Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
KiranM
Apologies first for i was not taking shots at you or other posters , it was a general observation where many a times , posters have posted their comments without thought through completely , including myself .
Coming back to your idea of an Intelligence Officer attached with SF Unit , let's see it in two different ways , one is this SF unit in operation actually has an additional guy designated as intel guy now what will be its usage , once you are in the operation and have reached ground zero , what this intel guy will tell you that rest of the SF unit has not been briefed before start of the operation or incase of a new intel piece been updated via their communication link or is it going to be the guy who will constantly keep talking on his communication gear asking so what's new ? Any other usage let's say about terrain or people or level of enemy resistance is something that's been given fully in the brief beforehand why take a memory hard disk type person with u to tell u what's been again n again ?
Other possible linkage is the logistic part / backroom organization for the SF unit on ground , well here such a system already exists at Battalion , Brigade & Div & at Corps level ( on some other forum , non desi defense guys raised eyebrows when they heard about 'administrative' staff at Battalion HQ level that was way higher than they have but in their new Brigade Combat teams ,they have raised the number of Brigade HQ troops , only diff. is IA shows them as clerks and so on but that's not what they do all the time so let's leave it at tht ) and as soon as some new information comes up that's considered relevant to current on going operation its past down the chain and its not passed in typical babu's speed . As for how many Intelligence Officers work with SF units or other IA units as back up , it will never be made public but such a system is in place with rest of IA units , i don't see why it won't be in place for SF.
On issue of Intel Agencies having their own special ops troops , they do exist, we all have heard/read the news about so many of terror modules been exposed/terminated ,and not all of them made it to DDM print media so yes they were taken out with means tht are not talked publicily but political control is a must and inspite of us having corrupt politicos , we need intel and their special ops capability under political control for they being on lose is not going to do us any good unless we want our very own Putin and his strong men club running the Republic.
Apologies first for i was not taking shots at you or other posters , it was a general observation where many a times , posters have posted their comments without thought through completely , including myself .
Coming back to your idea of an Intelligence Officer attached with SF Unit , let's see it in two different ways , one is this SF unit in operation actually has an additional guy designated as intel guy now what will be its usage , once you are in the operation and have reached ground zero , what this intel guy will tell you that rest of the SF unit has not been briefed before start of the operation or incase of a new intel piece been updated via their communication link or is it going to be the guy who will constantly keep talking on his communication gear asking so what's new ? Any other usage let's say about terrain or people or level of enemy resistance is something that's been given fully in the brief beforehand why take a memory hard disk type person with u to tell u what's been again n again ?
Other possible linkage is the logistic part / backroom organization for the SF unit on ground , well here such a system already exists at Battalion , Brigade & Div & at Corps level ( on some other forum , non desi defense guys raised eyebrows when they heard about 'administrative' staff at Battalion HQ level that was way higher than they have but in their new Brigade Combat teams ,they have raised the number of Brigade HQ troops , only diff. is IA shows them as clerks and so on but that's not what they do all the time so let's leave it at tht ) and as soon as some new information comes up that's considered relevant to current on going operation its past down the chain and its not passed in typical babu's speed . As for how many Intelligence Officers work with SF units or other IA units as back up , it will never be made public but such a system is in place with rest of IA units , i don't see why it won't be in place for SF.
On issue of Intel Agencies having their own special ops troops , they do exist, we all have heard/read the news about so many of terror modules been exposed/terminated ,and not all of them made it to DDM print media so yes they were taken out with means tht are not talked publicily but political control is a must and inspite of us having corrupt politicos , we need intel and their special ops capability under political control for they being on lose is not going to do us any good unless we want our very own Putin and his strong men club running the Republic.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
To enter the DSSC (Defence Services Staff College) is thorough an all Army Competitive exam. It has nothing to do with your Arm or Service.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
My apologies for misundertanding you.satya wrote:KiranM
Apologies first for i was not taking shots at you or other posters , it was a general observation where many a times , posters have posted their comments without thought through completely , including myself .
I was talking more of the below part. But if it already exists then I couldnt be more glad.
