India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 03 Aug 2008 03:18

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/N-de ... 319529.cms

N-deal: US will pilot India's case at NSG
K Subrahmanyam

NEW DELHI: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is to meet on August 21-22 to consider giving India a clean waiver from its guidelines in regard to nuclear commerce. The move for the waiver will be made by US as a major supplier of nuclear technology, equipment, enriched uranium, etc, and will be backed by other major nuclear commerce practitioners, Russia and France.

Members of the NSG will not be dealing with India on an Indian request but with US. The US move is backed by other major founders of the London Club, which was the predecessor of the NSG. The London Club consisted of US, Russia, UK, France, Germany, Japan and Canada. It was set up in 1975 in response to Indian nuclear test in 1974 and focused entirely on plutonium route to nuclear weapons.

Pakistan was able to buy all its equipment from Europe since uranium enrichment was not covered in the list of banned exports — the Zangger list. The club expanded to its present number of 45 only in the ‘90s and the prohibition of nuclear commerce became all comprehensive after Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons with Chinese support. China was not then a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nor of the London Club. The founders of the London Club are all in G-8 group of economic powers and they have endorsed the Indo-US nuclear deal involving the NSG waiver in their recent Hokkaido summit statement.

While nonproliferation fundamentalist nations may express their reservations on giving waiver to India, the founders of the London Club will be able to explain to them the circumstances in which India felt compelled to go nuclear weapon-wise. In spite of 1974 nuclear test India did not go for a nuclear weapons programme till 1989, till two years after Pakistan acquired its India-specific nuclear weapons with Chinese assistance. Rajiv Gandhi offered not to cross the nuclear threshold if his disarmament plan, offered to UN General Assembly in June, 1988 was accepted. But his offer was ignored. He authorised the assembly of Indian weapons only in March 1989.

Though India has had a number of reactors of 200 MW capacity operating for many years — the Madras reactor has been operating for decades — international estimates of Indian nuclear arsenal is very modest, highlighting that India is not engaged in an arms race but has its arsenal only to deter nuclear threats. India is committed to no first use. India's restraint in building up its arsenal has been referred to by US Administration during the Congressional hearings.

There may be questions on India testing. There is Vajpayee's commitment to the UN General Assembly. If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) comes into force by US Senate reversing its decision then the ban on testing will be universal and nondiscriminatory. While the 123 agreement envisages the contingency of India testing, it is extremely unlikely India will do so unless the treaty breaks down and another nation resorts to testing.

These factors have been explained to various NSG members by Indian diplomats and the movers of the waiver motion are fully aware of them. The NSG will also weigh in the need for a fast growing India having access to clean energy at a time when there is growing concern about climate change and increasing carbon emission. The waiver to be considered at the NSG is not just India's request but a move by major powers of the world to rectify a long existing anomaly in the international system.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 04:25

Sellout at Vienna?
Pioneer.com
Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi
India in all-duty-no-rights bind
With India only two steps short of a servile accession to the global non-proliferation regime, it is now clear that its sovereign right to enhance its nuclear weapons programme stands seriously challenged.

It is also clear that India's dealings with the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be technically conducted in the capacity of a non-nuclear weapons State, inviting sanctions if it proliferates.

While it was evident from the start - 18 July, 2005, to be precise - that the Indo-US nuclear deal would de facto bring India under the NPT regime, it is only now that the documents the Manmohan Singh Government has signed along the way prove how alarmingly close India is to submitting its national security to a nuclear bazaar governed by the insulated P-5 club.

In a nutshell, even if the bilateral nuclear deal with the US comes apart in case India conducts further tests, it will be impossible for it to deal with other members of the NSG, bound as they are by the international nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.

This was precisely the submission fiercely resisted by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, immediately after Pokhran. While Vajpayee had indicated India's commitment to complete global disarmament - India had declared a self-imposed moratorium on future tests - he had refused to sign the draconian CTBT that would have placed India under the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapons state and posed a threat to national security.

Terming the NPT a "discriminatory and flawed treaty," Vajpayee had said: "In any event we cannot join the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapon power when the fact is that we are a nuclear weapon power."

This came amid noises from the US that India's security requirements are best served without nuclear capability. Then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott even went to the extent of saying, "We do not, and will not, concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapons states under the NPT." Vajpayee's response: "We are a nuclear power State. It is not a gift from anyone."

Now that India stands on the verge of signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to access the nuclear bazaar on conditions that clearly show India's accession to the NPT regime as a non-nuclear power state, the Vajpayee Government's strategic victory in 2000 appears wasted.

The UPA Government took the first step towards this in August 2007 when India and the US sealed the bilateral nuclear deal. While the Agreement underlines the US "commitment to reliable fuel supply to India," it is silent on the fact that the deal is governed by a domestic American legislation, the Hyde Act, specifically formalised for the Indo-US deal.

Although the UPA Government is at pains to explain that the Act is a domestic law not binding on India, the Act clearly says the US would deem India a fit partner only if it "has a foreign policy congruent to that of the US and is working with the US in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation."

While the former clause impinges on India's foreign policy sovereignty to deal with countries like Iran, the latter is a veiled threat in case India tests nuclear weapons. In effect, despite assurances of "uninterrupted fuel supply", the US reserves the right to withdraw from the deal unilaterally leaving India high and dry.

The second step came on July 9, 2008 when India finalised the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, a step which placed India under a more binding international regime than the bilateral deal with the US.

While Manmohan Singh repeatedly promised the country an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA the formalised text resembled all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states.

Pinning India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default, the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity but holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.

India is, indeed, allowed to take some undefined "corrective measures" in the event of disruption in fuel supplies. But the text does not provide for such license. The document dwells at length on the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports but does not elaborate on India's rights incase of fuel disruption.

