Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[Aditya G]

There is more to a special forces command other that the Garuds, Marcos and Para (SF). Composition of the command can look something like this:

Code: Select all

2 x Garud Squadrons
5 x Para (SF) Bn and maybe even Vikas Regiment
2 x MARCO group
1 x MC-130 Sqn
2 x An-32 Sqn
2 x Mi-17-V5 Sqn
1 x Mi-35 Sqn
1 x INS Jalashwa with Seaking
? x midget submarines
? x landing ships

The need to have Para (SF) as separate regiment from Parachute Regiment is different from command issues. As of today these two are basically two different regiments under one name. A separate regiment for SF can ensure their interests are projected properly within the Army

[somnath]

The key question is not of specific equipment (whether choppers or small arms or for that matter mini nukes - the Russian Spetsnaz wasa rumoured to be at some point equipped with them!) - that quite frankly is a derivative of the doctrinal approach to Special Forces.

Someone said talking of the dosctrinal aspects is whining, and what is "strategic" about it. Well, a strategic asset is one that the state uses to accomplish broad national objectives. In India's case, fighing as we are a sub conventional war for so long, special forces (and intelligence) SHOULD be strategic imperatives. In Pakistan's case, SSG directly reports to COAS - makes sense because the COAS is the de facto commander in chief! In India, whatever the technical reporting lines, a special forces command should be under the direct effective control of the political executive, ie, the Prime Minister. Very similar to (for example), the CBI, which directly reports to the PM, or RAW (till recenntly!).

Once we are clear about the objectives of the special forces command, resources and equipment will be a derivative. For example, if we are to carry out Israel-style abduction/assassination of "elements" - key deliverables would be language skills, commint, intel, armed UAVs etc. there would be multiple "types" of operations, and the idea would be, especially for a resource scarce country like us, to optimise assets across missions and forces. Logistically, it makes eminent sense for a special forces command that has all the services "special forces" at least under its ambit, besides the SFF. NSG has a very specific mission, ie, hostage rescue and proximate security, and quite frankly doesnt require to be outside its current command structure under the Home Ministry.

[kaangeya]

...it comes from an ex. Lt General and a former PARA(SF) chap himself. So he does command more respect then a snide remark.

Please note my words, I refer to an alleged whine not the real thing. How could I since I haven't read the report/letter/memo etc? So Gen.Lidder a former Para SF says that we must integrate, so must we? Adm.Nadkarni suggested that we wind up the LCA program do we? Every now and then some 3-star officers, retired, have advocated a certain course of action wrt to a host of issues - CIDS/aircraft carriers/armour etc., do we listen to everyone of them? In this case no one has yet read the report in question, so how do we miss the nuance and flat out conclude that we must integrate all our SF resources? In fact in brandishing Gen. Lidder's name to bolster our arguments, we are making light of the soldier's experience and learning. A serious paper cannot be selectively quoted even if the conclusions drawn by the author of that article happen to coincide with the General's.

Because we think they must be integrated? So we assume that we must prove? And how did the Mumbai Op show up the lack of integration as a problem? What is the evidence that the Op suffered because the Marcos and NSG are not integrated? If anything it made a case for a dispersed or expanded/replicated SF infrastructure across several centers.

Re strategic and tactical forces and actions, it isn't that simple any more. Defensive plans are created to avoid strategic reverses or force the enemy to fight tactically by imposing huge costs on strategic action. A strategic action may not be a single move, but simply a combination of several tactical moves. And so on. The US Socom, has evolved over years of experimentation and reflects the US experience, where very clearly the force is used as a means to further international political goals. The US armed forces are controlled by executive appointees, with the Sec/Navy/Army/AF and the DefSec all being political appointees. Whereas in the case of TSP, the armed forces exist to get around weaknesses in the exercise of political power etc., Reading integration problems into the Mombai Op is not supported by the evidence.

[Vikram_S]

3. As for the SSG, wether one likes it or not, PA does have a better Command Structure for its SF. And the argument that what has this command structure achieved for PA is a non sequitor. We talk only of 1965 para drop and Siachen (Qaid Post) as examples of SSGs failure in its entire operation history. Do we know of all their operations? Or for that matter of fact do we know of all IA SF operations? And let me ask you a question? What did IA Para(SF) achieve in 1965 and 1971? Why? Was it becasue they could not? Or was it because no one knew what to do with them? IIRC,9 Para(SF) was used a line infantry in Chamb sector in 1971.

command structure and strategy are very valid points but SSG performance is very underwhelming. at least reported items.

i have recently read PDF version of indo-pak special forces (osprey) and it has catalogue of SSG ops. most are so so and failures. it also briefly mentions that SSG was decimated by indian army at siachen glaciar

i also remember on internet there was account of how SSG ambushed russian so russian set up revenge ops and cut SSG detachment to pieces using their spetznaz

i think like we recently caught paki soldier in kashmir, SSG also uses deputation/detachment method to boost insurgency movement, taliban etc
those kind of ops have not received much publicity

[Vikram_S]

this probably involved SSG as well.

http://modern-war.suite101.com/article. ... _hill_3234

Composition of Forces at Hill 3234
A look at the 9th Rota and the Forces it fought against

© Christopher Eger

Mar 14, 2007

At the Battle for Hill 3234 two very different groups fought each other through the night in 12 engagements. Here is what is known about them.

