Bharat Rakshak

Some years ago, there was talk in the Indian press about whether the US would offer India the USS Kittyhawk, the last conventional aircraft carrier in the US Navy, which was being decommissioned. The idea was given a lift in Track-2 (or informal) circles, but was quickly put to rest in public. Whether or not the idea of the Kittyhawk coming to India had merit, there is one fact: there wasn't an official high-level request from India to the US to that end, nor was there a US 'offer'.

This theme resonates through the US-India defence relationship, when looking beyond defence sales where India issues RFPs (Requests for Proposal) for equipment it wants to buy, to niche technology or capability areas and to joint development of technologies. Unless it hears from the 'customer' what it wants, the US doesn't do well at coming up with ideas and 'offering' them; India doesn't do well at asking.

There are three explanations for this: first, a simple mismatch between the US defence 'marketing' process and the Indian 'buying' process. In the Indian bazaar, it is frequently up to the 'seller' of ideas to come up with an 'offer'. The US interagency process just isn't set up to work like that.

Second, a desire in India to maintain a manageable political distance from the US, and avoid being seen to be getting too close. Here, making the effort to 'ask' could be construed within the Indian system as doing exactly that.

Third, the limited bandwidth of the US political milieu. Consumed by domestic crises and foreign hotspots, senior leadership in Washington will likely not have time to intellectualize on defence co-operation with India. The water has therefore to be carried by the mid-levels of the bureaucracy, but to table prickly issues on which there will inevitably be interagency debate in the US, it can often take an official, high-level, request as a trigger.

How does India, a country whose perception of the US as a defence partner is still colored by fear of sanctions, unanswered requests for information, the vagaries of the US export control process, and a desire to keep its political distance, get used to a culture of making such requests? And get over the negativity of past experiences while doing so?

How does the US, a country with a defence export system used to responding to requests from partner countries, turn itself into one that generates ideas and present them to India? How can it convince India that the worm has really turned, that there is a changing paradigm in the Washington interagency discussion of defence co-operation with India? Whether this circle is squared or not will be a bellwether for the long-term health of defence co-operation. This isn't a Gordian Knot, with no solution in sight.

For its part, as a result of the Defence Trade Initiative (DTI), led on the US side by Deputy Secretary of Defence Ash Carter, the US now has a superstructure in place -- by way of greater interagency dialog than ever before -- to holistically examine issues related to the defence trade with India. This initiative, started after Leon Panetta's visit in June, was intended to break down the notorious barriers to communication within Washington.

The unanswered question across Washington remains: what does India want to do with the US from a future defence technology and capacity building standpoint? This question has to be seen in India in the context of the US 'rebalancing' its strategic priorities in Asia.

Debate about the shape of the 'rebalance' is ongoing in Washington, and India has a chance to influence it, within its own strategic context, by identifying areas of capability or technology development it sees as national priorities that the US can uniquely help with. And, by being able to table them.

India can, and will, take several paths to these national priorities. Indigenisation is a desirable strategic goal, as is strengthening defence relationships with other countries, consistent with India's foreign policy. But, there are some areas in which the US has capabilities to offer that no one else can.

In this new paradigm, presuming to know beforehand what Washington will or will not give India, as some in the Indian strategic community seem wont to do, is self-defeating. There certainly will be some areas in which the US is not able to work with India.

But, if India chooses to strengthen the process of the DTI by encouraging debate on its priorities, thereby strengthening mid-level communication between the two bureaucracies, it is likely to find a payoff.

For a non-export dependent defence economy like the US -- exports as a percentage of total defence expenditure are below 10% -- economics are not the primary driver of the defence trade. If the US is to dilute its technological advantage, the strategic imperative has to clear.

The USS Kittyhawk case is worth noting. Would the tone of the debate in Washington over giving the carrier, which is still in fleet reserve, to India have been different if there had been an official high-level request from the Indian Navy? Possibly. A lesson perhaps for any future co-operation in the development and operation of large aircraft carriers.

As the 'strategic partnership' continues to evolve, so will the logic of a defence technology and capability building relationship. However, if it is to mature, then India has to get better at asking for what it prioritizes, and the US better at brainstorming what it wants India to have.

The best way to succeed is probably to start small, grow big. Niche areas such as counter-IED technology co-development are a good place to look. India could also think about whether license producing mature US-origin equipment still with potential uses in India -- as an arbitrary example, the A-10 Thunderbolt -- would be a good model to build industrial capability.

Alfred Hitchcock used to use a plot device called a 'McGuffin' in his movies -- something non-essential to the narrative. The growing US-India defence relationship would have been unthinkable in the past days of sanctions. Whether communication between the two countries' systems can be improved or not will be a key determinant in how far, and fast, it can go. And, to the narrative of the 'strategic partnership', whether it remains a McGuffin, or the hero of the piece.

Why Australia should scratch the F-35 and fly Sukhois
April 8, 2013 Rakesh Krishnan Simha
The F-35 Lighting was the first choice of the Australian air force. But several thunderbolts have struck the stealth aircraft, including the arrival of new generation Sukhois that are skewing the odds against the Australians.

Why Australia should scratch the F-35 and fly Sukhois
Russian pilot: "No F-35 can ever out-fly Sukhoi in knife fight." Source: Sukhoi.org

Sometime by the middle of this year, Australia will have to make a stark choice. Its defences vulnerable and budget in tatters, the country will announce whether it will buy another squadron of 24 F-18 Super Hornets, or that Australia will stick with the original plan to buy 100 units of the F-35 Lightning – America’s joint strike fighter.

Trouble is neither option adds to the country’s security.

The reason, according to the Business Spectator is: “Indonesia plans to buy an incredible 180 of the Russian/Indian Sukhoi fighters, almost certainly including the PAK-FA T-50 and Su-35S. So the question is not whether the JSF is better than the outdated Hornet, but whether it is better than Indonesia’s Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA T-50 and Su-35S.”

