Bharat Rakshak

ramana wrote:I was thinking we divide by region: South, West, Central India, North East, etc. Then we go state by state. And its important to cross link the data between the states. Then we go on and list all the threats and the orgs and what we know about them. In parallel we list all the resources to combat these and see what the gaps are. By the way I want all this off line.

The work I mean. The listings can be from the IS/ Police/ blasts threads.

Lets see what turns up.

Sumeet wrote:I just checked that following very relevant article from B Raman that was not posted on this site for review.

Terrorism and Elections -- B Raman

1. As we have been facing a grave problem of insurgencies and terrorism of different hues----jihadi, ideological, ethnic and separatist--- in different parts of the country since 1947, one would have expected a serious and professional debate on insurgency, terrorism, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism during the election campaign---- particularly from the Congress (I) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The expectations have been belied.

2. There has been hardly any meaningful debate, which has been trivialised by both the Congress (I) and the BJP. Personal attacks and exchanges of mutual recriminations and ridicule of a highly personalised nature by both the parties have become one of the defining characteristics of the election campaign. While the Congress (I)'s campaign has been marked by false projections and assertions with a cover-up of the failure of the Governments at the Centre and in Mumbai to prevent the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29, 2008, the campaign of the BJP has been rich in rhetoric and negative with almost the entire focus being on the abolition of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) by the Congress (I) led coalition and its perceived reluctance to carry out the death sentence passed by a court on Afzal Guru for his role in the attack on the Indian Parliament House on December 13, 2001.


3. It is surprising that the BJP and other Hindutva organisations, which like to project themselves as strong on counter-terrorism, have not been able to come out with positive ideas as to how to deal with the threat. Their approach has been more tactical and denunciatory than strategic and reflective. The result: the public is none the wiser as to what changes it could expect from any new coalition Government that might come to power after the elections.

4. The various insurgencies confronting the country since 1947---- whether the tribal insurgencies in the North-East or the left extremist or Naxalite (Maoist) insugencies in the tribal belt in Central India--- started during the long Congress (I) rule between1947 and 1977. While the Congress (I) was able to find a political solution to the insurgencies in Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura, it has been totally at its wit's end in dealing with the left extremist or Naxalite (Maoist) insurgency, which continues to gather strength and adherents and spread its area of political influence and territorial dominance despite tall claims by the intelligence and security agencies of eliminating many Maoist cells.

5. After the Congress (I) came to power at the head of a coalition in 2004, it had set up a special task force of the party headed by one of its Members of Parliament (MP) from Andhra Pradesh to recommend a strategy on counter-insurgency in the Naxalite-infected areas. Its report-- for whatever its worth--- has been gathering dust without implementation. The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, has made more statements and issued more warnings on the threat posed to internal security and our economic progress by the unchecked activities of the Naxalites (Maoists) than on the threat posed by the Pakistan-sponsored jihadi terrorists. From this, one would have thought that his Government would have come out with at least a workable counter-insurgency strategey to deal with the Naxalites since the so-called vote bank politics does not operate in their case. Surprisingly, the statements and warnings of the Prime Minister have not been translated into concrete action on the ground.

6. During the 28 years that have seen terrorism emerge as the most serious threat to internal security, the Congress (I) has been in power for 18 years---from 1981 to 89, from 1991 to 96 and now since 2004. During this period, the BJP was in power for six years from 1998 to 2004. Other coalitions headed by V.P Singh,Chandrasekhar, Dev Gowda and Inder Gujral were in power during the remaining four years.

7. Khalistani terrorism, the ethnic terrorism of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Pakistan-sponsored separatist-cum-religious terrorism of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) started when the Congress (I) was in power due to the mishandling of the grievances of some sections of the Sikh community in Punjab and in the Sikh diaspora abroad and of the grievances of sections of the Assamese students over the Government's failure to take action against the hundreds of thousands (now millions) of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh into Assam. The ground work for the proxy war of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in J&K started when the Congress (I) was in power before 1989. This proxy war started in J&K when the V.P.Singh-led coalition, which had the support of the BJP, was in power in 1989-90 and it acquired momentum after the Congress (I) returned to power in 1991. The unchecked infiltration of Pakistani terrorist organisations into J&K started in 1993 and it spread to other parts of India subsequently.