The Composition of the 9th Company (9Rota) of the 345th Independent Guards Airborne Regiment (VDV) at the “Battle for Hill 3234” January 7-8, 1988. The company was made up of 39 men: 6 officers and 33 Sergeants and private soldiers. These men were of nine different nationalities including Russian, Ukrainian, Turkistani, Uzbeks and Lithuanian. Nine lost there lives and of the remaining 30, 28 were wounded. Two of the dead, Sergeant Aleksandrov and Private Melnikov are posthumously honored the Title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Soviet paratroopers were armed with man portable weapons mainly consisting of AK-74 assault rifles and BG-30 Grenade launchers. They were re-supplied once during the battle with ammunition via helicopter.

Unit Roster, 9th Rota

1. Senior Lieutenant Tkachev, Sergey Borisovich - commander of company
2. Senior Lieutenant Gagarin, Victor yurivich
3. Senior Lieutenant Babenko, Ivan Pavlovich
4. Senior Lieutenant Rozhkov, Sergey Vladimirovich
5. Senior Lieutenant Matruk, Vitalius Vasilyevich - political officer
6. Ensign Kozlov, Vasiliy - Chief Petty Officer of company.
7. Sergeant Aleksandrov, Vyacheslav Alexandrovich - Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumous)
8. Sergeant Tsvetkov , Andrey Nikolayevich, killed
9. Sergeant Bobko, Sergey
10. Sergeant Rushinskas, Virginajus Leonardovich
11. Sergeant Borisov, Sergey
12. Sergeant Borisov, Vladimir
13. Sergeant Verigin, Vladimir
14. Sergeant Demin, Andrey
15. Sergeant Karimov
16. Sergeant Ofkopyrin,. Arkady
17. Sergeant Krishtopenko, Vladimir Olegovich, killed
18. Private Kuznetsov, Anatoliy yurivich, killed
19. Private Kuznetsov, Andrey
20. Private Korovin, Sergey
21. Private Lash, Sergey
22. Private Melnikov, Andrey Alexandrovich - Hero of the Soviet Union, (posthumous)
23. Private Menteshashvili, Zurab
24. Private Medvedev, Andrey
25. Private Leavingski, Sergey
26. Private Peredel'skiy Victor
27. Private Puzhayev, Sergey
28. Private Salamakha, Yuri
29. Private Safronov, Yuri
30. Private Sukhoguzov, Nikolai
31. Private Tikhonenko, Igor
32. Private Trutnev, Pavel
33. Private Fedotov, Andrey Alexandrovich, killed
34. Private Fedorenko, Andrey
35. Private Fadin, Nikolai
36. Private Yatsuk, Yevgeny
37. Private Zanegin, Igor Viktorovich, killed
38. Private Kudryashov, Alexander Nikolaevich, killed
39. Private Millers, Andrey Aleksandrovich, killed

The Soviet forces fought a group of Mujahideen that was believed to be of battalion sized. Soviet sources cite that as many as 500 afghan forces were involved and it was stated that they were composed of units of the “Black Storks”. The Black Storks were part of Pakistan Army Intelligence’s Special Services Group that dressed up as Afghan Mujahideen and fought during the Soviet-Afghan war. Soviet sources cite at least 90 of these fighters were killed in the battle. There is no known list of casualties in open circulation or even for sure who these fighters were. It is known that they were equipped with a mix of western and communist bloc weapons including RPG 2 and RPG 7 40mm grenade launchers, Enfield rifles and AK-47 assault weapons. The force withdrew over the Pakistani border at daylight, avoiding further combat.

Sources

"Oath of Thirty Nine", and “Exploit at Height 3234” by Colonel A. Oliynik published in "Red Star", June 14 and October 27,1988 respectively.

"Battle in height 3234" A. Meshchaninov, published in "Izvestiya", January 17, 1988

The Soviet-Afghan War: Breaking the Hammer & Sickle, published in VFW magazine

[somnath]

The question of unified command for SF is pertinent for sub conventional "warfare", not for hostgae rescue situations..

And how did the Mumbai Op show up the lack of integration as a problem? What is the evidence that the Op suffered because the Marcos and NSG are not integrated? If anything it made a case for a dispersed or expanded/replicated SF infrastructure across several centers.

Hostage rescue is a police job (specially trained SWAT police), its not sub conventional warfare. To that extent, the role and doctrine of NSG is pretty good today, and as I mentioned before, it does not need to be integrated with an SF command, its current structure is quite robust. The problem with NSG is about its utilisation, and that pertains to the overall disaster/crisis management command structure in the govt - not so much to do with the NSG, and maybe a little bit to do with equipment.