Like much of what comes spinning out of the Australian media, the article is alarmist. But it offers a sound suggestion – instead of seeking advice from Australian and American military officials, who have staked their careers on the F-35, the defence ministry must get an informed and unbiased opinion from outside. As things stand now, Australia “will soon discover that the latest defence slogan – ‘first look, first shoot, first kill’ – works against the outmoded Hornet but not against the Sukhoi. The Sukhoi is just too good”.

The article adds: “For example, the JSF can operate effectively only to a maximum of around 40,000 feet (it can fly higher but loses operational impact at higher levels). By contrast the Sukhois can operate at full capacity at much higher levels and with that advantage they have systems and weapons that could blast an Australia JSF and its pilot out of the sky before they had a chance to ‘first look, first shoot, first kill’. No dogfight required.”

The Business Spectator offers a way out of this “heads we lose, tails we lose” dilemma. It suggests Australia either acquire the F-22 or its technology. The prescription is pretty close to what much of the Australian media and defence experts have been peddling. The only problem is they are peddling snake oil. Even if it were possible to borrow technology from the F-22 (made by a different company) and graft it on to the F-35, American law prevents the export of F-22 and its technology.

A re-look at Sukhoi

So what is Australia to do? According to the independent think tank New Australia, it should consider not just the Sukhoi Flanker but in future the PAK-FA. “We recommend that Australia enter an arrangement with Sukhoi similar to HAL in India to build either the Sukhoi Su-35S Flanker or Su-32 Fullback aircraft under licence in Australia. The current preference is Su-35S,” says New Australia.

“Sukhoi licenses the manufacture of Sukhoi planes and parts in several countries including India and China. Australia could buy the entire Sukhoi aircraft and build the avionics, consumables and weaponry locally. Many companies in Russia, Asia, Israel and Europe manufacture Sukhoi components. Sukhoi is ‘open source’.”

New Australia cites a study by Air Power Australia: “In strategic terms the Su-35S is a game changer, as it robustly outclasses all competing Western fighter aircraft other than the F-22A Raptor. Deployed in significant numbers it is capable of changing the balance of power in any region where this occurs. This reality does not appear to be widely understood in most Western air forces, or Department of Defence bureaucracies.”

Deal breaker or clincher

Australia is troubled mainly by Indonesia’s rise as a regional power, but in many circles India is also seen as a threat. This is perhaps because the antipodeans – who are sometimes more English than the queen – see India as the villain that brought down the British Empire.

In 1986, Australia made a lot of noises when India acquired its second aircraft carrier, the Virat. Again in 1998 when India tested five nuclear bombs, it withdrew its ambassador and in a fit of pique, pulled out an Indian military officer midway through his class in an Australian exchange programme.

While a string of former Australian prime ministers, led by Kevin Rudd, have taken a strong anti-India stance, there is another lobby led by the current premier Julia Gillard, who has tried to make amends.

In this backdrop, any decision on buying Russian jets will be influenced by which lobby carries the day. If India is seen as an ally, then the Australian military might look at the T-50. But if India is bracketed as a threat, that together with Indonesia’s purchases, will pave the way for the F-35. However, such a decision will send Australian’s defences and national budget into a tailspin.

Ballooning costs

Costs are clearly a concern as the F-35 is a programme that has run out of control. It is quite shockingly an aircraft that is more expensive than Australia. Yes, the programme will eventually tip over the $1.385 trillion mark, which is more than the Australian economy.

From Canberra’s point of view, each of these aircraft could end up costing US$238 million each (? this is too much,around $100M would be a better estimate), which is more than the price tag of US$60 million per plane when it first committed itself to the programme. Also, because the F-35 represents the latest in American defence tech, many of its parts will be off limits to Australians and will have to be flown to US bases or serviced by Americans flown in especially for the task. This will not only add to costs, it will increase down time.

Buying Sukhoi aircraft would, therefore, be a mission of mercy. New Australia says instead of buying 100 F-35s, Australia could get the job done with just 70 Sukhoi Super Flankers. And at just US$66 million per plane, it would prevent Australia’s over-stretched defence budget from snapping altogether.

Australia and Russia – Similar requirements

Russian aircraft are designed to overcome a uniquely Russian problem – covering its vast air space with limited aircraft. The Australian landmass is 4000 km wide, and the F-35 just doesn’t have the legs to cover that distance. The Su-35 has an effective range of about 4,000 km compared with about 2,200 for the JSF. This means the JSF would require air-tanker support to operate both within and outside Australia’s boundaries.

Speed – Bullet train vs slowcoach

The Su-35 is a Mach 2.4 (nearly two and half times the speed of sound) aircraft while the F-35 is limited to Mach 1.6. According to Victor M. Chepkin, the first deputy general director of NPO Saturn, the new AL-41F engines will allow Russian jets to supercruise – fly at supersonic speed for long distances. By not having to switch their afterburners on, aircraft are able to save a lot of fuel. Translation – non-supercruising fighters such as the F-35 and F-18s will be at a huge disadvantage against the Sukhois.

Stealth – Holes in the cloak

So obsessed were the aircraft’s designers with stealth that they ignored or sacrificed fighter basics such as range, payload and speed. The thinking was stealth alone would be enough to keep the JSF ahead of the pack. However, even as the Americans were perfecting stealth tech, the Russians were developing new combat techniques against it. They are now experimenting with new radar that can pick out stealth planes.

Colonel of Aviation Grigoriy “Grisha” Medved, a former Russian fighter pilot, says the worst part of the F-35 is a very hot engine – 160 Celsius hotter than standard combat jet engine exhaust. “It makes a very bright star in the sky and a long jet plume,” he says in a study for Air Power Australia.

Russia has adapted technology developed for detecting ICBM launches, to air combat fighters, says Medved. This technology enables Russian fighter pilots to see a standard fighter at about 50 km; by 2017 it will allow them to see stealth fighters at about 150 km. Because such radars are passive, the enemy will have no idea they are being watched.

In a dogfight, Medved notes an Su-35 can salvo a pair of missiles. The first, an active-radar-homing one, will force the F-35 pilot to take evasive action, exposing his beam-on radar cross section and exhausts to another (heat-seeking) shot.