What it certainly does is to make it impossible for India to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments.

That India has now opened itself to stringent IAEA safeguards, unsure fuel supplies and possible sanctions in the event of non-compliance with non-proliferation norms is evident in the Additional Protocol that India will have to sign with the IAEA.
This signature would bind India to inspections in both "declared and undeclared" nuclear facilities at the IAEA's will if it determines that India is violating international non-proliferation norms in any way.

These would be far more stringent than the token inspections conducted by the IAEA in nuclear weapons states, in effect, making a mockery of the much-touted "separation plan." Unlike the five declared nuclear weapons powers, India will not have the luxury of testing further nuclear weapons in case of a changed security environment.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 04:41

In a nutshell, even if the bilateral nuclear deal with the US comes apart in case India conducts further tests, it will be impossible for it to deal with other members of the NSG

Nonsense. The terms of the NSG waiver are not yet known. There is nothing about testing in the IAEA agreement.

Right now, it is impossible for India to deal with any member of the NSG. Even if it signed the CTBT, even if it does not conduct tests, India can buy nothing from the NSG. Not one gramme of Uranium. Not one bolt or screw.

This signature would bind India to inspections in both "declared and undeclared" nuclear facilities at the IAEA's will if it determines that India is violating international non-proliferation norms in any way.

Rubbish. The IAEA agreement says no such thing. The author should read it, instead of writing arrant nonsense.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 05:02

India yet to be recognised as a nuke power: Russia
Posted online: Saturday , August 02, 2008 at 05:23:25
Updated: Saturday , August 02, 2008 at 05:23:25

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... ia/343840/#

Moscow, August 2: Russia has welcomed the IAEA-nod for the India-specific safeguards agreement, but has said the approval of the nuclear watchdog did not imply a recognition of the country as an official nuclear power as stipulated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The safeguards agreement was approved by the 35-member Board of Governors of the IAEA by consensus on Friday, and would pave the way for implementing the Indo-US atomic deal, bringing India closer to ending nuclear isolation.

"Consistently acting in favour of developing peaceful cooperation with India, we welcome the decision of this country to put its nuclear fuel and facilities in the civilian nuclear sector under IAEA supervision and safeguards," Russian permanent envoy in Vienna, Alexander Zmeyevsky was quoted as saying by the local media.

The agreement will open 14 of India's 22 existing and future nuclear reactors for inspections by the UN nuclear watchdog.

Zmeyevsky, however, underscored that India-specific safeguards agreement "does not contain clauses, which could be interpreted as recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state in the sense of NPT or giving India the right to withdraw from the IAEA safeguards at its own discretion".

He expressed hope that implementation of the IAEA safeguards will be expanded to the nuclear fuel cycle and would serve as "a reliable mechanism to purely peaceful nature of New Delhi's international nuclear cooperation".

Russia is completing the construction of two nuclear reactors for the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu, even as the two countries have signed an MoU to build four more reactors after an NSG clearance.

Can anybody explain

rachel · Post by **rachel** » 03 Aug 2008 05:29

Please forgive my ignorance on this topic,but there is a very fundamental issue about this that is unclear to me.

If this agreement goes all the way thru NSG and US Congress, does that mean

a. inspections start immediately or
b. inspections start ONLY if and when we actually buy some reactors and/or fuel and/or restricted nuke products?

Because if (b) were the case, we could keep this agreement in our hip pocket and not actually buy anything until we get the right product or pricing,... but if (a) were true, it virtually forces us to buy something from someone.

I would prefer rather than buying expensive reactors, if we just bought uranium from Canada and South Africa for our existing reactors which will fall under inspections.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 05:38

The IAEA agreement is an INFCIRC66 type agreement just like the previous INFCIRC66 agreements that India has signed for the six reactors it has under safeguards (some for decades).
No IAEA agreement will confer NWS status. That is given by Article IX section 3 of the NPT.

INFCIRC66 agreements are facility agreements. They apply to those facilities only. So while the IAEA could inspect Tarapur, it could not inspect BARC.
That situation still stands. India is offering an additional 8 reactors, and all imported reactors for facilities safeguard. The reprocessing plants will be under campaign safeguards, just as they have been before.

But INFCIRC66 agreements no longer apply to NNWS. They must use INFCIRC153 and (optionally) INFCIRC540. So while this agreement does not give NWS status, by acknowledging India's non-safeguarded facilities, the IAEA BOG is accepting Indian status as a SNW (state with nuclear weapons).

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 05:40

The agreement subsumes previous INFCIRC66 ones so facilities that are currently inspected (two BWRs, two PHWRs, two VVERs) will continue to be safeguarded. Of the 14 reactors that India is offering, six are already being inspected.
Additional facilities will be safeguarded as India adds them to the list.

It is not just fuel that will be bought. Even additional CANDU units may be on offer. Though India has mastered PHWR tech, it will certainly learn new things from the larger reactors that AECL now builds, plus the new safety and control equipment that has been developed in Canada.

Note that China bought reactors of all kinds - there is much to learn by comparing Russian, French, and US designs.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 06:12

BJP, Left parties slam IAEA-India safeguards agreement

* Say agreement has put India under perpetual inspection regime of IAEA

By Iftikhar Gilani

NEW DELHI: As the government of Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh rejoiced at the conclusion of the safeguards agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and India, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Left parties on Saturday slammed the government for signing the agreement.

The BJP and the Left parties said that the agreement had put “India under a perpetual inspection regime of the IAEA”. They said that the inspection regime of the IAEA had come into force without guarantees of permanent supply of fuel. “The India-IAEA safeguards agreement comes with perpetual and legally irrevocable obligations that India can neither suspend nor end the agreement even if the supplier states cut off supply of fuel and replacement parts,” BJP spokesman Prakash Javadekar said at a press conference at the BJP headquarters.