Sub conventional warfare, on the other hand, is part of a larger, longer drawn, strategy to achieve naional policy objectives. Given our geographic situation, it is a key imporeative whether we like it or not. And key national objectives cannot e fulfilled in a piecemeal manner, with half a dozen different force under different command structures and fiefdoms.

It would be quite naive to judge the effectiveness of a "special ops" unit on the basis of "published" info alone. Ditto with SSG - it is far better to analyse frm larger political developments. Take for example, the taliban takeover in Afghanistan. As a special ops, it was undoubtaedly a stunning success, afecting a "regime change" and putting one's own proxies in power, in the process defeating the defences of Ahmed Shah Masood. That was achieving the political objectives of the Paki state, and it can be inferred without too much doubt that the SSG would have been involved, along with intel and other units. This was a perfect example of a coherent national strategy and effective use of "special forcecs". Kargil on the other hand, was an example of an incoherent national strategy to use special forces, and it failed even though the performance of the "SF units" was by all account, exemplary. A perfect example of how war is too important to be left only to generals?!

Special ops, like any other military operation, hinges on a well thought out strategy to achieve specific objecetives. If those are not clear, even a Delta PLUS Sayaret Matkal is of no use!

That is why a Special Forces command, not dissimilar to the Strategic Forcecs command we have set up, is important so that the political leadership has a clear and full visibility of capabilities, and can make best utlisation of those capabilities for sub conventional objectives.

[kaangeya]

Hostage rescue is a police job (specially trained SWAT police), its not sub conventional warfare.

If by hostage rescue you mean a Mumbai type Ops, from your fist comment itself, it looks like the discussions of the last few weeks re the inadequacy of SWAT for Special Ops have passed by you completely. You cannot be wronger than this.
If you know what is the role of the IAF Garuds, please make a case for integrating them with the SG among others in a SF Command.

[RayC]

If there are too many organisations aimed to do the same job in different areas of specialisation with different command and control structures, there will always be a problem for coordination since there will be turf wars. It is a Gospel truth, like it or not.

Therefore, there is an requirement for a central command.

SF is a separate field from the NSG. SF is external and NSG is internal. Therefore, this should not be mixed. If indeed, SF is to be used for internal issues, then it should be under the single central structure that is aimed at internal security. If that be so, who do they report for external issues, when required? Thus, could it be that all this is under one command structure?

SWAT is a US concept where they fire and kill and then asking questions. To have that temperament, India has to change laws and the Indian mindset. As it is, the laws that has given or had given some security are questioned by all and sundry; and more so by the Human Rights Brigade, who are more concerned about the terrorists' and anti national rights than of the country itself! Arundhuti comes to mind.

I find the new terms for the same thing very amusing. It was Low Intensity Ops and then it converted to COIN and now sub conventional warfare. Why is the world so keen on inventing new terminology instead of addressing the issue and ridding the world of this ailment?

In Kargil, the SF may not have been used in its classical role, but would it have been better to have them sitting idle and depleting scarce rations? They are soldiers first and then SF. Or does being an SF mean that they are not fit to fight conventionally, if there is a need? If the Armoured Cops can be employed as infantry in Kashmir and they do well, how come the SF is to be rated as inferior to them, when basically they are infantry men?

It must be understood that India is not a rich country. Therefore, all organisations have to be in the multi tasked mode. And more so, since more Indians look for cushy jobs rather than join what was termed in Telegraph as ‘dangerous jobs’ and which find no seekers! If the organisations are not dexterous, why should the Army come out for flood control, police tasks etc? They should, by that logic, only guard the borders and leave Internal security and assistance in natural calamities to those who are paid to do so.

[somnath]

RayC,

Agree with you completely on the first point - NSG is a proximate security/hostage rescue unit, it is not a "special ops" unit.

But not so sure about the example of Kargil. Kargil was in essence a "limited conventional" territory. An enemy encroachment along a defined line, and the Amry was tasked to restore the line to its original sanctity. To that extent, it was a pretty "conventional" mountain warfare scenario. There might have been some operations within Kargil that necessitated Special Ops, but as an overall operation from India's perspective, it was as conventional as say, our counter to Gibralter (without the action across the Punjab plains!).

IMHO, using special forces for conventional ops is a "waste" of expensive resources. By defninition, each section of a special forcecs unit would be 4-5 times more expensive as compared to a normal light infntry unit. To use them in "conventional" roles will be a massive waste of resources. Officers can be deputed to other units, but to have entire spec forces units to operate as line infantry (a la 1971) can only arise out of not having a doctrine!

While you are right on the "need" for different semantics for the same scourge, India conceivably would be in an extremely "target rich" sub conventional scenario. All the strategic scenarios today would involve heavy spec ops requirements. To not have a therefore a doctrine for sub conventional/low intensity warfare, and therefore to "waste" special forces in variious fiefdoms without a command structure is really criminal. And the question of co-locating the para regiment with the Para (SF) - thats not even a joke anymore - we must be the only self respecting Army to have its "special forces" colocated with a regular infantry unit.