8. Both the Congress (I) and the BJP have to be held equally responsible for the spread of jihadi terrorism to other parts of India outside J&K starting from the Mumbai blasts of March 1993. The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya by a Hindutva mob in December, 1992, acted as the trigger for the spread of jihadi terrorism to other parts of India..

9. The Congress (I) has to be held equally responsible because it was in power in New Delhi at the time of the demolition and its inaction in the face of reports and assessments that the Hindutva elements congregating in Ayodhya might target the Masjid indirectly facilitated the demolition. The role of the BJP was public knowledge, but not the negligence of the Congress (I) Government led by Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister. He failed to act on the advice of his senior bureaucrats to dismiss the UP Government and impose the President's rule in order to protect the Masjid.

10. While the Congress (I) has to be blamed for the birth and growth of terrorism in many parts of the country, it has had a better record than other governments in dealing with terrorism after it started threatening the country. The credit for the petering-out of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab and the bringing under some control of the indigenous terrorism backed by the ISI in J&K should largely go to the Governments headed by Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh.

11. There were eight hijackings of aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Pakistan by terrorists when Indira Gandhi was in power--- seven by the Khalistani terrorists and one by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).She refused to concede the demands of the hijackers in any of these cases. Similarly, she refused to concede the demand of the JKLF kidnappers who kidnapped Ravi Mhatre, an Indian diplomat posted at the Indian Assistant High Commission in Birmingham, in 1983, for the release of Maqbool Butt, who had been sentenced to death for an act of terrorism, The terrorists killed Mhatre. She retaliated by having the death sentence on Maqbool Butt carried out. The only instance of weakness by a Congress (I) Government was in not taking action against the terrorists responsible for occupying the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar in 1993. They were allowed to escape into Pakistan by Narasimha Rao in return for their agreeing to lift the siege.

12. The Congress (I)'s Prime Ministers---- Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao---realised the importance of covert action by the intelligence community to counter Pakistan's proxy war. They had a well though-out strategy for countering Pakistan's proxy war. Covert action formed an important component of this strategy. It played an important role in countering the ISI's designs in Punjab. This capability was reportedly wound up by Inder Gujral when he was the Prime Minister in 1997.It should also be underlined that in 1993 Narasimha Rao had succeeded in having Pakistan declared as a suspected state-sponsor of terrorism by the Clinton Administration --- though only for six months.

13. The BJP's record in dealing with insurgency and terrorism, when it was in power between 1998 and 2004, was marked by the mishandling of the hijacking of an IAC aircraft to Kandahar by terrorists of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in December 1999, which led to the release of three notorious terrorists from detention of whom one Maulana Masood Azhar later founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and another Omar

Sheikh had Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, kidnapped and murdered in Karachi. Maulana Azhar released by the BJP-led Government later played an important role in the conspiracy to attack the Parliament House.

14. In the history of Indian counter-terrorism, there have been two instances of pathetic surrender to the terrorists by the Government. The first was in 1989 when the V.P.Singh Government shockingly surrendered to the demands of the indigenous Kashmiri terrorists to release some terrorists under detention in order to secure the release of the daughter of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the then Home Minister, who had been kidnapped by the terrorists. The second was in 1999 when the BJP-led Government agreed to release three terrorists---two of them Pakistani nationals--- to secure the release of the IAC passengers.

