Re: West Asia News and Discussions
Posted: 06 Apr 2011 03:35
Ramana, re: your iraq comment. Do you see my point about the US plan to shia'ize the peninsula?
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The Safavid conversion of Iran from Sunnism to Shiism made Iran the spiritual bastion of Shia Islam against the onslaughts of orthodox Sunni Islam, and the repository of Persian cultural traditions and self-awareness of Iranianhood, acting as a bridge to modern Iran. Through their actions, the Safavids reunified Iran as an independent state in 1501 and established Twelver Shiism as the official religion of their empire, marking one of the most important turning points in the history of Islam.
Pre-Safavid Iran
Iran’s population was mostly Sunni of the Shafi`i[1] and Hanafi legal rites until the triumph of the Safavids (who had initially been Shafi`i Sunnis themselves).[2] Ironically, this was to the extent that up until the end of the 15th century the Ottoman Empire (the most powerful and prominent Sunni state and future arch-enemy of the Shia Safavids) used to send many of its Ulema (Islamic scholars) to Iran to further their education in Sunni Islam, due to a lack of Madrasahs (Islamic schools) within the Empire itself.[3] The Sunni Iranians had always held the family of Muhammad in high esteem.[4] In contrast, before the Safavid period, a minority of Iranians were Shia and there had been relatively few Shia Ulema in Iran.[5]
Reasons for Ismail’s conversion policy
More than most Muslim dynasties the Safavids worked for conversion to their branch of Islam and for ideological conformity. The reasons for this conversion policy included:
* One of the main reasons why Ismail and his followers pursued such a severe conversion policy was to give Iran and the Safavid lands as distinct and unique an identity as was possible compared to its two neighboring Sunni Turkish military and political enemies, the Ottoman Empire and, for a time, the Central Asian Uzbeks — to the west and north-east respectively.[9][10][11]
* The Safavids were engaged in a lengthy struggle with the Ottomans — including numerous wars between the two dynasties — and this struggle continuously motivated the Safavids to create a more cohesive Iranian identity to counter the Ottoman threat and possibility of a fifth-column within Iran among its Sunni subjects.[12]
* The conversion was part of the process of building a territory that would be loyal to the state and its institutions, thus enabling the state and its institutions to propagate their rule throughout the whole territory.[13]
[edit] Methods of converting Iran
Ismail consolidated his rule over the country and launched a thorough and at times brutal campaign to convert the majority Sunni population to Twelver Shiism and thus transform the religious landscape of Iran.[14] His methods of converting Iran included:
* Imposing Shiism as the state and mandatory religion for the whole nation and much forcible conversions of Iranian Sunnis to Shiism.[15][16][17]
* He reintroduced the Sadr (Arabic, leader) – an office that was responsible for supervising religious institutions and endowments. With a view to transforming Iran into a Shiite state, the Sadr was also assigned the task of disseminating Twelver doctrine.[18]
* He destroyed Sunni mosques. This was even noted by Tomé Pires, the Portuguese ambassador to China who visited Iran in 1511–12, who when referring to Ismail noted: “He (i.e. Ismail) reforms our churches, destroys the houses of all Moors who follow (the Sunnah of) Muhammad…”[19]
* He enforced the ritual and compulsory cursing of the first three Sunni Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) as usurpers, from all mosques, disbanded Sunni Tariqahs and seized their assets, used state patronage to develop Shia shrines, institutions and religious art and imported Shia scholars to replace Sunni scholars.[20][21][22]
* He shed Sunni blood and destroyed and desecrated the graves and mosques of Sunnis. This caused the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (who initially congratulated Ismail on his victories) to advise and ask the young monarch (in a “fatherly” manner) to stop the anti-Sunni actions. However, Ismail was strongly anti-Sunni, ignored the Sultans warning and continued to spread the Shia faith by the sword.[23][24]
* He persecuted, imprisoned and executed stubbornly resistant Sunnis.[25][26]
