Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

[NRao]

If Obama brings Kashmir onto the table, we should probably just tell him, he should start with Palestine first, and then go on to Tibet, because the suffering and culturocide there is far more acute, and when he has healed the world after that, we are willing to listen to him. Now the Dems may feel they can frack India on Kashmir to get brownie points from the Muslims, and get TSP to do its bidding, but that thought ought to be given a quick burial. India has been able to form a good relationship with the GoP, especially George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice, but the Dems still have to show the pedigree of their support for a strategic relationship with India, and if they don't watch out they may piss off India so much, that all the gain of the past decade would go down the drain. There is still a big trust deficit between India and the Dems, and it will take time before that is built up.

Only as a FYI/JMTs:

Obama is not the normal politician one happens by everyday. For one he is a very good/great listener - specially of opposing points, and, he is one of those very rare people who have no temper - which again makes him a very good listener. He is very open to "opposing" ideas.

However, Pakistan is their FP center - not China, not ME, not Russia. Pakistan. For sure. (If you get a chance to listen to Md. Halfbright - she makes a good case from a US PoV, why it is so. In short - geo. The US NEEDS a stable Pakistan - could be fragmented, but stable.)

Now, there is no need to redirect him to some other part of the world. He is bring up Kashmir ONLY because Pakistan did - no other reason. All India has to do is to take it off the table and let Obama drive from there on. He will stick to his "If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will." (http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/r ... he_w_1.php) Obama has his own set of thinkers in place, in addition to those that supported Clinton, but the Clinton supporters have a diff tier to sit on.

IF (big IF), India can make it a we vs. ISI as opposed to we vs. Pakistan, then it will do everyone a lot of good.

I strongly feel about two things: India has a very unique opportunity to break from the old mold and also to come up with a new mold. I think India is the only nation that can actually get along with both US parties and with multiple nations. In particular, this is the chance with Democrats in the US.

[ramana]

NRao, you are right. Instead of making the whole TSp the object of dislike, its fangs and enabling architecture should be made the objects. ISI is the enabling system that feeds the terror machine in all its forms- AlQ, LeT, JeM what not. At same tim eit acts as a plausible denial arm of US agencies. So need to separate the two. The need is to make US aware of its lack of credibility when it mollycoddles ISI.

[RajeshA]

NRao Ji,

My earlier rant about Obama was in the hypothetical situation, that he insists on keeping Kashmir on the table. I doubt that he would.

Changing the script from India vs Pakistan to India vs ISI is useful, if we wish to continue with the so-called peace process and engage with TSP despite the continuation of terrorist attacks in India. Accepted, it would make our case in the world a lot more credible, because when we condemn Pakistan as a whole, other governments may not take us seriously enough, as the impression remains, "Oh, well! It is the same age-long tribal, ethnic and religious rivalry of these barbarians in South Asia. So, what else is new?".

It would however not change much on the ground, and may give Pakistan even plausible deniability, without having to face too much pressure. They can always contend, they have put the ISI on a leash. Is India going to run around every place of terrorist attack looking for clues of ISI-complicity?

If our stress on ISI helps India to continue with an engagement with Pakistan, which gives India more Spielraum to unravel TSP, then that is fine, but I am skeptical of this approach.

[Rye]

Not at all helpful for India to create a artificial division between the Pakis/Pakistani Army and ISI -- very helpful for the USA since it gives pakistan room to breathe at the expense of India (as has been going on for decades).

[ramana]

I dont know why Indians ask for moon when they want moonshine.

Getting ISI is a doable small win. It has the potential to unravel the great game. ISI is a creation of the Great Game exponents(Cawthorn et al.) and it has turned on its foreign masters- feeding terrorists orgs against Great Britain (all those disaffected youth trained in TSP camps), Europe(madrid and what not) and even US(911 and Taleban attacks on US troops in Afghanistan). So cutting ISI to size should be the goal. Yes its even better to cut TSP but that wont happen for various reasons.

[ramana]

X-Posted froM Afghan Thread..
By Shaardula

This will go under subscription in a few days so posting in full.

'To Talk To Terrorists Is Like Frying Snowballs'
The Indian ambassador in Afghanistan on why his embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali this year and what it means to stay back after the July 7 bombings
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR ON JAYANT PRASAD
Outlook India
The year 2008 has been one of the most challenging for both Afghanistan as well as India's presence here. For one, the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy killed five of its staff, including two diplomats, shocking the international community as well as the Afghans. Worse, the security situation continues to deteriorate here amidst talk of negotiating with the Taliban, rearming the tribal militia and increasing the presence of international troops. Simultaneously, pressure has been mounted on Pakistan to deal with the sanctuaries of terrorism on its soil.

The Indian embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali to commiserate with their colleagues who lost their lives. On that day, however, Indian ambassador to Afghanistan Jayant Prasad talked to Aunohita Mojumdar. Excerpts:

Indian Embassy Bombing

The Indian government has identified the ISI as the perpetrator or the brains behind the July 7 blasts. What's your assessment about how far Pakistan was complicit in it?

It's not for me to speculate on the details of this event which is still being investigated by concerned agencies here. Suffice it for me to underline what is publicly known: that there was complicity and support, on the basis of which we were alerted before the attack. We had specific warnings on June 23 and July 1 on the imminence of a terrorist strike on the Indian mission. Which is why we were able to take precautionary measures. Unfortunately, we lost five of our colleagues, but the number of Afghans who died in the area contiguous to the embassy was 54 and over 100 seriously injured. But for the protective measures we were able to take, the embassy might have come crashing down that morning. That protective measure was based on specific intelligence inputs from friendly governments.

What impact did the traumatic event have on you and your feelings about being here?

I have thought a great deal about that event and I'm ready to talk freely about the collective impact of this tragic incident on the members of this mission. It had an impact in general, and specifically it had a different impact. The general impact was to make us aware of the fragility of the situation here in Afghanistan and the fragility of life itself.

There was a more immediate impact caused by confronting the process of senseless killing of five of our dear colleagues. All of us were shaken initially because the event challenged our conventional assumptions about human behaviour. We came face to face with the human propensity for evil, death and destruction. But I'd say, paradoxically, the incident had an impact that was opposite to that intended by the perpetrator of the attack. They had sought to weaken our resolve and capacity to work in Afghanistan. Actually, the staff officers rallied around in a most admirable way. Not one official opted to return to India though the option was offered, since posts in the embassy and all consulates are volunteer posts in Afghanistan.

In fact one officer who had earlier sought to return to India for family reasons came to me soon after the incident and asked for a week's leave to go to India. He wanted to explain to his wife that he had decided to stay on in Kabul because he felt impelled to do so by the sacrifice of his colleagues and that he was staying for that reason and not staying away from his family for any other reasons. Mrs Malti Rao and Mrs Sunita Mehta took the remains of their (respective) husbands, Venkat Rao and Brig Mehta, back to India the same day in the evening in the special aircraft that the government had flown in for the purpose. They displayed exemplary courage and dignity. That too was inspiring for the officers and staff of the region.

