Indian Foreign Policy

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 20 Mar 2011 09:51

Nirupama Rao Interview

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/in-wi ... on/764841/

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 20 Mar 2011 10:12

RamaY wrote: Why it's too soon to give Brazil and India permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council.

That is 22ct BS article. What political power and international influence China had in 1970?

They got China to the system to get geo political balance to Soviet - India axis after 1971. It was for the US interest in the global system
They changed their stance to one china policy to accommodate PRC.
They have helped PRC to multiply their economy in the last 30 years.

Stan_Savljevic · Post by **Stan_Savljevic** » 20 Mar 2011 11:06

^^^ That article in FP is written by a former Mexican Foreign Minister. Obviously, Mexico has a takleef with Brazil's membership as does Italy and Spain with Germany's or Pakis with India's. In fact, Mexico is a member of what is called the Coffee Club (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus). So it is hard to discern the takleef with Brazil and a collective takleef to India's membership, whatever reasons expounded notwithstanding. Much of India-Mexico bilateral relations surround either Norman Borlaug or Octavia Paz.

arun · Post by **arun** » 30 Mar 2011 07:21

X Posted from the India-Australia News & Discussion thread.

American diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks and published by The Hindu shows that the Australian Government was dishonest in dealing with the issue of the assault of Indian Students with the racist element of the attacks being covered up:

Even as Australian Ministers, politicians and officials were taking the position in public that there was no racial motivation behind the spate of attacks on Indian students in Australia, chiefly in and around Melbourne in the State of Victoria, Australian diplomats were quietly acknowledging to their U.S. counterparts that it was indeed a likely factor. …………………

Read it all in The Hindu:

Australian diplomats saw attacks on students as racially driven

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 31 Mar 2011 13:07

India, no rubber-stamp for West - G. Parthasarathy

Emerging from the situation two decades ago, when the country was bankrupt and internationally isolated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India can derive satisfaction from what has been achieved since then.

The nuclear tests of 1998 and end of global nuclear sanctions by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 led to worldwide recognition of India as a legitimate nuclear weapons power.

With a sustained high rate of economic growth and increasing integration with the global economy, India is now a member of the G-20 and the expanded East Asia Summit comprising the members of Asean together with the US, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand.

It is closely linked to emerging economic powers such as Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa through BRICS and IBSA.

It is only a question of time before India joins the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, laying the ground for a larger profile in Central Asia. But it is crucial that, despite its economic progress, India retains its strategic autonomy, if it is to be respected internationally.

India's candidature for Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been endorsed by all the Council's Permanent Members except China.

In the meantime, there have been unambiguous suggestions from the Americans and even American client-states such as the UK that India would be considered worthy of a Permanent Seat on the UNSC only if the “international community” (euphemism for NATO members) is satisfied with how India “behaves” in its voting on important contemporary issues, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. These are pressures India will have to resist and deftly deflect.

Resisting double standards

Despite these western blandishments, New Delhi appears to have shaped the broad contours of how it will proceed to deal with pressures involving the typical western double standards on “human rights” and the “responsibility to protect”.

One is all too aware of how NATO did not hesitate to dismember Yugoslavia in the 1990s, after virtually demonising the Serbs. Force was used to carve out Kosovo — an action not sanctified by a majority of UN member-states.

The UNGA Resolution of 2005 on the “Responsibility to Protect” has been used at the convenience of NATO members, to remove regimes alleged to be guilty of “crimes against humanity”. Needless to say, NATO would not dare to act on anything the Russians do in Chechnya, or against Chinese clampdowns in Xinjiang, or Tibet. Genocide in Rwanda will be long ignored, because it is a poor African country with no oil or mineral resources.

A blind eye will be turned when a Sunni minority ruling elite in Bahrain clamps down on the Shia majority in the country, because the US 5{+t}{+h} Fleet is based there. But if Col Gaddafi clamps down on oil-rich Libya, he is subject to a no-fly zone and bombed by the British and French, with American backing.

There now appears to be a clearer enunciation of Indian thinking on such issues. After consultations with like-minded emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa, India made it clear that on issues such as the Libya developments, it will first seek consultations with regional groupings such as the Arab League and African Union, before finalising its response.

Rather than blindly following the western lead, India would seek to forge and back a regional consensus, in formulating its policies. Thus, in developments in sub-Saharan Africa, Indian policies will take into account prevailing views and a consensus, if any, in the African Union. On Zimbabwe, the advice of South Africa would be more important than that of Whitehall.

On Myanmar, India will seek to promote a consensus evolved in consultation with Asean. The views of the GCC would be of primary importance in formulating policies on Bahrain.

This policy makes it clear that India is not going to be a rubber stamp for Anglo-American and NATO policies of selective use of force against regimes considered distasteful.
India stance on Libya

Over 17,000 Indians living across Libya have returned home safely, thanks to commendable work by Indian Ambassador Manimekalai and her staff. Muammar Gaddafi knows that India is not exactly pleased by his use of airpower against his own people.