If by hostage rescue you mean a Mumbai type Ops, from your fist comment itself, it looks like the discussions of the last few weeks re the inadequacy of SWAT for Special Ops have passed by you completely. You cannot be wronger than this.
If you know what is the role of the IAF Garuds, please make a case for integrating them with the SG among others in a SF Command.

Hostage rescue is a police job (specially trained SWAT police), its not sub conventional warfare.

If by hostage rescue you mean a Mumbai type Ops, from your fist comment itself, it looks like the discussions of the last few weeks re the inadequacy of SWAT for Special Ops have passed by you completely. You cannot be wronger than this.
If you know what is the role of the IAF Garuds, please make a case for integrating them with the SG among others in a SF Command.

Mumbai type ops is classicl hostage rescue - requires a SWAT type response, NSG is the right forcce for it - the AFTERMATH of Mumbai, in terms of our response, would be Special Frces territory. About the Garuds, dnt think anyone is quite clear what their role is, including the IAF itself! In fact the IAF crated a world recxord of sorts when it asked for aplications to the Garud force through newspapers - has to be the first for any "special force"!!

[Singha]

methinks the best "laboratory of indian hegemony" with use of SF units would be in nepal and bangladesh
by working in collusion with local elements there opposed to the respective capitals.

some leading islamists and BDR top guns are very openly engaged in anti-India activities from the
safety of BD. they can be targeted.

Gulf is another area where financiers and intellectual recruiters of terrorists among NRIs and pakis
can be targeted.

it needs highly educated officer rank people who have the armed skills but also foreign languages,
skilled in survival as deep penetration agents and sleepers, skilled forgers and fake passport users,
the kind of people seen in "Munich" and who I am sure the israelis retain for mossad and shin bet
black ops. we need supply channels and front cos put in place to allow these tourists and business
people to move around, channels to supply money, information, explosives, weapons and channels
to facilitate their escape after an operation. i.e. our desi Vympel unit or some of the black cia/socom
elements drawn from ex-delta force ranks etc.

the war has to be fought in the lands of the enemy, not from behind sandbags in our railway
stations and schools.

call it MEOW-X or JIT-X or xyz , but the best people need to be pulled in and trained and armed
for the job, with israeli guidance & technology if available.

if we cannot shape the destiny of nepal and bd in our favour, pls forget about dealing with pak
let alone prc.

[somnath]

Language skills are the most sought after skills in special ops. And for India, the canvas is really huge - dari, pushto, urdu, bangla, sinhalese, mandarin, tibetan...Dont know what kind of expertise Army SF has in these areas (or the other "spceial orces"). Any pointers, RayC?

About the Israeli operation in the aftermath of Munich, THAT was a classic special ops - intel (Mossad) and spec forces (sayaret matkal) combining in a variety of operations to take out strategic "targets". Among others, Ehud BArak was apprently involved in one of the operations!

[sum]

The Russians should not be underestimated in this field..

They have conducted similar ops wherein a senior Chechan leader was blown up in Oman( two Russian embassy "staff" were arrested but quietly released within a year after some arm-twisting) and recently, a Chechan leader was shot dead in turkey by a pistol usualy sed by Russian intel/SF...

[somnath]

not to forget the ex-KGB spy Litvinenenko killed in London! Russians are very good in special ops - the initial phase of the Afghan operation was again brilliant special ops, before they messed up the "conventional" bit.

[soutikghosh]

i have recently read PDF version of indo-pak special forces (osprey) and it has catalogue of SSG ops.
i

Any link to the PDF document please. Thankyou.

[Vikram_S]

It would be quite naive to judge the effectiveness of a "special ops" unit on the basis of "published" info alone. Ditto with SSG - it is far better to analyse frm larger political developments. Take for example, the taliban takeover in Afghanistan. As a special ops, it was undoubtaedly a stunning success, afecting a "regime change" and putting one's own proxies in power, in the process defeating the defences of Ahmed Shah Masood. That was achieving the political objectives of the Paki state, and it can be inferred without too much doubt that the SSG would have been involved, along with intel and other units. This was a perfect example of a coherent national strategy and effective use of "special forcecs". Kargil on the other hand, was an example of an incoherent national strategy to use special forces, and it failed even though the performance of the "SF units" was by all account, exemplary. A perfect example of how war is too important to be left only to generals?!

while you have valid point about strategic aspects and big picture you are also resorting to unsupported rhetoric statements, as supporting taliban against rag tag NA is not stunning success

you are also missing the point that published statement about a force also reveal data about its successes, failure and overall evolution to understand its ability

and on this statement :

Kargil on the other hand, was an example of an incoherent national strategy to use special forces, and it failed even though the performance of the "SF units" was by all account, exemplary.

are you referring to indian forces in kargil?