The Indian government's reaction was that India remained fully committed to its assistance for rebuilding Afghanistan.One final element was the supportive reaction of the Afghan people and government. It provided us great psychological support. The governor of a province I had not met called to say India and Indians were sweating it out in Afghanistan for the development of this country and now that Indian diplomats and official had been killed in a terrorist attack, the bond of sweat had become a bond of blood. And I think this was the sentiment that sustained us.

After every such incident, most of the international community hunkers down and indeed that very day most institutions were on high alert and most international personnel had their movement restricted. Did you consider closing down the embassy at any point?

Well, everything was shattered in the mission and all the windows and doors had broken. Luckily there was no major structural damage. The consular wing, which was our public dealing wing, had completely come down. We couldn’t use the embassy building for two days, so we were functioning from the courtyard. But I must say that even the local people did not hunker down. The foreign minister, Dr (Rangir Dadfar) Spanta, was on the spot 20 minutes after the incident when he was told by the security there could be a follow-on attack and he was told not to come. But he was still there. The defence minister General (Rahim)Wardak was there soon thereafter at Brigadier Ravi Mehta’s residence together with the National Security Adviser. The French ambassador walked into the broken chancery soon after, showing great courage and completely disregarding his own security instructions. So I think there was tremendous solidarity. Members of parliament walked into the chancery that evening while the special team from India was still there. The deputy speaker of the Wolesi jirga walked across. He is a neighbour. So it was not as if we hunkered down because Indians don’t hunker down and terrorists incidents are not new to us so we have a normal way of dealing with the situation and I would say that there is nothing special about the officers and men of the Indian mission and that this is the way any other Indian mission would have reacted.

Democracy in Afghanistan

How do you view the situation here today? The concept of building democracy in Afghanistan -- there are some things very different from the way we would build democracy. You have a Parliament without political parties, and now the concept of rearming the militias because you cannot build a national army very fast. Is this what is needed here now? Does this need a change of direction?

We have a very well established of Indian diplomacy: we do not really believe that a democratic model can be exported to another environment. It is sui generis to societal structure and historical traditions of every society. It is really for the Afghan people to sit and decide as to what constitutional make up they should have and what kind of accommodations they should experiment with. After all, the Afghan Constitution was evolved through a process of the loya jirga and it is a fledgling democracy--it is very new. It has to develop the conventions and practices over a period of time. If you look at our own experiment -- the decentralisation to the third tier of government -- that came 50 years after our Constitution. So you’ll have to give this experiment more time.

There's a general assumption shared across the spectrum that the situation has become much worse than it was in previous years, that there has been progressive deterioration. Still, people have not lost hope. I feel there's a silver lining to the situation today. That there was an incremental deterioration in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and now you have a precipitate decline in security.There's a crisis now on our hands. But a crisis tends to concentrate the mind. There is a lot of churning, thinking and consultation and something good might come out of the process.

India-Afghanistan

Can you define the special relationship between Afghanistan and India and how this has changed?

There was a hiatus in the India-Afghanistan relationship which has been a strong relationship since independence. From the period 1979 onwards, we lost contact with the Afghan people though there were government to government relations. Then there was the period from 1992-96 when there was a gap -- the mujahideen were fighting amongst themselves -- and then the Taliban came between 1996 and 2001. So in the present context we are looking at end 2001 and beginning 2002.

The relationship between India and Afghanistan goes back to cultural and civilization ties but the essence of it today is to build a modern partnership. Our expectations of our involvement in Afghanistan are fairly simple and straightforward. We want the unity, integrity, stability and prosperity of Afghan people and Afghan society. There is absolutely a full consonance of interests between India and Afghanistan.

You mentioned the period between 1996 and 2001. At that time also, India had close relations in trying to help the Afghan people counter the Taliban...

Yes, indeed. We were one of the few voices which wanted a more active support for those who had the vision of a democratic and pluralist Afghanistan and we did provide assistance to Commander Masood at that time and in that context links had not been broken off completely. But we were not able to be present in all parts of Afghanistan as we were earlier and as we are today.

International Presence in Afghanistan

What is our view of the huge international presence here--both the military and non military?

The international presence here is based on successive annual UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and India is happy that countries involved here are working within the UN mandate. The only supplement is that this process has to be much more Afghan-led. This realisation is now there in the commitment to build the Afghan army and has to reflect itself in other domains.

Another supplement to the international engagement would be that a prerequisite for success in Afghanistan is greater regional cooperation. Afghanistan as a landlocked country has always done well when it has served as a trade hub between central and south Asia and between Iran and South Asia. And now, of course, given the importance of energy, Afghanistan should ideally become a trade energy and transportation hub between two different parts of Asia. It would be a duty of all Afghanistan’s neighbours to be helpful and supportive in achieving this objective.

India-Afghanistan != India-Pakistan-Afghanistan

How concerned are you about the stability of the region, especially what we have seen over the last one year?

Let me not mince words to say that we are happy that Afghanistan and Pakistan are now engaged in some kind of revival of Track-II diplomacy. With the return of democracy in Pakistan, we hope it will have a good impact in tackling problems. Currently, a mini jirga is taking place between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

These are positive signs in the sense that if the parameters under discussion are what were decided earlier, it might have a positive impact. The loya jirga itself in its major decision last year talked about not allowing sanctuaries and training centres for terrorists and that would be the key to resolving the problems being faced by Afghanistan.

Is there anything to indicate that Pakistan is changing its attitude?

This has to be tested against actual performance.Expression of intent, I'm afraid, is not going to be enough.h.

There are some who think the relationship between India and Pakistan is intricately linked to that between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that movement on the Indo-Pak relationship is necessary for movement on Afghan-Pak relations.

Absolutely not. India does not view its relationship with any third country predicated on, or in reaction to, or refraction of its relationship to any other country.

Improvement in the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan and India will have a positive resonance but that doesn't mean they are linked. We are conducting our own composite dialogue with Pakistan which came under a certain strain after the July 7 attack on the embassy. We are hoping that the conducive atmosphere for resuming our dialogue with Pakistan is in the process of being created. We have already engaged in a full dialogue with Pakistan across the spectrum for that reason.

The basic issue is we don't see how that (Indo-Pak relations) is related to the problem of dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan or how that's related to improvement in Pak-Afghan relations.

But Pakistan seems to think so.

Pakistan seems paranoid about our development activity here and we have, at different levels, tried to tell them about what we are doing here. Pakistan has a mission here and it must be reporting on what we are doing here. What we are doing is very transparent and open. We have modest-sized consulates overseeing development activity and we have a medium-sized embassy in Kabul. Most of my diplomatic colleagues here marvel at how we manage with so few people running a development assistance programme, the envelope of which is over a billion dollars today.

What are the implications of the talks that the Afghan government is initiating with the Taliban?

Our view is that it is unexceptionable for all governments to talk to all alienated individuals and groups. We do that too. But we have to be circumspect about the circumstances in which we talk and with whom we talk. Evidently, you cannot talk with anyone outside the pale. For instance, terrorists who believe in settling political issues with violence. Or with those who do not accept democracy and political pluralism. Or do not believe in human rights and fundamental freedoms and those that don't operate within constitutional bounds. If you do, then it is to accept that you can fry snowballs.