India, nevertheless, joined hands with Russia, China, Germany and Brazil in abstaining on the March 17 Security Council Resolution on Libya, because of the absence of carefully considered guidelines on the use of force amidst a raging civil war, the lack of specificity on the countries and organisations undertaking the military effort and the absence of clarity on how a political solution would be evolved to end the Libyan impasse.

India is concerned that the military intervention in Libya is going to result in a prolonged stalemate and growing radicalisation in West Asia. It will inevitably be perceived there as an attempt to partition an oil-rich Muslim state.

If ‘gunboat diplomacy' was the hallmark of European colonial powers in the 19th Century, ‘no-fly zone' NATO diplomacy seems to be the order of the day after the Cold War. Lessons will be learned only after the European powers, who have no appetite for real combat in tough places such as Afghanistan, face the wrath of people opposing them, as the US did after its ill-advised military interventions in Lebanon in 1983 and in Somalia, in 1993.

Tired and tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Americans understandably appear to be more cautious in taking the lead in intervening in Libya.

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 01 Apr 2011 02:31

What is it about a UNSC seat that makes Indian foreign policy so hooked up on it. Are we still fearful that UNSC could cite a resolution from the past and reccoment a plebeside on Indian territory and India would not be able to do much about it.

Maram · Post by **Maram** » 01 Apr 2011 05:55

Nihat wrote:What is it about a UNSC seat that makes Indian foreign policy so hooked up on it. Are we still fearful that UNSC could cite a resolution from the past and reccoment a plebeside on Indian territory and India would not be able to do much about it.

Nihat ji,

It is not about Indian foreign policy.It is about MMS. He is an old punjabi who has psychological trauma from partition and so he is out to wrong a right.... same as Jaswant Singh ji(to a certain extent)

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 29 Apr 2011 18:10

Pact on contours of TAPI gas price

For the TAPI pipeline, India has agreed to take responsibility of gas at the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. But, it insists Teheran take responsibility for delivering gas through Pakistan to the Indian border in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Besides the security issue, there are essentially two commercial issues that need to be sorted out – transit fee to be charged by Afghanistan and Pakistan and the final price of gas.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/busi ... 113133.cms

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 07 May 2011 14:59

Shyam Saran at Brookings

Arjun · Post by **Arjun** » 08 May 2011 09:00

Nirupama Rao interview

Nirupama Rao comes across as extremely pedestrian in this interview....Am aware that there is this BRF lobby that thinks India's politicians stink but that the babus are the ones 'quietly saving' the country. But seriously, Nirupama's thoughts do nothing whatsoever to justify that impression.

Even if engaging with Pakistan is the appropriate way forward, the language used to justify it needs to be way different. It should be on the lines of 'our strategic objectives are best served by engaging with Pakistan today'....but instead Nirupama seems to be all over the place with wafflling talk of 'geography is destiny' and a boatload of other such meaningless platitudes.

Btw, what is the appropriate term for a female 'babu' ?

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 08 May 2011 19:27

^^^
"babini"

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 02 Jun 2011 04:12

Interview excerpt with David Malone, former Canada's high commissioner to India, on INdia's foreign ppolicy making

There is strong strategic sense at any given time among several Indians shaping foreign and security policy, sometimes retired, as was the late, great K Subrahmanyam when at his most influential. Their disposition is generally prudent, but they see further than the rest of us, and are less likely to be waylaid by the lure of sentimentality or ideology than us.

India has never for long locked itself into foreign policy or national security frameworks. These generally just keep on failing elsewhere.

Hence India's approach, while often reactive, may suit the country's interests better, given an Indian genius for improvisation, however late in the day it sometimes occurs!

Hmmm, interesting indeed.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 02 Jun 2011 05:28

India's UNSC dream is not just for India. It is for greater good. I am very glad to read Former candian HC's assessment of Indian thought.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 02 Jun 2011 05:34

IUCNA and the NSG waiver made Canada realize they had got locked into false premise about India after 1974.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 24 Jun 2011 02:29

MKB Uvaacha.
MEA repaints with primary colours

If you ever plan to get seriously into fishing - ie., not merely as ideal leisure or occupation but as a philosophical excursion into time, space, God, et al - you must get to read the 17th century classic The Compleat Angler (1653) by Izaak Walton. Similarly, if you ever wish to know the quintessence of what Allahabad culture would have been once upon a time, meet Prabhu Dayal, our consul-general in New York. That is why it came as a shock when one heard such scurrilous allegations were made about him - and, alas, our media took them up. Prabhu is a ‘compleat‘ foreign service officer - although of a vanishing breed.