The spokesman said that while the BJP wanted a strategic partnership with the US, what the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) had achieved was a “strategic subservience”.

Javadekar said that as against the five established nuclear weapon states policy of placing only 11 out of total 400 facilities for inspections, India had agreed to place 14 reactors and 21 other institutes under IAEA inspections. Referring to a statement by Nicholas Burns, he said that yet another fear of the BJP had come true. The BJP spokesman said, “Burns has clearly stated that Hyde Act is applicable to 123 agreement and prohibits India from further nuclear tests. If India tests in future, the US can take back the fuel, plant, machinery and spare parts without India’s permission.”

Burns’ statement vindicated BJP’s interpretation and negated the government version, which was why the government was silent on the issue, Javadekar said.

The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) also criticised the agreement. The party said that the prime minister had assured the parliament that the agreement guaranteed uninterrupted fuel supply.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 06:16

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340 ... 67,00.html

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story ... 5579c9f933

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 06:17

If India tests in future, the US can take back the fuel, plant, machinery and spare parts without India’s permission.”

India gave permission for the US to take back the Tarapur spent fuel. It remains in India.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 06:25

India, one of only four states not party to the treaty, would be the only country with nuclear weapons to receive reactor technology and materials with permission from the IAEA.

Nonsense.

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docume ... f418.shtml

INFCIRC/418 - March 1993
Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 06:26

India's 2nd round with IAEA will be tougher
3 Aug 2008, 0227 hrs IST, Srinivas Laxman,TNN
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 319725.cms

MUMBAI: With the UN nuclear watchdog adopting India specific safeguards, New Delhi's dealing with the IAEA is far from over. A N Prasad, former BARC director and an expert in safeguards agreements who was with the IAEA between 1996 and 1999 says the process of drafting an India-specific additional protocol may not be easy since this country stands between a weapon and a non-weapon state.

According to the Vienna-based body, an additional protocol is a legal document which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a complementary inspection authority to that provided in the safeguards agreements. The main aim of the additional protocol is to allow IAEA to provide assurance about both declared and undeclared activities. Under this protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites. On Friday, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, said India and the IAEA have begun discussions on an additional protocol.

Speaking to TOI on Saturday, Prasad said the additional protocol being drafted has to keep in view India's strategic interests. "Considering this there has to be a certain amount of give and take. An additional protocol is generally very intrusive, but it should not be with the case of India," he said. He said that usually under an additional protocol agreement, inspections can be carried out at any time and at a short notice.

In fact IAEA itself states, "Advance notice in most cases is at least 24 hours." Notice can be given just two hours prior to inspection. Asked if the additional protocol has to be finalized before the crucial NSG meeting scheduled for August 21, Prasad said, "If India wants to compromise on certain issues, the process can be expedited. But if it decides to remain firm and not compromise, it could take a little longer," he said. He said till now New Delhi did not bother to spell out the broad framework of the additional protocol. "Matters started moving only when IAEA's board of governors began asking for it," he said.

Once the protocol is firmed up, it will cover the 14 nuclear reactors which will be placed under the civilian list and coming under the India-specific safeguards agreement. On Friday, IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei told the agency's board of governors these reactors will come under safeguards by 2014.

Prasad explained that while a safeguards agreement had a broad framework, an additional protocol on the other hand delved into specifics. "An additional protocol is not mandatory. But in the case of India it has become mandatory as a result of the Indo-US nuke deal," he said.

The agency says inspection involves examining records, carrying out visual observation and environmental sampling, and examining utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices.

Prasad said permanent Security Council members — China, France, Russia, UK and US — adopted double standards while implementing safeguards agreements and the additional protocol. Citing the example of China, he said that those atomic facilities which are either exporting or importing are under safeguards and covered by additional protocol.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 06:51

Side-effects of Npowerment

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 03 Aug 2008 07:17

Belgian beers to enter Indian market in 2008

Stella Artois is a premium Belgian lager, while Hoegaarten is an original Belgian white beer laced with coriander and orange peel and an alcohol content of 4.8 percent volume. Beck's is the world's most famous German beer, while the famous Leffe beer is a dry, fruity, lightly spiced beer, full and creamy - a perfect balance of strength and subtlety.

The event was alsoattended by Belgium's envoy to India Jean M. Debountte. He told ANI on the sidelines of the function that Belgium would totally back India's bid for participation in international nuclear commerce. When asked whether Belgium would support India at the meetings of the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), he replied in the affirmative

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Aug 2008 08:46

With the UN nuclear watchdog adopting India specific safeguards, New Delhi's dealing with the IAEA is far from over. A N Prasad, former BARC director and an expert in safeguards agreements who was with the IAEA between 1996 and 1999 says the process of drafting an India-specific additional protocol may not be easy since this country stands between a weapon and a non-weapon state.

IF the NSG provides a waiver without any issues, then AKs statement stands - India cannot be treated like a non-weapon state. No body will use the acronym NWS, but that is a "silent node".

In fact I am tempted to think that even if BJP comes to power and tests nothing will change outside of some NPAs going insane.

JMTs

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 03 Aug 2008 11:12

Gerard wrote:
Instead of fabricating the core as two hemispheres as was done during the Manhattan Project, Soni and Kakodkar designed the core to be made in a number of slices (probably six) that stacked to form a sphere. To ensure a snug fit, the mating surfaces of the slices tapered off with a twist so that they would lock together securely. This design, which they first modeled this in brass, allowed them to work with smaller pieces of plutonium. The actual plutonium core was fabricated by a team led by P.R. Roy of BARC's radio-metallurgy department, who had also made the plutonium fuel rods for Purnima.
The device was assembled in a hut 40 m from the shaft. Assembly began on 13 May with a team made up of Soni, Kakodkar, Iyengar, Venkatesan and Balakrishnan.