Now wouldnt it be prudent for NSG to have such 'assets'? But then if it already does then I am happier still.satya wrote: Other possible linkage is the logistic part / backroom organization for the SF unit on ground , well here such a system already exists at Battalion , Brigade & Div & at Corps level ( on some other forum , non desi defense guys raised eyebrows when they heard about 'administrative' staff at Battalion HQ level that was way higher than they have but in their new Brigade Combat teams ,they have raised the number of Brigade HQ troops , only diff. is IA shows them as clerks and so on but that's not what they do all the time so let's leave it at tht ) and as soon as some new information comes up that's considered relevant to current on going operation its past down the chain and its not passed in typical babu's speed . As for how many Intelligence Officers work with SF units or other IA units as back up , it will never be made public but such a system is in place with rest of IA units , i don't see why it won't be in place for SF.
Peace.
Regards,
Kiran
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
NSG is a specialised HRT outfit, its jobs are specific, short sharp - it doesnt need "intel" resources embedded.Now wouldnt it be prudent for NSG to have such 'assets'? But then if it already does then I am happier still.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
^^^ Somnath, I wish to differ. Lets assume NSG had an embedded SIGINT unit. Considering that scums nowadays use sophisticated communication devices to talk to their handlers, may be it can aid in locating them in an area of action. Also jam the communications if required. From what we know there may have been contact between the scums at Nariman house, Taj and Trident. Just like NSG has a bomb disposal unit which is not 'active' in HR and CQB operations, we can also have a theatre SIGINT for the purposes I outlined above.
Also, such a unit can serve the purpose to jam TV signals when required, since our Indian TV journos seems to have lost basic ethics for news sensationalism.
They may also need to jam mobile comm / infact all possible communications within a certain radius of action. For all we know, the terrorists can have scums just outside monitoring the activities and providing info of the response via mobile, etc.
Also, such a unit can serve the purpose to jam TV signals when required, since our Indian TV journos seems to have lost basic ethics for news sensationalism.
They may also need to jam mobile comm / infact all possible communications within a certain radius of action. For all we know, the terrorists can have scums just outside monitoring the activities and providing info of the response via mobile, etc.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
My observations from Mumbai and WTC type attacks. Such terror modules basically have 3 sections:
1) Intelligence
2) Logistics
3) Operations
1) -> consist of locals / sleeper agents embedded into the local society. But they will be few in number. May be highly skilled in technical resources like communications, internet, etc. Carries out surveillance and reconnaissance of targets prior to strike. Carries out BDA post strike. Provides live intel about authorities' response for siege type operations / hostage scenarios lasting a long time. These chaps can have some idea about the attacks, a requirement for being effective in their job.
2) -> again consist of locals / sleeper agents embedded into the local society and as such can provide the means for transport, lodging, etc. But they need not have high skills. Usually they do not know the purpose/ details of the strikes for operational security.
3) -> the public face of terror we know. Consists of gunmen, bombers, etc
3) Countered only through response forces like police, NSG, RR, etc.
2) Can be trapped only by effective Counter Intelligence.
1) Prior to strikes again can be trapped only by effective Counter Intelligence. It will be all the more difficult since they can be trained for counter surveillance / countering Counter Intelligence. Effectively, top notch spies. However, unlike spies just stealing info, these guys can support the terrorists during the strikes and may be BDA after the strikes. This is when as we can trap them IMHO. Hence, me shouting for an embedded SIGINT in NSG. It may be too late to prevent the strikes. But unlike 3) and may be 2) being use and throw modules, 1) can be reusable modules. These chaps are few in number and hence prized. May be used for future strikes.
1) Intelligence
2) Logistics
3) Operations
1) -> consist of locals / sleeper agents embedded into the local society. But they will be few in number. May be highly skilled in technical resources like communications, internet, etc. Carries out surveillance and reconnaissance of targets prior to strike. Carries out BDA post strike. Provides live intel about authorities' response for siege type operations / hostage scenarios lasting a long time. These chaps can have some idea about the attacks, a requirement for being effective in their job.