* With the establishment of Safavid rule, there was a very raucous and colourful, almost carnival-like holiday on 26 Dhu al-Hijjah (or alternatively, 9 Rabi' al-awwal) celebrating the murder of Caliph Umar. The highlight of the day was making an effigy of Umar to be cursed, insulted, and finally burned. However, as relations between Iran and Sunni countries improved, the holiday was no longer observed (at least officially).[27]
* In 1501 Ismail invited all the Shia living outside Iran to come to Iran and be assured of protection from the Sunni majority.[28]
The fate of Sunni and Shia Ulema (scholars)
[edit] Sunni Ulema
The early Safavid rulers took a number of steps against the Sunni Ulema of Iran. These steps included giving the Ulema the choice of conversion, death, or exile[29][30][31] and massacring the Sunni clerics who resisted the Shia transformation of Iran, as witnessed in Herat.[32] As a result, many Sunni scholars who refused to adopt the new religious direction lost their lives or fled to the neighboring Sunni states.[33][34]
Historical outcome of Ismail’s conversion policy
Ismail’s conversion policy had the following historical outcomes:
* Although conversion was not as rapid as Ismail’s forcible policies might suggest, the vast majority of those who lived on the Iranian plateau did identify with Shiism by the end of the Safavid era in 1722. Hence it is no accident that today Iran’s Sunni minorities are concentrated among the countries non-Persian ethnic groups that are scattered along the country’s borders, with their Sunni conationals next door.[84][85][86][87][88][89][90]
* The Safavid experience largely created the clear line of political demarcation and hostility between Twelver Shiism and Sunnism, even though doctrinal differences had long been recognized. Before the Safavids the Twelvers for many centuries had mostly accommodated themselves politically to the Sunnis, and numerous religious movements combined Twelver and Sunni ideas.[91]
* Ismail’s advent to power signaled the end of Sunni Islam in Iran and Shiite theologians came to dominate the religious establishment.[92][93]
* The hierarchical organization of the Shiite clergy began under Ismail.[94]
* The current borders between Iran, on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Turkey on the other, date from this time and are not ethnic but religious, opposing Shiites and Sunnis.[95]
* The Sunni majority was treated brutally and was most resistant to the Safavids’ conversion policies, which went on at least until the end of the Safavid period.[96][97]
* The use of the Shia religion to exert control was not completely successful. It resulted in the annexation of large areas of the country, but was followed by centuries of conflict between the Sunni and Shia populations, even after the fall of the Safavids.[98]
* Iran was a Shia country and gradually became an isolated island surrounded by a sea of Sunnism. While regretting the cruelty of forced conversion, modern Persian historians are generally agreed that the establishment of Shia religious hegemony saved Iran from being incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.[99]
So Indian establishment has been briefed and is thinking about it.Introductory Observations
Providence and the United States have in an
uncanny manner periodically facilitated the
reinvention of Pakistan Army’s ‘strategic
utility’ to United States strategic
interests in both South Asia and in the Gulf
Region. Both are contiguous geographical
regions of geostrategic significance.
The recent political upheaval in the Arab World
from North Africa and now engulfing the Gulf
Region monarchial kingdoms has shaken the
very fundamentals of the underpinnings of
United States security framework in the Gulf
Region. The United States security
architecture in the Gulf Region rested on
the continuance of existing autocratic
US-friendly monarchies presiding over the
oil riches of this Region.
With the political upheaval in the Arab World
seeking governance transformation and
political reforms, which means regime
changes in the Gulf Region, both the United
States and the Gulf Kingdoms have a
strategic and political convergence to
maintain the ‘status-quo’.
The United States is militarily over-stretched
and limited by domestic political
compulsions to adopt a military proactive
role in maintaining the status-quo in the
Gulf Region. Saudi Arabia and the smaller
Gulf Kingdoms are not militarily capable of
securing the status-quo.