What India is doing in Afghanistan

How is the Indian assistance different from that of others?

Indian presence and Indian support are different from how other countries approach Afghanistan in many significant ways. We are present all over Afghanistan and we are in all major domains of activity: humanitarian assistance, infrastructure projects, small development projects with quick gestation and capacity building in government.

We came in with humanitarian assistance which meant, for example, setting up camps for putting the Jaipur limb on disabled people, providing food assistance and medical services. We set up five medical missions which still continue and we promised a million tonnes of foodgrain assistance which we unfortunately could not ship across to Afghanistan through Pakistan because of objections and then we decided to convert it into high protein biscuits.

The second part of our program includes the three major infrastructure projects -- the Nimroz project connecting Seistan province in Iran to the Kandahar-Herat highway, the Pul-e-Khumri transmission line and the Chimtala sub station which is part of a scheme we are working together with the World Bank and ADB to bring Uzbek electricity to Kabul which will be completed and handed over by end-November this year.The third big project in this sector is in the Western province of Herat where we are building the 42 mw Salma dam on the Hari Rud river.

The third element is something we introduced three years ago when Dr Manmohan Singh came here. He wanted us to think of inventive schemes where we had quick gestation projects, not executed by Indian agencies but by the local provinces. And in the social sector, setting up clinics and schools, even small irrigation works, electrification, micro hydel or putting in an array of solar cells for powering institutions. This is called the small development project program. We had 50 such projects -- typically less than $1 million each -- in all parts of Afghanistan, conceived and executed by local and provincial governance. This has been a great success. The first part of this program is over. In fact, the projects are spread all over Afghanistan and this is the second major aspect of our assistance that, unlike other donors who have their provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in particular areas, or who have concentrated in certain areas, we are located in terms of development assistance all over the entire territory of Afghanistan. We have projects in every part of Afghanistan from the solar power of a teacher’s training institute in Badakshan in the Northeast to a cold storage for fresh fruit in Kandahar in the South. We have in the South West this unique road construction project in Nimroz which has been completed and handed over. In the heart of Afghanistan, which is Kabul, we supplied Tata buses, we have set up the Sulabh shauchalaya (public conveniences) which are extremely popular and the Pul e Khumri transmission line to bring electricity to Kabul.

The fourth element of our aid, which I consider the most important, is to rebuild the state structure in Afghanistan and here let me say that we have the biggest state building program in Afghanistan compared to any other country and these are the biggest programs that India has for any third country. From both ends, it is a first. We offer 500 placements in our institutions under the ITEC program.

Another element is the 500 undergraduate and graduate scholarships that we are giving to Afghan nationals to study in India. Apart from this we have specially conceived programs for special people. Right now, in Kabul, we have two programs -- one of which is being run by SEWA to train 1000 war widows and destitute and orphans. They are being trained in four different types of occupations so that they can stand on their own feet. Then the CII is executing another development program here to train 1000 Afghan youngsters in different trades like masonry, plumbing, machining electric work and women in industrial stitching and tailoring.

If these programs are successful then they can be replicated in other parts of Afghanistan. Without spreading our personnel all over Afghanistan, because we have done these programmes smartly. The Afghan trainers in these programs have been trained by us and they are the ones who are imparting training. We are developing a local capacity for Afghans to train themselves. We have also conceived a system of capacity development within Afghan national institutions, especially the central ministries where we have some middle rank officials from India on deputation here in a trilateral agreement in cooperation with UNDP.

Unlike consultants who are placed by other foreign governments in ministries, here we have made clear that our personnel are strictly there as mentors and guides and for developing training modules for maximising the output of Afghan pubic servants. This has been a great success because there is a demand for more such mentors and guides to be brought from India.Currently, we have 25 of them working in different departments in Kabul. They are strongly discouraged from giving advice on taking decisions. Their terms of reference preclude them from this type of activity. The ministries and departments who do not have CAP officers are asking for them which is a good sign.

All our projects and programmes are completely Afghan-led in the sense that we are not executing a single project or providing any type of assistance that the Afghan government has not asked us for.

And if I may say so, it may sound like a boast but we have taken on some of the most difficult projects that have been executed here. Take, for example, the Nimroz road project handed over last month. This was a 218 km road which is different from the tremendous road resurfacing program undertaken by many western donors all over Afghanistan. This is a completely brand new road which has been built in a desert area without any previous foundation.

The Salma dam project is being constructed in an inhospitable terrain, 170 kms away from any road head. Also power transmission lines being built in collaboration with the World Bank and the ADB. The hardest part of the project was to bring the power lines over the Salang pass and this was higher than any place the power grid corporation has built such lines anywhere, and this was successfully done. The most difficult part of the line construction came our way, so we are very proud of having successfully executed these projects. Of the three infrastructure projects, one is complete; the second will be completed in two months time and the third, where we have some real serious logistical difficulties, is somewhat behind schedule, i.e. the Salma dam.

Is there also a different perception of viewing assistance to this country that is different from other donors?

What I feel is that we are doing things in this domain that are natural to us, which we have done in our neighbourhood earlier and we can’t actually think of doing things in a different way. Because, many countries -- who are unfamiliar with south Asian culture topography, society -- bring their foreign models here and they go through a process of learning. Our advantage is that we didn’t have to have a long learning curve here.

[RajeshA]

I dont know why Indians ask for moon when they want moonshine.

Maybe because if you have the moon, you are always assured of moonshine, otherwise one would have to depend on others for procurement of moonshine, and if the others have had a bad day, they can cutoff supply any time they want. So we need our own moonshine generator. We are like that onlee!

[ramana]

Yes That we lose the whole game while waiting for godot. What is doable we kick it away and then demand for something thats not avaialible. And meanhile whine. I am sure there is a panchatantra story on this. ISI is the key to the ramshackle struture of TSP. Curb it and the whole thing falls down.

Just think why even after so many years Cawthorn's bio is not released?

[RajeshA]

Ramana Ji,
I don't mind eating salami either!

[ramana]

X-posted...

Barack Obama's Kashmir thesis!

C Raja Mohan
Posted: Nov 03, 2008 at 1431 hrs IST

Singapore, November 3: As Obamamania grips much of the world, including India, the man who might become the next President of the United States has ideas on Jammu and Kashmir that should cause some concern to New Delhi.

Given its vastly improved relations with the United States and Pakistan, India has no reason to press the panic button. Yet it should be quickly flagging its concerns with the foreign policy team of Senator Barack Obama, should he be declared the Forty-fourth President of the United States on Tuesday night.

In an interview broadcast on MSNBC, Obama suggested that his administration would encourage India to solve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, so that Islamabad can better cooperate with the United States on Afghanistan. Obama’s definitive thesis comes in three parts.

“The most important thing we’re going to have to do with respect to Afghanistan is actually deal with Pakistan. And we’ve got to work with the newly elected government there (Pakistan) in a coherent way that says, terrorism is now a threat to you. Extremism is a threat to you. We should — try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants”. India entirely agrees with the first two elements but should strongly object to the third.

