbhat wrote:Pakistan foreign minsiter denies Bilawal Bhutto affair rumours

Senior PPP figures on Thursday said they believed the claims were part of a plot by the country’s feared Inter-Service Intelligence [ISI] agency to damage Ms Rabbani Khar’s reputation because it blames her for her part in facilitating a UN investigation into thousands of missing people detained by the security forces.

One PPP official told The Daily Telegraph that the ISI expects the United Nations’ Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances to recommend senior army and intelligence officials be charged for their role and blame Ms Rabbani Khar for allowing the delegation into the country.

“They are not happy with her,” the official said. “The UN mission received a cold reception but Hina was called in by the president to meet him and the army chief. She crossed some red line.”

I have kept the typo in the headline intact.

Pakistani-Canadian columnist Tarek Fatah, an unsparing critic of Pakistan who writes for the Toronto Sun, expressed in his own words that the decision to block the Sun‘s website “is definitely politically motivated and it does no credit to the current administration in the national capital Islamabad.”

Fatah further said, “I have had it confirmed for me by an extremely senior member of the government. I have the tweet where he outlined why the firewall has been imposed.”

“The tweet says, when asked why the Sun has been blocked: ‘Your criticism and exposure of Fauji-Jihadi shenenigans. Decision from Aabpara.’”

Fatah interpreted this tweet as a nod towards the military. He added, “That clearly shows that this banning decision has been made by the Pakistan military. It is they who really run Pakistan.”

As the battles raged in South Waziristan, the station chief in Islamabad paid a visit to Gen. Ehsan ul Haq, the ISI chief, and made an offer: If the C.I.A. killed Mr. Muhammad, would the ISI allow regular armed drone flights over the tribal areas?

In secret negotiations, the terms of the bargain were set. Pakistani intelligence officials insisted that they be allowed to approve each drone strike, giving them tight control over the list of targets. And they insisted that drones fly only in narrow parts of the tribal areas — ensuring that they would not venture where Islamabad did not want the Americans going: Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, and the mountain camps where Kashmiri militants were trained for attacks in India.

The ISI and the C.I.A. agreed that all drone flights in Pakistan would operate under the C.I.A.’s covert action authority — meaning that the United States would never acknowledge the missile strikes and that Pakistan would either take credit for the individual killings or remain silent.

"The evidence indicates that the ISI hasn't fundamentally changed its policy. The Afghan Taliban are in some ways stronger now. They launched twice as many attacks in 2012 than they did in 2008. They are able to sustain such a high level of attacks on Afghan and coalition forces by having quite an extensive network of bases inside Pakistan that deal with operations, logistics, training, recruitment and other matters."

"All the evidence suggests that there are elements in the Pakistani military that continue to support the Taliban. And, if the West's expectation is that this support is going to stop, then the West is right to view aspects of the military and state do support the Taliban with suspicion."

the report is to exonerate the intelligence agencies by effectively accepting the official version that the ISI and the Federal Investigation Agency were unaware of Bin Laden's presence in the country.

In May 2012, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered evidence of Pakistani officers plotting to “eliminate” a prominent human rights activist, Asma Jahangir, according to the summary of a top-secret DIA report. Jahangir had been a leading public critic of the ISI for years.

The DIA report did not identify which officers were plotting to kill Jahangir, but it said the plan “included either tasking militants to kill her in India or tasking militants or criminals to kill her in Pakistan.”

The U.S. agency said it did not know whether the ISI had given approval for the plot to proceed. Although the report speculated that the ISI was motivated to kill Jahangir “to quiet public criticism of the military,” the DIA noted that such a plot “would result in international and domestic backlash as ISI is already under significant criticism for intimidation and extra-­judicial killings.”

News of the alleged plot became public a few weeks later when Jahangir gave a round of interviews to journalists, revealing that she had learned that Pakistani intelligence officials had marked her for death. The plot was never carried out.