West Asia News and Discussions

[svinayak]

Same goes with GCC monorchies now. They export oil at market prices, yet treat it as a trade concession to the recipient.
We are getting good at destroying our core to sustain our periphery.

We have too many Sanjayas amongst ourselves. Please refer the epics thread for details.

It is extraordinary to read Indians batting for some foreign countries.

[Prem]

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-0 ... -says.html
Iran Must See ‘End of Tunnel’ for Nuclear Deal, Russia Says
June 2 (Bloomberg) -- World powers should offer to ease sanctions to gain Iran’s cooperation in resolving the dispute over the country’s nuclear program, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.

Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany have stalled since January and Russia believes incentives are needed to kick-start the process, Lavrov said yesterday in an interview in Moscow.

“We have to show to Iran that if it cooperates, if it answers satisfactorily the IAEA demands, then it should see the light at the end of the tunnel,” Lavrov said, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog.The Persian Gulf state in mid-2010 came under a fourth set of UN sanctions, which Russia supported. The U.S. and European Union later imposed tougher unilateral measures. Russia won’t support new sanctions against Iran, Lavrov said.“It’s a process that can only be successful if we count not on new sanctions and threats, but on negotiations,” he said.The IAEA, based in Vienna, has been probing Iran’s nuclear work since 2003, when it was revealed that the government had hidden atomic research for two decades. The U.S. has accused Iran of seeking to build a nuclear weapon, while Iran says its program is for civilian energy production.Russia built Iran’s first nuclear power plant, in Bushehr, and plans to start full operations at the facility “very soon,” Rosatom Corp., Russia’s state nuclear holding company, said May 26.Tougher Inspections
If Iran agrees to resume tougher IAEA inspections, the EU and U.S. should pledge not to introduce any new, unilateral sanctions, Lavrov said.“And then when Iran does something else, expanding access for the IAEA to the places where the agency wants to go, then we suspend sanctions,” he said.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in July that Iran was getting closer to achieving the capability to make nuclear weapons

[Agnimitra]

Pakistan marches to Saudi tune

Military service has been part of the lives of young men in the Pakistani Punjab at least since the British East India Company set up indigenous forces 200 years ago. It was Punjabi soldiers who later became the backbone of the British imperial army and who served Britain in both world wars. Soldiering for foreign powers, then, is an honored tradition there.

Pakistan feels it can skillfully juggle Iran and Saudi Arabia without falling out with either, much as it is juggling the US and China. But the latter act is failing badly and Pakistan could see Iran turning on it, perhaps by threatening the pipeline running into Pakistan. The last thing Pakistani generals want is to be opposed by Iran in the west and by India in the east, but their stewardship over national security has been marked by failure, defeat, and loss of territory.

[ramana]

So this is the Mahdi brigade! The new slaves for the Wahabis just as the Turks were for the Abbasid dynasty.

I guess KSA decided not to trust the Pak troops under TSPA command to be deployed to holy sites. They want borgs under their own command.

What was the title of Ayub Khan's Bio again, " Friends not Masters".
Looks like its the otherway round this time.

[shyamd]

Interesting debate going on in Israel. Dagan supports the arab peace initiative.

Ex-Mossad Chief in eye of storm, again

Dagan's support of Saudi peace initiative stirs new controversy. Ex-Shin Bet chief says gov't must listen to him, while former National Security Council head claims 'It's the least Pro-Israeli proposal'

Aviel Magnezi Published: 06.03.11, 09:50 / Israel News
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Former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan is in the eye of yet another storm: After stirring controversy by saying that a strike on Iran should only be considered as the last resort, the former head of the Israeli intelligence community said Israel should pursue a peace plan based on the Saudi Peace Initiative.



Speaking at a recent conference in Tel Aviv, Dagan said that while Israel should have agreed to the Saudi Initiative, once it turned into a general Arab initiative which insists on the right of return, it has become problematic for Israel.


Dagan's recent statement have surprised many in the political sphere, as it seems the former Mossad chief has chosen to position himself on the Left of the political map.



Former Shin Bet Chief Yaakov Peri, however, said the powers that be would be prudent to listen to Dagan: "The man left office after many years of service. You have to listen to him very carefully. His words are very calculated. Set in stone. He can back everything up.



"We are heading for complex times. Taking initiative means retaining control and power," he added, saying that Dagan's statements stem of a true understanding of Israel's realties.



Peri explained that if this move fails to work it's better "they say 'no' than us say it. We need creativity, we need to foresee the future."



As one the leaders of the Israeli Peace Initiative Peri sees Dagan's statements as reinforcment of the group's stance regarding the peace proposal.



"There's no doubt we've received great support from Meir Dagan," said Peri. "The support of a man coming from inside the system is appropriate."



However Peri vigorously rejected claims that he and his friends are no longer in the know. "These are empty claims," he said. "We've always believed the State should take initiative. We've never gone or pretended to go against the establishment, but only to prod and encourage the establishment."



As for Dagan's statements being published only a short while after leaving the Shin Bit, Peri commented: "We live in a democracy. There are those who will love it and those who won't. That's the nature of democracy. We're all obligated to pay attention and listen, take these things into consideration."



According to Peri, "We must hear what people who come from the same system, which has been deeply involved in security matters of the Palestinian and Arab world, and we must respond."



'Entire thing seems irrelevant'
Meanwhile, Major-General (res.) Giora Eiland, former National Security Council head, believes the Saudi initiative is not relevant and considers it to be "the least Pro-Israeli" proposal in comparison to other peace initiatives.




"This initiative clearly states that if and when Israel reaches an agreement with the Palestinians and the Syrians, and returns to 1967 lines, then the Arab world would acknowledge Israel," said Eiland. "It's ridiculous. Even without the initiative, if you've reached an agreement with the Palestinians and Syrians, your enemies, then Bahrain, Qatar and Morocco won't acknowledge us later?"



According to him, people are wrong to assume that Israel would not have to negotiate with the PA given this initiative takes place. "Furthermore, it remains unclear what exactly is the Arab summit. It doesn't mean there won't be talks with the immediate players. This entire thing seems irrelevant."



Eiland believes that "the bone of contention in the State is whether or not to agree to an agreement based on 1967 lines, and it's a legitimate argument. The center and moderate left support it, the right objects. They all bring up good points, but I don't know what's going on in the heads of those who support the Saudi Arabia."



He is not sure why Dagan chose to bring up the Saudi initiative at this time. "I'm not arguing about the fact that it's important to reach an accord, but why do we need the Saudi initiative? If Israel wishes to go this route then let it accept Obama's speech and begin negotiations tomorrow morning. It's more realistic and convenient to Israel, and doesn't call for an accord with Syria."

[Agnimitra]

Evidence grows Iran aiding Syria's Assad

[shyamd]

So this is the Mahdi brigade! The new slaves for the Wahabis just as the Turks were for the Abbasid dynasty.

I guess KSA decided not to trust the Pak troops under TSPA command to be deployed to holy sites. They want borgs under their own command.

What was the title of Ayub Khan's Bio again, " Friends not Masters".
Looks like its the otherway round this time.

As per agreement - command is placed under the host nations military command. So current PSF is under BDF command. You been reading Debka?

[ramana]

Not really. A big pop-up shows up and wants me to subscribe.

[shyamd]

SOBHANI: Israel’s Iran dilemma

Two cultures had history of tolerance until the Islamic Revolution
15 Comments and 14 Reactions|Tweet|Share|Print|Email|More

By S. Rob Sobhani

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses members of Congress on Tuesday, he will get a rousing reception and - no doubt - a standing ovation if he suggests a military strike on Iran to destroy that country’s nuclear weapons facilities. Mr. Netanyahu rightly will point out that Iran is the No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism, a supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah and a threat to the Jewish state.

Members of Congress would be well-advised to take stock of the history between Iran and the Jewish state before giving the Israeli prime minister a green light to attack Iran. This 2,500-year-old history suggests that the character of the regime in Tehran has had the most immediate influence on Israeli-Iranian relations: Secularists have welcomed ties to the Jewish state, whereas Islamists have opposed cultivation of closer ties to Israel.

One of the most difficult challenges facing Uri Lubrani, Israel’s envoy to Iran from 1973 to 1979, was to persuade the 120,000-plus Iranian Jews to leave their homeland and settle in Israel. The reason for their refusal was simple: Until the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, Jews had embraced Iranian culture and were major contributors to the country’s economic, cultural and political development.

To understand the unity between Jews and the Iranian culture, one must look back to the events of 2,500 years ago. The history of Jews and Persians begins with Cyrus the Great, then king of Persia. It was Cyrus, the liberator, who freed the Jews from their Babylonian captivity and allowed them to return home to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem. Those who remained settled in present-day Esfahan and Shiraz.