Plus, with its large internal fuel load, the Su-35 can perform multiple attacks, launching missiles, turning hard to evade and then re-engaging. That is, play “cat and mouse” with the Aussies. The Sukhoi’s much better inventory of BVR (beyond visual range) missiles can then finish the job. As Medved says, “Run in for kill with R-73 or guns. No (F-35) can ever out-fly Sukhoi in knife fight.”

And, the colonel adds, with the PAK-FA coming, the F-35 “best stay home unless escorted by bigger brother.”

Whether bigger brother can accompany the F-35 is doubtful. “The cancellation of the F-22 will make Sukhoi aircraft the most capable production fighter planes available,” says New Australia. “It also marks a historic shift in air-power from the United States to Russia and the countries that use Russian defence technology.”

If you are in the Australian air force, you are on your own mate.

NRao wrote:Another foundational article from Feb, 2013:

McGuffin or Not? The US-India Defence 'Technology' Relationship

Whether or not the idea of the Kittyhawk coming to India had merit, there is one fact: there wasn't an official high-level request from India to the US to that end, nor was there a US 'offer'.
In the Indian bazaar, it is frequently up to the 'seller' of ideas to come up with an 'offer'. The US interagency process just isn't set up to work like that.


How does India, a country whose perception of the US as a defence partner is still colored by fear of sanctions, unanswered requests for information, the vagaries of the US export control process, and a desire to keep its political distance, get used to a culture of making such requests? And get over the negativity of past experiences while doing so?

Acharya wrote:

NRao wrote:Another foundational article from Feb, 2013:

McGuffin or Not? The US-India Defence 'Technology' Relationship

Whether or not the idea of the Kittyhawk coming to India had merit, there is one fact: there wasn't an official high-level request from India to the US to that end, nor was there a US 'offer'.
In the Indian bazaar, it is frequently up to the 'seller' of ideas to come up with an 'offer'. The US interagency process just isn't set up to work like that.


How does India, a country whose perception of the US as a defence partner is still colored by fear of sanctions, unanswered requests for information, the vagaries of the US export control process, and a desire to keep its political distance, get used to a culture of making such requests? And get over the negativity of past experiences while doing so?

This is more like a bollywood article. A serious topic should be written seriously.
The people who are neither experts are generating news reports of idea of the Kittyhawk coming to India. This is how false images are being fed for the clueless public

Philip wrote:To put the matter in proper perspective,when it comes to the UK,it is always the UK/RN that has offered mil. eqpt. right from new Sea Harriers to old carriers like the Hermes/Viraat.Ex-RN warships and subs have been offered to many countries including India,where we strangely bought an old Leander frigate for the Trg. sqd. ,to Pak and many S.American countries.In the immediate past,the US has offered to us the F-18SH,F-16,JSF,etc.,and has captured several lucrative orders,like the C-17s,which allowed Boeing to keep its production run open for a few years more saving many jobs.In addition there are several official forums where India has defence discussions with Russia,the US,etc.,which meet regularly.At those meetings,the buyer/seller talks cover a range of topics including the progress of ongoing contracts and future acquisitions.India has already made significant purchases from the US,not to be sneered at by any means,costing upwards of over $10B,for a variety of mil. eqpt.One therefore can't fathom the author's concern and analysis of Indo-US mil. sales which are very robust at the moment.

Viv S wrote:The Spike and Javelin are being examined because they're required. They cannot be used interchangeably with the SAMHO. Now if the issue had to do with the LAHAT or AT-11, it would have been a different matter.

Viv S wrote:If say tomorrow Russia were to refuse to share core technologies relating to X,Y or Z component of the PAKFA, would we walk out of the program, up Tejas orders and wait twenty years for the AMCA to arrive?

Viv S wrote:The only thing at risk is the initial investment and as long as that isn't threatened, its hardly akin to shooting one's own foot.

Viv S wrote:The UK is not footing the bill for Japan or Australia. The only payments its sending to the US is for the development and its own purchases which amount to 138 aircraft.

With regard to support, yes its paying for that for its 138 aircraft fleet. But seeing UK companies are involved in the supply chain as well, its issuing invoices to operators of 3,100 aircraft.

Viv S wrote:Like I said before, the figures are not inflation adjusted . And most observers agree that the aircraft will come in at around $100 million. Also add in the cost differential for the B & C variant which will form about 30% of the order book.

The estimated cost for an F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft purchased in 2018 and delivered in 2020 (the first expected year of full rate production) will be about $85 million in inflation adjusted “then year” dollars.

Viv S wrote:But lets assume an ideal case and call it $75 million all inclusive in 2012 dollars. 15% of 3100 aircraft still amounts to about $35 billion. All for an investment of $3.5 billion and orders for another $10 billion (2012 dollars). We're used to talking about offsets, in this case, offsets equal at least 260% of the contract, so to speak.

NRao wrote:Most of all I would suggest that people read up - there is plenty out there (this topic of co-dev or co-prod is OLD). But when doing so, for your own sake do not hold opinions, they cloud the pointS being made.

NRao wrote:Most of all I would suggest that people read up - there is plenty out there (this topic of co-dev or co-prod is OLD). But when doing so, for your own sake do not hold opinions, they cloud the pointS being made.

Rafael being the only bidder in this tender, the Indian Army had to obtain a special permit to sign a deal on the basis of a tender with just one potential vendor. While technology transfer is a big issue in India, another reason for the absence of competitors was the Indian insistence on unique weapons performance – the Indians demanded that the missiles will enable “active-passive fire-and-forget guidance system”, which only Rafael can offer. Off the shelf third generation (3G) missiles are employing passive sensors to lock on the target before launch, and perform ‘fire and forget’ engagement. At present, only the Spike can offer ‘active passive 3G fire and forget’ – the ability for the user to correct the missile’s aiming in flight, as it closes in on the target, thus offering the ‘active’ element of the engagement.

Acharya wrote:

NRao wrote:Most of all I would suggest that people read up - there is plenty out there (this topic of co-dev or co-prod is OLD). But when doing so, for your own sake do not hold opinions, they cloud the pointS being made.

I go by the ITAR certification. How many are proceeding and what is the status. One of my good friend is the country head of a company. Their facility in desh is being certified but not sure if it is a done deal. Another small company which I know closely has abandoned it. Not many takers yet and there is confusion.