Put simply, the Obama thesis says: the sources of Afghan instability are in Pakistan; those in turn are linked to Islamabad’s conflict with New Delhi, at the heart of which is Jammu and Kashmir.

For months now, New Delhi has been assessing Obama’s seeming hard-line towards Pakistan, including a threat to bomb terrorist bases there if Islamabad failed to act against the al-Qaida and the Taliban. India, however, has paid less attention to the carrot

Obama was offering Pakistan—American activism on Kashmir in return for credible cooperation in Afghanistan.

Obama’s remarks on Kashmir are by no means off the cuff. They have been remarkably consistent since he launched his presidential campaign. In the first comprehensive articulation of his world view in the journal Foreign Affairs during the summer of 2007, Obama argued, “If Pakistan can look towards the east (India) with confidence, it will be less likely to believe its interests are best advanced through cooperation with the Taliban.”

If Obama’s Kashmir thesis becomes the policy, many negative consequences might ensue. For one, an American diplomatic intervention in Kashmir will make it impossible for India to pursue the current serious back channel negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir, the first since 1962-63.

India and Pakistan have made progress in recent years, because their negotiations have taken place in a bilateral context. Third party involvement will rapidly shrink the domestic political space for India on Kashmir negotiations.

For another, the prospect that the U S might offer incentives on Kashmir is bound to encourage the Pakistan Army to harden its stance against the current peace process with India.

Finally, the sense that an Obama Administration will put Jammu & Kashmir on the front burner would give a fresh boost to militancy in Kashmir and complicate the current sensitive electoral process there. Kashmiri separatist lobbies in Washington have already embraced Obama’s remarks.

To be sure, Indo-U S relations are much stronger today to suggest a return to the discordant early 1990s, when Kashmir topped the bilateral agenda. Yet, New Delhi cannot ignore that Pakistan is likely to be at the very top of a President Obama’s national security agenda and his perception of a linkage between Kashmir and Afghanistan.

India’s chattering classes may be carried away by Obama’s talk of ‘change’ in Washington. On Kashmir at least, India badly needs ‘continuity’ with President George W Bush’s deliberate hands-off approach.

Although his historic civil nuclear initiative got all the attention, President Bush’s Kashmir policy has contributed even more significantly to the transformation of Indo-U S relations.

Despite relentless pressures from Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Bush refused to inject the U S into the Indo-Pak conflict. By ending the traditional American meddling in Kashmir, Bush created the conditions for purposeful bilateral negotiations between New Delhi and Islamabad. India would not want Obama to disrupt this positive dynamic in the subcontinent.

India does not disagree with Obama that a Pakistan secure within its own borders is good for the whole region. That indeed is the basis on which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his predecessor Atal Bihari Vajpayee explored solutions to the Kashmir dispute on a bilateral basis.

India’s problem with the Obama thesis is in the simplistic trade-off it sets up between Kashmir and Afghanistan. More than seven years after 9/11, Washington has begun to understand that the source of the problem in both Kashmir and Afghanistan is the Pak Army and its instrumentalisation of extremism to achieve political objectives.

Ending the Army’s right to define Isalamabad’s national security goals would make it a lot easier to resolve Pakistan’s disputes with both India and Afghanistan. That in turn would demand Indo-U S cooperation in accelerating Pakistan’s democratic transition by establishing firm civilian control over the military.

(C. Raja Mohan is a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and a Contributing Editor of The Indian Express.)

.....

Flawed Obama thesis but good attempt anyway by an (over)confident Obama? One way or another almost every U.S. President since probably Truman tried or at least thought about a solution to Kashmir issue to no avail. That goes for West Asia ["middle-east"] peace too. Because of the unreasonable Puki stand on the matter this will not be solved amicably. If Obama becomes prez of the U.S. and tries to press this matter with India, then we should respond by saying that if the U.S. is willing to give large amount of territory back to the native Americans and give them sovereignty and right to exist as a separate nation then we can think about even having a discussion about this.

....

Indian elite (DIE) put all their eggs in the Republican basket and gave away the store. Now they are going to be asked for more. And they will find the way to comply.

[ramana]

Looks like another four years will be lost trying to stave off the Cashmere pressure. Its Clinton years redux. Bet its halfbright/(dim wit) at the bottom of this. And she was FP adviser to Clinton before he got elected. Somehow Indians are unable to impress the Democrats after JFK. Democrats always want to appease TSP with Indian territory.
Unless TSP self destructs its another lost years saga.

[ramana]

A fictinalized account of how Punjab was lost to the English.

Navtej Sarna's book Maharaja of Misfortune

Actually its a very compelling reading of how factions or groups work in India and can and will be used to subvert India.

[surinder]

The sad story of Ranjit Singh's son, Dulip Singh is a tale fit to be told and retold. It is not a tale that inspires a man to great action, but it is a tale of the times.

Basically he was taken in custody at a very tender age (approx 5-8) and basically was abused. He was cut off from his mother while in India. Cut off from Punjab, cut off from real Indians, cut off from his religion. He was fed propaganda and careful psy-ops by the British. The British government for many decades was extremely scared of his influence on the Punjab. Their intense focus to isolate and derescinate him was an immensely important project. He wasn't allowed in the Punjab. In fact, when he came back to take his mother to UK, all he was allowed to travel was to Calcutta. Even there, Sikh soldiers thronged his hotel and the Angrej Sarkar got him packing to UK. They understood the importance of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's progeny to controllling Punjab.

His conversion was affected very carefully. Fatehgurh in UP was a hotbed of Indian Chritians. So that is where Bhajan Lal (Brahmin convert to Xtianity) came into picture. Mr. & Mrs. Logan were scots who brain washed this hapless kid. When Mrs. Logan died, leaving behind young children, Mr. Logan would see Dulip Singh in them, how he had abused the child king who was without the protection of his mother or father.

The Koh-I-Noor was snatched from Dulip Singh. Koh-i-noor was willed to the Jagannath Puri temple in Orisssa by Maharaja ranjit Singh.

I haven't read the book, but the wife of Dulip Singh, Bamba, appears to me an arranged marriage by the British sarkar. His 2nd wife was a British spy. Most Britishers surrounding him were spies.

Funny thing is that after his conversion the British (I think Dalhousie) sent Dulip Singh a bible on who he wrote that it is great the Dulip Singh has found the ultimate kingdom of God, in front of whom all earthly kingdoms are nothing. It was ironical that the British worked so hard, spilled so much blood, to get the earthly kingdom of Dulip Singh, but were singing praises for the other worldly kingdom. The irony of hypocracy.

[ramana]

Op-ed in Deccan chronicle, 4 nov 2008

Pakistan’s collapse is India’s nightmare
By Harsh V. Pant


Pakistan, a nuclear armed state of 170 million is facing a virtual meltdown and its political leadership seems utterly incompetent to steer the country through the present mess. The international community has few levers left that might have any significant impact on the course of events. And so everyone is just waiting with bated breath for events to unfold in what is probably the worst crisis in Pakistan’s troubled history.

In an attempt to mobilise the Pakistani public against extremism, President Asif Ali Zardari called a special session of Parliament to debate the best possible means of fighting the growing menace of Taliban and Al Qaeda. But the debate in Parliament ended up exposing the fissures in the Pakistani polity.