And all because Americans have their own laws. But will they do that to the Russians or the Chinese? It is a standard practice in diplomacy to ‘target’ people who are not ‘cooperative’. Instances are multiplying in the US and MEA did well to warn that they “cannot be dismissed lightly”. Outsiders won’t know that consular ties are the real indicators of the state of play in inter-state relationship. Divested of rhetoric and blah blah , you get to see the warts. Is it all happening because of the MMRCA deal? Or, is it because visa for some undercover operative on a covert mission was denied by the consular section? Is it because India doesn’t play ball with the US in the horseshoe chamber in the UN Hqs? There are no easy answers. Only MEA can tell. And the spokesman used the word ‘target’.

Also a comment from someone

What sort of an article is this? More of a rant, I think….Sir, you need to live in the US for several years (not as an India govt employee but as, say, a professional). You will understand the way things work there. Bottomline: The word VIP does NOT exist there - neither literally, nor in their ethos. Its all about hard work and meritocracy. VIP Lounges, VIP lines, Flashing red beacons, VIP this, VIP that are the feudal vestiges that India and Indians still carry. In that country even millionaire carry their own bags, drive their own cars and go through security searches. VIP is by deed, not by entitlement….

ManishH · Post by **ManishH** » 24 Jun 2011 09:15

Chorus within govt for national security doctrine

NEW DELHI: The demand for India to put in writing a National Security Doctrine is growing within the government. This comes even as the Manmohan Singh government has decided on a comprehensive review of national security. The last time such a review was undertaken was after Kargil conflict of 1999.

Senior officials said they are hopeful that the task force, to be headed by former cabinet secretary Naresh Chandra, would end up helping the government to finally come out with the country's first National Security Doctrine.

The doctrine/strategy would define India's security concerns and how it plans to approach them. The doctrine would look at all aspects of security including the economic, technological, political and scientific.

"Everything would flow from the National Security Doctrine," the head of a major security agency of the government said, pointing out that his organization too had recently taken up with the government the need for such a doctrine. He hoped that the Naresh Chandra committee would help India finally have its own National Security Doctrine/Strategy.

He pointed out that such a doctrine would also help better utilize national assets and set specific targets for various organizations. For example, he said, the indigenization of critical technologies, undertaken mostly by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has not been satisfactory.

"If we have written, defined national security objectives then there would also be higher level of accountability among all concerned," the head of another agency said.

The lack of a national security strategy is also hampering several other key aspects of India's security apparatus. For example, India's Special Forces are directionless thanks to the absence of a defined national strategy. "Once you have a strategy, from it will flow the national security objectives. It would include India's interests in the region and the role of Special Forces," says Lt Gen PC Katoch, a retired Special Forces officer.

In most developed countries, National Security Doctrines are among the key documents defining the nation-state. In the US by law every president has to present his security strategy to the Congress. Barack Obama released a 52-page strategy in May 2010, significantly differing with George Bush. In contrast to the Bush strategy that spoke about Islamic radicalism and gave overarching approval for unilateral military efforts abroad, Obama called for global cooperation and placed focus also on climate issues.

Stan_Savljevic · Post by **Stan_Savljevic** » 27 Jun 2011 20:27

Ranjan Mathai to be India's next foreign secretary
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 013324.cms
http://telegraphindia.com/1110627/jsp/f ... 646700.jsp

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 27 Jun 2011 21:26

Stan_Savljevic wrote:Ranjan Mathai to be India's next foreign secretary
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 013324.cms
http://telegraphindia.com/1110627/jsp/f ... 646700.jsp

Kudos to Mallus. Under UPA-2 there is now a gang of top IAS/IFS type Mallus at very high positions. A lot of faith in them for 2G and the sardar saheb.

Stan_Savljevic · Post by **Stan_Savljevic** » 27 Jun 2011 22:47

Muppalla wrote: Kudos to Mallus. Under UPA-2 there is now a gang of top IAS/IFS type Mallus at very high positions.

That is an unfair statement. The contest was between Hardeep Puri and Ranjan Mathai with Mathai probably getting the look-in because of his CV -- ambassador at DC, Paris, Brussels, Tehran, etc. Shiv Shankar Menon comes from a family of diplomats and in that way, he is an exception. Like career lawyers and career politicians, he is a career diplo. Nirupama Rao is just nominally a Mallu having grown up primarily in KA and married to a Kannadiga (KA cadre, and Chief Secretary of KA). At the end of the day, an appointee can only come from a select pool. And if the pool has got a lotta Mallus, well, the onus is on others to take the mantle and serve India.