NRao wrote:SG,

Apologies. I have never meant to advocate anything. And, I do not recall advocating any either. But, ............... sorry, if I did.

Sagar G wrote:What I found in an old article while looking around

Rafael being the only bidder in this tender, the Indian Army had to obtain a special permit to sign a deal on the basis of a tender with just one potential vendor. While technology transfer is a big issue in India, another reason for the absence of competitors was the Indian insistence on unique weapons performance – the Indians demanded that the missiles will enable “active-passive fire-and-forget guidance system”, which only Rafael can offer. Off the shelf third generation (3G) missiles are employing passive sensors to lock on the target before launch, and perform ‘fire and forget’ engagement. At present, only the Spike can offer ‘active passive 3G fire and forget’ – the ability for the user to correct the missile’s aiming in flight, as it closes in on the target, thus offering the ‘active’ element of the engagement.

Is this true ??? If so then what's up with this sudden outburst of love for Javelin ???

TSJones wrote:I really don't want to get in on all the political and ideological love being shown here but have you ever seen a video of a Javelin being used? Well, I have. When a Javelin team takes a shot at a tank, they scatter like cockroaches. They don't hang around to correct the shot. You see, usually a tank has supporting elements attached with it, some infantry, some light vehicles, maybe even another tank nearby. You don't shoot a missile at a tank and then hang around and watch the show, and continue to live. That was the big criticism of the TOW missile package. Now back to your regularly scheduled channel.

Sagar G wrote:

TSJones wrote:I really don't want to get in on all the political and ideological love being shown here but have you ever seen a video of a Javelin being used? Well, I have. When a Javelin team takes a shot at a tank, they scatter like cockroaches. They don't hang around to correct the shot. You see, usually a tank has supporting elements attached with it, some infantry, some light vehicles, maybe even another tank nearby. You don't shoot a missile at a tank and then hang around and watch the show, and continue to live. That was the big criticism of the TOW missile package. Now back to your regularly scheduled channel.

Before delivering lectures maybe you should first read what has been posted, to make it more clear to you I wasn't the one who framed the requirements for IA it was IA itself which asked for the "active-passive fire-and-forget guidance system" according to the article. What Javelin does is not a unique thing the Spike does the same thing and in addition according to the article it has the option of the ability for the user to correct the missile’s aiming in flight, as it closes in on the target, thus offering the ‘active’ element of the engagement. I asked whether this is true or not that IA asked for this capability.

I guess seeing "videos" makes one deliver misplaced lectures as well.

TSJones wrote:You asked:
" If so then what's up with this sudden outburst of love for Javelin ???"

...and I answered your question.

Have a real nice day.

Acharya wrote:Remember : We need to keep pushing Indian interest and India. There is no need to push another country;s interest

It could actually be the scarce funding environment that validates the strategy behind the joint venture's new aircraft—the two-seat, twin-engine Scorpion. The team is unveiling its self-funded project Sept. 16 at the annual Air Force Association Air & Space Conference outside Washington, and officials gave Aviation Week an exclusive sneak peak.

The Scorpion demonstrator is intended to whet the U.S. Air Force's appetite with the promise of a low procurement and operating cost. The pitch is for this aircraft, which is optimized for 5-hr. endurance with onboard intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collectors and weapons, to handle the Air Force's low-end missions such as U.S.-based interdiction, quick-reaction natural disaster support and air sovereignty patrols. The goal is to field an aircraft capable of operating for less than $3,000 per flying hour; the company declined to cite a target unit cost. By contrast, the Pentagon in June cited the cost per flying hour of the F-16, which currently performs many of these missions, as $24,899.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, F-15s, F-16s and A-10s have been used for patrols and close air support in completely uncontested airspace. This was overkill, according to some military officials. Built for high-speed, high-G maneuvers, these aircraft made little use of their strengths in these conflicts, but were needed to drop ordnance and provide armed overwatch for ground troops.

Though designed as a tandem-seat aircraft, Scorpion can be flown by a single pilot. Textron is building it to include a highly simplified and reconfigurable bay that is capable of carrying 3,000 lb. of weapons or intelligence-collecting equipment; the aircraft also has six hard points total. The twin Honewell TF731 engines were selected to provide ample power and cooling for a variety of ISR payloads, Donnelly says. Though used for the demonstrator, these engines could be swapped out.

Textron AirLand selected Cobham for the cockpit, which will feature modern flat-panel displays. Scorpion is not fly-by-wire, a decision made to keep cost down and simplify the design. However, Donnelly acknowledges that an unmanned version could be of interest in the future; so this capability could eventually be incorporated to take the pilot out of the cockpit.

ramana wrote:Can go in Nuke Thread also

NSA Menon surprised and asserts nuke liability law wont be diluted for US

In babuspeak it means liability law was considered but seeing the possibility of BJP raising such dilution before the elections it is being denied.

Cosmo_R wrote:

ramana wrote:Can go in Nuke Thread also

NSA Menon surprised and asserts nuke liability law wont be diluted for US

In babuspeak it means liability law was considered but seeing the possibility of BJP raising such dilution before the elections it is being denied.

Could not find the Nuke thread. What SSM is actually saying is pretty clever: NPCIL which will negotiate contracts with suppliers has the right to insist on the liability clause therein but not the obligation to do so. This is the gist of Goolam Vahanvati's opinion.

This flexibility at the contract level is what the PMO is going to try and drive a truck through. It also makes eminent sense. In those contracts where the supplier liability clause is inserted, the price will reflect the 're-insurance' cost which would add anywhere from 2x to 10x the liability free price.

The basic problem is that with the liability clause, the capital costs will render an uneconomic KWH price that has to be charged.

Keeping it a right vs. obligation at the contract level makes it possible for SSM to legitimately argue they are not going against Parliament.

Clever.

Sagar G wrote:The requirement is there since the said missiles are up for sale in the commercial market and it's nothing surprising that there is a "requirement" from IA now for a man portable fire and forget ATGM. Had there been none such missile in the market there would have been no "requirement" from army as well and they would have been more than happy with SAMHO.

