Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 08 Jul 2017 17:29

Why will the chinese retreat? From what I understand they have already built a road (seen in the satellite images), this is a few years ago. Have their supply routes cut off, or are they merely in a disadvantageous position vis a vis the IA troops deployed in the area?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 08 Jul 2017 17:44

China aims to establish a multi-pronged warfare approach - Manmohan Bahadur, Economic Times

The ongoing 'skirmishes' in the Doklam plateau have been engaging India's attention as a behaviour that is 'different from normal' on part of the Chinese assertive, provocative and obdurate. That a third party, Bhutan, is involved adds to the murkiness. A closer look, however, shows it as no different from Sun Tzu's principle of strategic deception.

In 1999, two colonels of the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, wrote in their book, Unrestricted Warfare, how China should prosecute future wars. Stating that “the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden,“ they suggested a multi-pronged approach to attack the target country's vitals in all spheres diplomatic, political, social and of course military .

That this got an official sanction of sorts got indicated by the decision of the central military commission in 2003 to have a three warfare concept psychological, media and legal; a development conveyed to the US Congress by their defence department in a 2011 report.It was further analysed and expanded to mean warfare in multiple spheres like financial, ecological, technological, trade, media, economic aid and international law.Did this gameplan play out at Chumar and Depsang earlier, and is it now driving events in Dokalam?

The Depsang intrusions took place before the Indian foreign minister was to attend the ministerial conference on Afghanistan at Almaty, Kazakhstan. Thereafter, ever since an assertive government took office in Delhi, one can discern continuation of this trend to keep it occupied with multiple pin pricks.

The Chumar intrusions happened while President Xi Jinping was with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Ahmedabad. Reportedly, the Chinese withdrew after having achieved two objectives: first, a message that they would rake up the border issue as and when it suits them to keep our diplomatic and military establishments embroiled in expending energies and second, the intrusions played on India's sensitivities of the 1962 debacle to put a lingering doubt in the general public's mind all to psychologically dilute the muscular approach of the government in Delhi.

The Doklam incident is following a similar pattern as earlier: create a controversy by an intrusion and milk the brouhaha created in the raucous Indian media to strike the general national mood through psychological warfare that it has coincided with the PM's trips to the US and Israel is also no coincidence.

A new first has been added this time with the Global Times, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China, stating that “Beijing should reconsider its stance over the Sikkim issue“ and “although China recognised India's annexation in 2003, it can readjust its stance on the matter.“ This has introduced a new element of subversive warfare as the editorial further adds that, “since some Chinese support Sikkim's independence, the voices will spread and fuel pro-independence appeals in Sikkim.“

This could represent an escalation showing intent but may not necessarily be true.However, a new front may have opened, and even if the Doklam situation gets diffused, this is an argument that the Chinese can reopen any time and address us through their three warfare concept psychological, media and legal.

China has fished in India's troubled northeast since long and our internal governance has not helped matters.With the Gorkha agitation having restarted in the hills of Darjeeling, next door to Sikkim, the `Sikkim-independence' statement by China should not be ignored. It also confirms the unrestricted warfare strategy of China to engage with an adversary in myriad forms of warfare listed earlier.

So, as China tries to apply the geo-political squeeze by its strategy of drowning our neighbours through `loan warfare' (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, with Nepal to follow) and making them indebted to it, India's political establishment has its work cut out.

The defence minister has stated that we are not in 1962, and for sure we are militarily strong, but Doklam style events must be acknowledged for their long term effects and a `whole of government' approach adopted this involves planning at the strategic level and a coordinated implementation of an action plan by all arms of the government. A piecemeal approach, and feeling happy on termination of each individual crisis, would only be detrimental to India's long term strategic interests.

rsingh · Post by **rsingh** » 08 Jul 2017 18:00

^^^^^
Well for the moment it looks like their Sun-Tsu policy is going to cost them Tibet. India is not playing Tibet card but the cards are revealing themselves.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jul 2017 18:11

Do loans have to be paid back?

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 08 Jul 2017 19:29

People remember 1962 but not much discussion seen about the Sum Durong Chu escalation and armed forces stand-off that took place in 1986-1987. IMO, current situation is closer to Sum Durong Chu 'conflict' than 1962.