Any engineer in the trade of shockwave driven compression will never go for inherently poor design of assembling a spherical body by intentionally introducing metal-air discontinuity at the worst possible place by making slices (I.e. poor design choice is use of any angle different from direction of the radial compression. ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. The obvious and direct method is thus to partition pit segments where every cut is a diameter cut of the sphere, that passes through center of the sphere).

That is a very poor design. As if there were dreath of challenges for the Indian team in 1970's, this design is like shooting your own foot. A sure recipe for poor performance.

Neshant · Post by **Neshant** » 03 Aug 2008 11:13

the govt is just rushing through without thinking of the consequences.

------------------
After IAEA approval, India has virtually signed NPT: BJP

New Delhi, August 2: A day after approval of India-specific safeguards agreement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the BJP termed the government's move as virtually signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the agreement does not treat India as a nuclear state and prohibits it from conducting nuclear tests.

"From Indira Gandhi to Vajpayeeji, India had maintained that it will not sign the NPT. Yesterday, in a way, we have signed the NPT," BJP spokesperson Prakash Javadekar said.

He said the IAEA agreement does not treat India as a nuclear state. "There is nothing India-specific in the agreement. Whatever is written in the preamble is not part of the agreement. The operational part has the model which was prepared for non-nuclear states and is being applied to us," Javadekar said.

"We are now bound by the IAEA safeguard agreement in perpetuity. Whether we get uranium or not, whether we get the material or not, we have lost all rights to prevent IAEA inspections of our institutions for all times, and it will always be in their hands," he said.

"Even if the nuclear supply is stopped, the inspections will continue. This means nuclear supply is not in perpetuity, but inspection is in perpetuity," he added.

Saying the BJP is not against partnership with the United States but is opposed to the nuclear agreement in its present form, Javadekar said, "The BJP has always said it wanted a strategic partnership with the US, but not strategic subservience. Yesterday's agreement is a testimony of our strategic subservience."

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Aug 2008 11:19

Neshant wrote:the govt is just rushing through without thinking of the consequences.

This is being driven by the business lobby

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Aug 2008 11:29

Arun_S wrote:
Gerard wrote:
Any engineer in the trade of shockwave driven compression will never go for inherently poor design of assembling a spherical body by intentionally introducing metal-air discontinuity at the worst possible place by making slices (I.e. poor design choice is use of any angle different from direction of the radial compression. ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. The obvious and direct method is thus to partition pit segments where every cut is a diameter cut of the sphere, that passes through center of the sphere).

That is a very poor design. As if there were dreath of challenges for the Indian team in 1970's, this design is like shooting your own foot. A sure recipe for poor performance.

Rather a dumb question,
was it a half lap joint or butt joint?
If it was lap joint then atleast then

"ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere could be minimized "

If it is butt joint it definitely

"ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. "

The fact that there were bands to hold the the totapuri (aam) slices indicates to me a butt joint.

IVHO

Raju · Post by **Raju** » 03 Aug 2008 11:48

HEADMASTER OF SCHOOL FOR SCANDAL
By M.J.AKBAR
27 JULY 2008

In the end it's the jokes that get you, isn't it? SMS, that deadly virus, has been spreading sound bites like "Sting is King". Its first cousin, email, has been circulating emotional pleas to the heartless Finance Minister: "Don't you know how old MPs are? They have bad backs! Can't you print Rs 100,000 notes instead of measly little thousand-rupee notes??? Do you know how heavy a sack of 30 crores is?" There are heart-rending stories of MPs breaking down because they did not know how to take their loot, collected in Delhi, back to the security of their small towns.

One email was untouched by levity and weighed by hurt and anger. Dr Manmohan Singh had repeated Guru Gobind Singh's famous battle hymn, in which he asked the Lord to ensure that "shubh karman mein kabhu na darun [may I never be afraid to do right]" before the debate began. How could the Prime Minister have recited this just before he launched into unprecedented "dushkarman [misdeeds]"?

The Prime Minister won his battle in July. He may have lost the war that is only a few months away. He won the confidence of the House only to lose the trust of the nation.

Dr Manmohan Singh's reputation for personal honesty was the last remaining undiluted asset of the Congress after four years of government. The voter did not ever believe his ministers to be clean. Some of them have established fresh records in corruption. But he was certain that the Prime Minister was an honest man. After the cash-for-votes-and-hide-the-tape scandal, Manmohan Singh is just another sullied politician, willing to feast on Grub Street in the company of the most famous bagmen, and travel the Gravy Train chatting with fixers and pushers in order to remain in office.

As the cash disbursers have proved, the Congress is full of calculators. It needed a mathematician. A strategist would have analysed the cost-benefit ratio and sabotaged the cash-and-carry operation on grounds of common sense. What has been won is nothing compared to what will be lost.

There is enough evidence that the voter punishes corruption and rewards probity. Leaders like Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, Naveen Patnaik, Nitish Kumar and Narendra Modi have won support because they are believed to be personally honest. It may not be the only reason for re-election, but it is a primary reason. The Congress had that advantage in the image of Dr Singh. That reputation has self-destructed.

Inflation had already weakened the voter's confidence in Dr Singh's abilities as an economist. His second asset was wiped off the books in July.