Herein emerges Pakistan Army’s strategic
indispensability and strategic utility to
both the United States and Saudi Arabia in
securing the status-quo in the Gulf Region
for all of them
Media reports have widely publicized the
Pakistan Army earmarking two Pakistan Army
Divisions on standby alert for immediate
deployment to Saudi Arabia fearing outbreak
of political upheaval in that country.
Media reports also indicate that Pakistan
Army’s Fauji Foundation is recruiting
Pakistan Army retired soldiers for service
in the Bahrain National Guard at exorbitant
salaries. This is to boost up the strength
of the Bahrain National Guard to deal with
the majority Shia population spearheading
political upheaval calling for replacement
of the Sunni monarchy. Pakistani media also
indicates that this recruitment is being
restricted to Sunnis only and that too the
Mashnavi Syeds and its sub-clans of ManiKhel,
SahibKhel, DeraKhel and RahatKhel. Shias are
not being recruited.
It would be recalled that Saudi Arabia had
militarily intervened in Bahrain last month
by sending Saudi military forces when
Bahrain was being virtually taken over by an
Egypt style upsurge.
Saudi Arabia can ill afford a Shia takeover
of Bahrain which is just a causeway away
from oil-rich Saudi Arabian oilfields.
United States can similarly ill afford such
an eventuality as the Headquarters of the US
Navy Fifth Fleet along with other military
installations are located in Bahrain.
Pakistan seems to have now taken the first
tentative steps to reassert its intrusive
military presence in the Gulf Region, as
earlier visible in the 1970s but later
diminished. The way the political dynamics
are churning in the Gulf Region, one can
foresee the Pakistan Army being sucked-in
into the Gulf Region, both because of Saudi
Arabia and the United States.
Pakistan Army would relish such a
foreseeable eventuality but Pakistan itself
as reactions in the media there, seem to be
inclined for a more detached involvement.
Pakistan Army’s military moves in the Gulf
Region are fraught with regional
implications and for Pakistan itself and
which this Paper intends to examine under
the following heads:
United States
Strategic Dilemma in Facilitating
Pakistan Army Military Intrusiveness in
the Gulf Region
Pakistan Army: Can it
Afford a Sizeable Politico-Military Role
in the Gulf Region?
Pakistan Army’s
Transformation: From “Frontline State
Against Terrorism� to “Frontline State
of Sunni Islam�
Pakistan Army’s
Military Intrusiveness in Gulf Region
Generates Strong Regional Implications
 United
States Strategic Dilemma in Facilitating
Pakistan Army Military Intrusiveness in the
Gulf Region
The United States may perceive a tactical
advantage in facilitating Pakistan Army
military intrusiveness in the Gulf Region,
if US perspectives are solely confined to
viewing the securing of the status-quo in
the Gulf and Saudi pressures on USA to do
so. But the United States strategic
perspectives cannot be solely confined to
the Gulf Region only. The United States has
to also focus on the lateral implications of
such facilitation on the overall security
situation in the Middle East and more
importantly in South Asia and Afghanistan.
Overall, such a development places the
United States in a piquant situation in
South Asia and it could even be accused of
‘doublespeak’
India has been under constant US pressure to
lessen its military postures and deployments
so that the Pakistan Army Chief could feel
more secure in diverting Pakistan Army
formations from the Indian border to he
Afghan border to assist US military
operations in Afghanistan. If that be so,
how can the Pakistan Army divert two of its
Army Divisions to Saudi Arabia?![]()
Further, if that be so how can the United
States expect the commencement of US troops
withdrawal from Afghanistan by July 2011?
After all such planning was predicated on
Pakistan Army’s reinforcement of the
Pakistan-Afghan border by moving troops from
the India border?
In South Asia can the United States afford to
diminish the US-India Strategic Partnership
by strategic doublespeak and further distort
India’s emerging sizeable politico-military
profile in the Gulf Region?