As long as there were shahs ruling Iran, Jews were welcome members of Iranian society, in keeping with the precedent set by Cyrus the Great. In 1958, David Ben Gurion sent a letter to the shah in which he mentioned Cyrus’ policy toward the Jews as the foundation of a strategic alliance between the two countries. The shah replied: “The memory of Cyrus’ policy regarding your people is precious to me and I strive to continue in the path set by this ancient tradition.”

That tradition of tolerance continued during Adolf Hitler’s “Final Solution.” Seventy-eight years have passed since the “Tehran Children” arrived in Israel when Iran facilitated the rescue of 780 children who cruelly had been separated from their parents. These children were snatched from the crematories of the Holocaust - whose existence is denied by leaders of the Islamic republic - in a unique rescue operation and made their long and tortuous way to Israel via Iran. In 1941, Iranian diplomat Abdol-Hossein Sardari, known as the “Schindler of Iran,” gave 500 blank Iranian passports to an acquaintance of his to be used by non-Iranian Jews in France.

During Israel’s formative years, the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with Tehran was motivated primarily by the human and ideological considerations of immigration. In 1948, Jews were being persecuted in Iraq, and Israeli agents, with the tacit approval of Iranian officials, used Iran as a transit point to relocate Iraqi Jews to Israel.

Iran’s concern for the safety and welfare of the Jews continued until the shah left Iran. The fall of the shah in 1979 caused widespread despair among Iran’s Jewish community. A congratulatory kiss between Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat in 1979 turned out to be a kiss of death for a number of prominent members of Iran’s ancient Jewish community and the harbinger of difficult times for Iranian Jews.

The late Khomeini’s attitude toward Jews had evolved into complete antipathy by the time he toppled the shah. In May 1963, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt sent an agent named Col. Abdul Hamid Sarraj to Qom to deliver $150,000 to Khomeini for anti-government riots. Prior to this date, Khomeini had referred to the shah as a “Zoroastrian fire-worshipper.” But after Nasser’s cultivation of this hard-line cleric, Khomeini would refer to the shah as “an agent of Zionism.”

Khomeini made his position on Jews clear in all his writings: “From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda … they are wretched people who wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world.”

It should therefore come as no surprise that the heirs to Khomeini’s legacy call for wiping Israel off the map. They invoke a nuclear-armed Iran as the “beginning of the end of the Zionist state.”

While Mr. Netanyahu is right about the existential threat to Israel of a nuclear-armed Iran, he is wrong about advocating a military option. History suggests that the option of a secular Iran should be the focus of U.S.-Israeli dialogue on Iran. Helping secularists in Iran gain control of their country is the best guarantor of Israel’s security dilemma.

S. Rob Sobhani is author of “The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations 1948-1978” (Greenwood Press, 1989).

The key for things falling in place is actually regime change in Iran.Don't underestimate the author - he has the ear of several GCC leaders and authored King Abdallah's biography.

[devesh]

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpap ... r4526.html

YEMEN: A COMPLEX STRUGGLE FOR POWER
By B.Raman

Since January last, Yemen has been going through a complex power struggle with Yemeni characteristics, resulting in an almost civil
war situation which has already seen the death of over 350 people.

2.An inter-tribal armed struggle for power and a peaceful struggle of the youth for political reforms and a genuine democracy have been
going on side by side with the democratic youth finding themselves increasingly marginalised.

3. Even the interest of the US and other Western countries has been not in helping the pro-democracy forces win their struggle for
political reforms, but in helping to bring about an agreement among the tribal leaders that could pave the way for the exit of President
Ali Abdullah Saleh from power and the formation of an interim Government which could pave the way for a new political set-up.

4. The six-power Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), with Saudi Arabia in the forefront, is being encouraged by the West to bring about
such an inter-tribal agreement. The fact that the pro-democracy youth has no role in the GCC-initiated attempts to reach such an agreement is an indication that the objective of the West is not democracy--- at least not in the immediate future--- but internal stability based on a new inter-tribal equation which would be favourable to Saudi Arabia and the West.

5. In emulation of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, large numbers of youth started a movement for political reforms and genuine democracy. It has since been totally overshadowed by the inter-tribal power struggle, with the pro-democracy youth being increasingly marginalised.

6. It has consequently lost its jasmine flavour and has become a violent struggle for power involving different tribal clans. Hashem Nidal, of the Independent Movement for Change, has said in an interview: "They (the tribal leaders) wanted to push the revolution towards violence and we refuse this completely. All our protests across the country were peaceful and we want it to be away from this violence. We are co-ordinating with many protesters across the
country to make sure they don't fall into the trap of violence. After three months of great efforts in raising awareness among people to avoid violence, we managed to reach a level of understanding that refuses violence. We are looking to build our identity and to topple this regime by peaceful means."

7. The dramatis personae involved in the inter-tribal power struggle are the very forces responsible for Yemen remaining a poor Arab country ruled by a ruthless dictatorship. These forces are determined to see that Yemen remains that way with power passing from one tribal group to another. They are making opportunistic use of the youth movement without letting it pose a threat to the tribal domination of power.

8.On the one side of the power struggle are Saleh, a Zaydi Shia in a predominantly Sunni country, who became the President of North Yemen in 1978 and took over leadership of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 following unification with the south and his sons and nephews. His eldest son Ahmed Ali Abdallah Saleh was appointed as the head of the Republican Guard in 2000. Another influential son Ali Saleh al-Ahmar was the Military Attache in the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, and was subsequently Director in the office of the head of the military. Nephews Tarik, Yahya and Amar command elite security and intelligence units, trained and funded by Western Governments .

9.Fighting on the other side for the exit of Saleh from power and for he and his sons going into political exile are Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar, the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, who succeeded his father Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar when he died in 2007. His father was the founder of the Islamist Islah opposition party. He is supported by his brother Hamid al-Ahmar, who is a prominent businessman, and another brother, Sheikh Hussein Bin Abdullah al- Ahmar.

10. The inter-tribal clan conflict has been aggravated by the defection from the ranks of Saleh of one of his kinsmen army commander Gen Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, who commanded the 1st armoured tank division and headed the north-west military region. Gen Mohsin is not related to the al-Ahmar family. Reported personal differences with Saleh’s eldest son Ahmed Ali led to Mohsin’s defection in March. His defection has weakened the President without necessarily adding strength to the opposition tribal camp.

11.The GCC has been exercising pressure on Saleh to hand over power to an interim national unity Government and go into political exile along with his sons and nephews. He is not prepared to do so unless the leaders of the Al-Ahmar clan are also made to leave the country. The pro-democracy youth, on the other hand, want that Saleh should not be allowed to leave the country, but should be arrested and prosecuted on various charges.

12. The violent clashes between the Saleh and Al-Ahmar clans led to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Saleh on June 3. He escaped with injuries ---reportedly to his head—when a shell fell on a mosque inside the Presidential compound during the Friday prayers. The shell explosion killed three officers of the elite Republican Guard. Deputy Prime Minister Gen.Rashad al-Alimi was reportedly seriously injured. Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawar
suffered burns to his face. Among others injured were Parliament Speaker Yahya al-Raie, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, head of Yemen's consultative council, Member of Parliament Yasser al-Awadi, and Sanaa Governor Noman Duweik.

13. In an audio message, Saleh has blamed sons of Al-Ahmar for the attempt to kill him. If there is a consequent fight to the finish between the rival clans, the pro-democracy forces may be further handicapped and Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), which operates from the remote areas of Yemen, may be the ultimate beneficiary. Saleh was co-operating with the US in its counter- terrorism operations against Al Qaeda. This co-operation may be affected by his preoccupation with the internal fighting and consequent instability. Even if he is forced to leave by the West and the GCC, it is doubtful whether the successor interim Government may be able to act effectively against AQAP.

[brihaspati]

Another attempt from the Golan Heights, and Syria is claiming that Israeli forces have shot dead Palestinian protesters trying to force a passage through the border fencing. Assad was bound to start something like this sooner or later to divert from the movement against himself. But the pressure on Israel is being slowly mounted to give in to the Islamists. Moreover after the temporary retreat of the essentially theological intolerance of Jews in Europe after the devastation of WWII, those undercurrents have resurfaced again. US establishment [even if not all of the middle sections] no longer feels the need of Israel as a cold war pawn. So Israel is literally without most if not all - friends.

I would be eagerly anticipating the pleased reactions from various avid supporters of Palestinian statehood from within the Indian spectrum. Those reactions are to be noted down and held for accounting in the future when Islamists use exactly same political and ultimately genocidal techniques to "liberate" portions of current India as "Islamic homelands"!

[Agnimitra]

"New Middle East Map"

The link has a nice map worth a dekho.

[UBanerjee]

Moreover after the temporary retreat of the essentially theological intolerance of Jews in Europe after the devastation of WWII, those undercurrents have resurfaced again.

Far from being undercurrents- rabid anti-semitism is quite overtly fashionable in Europe again. In fact it has been this way for at least two decades- "retreat" was never really genuine. I draw some small consolation from the fact that Europe's ugly romance with Islam is biting it very, very hard in the musharaff.