The Prime Minister cannot hold his nose above the stink anymore. He was personally involved in the purchase of MPs. He was visibly uncertain at his own dinner on the eve of the debate, despite the fact that Shibu Soren had already been bought in what should be called the real "1-2-3 Agreement": the cash-stoked coal portfolio for Soren, deputy chief ministership of Jharkhand for his son, and a second ministerial berth for a party MP in Delhi. By Monday morning, the Prime Minister was smiling, and waving the V sign as he entered Parliament. Late at night he received word from his money-managers that enough MPs had switched, or been neutralised, to ensure a comfortable victory. Parliament had become a sleaze house, but so what? The mask of morality used to fool us for four years now lies in that great receptacle called the dustbin of history.

There is a problem when you tread on sleaze. You can slip on it, hurting yourself badly, even as your fall becomes the source of cynical laughter.

The Prime Minister's face turned visibly ashen when three BJP MPs threw bundles of currency notes into the well of the House. For the nation, that was the turning point of the debate. They may or may not have understood the intricacies of the Hyde Act. But they did recognise the corruption that had been hidden.

Sections of the urban middle class which welcomed the idea of closer relations with America [you could call them the Green Card Party of India] felt utterly betrayed by a man they had trusted, and besmirched by corruption.

In the process, Dr Manmohan Singh has one remarkable achievement: he has united the Opposition. For the last three decades, this has been the most difficult act in Indian politics. The irony is that he subverted what Mrs Sonia Gandhi had woven in order to bring the Congress back to power: she had used the Gujarat riots to create a formidable coalition against the BJP. Dr Singh has destroyed that framework by breaking with the Left and turning the Congress into an irredeemably right-wing organisation, with a foreign policy to match its economic thrust. This turn to the right will change the character of the Congress irrevocably.
By opting for the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, he has catapulted a dynamic agent of social change, Mayawati, into the leadership of the Third Front. Mayawati is the only regional leader with a national base, for she has a constituency in every constituency of India. She can lend Dalit support to an ally in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh as easily as in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Her candidates do not have to win; by contesting they slice enough Congress votes by ensure its defeat. It would have made more sense for the Congress to keep Mayawati as any ally, but that would need a leader who was a mathematician instead of a cash-broker.

The Government is trying very hard to "prove" that Mayawati is corrupt. Mrs Sonia Gandhi and Dr Singh must be regretting deeply that they let her off the in the Taj-market development case during those happy days when they were attempting a deal with her instead of Mulayam Singh. The important fact is that Mayawati's voters are unimpressed by such accusations against their leader. She has empowered them and they are grateful to her.

Corruption is not a sudden swerve into perdition for the Congress: the first jeep scandal [an extremely innocuous, by today's standards, desire for vehicles] broke out before the first general election in 1952. But flexibility in election expenditure is one thing; the purchase of elected MPs at exorbitant rates quite another. Venality turned into a rot when P.V. Narasimha Rao purchased Shibu Soren and his MPs in order to save his minority Government. Dr Manmohan Singh was finance minister, and no one heard the mildest protest from him. Perhaps he thought that he could repeat what his guru Narasimha Rao had managed. What was it that Marx said? History repeats itself, first time as tragedy and the second time as farce. But Dr Singh does not read Marx.

Power seems to have changed Dr Singh's character and temperament in crucial ways. Was it too much to expect some grace from him in this purchased victory? Instead, in his reply to the House he descended to the personal. That is not done.

But what is the point of expecting decorum when Parliament has been turned into a School for Scandal?

Vivek Sreenivasan · Post by **Vivek Sreenivasan** » 03 Aug 2008 12:02

There seems to be a lot of confusion as to the details of the nuclear agreement. Let me clear it up for you guys.

India has currently 22 nuclear reactors, it has agreed to submit 14 of them to inspections leaving 8 reactors TOTALLY INDEPENDENT. Therefore India can continue to ENRICH uranium and make NUCLEAR weapons as it pleases, this is especially the case as the 8 nuclear reactors used for INDIA's NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ARE OFFLIMITS TO THE IAEA. Therefore INDIA HAS NOT LOST ANYTHING in this deal. Insted it has gained access to new nuclear technology and uranium from all over the world.

Basically India needs a minimum credible deterrent. If we have 100 nukes, say 30 which are air mobile and 50 on ballistic missiles and the remaining 20 on the nuclear subs then Pakistan and China will have to be OUT OF THEIR MINDS to attack India. We can get this minimum credible deterrent under this deal as it does not prevent us from developing nuclear weapons. The only condition is that we do not TEST nuclear devices. But we have already TESTED

. Therefore we have all the information we need to develop and have confidence in our nuclear weapons.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Aug 2008 12:17

your forgot that only 30 (of the 100 stock piled )will work, and 10 will be able to reach their destinations, only 3 will be exploding and the other 7 will be intercepted.

There fore we need 750 bums

250 will work( from stock pile)
80 may be able to reach destination
27 may explode
53 will be intercepted.

all assuming we survive first strike, our leadership will not petrify, there is stiil some Command and control infrastructure working.....

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 12:21

Vivek Sreenivasan wrote:There seems to be a lot of confusion as to the details of the nuclear agreement. Let me clear it up for you guys.

India has currently 22 nuclear reactors, it has agreed to submit 14 of them to inspections leaving 8 reactors TOTALLY INDEPENDENT. Therefore India can continue to ENRICH uranium and make NUCLEAR weapons as it pleases, this is especially the case as the 8 nuclear reactors used for INDIA's NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ARE OFFLIMITS TO THE IAEA. Therefore INDIA HAS NOT LOST ANYTHING in this deal. Insted it has gained access to new nuclear technology and uranium from all over the world.