The call is on the United States also in terms
of getting involved in the Gulf Region in an
emerging internal Islamic Sunni- Shia civil
war, in the absence of a better word?
 Pakistan Army: Can it Afford a Sizeable
Politico-Military Role in the Gulf Region?
Pakistan Army has the propensity to box much
above its weight. To be drawn into a
sizeable role in the security of the Gulf
Region would be more than welcome to the
Pakistan Army hierarchy. More so when such a
role will take place at the behest of Saudi
Arabia and the United States.
The crucial question that arises is that against
the backdrop of the contextual domestic
situation within Pakistan and the
Afghanistan turbulence, can Pakistan Army
extend its reach to the Gulf Region? The
Pakistan Army is yet to gain firm control of
the internally driven insurgency within
Pakistan’s borders
Pakistan is seriously beset with sectarian
divides not only between Sunnis and Shias
but also sects within each of them. The
Baluchistan insurgency is still very much
active and with its geographical contiguity
to Iran may emerge even hotter to handle.
But then the Pakistan Army has all along been a
rentier Army whose services could be
requisitioned by the highest bidder. An
invitation to play a bigger role in the Gulf
Region coming from the United States and
Saudi Arabia carries the promise of sizeable
inflow of petro-dollars and advanced
military equipment for services rendered.
Pakistan Army’s Transformation From
“Frontline State Against Terrorism� to
“Frontline State of Sunni Islam�
Pakistani media reports indicate that
immediately after the uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt, the Pakistan Army hierarchy had
undertaken contingency planning for
earmarking of two Pakistan Army Divisions
for Saudi Arabia in the event of political
disturbances breaking out there. The process
was reinforced by the visit of the Secretary
General of the Saudi National Security
Council to Islamabad thereafter.
The significant point to note is that both in
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain where the Pakistan
Army is getting involved in the Gulf Region,
the Shia majorities on the Gulf littoral are
pitted against the conservative entrenched
Sunni monarchies
Pakistan Army is not getting involved in
these two countries to begin with, for
‘boy-scout’ duties. Any escalation of
political upheaval in Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain, to begin with, would require
Pakistan Army soldiers in Saudi Arabia and
its ex-soldiers in Bahrain National Guard to
take military action against Shia
protestors.
In effect, what it amounts to is that the
Pakistan Army will be actively involved in
perpetuating the Sunni monarchies status-quo
in the Gulf against overwhelming political
upheaval for regime change from the Shia
majorities.
No wonder in the Pakistan media some higher-up
has wryly commented that in such a process
the Pakistan Army gets transformed from a
“Frontline State Against Terrorism� to
“Frontline State of Sunni Islam�
The ramifications of the above transformation in
the Islamic World carries its own
consequences for Pakistan, and domestically
too.
Pakistan Army’s Military Intrusiveness in
the Gulf Region Generates Strong Regional
Implications Â
Strong regional implications are likely to
be generated by Pakistan Army’s military
intrusiveness in the Gulf Region. It would
require a separate Paper to effectively
analyze them in detail. For this Paper it
would suffice to highlight the salient
implications.
In the Gulf Region there is an ongoing
political and military rivalry for regional
predominance between Sunni Saudi Arabia and
Shia Iran. Iran has a sizeable edge over
Saudi Arabia but for the security ballast
provided to it by the United States.Â
Pakistan has been so far following a
‘hedging strategy’ in relation to Iran which
has a sizeable geographical contiguity with
Pakistan. Â Pakistan Army getting transformed
into a “Frontline State of Sunni Islam� is
not going to be lightly taken by Iran which
has the capability to create turbulence
against Pakistan in Baluchistan.Â
Pakistan’s nuclear bombs are no longer to be
viewed as ‘Islamic Bomb’ but a ‘Sunni Bomb’
and that would spur Iran to full scale
nuclear weapons capability.Â
Pakistan has a large workers population in
the Gulf States and these would stand
endangered by the wrath of Shia minorities
in these kingdoms enraged by the involvement
of Pakistan Army in suppression of Shias.