[somnath]

while you have valid point about strategic aspects and big picture you are also resorting to unsupported rhetoric statements, as supporting taliban against rag tag NA is not stunning success

Rag tag is a relative term, not an absolute one - a rag tag militia in certain conditions would be more effective than a superbly equipped US Army! See how a similarly "rag tag" Taliban is running circles around the "hi tech" coalition forces in Afghanistan. Even our jungle warfare school has the motto of "fighting he guerilla like a guerilla" - its all theatre/situation specific. In any case, Paki political objectives during the times was to install a "friendly" govt in Kabul - they carried out a "special ops", which by all acounts was a success. They installed a freindly regime, one that in turn managed to run its fiat in most parts of Afghanistan (barring the Panjshir valley, where Masood held on). So one must, even grudglinly admist that it was a success! its a fact, no rhetoric here.

are you referring to indian forces in kargil?

[/quote]

No, the Paki forces! As a special ops, it was fantastic. They identiefied the "weakness", ie, Indian forces vacating those peaks in winter, built up enough infrastructure to sustain a sizeable force INSIDE our territory, and then carried out an undetected intrusion, complete with choppers! Its another matter that the generals had no strategic sense at all, and hence had no idea of how it will pan out, and they got a bloody nose. Goes to show the importance of dovetailing special ops to national objectives, not as a glorious isolated "rambo" exercise.

[Vikram_S]

soutikghosh

search in

http://www.rapidsharedata.com/tag/force ... +military/

[Vikram_S]

Rag tag is a relative term, not an absolute one - a rag tag militia in certain conditions would be more effective than a superbly equipped US Army! See how a similarly "rag tag" Taliban is running circles around the "hi tech" coalition forces in Afghanistan. Even our jungle warfare school has the motto of "fighting he guerilla like a guerilla" - its all theatre/situation specific. In any case, Paki political objectives during the times was to install a "friendly" govt in Kabul - they carried out a "special ops", which by all acounts was a success. They installed a freindly regime, one that in turn managed to run its fiat in most parts of Afghanistan (barring the Panjshir valley, where Masood held on). So one must, even grudglinly admist that it was a success! its a fact, no rhetoric here.

i do not agree.

so pakistan created islamist regime (at cost of own society and which they are now fighting in FATA, Swat) and used it to run warfare against underequipped northern alliance

how is this some great success for SF or SSG?
the nearest it can be compared to is indian support for mukti bahini in 1971 and even there, mukti bahini did not lead to polarization of indian society.

pakistan "genius" is like a monkey cutting off its own nose to teach face a lesson

even taliban success is limited:

US has pretty much overthrown taliban in few months time and routinely overwhelms talibs in fighting. in conventional warfare they are nothing but infinite body bags and are just waging attrition war against US in hope that developed society will not bear cost and that collateral damage will turn local populace against "invader".

this is also not great genius. 160 million muslims in pakistan who are nothing but cheap bullet sack for pakistan army and ISI to send everywhere.

No, the Paki forces! As a special ops, it was fantastic. They identiefied the "weakness", ie, Indian forces vacating those peaks in winter, built up enough infrastructure to sustain a sizeable force INSIDE our territory, and then carried out an undetected intrusion, complete with choppers! Its another matter that the generals had no strategic sense at all, and hence had no idea of how it will pan out, and they got a bloody nose. Goes to show the importance of dovetailing special ops to national objectives, not as a glorious isolated "rambo" exercise.

this was not special ops but classic warfare which teaches to infiltrate enemy lines in depth. in this case lead soldiers doing work were NLI not only SSG. this was not just a quick raid or objective but a detailed invasion with limited scope. and it fail not just because it was not strategic but because idiots did not make proper plan to account for indian response and logistics constraints.

i think you are mixing up terms and issues. the SSG being part of Pak command structure did not create Kargil. SSG was just tool here. In 1971, 1965 even india did raids, attacks using SF as tool.

in your first case, there is some validity of SSG involvement in afghanistan on deputation supporting taliban movement.

that is valid. it is also valid to say SSG involvement in action against russian forces is also useful to consider as part of national objective at the time. but if everything is considered SF you dilute validity of own arguement.

point is basically that pakistan is fascist risk taking state. it is absolutely crazy in many ways thanks to hatred of india, hindus. so it will keep coming up with such aggressive ideas with no concern for conflict because it think india is deterred.

[somnath]

No miliary force, "special" or otherwise, can or should dictate the choice of national objectives. And the discussion here is not of the "rightness" of the national objective, but the efficacy of using special ops in acheving the same. That Pakistan has chosen political islam (with its attendant warts) as a national objective is not for discussion here. But given that it has, was the Taliban "regime change" a successful operation? By all accounts it was. It managed to replace the incumbent, and extended a type of control over a geogrphic area that Ops Enduring Freedom and the Karzai regime can only dream of. that Pakistan is suffering the poltiical/socioilogical consequences of political islam is not a comment on the merits of the installing the taliban from a special ops perspective.

this was not special ops but classic warfare which teaches to infiltrate enemy lines in depth. in this case lead soldiers doing work were NLI not only SSG. this was not just a quick raid or objective but a detailed invasion with limited scope. and it fail not just because it was not strategic but because idiots did not make proper plan to account for indian response and logistics constraints.

i think you are mixing up terms and issues. the SSG being part of Pak command structure did not create Kargil. SSG was just tool here. In 1971, 1965 even india did raids, attacks using SF as tool.