Basically India needs a minimum credible deterrent. If we have 100 nukes, say 30 which are air mobile and 50 on ballistic missiles and the remaining 20 on the nuclear subs then Pakistan and China will have to be OUT OF THEIR MINDS to attack India. We can get this minimum credible deterrent under this deal as it does not prevent us from developing nuclear weapons. The only condition is that we do not TEST nuclear devices. But we have already TESTED . Therefore we have all the information we need to develop and have confidence in our nuclear weapons.

Why get satisfied with Brass when we can go for Gold?

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 12:24

Its very interesting that main priority of Vajpayee in his 5-year term was moving forward on military nuclear programme of India.

While MMS's focus has been killing local programmes and satisfying his friends in western business lobbies.

Vajpayee's terms in Talbott-Jaswant talks were much wider and better for India, than MMS's GUBO terms.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 03 Aug 2008 12:55

rachel wrote:. . . does that mean

a. inspections start immediately or
b. inspections start ONLY if and when we actually buy some reactors and/or fuel and/or restricted nuke products?

India has agreed to place 14 thermal power reactors under IAEA safeguards, out of which six are already there. India has submitted a separation plan for its civilian and strategic facilities. However, India has not identified the facilities. The Annexure was blank as submitted to the IAEA. India has said that it will identify the facility only after it ties up bilateral (or multilateral) agreements for each one of these facilities. However, the timeframe agreed to by India is between circa 2006 and 2014. The Separation Plan, as tabled in the Parliament states that the list of 14 will include TAPS 1 & 2, RAPS 1 & 2 and KK 1 & 2. Some facilities of NFC, Hyderabad will also come under safeguards. Many other facilities like Heavy-Water production units, research institutes like TIFR, VEC, Saha Instt., Instt. of Mathematical Sciences etc will be treated as civilian and safeguards irrelevant. The reprocessing plants will be under campaign-mode safeguards.

Inspections will start immediately after India identifies the facilities. Two preconditions are that India-specific additional IAEA protocol should be in place and India must successfully conclude the fuel supply agreements.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 03 Aug 2008 13:00

John Snow wrote:
Arun_S wrote: Any engineer in the trade of shockwave driven compression will never go for inherently poor design of assembling a spherical body by intentionally introducing metal-air discontinuity at the worst possible place by making slices (I.e. poor design choice is use of any angle different from direction of the radial compression. ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. The obvious and direct method is thus to partition pit segments where every cut is a diameter cut of the sphere, that passes through center of the sphere).

That is a very poor design. As if there were dreath of challenges for the Indian team in 1970's, this design is like shooting your own foot. A sure recipe for poor performance.
Rather a dumb question,
was it a half lap joint or butt joint?
If it was lap joint then atleast then

"ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere could be minimized "

If it is butt joint it definitely

"ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. "

The fact that there were bands to hold the the totapuri (aam) slices indicates to me a butt joint.

IVHO

John Snow Saar, Even 1 micron thin layer of air/discontinuity between the pieces will kill it. And no one can even do 1 micron in modern lab environment for that size object and with manual assembly. Forget about doing it in hot pokhran assembly room, even if one forgets non-uniform temperature gradient in such non-uniform shape due to spontaneous fission of some isotopes in that metal. The above holds true no matter if Soni or Kakodkar use butt, lap or half lap.

Graduate students in my collage will tell that.

Yes in this case it was largely butt joint (with some interlocking features added in).

The only way to eliminate the gap between the metal pieces is to not have pieces and make it solid, or live with the thin layer of discontinuity in an axis that is far less sensitive to discontinuity.

And I am not even a Material Science graduate.

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 13:05

Gerard wrote:
If India tests in future, the US can take back the fuel, plant, machinery and spare parts without India’s permission.”
India gave permission for the US to take back the Tarapur spent fuel. It remains in India.

So you assume they will repeat that?

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 13:12

Acharya wrote:

The spokesman said that while the BJP wanted a strategic partnership with the US, what the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) had achieved was a “strategic subservience”.

Javadekar said that as against the five established nuclear weapon states policy of placing only 11 out of total 400 facilities for inspections, India had agreed to place 14 reactors and 21 other institutes under IAEA inspections. Referring to a statement by Nicholas Burns, he said that yet another fear of the BJP had come true. The BJP spokesman said, “Burns has clearly stated that Hyde Act is applicable to 123 agreement and prohibits India from further nuclear tests. If India tests in future, the US can take back the fuel, plant, machinery and spare parts without India’s permission.”

So, it means any foreign deal in nuclear commerce will come under inspections of IAEA and US inspectors.

This is indeed a surrender comparing to Vajpayee's position of India should get rights of P-5, who allows their domestic civilian industry(not under inspection) to interact with those reactors and technologies from foreign nuclear suppliers.

Clearly a secondary deal done in hurry just to benefit western nuclear companies. This deal doesn't allow domestic R&D institutions to use imported technology for defense and civilian use[without foreign permission].

Its also interesting to note that people who are supporting this deal has totally missed out on what India lost. Rather they are totally focused on narrow gains.

The whole purpose of starting nuclear programme was to attain "self-sufficiency" in electric power. Purpose was never to open it up one day to USA inspections and say "we have failed to fulfill purpose of this programme, please come and help us fulfill our electric power needs".

Self-sufficient comes with time and efforts. MMS is not ready to wait(time) and *****(efforts) but ready to bend to western lobbies and pass the bill to Indian consumers.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Aug 2008 13:15

And I am not even a Material Science graduate.

So "what you say is immaterial science" I suppose!

why didnt they think of Araldite option? for lasting joints except for broken hearts

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 03 Aug 2008 13:18

vishwakarmaa wrote:
Gerard wrote: India gave permission for the US to take back the Tarapur spent fuel. It remains in India.
So you assume they will repeat that?

