Bharat Rakshak

bala wrote: ↑01 Jan 2024 20:30 Unknown Gunmen send Masood Azhar to 72 Hoors | Pakistan Blames India | Sumit Peer in Jaipur Diaglogues

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUuGkr9nU4I

madhu wrote: ↑08 Jan 2024 11:35

bala wrote: ↑01 Jan 2024 20:30 Unknown Gunmen send Masood Azhar to 72 Hoors | Pakistan Blames India | Sumit Peer in Jaipur Diaglogues

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUuGkr9nU4I

personally i do not believe Sumit Peer. He just takes the info from twitter/ papers and gives us back same info is a different way. In comparison to him, i prefer Dr.RV as it is fun to listen to him or AIM as he gives his thoughts, may be correct or wrong but he attempts to give his analysis unlike Sumit Peer.

A_Gupta wrote: ↑08 Jan 2024 18:01 Terroristan is now also Terrifiedistan.

These terrorists who were killed - does the Pak press refer to them as shahid?

chetak wrote: ↑06 Jan 2024 20:14 ...

ISLAMABAD: The Federal Cabinet is all set to approve establishment of Performance Management Units (PMUs) in five high loss-making power Distribution Companies (Discos) under a serving Brigadier of Pak Army as dismal performance of Discos has made the sector unsustainable, sources close to caretaker Minister for Power and Petroleum told Business Recorder.

RCase wrote: ↑09 Jan 2024 03:12 [

Sirji - Pakistan does not have terrorists! Don't you remember rad-ul-fasad, zarb-e-azb etc. Pak fauj eliminated all terrorists and suffered billions of dollar losses (which the world needs to repay)! It is a very pissful country. If there are no terrorists, then how can they be killed shaheed?

Gen Asim Munir also assured businessmen of bringing $25-30bn investment from Qatar and Kuwait in his next visit to improve the country’s economy. He said that he would try to bring a total of $75-100bn investment from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait.

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has been negotiating with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for the provision of an additional $1 billion Saudi Oil Facility (SOF) on deferred payment for the ongoing calendar year 2024.

Modi Govt is planning to sell over 2.91 lakh 'enemy property' shares in 84 companies

Assets left behind by people who have taken citizenship of Pakistan and China -- mostly between 1947 and 1962 -- are called 'enemy property

In the first tranche, the government is looking to sell about 1.88 lakh shares in 20 companies and has invited bids from 10 categories of buyers.

This writer undertook an inquiry into the role of foreign assistance to Pakistan and its various aspects. The task is now complete, with the findings to be published soon by PIDE. And like Didac, the findings call for some serious contemplation.

It proved to be a difficult task. Covering various aspects of foreign aid meant sifting through either highly scattered or non-available information. Both government officials and donors like to pretend that everything is ‘out there’, but that is simply not the case.

Anyways, the first important query related to how much aid has Pakistan really received till now. Specifically, of the ‘committed’ aid since 1950 ($200 billion plus), how much aid did Pakistan really receive? Surprisingly, no one knows. The research, accumulating data from various sources, concluded that the received amount is anywhere between $155 to $157bn.

But even this figure does not tell the exact quantum of foreign aid that Pakistan received. Why? Because there have historically been ‘off the books’ inflows (especially under military rule) that have never been officially recorded. For example, a recently declassified US document revealed that President Carter authorised $2bn for Pakistan (with an equivalent matching grant from Saudi Arabia). Nowhere in official documents do we find mention of this inflow. Similarly, during a Congressional hearing in 2007, a senior fellow from the Woodrow Wilson Institute revealed that off-the-books aid to Pakistan was equivalent to the officially provided aid ($7bn plus).

In retrospect, the Punjabi-dominated establishment’s abuse of Pashtun land, considering it an outlier, has not come without costs. The situation resembles the outcome of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ for Punjab as the province itself has become more radicalized than any other part of Pakistan, with several masterminds of terrorism based inside it.