OTOH the US has incurred a great deal of costs by unswerving loyalty to Israel. It remains to be seen if they will continue to pay that cost- there will always be serious antagonism between the US and the Islamic world as long as this continues.

[Gerard]

Female activist calls for legalizing sex slavery

[Purush]

Far from being undercurrents- rabid anti-semitism is quite overtly fashionable in Europe again. In fact it has been this way for at least two decades- "retreat" was never really genuine. I draw some small consolation from the fact that Europe's ugly romance with Islam is biting it very, very hard in the musharaff.

[Advait]

Explain to me again why we need to suck up to Saudis.

Death Compensation in respect of a male person:

i. Muslim - SR. 100,000/-

ii. Christian/Jew - SR.50,000/-

iii. Other religions : such as Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, etc. - SR 6666.66

In the case of death of a female, death compensation allowed is equal to half the amount as admissible to males professing the same religion. Further the amount of compensation admissible, is based on the percentage of responsibility fixed on the causer e.g. if the causer is held 50% responsible for the accident resulting in the death of a Muslim, the amount of Death Compensation admissible will be SR 50,000 only.


So Hindu male = 6.6% of the value of a Muslim male
Hindu female = 3.3% of the value of a Muslim male

[brihaspati]

^^^the ratios come from interpretations of certain Hadiths. It is due to the "revelation" of the very humanitarian theology - and not peculiarly Saudi [but perhaps ME and Bedouin origin]. They have just been more literal and rigorous in implementing it. Blood-money is an old concept in that region and they had elaborate ratios fixing what needs to be be paid etc. the 1:2 ratio for male:female is very common in Islam - and applies to many other situations. The ratio of 1:2 for Muslim: other people of the book comes from a similar "feminization" argument. The ratio of 1:16 for non-people of the book comes from a few particular cases referred to in the Hadiths.

[Sanku]

Saleh Goes......

[shyamd]

KSA are gonna pump the $$$$'s into Yemen. Sounds like Egypt is out of the Sunni alliance (Israel, Jordan, KSA now).

[kmkraoind]

Attack kills 120 Syrian forces; crackdown feared

[Philip]

Inside info on the Arab/Plestinian deal from veteran M-E expert Fisk.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 93879.html

Key Excpts:

Revealed: the untold story of the deal that shocked the Middle East

Exclusive by Robert Fisk
Tuesday, 7 June 2011

Secret meetings between Palestinian intermediaries, Egyptian intelligence officials, the Turkish foreign minister, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal – the latter requiring a covert journey to Damascus with a detour round the rebellious city of Deraa – brought about the Palestinian unity which has so disturbed both Israelis and the American government. Fatah and Hamas ended four years of conflict in May with an agreement that is crucial to the Paslestinian demand for a state.

A series of detailed letters, accepted by all sides, of which The Independent has copies, show just how complex the negotiations were; Hamas also sought – and received – the support of Syrian President Bachar al-Assad, the country’s vice president Farouk al-Sharaa and its foreign minister, Walid Moallem. Among the results was an agreement by Meshaal to end Hamas rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza – since resistance would be the right only of the state – and agreement that a future Palestinian state be based on Israel’s 1967 borders.

“Without the goodwill of all sides, the help of the Egyptians and the acceptance of the Syrians – and the desire of the Palestinians to unite after the start of the Arab Spring, we could not have done this,” one of the principal intermediaries, 75-year old Munib Masri, told me. It was Masri who helped to set up a ‘Palestinian Forum’ of independents after the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas originally split after Hamas won an extraordinary election victory in 2006. “I thought the divisions that had opened up could be a catastrophe and we went for four years back and forth between the various parties,” Masri said. “Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) asked me several times to mediate. We opened meetings in the West Bank. We had people from Gaza. Everyone participated. We had a lot of capability.”

In three years, members of the Palestinian Forum made more than 12 trips to Damascus, Cairo, Gaza and Europe and a lot of initiatives were rejected. Masri and his colleagues dealt directly with Hamas’ Prime Minister Hanniyeh in Gaza. They took up the so-called ‘prisoner swap initiative’ of Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fatah leader in an Israeli jail; then in the winds of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the youth of Palestine on 15 March demanded unity and an end to the rivalry of Fatah and Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had always refused to talk to Abbas on the grounds that the Palestinians were not united. On the 16th, he made a speech saying that he was “thinking of going to Gaza”. Masri, who was present, stood on a chair and clapped.

“I thought Hamas would answer in a positive way,” he recalls. “But in the first two or three days after Abbas’ speech, it gave a rather negative response. He had wanted an immediate election and no dialogue. Hamas did not appreciate this.” Abbas went off to Paris and Moscow – to sulk, in the eyes of some of his associates. But the Forum did not give up.

“We wrote a document – we said we would go to see the Egyptians, to congratulate them upon their revolution. So we had two meetings with the Egyptian head of intelligence, Khaled Orabi – Orabi’s father was an army general at the time of King Farouk – and we met Mohamed Ibrahim, an officer in the intelligence department.” Ibrahim’s father had won renown in the 1973 war when he captured the highest ranking Israeli officer in Sinai. The delegation also met Ibrahim’s deputies, Nadr Aser and Yassir Azawi.

Seven people from each part of Palestine were to represent the team in Cairo. These are the names which will be in future Palestinian history books. From the West Bank, came Dr Hanna Nasser (head of Bir Zeit University and of the Palestinian central election committee); Dr Mamdouh Aker (the head of the human rights society); Mahdi Abdul-Hadi (chairman of a political society in Jerusalem); Hanni Masri (a political analyst); Iyad Masrouji (businessman in pharmacuticals); Hazem Quasmeh (runs an NGO) and Munib Masri himself.

The Gaza ‘side’ were represented by Eyad Sarraj (who in the event could not go to Cairo because he was ill); Maamoun Abu Shahla (member of the board of Palestine Bank); Faysal Shawa (businessman and landowner); Mohsen Abu Ramadan (writer); Rajah Sourani (head of Arab human rights, who did not go to Cairo); ‘Abu Hassan’ (Islamic Jihad member who was sent by Sarraj); and Sharhabil Al-Zaim (a Gaza lawyer).

“These men spent time with the top brass of the Egyptian ‘mukhabarat’ intelligence service,” Masri recalls. “We met them on 10 April but we sent a document before we arrived in Cairo. This is what made it important. In Gaza, there were two different ‘sides’. So we talked about the micro-situation, about Gazans in the ‘jail’ of Gaza, we talked about human rights, the Egyptian blockade, about dignity. Shawa was saying ‘we feel we do not have dignity – and we feel it’s your fault.’ Nadr Asr of the intelligence department said: ‘We’re going to change all that.’

“At 7.0 pm, we came back and saw Khaled Orabi again. I told him: ‘Look, I need these things from you. Do you like the new initiative, a package that’s a win-win situation for everyone? Is the Palestinian file still ‘warm’ in Cairo? He said ‘It’s a bit long – but we like it. Can you pressure both Fatah and Hamas, to bring them in? But we will work with you. Go and see Fatah and Hamas – and treat this as confidential.’ We agreed, and went to see Amr Moussa (now a post-revolution Egyptian presidential candidate) at the Arab League. He was at first very cautious – but the next day, Amr Moussa’s team was very positive. We said: ‘Give it a chance – we said that the Arab League was created for Palestine, that the Arab League has a big role in Jerusalem’.”

The delegation went to see Nabil al-Arabi at the Egyptian foreign ministry. “Al-Arabi said: ‘Can I bring in the foreign minister of Turkey, who happens to be in Egypt?’ So we all talkled about the initiative together. We noticed the close relationship between the foreign ministry and the intelligence ministry. That’s how I found out that ‘new’ Egypt had a lot of confidence – they were talking in front of Turkey; they wanted (italics: wanted) to talk in front of Turkey. So we agreed we would all talk together and then I returned with the others to Amman at 9.0 pm.”

The team went to the West Bank to report – “we were happy, we never had this feeling before” – and tell Azzam Ahmed (Fatah’s head of reconciliation) that they intended to support Mahmoud Abbas’s initiative over Gaza. “We had seven big meetings in Palestine to put all the groups there and the independents in the picture. Abbas had already given us a presidential decree. I spoke to Khaled Meshaal (head of Hamas, living in Damascus) by phone. He said: ‘Does Abu Mazzen (Abbas) agree to this?’ I said that wasn’t the point. I went to Damascus next day with Hanna Nasser, Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Hanni Masri. Because of all the trouble in Syria, we had to make a detour around Deraa. I had a good rapport with Meshaal. He said he had read our document – and that it was worth looking at.”