15. However, I would blame more the bureaucrats in the national security establishment under the BJP-led Government than A.B.Vajpayee, the then Prime Minster, L.K.Advani, the then Home Minister, and Jaswant Singh, the then Minister for External Affairs, for the Kandahar fiasco. The bureaucrats were responsible for ensuring that the aircraft was not taken by the hijackers to a hostile territory where commando action would not be possible. They failed to do so. Once they mishandled the hijacking and allowed the aircraft to reach Kandahar, no commando action was possible because Kandahar is in hostile territory and Pakistan would not have allowed an Indian plane carrying commandoes to overfly its territory. As a result of this mishandling by the bureaucrats, the BJP leadership was in the unenviable position of having no other option but to swap the three terrorists for the release of over 100 innocent passengers. Manmohan Singh has been less than honest in comparing his action in sending commandoes to Mumbai during the terrorist attack of November, 2008, to the BJP's failure to send the commandoes to Kandahar. Mumbai is in Indian territory, but Kandahar is in hostile foreign territory. A commando raid in Kandahar was out of the question.

16. The BJP, when in power, failed to implement its pre-election promise to issue a White Paper on the ISI's proxy war in India and to have Pakistan declared as a state-sponsor of terrorism. What was more, the security bureaucracy was surprised by the BJP-led Government's decision not to reverse the decision of Gujral to wind up the covert action capability.

17. Against this, the BJP's dubbing the Congress (I) led Government as soft in dealing with terrorism would hardly carry conviction. All political parties without exception mishandled counter-terrorism. They viewed terrorism not as a national threat to be countered with determination but as a political weapon to be exploited for partisan purposes.

18. There was a consistency of firmness in the policies of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao in dealing with Pakistan. Such a consistency has been missing in the policies of the Government led by Vajpayee as well as its successor Government headed by Manmohan Singh. Both of them followed a policy of "kabi garam, kabi naram" (sometimes tough, sometimes soft). Vajpayee's decisions to go to Lahore in February 1999 to meet Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, and to invite Pervez Musharraf to India in 2001 and take him on a high-profile visit to Agra for talks were taken without consulting the intelligence community on the implications of the decisions on the ground situation. Both the visits ended in an embarrassing fiasco.

19. It swung to the other extreme after the attack on the Parliament House in December 2001 and confronted Pakistan with the threat of a war by mobilising the Armed Forces and keeping them in the mobilized state for nearly 10 months without achieving any results on the ground. The anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in February 2002 after the massacre of some Hindu pilgrims travelling by train at Godhra allegedly by some Muslims and widespread perceptions in India and abroad of conscious inaction by the Narendra Modi Government in the initial stages deprived the Vajpayee Government of any moral high ground in its confrontation with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. The Muslim anger over the riots added fuel to jihadi terrorism.

20. The much tauted coercive diplomacy with a doubtful outcome was followed by another swing by the agreement reached by Vajpayee with Musharraf in Islamabad in January 2004 under which Pakistan agreed that it would not support any terrorism emanating from Pakistani and Pakistan-controlled territory. The BJP-led Government mishandled the overtures for peace talks from a section of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) in 2001,This section had got tired of terrorism. This mishandling enabled the Pakistan-based leadership of the HM to identify and eliminate the members of this section.

21. Manmohan Singh's record in dealing with Pakistan on the terrorism issue was no better than that of the Vajpayee Government.He swung to the soft extreme when he signed an agreement with Musharraf at Havana in September,2006, for setting up a joint mechanism for dealing with terrorism despite strong reservations from the security bureaucracy and non-Governmental security experts over the wisdom of this action.

When he was embarrassed by the November, 2008, terrorist attack, which was carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) from Pakistani territory at least with the complicity of the ISI, if not at its instance, he swung to the other extreme of coercive diplomacy There has been a meaningless debate between the Congress (I) and the BJP as to who has been more coercive in dealing with Pakistan. Neither has been as seen from the post-Mumbai surge in infiltrations into J&K by Pakistan-trained terrorists.