I agree that these types of appointments are not purely merit-based. Political considerations are an important part and there is significant difference between a career diplo and a political appointee. Plus, there is the issue of perceived gender bias which was another consideration. Only now do we see enough women IFS types and they are all no push arounds by any means. Images of Arundhati Ghose, Chokila Iyer, etc. should make the chai biskoth sessions go the same length. Last round, there was a triangular contest between Meera Shankar, Hardeep Suri and Nirupama Rao for Per. Rep to UN, US ambassador and For. Sec. Actually, NR, MS and Speaker Meira Kumar all belong to the same cadre, so the contest was more even-steven. See this: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?239919

What you see now is another round of ring-a-ring-a roses with the two year tenure done for most of the contenders. In fact, Home Sec GKP was seen to be a top contender for CVC in the PJ Thomas aftermath, but he has withdrawn from the race. So it is now a contest of the rest. Nothing bizarre or confidence in Mallus beyond a point even if there are some political considerations at a certain level.

Arjun · Post by **Arjun** » 30 Jun 2011 12:05

MMS seems to have spoken for the first time ever with some degree of specificity on foreign policy issues......One had thought he was not capable of speaking beyond platitudes delivered in his customary pedantic style - but this is definitely an improvement.

Terror outfits Jaish, Lashkar are ISI offshoots: PM

Terror outfits Jaish, Lashkar are ISI offshoots: PM

NEW DELHI: Directly linking Pakistan's state apparatus to terrorism, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said that terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) are offshoots of ISI. While India has blamed Pakistan for supporting terror, this is the first time that Singh has on record said LeT and Jaish are ISI creations.

Singh also said that he would go to Pakistan but only when there was something "solid" that he could achieve as a result of the visit. "We have a very uncertain neighbourhood. A very uncertain international, economic environment. We have to swim and keep our heads high," he said.

In forthright comments about India's geo-politics, the PM said the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan can hurt Indian interests and said it was hard to predict what will happen next in the land-locked nation. He expressed concern about the Haqqani network and said the good and bad Taliban process is best handled by Afghans.

On the defence gap between India and China, he said the Chinese were way ahead, noting "They are building a blue-water navy also. Aircarft carriers...they are acquiring."

On Sri Lanka, he noted that Sinhala chauvinism is a reality and India needs to "find a difficult balance as what happens in that country has a domestic dimension too."

In Bangladesh, the Jamiat-ul-Islami influences about a quarter of the population and this section is very anti-India. "...they are in the clutches (Jamiat), many times of the ISI. So the political landscape in Bangladesh can change any time. We do not know what these terrorist elements, who have a hold on the Jamiat-e-Islami elements in Bangladesh, can be up to," Singh said.

Talking to editors on Wednesday, he said, India was not encouraged by the action taken by Pakistan so far on dealing with terror groups operating from its soil. But this did not mean that India would stop engaging its western neighbour. "We have to keep Pakistan engaged," he told the editors. But the PM also quoted as saying that "he doesn't have full trust about whatever that is happening within Pakistani army and government".

Terror, he said, should never be used as state policy. Singh asserted it was "in the healthy interest of India that Pakistan retains democracy and there is no tension (in relations)".

About China, he said that the Indian media should not sensationalise differences with that country. He had dealt with the present leadership of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao whom he regards as men of peace.At the same time, the Prime Minister said India could not compromise on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh to which China lays claim and on river systems.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 30 Jun 2011 13:26

Arjun wrote:
the Prime Minister said India could not compromise on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh to which China lays claim and on river systems.

The most idiotic supine formulation one can think of. Why use the word "compromise" even if it is in the negative. Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Period! Why use language, which connotes defensiveness, uncertainty, possibility of retreat.

He should have said, China should stop fantasizing about Indian territory, as less fantasy would be conducive to better relations, blah, blah....!

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 30 Jun 2011 16:30

Rajesh, I agree with you completely. Choice of words is very important in pronouncements on foreign affairs. Unfortunately, many of our leaders use words without thinking. I doubt if they even know the implications of their utterances or if ever anyone in GoI brings it to their notice to correct themselves in the future. It is the responsibility of the bureaucrats in the MEA to advise the FM and the PM on proper usage of terms and words. In another sense, it also reflects on the inability of most older Indians to be forthright and blunt when needed.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 30 Jun 2011 21:15

^^ Unfortunately, not many people in GoI understand how important the whole psychological aspect of words are. Witness that gaffe involving the former Strategic Command Authority guy in interview telling that we will probably not nuke pak etc....

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 30 Jun 2011 21:18

When the documents signed by the prime ministers of India & pakistan, can have "spelling mistakes" after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai, these kind of gaffes ............

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 06 Jul 2011 08:37

Is India Ready for Prime Time?

David J. Karl reviews Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy by David M. Malone and Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization by Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta.

abhishek_sharma · Post by **abhishek_sharma** » 09 Jul 2011 10:51

Narendra Singh Sarila is dead

Uff...