Well, to start with a lot of accounts of Kargil say that the initial ops were largely led by the SSG. But that apart, this wasnt a "conventional" operation at all. Here was a state waging a (limited) war on another one, but at the same time straining to build a facade of "plausible deniability" of its responsibilioty - this is classic sub conventional war in my dictionary. The problem was that they couldnt realise (and that was the mistake of a strategic nature) that India would escalate this to "conventional" levels - using the air force, mobilising the Navy etc. And in a straight fight, a "sub conventional" force, equipped likewise, will never be a match for a larger conventional force unless it is reinforced itself by friendly conventional forces. Due to its "denial of involvement", Pakistan couldnt ratchet its own force levels up to match the levels India was bringing to bear - and after that the result could only be one. So as start, the "sub conventional" operation was "executed" brilliantly, but obviously with no thought process, it floundered later.

And you are right, India's operation in 1971 - the initial phase with the Mukti Bahini - is also a good case study of a successful special ops. In this case, we backed up the sub conventional effort with the required resposne once Pakistan ratcheted up a conventional response.

[Vikram_S]

somnath that is not the point

point is in pakistan military is controls the state so it can make such crazy decision to either create taliban or invade india and choose ssg, NLI as tools.

in india civilian authority does not permit such risk taking so whether SF is part of army HQ is secondary decision. in 1971 also SF command was same but india trained mukti bahini soldiers.

so we can do it also now and do kargil on pukes or support baluchi people but decision has to come from civilian master.

the problem is india does not have "national objectives" to deal with pakistan in your words. all the remaining is because of that. indias useless babus and politicians do not know how to deal with pakistan and are in wkk type behaviour or sheer callous. if national objective was there to make pakistan pay for its crimes then all this SF stuff will follow naturally
you do not even need SF to train baluchi, sindhi and create fire in pakistan. regular infantry is enough.

i agree that unified HQ of all SF is required, in fact including NSG, even if it is internal it has useful skill and training facility but without national aim on dealing with pakistan it is just a sword to be kept shiny but not used like Indin army tanks

[ParGha]

The need to have Para (SF) as separate regiment from Parachute Regiment is different from command issues. As of today these two are basically two different regiments under one name. A separate regiment for SF can ensure their interests are projected properly within the Army

How different are they from each other? (NOTE: Genuine question, not rhetorical) From an organizational stand-point, they appear quite similar. Do you remember the debates about having one RC for two Gorkha Rifles Regiments? Why the regular commando forces were given over to the Parachute Regiment in the very first place, instead of the Guards Brigade? Revisit the rationale, you may find many issues still relevant. Under current designation, the "Special Forces" already outnumber regular Para battalions. Divide them up... and someone please explain how only 3 or 4 battalions are supposed to sustain an RC these days?

[RayC]

IMHO, using special forces for conventional ops is a "waste" of expensive resources. By defninition, each section of a special forcecs unit would be 4-5 times more expensive as compared to a normal light infntry unit. To use them in "conventional" roles will be a massive waste of resources. Officers can be deputed to other units, but to have entire spec forces units to operate as line infantry (a la 1971) can only arise out of not having a doctrine!

Somnath,

As a Forum Moderator, one wanders up and down to see that things are running smooth and so I do miss the replies to my posts as a member and come in late. Sorry for that.

In the Artillery there is a dictum that no guns should lie idle.

The Parachute Regiment, the SF are strategic instruments. If they are lying idle, what is their use excepting earning their pay and consuming rations?

Soldiers, as a class, want to be where the action is. If they are treated as ''asset'' and touch me nots, then they will get rusted. They were utilised and they were acclimatised to the terrain and the mode of what the Pakistanis were up to in Kargil. Therefore, if there was the requirement to send them beyond, they would be in a perfect mental shape to take them on.

Let me explain it a bit more in a mundane manner. If I were to play golf without a warm up, I would be totally at sea, no matter what is my handicap. Thus, to prove one's mettle if one is 'warmed up', one delivers better.

I think resources lying idle is what is a waste and not utilising it, even in a manner that is not in their classical role, which may not appeal to many, may not be the answer.

I have not understood as to how an SF unit is more expensive that infantry.

Doctrines are guidelines. Innovations and thinking out of the box is what catches the enemy by surprise. However, it does not mean that ops in Kargil churned any eye catching surprises.

[somnath]

The Parachute Regiment, the SF are strategic instruments. If they are lying idle, what is their use excepting earning their pay and consuming rations?

Soldiers, as a class, want to be where the action is. If they are treated as ''asset'' and touch me nots, then they will get rusted. They were utilised and they were acclimatised to the terrain and the mode of what the Pakistanis were up to in Kargil. Therefore, if there was the requirement to send them beyond, they would be in a perfect mental shape to take them on.