2) -> again consist of locals / sleeper agents embedded into the local society and as such can provide the means for transport, lodging, etc. But they need not have high skills. Usually they do not know the purpose/ details of the strikes for operational security.
3) -> the public face of terror we know. Consists of gunmen, bombers, etc
3) Countered only through response forces like police, NSG, RR, etc.
2) Can be trapped only by effective Counter Intelligence.
1) Prior to strikes again can be trapped only by effective Counter Intelligence. It will be all the more difficult since they can be trained for counter surveillance / countering Counter Intelligence. Effectively, top notch spies. However, unlike spies just stealing info, these guys can support the terrorists during the strikes and may be BDA after the strikes. This is when as we can trap them IMHO. Hence, me shouting for an embedded SIGINT in NSG. It may be too late to prevent the strikes. But unlike 3) and may be 2) being use and throw modules, 1) can be reusable modules. These chaps are few in number and hence prized. May be used for future strikes.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Poonch encounter continues for 5th day - Special Forces rushed
Can someone tell what locations in Kashmir have our Para units ? Is it fixed or do they keep on changing ? I'm guessing its one of 2/3/4 Para battalions.Apart from Romeo Force’s 29th unit and 26 Rashtriya Rifles and Special Operation Group (SOG) of Jammu and Kashmir Police, the authorities have rushed para units of special forces to the area besides some additional troops, sources said.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Dont expect a answer for that in a open forum like BR...
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
there are 700,000 paratroopers in Kashmir. there are also 700,000 Grenadiers, and Gurkhas and Marcos - making a grand total of Indian forces in Kashmir of 700,000,000,000. They are located in every single village and hamlet and jhopri in batallion strengthnikhil_t wrote:Poonch encounter continues for 5th day - Special Forces rushed
Can someone tell what locations in Kashmir have our Para units ? Is it fixed or do they keep on changing ? I'm guessing its one of 2/3/4 Para battalions.Apart from Romeo Force’s 29th unit and 26 Rashtriya Rifles and Special Operation Group (SOG) of Jammu and Kashmir Police, the authorities have rushed para units of special forces to the area besides some additional troops, sources said.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Thanks. Appreciate your mathematics.Lalmohan wrote:there are 700,000 paratroopers in Kashmir. there are also 700,000 Grenadiers, and Gurkhas and Marcos - making a grand total of Indian forces in Kashmir of 700,000,000,000. They are located in every single village and hamlet and jhopri in batallion strengthnikhil_t wrote:Poonch encounter continues for 5th day - Special Forces rushed
Can someone tell what locations in Kashmir have our Para units ? Is it fixed or do they keep on changing ? I'm guessing its one of 2/3/4 Para battalions.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Interesting documentary - Pak army vs Taliban.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Just a question gurus here, why aren't we using light mortars and blowing that place up? They must be tightly holed up in that cell of theirs because of the cold weather. Why not shred those pigs to bits? Or are we still planning to nab them alive? Why expose our troops to piggy fire in such harsh conditions?
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
The Israeli Special forces have a very nice "official" website.
www.isayeret.com
Unfortunately most of the stuff is "premium" unless you are an existing/ex SF member! But very juicy pointers..
Wish our guys did something like this..
www.isayeret.com
Unfortunately most of the stuff is "premium" unless you are an existing/ex SF member! But very juicy pointers..
Wish our guys did something like this..
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Any links?Lalmohan wrote:there are 700,000 paratroopers in Kashmir. there are also 700,000 Grenadiers, and Gurkhas and Marcos - making a grand total of Indian forces in Kashmir of 700,000,000,000. They are located in every single village and hamlet and jhopri in batallion strengthnikhil_t wrote:Poonch encounter continues for 5th day - Special Forces rushed
Can someone tell what locations in Kashmir have our Para units ? Is it fixed or do they keep on changing ? I'm guessing its one of 2/3/4 Para battalions.
Good to know that things have improved from my times!
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Ray sir,
Sarcasm onlee....
Sarcasm onlee....