Dhiman · Post by **Dhiman** » 29 Jul 2011 08:02

Hina Rabbani seems like a major show off. Working extra hard to show that she is rich. Personally its insulting and offensive not just to her own people, but to the country (India) she is visiting without any disregard for the millions and millions who have barely enough to eat.

Next time she visit's india somebody should gift her some khadi garments and maybe she is remember the poor millions insted of Hermes Birkin crap.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 06 Aug 2011 10:39

sparse media coverage for deepening India-Mongolia ties

While our strategic community reacts anxiously to Beijing’s deepening ties with India’s neighbours, it devotes little attention to Delhi’s pro-active diplomacy in China’s periphery. Security cooperation with Mongolia adds a new dimension to India’s Look East policy — which, by geographic circumstance, involves building stronger ties with China’s neighbours. Located in inner Asia, Mongolia is landlocked by its two great neighbours, Russia and China.

During the Cold War, Mongolia was a buffer that leaned towards the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, it embarked on a dynamic policy of building multiple partnerships and raising its international profile. During the last two decades, Mongolia has worked hard to balance its two large neighbours — China and Russia — and reached out to the US, Europe and Japan. In its effort to reaffirm its national identity and preserve its autonomy, Mongolia has also begun to look at India.

The US — often called the “third neighbour” in Ulan Bator — offers military aid to Mongolia. The armed forces of Mongolia regularly train with American troops. Mongolia has made small but symbolic contributions to the US-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and actively participates in international peacekeeping operations.

Mongolia also hosts annual multilateral peacekeeping operations called “Khan Quest”. India has been a regular participant in these exercises, whose 2011 iteration has just begun. Whether Indian discourse pays attention to Mongolia or not, Beijing will carefully monitor Delhi’s plans for deeper defence ties with Ulan Bator.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 07 Aug 2011 06:24

^^^
inconsequential. when one sees India's ability to enforce its will on close periphery like PoK, and NE, it is clear that India has no interest in securing these places for itself, culturally, politically, and economically. now Mongolia is a planet away for all we care. India's "involvement" there will be minimal and ultimately useless. we should still have diplomatic relation with them, but there is no room for any chanakyan moves. it is so far away that any Indian movements into and inside Mongolia will be easily monitored by Panda.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 07 Aug 2011 17:43

^^ What is your take on why we are doing it?

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 07 Aug 2011 18:06

abhishek_sharma wrote:Narendra Singh Sarila is dead

Uff...

May his soul RIP. His work The Shadow of the Great Game: the Untold Story of India’s Partition, remains one of my favorite books on the subject.

shivajisisodia · Post by **shivajisisodia** » 07 Aug 2011 18:30

Ah, great thread. Did not know it existed. I had posted the following on another thread, but I think it would be relevent here as well.

While we are on the subject, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to make one other point.

Let us look first at some general facts.

1. US is like a composite of two personalities. One, that of a simple minded muscle kid in school who loves a good fight. His genetic makeup causes him to relish a confrontation. This kid particularly loves a fight that he has a great likelihood of winning. He further loves a fight that fits within the framework of a "narrative" or a dogma, prevelent in his family of his general culture. Two, that of a rich kid, who likes to treat others as pawn in his larger game, by leveraging his money.

2. US has a general narrative after 9/11 which continues to the present dayr which is reasonably ingrained in its social psychie, that Islamists are the enemy and that they should be confronted.

Let us now look at some specific current day facts.

1. Despite the general animosity towards the Islamists, the US population right now has battle fatigue due to its inability to have a clean win in Afghanistan. Then the American economy is in a depression coupled with the extreme debt that its government has. It therefore, has no appetite to expend either money or lives in another misadventure against any Islamists.

2. Because of this fatigue, it is desperately looking to get out of Afghanistan and in this desperation is willing to make deals with Taliban and basically secede a lot of poltical and military space in Afghan to Pak.

3. On the other hand, Paki actions over the years since 9/11 and particularly recently since Bin-Laden's killing has created palpable anger in the enlightened US population, particularly in a lot of the policy making circles such as the CIA and other intelligence agencies that have become intimately familiar with the true nature of Pak since the Af-Pak operation.

4. Therefore, the American animosity towards Islam coupled with its particular current anger towards Pak combined with American "natural" pre-disposition to fight, makes it very open to "alternate" ideas on how to successfully engage the Islamists and particularly Pak, as long as they can do it without spending too much money or expending many lives.

I humbly contend that India can provide a relatively cheap solution to this problem. India can present to the US the following, which I had touched upon my earlier post:

1. By all means withdraw the bulk of American forces from Af-Pak.

2. Continue a small American strategic presence, which is a combination of conventional army, intelligence, air force etc, in well fortified and discrete bases.