Moreover, the military itself has had to endure resistance from certain sections of the Taliban who launched attacks on its installments. The ethnocratic state’s instrumentalization of violence for domestic and foreign policy objectives—facilitated through the retainment of colonial governance system and ban on media in the then-FATA—also, in turn, created space for the anti-state Taliban, labelled ‘Bad Taliban’.

However, it is the primordially secular Pashtuns, especially those of the ex-FATA, who have most been at the receiving end, both physically and culturally. Their lives, lands and culture since far too long have been compromised by the “ethnic absolutism” and hegemony of Punjab.

The ex-FATA before the merger until 2018 were called ‘ilaqa ghair’, meaning lawless or foreign territory. They comprised seven ‘agencies’, namely, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, as well as six ‘Frontier Regions (FRs)’: FR-Peshawar, FR-Kohat, FR-Bannu, FR-Lakki Marwat, FR-Tank and FR-Dera Ismail Khan.

Since 1901, British colonizers had placed FATA under a parallel political, legal and administrative set-up minus fundamental rights, called the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which Pakistan retained. In these circumstances, the ancient unwritten code of honorable conduct, Pashtunwali/Pukhtunwali, maintained the social structure of the region. This article delves into Pashtunwali and the history of the territory to uncover how the Pashtun region in general and ex-FATA in particular became the hotbed of terrorism.

Concerning the armed struggles undertaken by the Pashtuns throughout history, it is important to understand that the inspiration to defend one’s land comes from Pashtunwali, which is more pre-Islamic than post-Islamic. This factor automatically makes the vital component of the Pashtun ethnic identity, that is, Pashtunwali, secular in nature, since it predates all theories of Islamism.

Therefore, Pashtunwali can only inspire national wars of liberation, and has not served as an inspiration behind jihadist militancy, as the Pashtun nationalist warrior-poet Khushal Khan Khattak wrote about its secular values in the seventeenth century.

Furthermore, given their geo-strategic location, the Pashtuns have been subjected to invasions by Alexander the Greek, the Mughals and the British, which compelled the former to fight to defend their land. This is also clear from Pashto ethno-symbolic poetry and music. For example, the Pashtun national anthem opens with, “it is our history that we have been traveling through blood.”

Furthermore, before leaving India, the British partitioned it, causing the birth of Pakistan. Certain tribal elders from FATA reportedly signed secret instruments of accession with the Dominion of Pakistan. Hence, the crucial territory fell under Pakistan’s control, which decided to keep its colonial status intact, and named it FATA.

The situation of the ex-FATA with regard to militancy cannot be understood without first understanding Pakistan, which the region became a part of, and the policies the state adopted. Pakistan, in itself, was a classic example of a “colonially created state with [a] culturally heterogeneous population,” called a “plural society.” The country’s civilian administration was dominated by two ethnic groups: the Punjabis and Mohajirs. In addition, the military was also controlled by the Punjabis, along with significant Pashtun representation.

As a geo-strategically significant fact, Pakistan’s western neighbor, Afghanistan, has historically problematized the former’s claim that the Durand Line was a permanent international boundary. Afghanistan holds that it was only meant to define the respective spheres of influence of the old Afghan Kingdom and British India, and never meant to act as an international border, thus rejecting the division of ethnic Pashtuns. The Afghan stance has understandably caused Pakistani foreign policymakers to be concerned about the rise of potential irredentism, leading to the breakup of Pakistan.

After 1973, Pakistan believed the then Afghan President Sardar Daoud was sponsoring Pashtun separatists inside Pakistan, to help them carve out an independent Pashtun state from within Pakistan-administered territories, to be called ‘Pashtunistan/Pukhtunistan.’ This scenario posed serious dangers for the integrity of the Pakistani state. It could deprive the country of more than half of its territory, by also possibly facilitating the secession of the southwestern province of Balochistan.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan perceived President Daoud to be covertly working for the creation of an autonomous Pashtunistan in the early 1970s. The Pakistani security establishment was aware that, notwithstanding intra-Pashtun conflicts, the “notion of the ethnic and cultural unity of all Pashtuns has long been familiar to them as a symbolic complex of great potential for political unity.” This is especially true considering they had once been politically united already in 1747 by King Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan.