There was widespread support for negotiations with the Taliban even as military operations in the tribal areas being undertaken by the Pakistani military came in for strong criticism. The leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), Nawaz Sharif, openly called for a dialogue with the militants in a letter he sent to the Prime Minister, further undermining Zardari’s position. Just days back, Zardari had promised Washington that Pakistan’s fight against terrorism would be his topmost priority. The opposition to fighting the militants remains substantial, making it almost impossible for Zardari and his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to engineer a broader national policy.

The Pakistani military commenced its operations against the Taliban and its Qaeda backers in the tribal areas around two months ago, receiving some limited praise from the American commanders. But it would like to have broader political support for its military operations. So, the director-general of military operations for the Pakistani Army, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, went before the joint session of Parliament to apprise the lawmakers of the military’s campaigns against militants. However, the sense that Pakistan was fighting America’s war was all pervasive in Parliament. After two weeks of in-camera discussions, Pakistan’s Parliament adopted a unanimous resolution that called for an "urgent review" of the national security strategy based on an "independent foreign policy" and stressed the need for dialogue with "elements" willing to abide by the Constitution and the rule of law. The debate failed to provide any clarity on Pakistan’s dangerously deteriorating internal security situation with the political parties divided even on the nature of the challenge that Pakistan is facing. The Opposition continued to charge the ruling PPP of toeing the US line while the PPP itself failed to provide the necessary leadership in formulating a consensual policy to deal with the rising extremism.

Meanwhile, finding the fight against Taliban more difficult than expected, the Pakistani Army is now relying on the tribal militia to take on the Taliban fighters and share some of their burden. These tribesmen are also taking a more active role as they would like to keep the Pakistani Army away from their areas. But in the process they are caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and the military. The Taliban has increased its attacks on tribal leaders and their supporters even as the Pakistani Army has been less than supportive in providing them with the resources necessary to fight effectively.

The Bush administration remains unconvinced of Pakistan’s commitment to fighting the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. In the last few months, the US-led forces in Afghanistan have frequently struck targets in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region with missiles and even used Special Operations Forces to stem cross-border attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan also has in recent weeks allowed the US military trainers to provide counterinsurgency instruction to Pakistani soldiers. But in the absence of ameliorative political and economic measures, a purely military approach will not be enough to stem the growth of extremism in the tribal areas.

Pakistan’s political leadership has little time on its hands, consumed as it is with the economic crisis facing the nation. Pakistan’s forex reserves are reportedly enough to cover payments for imports for just about two months and the currency has plummeted to a new low. Prices of essential commodities are rising with the possibility that this might lead to large scale societal turmoil. A balance of payments crisis is in the offing, forcing Pakistan to turn to the IMF in order to avoid defaulting on its loans. Pakistan’s precarious economic situation will only compound an already unstable political condition and create further complications for the fight against extremism.

Facing the prospect of defaulting on its current account payments, President Zardari sought aid from China during his visit to Beijing and had hoped that China would provide Pakistan with the needed funds. China only promised help to build the two nuclear power plants and greater business investments in the future, but gave no commitments on shoring up the Pakistani economy.

With the US and Europe facing financial turmoil and China sitting atop $2 trillion in foreign reserves, Pakistan found itself gravitating towards Beijing for emergency assistance. Help has also been sought from Saudi Arabia so that Pakistan can be granted concessionary terms for its oil imports but so far a favourable response has eluded Islamabad. The Chinese seem to be in no mood to bail Pakistan out of its economic woes. Chinese investments in Pakistan are becoming a casualty of the deteriorating security situation and Pakistan’s ability to manage its economy is in doubt.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that Pakistan needs about $15 billion over the next three years and the Western nations are not prepared to funnel aid in the absence of economic reform measures. Yet, going to the IMF would be considered only if financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank fail to help and if "friends of Pakistan" fail to deliver the required amount.

Over the past seven years, Pakistan has received more than $10 billion in aid from the US, ostensibly for counter-terrorism operations, but has failed to build up its institutional capabilities as it ended up diverting a huge proportion of that aid to acquire military hardware suited for conventional warfare vis-à-vis India. The underlying fragility of the state’s basic institutions will continue to haunt Pakistan, and with it the entire region as well, as the West’s war on Islamist extremism continues.

Pakistan’s return to democracy remains tenuous and the authority of the government is weakening by the day. The state institutions — the civilian government as well as the military — seem unwilling to acknowledge the obvious threat of extremism that is haunting the very survival of Pakistan today. It is the consequence of Pakistan’s long-standing policy of using Islamist extremist mobilisation and jihadist terror for domestic political purposes as well as for projecting Pakistan’s ambitions in its neighbourhood. Unfortunately, it isn’t clear if Pakistani leaders and its military are learning right lessons.

Pakistan is no longer failing, it is already a failed state. The sooner it is recognised, the better, for it will enable the international community to recalibrate its existing approach toward a nation that is staring at an abyss. Contrary to what some in India might hope for, a collapsing Pakistan is India’s biggest nightmare.

One hopes Indian policymakers are taking the challenges in Pakistan with the seriousness it deserves and have a plan to tackle the long-term implications. After all, it’s not only the survival of Pakistan but also of India that’s at stake.

Harsh V. Pant teaches at King’s College London

i would like a debate on the article's title please. the author lists a long litany of woes of TSP and Western shortcomings in helping TSP. And then tries to scare India in last para. is he out of his mind? And on what basis does he write in Indian papers?

Is it really India's worst nightmare? If so why? if not why not?

I think its a great opportunity that the Western project to keep India from her natural frontiers is failing and has failed. The nukes are a bogey.

[renukb]

India’s new space within Asia
India was invited into the elite club of nuclear powers this year, yet is still trying to establish who it might be and what it can do within greater Asia. It isn’t China, economically or militarily; it doesn’t want to upset China or the US; it has immediate cross-border problems



........more............

http://mondediplo.com/2008/11/08india

[surinder]

Ramanna,

the problem with the article is that last line:

Harsh V. Pant teaches at King’s College London

Where he lives determines what he has to attune himself to; he has to mould and follow prevailing thought and zeitgist.

My views are unsurprisingly similar to everyone's on BRF: Pakistan is a joint venture to do many dirty deeds, the biggest one is to contain India. Pakistan is the best balancer to checkmate India. Americans, UK, PRC is all extremely unhappy because their investment of 60 years is going down the drain. When TSP collapses, they will have to (a) deal with a more confident India, and (b) Nukes now become their problem, not just ours.

Is there temporary dangers? Of course. When a old decripit building is demolished to make way for a new beautiful garden, the demolishon balls have to be careful. The demolition itself can cause injuries etc. The destruction is to be carefully managed. End result is of course guarenteed to be good. That is all the danger there is to it. For brave and courageous people, there is nothing to worry.

Note: Contrast these strident warning to a complete absence of thought when TSP was first created by Partition. No thought was given to the consequences of that unnatural country being created. 10 million perished. 100 million became refugees. Do you think that the (Indian) casualties will be less than 1% of that?