22. It must be said to the credit of P. Chidambaram, who took over as the Home Minister after the Mumbai attack, that of all the Home Ministers since Rajesh Pilot, who was Minister of State for Internal Security under Narasimha Rao, he has shown greater lucidity and energy in dealing with at least Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, though his record against the ULFA and the Naxalites (Maoists) is yet to be felt on the ground. His strategy as unveiled in the beginning of April shows the beginnings of a professional approach... Please see the report in 'The Hindu" of April 8, 2009, titled "Congress Unveils Roadmap to Tackle Terror".

23. Some of the points in the road map such as the setting up of a Permanent Crisis Management Group ( a war room) and the preparation of an operating manual( a war book for counter-terrorism) are old ideas of R.N.Kao, when he was the Senior Adviser to Indira Gandhi before her assassination in October,1984. These ideas were evolved by Kao in the context of the then raging Khalistani terrorism. The idea of a better state of preparedness by the counter-terrorism community was originally Rajiv's. Other ideas in Chidambaram's strategy such as improving the rapid response capability, the concept of joint action in which all agencies are jointly responsible for dealing with terrorism and improving threat-level communication not only to various layers of the bureaucracy, but also to the public have been heavily borrowed from the post-9/11 counter-terrorism architecture set up by the Homeland Security Department of the US. Chidambaram has paid welcome attention to strengthening the number and capability of the police, in order to strengthen its role as the weapon of first resort against terrorism.

24. His strategy seeks to deal comprehensively with terrorism----particularly of the jihadi, Pakistan-sponsored kind--- as a threat to national security. The measures outlined by him are meant to deal with acts of terrorism----preventive as well as dealing with them when prevention fails. But it hardly speaks of measures to deal with terrorist organisations in order to impose a high rate of attrition on them. It was the success of the Sri Lankan counter-terrorism machinery in imposing such a high rate of attrition on the LTTE, which has contributed to its remarkable success against the LTTE. The attrition component is missing from Chidambaram's strategy.

25. Despite this, it is a good beginning and shows a professional approach to counter-terrorism. One would have expected such a professional approach to emerge from the BJP, which projects itself as having greater expertise and a greater number of experts in counter-terrorism. But one's hopes have been belied. Its entire thinking seems to be based on the belief that the re-introduction of the POTA and the execution of the death sentence on Afzal Guru would mark the death-knell of terrorism. It would not. There is more tocounter-terrorism than additional powers for the Police, which are necessary, and deterrent punishments.

26. The inability of the Government to prevent the Mumbai 26/11 attack provided the BJP with a wonderful pre-election opportunity to analyse what went wrong in Mumbai and confront the Government with a professional debate on its sins of commission and omission. It has failed to grasp the opportunity.

ramana wrote:Tanaji, If what you propose is better then do jump in. Sachin is the pilot.

Sachin wrote:

ramana wrote:Tanaji, If what you propose is better then do jump in. Sachin is the pilot.

Tanaji, any simple ideas to start this process? . If yes let me know, I can try sending you a PM or share my e-mail ID.

tsriram wrote:I have a half-finished list with data collated from the Internal security thread. Wanted to plot them on a map and tie the various hot-spots and events that occured there together to get some sort of a measure.

Sachin wrote:

AjayKK wrote:A sad and poor judgement sends the person who did his duty into prison for 14 years.11

Hope ex-IPS officer (now lawyer) YP Pawar takes up this police man's case and take it to the higher court. If this continues, a time would come when police men would be a group of people who would be inside a building (police station) doing nothing. And I feel this is exactly what the crooked politicians want (so that it is their goons who would become the law-enforcers).

Suyogv wrote:Second news from Mumbai Police. Pradeep Sharma is Back in Police force

Tanaji wrote:Ooops, was not checking this thread!

