Re: Geopolitical thread - 15
Posted: 03 Oct 2008 12:03
Well put,the world no longer "dances" to western,Atlanticist tunes!
News of chess games in the Czech Republic,site for a new NATO ABM radar condemned by Russia as part of a new "encircle Russia" strategy of the US/NATO and Estonia,where an alleged Russian mole was caught.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1662
Czech spying accusations against Russia spark political storm
Recent Czech intelligence reports have sounded the alarm over intensified intelligence activity by Russian and other foreign agencies focused on a planned US missile-defense radar to be built near Prague and on strategic assets set to be privatized by the Czech government.
In its annual report issued on September 25, the Czech counterintelligence service BIS said that Russian agents had been working to stir up public opinion against the radar. "Russian espionage activities in the Czech Republic are currently reaching a particularly high level of intensity," the BIS said, adding that over the last year Russian spies had sought "to contact, infiltrate, and influence people and organizations that have influence on public
US radar site, Brdy
opinion."
In a separate annual report issued on September 29, the Czech military intelligence agency (VZ) backed up the BIS findings, stating it had observed "concrete interest" from "foreign services" in the planned US radar system, which Russia strongly opposes.
The reports have also raised political tensions in Prague, with the center-left opposition accusing the pro-American government of politicizing intelligence ahead of a key parliamentary vote on the radar system later this fall and Senate and local elections this month.
Petr Uhl, a former anticommunist dissident who supports the opposition, says of the intelligence reports is only a political issue before the elections. Others say it's obvious that Russian and other services-- possibly Iranian - would be interested in the radar and more in the Czech Republic. Russia's overall aim in the Czech Republic, the BIS report suggested, may be to weaken NATO and the European Union and achieve at least a partial restoration of Moscow's former "security perimeter" in Central Europe.
The report, which offered few details, also warned about Prague's overreliance on Russian energy supplies and pipelines, and cited Russian efforts to influence the future of electric power generation in the country -- an apparent reference to CEZ, the electricity monopoly due to be sold off sometime next year.
The BIS report said Russian intelligence, often under diplomatic cover, tried to influence Czech politicians and media in order to increase public opposition to the radar. The report said Russian spies also sought to infiltrate unidentified civic groups in the Czech Republic, where opinion polls consistently have shown a strong majority opposed to the radar. The main Czech opposition group to the radar, "No To The Bases," has denied any Russian link.
But Andor Sandor, a former VZ director, who has consulted for the ruling center-right Civic Democratic Party, told RFE/RL that the methods used by Russian intelligence to influence public opinion were well-known. He says, for example, that they have helped publicize information wrongly claiming that the radar would harm the environment, create health problems for local residents, and even cause air-traffic accidents.
Media reports have also cited the possibility that Russian spies are buying up land near the Brdy military zone 90 kilometers southwest of Prague, where the radar is expected to be built. Czech Deputy Defense Minister Martin Bartak has said that the BIS and VZ are actively preventing land around Brdy from falling into the wrong hands.
While the military intelligence report did not name any specific spy agency, it stated that "foreign services" had shown interest in the radar - a point Sandor says likely refers to Iranian operatives. "I would be really surprised if the Iranians did not work here," he says. "When you openly state that the radar station is here to stop the Iranian threat of the nuclear and ballistic-missile program, then it's just quite understandable that the Iranians would like to know what's going on."
In recent years, Czech intelligence has warned increasingly about foreign spy services stepping up their activities in the country. But Uhl says the latest reports strike him as a return to the past, when Czechs who had contact with foreigners were accused of conspiring against the communist government. "I wouldn't like that these times come back," he says.
In a sign of the political storm brewing over the radar issue, the Defense Committee of the lower house of the Czech parliament canceled a hearing it was set to hold on October 1 to discuss the intelligence reports. Czech political sources say the hearing will not take place until after the elections on October 17.
Weekly newspaper analyses the real cost of high-ranking Estonian official’s betrayal
There’s nothing redeemable about selling state secrets to a nation’s long-term oppressor, especially when residual skepticism of Russia has existed in the Baltic states since their independence in the early 1990s, The Baltic Times writes, commenting on recent Herman Simm’s treason scandal.