[RajeshA]

Joe Biden may not have a knack for Presidential Campaigns, but he does know a thing or two about foreign affairs. When he said, a President Barack H. Obama is going to be tested within 6 months of taking office, he was being prophetic. The Jihadists have already established a close relationship between them and the George W. Bush Presidency. It ultimately dragged Bush into the Halls of Infame in world opinion, into wars, into heightened military spending, into obligations to foreign money, into financial crisis. Now Barack Obama comes along as the New Great (Half-)White Hope of USA and the World. It would be difficult to imagine, he is going to be left alone by the Jihadists, unless he just happens to be the Tamurian Candidate (which nobody really believes, or do we? One might even contend that George W. Bush was one, considering all he did for the Jihadist Movement).

So Obama is put to test by the Jihadists. What happens then? Does that mean, more oxygen for TSP Army and Pakistani economy, or does it mean fire under their butts? The oxygen strategy has already been tested, for the last seven years. Would that be the opening India needs to convince USA to turn off the lights in our western neighbor, that it has been a bad investment, it is throwing good money after the bad money?

If TSP is finally convinced, that it will get no more goodies from Western pockets, and only sticks, big long ones, would TSP finally show the West the middle finger, and do the complete switch of its rentier state loyalty to PRC? Will that be the right time for India to rearrange geography?

India should take an active interest in Joe Biden's prophecies.

[ramana]

Its not Biden but Bruce Reidel of Clinton WH fame..

X-posted...

Nimbu Paani is wrried guy now days

http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=144890
Be wary of America
by Ahmak Quraishi
But our troubles appear to be only starting. Bruce Riedel, who retired from the CIA in 2006 and served from 1007 to 2002 on the National Security Council, is advising Barack Obama on Pakistan. Even some Americans are alarmed at the ideas of Mr. Obama's pointman on Pakistan.

No matter how harsh the political polarization in Washington, everyone seems to be on board on Pakistan: denuclearizing the country, forcing the Pakistani army to forget about Indian water blocking and Kashmir and restructure the army to fight insurgents and buy only those weapons that serve this purpose.

Mr Obama is impressed with his adviser's ideas. Over the weekend he picked another longtime Riedel theme: that resolving Kashmir is essential to fighting terrorism. But before someone in Islamabad gets excited about this, Mr Riedel – and now his boss – are basically talking about ending Pakistan's excuse of the lingering dispute of Kashmir which stands in the way of accepting Washington's desire to see India walk all over Pakistan, open direct trade links to Afghanistan and central Asia and play a major role in securing Afghanistan and the region in the face of Russian and Chinese influence

Why not research Reidel's views on the the Great Game redux from NimbuPani's eyes?

[renukb]

Russia, China suspend $25 billion oil loan talks
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/id ... I120081112

By Vladimir Soldatkin and Dmitry Zhdannikov

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia and China have suspended talks over $25 billion in loans to Russian oil companies due to disagreements over interest rates and state guarantees, two Russian sources close to the talks told Reuters on Wednesday.

China was discussing lending Russian state oil major Rosneft (ROSN.MM: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and pipeline monopoly Transneft TRNF_p.RTS up to $25 billion in loans as part of a broader oil supply deal, which would allow Beijing to secure deliveries for 20 years and give Russian firms the means to sort out prompt refinancing needs.

A major delay in talks would deal a blow to the Kremlin's strategy to showcase its strategic relations with Asian energy consumers at a time of difficult relations with the West.

It will also put additional pressure on the finances of some of the biggest firms in the world's second-largest oil exporter at a time of plunging oil prices.

"The working groups have suspended talks after the Chinese side raised quite absurd lending conditions... One could have a feeling that there had been no previous round of talks in Moscow," one source, who asked not to be named because he is not allowed to talk about the issue publicly, told Reuters.

The shares of Rosneft (ROSNq.L: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) fell 19 percent in London, underperforming the broader Russian index . Share trading on Moscow's main MICEX exchange .MCX was suspended on Wednesday after heavy losses on Tuesday.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Moscow last month when the two countries agreed to jointly build a new overland supply route for Siberian oil to carry 15 million tonnes a year (300,000 barrels per day) between the countries' trunk pipelines from 2009.

Russia's top energy official, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, said Russian oil firms would receive "considerable" loans from China in return for increased oil supplies and outlined the end of November as a deadline for the deal.

TACTICS

"It (the talk suspension) really looks like some kind of negotiation tactic by the Russians," said Valery Nesterov, oil and gas analyst at Troika Dialog brokerage.

"A deviation from earlier agreements would mean reducing trading relations with a very important partner at a time when Russia is seeking new partners in Asia. I don't think that a dispute about interests would be decisive here," he added.

The source said the Chinese side had asked at the latest round of talks in Beijing to peg interest rates on the loans to LIBOR, after having agreed previously to lend the money at 7 percent a year.

He also said Beijing was seeking additional state guarantees from the Russian government and wanted direct access to some of Russia's biggest fields.

"They have demanded the entire Talakan field," the source said, referring to a large eastern Siberian field owned by No. 4 Russian producer, Surgutneftegas (SNGS.MM: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz).

Another source said the deal was complicated by the fact a $10 billion portion of the loan to Transneft should be guaranteed by export deliveries. Transneft cannot supply this as it does not produce its own oil.

"Everything is on hold now. It is all very high-level politics," the second source said.

Nesterov said the $10 billion loan for Transneft was very important to help it build the second stage of Russia's first pipeline to Asia, so it can reach the Pacific coast. The first link to China is estimated to cost $14 billion and is due to be completed by the end of next year.

But Nesterov also said that the $15 billion portion of the loan to Rosneft was of a much bigger importance as Russia's most indebted firm has to refinance a large part of its $22 billion debt in the next years while also financing an ambitious development program.

The first source said Transneft might now even decide against building a spur to China should talks over lending fail and could choose to construct only a direct pipeline to the Pacific coast, where a new oil terminal would be built.

"China is showing interest in this port. And Japan and Korea are also interested," he said.

(Reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin and Dmitry Zhdannikov, Editing by Peter Blackburn)

[ramana]

Need the info in this thread summarised on a few charts say 20 -30 charts. the focus should be on the continuing Great Game from an Indian point of view.

Paul and Sridhar could you do the honors?

[Paul]

Sure thing...I am writing a article, should not be a problem coming up with a deck. Will get back soon

[ramana]

Thanks.

We have to think of BRF as flight of the geese where one takes over when the lead goose needs some rest. That way the flock still moves on.

[ramana]

Foreign Policy:

Five real missions for 007

[Paul]

It is a mystery as why 007 was never sent on a mission to take out OBL post 9/11.

But then that would mean the anlo-saxons giving on the sunni alliance.

[RajeshA]

^^^

No Martinis there and no beaches. Only burqas as far as the eye can see! 007 does not fight cavemen, Conan the Barbarian does that sort of stuff.

[abhischekcc]

>>No Martinis there and no beaches. Only burqas as far as the eye can see! 007 does not fight cavemen, Conan the Barbarian does that sort of stuff.

Surely, you mean Conan the Republican!!!