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Brigadier, Lalmohan's reply is sardonic. The 700,000 number makes many appearances in articles by Suzanna A Roy and others on the 'atrocities' of the Indian security forces in KashmirRayC wrote:Any links?Lalmohan wrote:
there are 700,000 paratroopers in Kashmir. there are also 700,000 Grenadiers, and Gurkhas and Marcos - making a grand total of Indian forces in Kashmir of 700,000,000,000. They are located in every single village and hamlet and jhopri in batallion strength
Good to know that things have improved from my times!

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
And I am sure IA, nay no Army, has 700,000 paratroopers. 

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
OK.ChandraS wrote:Brigadier, Lalmohan's reply is sardonic. The 700,000 number makes many appearances in articles by Suzanna A Roy and others on the 'atrocities' of the Indian security forces in KashmirRayC wrote: Any links?
Good to know that things have improved from my times!
I was not aware of the background.
My mistake! And my profound apologies!
These days we are overwhelmed with so many statistics and figures, be it from the Indian or the Pakistani media, that the brain freezes and ridiculous figure hang around till someone clarifies that it is a sarcastic stuff!
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
the good brigadier's confusion only highlights the secret RAW truth that India does actually have 700,000 paratroopers!!
(put that in your hookah and smoke it paklurks!)

(put that in your hookah and smoke it paklurks!)

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
but these days paklurkers are smoking thru their other orifice !!!
i dont know what evidence is to be provided to prove kasb is a paki... he gave his house address just go and knock knock
))
i dont know what evidence is to be provided to prove kasb is a paki... he gave his house address just go and knock knock

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
The Poonch encounter has ended with a whimper.SHBO with paratroopers notwithstanding...The buggers have fled and the Army and Paramilitary along with the SOG have been left .....issuing press statements ... 

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
see my response in the other thread.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Singha Saar...please transmit gps co-ordinates of the response.GI Anshul will proceed on foot to ground zero.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Modernising the NSG.
Mumbai exposed the inadequacies of our best anti-terror forceThe National Security Guard (NSG) was raised on the lines of Germany’s GSG-9 in 1986 as India’s elite anti-hijacking, anti-terror and bomb disposal force. Today, it is better known as a force that provides security cover to VVIPs.
The Mumbai attacks has put the focus back on NSG’s capabilities and revealed that the elite force is beset with the usual problems that India’s uniformed personnel remain mired in for decades—archaic equipment and weaponry, procurements hauled up in the long waiting list with the nodal Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
The nation’s top-notch terror fighting force 51 SAG, is manned entirely by army men, as is the 52 SAG, the anti-hijack squad. Equipment, manpower, training—you name it, and the NSG is lagging behind. The larger part of their equipment is aging and in state of disrepair. The sniper rifles that SAG uses, the Heckler and Koch PSG1, have not been replaced or upgraded since NSG’s inception, basic equipment like collapsible ladders haven’t been procured as yet. (see box)
“Who should be deciding what to buy? We, who put our life on the firing line, or the MHA, that has neither the expertise nor the willingness?” asks a major who participated in the Mumbai operations. “We would have saved both our men in Mumbai operations if we had state-of-the-art equipment,” he adds. That’s a serious allegation but the MHA exudes familiar bureaucratic apathy.
What the NSG lacks
Transport is pathetic; the force does not have armoured vehicles for operations in the urban environment
Bulletproof clothing (Level 3) to resist the high-velocity bullets that terrorists use and bulletproof helmets with inbuilt communication devices and night vision equipment
Light and collapsible metal ladders for operational purposes
Radar imaging equipment to see through walls and anti-material rifles to penetrate them
Situational awareness equipment like radio sets with in-built GPS chips
Small explosive charges to open holes in walls and blow up locks for strategic entries
State-of-the-art versions of sniper rifles, hand grenades and other weaponry
Former home minister Shivraj Patil made tall promises that were never met. “We have to simplify the procedure for buying arms and other weaponry for various forces so that they are fully equipped. We cannot let our forces lag behind terrorists,” Patil said on the 23rd Raising Day parade of the NSG in October 2007. The reason was provided by a joint secretary of the ministry, “Why would any official go out of way to secure speedy procurement? It is interpreted as the vested interest of the officer dealing with the matter.” Arun Bhagat, former IB chief does not agree, “If the procurement is transparent, there is no room for doubt.”