Sachin,

Give me a few days, we should definitely hook up on this and move it forward. I will be interested in working with you and tsriram on this. My approach was the same as tsriram's essentially, but on a grander scale. But we have to start with a reduced scope. I am reachable at tmalusare a t [email protected]

Suyogv wrote:Second news from Mumbai Police. Pradeep Sharma is Back in Police force

Yes, the deaths of Karkare et al have hit that unit very hard. Its not just the men, its the whole network of agents that went with them. Pradeep Sharma will definitely be welcome news: his network was I think the second largest in India, after the M. Sharma's I think

Suyogv wrote:His Network will definately will help Mumbai Police. Now we must pray that Daya Nayak, Prafull Bhosale, etc should taken back in force.

Sachin wrote:

Suyogv wrote:His Network will definately will help Mumbai Police. Now we must pray that Daya Nayak, Prafull Bhosale, etc should taken back in force.

My understanding is that Daya Nayak is suspended, and Praful Bhosale has been shunted out to some other unit. But Pradeep Sharma was dismissed from service, by using a special power given to the President of India. The President has the power to dismiss any officer, by passing judicial proceedings and this was what was used against Pradeep Sharma. Did not know that such orders can be cancelled, and the officer taken back to service.

In a detailed judgment released on Monday, the Sewri sessions court said it failed to understand why Kadam, who ordered firing on the mob, didn’t give a ‘thought for the feelings of the people who were hurt due to the desecration’.

Criticising Kadam for not studying the situation well, Judge Kulkarni remarked, “People were crying on account of the desecration of Dr Ambedkar’s bust, and some were abusing the RPI leaders. This evidence clearly shows that people who were present in the mob were expressing their protest. I fail to understand why Kadam has not given thought to the feelings of those people, when their feelings were hurt due to the desecration.”

Dismissing Kadam’s defence, that without opening fire the mob would have set fire to two LPG tankers, the court noted that he could have deputed platoons near the tankers to save them, which he didn’t.

Criticising Kadam for not studying the situation well, Judge Kulkarni remarked, “People were crying on account of the desecration of Dr Ambedkar’s bust, and some were abusing the RPI leaders. This evidence clearly shows that people who were present in the mob were expressing their protest. I fail to understand why Kadam has not given thought to the feelings of those people, when their feelings were hurt due to the desecration.”

sum wrote:With all due respect, the judge who gave this judgment should be made to stand in front of a mob during the next disturbance when the mob is "expressing their protest"....

Sanjay wrote:Sachin, without going into the specifics of the particular incident, let us face one ugly fact - firearms are used way too often in riot control in India. In addition, gunfire is not coordinated properly and there is considerable confusion as to where fire is to be directed.

At least part of the problem is the shortage of riot control gear for policemen and generally poor deployment of resources so that small ill-equipped parties of policemen are sent to confront large and irate mobs.

A lathi and a rifle in the hands of unfit, untrained, surrounded and abused policemen does not make for an effective response to a situation.

BTW - does anyone have anything more from that CAG report on police weapons modernization ?

Suyogv wrote:He did what he thought was best. and in deed the deed best.

A day after a police informer was injured and his wife killed in a road accident at Byculla, another informer Ashraf Ateeque has alleged that he was attacked by members of the Chhota Rajan gang.

Police officials, however, dismissed this as a mere "publicity stunt''.

"Most informers have enemies. A real informer will never come out in the open and seek publicity,'' said a senior IPS officer who is believed to have the biggest network of informers.

The informer community is living in dread -- its members constantly looking over their shoulders.

After the killing of Irfan Chindi, one of Mumbai Police's top-class informers, last month, another one was "brutally attacked", and his wife killed at noon in Byculla on Friday.

Dilawar Momin, 27, who belonged to Chindi's camp, and his wife, Asama, were going to Sewree court on a motorbike to attend his brother's hearing. A truck rammed them from behind. Both fell off the bike, and were crushed under the wheels. Asama, 24, died on the spot. Dilawar is battling for life in the ICU of JJ Hospital.

AjayKK wrote:

Suyogv wrote:He did what he thought was best. and in deed the deed best.

i agree with this. If the protocol had been followed, mob would have gone out of control.

