Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi
Posted: 26 Nov 2008 01:18
Mission creep on the part of the United States could break open the levies. Consider the recent comments of former CIA Islamabad station chief, Robert Grenier:
“… as we work out with [the Pakistanis] a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”The excerpt is from an otherwise very reasonable set of comments. Grenier’s proposal would further dilute whatever waning influence Pakistan has in the region. Local actors would either become loyal to the new power broker in the area, the United States, or to a third party, rendering the Pakistani state irrelevant or an enemy.
The logic seems to be that if Islamabad has no writ in territory X, it has effectively lost sovereignty, giving a free hand to other parties to take action in the area. That, however, serves to reify or exacerbate Islamabad’s distance from the region. And the authority vacuum, a requisite for stability, can only truly be filled by Islamabad.
The loss of local assets, the weakening (at least) of the malik system, and the alienation of locals (via drone attacks), makes that impossible. FATA, in fact, could fall permanently out of the hands of Islamabad.
That, combined for the spread of violence into Pakistan’s cities (particularly Karachi) could accelerate the breakdown of the Pakistani state. Indeed, there is the potential for a 1,001 separate wars to go on simultaneously (given the ethnic and tribal differences, the proliferation of criminal networks, and the role of badal, or revenge, in Pashtunwali). Like Iraq, Pakistan would witness the flight of capital abroad (Amman certainly benefited from Iraqi expats); the departure of the haves (doctors, bankers, and other professionals) to safer shores, such as Dubai, London, and Canada; and leaving the country to the have nots. Middle class and poorer Karachiites would be left to fend off militants and criminal gangs (not entirely difference from today!). Karachi, I fear, would burn incessantly.
There is no alternative to strengthening the Pakistani state. Pakistan must be the predominant agent on the ground; a big part of that is the requisite training and equipment (e.g. nightvision goggles and communications). Establishing the rule of civil law, from Karachi to Khyber, is also essential. The use of drones should be limited. Consider that the cost of a Hellfire missile shot from Predator/Reaper drones is roughly the same as that of building a school in a Pakistani village. Given the danger posed to Westerners, development aid might be better routed through more expressly Pakistani entities/persons. And finally, the fundamental contradictions in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership must be ironed out. This requires the Pakistan Army to redouble efforts to root out al-Qaeda and other transnational takfiri terrorists. And it also requires the United States to come to terms with the fact that a great number of important Pashtun actors quite simply oppose its presence in their lands. Washington should let them know it is ready, in a phased and conditionalized fashion, to say goodbye.
http://pakistanpolicy.com/2008/11/25/to ... -pakistan/
“… as we work out with [the Pakistanis] a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”The excerpt is from an otherwise very reasonable set of comments. Grenier’s proposal would further dilute whatever waning influence Pakistan has in the region. Local actors would either become loyal to the new power broker in the area, the United States, or to a third party, rendering the Pakistani state irrelevant or an enemy.
The logic seems to be that if Islamabad has no writ in territory X, it has effectively lost sovereignty, giving a free hand to other parties to take action in the area. That, however, serves to reify or exacerbate Islamabad’s distance from the region. And the authority vacuum, a requisite for stability, can only truly be filled by Islamabad.
The loss of local assets, the weakening (at least) of the malik system, and the alienation of locals (via drone attacks), makes that impossible. FATA, in fact, could fall permanently out of the hands of Islamabad.
That, combined for the spread of violence into Pakistan’s cities (particularly Karachi) could accelerate the breakdown of the Pakistani state. Indeed, there is the potential for a 1,001 separate wars to go on simultaneously (given the ethnic and tribal differences, the proliferation of criminal networks, and the role of badal, or revenge, in Pashtunwali). Like Iraq, Pakistan would witness the flight of capital abroad (Amman certainly benefited from Iraqi expats); the departure of the haves (doctors, bankers, and other professionals) to safer shores, such as Dubai, London, and Canada; and leaving the country to the have nots. Middle class and poorer Karachiites would be left to fend off militants and criminal gangs (not entirely difference from today!). Karachi, I fear, would burn incessantly.
There is no alternative to strengthening the Pakistani state. Pakistan must be the predominant agent on the ground; a big part of that is the requisite training and equipment (e.g. nightvision goggles and communications). Establishing the rule of civil law, from Karachi to Khyber, is also essential. The use of drones should be limited. Consider that the cost of a Hellfire missile shot from Predator/Reaper drones is roughly the same as that of building a school in a Pakistani village. Given the danger posed to Westerners, development aid might be better routed through more expressly Pakistani entities/persons. And finally, the fundamental contradictions in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership must be ironed out. This requires the Pakistan Army to redouble efforts to root out al-Qaeda and other transnational takfiri terrorists. And it also requires the United States to come to terms with the fact that a great number of important Pashtun actors quite simply oppose its presence in their lands. Washington should let them know it is ready, in a phased and conditionalized fashion, to say goodbye.
http://pakistanpolicy.com/2008/11/25/to ... -pakistan/