It was a sign of the mutual distrust between Hamas and Abbas that they both seemed intent on knowing the other’s reaction to the initiative before making up their own minds. “Meshaal said to me: ‘What did Abu Mazzen (Abbas) say?’ I laughed and replied: ‘You always ask me this – but what do you (italics: you) want? We met with Meshaal’s colleagues, Abu Marzouk, Izzat Rishiq and Abu Abdu Rahman. We reviewed the document for six and a half hours. The only thing we didn’t get from Meshaal was that the government has to be by agreement. We told him the government has to be of natiuonal unity -- on the agreement that we would be able to carry out elections and lift the embargo on Gaza and reconstruct Gaza, that we have to abide by international law, by the UN Charter and UN resolutions. He asked for three or four days. He agreed that resistance must only be ‘in the national interest of the country’ – it would have to be ‘aqlaqi’ – ethical. There would be no more rocket attacks on civilians. In other words, no more rocket attacks from Gaza.”

Meshaal told Masri and his friends that he had seen President Bashar Assad of Syria, his vice president Sharaa and Syrian foreign minister Moallem. “He said he wanted their support – but in the end it was the word of the Palestinian people. We were very happy – we said ‘there is a small breakthrough’. Meshaal said: ‘We won’t let you down.’ We said we would communicate all this to Fatah and the independents on the West Bank and to the Egyptians. In the West Bank, Fatah called it the ‘Hamas initiative’ -- but we said no, it is from everybody. After two days, Meshaal said he had spoken to Egyptian intelligence and they like what we have offered.”

The talks had been successful. Meshaal was persuaded to send two of his top men to Cairo. Masri’s team hoped that Abbas would do the same. Four men – two from each side – travelled to Egypt on 22 April. A year earlier, when there was a familiar impasse between the two sides in Egypt, the Moubarak regime tried to place further obstacles between them. Meshaal had fruitlessly met with Omar Sulieman – Mubarak’s intelligence factotum and Israel’s best friend in the Arab world – in Mecca. Sulieman effectively worked for the Israelis. Now all had changed utterly.

On the day Abbas and Meshaal went to Cairo, everyone went except the two rival prime ministers, Fayad and Hanniyeh. Hamas agreed that over the past four years, the Israelis had seized more of Jerusalem and built many more settlements in the occupied West Bank. Meshaal was angry when he thought he would not be allowed to speak from the podium with the others – in the event, he was – and Hamas agreed on the 1967 border, effectively acknowledging Israel’s existence, and to the reference to the ‘resistance’; and to give Abbas more time for negotiation.

If Hamas was in the government, it would have to recognise the State of Israel. But if they were not, they would not recognise anything. “It’s not fair to say ‘Hamas must do the following’, Masri says. “The resistance must also be reciprocal. But as long as they are not in the Palestinian government, Hamas are just a political party and can say anything they want. So America should be prepared to see Hamas ageeeing on the formation of the government. That government will abide by UN resolutions – and international law. It’s got to be mutual. Both sides realised they might miss the boat of the Arab spring. It wasn’t me who did this – it was a compilation of many efforts. If it was not for Egypt and the willingness of the two Palestinian groups, this would not have happened.” In the aftermath of the agreement, Hamas and Abbas’ loyalists agreed to stop arresting members of each side.

The secret story of Palestinian unity is now revealed. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu’s reaction to the news – having originally refused to negotiate with Palestinians because they were divided – was to say that he would not talk to Abbas if Hamas came into the Palestinian government. President Obama virtually dismissed the Palestinian unity initiative. But 1967 borders means that Hamas is accepting Israel and the ‘resistance’ initiative means an end to Gaza rockets on Israel. International law and UN resolutions mean peace can be completed and a Palestinian state brought into being. That, at least, is the opinion of both Palestinian sides. The world will wait to see if Israel will reject it all again.

Q & A: The events that led to the historic handshake

Q: How did the split come about? The rift between Fatah and Hamas, known among Palestinians as "Wakseh", meaning ruin or humiliation, emerged when Hamas won a sweeping majority in the 2006 elections. Hamas ran on a change-and- reform ticket and had garnered broad support through its social programmes. Anger with corruption within Fatah, and frustration with President Mahmoud Abbas's lack of progress on the peace process helped propel them to victory. The election result stunned US and Israeli officials, who had repeatedly said they would not work with a Palestinian Authority which included Hamas, and led to sanctions and a Western-led boycott. Security forces, still under Fatah's control, refused to take orders from the government and the US continued to fund Fatah. In 2007, the two sides briefly formed a unity government but it collapsed as masked gunmen took to the streets of Gaza. A state of emergency was announced and President Abbas dismissed Hamas's Ismail Hanniyeh as Prime Minister, swearing in a new emergency cabinet in the West Bank. Hamas seized control of Gaza, while Fatah held on to the West Bank, leaving a de facto split as both sides traded accusations about the legality of each other's rule.


Q: What was the impact of the rift on the peace process? The split between Hamas and Fatah effectively stalled the peace process, with Israel refusing to negotiate with a divided Palestinian leadership, which was forced to focus on putting its own house in order. However, with both sides reunited the prospect for peace is not necessarily more positive. The "Palestinian Papers", diplomatic cables leaked to Al Jazeera in January, showed Mr Abbas had offered far-reaching concessions during talks with Ehud Olmert's government, but to no avail. It is unlikely concessions so favourable to Israel will make it to the negotiating room again if Hamas has a seat at the table. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had used the rift as a reason not to negotiate, now says he will not speak to Mr Abbas if Hamas is included in the Palestinian government.


Q: What were the details of the agreement? In Gaza, dozens took to the streets to celebrate the Egyptian-brokered pact, signed on 4 May, which brought an end to four years of bitter rivalry. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said he was ready to "pay any price" to reconcile the factions. The deal envisaged a caretaker government with the task of preparing for parliamentary and presidential elections. Egypt has set up a committee to oversee the deal, but the unity government has a rocky road ahead, with potential pitfalls over how to integrate Hamas's military wing into the security services. For years, Egypt sponsored reconciliatory talks in Cairo – but to no avail. It was the renewed vigour of the Arab Spring that finally led to the historic handshake.Loveday Morris

PS:The recent comments by the former Mossad chief Dagan,that Netanyahu and Barak's hard line policies are detrimental to a lasting ME peace and actually are endangering Israel's future need to be also factored into the situ.Apparently,the Saudis have assured the Israelis recognition from all Arab states if the Palestinians are allowed thier independent state along with some other assuarances reg. settlements,etc.The Syrian uprising and "invasion" of the Golan Heghts by Palestinian protesters,some shot dead by Israeli troops only heighten the tension growing in the region.

[brihaspati]

The Saudis have as little real control or intent to prevent the "recognized" Palestinian state from future military expansion or sponsoring Jihad using the territory as base. Israel will not be able to control what goes in under cover of an internationally recognized formal "nation". Promises from the Saudis about this is at the least a pious and ineffective formality, and possibly deceptive.

[shyamd]

A Saudi perspective on the Arab uprisings

Editor's Note: Nawaf Obaid is a Senior Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He recently wrote an op-ed for The Washington Post entitled, Why Saudi Arabia is stable amid the Mideast unrest. Previously, Obaid was also private security and energy advisor Nawaf Obaid to Prince Turki al-Faisal when al-Faisal was the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.

By Nawaf Obaid – Special to CNN

The Arab world faces a period of historic upheaval: The economic and social malaise that existed in Tunisia before the revolution remains, and there is no realistic plan to turn the situation around.

Egypt's economy is in free-fall and the Muslim Brotherhood is poised to significantly increase its power through upcoming elections.

Civil war in Libya and escalating violence in Yemen have cost thousands of lives and set back development by decades.

Syria is on the edge of an abyss of nightmarish internecine warfare, which could spill into Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.

The so-called "Arab Spring" has not brought new life to the Middle East, but leaderless anarchy, creating a virtual pan-regional movement that is alarmingly dangerous and ultimately unsustainable.

Recognizing the threat that the spread of this movement represents, Saudi Arabia is expanding its role internationally and mobilizing its vast resources to help countries facing domestic upheaval.

As the birthplace of Islam and the leader of the Muslim and Arab worlds, Saudi Arabia has a unique responsibility to aid states in the region, assisting them in their gradual evolution toward more sustainable political systems and preventing them from collapsing and spreading further disorder.

That the Kingdom has the ability to implement this foreign policy goal should not be in doubt - it is backed by significant military and economic strength.

The foundation for this more robust strategic posture is Saudi Arabia's investment of around $150 billion in its military. This includes a potential expansion of the National Guard and Armed Forces by at least 120,000 troops, and a further 60,000 troops for the security services at the Interior Ministry, notably in the special and various police forces. A portion of these will join units that could be deployed beyond the Kingdom's borders.

In addition, approximately 1,000 new state-of-the-art combat tanks may be added to the Army, and the Air Force will see its capabilities significantly improve with the doubling of its high quality combat airplanes to about 500 advanced aircraft.

A massive new missile defense system is in the works. Finally, the two main fleets of the Navy will undergo extensive expansion and a complete refurbishment of existing assets.

As part of this new defense doctrine, the leadership has decided to meet the country's growing needs for new equipment by diversifying among American, European and Asian military suppliers.

