mahadevbhu wrote:
Arrey. Thats where I think that the CT of hool is a little bit too much. The ISI gains nothing by not allowing a terrorist plot to get through.
On the contrary boss. What I have called "hool" has been an instrument of modern statecraft for decades if not centuries:
a calibrated demonstration of one's capability to harm the adversary.
Consider the cold war. How was it fought? The proxy conflicts such as Vietnam, Korea and Afghanistan were only one aspect. Calibrated capability demonstrations, by the US and the Soviets directly against each other, occurred frequently and regularly. Every so often one side would send a new aircraft or submarine to intrude undetected deep within the enemy's territory, and then leave a calling card. Heavy concentrations of armoured divisions would suddenly materialize on borders in lightning mobilization "exercises". In the field of espionage/intel/infiltration, especially, these kinds of demonstrations were constantly going on.
There are big advantages to "hool". First, it tests the preparedness of the adversary. Second, it sends a powerful deterrent message: "I am able to hurt you in an unanticipated way, hence I control the escalation ladder. I have more options than you." Such a message both demoralizes the enemy and makes him more likely to get on the defensive, lose initiative and bend to your will. Yet, it is done without actually crossing the line of causing physical or economic damage, hence it stops short of forcing a response in kind.
Of course there are risks with playing "hool" as the American P3C Orion crew found out over Hainan Island... or, on a larger scale, as played out during the Cuban Missile crisis. Calibration of the demonstration has to be very careful, and even then may get out of hand. But played successfully it has immense value.
The ISI gains a lot from "hools"... it convinces the US that civilian targets can be harmed on its own soil, and further, that the US has no option but to rely on the ISI itself in order to avoid such harm. Yet, by not actually allowing a terrorist attack to succeed, the ISI doesn't risk the probability that a massive outburst of public opinion may force a change in US policy. This kind of calibrated demonstration aims to contain the US' range of options... not force the US to explore new ones.
What will the US do? Bomb the Pakis?
ISI can't take that risk. They didn't take that risk on 9/13/2001, when Armitage told Musharraf that Pakistan would be bombed to the stone age if it didn't cooperate with the US. ISI has to calibrate the demonstration so as to minimize the risk. That's why their terrorist plants invariably fail.
They have had enough reason to do so up until now and have not done it.
No, they have calculated so far that the benefits of bombing do not outweigh the loss of whatever cooperation they can get from ISI. They may be wrong in that calculation, but it's the only reason why they have not done it. Ultimately a long war is about keeping as many options open as possible, until you are forced to discard some of them. Bombing would mean that the US discards a certain proportion of its options.
The Pak Army's main raison d'etre is to create such an atmosphere of fear and terror, such that it gets money from the Pak budget, and protection money from the US to allow supplies to Afghanistan and CIA spies inside Pakistan.
By giving hools, the Pak Army gets whatever it wants from the US without risking an overt hostile response from the US. Enough of an atmosphere of terror is created, just by infiltrating the terrorists into the US and letting the DHS find out in the nick of time just how close they came to being attacked. An actual attack isn't necessary, and would increase the risks to Pakistan. Game it and see.
If you look at the history of the AfPak conflict, you will see that these "hools" came into play at a certain time.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fo ... ted_States
You can see that they pick up around 2004 (3 incidents in one year), and show intensity peaks in 2005 (4 incidents), 2006 (4 incidents), 2009 (5 incidents) and 2011-12 (5 incidents).
Correlate these to events in the AfPak conflict.
2001-2003: Musharraf was delivering a number of "Al Qaeda #3s" like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, etc. to the Americans. During this period the ISI was giving sanctuary to Taliban leadership such as the Quetta Shura, but less effective sanctuary to the AlQ leadership. Furthermore, ISI were not yet actively abetting cross-border attacks by the Taliban into Afghanistan.