After the 1978 Communist Revolution in Afghanistan, subsequent rulers decided to perpetuate the nationalist policy, while also receiving Soviet backing. In 1979, the Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin explicitly called for ‘Greater Afghanistan’ by reincorporating Pashtun and Baloch territories under Pakistani control. He proclaimed, “[the Pashtuns and Baloch] want to live side by side, embrace each other and demonstrate this great love to the world at large [through their reunification in Greater Afghanistan].”

Throughout the process, Pakistan was monetarily and materially backed by the United States, given its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. It also received massive support from the Gulf Arab states who viewed the Islamist resistance in Afghanistan as a means to expand their Wahhabist influence through sponsoring ideological militants. Pakistan, for its own objectives, sought the installation of Islamist surrogate rule in Afghanistan, an aim for the fulfillment of which the adjoining FATA proved invaluable.

The region was already devoid of the state’s usual governance machinery and possessed a mountainous geography that offered ample space for high-quality militant training. Hence, the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani military establishment decided in favor of using the Pashtun ethnic minority’s land for its strategic objectives, orchestrating the anti-Soviet war. This was further enabled by the fact that neither the army’s decision-making ‘corps commanders’ nor a significant number of foot soldiers ever belonged to the peripheral FATA, therefore the areas’ interests did not fare prominently in the military elite’s agenda.

It is pertinent to mention that the terrorism in the region has hitherto hardly been addressed from this ethnic perspective in the existing literature. This is despite the fact that the ex-FATA being an ethnic minority region and the Pakistani military dominated by the ethnic majority are both documented realities. The military itself has acknowledged the Punjabi dominance at 71 percent, though independent sources, as early as in 1987, claimed the figure to be 80 percent. This was when the third and fourth martial rules entrenching Punjabisation further had yet to run their course.

Nevertheless, as a result of the sponsorship of Islamism inside FATA, the secular tribal elders’ social authority was undermined in favor of the mullahs, whose role, previously, had been “restricted to mosques.” The non-existence of political parties in the region facilitated their rise further.

Thus, a mullah-military alliance was enabled, which helped the diffusion of centrifugal, ethno-nationalist forces in the region. This also prepared the ground for Islamist militancy through “purpose-built”, hate-preaching madrasas. Militants from all around the globe, including the would-be founders of al-Qaeda, were brought to FATA, and provided weapons and training in special camps to fight the Soviet and Afghan forces as a ‘holy war.’

During the same period, in this region of the Pashtun “sidestream ethnicity”, sectarianism was also encouraged by Pakistan’s military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq—himself an ethnic Punjabi. He allowed the ‘mujahideen’ and Punjab-based Sunni sectarian militants to operate against the minority Shia Pashtuns of the Kurram agency.

Indeed, certain non-Punjabi mullahs and military authorities also played important roles during the 1980s in this strategic game played in FATA. One such figure was the ‘father of the Taliban,’ Mullah Sami-ul-Haq, who supplied human resources against the Soviets as the head of the most important madrasa, Darul Uloom Haqqania, in the now-KP. Another one was General Naseerullah Babur, who, as Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, had assisted the jihadist exercise.

Successive heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency that was orchestrating the anti-Soviet resistance issued statements such as “Kabul must burn” and “Afghanistan is a blank paper and it would look like whatever we write on it,” caring little about the repercussions of their Afghan policy for the Pashtun region.

This simultaneously injected radicalism into the traditional tribal society and altered ethnic identity in the process.

During the anti-Soviet war from 1979 to 1989, the madrasas built inside FATA and other western minority regions such as the adjoining KP and Balochistan were used to ‘educate’ the Afghan refugees’ and local Pashtuns’ children. Indeed, some of them joined the Islamist resistance. Later, they came to be known as the Taliban (seminary students), who had been infused with jihadist ideology.