I read this somewhere, link lost, that if following procedure is adopted it will result in mockery of riot control.

1. Warn using loudspeaker.
2.Use rubber bullets
3. Use smoke /tear gas shell.
4. Summon extra force
5.Summon water engines ( ! ) to use on mob
6. Ask for permission to fire
7. Fire in air and repeat warning
8. Fire below waist

This procedure can not be used in a quickly deteriorating riot control situation.

Other than firing on mob, and above procedure, what can be used to control ?

Suyogv wrote:just skip rubber bullets for now Rubber bullets clause is of US/UK police we still dont have rubber bullets.

“We cannot treat our people like terrorists.
We need ways to tackle mobs effectively without taking lives. To ensure incidents like the Ramabai Nagar firing are not repeated, we have decided to introduce plastic or rubber bullets,” said Director General of Police S S Virk.

http://www.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx? ... 345250eddc

AjayKK wrote:

Suyogv wrote:just skip rubber bullets for now Rubber bullets clause is of US/UK police we still dont have rubber bullets.

It is getting there

DGP -Mah Virk says:

“We cannot treat our people like terrorists.
We need ways to tackle mobs effectively without taking lives. To ensure incidents like the Ramabai Nagar firing are not repeated, we have decided to introduce plastic or rubber bullets,” said Director General of Police S S Virk.

http://www.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx? ... 345250eddc

Rubber bullets or baton rounds are cumbersome to work with. Dont they kill too if higher velocity bullets strike the person?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot_gun

There is no proper way to control a riot, especially a politically motivated one.

Hopefully, after the Mah. elections, some of the ex- (YP Singh , Sachin Vaze etc) will come to rescue of PSI Kadam..

Rubber bullets or baton rounds are cumbersome to work with. Dont they kill too if higher velocity bullets strike the person?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot_gun

There is no proper way to control a riot, especially a politically motivated one.

Hopefully, after the Mah. elections, some of the ex- (YP Singh , Sachin Vaze etc) will come to rescue of PSI Kadam..

AjayKK wrote: a senior IPS officer who is believed to have the biggest network of informers.

SuyogV wrote:bullets for now Rubber bullets clause is of US/UK police we still dont have rubber bullets.

Sanjay wrote:I appreciate that they are trained and theoretically have access to special equipment. The question is - did they have the equipment with them ? Were their rifles carrying reduced charge rounds developed for riot use ? Did they have the ability to summon reinforcements. These are questions that need to be fully explored and answered.

Also, whether trained or not, the SRPF and other units trained in riot control have acted in violation of riot control procedures on innumerable occasions. This is not a criticism of them for the sake of criticism it is an observation.

Sachin wrote:

AjayKK wrote: a senior IPS officer who is believed to have the biggest network of informers.

The IPS officer *could be* Rakesh Maria. He is now a senior level IPS officer, was holding the rank of Supdt. of Police even during the Mumbai blasts time.

SuyogV wrote:bullets for now Rubber bullets clause is of US/UK police we still dont have rubber bullets.

Some state police forces do have rubber bullets. In the recent firing at a coastal village in Trivandrum Rural Dt. (Cheriya thura), the police tried using rubber bullets. They could not do a lathi charge, as the crowd was waiting for them with crude bombs and sharp weapons. They tried rubber bullets, it was of no use. They fired rounds into the air, yet the rioters remained where they were. The local news channels had shown the police displaying a red banner asking the crowd to disperse. Then loud speakers were used, and the bugle sounded. The next option was to open fire, and the police did a splendid job. 6 kills.

Hindu news article, has details about the DGP's report

To top it all, the police officers who led the charge have now started getting threatening calls from some fringe Jehadi elements (one group of rioters were Muslims). The police officers are now suspended facing enquiry, and now they have been given police protection.

Here for a change, the state DGP has supported the police men and the firing. Hope they will not land up in the same case as PSI Kadam .