2003: Massive resentment built up in TSPA/ISI against Musharraf's policies. This started in late 2002, when the US leaned on Musharraf to cut down J&K terrorism after Parakram... and Musharraf complied. Attempts on Musharraf's life began to occur in 2003, prompting him to change course.
2004: Marked change in Pakistan's GWOT policy. Flow of Al Qaeda #3s dried up. Also, the US invasion of Iraq gave the AlQ/Taliban a morale boost which inspired them to take the fight into Afghanistan against under-resourced US forces. The "hool" front begins to open up.
2005-6: AlQ/Talib attacks into Afghanistan from within Pakistani soil began in earnest. This is when we see the "hool" front becoming more intense also. Such capability demonstrations are the ISI's insurance policy against US pressure to restrain Taliban attacks from Pakistani soil.
2007: Lal Masjid incident marks the beginning of the end for Musharraf, and also marks the beginnings of an anti-Islamabad TTP's ascendancy. The "hool" front becomes a little quieter as the TSPA/ISI also begin to feel the heat of cross-border attacks originating in Afghanistan.
2008-9: With the ascendancy of Obama to US Presidency, the use of drone strikes increases exponentially. Meanwhile, a new order of Kiyani/Pasha takes over in Islamabad... new generals who must show that they will not be cowed. Concurrently, in 2009, major "hool" begins to happen as well!
2010: There is a lull. The Faisal Shehzad incident, although dramatically publicized, seems to be an outlier. The only other incident in this year involves a Paki trying to blow up a train station in Virginia. Why the lull in 2010? Possibly the ISI figured they were pushing the risk envelope too far, after Clinton's stern warning regarding the Shehzad "hool". In addition, the Kerry-Lugar act, lavishing billions of aid $ on Pakistan, passed into law on October 15th 2010. Also, in June 2010, Pakistan received its first consignment of three F-16 Block 52 and fourteen more refurbished F-16s (free of charge) from the US. Jiziya was paid, so the "hool" died down.
2011: Pakistan-US relations on another nosedive. First Raymond Davis in January, then Abbotabad in May, then the Salala incident in November. True to form, the "hools" start again in Sept 2011, followed by 4 incidents in 2012.
I conclude that there is a trend towards more "calibrated demonstrations of capability" to inflict terrorism on US soil, by the ISI, whenever the US puts Pakistan on the backfoot in the AfPak conflict. On the other hand, the "calibrated demonstrations of capability" become less frequent when the Pakis are given what they want (as in 2010)... or alternatively, when there is instability at the top levels of Pakistani power structure, and serious internal military threats emerge against TSPA/ISI (as in 2007.)
The thing is. That the CIA has penetrated the Pakis left right and center. I would not be surprised to know that some of the top men in the TSPA have a safehouse and a greencard waiting for them in the states. Musharrafs son, for example, is a pretty successful banker in Manhattan.
And this is what allows the Americans to prevent terror plots like they did in some of the above. Pure investigation and spooky strength.
If you were right about the CIA's capabilities, I don't think the US would be losing the war in AfPak. Guaranteeing protection and asylum for a few RAPE isn't enough to penetrate the ISI, or the whole Pak power structure could have been bought off after 9/11 itself.
Carl ji: most definitely. The CIA and ISI go back a long way. It is in both the ISI's interests, and the interests of US intel and security apparatus, when a "hool" happens... i.e. a terrorist almost conducts an attack but is "foiled" at the last minute. ISI shows itself to be indispensable for the safety of US citizens; DHS/FBI/CIA get to publicize the fact that "the threat still exists" and demand bigger budgets for next year. These relationships are very complex indeed.
Another thought: the Abbotabad operation to kill OBL can be thought of as an American "hool" only. OBL himself had become a hermit and largely a figurehead... killing him was mostly for propaganda value. The real demonstration of Abbotabad was the American capability to arrive anywhere within Pakistan and take out anybody, no matter how well hidden or well guarded, any time they like. This must have really sent the Jernails running to their Pakistans... as it was intended to... without causing any damage that would justify a Paki escalation of hostilities.