Reports already exist of some Pakistanis
being killed in Bahrain in the recent
disturbances. Foreign exchange remittances
to Pakistan from the Gulf could be
drastically  affected.Â
Turkey would have to take a tough call in
relation to its strengthened relations with
Iran and its restive Shia population in the
South and its revival of warmth towards
Pakistan. A Turkish break with Iran
diminishes its increasing Middle East
profile
Iraq carries the most damaging potential
for the United States should it even
remotely facilitate an intrusive Pakistan
Army presence in the Region in whatever
form. Iraq has a sizeable Shia population
which would not take kindly to Pakistan Army
bolstering the autocratic regimes in Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. Iraq is already
noticeably restive on the Saudi Arabian
military occupation of Bahrain.
In South Asia, it is India that has to worry
more and be upfront in pointing out to the
United States of yet another tactically
expedient initiative facilitating Pakistan
Army military intrusiveness in the Gulf
Region. In effect India would have to face
two sets of pressures from the resultant
situation.Â
India in the ensuing developments would have
to face more intense United States pressures
on its Pakistan policy approaches as
Pakistan Army Chief would demand
quid-pro-quos more strongly in relation to
Kashmir and also maintaining ‘balance of
power equilibrium’ with India That
translates into more advanced weapons
systems and increased military aid. It also
translates into increased US pressures on
India on Kashmir
Additionally Pakistan Army can expect
greater under the table financial payments
from Saudi Arabia to bolster its military
machine with possible payments for raising
two additional Pakistan Army Divisions to
offset deployments in Saudi Arabia.
Concluding Observations
The Gulf Region today is sitting on an explosive
powder-keg where long suppressed aspirations
for political transformation and political
freedoms were ignored by the autocratic
Sunni monarchies sitting on unparalleled oil
wealth. Introduction of Pakistan Army in
whatever backdoor entries would amount in
Shia perceptions of perpetuating the
oppressive political systems as existing.Â
More than any country, it is the United States
which needs to steer clear of Islamic World
internally driven civil war divides between
the Sunnis and the Shias. In no case the
United States can afford to be seen as the
mover of the transformation of Pakistan Army
to a "Frontline State of Sunni Islam"
which would be a good thing if it happens. The wahabbi fundies fomenting radicalism and perpetually poisoning the IM clerics minds, would lose their petro$ since it is the shia regions which are oil rich in KSA.ramana wrote:After defacto partition of Libya between oil rich and no oil regions, KSA also has the same prospects.
Last point. And keep in mind the events in Bahrain. See my email. Keep in mind this is the GCC view, whether it is true or not is another matter.ramana wrote:Was it really a plan or the consequence?
I did see your point about allowing the Shiaizing of the peninsula but what choice did they have in these times?
Or are you suggesting the Iraq war/intervention was to bring about this outcome and reduce the Sunni power?
You have it BANG ON. Well done. Puki's will also be used down south in yemen and maybe in eastern province in ksa.ldev wrote:Pakistan has been "frontline" in Bahrain via its ex-servicemen since the early 1980s, maybe earlier. However earlier recruitment was in the Interior Ministry. Now it will be also in the BDF.
Basing in KSA is not new. Deployment if it occurs will be new. Two divisions means KSA fears incursions along the Iraqi border via sympathatic Iraqi Shias and also Iranians who can enter Iraq via the now porous border.
US service types will tell you that the most ruthless nationalities they have encountered in combat are the Turks and the Koreans. Dont ever discount these two armed forces. And the Koreans include both the North and South Koreans. JEM is correct. If you take away the nuclear component, the Turkish armed forces are the second most powerful in NATO, only next to the US.
The Saudi/Bahraini emissaries probably wanted assurances from India that it would not create problems along the Indo-Pak border in the event of the 2 div Pak deployment. Shows you how low US credibility has sunk in the Gulf region that they wanted direct assurance from GOI, unlike in the past when the USG would have conveyed the same.