Few countries are able to support such considerable military investment, but Saudi Arabia occupies a unique position in that it has sufficient reserves and revenues to carry out the above plans, while also funding vital domestic social programs.

With 25 percent of the world's oil reserves and over 70 percent of global spare capacity, current projections for the next five years estimate that the Kingdom will earn on average about $250 billion in oil revenue per year (for 2011, the projection is almost $300 billion). In addition, the Kingdom has approximately $550 billion in foreign reserves, a sum it plans to steadily increase.

To maintain current oil export levels while at the same time fulfilling its growing domestic energy needs, the government is investing heavily in solar technology, and will spend more than $100 billion to build at least 16 nuclear power plants across the Kingdom.

Solar energy will fill the gap in the short term, satisfying some incremental domestic energy needs, and within a decade, plans call for nuclear power to play the leading role in augmenting oil as a source of domestic energy.

Thus, Saudi Arabia will be able to fuel the growth of its burgeoning economy without significantly reducing its oil exporting capability.

The Kingdom's more assertive policies are already apparent. It has provided Egypt $4 billion and Jordan $400 million (the latter could form the first installment of a much larger aid package that is being discussed).

Saudi Arabia is also leading the effort to improve regional collaboration by working to include Jordan and Morocco in a Saudi-centric Gulf Cooperation Council alliance.

In Yemen, it is spearheading diplomatic negotiations to effect a peaceful transition of power.

The Kingdom is the main supporter of Bahrain's monarchy, and will maintain a military presence there.

As Saudi Arabia grows more influential, initiatives such as these - which currently stretch from Morocco to Malaysia - will increase in number and reach, regardless of whether they meet with Western approval.

In Saudi Arabia, protests on the so-called "Day of Rage" predicted by pundits never materialized; the country remains stable and the leadership enjoys widespread support.

Those who are similarly skeptical about the Kingdom's ability to rise to its historic role as the indispensable regional power will again be proven wrong. The Saudi government will use its vast resources to steer the Arab world away from anarchy and unrealistic populist movements, and towards steady evolution in a manner that respects each country's unique culture and history.

The views expressed in this piece are solely those of Nawaf Obaid.

My comments about the article on the blog:

Despite the disclaimer at the end, we know that Nawaf Obaid has regular interactions with the highest levels of the Saudi government. Born of a Lebanese mother and Saudi father, Obaid has lived in Switzerland, where his mother resides, and studied in the United States. He holds degrees from Georgetown University, MIT and Harvard. His articles tend to be fairly accurate in terms of the positions taken by the Saudi government and are often prescient.

Nawaf's article DECODED:

* They will back political political parties that are pro - Saudi in the Arab spring countries and if these parties come to power, the KSA government will back them to preserve a status quo. The KSA will do everything possible to preserve the status quo across the region and beyond (hence incorporating Jordan & Morocco) hence even supporting sunni monarchies such as Malaysia.
* Interesting that he hints that the Saudi units "could" be deployed abroad. He is referring to the Saudi Special Forces and specifically we believe he is hinting at deployment in either Lebanon (to cut off Hezbollah) or possibly in Iraq to defend the sunni tribes. Cheney had proposed deploying sunni troops in sunni provinces of Iraq such as Al Anbar back in 2006.

* Mentioning the specific Saudi plans to expand tanks, air force and army is a further confirmation that Saudi's will protect their own interests with minimal help of the US Security agreement. The emergence of a muslim brotherhood dominated Egyptian government is likely to be seen as a threat by the KSA government and particularly an egypt that is renewing diplomatic links with Iran. Therefore, the new air force/Naval purchases and expansion will be so that KSA can deal with a 2/3 front war (Red sea, arabian gulf, Iraqi borders).
* Tier 1 and 2 (high tech equipment such as Aircraft or Electronic warfare equipment) purchases will be from US/EU defence firms with some Russian systems, but Tier 3 equipment will be purchased from possibly China or India or maybe Russia.
* Saudi aid to Jordan is an incentive for Jordan to join the GCC. Once Jordan joins the GCC, it will be able to take advantage of larger aid packages.
* The article hints that KSA is likely to build a permanent base in Bahrain.
* The last paragraph reaffirms that KSA will do everything to prevent further pro-democracy movements in the region.

We'd also add that KSA will have to train up a vast number of Saudi defence personell, as it currently relies mainly on deputed Egyptian and Pakistani officers to man aircraft/naval vessels. The large increase in defence assets would also mean that more such officers will be brought in termporarily from Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan and other countries until Saudi officers are able to take over. This further re-affirms the position of Pakistan as a strategic partner to KSA.

Meanwhile, the Iranian government hasn't sat back to these latest developments. Stay tuned for the next post which will detail the Iranian response!

[shyamd]

Expect HEAT coming up in the region. All might not be how it seems.

[shyamd]

Riyadh issues an ultimatum to Washington. Interesting times.

Failed favoritism toward Israel

By Turki al-Faisal, Published: June 10

Riyadh, SAUDI ARABIA

President Obama gave a rousing call to action in his controversial speech last month, admonishing Arab governments to embrace democracy and provide freedom to their populations. We in Saudi Arabia, although not cited, took his call seriously. We noted, however, that he conspicuously failed to demand the same rights to self-determination for Palestinians — despite the occupation of their territory by the region’s strongest military power.

Soon after, Obama again called into question America’s claim to be a beacon of human rights by allowing Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to set the terms of the agenda on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Even more depressing than the sight of Congress applauding the denial of basic human rights to the Palestinian people was America turning its back on its stated ideals.

Despite the consternation and criticism that greeted the president’s words about the 1967 borders, he offered no substantive change to U.S. policy. America’s bottom line is still that negotiations should take place with the aim of reaching a two-state solution, with the starting point for the division of Israeli and Palestinian territory at the borders in existence before the 1967 Six-Day War.

Obama is correct that the 1967 lines are the only realistic starting point for talks and, thus, for achieving peace. The notion that Palestinians would accept any other terms is simply unrealistic. Although Netanyahu rejected the suggestions, stating “We can’t go back to those indefensible lines, and we’re going to have a long-term military presence along the Jordan [River],” both sides have long accepted the 1967 lines as a starting point. In 2008, Ehud Olmert, then Israeli prime minister, told the Knesset: “We must give up Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem and return to the core of the territory that is the State of Israel prior to 1967, with minor corrections dictated by the reality created since then.” Last November, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Netanyahu declared in a joint statement that “the United States believes that through good-faith negotiations, the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state, based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements.”

One conclusion can be drawn from recent events: that any peace plans co-authored by the United States and Israel would be untenable and that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will remain intractable as long as U.S. policy is unduly beholden to Israel. Despite his differences with Netanyahu, Obama is stymied in his efforts to play a constructive role. On the eve of an election year, his administration will no doubt bow to pressure from special interests and a Republican-dominated Congress, and back away from forcing Israel to accept concrete terms that would bring Palestinians to the negotiating table.


But U.S. domestic politics and Israeli intransigence cannot be allowed to stand in the way of Palestinians’ right to a future with a decent quality of life and opportunities similar to those living in unoccupied countries. Thus, in the absence of productive negotiations, the time has come for Palestinians to bypass the United States and Israel and to seek direct international endorsement of statehood at the United Nations. They will be fully supported in doing so by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations and the vast majority of the international community — all those who favor a just outcome to this stalemate and a stable Middle East.

Obama has criticized this plan as Palestinian “efforts to delegitimize Israel” and suggested that these “symbolic actions to isolate” Israel would end in failure. But why should Palestinians not be granted the same rights the United Nations accorded to the state of Israel at its creation in 1947? The president must realize that the Arab world will no longer allow Palestinians to be delegitimized by Israeli actions to restrict their movements, choke off their economy and destroy their homes. Saudi Arabia will not stand by while Washington and Israel bicker endlessly about their intentions, fail to advance their plans and then seek to undermine a legitimate Palestinian presence on the international stage.

As the main political and financial supporter of the Palestinian quest for self-determination, Saudi Arabia holds an especially strong position. The kingdom’s wealth, steady growth and stability have made it the bulwark of the Middle East. As the cradle of Islam, it is able to symbolically unite most Muslims worldwide. In September, the kingdom will use its considerable diplomatic might to support the Palestinians in their quest for international recognition. American leaders have long called Israel an “indispensable” ally. They will soon learn that there are other players in the region — not least the Arab street — who are as, if not more, “indispensable.” The game of favoritism toward Israel has not proven wise for Washington, and soon it will be shown to be an even greater folly.

Commentators have long speculated about the demise of Saudi Arabia as a regional powerhouse. They have been sorely disappointed. Similarly, history will prove wrong those who imagine that the future of Palestine will be determined by the United States and Israel. There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state. It would mark a nadir in the decades-long relationship as well as irrevocably damage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and America’s reputation among Arab nations. The ideological distance between the Muslim world and the West in general would widen — and opportunities for friendship and cooperation between the two could vanish.