No, it remains in India like Halahal, stuck in the throat, that can't be swallowed nor spitted. How perfect and deserving of India!

It will not be ironic to see its repeat; instead it will be asinine to allow room for it to be repeated.

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 13:23

Arun_S wrote:
vishwakarmaa wrote: So you assume they will repeat that?
No, it remains in India like Halahal, stuck in the throat, that can't be swallowed nor spitted. How perfect and deserving of India!

It will not be ironic to see its repeat; instead it will be asinine to allow room for it to be repeated.

This gives them a leaver on us. Isn't it? You know how weak Indian politicians are. Falls for anything.

MMS has ensured that India is dropping its LAST LEG which was still outside influence of western power cartel.

After 10 years,
India mobilizes against BD to attack on BeT's terrorist bases,

- Cartel issues warning to India - "Don't move or we will ****** your domestic nuclear power programme and those 50 private companies(50%americans) which depend on us"

- indian private nuclear sector companies runs to Delhi and convinces PM to not move forces.

- IA chief rubs his hands and blames it on West in private.

Sounds familiar guys?

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 13:33

Good strategy for India is to limit contracts only to those countries on which India has influence and she is sure that this country won't bend under western pressure.

Such country doesn't exist.

Thats why we have something called "self-sufficiency" motto under domestic nuclear programme. Now, who is going to explain this to Manmohan Singh, who has taken India back to same trap which will never end.

I doubt how many from original team(1974) agree to MMS's strategy to drop desi-way of achieving power objectives and turn to drop India's energy needs into hands of cartel.

Recognition of P-5 came to P-5 after a successful domestic nuclear programme, not by begging other P-5 for recognition. Its foolish of MMS to think it will come this way.

Rather he should have focused on private industry access to 4-decades of BARC's work, to ensure speed in domestic R&D and power programme. But, he preferred western cartel over Indian scientific talent(private + public).

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 03 Aug 2008 13:35

John Snow wrote:
And I am not even a Material Science graduate.
So "what you say is immaterial science" I suppose!

why didnt they think of Araldite option? for lasting joints except for broken hearts

Talk of business acumen of Araldite. Why sell a pack for Pok-1 when they can instead sell to perennial market of Injuns with hearts broken by the low yield of Pokhran-1 test?

Injuns get what they deserve.

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 03 Aug 2008 13:42

vishwakarmaa wrote:So, it means any foreign deal in nuclear commerce will come under inspections of IAEA and US inspectors.

This is indeed a surrender comparing to Vajpayee's position of India should get rights of P-5, who allows their domestic civilian industry(not under inspection) to interact with those reactors and technologies from foreign nuclear suppliers.

That is factually wrong. The US and China, among others, both have safeguards agreements with the IAEA, on the same lines as the ones India just negotiated. Here's the US agreement as an example: US-IAEA safeguards agreement. Links to both US and Chinese IAEA agreements have been posted in the past.

They face safeguards on civilian facilities. We already have safeguarded facilities that are subject to IAEA inspections. The extent of these inspections are subject to an IAEA budget; we don't pay for them.

Clearly a secondary deal done in hurry just to benefit western nuclear companies. This deal doesn't allow domestic R&D institutions to use imported technology for defense and civilian use[without foreign permission].

That is how all P5 weapons programs are. They are run in isolation, separately from safeguarded civilian facilities, within a discrete, localized, vertically integrated facility. That's what our separation plan entails as well.

The whole purpose of starting nuclear programme was to attain "self-sufficiency" in electric power. Purpose was never to open it up one day to USA inspections and say "we have failed to fulfill purpose of this programme, please come and help us fulfill our electric power needs".
Self-sufficient comes with time and efforts. MMS is not ready to wait(time) and balls(efforts) but ready to bend to western lobbies and pass the bill to Indian consumers.

India has never claimed self-sufficiency in Uranium. The thorium cycle is not going to come onstream out of thin air. It entails three stages, and the third doesn't happen without the first (which needs the Uranium). The greater the delay in getting the first stage going, the worse the chances of the 3rd stage helping our energy requirements.

There's really no point in repeating meaningless canards about the deal for the Nth time. Folks who oppose the deal would do better than to state arguements like 'IAEA safeguards and inspections are a surrender' or that 'P5 don't have civilian safeguarded facilities' or such. How does an argument filled with so many factual errors buttress an argument ? It merely appeals to the ignorant.

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 03 Aug 2008 13:55

Suraj wrote: India has never claimed self-sufficiency in Uranium. The thorium cycle is not going to come onstream out of thin air. It entails three stages, and the third doesn't happen without the first (which needs the Uranium). The greater the delay in getting the first stage going, the worse the chances of the 3rd stage helping our energy requirements.

I don't agree with this argument.

All you are saying is Vajpayee was stupid to keep India away from Cartel just 3-years ago and MMS is smart to bend and go for Cartel just 5-years after that.

So, how things changed so much in 3-years?

Secondly, there is no proof to give credibility to theory that India doesn't have Uranium resources. Its another matter if one is in too much hurry to get cake for some weird reasons like western offer of $$ to domestic business lobby.

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 03 Aug 2008 14:06

To claim 'X would have saved us, while Y is screwing us' is just politics getting in the way of viewing what has been a continuous process over the course of two Indian administrations.

In view of the politicization of the discussion, and recriminations against elected leaders here, let me quote what the first post of this thread says:

No politics
No whines or celebratory lungi dances
Wonleee nook noos pliss.

Please follow these instructions.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 03 Aug 2008 15:04

ravi_ku wrote: In the whole setup, I for one could never get the secrecy of India's moves. Hiding some of the motives was understandable, but the IAEA safety document leak proved some excessive paranoria with Indians themselves. When > 5 countries know it, you can believe that it is open to everyone with "access", but it did not believe in Indians themselves. Frankly after reading all the actual documents, I can say that MMS has done a good job, but the excess secrecy hurt him.