Below is an article from Indian Defence review. Summary is that China encroached into Indian territory and started building some bunkers. Indian troops confronted them and put a stop to it. China escalated and brought more soldiers. Then COAS Gen. K. Sundarji escalated and airlifted an entire brigade to the area (which was almost the same area where the 1962 war started- Thag La ridge etc. The Chinese reinforced further. Then PM Rajiv Gandhi at that point was thinking of backing off and Gen. Sundarji told him that the only way to deal with the situation was to match them and not back down, and that if the PM did not agree, he could 'seek other opinions'. Full article worth reading.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the- ... ian-stand/

Cannot post the entire article by Claude Arpi, written in 2013.

In June 1986, an Indian patrol found some 40 Chinese working on permanent structures. Soon some 200 men reinforcements arrived on the spot. By August after the Chinese had constructed a helipad, the Indian Army took a more aggressive stand along the entire front in the NEFA.

In September, in order to diffuse the tension Delhi suggested that, if the Chinese accepted to withdraw their forces during the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area following summer. The proposal was flatly rejected by Beijing.

Delhi reacted swiftly, by October, an entire Indian Army brigade was airlifted to Zimithang, the closest helipad.

It is known as Operation Falcon. In its obituary (Warrior as Scholar) of General K. Sundarji, then Army Chief, India Today wrote: “Sundarji’s place in history will probably rest on the lesser-known Operation Falcon. Spooked by the Chinese occupation of Sumdorong Chu in 1986, Sundarji used the air force’s new air-lift capability to land a brigade in Zimithang, north of Tawang. Indian forces took up positions on the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu river, the site of India’s humiliating 1962 defeat and manned defences across the McMahon Line. Taken aback, the Chinese responded with a counter-build-up and in early 1987 Beijing’s tone became ominously similar to that of 1962. Western diplomats predicted war and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s advisers charged that Sundarji’s recklessness was responsible for this. But the general stood firm, at one point telling a senior Rajiv aide, ‘Please make alternate arrangements if you think you are not getting adequate professional advice’.

The civilians backed off, so did the Chinese.”

Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the- ... ian-stand/

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 08 Jul 2017 19:39

One difference from the 1986-1987 situation is that Bhutan is involved this time. So the implications are different/greater. But the Sum Durong Chu shows Chinese approach and attitude. They'll keep building structures/roads in areas that are disputed by them (where, by definition you cannot unilaterally start building stuff, you need to maintain status quo until dispute is resolved). This really nothing more than a long-term, piecemeal land-grab. GOI really has no option other than to face this down at some point.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 08 Jul 2017 20:12

SriKumar wrote:One difference from the 1986-1987 situation is that Bhutan is involved this time. So the implications are different/greater. But the Sum Durong Chu shows Chinese approach and attitude. They'll keep building structures/roads in areas that are disputed by them (where, by definition you cannot unilaterally start building stuff, you need to maintain status quo until dispute is resolved). This really nothing more than a long-term, piecemeal land-grab. GOI really has no option other than to face this down at some point.

I think a big difference between 86-87 and now is that we can reinforce this area must faster than we did Tawang, without even resorting to
an airlift. I don't see any scenario where the numbers will be against us in this sector (Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor).

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 08 Jul 2017 20:18

^^^ The area is adjacent to where India has had a long presence being just south to Nathu La, and I am surprised if this was not noticed a long time ago. The roads are not built overnight for sure. Would have taken them at least a year if not more to build up on to the plateau at the tri-junction area. They have to really climb up sharp to higher elevations on their side of the border and enter Bhutanese territory.

It is quite possible they do not man the area permanently as they could have ingressed and exited the area at wish, as Bhutan is not India. But something changed recently and they started having permanent presence to which Bhutan protested and invited India in to resolve the dispute. But why would China do that now ? Perhaps to divert attention away from their North Korean adventures, as they see the writing on the wall there.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 08 Jul 2017 20:22

If you check google maps, there are other areas too where the Chinese have built roads after crossing the valley below at the border areas and edged up to the ridge line. The fact that there are no roads from the ridge tops to the valleys on the Bhutan side is a dead giveaway. If you look at the general terrain and its layout, they seem to be inching their way into the Haa valley as their final destination...it is a long term plan of theirs from the looks of it.

Guddu · Post by **Guddu** » 08 Jul 2017 20:26

Karthik S wrote:

Gopal Baglay‏Verified account @MEAIndia 56m56 minutes ago
At d BRICS leaders' informal gathering @ Hamburg hosted by China, PM @narendramodi and President Xi had a conversation on a range of issues
Cheen is embarrassing itself. That's all.