[Rye]

As an idle exercise, looking at the map of India's northern borders and the NE and the creation of the SL issue, the british cartographers really screwed India solidly. Look at how the little sliver of Afghan land that stops India from directly connecting to CA (Tajikistan to be more specific).

In the NE, the creation of chicken's neck and the subsequence hosting of Isaak Muivah and NSCN "freedem phighters" in the UK and dozens of such groups, the arming and funding of NE terrorist groups (with Peter Bleach and the Purulia arms drop as a data point of involvement during the cold war days) -- the skulduggery still goes on in the NE which is yet to come completely under control of the GoI.

Again in the NE India has been deliberately cut off from any sea access from the Bay of Bengal -- the Chittagong Hill Tracks would have been a vital link for the peace and prosperity of the NE but it was deliberately given to "East Pakistan"/BD. The carving out of states from India's NE was clearly the intention of choking of ALL transporation corridors to the NE.

JMT

[surinder]

The tragedy is that Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), was 98% Budhist. It was actually upto India to take it, but it refused to take it. You can thank Nehru, Gandhi etc. for gifting CHT to then-TSP.

Most reasonable nations, would militate against such territory transfers and would continue to fight to get it back. TSP 1/3 of India failed did not like the Kashmir acceding to India, what did it do? It fought. PRC did not like Aksai Chin with India, it fought. We docilely accepted the radcliffe line. We did not ask for an adjustment even slightly.

Talking about arbitrary drawn borders: In Punjab, there is a historic city associated with Guru Nanak. That historic city has gone to TSP, thanks to "Sir" Radcliffe. The Gurudwara in that city falls barely few 100 meters from the border. I think it is across from the city of Dera Baba Nanak. There is a gurudwara on the Indian side, where devotees climb on the terrace to see the Gurudwara on the Paki side. Note: the Gurudwara on the Paki side is lying in ruins and is unused and bad state. Sad state of affairs for those devotees, and also for India.

[Paul]

Situation in Pakistan ‘more dire’ than Afghanistan: expert

LAHORE: A comprehensive regional strategy by the international community is urgently needed to end chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistani analyst and writer Ahmed Rashid stressed while addressing legislators during the 54th annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – which was held in Valencia on November 14-18.

According to the American website NewsBlaze, Rashid said, “The civilian government in Pakistan needs more international support to face problems in three major areas … There is an economic crisis – which is the result of lack of structural changes during the military rule of Perez Musharraf – a terrorist threat from militias controlling the semi-autonomous Tribal Areas near the Afghan border, and a difficult relationship between the government and the military which is refusing to move against insurgents.”

The NewsBlaze report quoted Rashid as saying that the civilian government in Islamabad was ‘very open’ to rectifying the errors of the past and convincing the Pakistani military to rein in the terrorist threat in FATA. But “unless the decision-makers in Pakistan decide to make stabilising the Afghan government a higher priority than countering the Indian threat, the insurgency conducted from bases in Pakistan will continue”.

Rashid said no multilateral framework existed to deal with the complex and entwined problems of the region. He claimed that NATO had ‘no clear Pakistan policy’, despite the fact that its troops in Afghanistan were suffering losses from the Pakistani Taliban. The UN Security Council ‘has hardly discussed Pakistan‘s role in Afghanistan’, he added.

According to Rahid, as the incoming US administration has talked about a troop surge in Afghanistan and renewed political efforts in the region, this should be elevated to a ‘high-level diplomatic initiative’ to build a genuine consensus on the achievement of Afghan stability by addressing the sources of Pakistan’s instability.

Kashmir dispute: Rashid said that this should include a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which would allow the Pakistani military to concentrate its efforts on the border with Afghanistan.

“A first step could be the establishment of a contact group on the region authorised by the UN Security Council – including the five permanent members, NATO and Saudi Arabia – and promoting dialogue among all regional actors. Such dialogue would have to be complemented by a multi-layer international development aid package aimed particularly at the border regions.” daily times monitor

[ramana]

Before blaming the INC folks in 1947 please look at this;
X-posted from TSp thread....

MAP OF PUNJAB 1949

[surinder]

Raman,

What is your point?

[svinayak]

See the boundary Claimed by India during partition.

[Neshant]

As an idle exercise, looking at the map of India's northern borders and the NE and the creation of the SL issue, the british cartographers really screwed India solidly. Look at how the little sliver of Afghan land that stops India from directly connecting to CA (Tajikistan to be more specific).

The british in the 19th century wanted a buffer between India and Tsarist russia which was expanding its borders. That is why the borders do not touch. The buffer is afghanistan.

[SwamyG]

Why is the single (simple ?) action of hitting a pirate ship considered so important? It is not like US or China (or some European powers) can not do this. They have equal or more capability. What is the increased attention for? Things are changing both infront and behind the scenes. Routes that took Islam to Indonesia are coming into play again.

Pakistan Now or Never

In what is being seen as one of the biggest projections of Indian naval power since India defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, an Indian warship has sunk a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian navy is now looking at deploying more warships off Somalia.

In the Asia Times, former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar writes of the possibility of a new Great Game unfolding for control of the sea route in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan has historical reasons to be sensitive about this new development. It lost control of Bangladesh in 1971, in part because the Indian navy was able to prevent it from shipping supplies and men to what was then East Pakistan. And it has traditionally been sensitive whenever India has shown signs of flexing its muscles in the broader region — its anxiety about growing Indian influence in Afghanistan being a case in point.

But this time there seems to have been very little reaction in Pakistan, whose navy is also involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

India is looking to play a leading role in bringing together countries from the Indian Ocean region to work together to fight piracy, according to this story in the Times of India, working through the so-called Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). “The IONS includes countries as diverse as Oman, Mozambique, Yemen and Egypt to Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar,” the newspaper says. “If some countries can provide warships and aircraft, others can chip in with ports and refuelling facilities in the fight against pirates,” it quotes a senior official as saying.

That to me raises an intriguing question. Would Pakistan, which for so long has seen India as a regional bully, now be willing to accept Indian regional leadership in combating problems such as piracy, from which both countries suffer? And what would that mean for future relations between the two countries?

As underlined in this U.S. intelligence study released this week, the global context has changed drastically since the days when Pakistan sought to maintain military parity with India. The National Intelligence Council analysis “Global Trends 2025″ sees China and India joining the United States atop a multipolar world and competing for influence. (see full pdf document here).

Pakistan gets short shrift, presented primarily as a problem rather than the global player it sought to become when it matched India’s nuclear weapons programme with its own. “The future of Pakistan is a wildcard in considering the trajectory of neighbouring Afghanistan,” it says. Then in a rather chilling line introduced without further explanation, it says “if Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line (dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan), maximising Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.”

When intelligence experts in your supposed ally raise questions about whether your country can hold together, maybe falling under the regional leadership of your supposed enemy does not look so bad? But then again, and to return to the “Great Game” unfolding in the Indian Ocean, the intelligence report also examines the risk of a naval arms race unfolding between India and China as both seek to protect vital energy supplies.

Choosing your friends in a multipolar world is going to become increasingly tricky. For Pakistan, it may turn out to be a matter of survival. Which way is it going to turn? Pakistan’s reaction to India’s role in combatting piracy in the Indian Ocean may provide important clues.