We Arabs used to say no to peace, and we got our comeuppance in 1967. In 2002 King Abdullah offered what has become the Arab Peace Initiative. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, it calls for an end to the conflict based on land for peace. The Israelis withdraw from all occupied lands, including East Jerusalem, reach a mutually agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees and recognize the Palestinian state. In return, they will get full diplomatic recognition from the Arab world and all the Muslim states, an end to hostilities and normal relations with all these states.

Now, it is the Israelis who are saying no. I’d hate to be around when they face their comeuppance.

The writer is chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies in Riyadh. He was Saudi intelligence chief from 1977 to 2001 and ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006.

[devesh]

^^^
time is coming when Israel will need a "Berlin Airlift." but that is only temporary. and remains to be seen Arabs will ever accept Israel permanently...

[Samudragupta]

The Arab consolidation probably under KSA may not be a bad affair afterall..but only time can tell the implication of this process...but certain points can be drawn from the process...

1. The consolidtaon of the Arabs under KSA will put lots of strain on the relationship with the Turks and the Persians....wrt the Persians the effect is already visible...the effect on the Turks will be visible only in the future when Turkey will move more closer to
West Asian Geopolitics.

2. The Arab consolidation is specially happenning under a strong muscular presence of Punjabi army in the Arab lands. This Persians are alredy hitting the Punjabis....its only a metter of time when the Rurks will start to hit the Punjabis. The Arabs will use the service of the Punjabis to nullify the influence of US/EU, Turks and Persians in the WA.

3. Israelis will be be increasing seen as a liability by the West.

4. The more the conflict rises in the WA the more India can take the matters in its own hand in the Land East of Hindukush.

5. It is India's interest to increase the conflict with the four powers in the WA and to transfer the conflict primarily from the Mediternean to the Persian Gulf.

[shyamd]

An excellent article for those that are interested. One of the best political scientists explains the arab spring phenomenon:

How Tyrants Endure

By BRUCE BUENO De MESQUITA and ALASTAIR SMITH
Published: June 9, 2011


WHY do certain dictators survive while others fall? Throughout history, downtrodden citizens have tried to throw off the yoke of their oppressors, but revolutions, like those sweeping through the Arab world, are rare.

Despotic rulers stay in power by rewarding a small group of loyal supporters, often composed of key military officers, senior civil servants and family members or clansmen. A central responsibility of these loyalists is to suppress opposition to the regime. But they only carry out this messy, unpleasant task if they are well rewarded. Autocrats therefore need to ensure a continuing flow of benefits to their cronies.

If the dictator’s backers refuse to suppress mass uprisings or if they defect to a rival, then he is in real trouble. That is why successful autocrats reward their cronies first, and the people last. As long as their cronies are assured of reliable access to lavish benefits, protest will be severely suppressed. Once the masses suspect that crony loyalty is faltering, there is an opportunity for successful revolt. Three types of rulers are especially susceptible to desertion by their backers: new, decrepit and bankrupt leaders.

Newly ensconced dictators do not know where the money is or whose loyalty they can buy cheaply and effectively. Thus, during transitions, revolutionary entrepreneurs can seize the moment to topple a shaky new regime.

Even greater danger lurks for the aging autocrat whose cronies can no longer count on him to deliver the privileges and payments that ensure their support. They know he can’t pay them from beyond the grave. Decrepitude slackens loyalty, raising the prospects that security forces will sit on their hands rather than stop an uprising, giving the masses a genuine chance to revolt. This is what brought about the end of dictatorships in the Philippines, Zaire and Iran.

In addition to rumors of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s and Hosni Mubarak’s health concerns, Tunisia and Egypt suffered serious economic problems that kindled rebellion. Grain and fuel prices were on the rise, unemployment, particularly among the educated, was high and, in Egypt’s case, there had been a substantial decline in American aid (later reinstated by President Obama). Mr. Mubarak’s military backers, beneficiaries of that aid, worried that he was no longer a reliable source of revenue.

As money becomes scarce, leaders can’t pay their cronies, leaving no one to stop the people if they rebel. This is precisely what happened during the Russian and French revolutions and the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe — and why we predicted Mr. Mubarak’s fall in a presentation to investors last May.

Today’s threat to Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria can be seen in much the same light. With a projected 2011 deficit of approximately 7 percent of G.D.P., declining oil revenue and high unemployment among the young, Mr. Assad faces the perfect conditions for revolution. He may be cracking heads today, but we are confident that either he will eventually enact modest reforms or someone will step into his shoes and do so.

Contagion also plays an important part in revolutionary times. As people learn that leaders in nearby states can’t buy loyalty, they sense that they, too, may have an opportunity. But it does not automatically lead to copycat revolutions. In many nations, particularly the oil-rich Gulf States, either there has been no protest or protest has been met with violence. In Bahrain, for example, 60 percent of government revenue comes from the oil and gas sector; its leaders have therefore faced few risks in responding to protests with violent oppression.

This is because resource-rich autocrats have a reliable revenue stream available for rewarding cronies — and repression does not jeopardize this flow of cash. Natural resource wealth explains why the octogenarian Robert Mugabe shows no sign of stepping down in Zimbabwe and the oil-rich Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi has given little hint of compromise from the start in Libya. As NATO bombs fall on Tripoli, however, Colonel Qaddafi is discovering that he needs to convince remaining loyalists that he can re-establish control over Libya’s oil riches or they, too, will turn on him. Sadly, if the rebels win, they are also likely to suppress freedom to ensure their control over oil wealth.

Regimes rich in natural resources or flush with foreign aid can readily suppress freedom of speech, a free press and, most important, the right to assemble. By contrast, resource-poor leaders can’t easily restrict popular mobilization without simultaneously making productive work so difficult that they cut off the tax revenues they need to buy loyalty.

Such leaders find themselves between a rock and a hard place and would be wise to liberalize preemptively. This is why we expect countries like Morocco and Syria to reform over the next few years even if their initial response to protest is repression. The same incentive for democratization exists in many countries that lack a natural reservoir of riches like China and Jordan — a bad omen for authoritarian rulers and good news for the world’s oppressed masses.

Read the first chapter of his book "How bad economics is good politics". Its based on a study on Congress party and how they won election. Extremely interesting insight and extremely valuable for knowledge and predicting moves that leaders make.

So the conclusion from this article is that Assad is going out. Source says Saleh is on his way too.

[krisna]

Syrian tanks roll into Jisr al-Shughour as locals flee

Forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad stormed the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughour overnight Saturday, as residents fled in their thousands to neighbouring villages and across the border into Turkey to escape the crackdown.

The strategic town, among hills on the road between Syria's second city Aleppo and the country's main port of Latakia, had seen large demonstrations, with residents describing a mutiny by security forces whom they said fought other troops to try and prevent the killing of civilians.

Radikal newspaper said Turkey would establish a buffer zone if migrant inflows from Syria exceed 10,000.

mutiny by armed forces never a good thing for dictatorial regimes, can result in coup anytime.

[shyamd]

Black market rates for weapons in Leb just shot up due to heavy demand from Syria. Will be interesting if Hezb take the arms dealers, traditionally they are very powerful and Hezb normally stay out of their way and keep them in good terms.

Bashar has to commit to reforms or he is finished.

-----------------------
Talmiz Ahmad (Indian ambassador to KSA) speaks on Oil and India. Interesting view.


Saudi oil boost 'safeguards global economy'

By SIRAJ WAHAB | ARAB NEWS

Published: Jun 12, 2011 22:15 Updated: Jun 12, 2011 22:15

DAMMAM: The Kingdom’s bold move to ramp up oil production despite reservations from some members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will help keep Asian economies growing and may be a foil for predatory speculation in the West that has sent oil prices skyrocketing in recent months.

Newspaper reports, citing officials in OPEC, said Saudi Arabia will produce 10 million barrels per day (bpd) in July to meet global market demand, which is expected to rise, compared to 8.8 million bpd in May.

The Saudi decision is being described as significant because it comes just two days after the failure of intense negotiations at the OPEC meeting at its Vienna headquarters.

At the meeting, Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, called for raising production from some 25 million bpd to 30.87 million bpd to meet projected increased global demand of 2 million bpd more oil for the third quarter of this year and 1.5 million for the fourth quarter.

However, Iran, which currently chairs the 12-member OPEC, and six other countries opposed any move to pump more oil.

“We were unable to reach an agreement (on output increase),” said Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali Al-Naimi after the Vienna conclave ended on Wednesday. “This is one of the worst meetings we have ever had.”

Experts said the Saudi output hike proposal was in line with industry forecasts, including one from OPEC itself, that more oil is required to stop prices from rising again.

Indian Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad told Arab News that he has seen reports suggesting Saudi Arabia has decided to increase its oil production primarily to make up for the withdrawal of the Libyan oil from the market.

“I do hope that this intervention will lead to a moderation in oil prices,” he said. “Given that India is a major importer of its oil requirements, we welcome any initiative that brings the prices down.”