Even more alarming, a British former civil servant has informed The Baltic Times that this might not be a one-off case, but part of a wider breach of national security. The source, who worked for the civil service throughout the 1990s, claims that Russia exerts great pressure on Estonian government officials to sell secrets. He realized this while handling a senior official of the Estonian police who sought UK asylum to escape the demands of the Russian secret service in Estonia. A senior government source told The Baltic Times he was not surprised when the Simm case came out and the government knew there had been a leak for some time.
There is a genuine feeling that Estonia has, through Simm’s treason, weakened NATO’s position with Russia, particularly as Simm may have betrayed secrets concerning other member states. The other side of the argument suggests that Estonia’s detection and efficient handling of Simm’s treason proves to NATO that it can be considered a responsible and trustworthy member state. “I can say that the legal protection has acted very professionally. Therefore I cannot agree that Herman Simm’s case would have damaged
Herman Simm
Estonia’s reputation — rather the opposite. Eliminating defense risk so professionally definitely raises Estonia’s reputation,” parliament member Marko Mihkelson said.
NATO, on the other hand, has seemed somewhat blase about the whole affair, offering nothing more than an abrupt “no comment” when questioned by the Estonian press.
Speaking at Tartu University last week, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson told audiences that Russia was not a threat to NATO or the Baltics, apparently continuing to toe the line after leaving the organization in 2004. Despite talking on the subject of international security, Simm’s recent treason conviction apparently didn’t warrant a mention. If Robertson’s perspective is any indication, it would seem that NATO is more concerned with relieving Baltic anxieties than actually addressing the serious consequences of Simm’s treason, The Baltic Times concludes. A less contentious issue that has arisen from the case is the Estonian penal code’s light punishment for treason, a meager three to 15 years’ imprisonment, the paper notes. Given the potentially severe consequences of betraying national security, the punishment hardly seems to fit the crime.
Around the globe treason is considered among the most damnable of offenses, and punishment is categorically firmer than that found in Estonia. This begs the question of why Estonia is so light in its sentencing, especially when its national sovereignty may realistically come under threat from such actions. At the very least, a stiffer penalty might act as a crude deterrent for those tempted to repeat Simm’s treachery.
News of chess games in the Czech Republic,site for a new NATO ABM radar condemned by Russia as part of a new "encircle Russia" strategy of the US/NATO and Estonia,where an alleged Russian mole was caught.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1662
Czech spying accusations against Russia spark political storm
Recent Czech intelligence reports have sounded the alarm over intensified intelligence activity by Russian and other foreign agencies focused on a planned US missile-defense radar to be built near Prague and on strategic assets set to be privatized by the Czech government.
In its annual report issued on September 25, the Czech counterintelligence service BIS said that Russian agents had been working to stir up public opinion against the radar. "Russian espionage activities in the Czech Republic are currently reaching a particularly high level of intensity," the BIS said, adding that over the last year Russian spies had sought "to contact, infiltrate, and influence people and organizations that have influence on public
US radar site, Brdy
opinion."
In a separate annual report issued on September 29, the Czech military intelligence agency (VZ) backed up the BIS findings, stating it had observed "concrete interest" from "foreign services" in the planned US radar system, which Russia strongly opposes.
The reports have also raised political tensions in Prague, with the center-left opposition accusing the pro-American government of politicizing intelligence ahead of a key parliamentary vote on the radar system later this fall and Senate and local elections this month.
Petr Uhl, a former anticommunist dissident who supports the opposition, says of the intelligence reports is only a political issue before the elections. Others say it's obvious that Russian and other services-- possibly Iranian - would be interested in the radar and more in the Czech Republic. Russia's overall aim in the Czech Republic, the BIS report suggested, may be to weaken NATO and the European Union and achieve at least a partial restoration of Moscow's former "security perimeter" in Central Europe.
The report, which offered few details, also warned about Prague's overreliance on Russian energy supplies and pipelines, and cited Russian efforts to influence the future of electric power generation in the country -- an apparent reference to CEZ, the electricity monopoly due to be sold off sometime next year.