Add to this 50 and 20 per cent vacancies in its SRG and SAG wings respectively and the picture gets grimmer. This shortage of manpower was felt in Mumbai operations, the 51 SAG fell short of the numbers and 52 SAG was summoned as reinforcement. This raises another question: If a similar attack was carried out at some other place simultaneously, what would the response be? “We do not have an answer,” says a Lieutenant Colonel of the NSG.
According to NSG sources, the reason for ‘avoidable delay’ by 10 long nagging hours in reaching the scene of mayhem was that the plane, an IL-76, that was to carry 51 SAG personnel to Mumbai had to wait for hours for some VVIPs who were to travel on the same flight.
Despite the delay, the NSG rescued more then 600 hostages in 48 hours during the Mumbai operation and eight well-trained and equipped terrorists were ‘taken out’ in a highly restrictive urban environment, under live media coverage, with two NSG casualties. Describing the situation, the experts say, “the boys are good; force needs improvement.”
To avoid such delays the MHA has announced setting up of regional NSG centres at Kolkata, Hyderabad and Mumbai or Nagpur. This has raised apprehensions that how will the government arrange for 4,000 additional trained men for these new regional centres without compromising the recruitment standards?
Despite constantly redesigning courses and drills, training still remains a major concern. Insiders agree that the training is very inward looking with no new ideas being infused in operational tactics by sharing experiences and interacting with the specialised anti-terror squads from other countries. As a result NSG operations have become predictable. “In Mumbai operation, the terrorists knew how we operate,” says a lieutenant colonel.
This is a wake-up call from the disgruntled members of this elite force, a call that cannot be ignored. The NSG is the sword arm of the nation’s war on terror and it’s got to be sharp, and more than ever before.
ACTION PLAN
SETTING up a ‘Special Operations Command’on the lines of the US or Israel with its own dedicated aircraft, helicopter in readiness
SPEEDY and task-based procurement of equipment for
NSG should not be clubbed with general procurement for other paramilitary forces
COUNTER-TEROR operations in an urban environment call for regular training in real situations and intensive interaction with such parallel forces across the world
COMING up of regional centres should not lead to the force being spread too thin
Mumbai exposed the inadequacies of our best anti-terror forceThe National Security Guard (NSG) was raised on the lines of Germany’s GSG-9 in 1986 as India’s elite anti-hijacking, anti-terror and bomb disposal force. Today, it is better known as a force that provides security cover to VVIPs.
The Mumbai attacks has put the focus back on NSG’s capabilities and revealed that the elite force is beset with the usual problems that India’s uniformed personnel remain mired in for decades—archaic equipment and weaponry, procurements hauled up in the long waiting list with the nodal Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
The nation’s top-notch terror fighting force 51 SAG, is manned entirely by army men, as is the 52 SAG, the anti-hijack squad. Equipment, manpower, training—you name it, and the NSG is lagging behind. The larger part of their equipment is aging and in state of disrepair. The sniper rifles that SAG uses, the Heckler and Koch PSG1, have not been replaced or upgraded since NSG’s inception, basic equipment like collapsible ladders haven’t been procured as yet. (see box)
“Who should be deciding what to buy? We, who put our life on the firing line, or the MHA, that has neither the expertise nor the willingness?” asks a major who participated in the Mumbai operations. “We would have saved both our men in Mumbai operations if we had state-of-the-art equipment,” he adds. That’s a serious allegation but the MHA exudes familiar bureaucratic apathy.