Let me explain it a bit more in a mundane manner. If I were to play golf without a warm up, I would be totally at sea, no matter what is my handicap. Thus, to prove one's mettle if one is 'warmed up', one delivers better.

I think resources lying idle is what is a waste and not utilising it, even in a manner that is not in their classical role, which may not appeal to many, may not be the answer.

Sir, agree with you completely. My problem is that we dont have a proper strategic doctrine to exploit the speial forces altogether, in a strategic scenario which is rich in "sub conventional" opportunities! If we did that, utilisation would hardly be a challenge. Because we dont have a doctrine, we do things that range from the ridiculous (co-locating the para and special forces, newspaper advert for the Garud) to the criminal (no SF command, lack of suitable skills like language skills, inadequacy of basic equipment).

None of our special forces enjoy any degree of clout in the services - not the Army SF (most infantry officers treat them as "slightly better trained" infantry), not the Navy (MARCOS is a sideshow, you dont get ahead unless you are an aviator or a non-tech officer). If the "strategy makers", I would blame the political leadership - this is way out of the general's grasp, dont realise the importance of Sfs, it is unlikely that the services will.

But at the same time, the services are also being quite short sighted by not taking the lead in drafting a doctrine and implementing it. Doctrine, Training, Equipemnt -thats the ideal thought process IMHO. In absence of a doctrine, the training is muddled and the equipment is below par. If there was some effort at building one, wont it show up the glaring deficiencies in launguage skills, electronic equipment, communication gear etc? Shouldnt the Army chief in that case be fighting more to get that, rather than fighting on T-90 tanks - platforms that may never see action in our strategic scenario?

I have not understood as to how an SF unit is more expensive that infantry.

Just the equipment and "manning" I would think. A special forces unit would need to be officer heavy, and at least should be carrying much better quality and more specialised gear than a light infantry unit.

Kargil would have actually been quite a "rich" special forces territory - I am sure there were special ops conducted that we wouldnt know of. But special forces should be there every day at the tip of our strategic spear, taking the battle into enemy territory all the time. But today there is simply no doctrine to utlise them likeise!

[Rishi]

Any one seen/read this kitab?:

[KiranM]

I have not understood as to how an SF unit is more expensive that infantry.

Just the equipment and "manning" I would think. A special forces unit would need to be officer heavy, and at least should be carrying much better quality and more specialised gear than a light infantry unit.

With due respect to RayC sir, the expense is to also accrue for the training on skills like demolitions, sniping, communication, ISTAR, etc. The wider Army do train for such expertise. But in small SF teams we would see greater concentration of such skills; not to forget double redundancy, like a team of 8 may have one sniper, but there are 2 people with sniping abilities; so on and so forth.
Also niche skills like languages, etc.
We may also need to factor the associated costs in the greater degree of training and comparatively more exercises to train for different terrains and scenarios.
Of course there may be something else that does not meet my eye in your statement.

Kargil would have actually been quite a "rich" special forces territory - I am sure there were special ops conducted that we wouldnt know of. But special forces should be there every day at the tip of our strategic spear, taking the battle into enemy territory all the time. But today there is simply no doctrine to utlise them likeise!

IMHO such a doctrine does not exist simply because there is now no requirement for 'doctrinal' use of SF. Other than ops inside the country and for 'unknown' ops few KMs from border/ LOC our political masters do not authorize any deep penetration ops.

Regards,
Kiran

[somnath]

One of the problems of lacking a strategic culture is how we deal with issues in a manner that is a complete cock-up even when the intentions are good. Take for example the operation in Bhutan against the ULFA camps. This was classic special forces territory - typically the operation should have been carried out first and then (maybe) the info released to the media. Instead, we had a situation where the media was reporting almost real time news about the various steps leading up to the operations! This included training of the Bhutanese forces, the fact that the King himself was leading the forces, which routes in the jungles the IA was intercepting et al. And most of it attributed to the govt/services sources..And then day by day report on the progress of the operation...Complete with video footage of army columns and choppers..the result was that while the bases were taken out, the efficacy of the operation in terms of liquidating ULFA's "assets" was doubtful.

[Singha]

I agree it would have been better to move quietly, kill the camps then make a show of bombarding them
for the benefit of NDTV after the debris had been carefully searched and bodies burnt.

[sum]

I agree it would have been better to move quietly, kill the camps then make a show of bombarding them
for the benefit of NDTV after the debris had been carefully searched and bodies burnt.

But, they dont get votes, Somnath-sir...Its only the visible slam-bang which enables the netas to brag about it.

Guess its a flip side of being a flawed democracy like ours.

[Surya]

somnath

you could not be more wrong on Bhutan ops




but thats life

[Rahul M]

AFAIK the bhutan ops worked pretty well.

if it could be bettered is of course another question.

[somnath]

somnath

you could not be more wrong on Bhutan ops


but thats life

Would be very happy to be corrected! From where I stand (read, observe) the Bhutan operation was followed by a serious "upscaling" of ULFA operations soon after, as a lot of the cadres moved over to either Assam or Bangladesh, and wanted to prove a point...But happy to be corrected, anytime!