Sounds like a Reaper drone Hellfire strike! No info on whether any fighter planes were sighted.Singha wrote:would require some onsite humint and designation to be able to hit a single car in sudan!
or maybe someone planted a homing beacon beneath the car to attract the weapon...
Maram ji,Maram wrote:Rajesh A Garu,
Regarding the post above, one small correction. Qatar have significant investments here in the UK and in Europe and even in the US. So, I can't see how they can do anything anti amirkhan/antiwestern????
I know, that is just my idea of killing a whole flock of birds with just one stone. Nobody needs to expect any similar moves by GoI, at least not yet.Gagan wrote:RajeshA ji,
There are a number of problems with that line of thought:
1. There is no movement yet or on the horizon calling for a union of India and Bangladesh.
The populations of the two countries still guard their respective nationalities with zealousness, and any such suggestion out of the blue will be wajib-ul-cattle period.
Assuming that this is the goal, one would expect a SERIES of aman ki asha type moves that will generate debate and acceptance amongst the ordinary and elite alike in both nations.
None of this is happening.
Yes it is a challenge. We cannot allow the various Muslim sectarian groups to create trouble in India. There hasn't been much of that in India, and it should stay that way!Gagan wrote:2. The overwhelming majority of muslims in the Indian subcontinent are Sunnis. We are the largest group of sunni muslims on this planet. One clarion call from Mecca that the Shias are coming in and are going to destroy the holy lands and you have pakistaniyat hitting the fan all over. Each government will be under pressure from within to side with KSA / Sunni group of nations in the Middle East.
Al Qaeda, IMHO, may have sent out a few anti-Indian messages, in order to tap in into the Pakistanis native enmity against India, but my feeling is that it has been pretty much hands off in their approach to India. That however is here beside the point.Gagan wrote:3. India siding with Al Qaida? Rajesh-ji, I don't see that happening.
Al Qaida has announced that it wants to attack targets in India, its hands have been found in some terrorist attacks. I will give them this that they have not focussed on India the way the ISI would have wanted them to, and they have realized that they are better off not messing with the regional goonda. But their role has been extremely negative in the IC-814 episode, and thereafter and they have been against Indian interests all this while.
If Iran and the Arab Shias are put down ruthlessly and Pakistanis have a hand in it, which whatever little size, they will probably brag about it till even Allah hears about their valor, then one can be assured that Pakistan's anti-Indian rile would increase.Gagan wrote:4. How about we watch from the sidelines. As it is the GCC knows we are not going to jump in and get our hands dirty (euphism for: We are not invited onlee). If the GCC starts to sink, and that day will probably never arrive, then they'll ask for India's help.
How about we watch from the sidelines, move a few pieces on the chessboard, and when the fighting is done, and the dust settles down, we move in for the reconstruction.
When the fighting is done, both the fighting nations and their allies will be out of money. Our private business houses with their capital can move in, bribe the guys and get reconstruction deals. Our guys have done this everywhere, they've been doing reasonably well so far.
No reason why we NEED to jump into this muck and dirty ourselves here. This is one messy ethino-religious fight we should be very wary of. It has the potential to fracture our internal unity. The gains we seek will be there even if we don't join in.
My do naya paisa.
That is what it would cost us. And we are being told we again have to just swallow the bitter pill, and some contracts is the sugar afterwards to help us swallow.India in the ensuing developments would have to face more intense United States pressures on its Pakistan policy approaches as Pakistan Army Chief would demand quid-pro-quos more strongly in relation to Kashmir and also maintaining balance of power equilibrium with India That translates into more advanced weapons systems and increased military aid. It also translates into increased US pressures on India on Kashmir.
Additionally Pakistan Army can expect greater under the table financial payments from Saudi Arabia to bolster its military machine with possible payments for raising two additional Pakistan Army Divisions to offset deployments in Saudi Arabia.