I don't think the IA projected a requirement for it to DRDO, check out the interview of Dr. Chander posted by Avarachan in Indian missile thread. He talks about a man portable Nag.

Why are you bringing up our relationship with Russians when the discussion is about the US offer ??? If you don't have enough material to advocate for USA then don't say anything why create strawmen argument regarding our defence relationship with Russia, that's a totally different topic. But by the way we have some very high level off the records technological partnership with them.

Where is the guarantee that the initial investment won't go waste or US won't back off from sharing technology ??? First show me the guarantee.

You can keep playing with numbers and keep doing backhand calculations but none of your arithmetic skills answer my real question which you in first place didn't understand and still it seems to be going over your head. You haven't yet produced any proof that USA will earn less than UK. You either have a proof backed up with solid numbers or you don't, it's as simple as that.

While you are fumbling with your logic and your theories also take a look at the SAR report and what it say's about the unit cost.

So first you bring in JV, then constantly produce half baked numbers, then bring Russia, then keep going round and round with your numbers and now you also bring "offsets"

No need to apologise saar I am only wondering what has got into you suddenly that you are so gung ho about partnering USA based on some mouth platitudes of there diplomats and nothing to show actually on ground which indicates there honest intention.

Another thing is saar that if Khan wants to emulate the Brahmos model today then it only shows their real intentions about "partnering" with India. In the Brahmos model we didn't get any critical technology in return, both sides bought there technology on the table with India being a junior partner and the partnership started in the 90's. It's 2013 and Khan wants to emulate the same thing now when India has grown in terms of what it can bring to the table and be more on equal terms. If you still ignore such on the face indications then I don't have anything else to say.

Virupaksha wrote:Cosmo_R, Basically,

Say a toyota cares with honda engine is sold and breaks down. The person who bought it from toyota, will sue toyota for damages and toyota has to reimburse it. But say now, toyota determines that the breakdown was the fault of honda's engine. Toyota now goes to sue honda for what it had to pay in damages, because ultimately honda was the guy who sold a lemon.

In this kind of transaction, usually unless explicit in contract or law, the damages are limit less.

If you remember the bhopal gas tragedy, the amount paid essentially is limitless (as determined by courts). That the courts were idiots to give low figures, doesnt mean that there was per se limit. Now imagine that root cause wasnt negligence by UC, but due to faulty machinery by TI. Now UC goes on to sue TI for whatever the damages are.

Before this law,
Toyota = NPCIL = UC
Honda = WestingHouse = TI
car break down = nuke accident = bhopal gas tragedy

By tort law, honda/TI/WestingHouse face limitless exposure.

In most cases, a routine general insurance would take care of the exposure. But with nuke accidents, since the exposure is limitless and will definitely bankrupt both the supplier and insurer - insurers baulk at them. So international nuke rules (even before indian Nuclear Civil Liability on Damage act) capped the exposure so that nuke suppliers can take insurance.

NCLD follows that convention. It capped NPCIL's liability at 1500 crores out of which 1000 crores is for the supplier. The rest of liability is taken over by the central govt. Those figures are the base, GOI can change them at will.

I am not worried about these US companies directly skirting the NLD. If they try to do that they expose themselves to limitless damage.

There are however loopholes. NPCIL may explicitly take over the liability in the contract or some paper company will.

Cosmo_R wrote:
The opinion by G Vahanvati that NPCIL did not have the obligation to enforce NLCD is the 'loophole' that GoI have seized on.

ramana wrote:I think that G Vahanavati finds many legal ways for India to be Ghulam for ever.

It’s lonely at the top. It’s even lonelier at the bottom. PM Manmohan Singh should know. On his last flight, every big-time politician seeks the statesman’s boarding pass, leaving behind a legacy by which he would be judged by posterity. Many of them, who have come into their own at pivotal points in time, whether to rescue or doom a nation, have impacted the future in unexpected ways. On some pedestals are carved gilded names. Others are defaced by the graffiti of history that mocks the futility of lost opportunities. Manmohan Singh is a leader who has a place on both.

Today, his image is substrata—the wasted years of a government in drift, tattooed by corruption, incompetence, vertiginous prices and overall economic collapse. With his resume of having rescued India twice—once as P V Narasimha Rao’s finance minister and the other as Sonia Gandhi’s architect of reform that saw growth exceeding 8 per cent during UPA I—Manmohan is sweating to save his reputation. After having failed in India as PM, he is attempting to do it overseas. For that, can there be a better forum than the United Nations and a nobler issue than the eternal chimera of peace with Pakistan whose swagger only conceals its pusillanimity?

To get the whole enchilada, foreign minister Salman Khurshid and adviser to the Pakistan PM on national security and foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, have been de-weeding the garden of peace for Manmohan’s tryst with Nawaz Sharif in New York. The obituaries of beheaded Indian soldiers, their bodies returned as grisly trophies of Pakistani contempt for a soft Indian state is not part of the subtext of their dialogue. It doesn’t matter that the Pakistan Army continues cross-border shelling to enable jihadis to infiltrate Kashmir, where they hope to revive an infirm insurgency. Ironically, it’s not peace that has brought change in the Valley. The promise of jobs, economic betterment and firm military vigilance is responsible for the decline in popular violence. Except Indira Gandhi who never trusted Pakistan, every other Indian PM has chased the diaphanous dream of détente with our duplicitous neighbour. Indira was even willing to annoy the powerful Arab lobby by offering Israeli warplanes a refuelling base in India on their way to bomb Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility. RAW operations enjoyed their finest hours during the Indira years. Late I K Gujral, however, destroyed the Indian intelligence network in Pakistan painfully cultivated over decades and unwittingly sent hundreds of agents to their deaths. Atal Bihari Vajpayee dealt first with Sharif and later with General Pervez Musharraf, the architect of Kargil War, who undermined the Lahore treaty. Pakistan revels in humiliating India: Sharm el-Sheikh, Sir Creek and Siachen troop withdrawal, as we breed doves by the dozen. Only they don’t turn out to be doves, only stool pigeons.