I thought I should comment on the XI Modi handshake in Hamburg (Note to self: We should call Porkistan Hamburg

). Its a great picture for analysis.
1. XI has a sheepish constipated grin, Modi has a winners look and is crowing, "saaley kitney aadmi thay"
2. The tension is written large on XI's aides, each and everyone of them (note the furrowed brows!!). The tension on their faces, show the pre meeting discussions with XI and aides were not pleasant, XI may have ranted and raved, as Chinese would do to save face. They seem to dread this meeting/moment with Modi. They fully expected XI to blow up, but instead XI backed down.
3. The dove is clearly smirking, a knowing smile that they have the bully by the nuts. Its lose-lose for XI. Chinese cannot win in this land grab.
4. However, XI's constipation leads me to worry. He might do something to save face, but end up with more egg on his face.

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 08 Jul 2017 20:30

There is a mention of the Chinese 'GO' game where if they have the enemy surrounded on the three sides, then they can evict the enemy and if its the other way around then its wise to retreat, the latter happened in Sumdurong Chu when Indian troops dominated the ridges alongide their positions and they retreated, the same could be done for the Chumbi valley today

Also, we need to think how China with a modest presence on the Indo-Tibet border is able to hold it with tenuous logistical lines while we creating a similar line say closer to Lhasa and HOLDING it is considered totally hawkish

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 08 Jul 2017 20:32

Deans wrote:
SriKumar wrote:One difference from the 1986-1987 situation is that Bhutan is involved this time. So the implications are different/greater. But the Sum Durong Chu shows Chinese approach and attitude. They'll keep building structures/roads in areas that are disputed by them (where, by definition you cannot unilaterally start building stuff, you need to maintain status quo until dispute is resolved). This really nothing more than a long-term, piecemeal land-grab. GOI really has no option other than to face this down at some point.
I think a big difference between 86-87 and now is that we can reinforce this area must faster than we did Tawang, without even resorting to an airlift. I don't see any scenario where the numbers will be against us in this sector (Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor).

Sure. There are many differences, I was just pointing out one which has major legal implications. I think the said area would have been reinforced even after the escalation wound down. India declared Arunachal Pradesh as a state in the afternamth of Sum Durong Chu face-off, and China had an opinion on that. There is no saying when the Chinese would start something somewhere.

Bade.
Indeed, when I look at the map by rohitvats, they have a road (S204) through Chumbi valley through one disputed territory of Bhutan (i.e. the Dhoklam 'plateau') all the way up to the trijunction. India surely knew about it but did nothing ....perhaps because it was in Tibet/China territory. This particular new extension goes into Bhutan's territory by the trijucntion and thins down the chicken neck corridor. So perhaps India reacted.

For China, 'disputed' means that they can construct what they want in the disputed area and the other party should be OK with that. Nice.

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 08 Jul 2017 20:41

Posting it here because it has relevance to how china (and the chinis) manage to fool its own people by faking it (e.g., attracting business, cooking up numbers as well as posturing on defense)!!

China: Rent a White Guy - Watch it till the end. It is hilarious.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 08 Jul 2017 20:43

Srikumar, Now we should use whatever they have built in the tri-junction area to get down to the valley below if a firing skirmish happens. To some extent it might make our job easier too. One never knows, maybe that is why India observed silently, but took action only when they started to camp permanently on the plateau at the tri-junction. Quite possible, nothing like getting the enemy to do your work to make it easier.

Now if you extend this idea and India poses a significant counter incursion threat to them, wherever they build roads up to the ridge tops, they may stop doing this. So far India has been reluctant to build roads closer to the perceived border demarcations. Once we do the same to them, then they will take a step back, as it negates their advantage in doing so. So all we need to do is keep building more and more roads to the ridge tops and they might pull back on such activities as they see the futility in what they are doing. Our earlier policy of no roads dead close to the borders have backfired on us in containing the Chinese threat. A change in policy on this front can manage this threat better for us.

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 08 Jul 2017 21:40

China: Rent a White Guy - Watch it till the end. It is hilarious.

That was embarrassing, just watching it. I could not finish it.

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 08 Jul 2017 22:17

Bade wrote: Now if you extend this idea and India poses a significant counter incursion threat to them, wherever they build roads up to the ridge tops, they may stop doing this. So far India has been reluctant to build roads closer to the perceived border demarcations. Once we do the same to them, then they will take a step back, as it negates their advantage in doing so. So all we need to do is keep building more and more roads to the ridge tops and they might pull back on such activities as they see the futility in what they are doing. Our earlier policy of no roads dead close to the borders have backfired on us in containing the Chinese threat. A change in policy on this front can manage this threat better for us.