Great game of hunting pirates

[ramana]

Hunting for pirates is how naval dominance was achieved in the Arabian Sea and that led to the end of the sea trade for the Mughals. Unfortunately Indics have no sense of history and hence are puzzled by this development. Before the Portuguese followed by European powers came into these waters the dominant sea power albeit by trade for there was little piracy in those days was the Mughal fleet. So that is why there is angst at this "little" act. those were Indian seas and are coming back to rightful overlords.

SwamyG, Do you recall the Mahabahrat story of Balaram and Rohini Devi? Do look it up.

[ldev]

The tea leaves seem to indicate that:

1. India has reached a quid pro quo with the US for military access to Oman and Qatar with the IN using Omani ports as a replenishment point for its anti piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa and helping provide security to Qatar given the strategic nature of energy security via growing LNG supplies from Qatar.

2. The problems of acess to Central Asia given the disputed situation over Iran would seem to indicate a lower priority for establishing a military foothold in Central Asia i.e. Ayni

3. The preferred energy corridor for India from Central Asia now seems to be the pipeline through Turkey and transhipment via Israel and then tankers through Eiliat in the Red Sea and then via the Gulf of Aden. The longer term objective of port visitation rights for the Indian Navy in the Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa would be to safeguard this energy corridor with the first steps being the current anti piracy patrols.

[SwamyG]

Ramana garu: Can you elaborate on the Balarama analogy? I think the key word is "transfer", that much I can understand.

Also why would the other World powers allow India to assert itself in the Indian Ocean. Does it hint at any kind of power-sharing?

[brihaspati]

The Mughals were not very successful at sea-trade, and the Mughal navy managed hardly to defend the coasts against pirates. Pirates definitely have a long dominance and presence in the Arabian sea and the mouth of the Red Sea - as far as we can see from writings of Strabo - with fingers pointed squarely at Nabataens of the Arabian peninsula. The Thaparites try to implicate Indians in piracy during the Islamic expansion based practically on three dubious textual references and one inscription. Textual sources from Chinese and Arab sources indicate that during this entire Islamic period, the fastest and strongest ships were Sri Lankan, and Arab, and that the pirates carried out their depredations in "fast" powerful ships right up to the Red Sea.

I think the tradition continues, in the East Africans and Arabians/Yemenis getting directly or indirectly involved in this escalation of piracy. The Islamic extermist organizations could have a hand in encouraging this as it has an economic impact on trade and energy supply between non-Muslim axes of power running from India to Europe/Russia and USA, as well as the politico-military significance of making the Red-Sea area a non-go zone.

Somalia has to be invaded to solve this problem. The western axis wants India to be drawn in from several reasons (1) more cost effective because of "closer to home" bases (2) if India can be made to cause damage to African countries, Islamic interests, India's possible tactical softness towards Islamic regimes in the area can be preempted (3) if there is retaliation and war, the US at least does not have to face "immediate" costs - it will be borne by India.

[svinayak]

Somalia has to be invaded to solve this problem. The western axis wants India to be drawn in from several reasons
(1) more cost effective because of "closer to home" bases
(2) if India can be made to cause damage to African countries, Islamic interests, India's possible tactical softness towards Islamic regimes in the area can be preempted
(3) if there is retaliation and war, the US at least does not have to face "immediate" costs - it will be borne by India.

This is true. India has to guard itself against other peoples war.

[SwamyG]

I am not sure if this is relevant to this topic. But it is about the role of India, so I post here.

Attack on pirates reflects India’s growing sea power

By Eric S Margolis
WASHINGTON: The question of what to do about the epidemic of Somali piracy is becoming a major international security issue as ships fear to ply the waters off the Horn of Africa and Arabian Sea and insurance rates soar.
This year alone, brazen Somalia pirates have attacked 95 vessels. They still hold 16 ships and some 300 sailors hostage. Among them, a Ukrainian freighter loaded with T-72 tanks whose ultimate destination remains a mystery, and now a Saudi supertanker, the Sirius Star, laden with 2mn barrels of oil valued at $110mn. The pirates demand $25mn ransom for the vessel and its Filipino crew.
Western powers have increased naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. But the piracy epidemic underlines the urgent need to bring stability to anarchic Somalia, where millions face famine. In fact, according to some UN experts, starvation, disease and violence in Somalia is even worse and more widespread than in Darfur.
Somalia’s last government, a moderate Islamist movement called the Islamic Courts Union, had managed to restore a semblance of order. But it was overthrown in 2006 by the US and regional ally Ethiopia. Since then, chaos has ruled what is left of Somalia.
One of the more interesting aspects of the pirate drama involves India. An Indian frigate, INS Tabar, stole the limelight by sinking a Somali pirate mother ship off the coast of Oman. Tabar had previously driven off other Somali buccaneers.
I first saw Tabar, a Soviet/Russian Krivak-III missile frigate, under construction at St Petersberg’s Baltisiskya Zavod yards. This elegant warship carries the new Russian/Indian BrahMos, the world’s deadliest supersonic anti-ship missile, and the Israeli Barak missile system.
Tabar was on station in the Gulf of Aden protecting Indian and international commerce. Her presence is the latest sign of India’s growing maritime power, a subject about which I have been writing for two decades.
India is now making her maritime strength felt right to the mouth of the Red Sea and up to the oil exporting Gulf, along Africa’s east coast, and all the way south to Fiji and Australian waters.
Many Indian strategists regard the vast Indian Ocean as their nation’s exclusive sphere of influence. India’s steady naval expansion is designed to protect its commerce and long coasts, and exert Delhi’s growing influence around the Gulf and South Asia’s strategic Strait of Malacca, which used to suffer from pirate attacks.
India’s navy also keeps a weather eye on the evolution of China’s fleet from a coastal defence force into a true blue water navy. Just this week, a senior Chinese official caused a stir in Washington by hinting his nation was planning to build its first aircraft carrier (the US has 11).
India’s fleet includes an aircraft carrier; a former ex-Soviet carrier on order; at least 16 modern submarines, plus a series of nuclear-powered subs being built; 48 surface warships; a powerful naval air arm, and advanced reconnaissance satellites.
India’s growing navy may one day challenge the Indian Ocean’s premier naval power, the United States, which regards the Gulf oil routes and Arabian Sea as its own pond. India’s acquisition of Russian Akula class nuclear-powered subs that do 40 knots submerged; the deadly BrahMos missiles (ideal for sinking carriers); and the Russian heavy, TU-160 long-ranged bomber have the US Navy warily watching.
In another important event barely noticed in the West, on November 14, an Indian space probe hit the moon. If India can deliver a probe to the moon, the same launchers and guidance systems can deliver nuclear warheads around the globe.
India is testing a new 5,500km medium ranged ballistic missile, Surya, which will be upgraded into a true inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with double the range. India is deploying a submarine-launched, nuclear armed ballistic missile.
The lesson to be drawn from all this is that India must be a force to be reckoned with in the Indian Ocean and Gulf as it advances its own oil, trade and political interests. Hindustania does not yet rule the waves, but one day, who knows.