Manmohan’s hallucination that Sharif’s government will oppose the ISI’s machinations against India shows he is in a hurry to climb the lofty peak of global ambition. A recent report revealed that the Pakistan government has made a deal with the ISI on Kashmir. Sharif has reportedly sought plausible deniability—his government would deny knowledge of ISI’s plans to revive Kashmir as an international issue, using terror. This is reminiscent of the Kargil days when he admitted ignorance that Musharraf had moved troops and seized the heights to wage war against India. It is highly unlikely that a PM, who has access to even scraps of intelligence, is denied information of a war in the offing by the entire Army brass. No country tolerates a neighbour who seeks to destroy it: Russia decimated Chechen rebels and Israel stands fast against its Arab foes.

Not Manmohan. In his last gamble to restore the legacy of a moribund captaincy, the innocence of India is being bartered. What the country needs is a strong leader who brings centrality to India. Manmohan’s strength is his weakness; a statesman who expresses happiness to serve under a novice, thereby indicating he will be around for a bit longer. Maybe New York is his new constituency.

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1
Saudi Arabia’s Proxy Wars By FAHAD NAZER
Sat Sep 21, 2013 6:06 am (PDT) . Posted by:
"n m" nyayamurti1
http://www.nytimes. com/2013/ 09/21/opinion/ global/saudi- arabias-proxy- wars.html? _r=0

Saudi Arabia’s Proxy Wars
By FAHAD NAZER
Published: September 20, 2013
Saudi Arabia appears resolute: It wants Bashar al-Assad out of Damascus. The Saudis view the fighting in Syria with the same intensity that they did the civil war in Yemen that raged in the 1960s — as a conflict with wide and serious repercussions that will shape the political trajectory of the Middle East for years to come.
Related News
* Syrian Rebels Say Saudi Arabia Is Stepping Up Weapons Deliveries (September 13, 2013)
* Times Topic: Saudi Arabia
The Syrian war presents the Saudis with a chance to hit three birds with one stone: Iran, its rival for regional dominance, Tehran’s ally Assad, and his Hezbollah supporters. But Riyadh’s policy makers are wary. They know that once fully committed, it will be difficult to disengage. And
so they are taking to heart the lessons of another regional war that
flared on their border 50 years ago.
The war in Yemen that broke out in 1962 when military leaders ousted the centuries-old monarchy and declared a republic quickly turned into a
quagmire that sucked in foreign powers. The Soviet Union provided the
new regime with air support. British airstrikes aided the royalists and
the United States offered warplanes in a symbolic show of force.
More than anything else though, the conflict became a proxy war between
Saudi Arabia, which backed the deposed imam and his royalist supporters, and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, who supported the new republic.
Nasser’s vision of a united Arab “nation” free of Western domination and sterile monarchies resonated across the Arab world. The Saudi monarchy, wary of this republican fever on its border, decided it was not going
to stand on the sidelines. The kingdom used all available means to try
to check Nasser’s ambitions — but it did not send troops.
By some estimates, Egypt sent as many as 55,000 troops to Yemen, some of whom became involved in fighting well inside Saudi territory, while
others were accused of using chemical weapons supplied by the Soviet
Union. Saudi Arabia provided money and weapons to the royalists. Yet
neither side achieved its goals. Egypt’s war with Israel in 1967 led
Nasser to withdraw his forces, but the Saudis were unable to turn the
tide. Riyadh was eventually forced to recognize Yemen’s republican
government.
Now as then, Riyadh sees the struggle in Syria as a defining moment. As
the leader of the Sunni Muslim world, it perceives an opportunity to
check what it sees as Iranian plans to encircle the kingdom with hostile Shiite-dominated regimes. As the war has taken on a more sectarian
character, the usually reserved foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, has described Assad’s onslaught against his own people as “genocide”
and Syrian lands as being “under occupation” — a clear reference to the
presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces.
It is no secret that the Saudis are supplying elements of the Syrian
opposition with weapons. They all but admitted as much when the prince
said a few weeks ago that “if the international community is not willing to do anything, then they must allow Syrians to defend themselves.”
The Saudis will use all tools available to oust Assad, while taking
measures to ensure that the weapons they’re supplying to the rebels do
not fall into the hands of extremists. Nevertheless, following the
chemical attack on civilians near Damascus last month, the Saudi foreign minister spoke candidly about the inability of the Arab nations to put a stop to Assad’s campaign through force of arms, adding that any
military effort to do so would likely involve actors outside the region. Recent suggestions that the Arab League should assemble a military
force to check Assad’s aggression do not seem viable. Disagreements
among the league’s member nations have prevented it from agreeing to
even endorse a potential U.S. strike.
But on Monday, the Saudi Council of Ministers issued a strong statement
making clear that it considered preventing another chemical attack by
Assad to be only a short-term goal. In the long-term, he must be ousted.
Saudi Arabia will intensify its efforts to arm the rebels and to use its media outlets and diplomatic clout to rally support for a military
strike. Although the kingdom is known for using its troops sparingly, it has done so judiciously in the past. Riyadh did, for example, send
troops to Bahrain to show its support for the Sunni regime in the face
of extended mass protests. Of course, Syria is not Bahrain, but neither
is Saudi Arabia the same country that it was in the 1960s, when it
failed to achieve its goals in Yemen.
The oil-rich kingdom of today wields far greater influence than it did
half a century ago. There is no question that it will wield that
influence forcefully, supporting the rebels with guns and diplomacy as
it struggles to outmaneuver Iran, outflank Hezbollah and oust Assad.
Fahad Nazer is a former political analyst with the Saudi Embassy in Washington.
A version of this op-ed appears in print on September 21, 2013, in The International Herald Tribune.