I think that was based on the idea of having a credible defense against China and not take an offensive posture. I dont fault anyone for this because, atleast in the past, the idea was that India, at best, would be able to comfortably defend its territory. And to maintain this posture, billions are spent every year on maintaining the divisions, creating new structures, installations etc. What you advocate would be the way to go if India decides to get pro-active about the steady border 'digestion' from China and actually up the ante with them. The policy change has to come from military strength. I think India has some capability to do this, but it is not demonstrated. Should the situation end up become a shooting war, I wonder what is the end game GOI has in mind.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jul 2017 22:34

New video: India-China standoff at Doklam plateau.

Geographical info courtesy Rohit Vats
http://vatsrohit.blogspot.in/2017/07/do ... l?spref=tw

https://youtu.be/6IXlLdtKIxQ

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 08 Jul 2017 23:04

^^ Excellent video as usual.

schinnas · Post by **schinnas** » 08 Jul 2017 23:27

SSridhar wrote:China aims to establish a multi-pronged warfare approach - Manmohan Bahadur, Economic Times

Such a multi pronged strategy would work fantastically when faced with a smaller adversary. For example, even if Vietnam may have fortified their defences and may have jungle warfare advantages, they cannot go ahead to head against China in a multi pronged war.

This strategy would work against China when faced with adversaries who are capable of playing such a game themselves such as India. India has enough cards in its hands to play psychological or media war and win it than Chinese and given the trade imbalance can hurt Cheenaa far more than Cheenaa can hurt India.

Bring it on Cheenaa. Its time to adminster you a tight slap. You are up against clever gujjus this time, who are chankian enough to teach Sun Tsu a lesson or two.

nirav · Post by **nirav** » 08 Jul 2017 23:41

^looks like dhokla khilage rahenge these gujjus.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 08 Jul 2017 23:42

Reading up on the Bhutan-China border disputes (from the link in Rvats blog) , it seems the Chinese always go for the valleys (two of them even in North Bhutan for future inroads to be made if needed), whereas India seems happy to keep the ridges. Keeping the ridges is a defensive posture, whereas making inroads in the valleys is a more attacking posture. It is time to change that too perhaps.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 08 Jul 2017 23:46

Bade wrote:Reading up on the Bhutan-China border disputes (from the link in Rvats blog) , it seems the Chinese always go for the valleys (two of them even in North Bhutan for future inroads to be made if needed), whereas India seems happy to keep the ridges. Keeping the ridges is a defensive posture, whereas making inroads in the valleys is a more attacking posture. It is time to change that too perhaps.

Its an attacking posture when there's no chance of being attacked (as the PLA assume), I'd like to see how convoys in the valley deal with for e.g. air strikes.

khan · Post by **khan** » 08 Jul 2017 23:54

Bade wrote:Reading up on the Bhutan-China border disputes (from the link in Rvats blog) , it seems the Chinese always go for the valleys (two of them even in North Bhutan for future inroads to be made if needed), whereas India seems happy to keep the ridges. Keeping the ridges is a defensive posture, whereas making inroads in the valleys is a more attacking posture. It is time to change that too perhaps.

This is a very astute observation and might be an indication of obsolete thinking on the Indian side.

In the era of precision weaponry, where a shoulder mounted bunker piercing missile can be made to hit an area - the size of the coin, maybe being up on an exposed ridge isn't the best place to be.

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 09 Jul 2017 00:01

Iyersan wrote:Why a safety advisory. Chinese are increasing diplomatic pressure. Please discuss opinions. Significant development

Standard operating procedure that gives the impression of a potential clash/battle/war....chinis are faking it. They will lose India's business for decades and spook off others. Wait and watch. Their next "advisory" will be for all airlines to avoid this region.

India's official reaction should be ...silence. This bugs the chinis a lot. Let the media do the talking. But in private, the chinis should be told that in no uncertain terms India will take up the bluster and rancor to next level - diplomatic support to the Taiwanese, Uighurs and Tibetans. Then there is the unresolved issue of Inner Mongolia. All these freedom movements should be invited to a "global" conference in a Tier-2 city. Invite the pakis to it.

Chinis hate to be ignored. They particularly hate an opponent who walks softly but carries a big stick.