3. Have Americans covertly and heavily arm a well organized and lean and mean Northern Alliance type militia to create a sort of a permanent civil war situation in Afghan, possibly for decades or until there is so much war fatigue amongst even the most isolated cave dwelling Afghan population that Taliban and Pak completely loses any civilian support base that it currently enjoys and in fact the civilians start hating the Pakis, the hate whose seeds already exist in most Afghan hearts already, including the PAshtuns

4. Have the American "establishment", civil society and the media start thinking aloud the possibility of American recognition of all of JK(including POK) as Indian territory

5. Have Americans heavily arm the Baloch nationalists and unleash the American propoganda machinary to prop up their cause

6. Clearly, gradually scale back and end all military and economic aid to Pak

7. Covertly finance very indirectly some Uigher groups within Pak to create periodic tensions in Xinjiang, which can be attributed to cross border groups in Pak, so as to keep that modicum of distrust between China and Pak

8. Wait for the Paki poodle to come and lick "massa's" feet or cry "Uncle" whichever it prefers.

It will be a challenge to Indian diplomacy to present such a narrative to the US in a serious way that brings out its cost efficient and low risk nature. In fact, it will be a collossal failure of Indian diplomacy if it fails to put forward such a solution to the US and doesnt successfully carries this through the various Congressmen, Senators, policy types and the White House.

Hillary Clinton invited India to play a bigger role in its neighborhood, let us take her up on it and present this as our first initiative to meet her challenge. Let us see how US responds.

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 09 Aug 2011 15:57

Came across this excellent 2008 piece by Prof Kishore Mahbubani on the underpinnings of Chinese Diplomacy, which i believe has not been posted in these forums.
Many lessons for Indian Diplomacy in this.

Smart Power, Chinese Style

Kishore Mahbubani

History teaches us that the emergence of a new power almost always generates tension and conflict. With the exception of the United States replacing Great Britain, relations between the world’s greatest power and the world’s greatest emerging power have always been difficult, to say the least. No great power cedes its place easily, as is demonstrated by the present reluctance of Britain and France to give up their anachronistic seats on the UN Security Council.

It is remarkable, then, how little tension there is between the United States, the lone superpower, and China, the world’s greatest emerging power. This seemingly unnatural state of affairs could be a result of pure luck. Or it could be the result of extraordinary statesmanship in one or both countries. Certainly both can claim some credit, but any objective study will show that this unnatural state is mostly a result of Beijing’s geopolitical competence outweighing Washington’s tendency toward incompetence. Indeed, Washington could learn a great deal from Beijing’s example.

At first blush, this asymmetry seems odd. After all, there is nothing in China to match the rich array of think tanks and the various processes of policy dialogue that one finds in Washington (and in other intellectual centers like New York and Boston). No country can match America’s conceptual output in volume. The story is different when it comes to quality, however. There is little debate heard in Beijing from op-ed pieces, television talk shows or think-tank forums, but there is nevertheless a remarkable ability to think outside the box, particularly with respect to long-term planning. The typical time horizon in Washington hovers somewhere between the daily spin for the evening talk shows and the next election cycle. In Beijing the clear focus is on where China wants to be in fifty years in order to avoid a repetition of the two centuries of humiliation China experienced before finally emerging as a modern power. The desire to permanently erase all traces of that humiliation is a profound motivating factor in the psyche of the Chinese leadership. It ensures national unity on foreign policy issues—as when Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were able to pursue normal ties with America despite the ongoing madness of the Cultural Revolution.

China’s deft geopolitical instincts have deep historical roots. For millennia, Chinese empires, kingdoms and warlords have risen and fallen. The pool of historical wisdom that China can turn to is enormous. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping turned to such ancient wisdom to craft his famous 28 characters, which prescribed seven guidelines for China to follow: (1) lengjing guancha, observe and analyze developments calmly; (2) chenzhuo yingfu, deal with changes patiently and confidently; (3) wenzhu zhenjiao, secure our own position; (4) taoguang yanghui, conceal our capabilities and avoid the limelight; (5) shanyu shouzhuo, keep a low profile; (6) juebu dangtou, never become a leader; and (7) yousuo zuowei, strive for achievements.

Point number five is especially significant. It explains much of China’s recent behavior in international fora. It also makes it difficult to describe Chinese successes, because the Chinese themselves say so little about them. There is enormous pressure on Chinese policymakers not to appear boastful or triumphant, as keeping a low profile is a carefully calculated element of China’s geopolitical strategy. Deng passed away in 1997, but his wisdom and advice remain in effect, as a few recent examples show.
A Free Trade Coup

Chinese leaders are astute enough to know that some day, when China’s comprehensive national power becomes even more evident, America may try either to contain or roll back Chinese power. Indeed, America has already demonstrated this impulse by strengthening its military ties with Australia and Japan, as well as by including India in the mix. The Chinese know that America is buying an insurance policy against the rise of China. The Chinese also know that even though America neglected ASEAN after the Cold War, America might one day try to use Southeast Asia to check China, as well.