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The Pakistani state on its knees — Dr Mohammad Taqi
Sat Sep 21, 2013 6:15 am (PDT) . Posted by:
"n m" nyayamurti1
The Pakistani state on its knees — Dr Mohammad Taqi

http://www.dailytim es.com.pk/ default.asp? page=2013\09\ 19\story_ 19-9-2013_ pg3_2

Without setting the parameters for what exactly is the state willing
to concede to the TTP in exchange for peace, the prime minister and his
APC have left the door wide open for the terrorists to keep making
highly perverse demands

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
has claimed the killing of Major General Sanaullah Khan, GOC Swat
Division, along with Lt-Colonel Tauseef and Lance Naik Irfan Sattar in
an IED bombing in Upper Dir on Sunday. In a statement released a day
after the attack, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said that while peace
must be given a chance through the political process, no one should have
any misgivings that “we would let terrorists coerce us into accepting
their terms” and that “the military has the ability and the will to take
the fight to the militants.” Frankly, there is little in the general’s
almost decade-long track record at the helm, first as the ISI director
and then as the army chief, to suggest that he would deliver on his
pledge, especially with one foot out the door. General Kayani, like the
politicians who signed the September 9 declaration of the All Parties
Conference (APC), did not deem it necessary to even name the enemy that
he intends to take the fight to.

Of late the Pakistani media is
abuzz with the claims that the Pakistan army wishes to fight the Taliban
while the politicians lack such resolve. The fact is that the army has
been ceding territory to the jihadists of assorted varieties for about
10 years now. And wherever and whenever it has acted against the
terrorists, it has done so reluctantly and after dragging its feet not
for days or months but literally years. The Swat operation is often
cited as a success story and also to show that the-then ruling Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) and the Awami National Party (ANP) wanted to
negotiate with the TTP while the army wanted to act decisively. The
reality however is that the TTP takeover of Swat happened over at least
two years while the mullahs governed the Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa and the army
chief General Pervez Musharraf ruled the country. The PPP-ANP coalition
was forced into negotiating with the TTP when the army — the only
fighting force they could rely on — was gun shy when it mattered the
most.

Consider the much-trumpeted Rah-e-Nijat operation in South
Waziristan Agency. The operation was announced some six months before
the action actually started in October 2009. Stealth and caution were
both thrown to the winds. As expected, the Taliban did not stay and
fight pitched battles and simply melted away into their hideouts in the
neighbouring North Waziristan Agency (NWA), Orakzai Agency and
Balochistan. Media fanfare surrounding the Pakistan army’s incursion
into and conquest of Kotkai — the hometown of the TTP head honcho,
Hakimullah Mehsud — sounded then as if the Allies had descended upon the
Führerbunker. Only there was no Hakimullah there. Fast forward four
years almost to the date and the TTP chief is dictating terms to a
nuclear-armed state! It is indeed somewhat surprising that almost all
top TTP leaders from Nek Muhammad Wazir and Baitullah Mehsud to
Wali-ur-Rehman escaped alive from the Pakistan army operations. They
were all killed in the much-maligned drone attacks.

The simple
point is that if the Pakistan army wished to build a case against the
TTP it could have done much better than the six-monthly speeches that
General Kayani delivers about the internal threat being the pre-eminent
danger without naming names and ever pointing a finger. Sheer
incompetence, of course, cannot be conclusively excluded but it is hard
to believe that with its tremendous wherewithal, including a whole
division of media men and women that virtually raised hell about the
PPP’s attempt to bring the ISI under civilian control, the
Kerry-Lugar- Berman Act and the Memogate matter, the army failed to
capture and mould the narrative to fight against the TTP. There is
little doubt, at least in the minds of many in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
FATA, that the army did not wish to take on the Taliban for various
reasons. The three primary reasons being: a) the military
establishment’s plans for the ‘endgame’ in Afghanistan; b) concerns
about the domestic terrorist fallout that might not be manageable,
especially in Punjab province; and c) the army’s rank and file lacking
the will to fight the jihadists they have supported for decades.
Additionally, when the army-friendly media machine went into overdrive
to build the image of the pro-Taliban/ negotiation Imran Khan, many other
leaders took it as their cue to hop onto the dialogue bandwagon.

Nonetheless,
what Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has presided over in the name of an
APC is nothing short of a humiliating collective capitulation to the
TTP, which has been rechristened as ‘stakeholders’ in the declaration
that reviles NATO, the United States and its drones as the cause of
terrorist evil in Pakistan. It merely shows how delusional, hypocritical
and cavalier the political leadership is. Mr Khan might be naïve about
the TTP being amenable to unconditional talks but Mr Sharif is most
certainly not. By letting Mr Khan and his ilk virtually hijack the APC
and dictate its outcome, Mr Sharif has virtually offered the TTP a
velvet fist in a velvet glove. States, especially those brandishing
nukes at the drop of a hat, do not negotiate with terrorists. The Irish
Republican Army (IRA) model cited by some is a false analogy. The IRA
subscribed to everything that a modern state stands for while the TTP
rejects everything that is modern.

Without setting the
parameters for what exactly is the state willing to concede to the TTP
in exchange for peace, the prime minister and his APC have left the door
wide open for the terrorists to keep making highly perverse demands.
Drone strikes and the US presence in Afghanistan may end soon but the
TTP would certainly find another pretext to continue its violent
campaign. The TTP’s negotiations ruse has always ended in more bloodshed
and there is little reason to believe it would be different this time.
Mr Sharif might have thought that sharing responsibility with other
leaders would help build consensus for action if/when the talks fail.
But chances are that like the TTP, its apologists too will come up with
yet another justification for continued terrorism when drones and the US
are out of the picture. After all, it previously was the Palestine and
Kashmir problems that the jihadists used as a license to kill and their
apologists for blaming the US and others.

The TTP has clearly
brought the Pakistani state down to its knees. Unless the army and the
political leadership stop deluding themselves, this learned helplessness
will only get worse.

The writer can be reached at [email protected] and he tweets @mazdaki
Home | Editorial
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US immigration bill to hurt Indian IT, ITES firms’ interests
Sat Sep 21, 2013 3:09 pm (PDT) . Posted by:
"n m" nyayamurti1

US immigration bill to hurt Indian IT, ITES firms’ interestsTNN | Sep 22, 2013, 03.17 AM IST

http://timesofindia .indiatimes. com/india/ US-immigration- bill-to-hurt- Indian-IT- ITES-firms- interests/ articleshow/ 22872775. cms

READ MORE US immigration bill|Manmohan Singh|Indian IT firm|H-1B|Barack Obama
Foreign secretary Sujatha Singh said Indian IT companies have a certain
business model and that the procedures that are being discussed in the US Congress would make it difficult this business model to be continued successfully.