What the NSG lacks
Transport is pathetic; the force does not have armoured vehicles for operations in the urban environment
Bulletproof clothing (Level 3) to resist the high-velocity bullets that terrorists use and bulletproof helmets with inbuilt communication devices and night vision equipment
Light and collapsible metal ladders for operational purposes
Radar imaging equipment to see through walls and anti-material rifles to penetrate them
Situational awareness equipment like radio sets with in-built GPS chips
Small explosive charges to open holes in walls and blow up locks for strategic entries
State-of-the-art versions of sniper rifles, hand grenades and other weaponry
Former home minister Shivraj Patil made tall promises that were never met. “We have to simplify the procedure for buying arms and other weaponry for various forces so that they are fully equipped. We cannot let our forces lag behind terrorists,” Patil said on the 23rd Raising Day parade of the NSG in October 2007. The reason was provided by a joint secretary of the ministry, “Why would any official go out of way to secure speedy procurement? It is interpreted as the vested interest of the officer dealing with the matter.” Arun Bhagat, former IB chief does not agree, “If the procurement is transparent, there is no room for doubt.”
Add to this 50 and 20 per cent vacancies in its SRG and SAG wings respectively and the picture gets grimmer. This shortage of manpower was felt in Mumbai operations, the 51 SAG fell short of the numbers and 52 SAG was summoned as reinforcement. This raises another question: If a similar attack was carried out at some other place simultaneously, what would the response be? “We do not have an answer,” says a Lieutenant Colonel of the NSG.
According to NSG sources, the reason for ‘avoidable delay’ by 10 long nagging hours in reaching the scene of mayhem was that the plane, an IL-76, that was to carry 51 SAG personnel to Mumbai had to wait for hours for some VVIPs who were to travel on the same flight.
Despite the delay, the NSG rescued more then 600 hostages in 48 hours during the Mumbai operation and eight well-trained and equipped terrorists were ‘taken out’ in a highly restrictive urban environment, under live media coverage, with two NSG casualties. Describing the situation, the experts say, “the boys are good; force needs improvement.”
To avoid such delays the MHA has announced setting up of regional NSG centres at Kolkata, Hyderabad and Mumbai or Nagpur. This has raised apprehensions that how will the government arrange for 4,000 additional trained men for these new regional centres without compromising the recruitment standards?
Despite constantly redesigning courses and drills, training still remains a major concern. Insiders agree that the training is very inward looking with no new ideas being infused in operational tactics by sharing experiences and interacting with the specialised anti-terror squads from other countries. As a result NSG operations have become predictable. “In Mumbai operation, the terrorists knew how we operate,” says a lieutenant colonel.
This is a wake-up call from the disgruntled members of this elite force, a call that cannot be ignored. The NSG is the sword arm of the nation’s war on terror and it’s got to be sharp, and more than ever before.
ACTION PLAN
SETTING up a ‘Special Operations Command’on the lines of the US or Israel with its own dedicated aircraft, helicopter in readiness
SPEEDY and task-based procurement of equipment for
NSG should not be clubbed with general procurement for other paramilitary forces
COUNTER-TEROR operations in an urban environment call for regular training in real situations and intensive interaction with such parallel forces across the world
COMING up of regional centres should not lead to the force being spread too thin
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
I always had a nagging doubt about the theory of tpt a/c being not available and an a/c had to be fetched from Chandigargh. The reason being post IC-814 fiasco, NSG had started maintaining a det at the airport itself. When is moving towards the domestic terminal in Delhi, one can see the enterance to the NSG Det on the left hand side. While there is no board/marking, men in black combat uniform holding MP-5 is a giveaway. Also, if the a/c is landing in east-west direction, one can see two IL-76s parked at the beginning and on the left of the runway.According to NSG sources, the reason for ‘avoidable delay’ by 10 long nagging hours in reaching the scene of mayhem was that the plane, an IL-76, that was to carry 51 SAG personnel to Mumbai had to wait for hours for some VVIPs who were to travel on the same flight.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
not discounting the effort done so far in discovering TSP weapons, which most of us have no clue of, can use of seismic devices camouflaged as rocks among other things scattered around possible weapon storage locations in TSP allow us trace the rat holes along with their escape routes? These seismic devices are data linked either to an AWACS or a satellite. closing all the exits with precision weapons ...