The BIS report said Russian intelligence, often under diplomatic cover, tried to influence Czech politicians and media in order to increase public opposition to the radar. The report said Russian spies also sought to infiltrate unidentified civic groups in the Czech Republic, where opinion polls consistently have shown a strong majority opposed to the radar. The main Czech opposition group to the radar, "No To The Bases," has denied any Russian link.
But Andor Sandor, a former VZ director, who has consulted for the ruling center-right Civic Democratic Party, told RFE/RL that the methods used by Russian intelligence to influence public opinion were well-known. He says, for example, that they have helped publicize information wrongly claiming that the radar would harm the environment, create health problems for local residents, and even cause air-traffic accidents.
Media reports have also cited the possibility that Russian spies are buying up land near the Brdy military zone 90 kilometers southwest of Prague, where the radar is expected to be built. Czech Deputy Defense Minister Martin Bartak has said that the BIS and VZ are actively preventing land around Brdy from falling into the wrong hands.
While the military intelligence report did not name any specific spy agency, it stated that "foreign services" had shown interest in the radar - a point Sandor says likely refers to Iranian operatives. "I would be really surprised if the Iranians did not work here," he says. "When you openly state that the radar station is here to stop the Iranian threat of the nuclear and ballistic-missile program, then it's just quite understandable that the Iranians would like to know what's going on."
In recent years, Czech intelligence has warned increasingly about foreign spy services stepping up their activities in the country. But Uhl says the latest reports strike him as a return to the past, when Czechs who had contact with foreigners were accused of conspiring against the communist government. "I wouldn't like that these times come back," he says.
In a sign of the political storm brewing over the radar issue, the Defense Committee of the lower house of the Czech parliament canceled a hearing it was set to hold on October 1 to discuss the intelligence reports. Czech political sources say the hearing will not take place until after the elections on October 17.
Weekly newspaper analyses the real cost of high-ranking Estonian official’s betrayal
There’s nothing redeemable about selling state secrets to a nation’s long-term oppressor, especially when residual skepticism of Russia has existed in the Baltic states since their independence in the early 1990s, The Baltic Times writes, commenting on recent Herman Simm’s treason scandal.
Even more alarming, a British former civil servant has informed The Baltic Times that this might not be a one-off case, but part of a wider breach of national security. The source, who worked for the civil service throughout the 1990s, claims that Russia exerts great pressure on Estonian government officials to sell secrets. He realized this while handling a senior official of the Estonian police who sought UK asylum to escape the demands of the Russian secret service in Estonia. A senior government source told The Baltic Times he was not surprised when the Simm case came out and the government knew there had been a leak for some time.
There is a genuine feeling that Estonia has, through Simm’s treason, weakened NATO’s position with Russia, particularly as Simm may have betrayed secrets concerning other member states. The other side of the argument suggests that Estonia’s detection and efficient handling of Simm’s treason proves to NATO that it can be considered a responsible and trustworthy member state. “I can say that the legal protection has acted very professionally. Therefore I cannot agree that Herman Simm’s case would have damaged
Herman Simm
Estonia’s reputation — rather the opposite. Eliminating defense risk so professionally definitely raises Estonia’s reputation,” parliament member Marko Mihkelson said.
NATO, on the other hand, has seemed somewhat blase about the whole affair, offering nothing more than an abrupt “no comment” when questioned by the Estonian press.
Speaking at Tartu University last week, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson told audiences that Russia was not a threat to NATO or the Baltics, apparently continuing to toe the line after leaving the organization in 2004. Despite talking on the subject of international security, Simm’s recent treason conviction apparently didn’t warrant a mention. If Robertson’s perspective is any indication, it would seem that NATO is more concerned with relieving Baltic anxieties than actually addressing the serious consequences of Simm’s treason, The Baltic Times concludes. A less contentious issue that has arisen from the case is the Estonian penal code’s light punishment for treason, a meager three to 15 years’ imprisonment, the paper notes. Given the potentially severe consequences of betraying national security, the punishment hardly seems to fit the crime.
Around the globe treason is considered among the most damnable of offenses, and punishment is categorically firmer than that found in Estonia. This begs the question of why Estonia is so light in its sentencing, especially when its national sovereignty may realistically come under threat from such actions. At the very least, a stiffer penalty might act as a crude deterrent for those tempted to repeat Simm’s treachery.