In a preemptive strike against potential American encirclement, China has decided to share its prosperity with its ASEAN neighbors. As quoted in the February 19, 2007 Financial Times, Joshua Kurlantzick warns that

Chinese ‘soft power’ in Southeast Asia is now so potent that, for the first time since 1945, the United States is ‘facing a situation in which another country’s appeal outstrips its own in an important region.’ China’s aid to the Philippines is now four times that offered by America; twice as many Indonesians now study in China as in the United States.

With strong economic ties to China, the ASEAN countries are not disposed to join any containment policy. Remarking on China’s ASEAN policy, National University of Singapore scholar Sheng Lijun writes,

China is no longer using the simplistic either black-or-white, either friend-or-enemy attitude, as in the Cold War, to look at the complex world now. This has fundamentally changed its ASEAN policy and added a lot of flexibility to its diplomacy, which accounts heavily for its initiatives in the China-ASEAN FTA.1

The boldest and most effective manifestation of this new strategy was China’s decision to offer a free trade agreement at the ASEAN-China Summit in November 2001. A senior official from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that the Chinese offer struck Japan like a “bolt from the blue.” Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stunned the ASEAN leaders by offering unilateral concessions to the ASEAN countries, including an “early harvest” provision, giving duty-free access to the Chinese market on 600 agricultural products. Chinese leaders then confirmed their seriousness by completing negotiations for the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) in record time. A year after the proposal, the agreement was signed by Chinese and ASEAN leaders at the eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. By its terms, the two sides will establish an FTA within ten years, first with the six original ASEAN states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), then expanding to include the less-developed members (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) by 2015. China also accorded the three non-WTO ASEAN members, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, most-favored nation status. When fully implemented, the China-ASEAN FTA will constitute a common market of 1.9 billion people with a combined gross domestic product of $3 trillion.2

In theory, an FTA is merely a trade agreement. In practice, it represents a strategic calculation that the two parties have long-term interests in forging a closer partnership, or that one party has an interest in strengthening the other. The U.S. decision to offer Mexico trade access through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was driven by a cold calculation that if America did not help strengthen the Mexican economy (even at the cost of exporting jobs to Mexico), then Mexico would end up sending more illegal immigrants to America. Hence, when Mexico joined NAFTA, it appeared to be the big short-term beneficiary in economic terms. In reality, the United States benefited more by reducing the potential for political and economic instability at its own doorstep.

Similar geopolitical calculations drove China’s offer. By tying ASEAN into the Chinese zone of prosperity, China created a level of economic interdependence that will make it difficult for ASEAN countries to contemplate anti-Chinese orientations in future. Thus, Chinese initiatives toward ASEAN have paid China significant political dividends. By any objective measure, Japan has given more aid and support to ASEAN than China, but when Japan campaigned for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council a few years ago, only one ASEAN country, Singapore, publicly supported its bid. (Another, Vietnam, offered support privately.) The remaining ASEAN countries hedged their bets and remained silent after strong lobbying by China.

What makes the Chinese-ASEAN deal so remarkable is that when ASEAN was created in 1967, its main political purpose was to work with America to check the threat of communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indeed, China was then supporting several Communist Parties in the region that were attempting to overthrow their governments. Yet when ASEAN held a summit to celebrate its fortieth anniversary in November 2007, it was China that sent its Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, to attend the celebrations. Neither George W. Bush, Dick Cheney nor Condoleezza Rice turned up. Indeed, two months earlier, Bush had suddenly cancelled a U.S.-ASEAN Summit set for September 2007 so that he could make another secret stopover in Baghdad. Similarly, Rice had failed to turn up at the regular ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in 2005 and 2007. (Her predecessor wisely never missed one.)

In each of these instances, American decisions were driven by short-term considerations; ASEAN’s long-term value was ignored, as senior American officials have admitted to me in private. By contrast, all Chinese decisions have been driven by clear long-term goals. Joseph Nye captured the result of these bold Chinese moves in Southeast Asia:

The United States was noticeably absent from the guest list when countries from Australia to India gathered recently in Malaysia for the first East Asian Summit. It was a meeting which some fear marks the first step in China’s long-term ambition to build a new regional power structure, known as the East Asian Community, that excludes Washington. Couple that with a recent BBC poll of 22 countries, which found that nearly half the respondents saw Beijing’s influence as positive compared to 38% who said the same for the U.S., and it is clear that the rise of China’s soft power—at America’s expense—is an issue that needs to be urgently addressed.3

To understand the remarkable turnaround in China-ASEAN relations, try to imagine America making a similar effort in Latin America. Most Latin American leaders, with the exception of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, try to maintain good relations with Washington. Sheer American power dictates this reality. Yet virtually no Latin American leaders would dare repeat today what Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella said at the end of the Cold War, that Argentina wanted to have “carnal relations” with America. Today, public opinion surveys show strong anti-Americanism in Latin America, even higher than the usual, fashionable variety. The two largest Latin American states, Brazil and Argentina, have swung leftward and now keep a politically useful distance from the United States.