Bade · Post by **Bade** » 09 Jul 2017 00:12

Deans wrote:Its an attacking posture when there's no chance of being attacked (as the PLA assume), I'd like to see how convoys in the valley deal with for e.g. air strikes.

Yes, you are right partly and it works perfectly when you do this against a weaker adversary.

But even otherwise it is easier to stay in the valleys even in winter as opposed to the ridges, which might need to be vacated due to adverse weather. Besides, these days tunnels when built in the valleys through the mountain face, can protect one from air assault if need be...at least the most precious assets.

It is also true perhaps for India that the valleys do no open up to enemy lines as they seem to be mostly North-South, whereas we have a border which is also North-South to protect, so we end up with the ridge lines. Pure local geography demanded that of us at least in the Chumbi valley area.

nam · Post by **nam** » 09 Jul 2017 00:51

khan wrote:
Bade wrote:Reading up on the Bhutan-China border disputes (from the link in Rvats blog) , it seems the Chinese always go for the valleys (two of them even in North Bhutan for future inroads to be made if needed), whereas India seems happy to keep the ridges. Keeping the ridges is a defensive posture, whereas making inroads in the valleys is a more attacking posture. It is time to change that too perhaps.
This is a very astute observation and might be an indication of obsolete thinking on the Indian side.

In the era of precision weaponry, where a shoulder mounted bunker piercing missile can be made to hit an area - the size of the coin, maybe being up on an exposed ridge isn't the best place to be.

Mountain warfare rule number 1. Always take the heights.

Warfare rule 1000 at 15k feet. Always take the heights.

We learn the hard way in 62 when we took valleys. The same lesson in kargil and the effort we spend.

To dislodge from heights, need direct mode artillery or airpower. For artillery go reverse slope.

The most effective way is airpower. But the cheenis have to dislodge IAF first. What r the odds?

So I would say we r aggressive.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 09 Jul 2017 01:48

Bade wrote:
Deans wrote:Its an attacking posture when there's no chance of being attacked (as the PLA assume), I'd like to see how convoys in the valley deal with for e.g. air strikes.
Yes, you are right partly and it works perfectly when you do this against a weaker adversary.

But even otherwise it is easier to stay in the valleys even in winter as opposed to the ridges, which might need to be vacated due to adverse weather. Besides, these days tunnels when built in the valleys through the mountain face, can protect one from air assault if need be...at least the most precious assets.

It is also true perhaps for India that the valleys do no open up to enemy lines as they seem to be mostly North-South, whereas we have a border which is also North-South to protect, so we end up with the ridge lines. Pure local geography demanded that of us at least in the Chumbi valley area.

Bhai log .. you folks are correct that holding to ridge-line is defensive BUT it is also the BEST defensive position.

From the ridge-line you overlook ~~all~~ most activities down below. Your field of view and fire is much better. It is easier to aim down than aim up. A few men with anti-tank missiles can bottle up an entire narrow valley if vehicles are involved. No need to call in air support.

If you are still not convinced just ask the bakis about their experience in Kashmir where Indian forces look down on their position for about 70% of the LOC.

Still not convinced, again ask the bakis but this time about Siachen and why the bakis are unable to wrest it from our control in spite of having much favorable approach from their side.

darshan · Post by **darshan** » 09 Jul 2017 02:34

The nationalistic feeling should be at 110% with everyone pitching in. Indian Media starting with DD needs to be on it. Customs need to start enforcing laws without being corrupt with all duties being paid. Law should be passed to clearly display origin of country (especially with special guidelines for countries with which India has border disputes). Even simple habit changes that curb wastefulness that feed chinese economy should be paid attention to. Like many posters have mentioned, there needs to be clear database and open media talk that clearly identifies chinese origin companies or Indian companies that mainly rely on chinese goods and services. This stretches from telecom equipment to building material. Gov't sectioned and hobby cyber warriors need to be put to offensive and defensive tasks with priority (very low hanging fruit). Indian software engineers should be thinking about software weaknesses of their own software projects that they have worked on. china does beg, borrow, steal to import many things that contain software written by Indians. intentional/accidental easter eggs? Always code with the end user in mind. Everyone can pitch in without being in uniform.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 09 Jul 2017 03:08

nirav wrote:^looks like dhokla khilage rahenge these gujjus.

Dhokula is corruption of Sanskrit name Gokula thus our territory since Dwapar Yuga.

tandav · Post by **tandav** » 09 Jul 2017 03:34

shiv wrote:New video: India-China standoff at Doklam plateau.