The Indian ambassador, who is seen among the diplomatic community as an oil industry pundit, reiterated that high oil prices were due to unchecked rampant speculation.

“I would also like to point out that the boost in oil prices have very little to do with demand-and-supply issues,” he said. “It has much more to do with the activities of the speculators, particularly at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).”

He called for a robust mechanism to check speculators.

“I do believe that there should be some degree of regulation of what is happening at NYMEX because until we do that NYMEX will continue to boost oil prices to the extent of $40 and possibly even more than that,” the ambassador said.

According to Ahmad, developing countries like India and China, which depend heavily on oil imports, are seriously affected by the activities of the speculators.

“The kind of trading activity that takes place at NYMEX is mind-boggling; some times they trade in a day the actual production for an entire year,” he said.

“This clearly means that the trade is not in regard to real oil; it is in regard to virtual oil.”

European and American oil experts have in the past pointed out the negative effects of speculation. Also, a cursory look at US media reports indicate that the American authorities have recognized the magnitude of the problem but have so far shied away from formulating any solid legislative initiative to regulate the speculative activities of the NYMEX.

According to the latest statistics, India imports 17 percent of its crude oil requirements from Saudi Arabia. From the entire GCC, it imports 50 percent. Add Iran and Iraq and it becomes 80 percent of India’s energy requirements.

Ahmad explained the reason.

“We are buying more and more oil on the spot market. There is a difference between spot market and term contract. A term contract is for one year. Spot market is on the spot — literally on the spot — so we buy more and more on the spot market. Another reason is that Iran and Iraq give India a three-month credit,” said the ambassador.

“When their oil reaches our refineries, in three months we monetize it. By the time you pay them for the crude you have already got the money for your refined products, which is why India is buying more from Iran and Iraq,” he added.

The Saudi move clearly indicates that Riyadh will counteract any disruptions in the market arising from the turmoil sweeping through North Africa and Middle East.

According to oil analysts, the fighting in Libya has taken 1.3 million barrels off the world market, and the turmoil in Yemen and Syria has subtracted an additional 300,000 barrels.

“By signaling its intention to raise production and offering those refiners interested in additional supplies, Saudi Arabia, one of the few if not the only OPEC producer capable of increasing its output, signaled that is capable and willing to act as the stabilizer of the oil market,” said senior researcher James M. Dorsey in his analysis on alarabiya.net.

“Oil consuming nations are certain to be reassured by expectations that Saudi Arabia is likely to thwart Iranian-led efforts to spark a price hike.”

[Muppalla]

With dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen collapsed or collapsing, America’s spies have lost many of their most valued allies in the war against the jihadists.

It’s not a philosophical thing, just a practical one. Confronted by the cold realities of this year’s Arab Spring, many intelligence and counterterrorism professionals now see major dangers looming near at hand, while the good news—a freer, fairer, more equitable and stable Arab world—remains somewhere over the horizon. “All this celebration of democracy is just bullshit,” says one senior intelligence officer who’s spent decades fighting terrorism and finds his job getting harder, not easier, because of recent developments. “You take the lid off and you don’t know what’s going to happen. I think disaster is lurking.”

To be sure, Osama bin Laden has finally been terminated, but the impact of that single operation on Al Qaeda and its affiliates may have been both overrated and overstated by a U.S. administration anxious to score political points. If, as claimed, bin Laden was still directing operations, what were they? No actual plots have been publicly identified. “Bin Laden needed killing, and I am glad he is dead,” says another veteran American operative—let’s call him Mr. Mum, because he’s not authorized to speak on the record. “But bin Laden is what he was: this old guy who got lucky on 9/11, sitting in a crappy little room watching a crappy little TV and trying to pretend that he mattered.”

says Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “the Libyans, the Tunisians, the Egyptians, the Yemenis—they are either gone or going.” And a particularly cruel irony, as a former CIA station chief in the Middle East points out, is that these relationships were so focused on catching a handful of terrorists that they missed the oncoming tidal wave of popular revolt. “What intelligence is supposed to do is be ready for things like this,” he says.

Americans have once again turned to Riyadh as their discreet and indispensable ally. In Yemen particularly, the Saudis have their own operatives on the ground and many tribal leaders on their payroll. The kingdom’s main objective—to stabilize Yemen while eliminating Al Qaeda—is much the same as Washington’s. But can Saudi Arabia really resist the region’s seismic change? If the country is about to erupt as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria have done, would local intelligence services know? Would the Americans? The record is far from encouraging.

[ramana]

Shyamd, The article is interesting bt ignores the role of external interests. The bad path is a dictator suppresses reform movement with violence and gives external players a chance to use UN sanctions to attack him.

[shyamd]

Ramanaji, external influence is a factor, especially in Syria now and Egypt. It was the US that got the military to drop support to Mubarak. But to stay in power, it is essential to be able to enrich his constituency. Problem in egypt was last year I don't think the egyptian economy did too well. US promised to provide aid to sustain the economy (Egypt army runs the economy like TSP).

UN sanctions is one thing, but see in the case of Iran, they survive on oil and as long as the supreme leader can make his money and feed the basij/IRGC etc. He is fine. Same with NoKo. He has allowed his henchmen to operate rackets and enriched them. Same with Basij, they run smuggling businesses, import export netwworks. Its big business.

Gaddafi lasted this long because he was literally buying support. Those people who came out in support of the regime were offered €60,000 (CNN must have exaggerated). He is losing support now because he hasn't got any cash and can't pay.

Ideology/belief is another impotant aspect.

Even a religious entity like Hamas was gaining popularity because they were able to distribute more wealth to people and deliver on essential services.
The Israeli sanctions, cast lead was meant for the local people to hate Hamas rule. As sanctions meant Hamas couldn't pay the govt servants (most of the population relies on this), but hamas was able to smuggle money in from iranians/qataris which sustained them to an extent.

The power of the $ is the most important I think because it affects everything else.

[abhischekcc]

The interview of Indian ambassador to KSA has many subtexts which are faaar more interesting than the interview itself:

Point 1.
KSA is acting against US interest, and by US interests I mean the banking/financial community. KSA's decision to ramp up oil production will directly hit the speculators, who are the main supporters of Barack Obama. This is a hit against the current administration. But the action goes against several decades of KSA/USA friendship and is therefore also against the US system itself.

Point 2.
That KSA got the Indian ambassador to speak for itself and defend its action against the US financial system is a coup and is the main subtext. KSA may in fact insinuating to the US that it is not indispensable, and that KSA has support for its new oil policies. I for one am glad that at least it was not the Chinese ambassador in that interview.

Although I must wonder how broad is the support in the Indian establishment to go along in a path that leads to confrontation with the US.

[shyamd]

Abischekcc,

Point 1 partly agree. But from what I have heard, the US has been asking KSA to go up to 12 million barrelspd. It was KSA who refused to spite the US.
The aim was to help the US/ world economy through the recession and hit Iran (just like how they both did to Soviets). Not sure why the Saudi's refused, shall see what source says.
Speculators make money both ways (traders bet that price comes down too). Main thing is, we all know that 2nd half of 2011 is going to be bad economically, there will be a slowdown everywhere.
KSA might be pre-empting this, and also keep arab spring in mind, I am sure KSA doesn't want more revolutions in the neighbourhood.

The second main reason is that they have decided to take on Iran, and will play the oil weapon to reduce the ability for Iran to fund its budgets, fund hamas, hezb, ops in iraq etc. The time has come to fight iranian influence.

Regarding point 2, a birdie told me that we have to keep reminding washington that we are independent.

[ramana]

ShyamD, To recap:
- WANA production in current quarter is 25M Bpd This is planned to raise to 30.87M Bpd.
- Demand is forecast to raise by 2M Bpd to 1.5M Bpd in 3rd and 4th quarter 2011.
- Libyan oil of 1.3M Bpd is out of market plus yemen .3M BPD for total 1.6M Bpd.
- KSA will raise its production to 10M Bpd from 8.8M Bpd
- US wanted KSA to raise it to 12M Bpd
- Iran and some others dont want the production rise lest it hurts the market prices
- Iran and KSA are on two oppostie politcal sides
Conclusions:

- KSA wants to sell more oil even if its at lower prices to ensure enough money to quell/preclude "Arab Spring" type risings
- KSA still has a hedge/reserve of 2M Bpd for future needs
- Indian ambassador is concerned with NYMEX spot prices rising due to speculation.
- India gets 80 percent from WANA of which 30 percent is from Iran Iraq (Shia powers)
- KSA is consulting India more than before


Can we see a sudden surge in oil productionton targets to destroy speculators?

[shyamd]

^^ Agree with the conclusions. Also need to finance local spending on people (increase in govt worker salaries etc), massive arms expansion tri forces. And possibility of war with Iran in the future. Need $$'s to sustain the family and neighbours and the war expenses. Remember ABV moves during 98.