maybe, CIA already built such maps. Their seismic devices may not even emit, a remote signal impinges on them and reads of the return signal which contains the info while hiding in the noise for other 'listeners'
if we had the capability to map the underground in a short time, we could have used in op Mendhar? heck, we can't even fight in fog or night conditions after 20 years of COIN ops in similar areas or that capability if it exists is so strategic that can't be trivialized in a regular COIN?
maybe, CIA already built such maps. Their seismic devices may not even emit, a remote signal impinges on them and reads of the return signal which contains the info while hiding in the noise for other 'listeners'
if we had the capability to map the underground in a short time, we could have used in op Mendhar? heck, we can't even fight in fog or night conditions after 20 years of COIN ops in similar areas or that capability if it exists is so strategic that can't be trivialized in a regular COIN?
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Heads Up:
Jai Jawan on NDTV of Dhoni at NSG base, Manesar at 11 PM IST, 24th Jan ( ~3hrs from now)
Jai Jawan on NDTV of Dhoni at NSG base, Manesar at 11 PM IST, 24th Jan ( ~3hrs from now)
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Now, NSG can requisition aircraft during crisis
At last the Babus have woken up. Why on earth does it take 100's of civilian/military lives to wake up Babus? Wasn't Kandhahar fiasco sufficient to make this notification applicable to whole of NSG? No.Sir, our Babus needed just another 150+ lives to be sure...
Disgusting Babus and politicians..One thing, barring some unforeseen events, I am heading home this year to vote.
New Delhi (PTI): To avoid delay in rushing forces for anti-terror operations, the Union Home Ministry has empowered the National Security Guards (NSG) chief to requisition aircraft from any operator registered in India.
The Home Ministry notification empowers the Director General of NSG or an Inspector General of NSG authorised by the head of the para-military force to requisition aircraft from any operator registered in the country in the interest of public safety, an official release today said.
Previously, the NSG could commandeer an aircraft for a counter hijack operation, but there was no provision for requisitioning an aircraft from a commercial operator to carry out troop movement for an anti-terrorist operation.
The notification has come in the wake of delay in procuring of an aircraft during the Mumbai terror attack. The Black Cat commandos of the NSG lost few hours until an IL-76 of the Indian Air Force was brought in from Chandigarh.
However, with this notification, NSG will now be able to get an aircraft at a short notice for rushing its commandos for anti-terrorist operation anywhere in the country, the release said.
The Home Ministry order came a day after the Civil Aviation Ministry issued a notification empowering authorised officers in the government to requisition an aircraft from an operator registered in the country.
A requisition from an officer of the Central Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary in Home or Civil Aviation Ministry will be required for seeking one or more aircraft for "public service", the Civil Aviation Ministry notification said.
At last the Babus have woken up. Why on earth does it take 100's of civilian/military lives to wake up Babus? Wasn't Kandhahar fiasco sufficient to make this notification applicable to whole of NSG? No.Sir, our Babus needed just another 150+ lives to be sure...
Disgusting Babus and politicians..One thing, barring some unforeseen events, I am heading home this year to vote.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Sunil,At last the Babus have woken up. Why on earth does it take 100's of civilian/military lives to wake up Babus? Wasn't Kandhahar fiasco sufficient to make this notification applicable to whole of NSG? No.Sir, our Babus needed just another 150+ lives to be sure...
IIRC, this order was passed after the Akshardham attack itself. Not sure why its being restated all over again. Maybe, the previous order didnt make it past the lowest babu's desk in South Block...
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
the file should move up 3 more tables now. hopefully that takes it past the gate this time. RIP - those who could have been saved.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Maybe the souls should not rest in peace and should keep haunting those babus till they get off their musharrafs and clear those files. Ofcourse I am sure our ministers are not losing their sleep...their loss of sleep is only reserved for convicted terrorists and mass murders.Singha wrote:the file should move up 3 more tables now. hopefully that takes it past the gate this time. RIP - those who could have been saved.
Hmm....posting on B-R from a E71 phone is not that bad!
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Jai Jawan with M.S.Dhoni/NSG currently ongoing...