The India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement was not kept secret, because the govt. wanted to conduct business in secrecy and hide stuff, but rather the UPA had seen how the Left and Arun Shourie, after reading the Hyde Act and 123 Agreement, had started creating critical matter out of nothingness, and then declaring from the top of their houses, that MMS has sold away India's sovereignity to the great Imperialist.

It was a given, that the Left would simply say, "now that we have the safeguards agreement, we will look into it. It is technical and so, and we need at least 9 months to understand it. The Govt should not hurry, and wait for an assessment of the UPA-Left Committee."

At least by keeping it back, MMS could provoke a distancing from the Left, so that the nuclear deal can move forward, and it need not die sitting in some desk drawer.

Once the safeguards agreement was made public, most experts were satisfied, that India's national interests had be ensured. So there wasn't anything sinister in the text.

I would say, MMS did the right thing in not giving the Left another reason to stall the deal and kill it in the process.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 03 Aug 2008 16:48

Suraj wrote:
vishwakarmaa wrote:So, it means any foreign deal in nuclear commerce will come under inspections of IAEA and US inspectors.

This is indeed a surrender comparing to Vajpayee's position of India should get rights of P-5, who allows their domestic civilian industry(not under inspection) to interact with those reactors and technologies from foreign nuclear suppliers.
That is factually wrong. The US and China, among others, both have safeguards agreements with the IAEA, on the same lines as the ones India just negotiated. Here's the US agreement as an example: US-IAEA safeguards agreement. Links to both US and Chinese IAEA agreements have been posted in the past.

They face safeguards on civilian facilities. We already have safeguarded facilities that are subject to IAEA inspections. The extent of these inspections are subject to an IAEA budget; we don't pay for them.
Clearly a secondary deal done in hurry just to benefit western nuclear companies. This deal doesn't allow domestic R&D institutions to use imported technology for defense and civilian use[without foreign permission].
That is how all P5 weapons programs are. They are run in isolation, separately from safeguarded civilian facilities, within a discrete, localized, vertically integrated facility. That's what our separation plan entails as well.
The whole purpose of starting nuclear programme was to attain "self-sufficiency" in electric power. Purpose was never to open it up one day to USA inspections and say "we have failed to fulfill purpose of this programme, please come and help us fulfill our electric power needs".
Self-sufficient comes with time and efforts. MMS is not ready to wait(time) and balls(efforts) but ready to bend to western lobbies and pass the bill to Indian consumers.
India has never claimed self-sufficiency in Uranium. The thorium cycle is not going to come onstream out of thin air. It entails three stages, and the third doesn't happen without the first (which needs the Uranium). The greater the delay in getting the first stage going, the worse the chances of the 3rd stage helping our energy requirements.

There's really no point in repeating meaningless canards about the deal for the Nth time. Folks who oppose the deal would do better than to state arguements like 'IAEA safeguards and inspections are a surrender' or that 'P5 don't have civilian safeguarded facilities' or such. How does an argument filled with so many factual errors buttress an argument ? It merely appeals to the ignorant.

Honestly, Without going into all the details again, it is clear that the deal India (one of the largest countries/democracies in the world and an economic superpower in the near future) is getting is inferior to that the P-5 has. Maybe it does not matter - that can be debated. Maybe India has a lot to gain - that may also be debated. If China or France or Russia test a nuclear weapon, they will have to worry much less about US/Western response than India. Again one can say that India does not need to test anymore - that can also be debated. Maybe India has no other choice but to accept the best deal offered like Germany after WWI. If India ever dares to test a nuclear weapon then the economic response will be massive and one cannot legally rule out a military response (eg: Israel's attack on Iraq's reactor). The deal gives the US the "legal right" to take away nuclear material from the territory of India. This deal will give the US and Western countries the moral backing (relative to their political constituencies and the press) to retaliate against India. One can also argue that India can absorb such economic (and possible military) assaults and continue. After all India has done so for centuries.

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 03 Aug 2008 17:34

Arun_S wrote:
Any engineer in the trade of shockwave driven compression will never go for inherently poor design of assembling a spherical body by intentionally introducing metal-air discontinuity at the worst possible place by making slices (I.e. poor design choice is use of any angle different from direction of the radial compression. ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. The obvious and direct method is thus to partition pit segments where every cut is a diameter cut of the sphere, that passes through center of the sphere).

Since what won't work for air, most likely won't work for Araldite (as has been, I think, proposed in jest in a subsequent post in this thread) either, I ask the following questions out of genuine curiosity:

1) Can a "jugad" (= fixture, robotic, if you will) be designed and used in such a way that the assembly of the parts is made in (or at near) vacuum? This way, even manual handling (using gloves to prevent contamination from the human hands affecting the assembled parts) may not be required. More importantly, if the material happens to have any traces of radioactivity, then, even that situation could probably be overcome.

2) There is an effect called "wringing" between two highly polished surfaces; this is commonly used in metrology labs to put together several precision machined slabs so as to make up a single block - usually for accurate measurement of height of a component. (Also please see here.) Will there be unacceptable quantity of air, in the case of the assembly under discussion, even if the mating parts are made to wring together?

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 03 Aug 2008 17:41

Going by AK's statement, though he is not talking with FULL confidence, (as he should be) so far every thing looks to be OK. There are no reason to doubt GOI's / DAE objectives and goals. Though he indicated we will walk out, he should have bluntly told that India will walkout and there will be No deal, if NSG or congress add's conditionalities.

Let us wait and see, how the uncle shifts goal posts in NSG and CONGRESS