Geographical info courtesy Rohit Vats
http://vatsrohit.blogspot.in/2017/07/do ... l?spref=tw

https://youtu.be/6IXlLdtKIxQ

You should mark out the actual tri-junction point to the north and also mark out Bhutanese military outpost that is being cut off by Chinese road. Also mention the towns of Chumbi as Tibetan town they are not Chinese towns as being mentioned by the narration.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jul 2017 04:19

ricky_v wrote in geopolitical thread

viewtopic.php?p=2181375#p2181375

How about we look from China's side?

To get an understanding read on:

ricky_v wrote:http://www.realcleardefense.com/article ... 11742.html
In a recent article, "Big Picture, Not Details, Key When Eyeing Future," General David Perkins describes how the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is tackling the task of preparing the Army for future warfare. He calls for a shift in strategy to “encompass more than delivering decisive battlefield firepower.”[2] Perkins describes this shift as one from playing checkers to playing chess, characterizing the complexities and requirements of future warfare. While the character of war is indeed increasing in complexity, the essence of strategy in warfare remains unchanged. Strategy remains a sum of the ways to apply means to achieve ends, and as General Perkins recognized, it involves so much more than decisive battlefield firepower.

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz describes war as a continuation of politics by other means.[4] Eastern military thinkers Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, in contrast, describe war not as a continuation of politics but as intertwined conditions undertaken to advance interests.[5] Regardless of the sequential or simultaneous perspectives, all three strategists agree that achieving political objectives determines the success of a strategy.

To better explore the value of developing strategic understanding in junior leaders, this article explores flaws in strategic thinking by looking at the game of chess, a game of perfect information, a single objective, defined territory, and no regard for the state of the board after victory. Next, it looks at how the Chinese game of Wei Ch’i can offer solutions for framing a better way of thinking strategically: by focusing on positions of advantage, working with uncertainty, and linking efforts to achieve end-state conditions. Using the lessons of Wei Ch’i, we then look at how the U.S. Army’s operational variables can help us identify comparative advantages and how thinking with strategic empathy helps us understand adversaries and solve the right problems.[6] Finally, we discuss the importance of senior leaders in shaping the problem-solving skills of the next generation of strategic leaders.

Despite the complexity of chess, we have perfect information about the board. All the pieces in play are in plain sight and stringent rules dictate their movements. Chess is geographically linear; each side begins with a forward line of troops and must progress toward the enemy. The objective of chess is simple: checkmate the king. The singularity of the objective creates two approaches to the game. First, attrit the enemy. Second, use tactical maneuvers to achieve positions of relative advantage on the board. Both strategies focus on a single objective, checking the king, and neither consider the state of the board after the victory. This makes chess, at its heart, a decisive battle game where the end state is achieved at culmination.

Fiery Cross Reef. Woody Island. Mischief Reef. Spratly Islands. Paracel Islands. It is no secret the Chinese are turning reefs and rocky outcrops into inhabitable islands in a move to control the South China Sea. This should not surprise us, especially if we are familiar with the game they are playing. The South China Sea is unfolding like a real-life game of Wei Ch’i. Wei Ch’i is a 2,500-year-old Chinese game played on a 19x19 square board. The game begins with an empty board. Each player places a piece on an intersection to claim the squares, or “territories” around it. As players build up their territory, opponents can encircle, divide, and conquer by linking “territories” to achieve positions of advantage as shown in Figure 2. The game is fluid, the objective is not fixed, and players must consider not only what is on the board, but the introduction of new pieces into the mix in places you would never expect them. There is hardly a decisive battle or point in Wei Ch’i. There are many decisive moves, but how the whole game unfolds determines the victor. Furthermore, the game exhibits an interesting parallel to actual conflicts and the contest of wills in warfare: the game terminates only when neither player wishes to make another move.