Hitesh wrote:Great news!! Kadam's sentence suspended by High Court.

BTW, in the recent police firing at a seashore village in Thiruvananthapuram, is also going in similar lines

sum wrote: Sachin saar,
Is this about the rioting which is happening (and seems to have been supressed by our media) in Kerala similar to the Marad incident?

Sachin wrote:[

I do not know if there is still a simmering situation there, which the media is not highlighting.

“Firing by the police near the Beemapally mosque which resulted in the death of 5 people is a great tragedy. In such circumstances an instant judicial enquiry is called for. Since there are communal implications it is fair to have a sitting judge to enquire into the matter. Not that retired judges are not good, but a sitting judge commands the community’s confidence more than a superannuated one

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... OZ5Y=&SEO=

“At present, all my focus is on the Beemapally - Cheriyathura area,’’ said Ajith Kumar, who was posted in place of S. Gopinath following the Cheriyathura clashes and police firing.

“Bringing normalcy to Beemapally-Cheriyathura as well as the nearby coastal belt is my first priority. The law and order situation in the coastal areas has to be brought under control, especially in the wake of the ensuing trawling ban,’’

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... 7OVZOOEmts

AjayKK wrote:What i am watching is that few media reports mentioned that the protesters were shot dead near the pink masjid ( Beemapally Mosque) and were carrying explosives with them

It is so near to the airport. Why doesn't the cops keep a regular vigil on the place?

Police version

The contention of the police is that if they had not acted in the manner they did, more lives would have been lost and the violence would have spread to other coastal areas.

The rioters were armed with swords and explosives. They had thrown crude explosives, including at least one made using highly explosive gelignite, to destroy property and create terror, official sources said.

The police were reportedly caught sandwiched between the two belligerent groups on the beach.

The police said they had used considerable amount of non-lethal ammunition, an estimated 60 rounds of tear gas shells, stun grenades and at least 12 rounds of rubber bullets, before opening fire on the rioters. The non-lethal ammunition proved to be ineffective on the seashore, the police said.

http://www.hindu.com/2009/05/22/stories ... 040300.htm

On May 16, when the clashes erupted at the Beemapally-Cheriyathura belt, the Church authorities and Jama-ath Council members swung into action and advised the believers to keep off from violence.

But the very next day, without any further provocations, there was a heavy mobilisation of people on both sides, that too armed with explosives and crude weapons.

“We really don’t know what happened in between,’’ says Corporation Councillor and Beemapally Jama-ath Council office-bearer Beemapally Rasheed.

“We have been taking all steps to instil religious harmony in the area.

But at times we remain as mere spectators,’’ he adds.

Sources at the Latin Catholic Archdiocese says that they were unaware how a group had gathered near the Church.

Despite the heavy police security, the agitators managed to amass explosives in large quantities.

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... Niw=&type=

M. P. Aziz, a Muslim leader in Beemapally, said the two Catholics had demanded money from the traders and a group of Muslim youths had chased the pair from the area on May 16. In retaliation, the two Catholic brothers had assaulted a Muslim who was traveling on a motorbike with his two children, near Cheriathura.

The two brothers were then joined by a crowd of around 20 who set fire to boats and fishing nets and damaged shops in Beemapally.

On May 17, Muslims marched toward Assumption Church in Cheriathura and attacked houses and boats. Police fired teargas canisters to disperse the crowd but the mob retaliated against the police with crude bombs and swords. Police fired 37 rounds and wounded 45 people who were admitted in a hospital in the state capital.

Babu Stanislaus, secretary of Cheriathura Residents' Association, dispute this version of events, saying criminal gangs, not Catholics, started the violence.

http://www.ucanews.com/2009/05/18/five- ... in-kerala/

ramana wrote:For example when and how did FBI get powers to arrest and for what crimes?

Currently in India IB and other Central agencies don't have arrest powers and need state police assistance. This leads to a lot of terrorists get away.