Bharat Rakshak

The game of Go by China-India leading to 1962 war

One can recognise many elements of GO and what would happen if India does not withdraw when surrounded by Chinese troups and can not match with overwhelming power.

So the first priority is to talk from the position of demonstrated strength as opposed to assumed superiority. Else there would be many peacemakers selling 'appeasement to china' doctrine.

Garib ki lugaai, sabki bhoujai

In village everybody knows what it means

From the above article:

On the other hand, India actually helped China consolidate its control over Tibet.
In October 1950 India refused to sponsor a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations. When
El Salvador sponsored such an appeal, India played a key role in squashing it. Many
governments, including the U.S., the British, and many Middle Eastern, were willing to
follow India’s lead on this issue, and India’s opposition to the Tibetan appeal to the U.N.
was, in fact, a major reason for its non-consideration.14 New Delhi also turned down U.S.
proposals 1950 of Indo-U.S. cooperation in support of Tibetan resistance to China.15
India also played a key role in persuading the young Dalai Lama not to flee abroad and
try to rally international support for Tibet, but to return to Tibet and reach an
accommodation with China's Communist government --- an accommodation that
occurred with the 17-Point agreement of May 1951. Then in 1954 India formally
recognized China's ownership of Tibet as part of an effort to reach a broader
understanding with China. Again, most countries recognized India’s leadership on this
matter.

So i fail to believe that Nehru's 'forward policy' was a reason for the Chinese attacking in 62. It's the same today. Concuct 300 aggressive patrols into Indian terrotory and label Indian media as 'aggressive'. Get the GOI mandarins to say it too and voila..it's your being aggressive.

In all this foreign governments are going to follow India's lead. India must at an appropriate time warn Beijing that in view of it's aggresion in Tibet and Indian borders, it may have to reconsider Chinese claims on Tibet and take the stance to an Independent Tibet. We're on a strong wicket here really and China on a very sticky one.

From the same study:

By late 1958 Beijing began demanding that
India expel key leaders of the Tibetan resistance based in India, and suppress activities
supporting opposition to Chinese policies within Tibet. Nehru sought a middle course,
restricting Tibetan activities, but refusing to expel Tibetan leaders. A key question we
will return to below is how much Nehru knew about CIA operations in 1958-61.
Once the Tibetan national rising began in Lhasa on 10 March 1959, India did not
wash its hands of Tibetan affairs as Beijing insisted. Rather, Indian media and elected
Indian politicians, including Nehru and virtually every other Indian politician, expressed
greater or lesser sympathy with Tibet's struggle. Beijing condemned a large number of
Indian moves that it said encouraged the rebellion. These Indian moves included: the
Indian Consul General in Lhasa met with demonstrating Tibetans in the early days of the
Lhasa uprising; granting asylum to the Dalai Lama; having official contact with the
Dalai Lama; treating the Dalai Lama as an honored guest; permitting the Dalai Lama to

meet with the media and foreign representatives; not quashing the Dalai Lama's appeal
to the United Nations; granting asylum to ten thousand or so Tibetan refugees who
followed the Dalai Lama to India; concentrating those refugees in camps near the
Tibetan frontier; not suppressing "anti-China activities" conducted in those refugee
camps; permitting or encouraging negative commentary by Indian newspapers about
China's actions in Tibet; Nehru raising the "Tibet issue" in India's parliament and making
critical comments about China's policies in Tibet; Nehru permitting the Indian
parliament to discuss Tibet; allowing "anti-China activities" by protesters in Indian
cities; not punishing Indian protestors for defacing a portrait of Mao Zedong; instigating
an "anti-China campaign" in the Indian press; restricting trade between India and Tibet;
and allowing the Dalai Lama to speak of "a Tibetan government in exile.” All these acts
constituted, in China's view, "interference in the internal affairs of China."17 Beijing saw
these Indian actions as ways in which New Delhi was attempting to "seize Tibet."

One see's that China wanted then too that India suppress the media, give back top leaders seeking refuge, stop discussing the crises with either Tibetan dissidents and not take matters up in parliament. It goes to the extent that it wants India to punish those that tarnished Mao's picture. Now how can India ever do that without changing it's constitution, quashing free speech as a democracy? All these were considered as 'aggressive posturing against China'.

This is a classic battle between freedom and totalitarian doctrinal ideologies. It cannot be won over by appeasement. It cannot be won over by shedding our value systems. Ironically, It can only be won by standing firmly rooted by our value systems. When we do that, we can apply reasonably practical measures so things don't go overboard.

chaanakya wrote:Garib ki lugaai, sabki bhoujai

In village everybody knows what it means

Chaan Akya, I liked this proverb, could you explain this to me in detail? Thanks.