An understanding of Wei Ch’i allows us to explain China’s actions in the past century, and potentially its future moves. In a brilliant analysis, Henry Kissinger shows in his book, On China, a clear parallel between Wei Ch’i strategies and China’s actions. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong used encirclement strategies like those in Wei Ch’i during the Chinese Civil War.[11] In their conflicts with India in the Himalayas, China responded to new Indian outposts with Chinese outposts positioned to encircle Indian positions.[121]Kissinger concluded that the driving factor in China entering the Korean War was to prevent a U.S. position on its border.[13] The message from China is clear. When the U.S. military pivoted to the Pacific, and increased bilateral and multinational military exercises, intentionally or not, American policymakers sent an encirclement message to China. China responded, in Wei Ch’i fashion, by claiming territory in the South China Sea to break U.S. encirclement. Furthermore, China’s One Belt, One Road initiative to create a modern-day Silk Road, and their Forum on China-Africa Cooperation both appear to be attempts to gain positions of advantage in areas largely ignored by the U.S., but that could be strategically important in the future.[14]

Wei Ch’i can also teach us about developing positions of advantage, yet strategic thinking requires us to validate assumptions and identify comparative advantages as well. First, we must understand how circumstances are intertwined and connected. There are no separate levels of war; Michael Handel’s model of interaction submits that tactical actions can have strategic consequences just like strategic decisions can alter where and how the application of tactics occur. When you view the spectrum of operations, do not imagine yourself moving along in discrete phases—defensive to offensive to stability—but rather imagine that your level of effort varies widely throughout the spectrum simultaneously and across multiple domains of physical and information space.When we remove the ways and means of strategy, we are left with the ends—the political objectives we hope to achieve. Our analysis should start from a clear understanding of these ends. Junior leaders should become increasingly more familiar in applying the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) when analyzing problem sets that exist between the current state and a desired end state. Operational variables assist us in understating adversaries and the strategic environment and, more importantly, lead to the identification of comparative advantages as the brief example in Figure 3 helps visualize. Sun Tzu reminds us that a “victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle.”[15] In that respect, a successful strategy is more about identifying and seizing positions of advantage across the entire physical and information domains, than tactical actions on a specific battlefield.

The final important lesson of Wei Ch’i is learning how to anticipate an adversary’s actions and reactions. This requires the player to look at the board from their opponent’s perspective and to plan moves based on their playing style. This is a form of empathy. The Army’s manual for leadership says that, “Army leaders show empathy when they genuinely relate to another person’s situation, motives, and feelings.”[17] Applied to the study of adversarial conflict, Zack Shore in Sense of the Enemy calls this concept “strategic empathy.”[18] It is in this area that our strategic thinkers fail most. By classifying our adversaries broadly as rogue regimes, revisionist powers, or extremists, we risk an incomplete analysis based on the mental model we create for them instead of an accurate, empathetic identification of their interests and objectives. In the opening quote to this article, Machiavelli implies that it might be easier to empathize with our adversaries if we recognize that all peoples of all cultures and times have the same desires and traits. As leaders, the more we train our minds to empathize with our adversaries, the better we identify comparative advantages and use our strengths to attack their weaknesses with the full spectrum of operations across the entire physical and information space.

Another technique that assists us in empathizing with our adversaries is the Six-Sigma root-cause analysis known as the “Five Whys.”[23] In this approach, we ask ourselves why the current condition exists, repeating this for our answers until we are looking at the problem five levels in as Figure 6 demonstrates. Some causes may be beyond the scope of our ability to solve, but at least we gain an understanding of root causes and then can select a level to begin solving the problem.

So at the least do the Five Whys which in my view are a superficial RCA method.

Guddu · Post by **Guddu** » 09 Jul 2017 05:42

This is the Hamburg handshake. Note XI's limp hand, he is not gripping Modi's hand, whereas Modi is. This suggests XI is not happy, he also has that funny look (best described as $hitting bricks).

Some older handshakes, hand is still limp, but facial expressions of Xi are better

and with Nawaz

with Abe

sum · Post by **sum** » 09 Jul 2017 06:22

^^pic with Abe is priceless☺☺

darshan · Post by **darshan** » 09 Jul 2017 06:57

If conflict does get forced upon India, why would all neighbors of china not utilize this opportunity? To me that would be the best chance that they will ever have to make strategic moves while still be in defensive position. All chinese neighbors should be heading out to exact revenge whether grabbing better strategic defensive points, sniping out chinese empire uniforms, destroying infrastructure, utilizing sleeper cells, taking out illegal maritime ships etc. I just can't see any other better opportunity. These nations won't be doing it to help India but essentially to help themselves.

chola · Post by **chola** » 09 Jul 2017 08:34

darshan wrote:If conflict does get forced upon India, why would all neighbors of china not utilize this opportunity? To me that would be the best chance that they will ever have to make strategic moves while still be in defensive position. All chinese neighbors should be heading out to exact revenge whether grabbing better strategic defensive points, sniping out chinese empire uniforms, destroying infrastructure, utilizing sleeper cells, taking out illegal maritime ships etc. I just can't see any other better opportunity. These nations won't be doing it to help India but essentially to help themselves.