---------------------------------

Oman joins Turkey in anti-piracy drive

Times News Service
Tue Jun 14 2011 06:43:21 GMT+0400 (Arabian Standard Time) Oman Time



Oman joins Turkey in anti-piracy drive

MUSCAT: Part of its global anti-piracy drive, Turkey will be deploying four frigates, which will be conducting joint exercises with Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Pakistan, India, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

The frigates will be docking at the Sultan Qaboos Port in Muscat on June 19 and will be conducting the joint exercises till June 21.

The four warships are part of the Turkish Maritime Task Group (TMTG), which was set up early this year as part of the Turkish Navy’s expansion plans.

The warships coming here are TCG YB Kudret Güngör, TCG Barbaros, TCG Gelibolu, and TCG Gemlik, a communiqué issued yesterday by the Turkish embassy in the Sultanate said.

The TMTG exercise will become an annual affair hereafter, and the grand objective is to support the ongoing United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) operations worldwide, and ensuring maritime security.

Given the threats to global security, especially maritime security, Turkey’s drive assumes greater significance.

The move also aims at showcasing Turkish Navy’s capability to deploy frigates for prolonged periods, while promoting security at the seas and contributing to world peace.

This year, TMTG will be supporting the ongoing counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Somali basin, and other areas, while contributing its bit to Nato and other multi-national efforts.

Naval escorts
In a bid to boost the anti-piracy efforts, TMTG will be providing naval escorts to Turkish and non-Turkish flagged vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden.

The larger objective is to facilitate international efforts at providing protection to merchant vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden. TMTG, whose operational control is exercised by Turkish Navy Command HQ, consists of a logistic supply ship, aside from the four frigates, and is commanded by a rear admiral.

In its inception year in 2010, TMTG frigates visited ports at Tunis (Tunisia), Algiers (Algeria), Cartagena (Spain), Taranto (Italy), Bar (Montenegro), Neum (Bosnia Herzegovina), Split (Croatia), Durres & Vlore (Albania), and Alexandria (Egypt), with a view to enhancing cooperation with friendly countries.
During the TMTG visit to the Sultanate, media persons will be taken on board the TGC Gelibolu frigate.

A Navy band comprising 30 members will be on board the frigates. The band will present a concert at Muscat City Centre in Seeb on June 20.

Note the nations. India conducted a similar exercise back in the day.

Bloomberg: Saudi Aramco Said to Offer More Oil to Refiners in Asia, Europe

Meanwhile...
CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes

Covert Program Would Be a Major Expansion of U.S. Efforts to Kill Members of al Qaeda Branch

By SIOBHAN GORMAN And ADAM ENTOUS
[USYEMEN] Reuters

Yemeni residents pointed in order to spot a U.S. drone in October. The CIA has aided military drone strikes in Yemen, and plans to begin its own.

WASHINGTON—The Central Intelligence Agency is preparing to launch a secret program to kill al Qaeda militants in Yemen, where months of antigovernment protests, an armed revolt and the attempted assassination of the president have left a power vacuum, U.S. officials say.

The covert program that would give the U.S. greater latitude than the current military campaign is the latest step to combat the growing threat from al Qaeda's outpost in Yemen, which has been the source of several attempted attacks on the U.S. and is home to an American-born cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, who the U.S. sees as a significant militant threat.

The CIA is launching a covert operation whereby drones will be sent over Yemen to kill al Qaeda operatives. WSJ Washington Bureau Chief Jerry Seib reports. Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

The CIA program will be a major expansion of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Since December 2009, U.S. strikes in Yemen have been carried out by the U.S. military with intelligence support from CIA. Now, the spy agency will carry out aggressive drone strikes itself alongside the military campaign, which has been stepped up in recent weeks after a nearly yearlong hiatus

The U.S. military strikes have been conducted with the permission of the Yemeni government. The CIA operates under different legal restrictions, giving the administration a freer hand to carry out strikes even if Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, now receiving medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, reverses his past approval of military strikes or cedes power to a government opposed to them.

The CIA program also affords the U.S. greater operational secrecy, and because CIA drones use smaller warheads than most manned military aircraft, U.S. officials hope they will reduce the risk of civilian casualties and minimize any anti-American backlash in Yemen.

The Yemen program is modeled on the agency's covert program in Pakistan, which has killed 1,400 militants but is also unpopular in the country, where it is seen as a violation of sovereignty that costs civilian lives. Some U.S. diplomats and military officials have begun questioning whether the pace of Pakistan drone strikes should be slowed to ease the backlash.

President Barack Obama secretly approved the new Yemen program last year. It has been under development for several months because of the complicated logistics required to set up a major intelligence operation in an unstable corner of the world.

The program is authorized under the same broad 2001 presidential finding that created the legal underpinnings for the program in Pakistan. That secret finding, signed by President George W. Bush shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, directed the CIA to find ways to kill or capture al Qaeda leaders.

The Yemen program had been slated to begin in July, but the launch time may be moved back a few weeks to accommodate planning and logistical needs, U.S. officials said. The last known CIA strike in Yemen using an unmanned aircraft was conducted in 2002.

The CIA declined to comment. "As a rule, the CIA does not comment on allegations of prospective counterterrorism operations," said CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf.

White House National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor declined to comment on the program or any shift to the CIA.

The U.S. is increasingly concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Yemen, worries heightened by signs that Islamist militants are trying to seize control of towns in southern Yemen.

"They're looking to take advantage of an opportunity that has arisen," a U.S. intelligence official said of the recent movements in the south. "Whether they're going to succeed or not is an open question."

The CIA has been ramping up its intelligence gathering efforts in Yemen in recent months in order to support a sustained campaign of drone strikes. The CIA coordinates closely with Saudi intelligence officers, who have an extensive network of on-the-ground informants, officials say.

The new CIA drone program will initially focus on collecting intelligence to share with the military, officials said. As the intelligence base for the program grows, it will expand into a targeted killing program like the current operation in Pakistan.

While the specific contours of the CIA program are still being decided, the current thinking is that when the CIA shifts the program from intelligence collection into a targeted killing program, it will select targets using the same broad criteria it uses in Pakistan. There, the agency selects targets by name or if their profile or "pattern of life"—analyzed through persistent surveillance—fits that of known al Qaeda or affiliated militants.

By using those broad criteria, the U.S. would likely conduct more strikes in Yemen, where the U.S. now only goes after known militants, not those who fit the right profile.

The U.S. military narrowed its criteria after a botched strike in May 2010, when U.S. missiles mistakenly killed one of Mr. Saleh's envoys and an unknown number of other people.

That strike infuriated Mr. Saleh and sparked a debate in the Obama administration over whether to target only known militants, such as Mr. Awlaki, or to continue a broader campaign of airstrikes aimed at weakening al Qaeda through attrition.

Christopher Boucek, a Yemen expert with the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, said a CIA drone program could help curtail al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but won't be enough to eliminate the group and risks further alienating the Yemeni population.

"Obviously, as things fall apart in Yemen, and the central government is not doing this job, the operational space for unilateral military operations gets bigger and bigger," Mr. Boucek said.

The May 2010 strike was carried out without confirmation from human sources on the ground, U.S. officials said. Administration officials, including top counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, concerned about the consequences for U.S.-Yemeni relations, decided to narrow the target list for future strikes to senior al Qaeda leaders.

Most of the military's strikes have been conducted with manned aircraft and cruise missiles. But last month, the U.S. military used an armed drone to try to kill Mr. Awlaki, the American-born radical cleric. The missile missed its target.

U.S. officials say Mr. Awlaki was in contact with an Army psychiatrist charged in a shooting spree in November 2009 at Fort Hood Army base in Texas which killed 13 people. The U.S. added Mr. Awlaki to the CIA's target list after AQAP's failed attempt a month later to blow up a U.S.-bound passenger airliner.

Write to Siobhan Gorman at [email protected] and Adam Entous at [email protected]

They have been conducting operations for a while. They are just expanding it. THey already have US SF there for conducting ops, and training the Yemeni anti terror SF. Brits have an SF team from the SAS there to train too. US is going to the public on ops now. Saleh played his cards right looks like, let the AQ loose in Abyan. AQ camps in Abyan have suddenly sprung up.

Meanwhile Indian Embassy has evacuated nationals. 41 nurses working in the military hospital have been brought back. So any Indians in Yemen reading this, please contact the embassy for free tickets back to India. I think tomorrow might be the last day to take advantage of this GoI offer to repatriate nationals.

[shyamd]

Anyone heard of Imam Shirazi World Foundation? The foundation is supposedly themost important in the United States for the shia lobby and works to unite Afghan, Indianand Pakistani Shiites.

[devesh]

^^^
http://imamshirazi.com/index.html

recreation of a single islamic nation"

[krisna]

Libyan rebels make fresh gains

They seized the town of Kikla, 150km south-west of Tripoli, after government troops fell back, and pushed several kilometres west of their Misrata stronghold to the outskirts of government-held Zlitan, photographers said.
Pro-Gaddafi forces retreated about 9km from Kikla and rebels were setting up defensive positions, they said.