The opening shot was of Dhoni laying a wreath for the NSG martyrs...the plaque seemed to have atleast 10-15 men from 13 SRG..Any idea as to which ops were these 13 SRG commandos martyred in?
Also, the obstacle course featured the commandos doing the wall climbing in actual scooter helmets(complete with ISI mark!!!! )
. Not sure if this was only for NDTV or is the usual practice..
The opening shot was of Dhoni laying a wreath for the NSG martyrs...the plaque seemed to have atleast 10-15 men from 13 SRG..Any idea as to which ops were these 13 SRG commandos martyred in?
Also, the obstacle course featured the commandos doing the wall climbing in actual scooter helmets(complete with ISI mark!!!! )

Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
sum ji....please no more scooter helmet debate.
Yes the NSG martyrs memorial has more names than what the public knows. Akshardham casualty (Hav. Suresh Yadav) was not NSG's first KIA...it was NSG's first KIA in a public operation.

Yes the NSG martyrs memorial has more names than what the public knows. Akshardham casualty (Hav. Suresh Yadav) was not NSG's first KIA...it was NSG's first KIA in a public operation.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Raja, I do remember that there are three more NSG casualities prior to Akshardam - all three in Punjab Counter insurgency IIRC. dont knw the details of those missions but can dig up the names and dates later. dont know about the rest.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
jag, any idea of the thought process behind deploying a primarily HR oriented team in counter insurgency ops ? or was it HR situation in a COIN background ?
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
I have no clue other than to guess that they were flexing their counter terrorism muscles and not necessarythe HR ones. They were employed in black thunder even though it was not necessarily HR so NSG may have been cutting their teeth there.Rahul M wrote:jag, any idea of the thought process behind deploying a primarily HR oriented team in counter insurgency ops ? or was it HR situation in a COIN background ?
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Jagan wrote:Raja, I do remember that there are three more NSG casualities prior to Akshardam - all three in Punjab Counter insurgency IIRC. dont knw the details of those missions but can dig up the names and dates later. dont know about the rest.
Hmm, found the names pretty easily. But there are only two I found.
Hav Ram Chandra 12 Aug 1989 in Punjab, 51 SAG
Hav Ram Shankar Singh 29 Apr 1985 Punjab, 51 SAG
Akshardham was ofcourse two casualities (and not one)
Subedar Suresh Chandra Yadav (Ashok Chakra)
Commando Surjan Singh (Kirti Chakra)
We are likely to see Ashok Chakra/Kirtichakra to Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan and Hav Gajendra Singh Bisht as well
someone with access to newspapers will be able to find out what the operations were based on the dates.
Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces
Good find Jagan! I remembered that some of the 51 SAG casualities were of Havaldar rank but didnt know the names. If any BRFites are in NCC in Delhi region or have their sons/daughters in NCC....they sometimes organize trip to Manesar to NSG training wing.
Surjan Bhandari was the 2nd casualty....he died in AIIMS after being in coma. The government's treatment of him and his relatives is something befitting a Paki.
NSG was raised in response to Blue Star and is not a pure HR force. As per the NSG Act, it was and is meant for urban CT ops such as what was faced during Blue Star. NSG was created for land based threats and MARCOS was created for sea based threats. That is why I keep reiterating to those who equate NSG to LAPD SWAT type groups, that NSG is not a souped up SWAT team...its brief is much wider and complicated and AFAIK actually exceeds that of any other individual CT unit in the world today.
Surjan Bhandari was the 2nd casualty....he died in AIIMS after being in coma. The government's treatment of him and his relatives is something befitting a Paki.
NSG was raised in response to Blue Star and is not a pure HR force. As per the NSG Act, it was and is meant for urban CT ops such as what was faced during Blue Star. NSG was created for land based threats and MARCOS was created for sea based threats. That is why I keep reiterating to those who equate NSG to LAPD SWAT type groups, that NSG is not a souped up SWAT team...its brief is much wider and complicated and AFAIK actually exceeds that of any other individual CT unit in the world today.