This is the geo-political side of the equation that people always forget to factor in but which is absolutely important when discussion war with Cheen in our theater.

The PRC's core in along its east coast. This is where things are life and death for them. They can't allow Japan to take control of the ECS without challenge, or the US to weaken their hold on the SCS and most of all they can't allow Taiwan to declare formal independence.

All this means the bulk of their force must stay east no matter what happens in their west. Combine this fact with the geography of Tibet and it guarantees overwhelming Indian advantages in men and material against Cheen when fighting on our border.

Iyersan · Post by **Iyersan** » 09 Jul 2017 09:01

chola wrote:
darshan wrote:If conflict does get forced upon India, why would all neighbors of china not utilize this opportunity? To me that would be the best chance that they will ever have to make strategic moves while still be in defensive position. All chinese neighbors should be heading out to exact revenge whether grabbing better strategic defensive points, sniping out chinese empire uniforms, destroying infrastructure, utilizing sleeper cells, taking out illegal maritime ships etc. I just can't see any other better opportunity. These nations won't be doing it to help India but essentially to help themselves.
This is the geo-political side of the equation that people always forget to factor in but which is absolutely important when discussion war with Cheen in our theater.

The PRC's core in along its east coast. This is where things are life and death for them. They can't allow Japan to take control of the ECS without challenge, or the US to weaken their hold on the SCS and most of all they can't allow Taiwan to declare formal independence.

All this means the bulk of their force must stay east no matter what happens in their west. Combine this fact with the geography of Tibet and it guarantees overwhelming Indian advantages in men and material against Cheen when fighting on our border.

Now that both the premiers have arrived at their turfs. We can expect mobilisation.

Iyersan · Post by **Iyersan** » 09 Jul 2017 09:02

https://thewire.in/155657/lobsang-sanga ... dia-china/
Tibet Card’ Added to India-China Border Mix as Tibetan Flag Is Hoisted at Pang Gong Lake
Is this change in strategy by India warning china to not push the limits??

DrRatnadip · Post by **DrRatnadip** » 09 Jul 2017 09:31

Chinis do haramipana against us everywhere.. On border , on international fora.. They have virtualy adapted pakis and use them as proxies against us.. All this just because they are very much sure that we are never going to attack them..We must stop them from taking us granted.. Only way to make them understand is using raw power..Chinis dont understand any other language..

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 09 Jul 2017 09:35

PMO, NSA tracking impact of Chinese FDI in South Asia - Arun S, The Hindu

In the backdrop of the tense border stand-off in Sikkim with China, the Centre has begun its first ever in-depth assessment of Chinese investments in India’s neighbouring countries.

The exercise — being conducted mainly from India’s national security perspective — has been initiated by the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Adviser, official sources told The Hindu .

Informal discussions have already been held with the concerned Ministries, including the Commerce and Industry Ministry — the nodal body for foreign trade and foreign investment.

Dynamic mandate

Given the increasing influence of China in the Indian sub-continent and South Asia, the study will be dynamic and is, among other things, expected to look into various trends, tracking a surge, if any, in Chinese FDI in the region. For instance, Pakistan government data shows that FDI from China jumped from $256.8 million in 2014-15 to $878.8 million in 2016-17 (July-May). Pakistan’s financial year follows a July to June calendar.

The study will also analyse the impact of these Chinese investments — including those being made as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as One Belt One Road or OBOR) — on India’s national security, sources said requesting anonymity. India’s reservations regarding the BRI/OBOR include strategic concerns on the BRI’s flagship project, the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as it is expected to cover regions including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

In addition to assessing the nature and impact of Chinese FDI in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the study will track Chinese investments in Afghanistan and Maldives too.

However, the major challenge in the study will be the lack of detailed, country-wise data on overall FDI (year-wise) and Chinese FDI, in particular.

According to Biswajit Dhar, Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Chinese investments in countries like Pakistan could, in turn, set the stage for Pakistan to make inroads into markets in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal and challenge the presence of Indian firms in these markets, where India is currently the major player.

The CPEC/OBOR projects can also better link Pakistan with the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and help the country establish a footprint in those markets, Prof. Dhar said.

Iyersan · Post by **Iyersan** » 09 Jul 2017 09:48

https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/07/08/ ... ign=buffer
India-China standoff: What is happening in the Chumbi Valley?