The study is largely from Chinese description of events.It does give an insight into thought process of Chinese leadership. The depiction of events or sequence may not be accurate from Indian perspective.

The moral stand of Indian position is never in doubt.
The failure of forward policy was in not ensuring adequate intelligence about chinese designs and asses their strength/weaknesses.Without equipping army with means to carry out its objectives.
It is not surprising that India failed to know the existence of xinxiang road built by chinese in Aksai chin.Years later , we failed to know occupation of peaks by Pakis which finally led to Kargil.

Indian infrastructure is so poor in NE that any quick deployment of large scale force would stretch our limits. Even than , do we have sufficient force as of now to be deployed. No doubt India is trying to remedy this situation yet when we reach the force level required currently by 2020, China might have leapfrogged. So force requirement projection would have to take into account what would be chinene strength deployable on Indo-china border.

From Art of War
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
with the Moral law? India
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability? well you decide
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven Heaven-India, earth-China
and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? I would think that both armies are disciplined
(5) Which army is stronger? Should I say China
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? I think both
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy
both in reward and punishment? No data to decide either way.

I don't believe that Forward policy was the cause of chinese aggresion.It was merely an accelerating factor or excuse. Chinese had intended to teach India a lesson on Tibet so that 30 years of peace can be on the border. That thirty years have passed and another showdown may be looming in future unless we talk from strength.

In Xu Yan's
characterization of the thinking of China’s leaders: "If we strike, we must strike in a big
fashion, moreover wage a war of extermination, resolutely hit the wolf and make it hurt
(da lang da tong). Only in this way can we completely destroy his aggression and cause
the aggressors to receive their proper punishment. Moreover, we can guarantee that for a
long time to come [the aggressors] will not dare to come again to conduct aggression
against China's borders."

This has not changed till date. 2010 is the year of tiger for chinese and they are already rubbing a lot of shoulder wrong way.

Chinese would act on the basis of what they think or what they think Indians believe and not necessarily
on what we actually believe. So if peacemakers prescription is accepted, it would only be counterproductive.
Boundary dispute should be settled but without abandoning our stand and negotiate from a position of strength.

surinder wrote:

chaanakya wrote:Garib ki lugaai, sabki bhoujai

In village everybody knows what it means

Chaan Akya, I liked this proverb, could you explain this to me in detail? Thanks.

It means that everyone takes little liberty with the wife of a poor and weak man

harbans wrote:From the above article:

On the other hand, India actually helped China consolidate its control over Tibet.
In October 1950 India refused to sponsor a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations. When
El Salvador sponsored such an appeal, India played a key role in squashing it. Many
governments, including the U.S., the British, and many Middle Eastern, were willing to
follow India’s lead on this issue, and India’s opposition to the Tibetan appeal to the U.N.
was, in fact, a major reason for its non-consideration.14 New Delhi also turned down U.S.
proposals 1950 of Indo-U.S. cooperation in support of Tibetan resistance to China.15
India also played a key role in persuading the young Dalai Lama not to flee abroad and
try to rally international support for Tibet, but to return to Tibet and reach an
accommodation with China's Communist government --- an accommodation that
occurred with the 17-Point agreement of May 1951. Then in 1954 India formally
recognized China's ownership of Tibet as part of an effort to reach a broader
understanding with China. Again, most countries recognized India’s leadership on this
matter.

So i fail to believe that Nehru's 'forward policy' was a reason for the Chinese attacking in 62.

What is not told is the some kind of understanding which Nehru and Anglo American power/CIA had over the behavior of PRC and PLA. The world after WWII was formed during the period 1945-1950. The soviet expansion frightened the west and they asked help from India and PRC to make sure that Asian landmass was secure. Tibet was taken over with some understanding(between India/PRC/UK/USA) that Soviet would not be allowed to enter Tibet.

Anglo Americans need the help of Nehru to accommodate China in place of Soviet Union. But once the Tibet was kept away from Soviet Union then they did not need Nehru or India.
India was expendable.



Indo-China deterioration in relationship happened after 1955. When Nehru used the relationship with China to create Asian solidarity it pissed the Anglo power and they made sure that it will never happen. Current fractured Asia is because of this Anglo strategy.

There are three periods

1945-1950 - Global Geopolitical changes
1950-1955 - Tibet consolidation by PRC
1955-1962 - India China border problem

1972- China in the Global power circle.