These extremist by-products of the anti-Soviet episode proved useful for Pakistan in the 1990s, when its favored ‘mujahideen’ could not prove capable of installing a sustainable Islamist government in Kabul. Thereafter, as a more ‘effective’ alternative, the Taliban were brought to power for providing ‘strategic depth’ to Pakistan in the event of war with India. This was evident from Pakistan’s prompt recognition of their tyrannical government in 1996.

They systematically began to target the local tribal elders who were opposed to their presence, thereby throwing into disorder the tribal society. The Taliban intended to fill the subsequently created social vacuum themselves, as they did through the formation of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.’

In their self-defense according to Pashtunwali, the locals formed anti-Taliban lashkars/lakhkars (armed groups); however, the Pakistani state offered little support while the Taliban were attacking these lashkars. Instead, the state appeared to view the happenings as ‘necessary,’ so the jihadists could establish bases in FATA. From those bases, they had to attack the Coalition and Afghan forces, and subsequently rise to power in Kabul, as in 1996. This would fulfil Pakistan’s regional objective of suppressing Pashtun nationalism.

ricky_v wrote: ↑14 Jan 2024 13:13 https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the ... tionalism/

As a geo-strategically significant fact, Pakistan’s western neighbor, Afghanistan, has historically problematized the former’s claim that the Durand Line was a permanent international boundary. Afghanistan holds that it was only meant to define the respective spheres of influence of the old Afghan Kingdom and British India, and never meant to act as an international border, thus rejecting the division of ethnic Pashtuns. The Afghan stance has understandably caused Pakistani foreign policymakers to be concerned about the rise of potential irredentism, leading to the breakup of Pakistan.

Technically, Pakistan evicted Afghans not from Pakistani, but Afghan lands.
The Durand Line agreement (which is now lapsed) was imposed by British, dividing Afghan lands in order to create a buffer for the core of their empire of India.
Time to correct this historical wrong.

kancha wrote: ↑14 Jan 2024 17:12
Link

Technically, Pakistan evicted Afghans not from Pakistani, but Afghan lands.
The Durand Line agreement (which is now lapsed) was imposed by British, dividing Afghan lands in order to create a buffer for the core of their empire of India.
Time to correct this historical wrong.

Matriphagy is the consumption of the mother by her offspring. The behavior generally takes place within the first few weeks of life and has been documented in some species of insects, nematode worms, pseudoscorpions, and other arachnids as well as in caecilian amphibians.

Anujan wrote: ↑17 Jan 2024 08:07 Pakistan should give a fitting reply to Iran and cancel the next monthly approval of Iran-Pakistan pipeline.

TEHRAN, Jan. 16 (Xinhua) -- The Iranian and Pakistani navies have staged a one-day joint military exercise in the Gulf and Strait of Hormoz, according to a statement published on the Iranian army's public relations website on Tuesday.

TEHRAN, Jan. 16 (Xinhua) -- Two important bases of the Jaish al-Zulm "terrorist group" in Pakistan were destroyed in missile and drone strikes on Tuesday, Iran's semi-official Tasnim news agency reported.

#BREAKING : Strict instructions issued by PMO Pakistan on behalf of Pakistan Army for not covering news related to Iranian missile attacks in Turbat and Panjgur. Visiting the affected area is also prohibited.

Reminds of Balakot airstrikes when same orders were issued.

partha wrote: ↑17 Jan 2024 10:30 Pakistan should also drop Iran from SIFC and CPEC schemes.

sanjaykumar wrote: ↑18 Jan 2024 07:16 Naah, they are setting up to do an Afghanistan on Iran. Via Pakistan, as usual.

A video uploaded by news outlets of Saravan city at dawn shows at least one site hit by Pakistan early this morning. Multiple bodies are under the debris it states. Saravan city in Sistan wa Balochistan province of Iran is approximately 200 kilometres from Panjgur, Balochistan Province of Pakistan