NEW DELHI: As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh prepares to leave for his bilateral meeting with US President Barack Obama, New Delhi has reiterated that the proposed immigration Bill being discussed in the US Congress will hurt Indian information
technology (IT) companies by adversely impacting visas for highly
skilled non-immigrant workers.

Foreign secretary Sujatha Singh
said Indian IT companies have a certain business model and that the
procedures that are being discussed in the US Congress would make it
difficult this business model to be continued successfully.

"So, what we are trying to do basically is to flag our concerns in the
manner in which this is going to impact on our highly-skilled
non-immigrant workers. We are trying to flag the fact that some aspects
of the proposed immigration reform would adversely impact visas for
highly-skilled non-immigrant workers,' ' said Singh, briefing reporters
about the visit.

In July, the US Senate had passed an Immigration Bill that changed rules governing H-1B and L-1 employment visas intended for high-skilled workers. The Bill will now be sent to the House of Representatives.

If passed in the current form, the Bill will make it mandatory for
firms with temporary foreign employees to pay a sharp supplemental fee
for each such non-US national. It may also prevent any firm from hiring
people on H1-B visas if 50% of its employees are not Americans.

The foreign secretary described trade and economic relations as a key
pillar of the relationship, with a combined total of $100 billion in
goods and services trade. "Both sides are working at a senior official
level to address issues of concern on each side, in areas ranging from
manufacturing, trade, investment, innovation as well as with regard to
issues relating to non-immigrant visas for our highly skilled IT and
ITES workers," she said.


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4
US ties pegged on Indian appetite for technology
Sat Sep 21, 2013 3:35 pm (PDT) . Posted by:
"n m" nyayamurti1


US ties pegged on Indian appetite for technology

The aim of India-US dialogue is that as India rises and seeks
an adaptation of existing rules, it does so in a concerted manner with
the US.
Kanwal Sibal

http://www.tribunei ndia.com/ 2013/20130922/ edit.htm# 1

Our ties with the US
have improved remarkably. The number of dialogues that the two countries are holding — on energy, education, agriculture, health, development,
science and technology, environment, trade, defence, counter-terrorism,
non-proliferation and high technology — far exceed those with any other
country.

The objective is to
build Indian sectoral capacities with US technology and know-how, a
process that would help India grow and provide the US greater
opportunities in an expanding Indian economy.
The US position on India’s permanent membership of the UN has evolved
positively, indicating that the US is inclined to open the strategic
space that India claims for itself. The US has also committed itself to
promoting India’s membership of the existing four non-proliferation
regimes.
The US attaches importance to bilateral dialogue on global commons — air,
space, sea and cyberspace. The aim is that as India rises and seeks an
adaptation of existing rules, it does so in a concerted manner with the
US. Freedom of navigation and securing the sea lanes of communication
are areas where the US has particular interest in partnering India,
given India’s dominating position in the Indian Ocean and the steady
expansion of its navy.
Cybersecurity is a matter of urgent international attention and India’s emergence as a major IT power, along with the vast expansion of its telecommunications network, makes it a partner of choice to establish new rules of the
game.
India’s defence ties
with the US in the last decade signify greater mutual trust. In the last few years, the US has bagged orders worth about $9 billion, but it
expects a greater share of defence procurements.
India is holding numerous joint military exercises with the US, especially
elaborate naval exercises in the Indian Ocean area. These convey an
important strategic message in view of massive trade and energy flows
through these waters.
The US
has described India as a lynchpin of its rebalancing towards Asia.
China’s growing muscle-flexing requires the US to strengthen its
presence in Asia to give confidence to its allies who may otherwise seek accommodation with China. Because of its attributes, the US clearly
sees India as a vital partner in the years ahead.
India, however, is wary of this re-balancing strategy as it doubts the
capacity and inclination of the US to contain China beyond a certain
point because of the huge economic and financial interdependence between the two countries.
On the
issues of terrorism and religious extremism, while bilateral cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism has progressed, the ambivalence of US
policies undermines Indian interests.
The US decision to talk to the Taliban disregards India’s strong objection
to any political accommodation with it without insisting on the red
lines laid down by the international community. The US decision to leave Afghanistan in 2014 in conditions permitting an orderly withdrawal with the help of the Pakistani military creates a potential security problem for India.
The Iranian issue has created wrinkles in our bilateral relationship as US sanctions have interfered with India’s energy security, forcing India to reduce its
oil intake from Iran quite drastically and blocking Indian investments
in attractive long-term projects in the hydrocarbon sector in Iran.
The last decade has also seen a significant expansion of India-US economic
ties, with trade in goods standing at $62 billion and the total
exchanges amounting to over $100 billion, making the US India’s largest
economic partner.
The
prospects of nuclear cooperation with the US have dimmed because of our
nuclear liability act. The US is pressing for signing a “small works
agreement” between Westinghouse and NPCIL to register some progress to
fulfil India’s commitment to order 10,000 MW of nuclear power from US
reactors at two sites.
Other
issues have contributed to a distinct lowering of enthusiasm for the
India relationship in the US, such as perceived Indian protectionism
exemplified by our Preferential Market Access decision to force foreign
companies to set up manufacturing facilities in the telecom sector;
Supreme Court judgment on the patents issue which has exacerbated
concerns about IPRs; and retroactive application of tax legislation as
in the Vodafone case. The US corporate mood towards India has soured,
and this needs to be reversed.
The US is pushing for a Bilateral Investment Treaty. On climate change and WTO issues, India and the US have differences.
On the Indian side, we have problems with the new Comprehensive
Immigration Bill that will put more restrictions on the movement of
personnel from India to the US in the IT sector, the increased cost of
H1B and L1 visas that will impose sizeable costs on the Indian IT
sector.
The general view is that the relationship is now suffering from the fatigue factor.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama will be grappling with these issues when they meet shortly.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary of India.