[Surya]

unfortunately I cannot correct you to the point of telling some of the things that happened.

yes some did move but a good bunch met their makers thanks to some very tough folks who then quietly returned to base to be idle resources

[somnath]

Surya, you may be right. But the fact remains that a host of the top leadership (Paresh Barua, Anup Chetia etc) got away...

[RayC]

With due respect to RayC sir, the expense is to also accrue for the training on skills like demolitions, sniping, communication, ISTAR, etc. The wider Army do train for such expertise. But in small SF teams we would see greater concentration of such skills; not to forget double redundancy, like a team of 8 may have one sniper, but there are 2 people with sniping abilities; so on and so forth.
Also niche skills like languages, etc.
We may also need to factor the associated costs in the greater degree of training and comparatively more exercises to train for different terrains and scenarios.
Of course there may be something else that does not meet my eye in your statement.

The type of training that is mentioned is also done by the Infantry. I am not aware of ISTAR training being imparted since it is a training input post my retirement. Language skills are also a part of the training curriculum since the Infantry are the boots on the ground and have to interact with locals. Redundancy is a phenomenon of all units in the Army, and a double trade is a minimum prerequisite.

It maybe mentioned that the SF is a specialised organisation and their area of expertise is narrower and specific than the infantry. The Infantry has to hone a larger variety of skills being ‘generalists’ and the tactical canvas is greater and hence a flavour for all seasons, terrain and tactics. The SF, so far, is seen as a strategic instrument.

Further, the Infantry has to be amalgamated into the combined arms doctrine by having regular training with the combined arms, apart from the period exercises at various levels of command. These exercises are very costly and so the periodicity was scaled down to make them manageable within the constraint of the Indian economy.. It maybe mentioned that the SF and Parachute troops come in at the highest level of such exercises and are a force multiplier (for the want of a better word). It in no way diminishes their very important role in facilitating the progress of operation and in fact, is an asset we could hardly do without.

The cost of transporting the SF by air during training and in exercises is a cost that is not incurred for the normal infantry, unless there is an air-landed operational exercise.

Training and being operationally fit is an expensive affair. However, comparison does not serve the purpose since it takes a unified and cohesive organisation to be able to deliver the goods when asked by the nation. Each play their role and the sovereignty and integrity of the nation is a costly exercise.

[somnath]

Language skills are also a part of the training curriculum since the Infantry are the boots on the ground and have to interact with locals.

RayC, thats interesting. So do the infantry units actually have people trained in foreign languages (at least the "relevant" one, like dari, pushto, urdu)? One of the main problems that Indian intel faces today is lack of language specialists..Would interesting to know if the Army has some intellectual property here!

Urdu, yes, and many languages where IA is in insurgency.

The units have those who are trained in the NE languages and Kashmiri.

There are also many who are trained in foreign languages beyond the ones mentioned by you.

I am not aware of IA intelligence being short of language translators.

Somnath,

You have removed your post?

[somnath]

Somnath,

You have removed your post?

Not really! its funny!

[RayC]

Somnath,

You have removed your post?

Not really! its funny!

My mistake.

[somnath]

There are also many who are trained in foreign languages beyond the ones mentioned by you.

I am not aware of IA intelligence being short of language translators.

Quite interesting. Why doesnt RAW recruit language specialists from Army Intel then? Apparently there is a big shortage of language skills in the intel world, especially the "neighbouring" ones.

Does the Army have its own language school? AFAIK most people take up the "fancy" languages in their NDA course (French, Russian etc)

RayC said:

I have no knowledge of RAW and their language skills. Since you have, could you elucidate.

In the NDA, foreign languages are taught. My was Hindi!!

The AEC School teaches foreign languages and also we subscribe to the Foreign Languages School in Delhi.

There is a quota as to what languages one subscribes to and then selected. There is an aptitude test and one cannot just 'jump' into a language course. As a child one can learn many languages, but not so as an adult.

[RayC]

Somnath,

To be frank, I enjoy divergent opinion from mine. It helps me to learn.

Yet, while you all are more well read on technicalities of weapons and tactics of foreign nations, you don't apply it to Indian conditions.

Yes, the US and their systems and organisations are fabulous, but inspite of their hugely superior weapon systems, finances and political clout, they are floundering in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Compare it with our "prehistoric" ways. It does not appeal to you all. And yet, see the percentages that have come out to vote, inspite of all the efforts of the terrorists and the Hurriyat. Does show, that we are doing better and are not totally stupid. I do agree we could do it better, but then we are not that bad! What about the raging insurgency in the NE. Has it not been controlled?

Dissensions will be everywhere, where there are many sub national groups and even caste groups. And yet we survive!

Let us also look at the goodness in India. We are not perfect. We however try!

[RayC]

Somnath,

My apologies again.

This edit and quote buttons are too close.

I am going to appeal to the Mods to distance them!