Even more tellingly, two Latin American countries, Chile and Mexico, joined others in depriving the United States of the crucial UN Security Council endorsement it needed in March 2003 to legitimize the American invasion of Iraq. Neither then-President Ricardo Lagos of Chile nor the then-President Vicente Fox of Mexico were inherently anti-American or anti-Western. Both were friends of America. But they were so appalled by the American justification for the war that they felt they had no choice but to withhold support. Indeed, both leaders privately tried to caution America against rushing into Iraq and urged the Bush Administration to give Saddam Hussein one last chance. They provided wise advice; the Bush Administration subsequently paid a heavy price for invading Iraq without Security Council sanction.
Listening to Latin America and Africa

It is odd: America is one of the most open societies in the world, yet when it comes to listening to the rest of the world or understanding the views of others, America instead resembles a closed society. Indian political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta once compared India and China by saying, “India is an open society with a closed mind; China is a closed society with an open mind.” The same comparison may well be made between America and China.

The Chinese have developed a remarkable capacity to understand the voices of others around the globe, a facility reflected in the contrasting fortunes of the American and Chinese diplomatic services. The American Foreign Service has never been so demoralized. Over the decades, as ever more American ambassadorial posts have gone to political appointees, the Foreign Service has progressively become less attractive and every day draws in ever less of the talent of the caliber of a Lawrence Eagleburger or Thomas Pickering—men who could rise to the very top of the State Department ladder. Today, the top rungs of the Foreign Service ladder have been sawn off. With such a short ladder to climb, there is little incentive for the best and brightest to leave Goldman Sachs to join the State Department. By contrast, China’s rising international stature has enhanced the standing of Chinese diplomats globally. The Chinese Foreign Service attracts the best and brightest, many of whom are appointed to senior ambassadorial posts at a relatively young age.

American diplomacy is being trumped by Chinese diplomacy through the powerful combination of enhanced geopolitical acumen and better professional diplomacy. In several regions I have visited, including the Middle East and Africa, local observers marvel at the linguistic skills of the Chinese diplomats sent to their countries. While Chinese diplomats walk around freely without escort, American diplomats live and work in fortress-like compounds, and venturing outside only rarely and with great care in many countries. Tom Friedman once recounted this story from a Turkish industrialist:

I was just on a tour to Amman and we stopped our tourist van in front of the U.S. Embassy there. We asked the guide why they need all these tanks around it, and the guy told us that within this American Embassy they have everything they need so they can survive without going outside. . . . I felt really sorry for the Americans there.4

The Western media fails to appreciate the nature and depth of Chinese geopolitical acumen. There is a considerable amount of alarmist reporting in the Western media about new Chinese initiatives in Latin America and Africa, the former a zone traditionally well outside of Chinese influence. Most of these reports suggest that China has become yet another rapacious great power out to dispossess the poor, defenseless natives of their precious raw materials. No Western commentary dares to suggest the truth: China’s entry into these regions is driven not by short-term opportunism, but by a careful calculation that in the smaller, interdependent world we are moving toward, China will inevitably have more concentrated dealings with these regions. It’s part of China’s fifty-year plan.

In the Western Hemisphere, China is taking advantage of the failure of half-hearted market reforms and Washington’s unwillingness enthusiastically to pursue genuine “good neighbor” relations in Latin America. China’s flexibility contrasts with more rigid U.S. approaches, as noted by Stephen Johnson of the Heritage Foundation:

Obtaining any kind of assistance from the United States requires compliance on a battery of restrictions, including observing human rights, protecting the environment, promising not to send U.S. military personnel to the International Criminal Court (ICC), not assisting current or former terrorists, and not using U.S.-provided equipment for any other than its stated purpose. American commitments also depend on legislative approval and can be reversed if the mood in the U.S. Congress shifts. China, on the other hand, can bargain on the spot without a lot of caveats.5

In Africa, China is increasingly making its presence felt in many ways, beyond the quest for natural resources, and not all of them are as controversial as the oil business. Under UN auspices, the China-Africa Business Council opened in March 2005. Headquartered in China, it was created to boost trade and development in the region. China has peacekeepers in Liberia and has contributed to construction projects in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia. China is the only country to host a massive conference, the China-Africa Summit 2006, which was attended by a large number of African leaders in November 2006. There are an estimated 900 investment projects on the African continent financed with Chinese money.

As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s eight-day tour to Africa began in June 2006, the official English-language China Daily highlighted the political tagline of “non-interference.” One editorial argued that

China has been offering no-strings attached financial and technical aid to the most needy in Africa. It has been encouraging the African countries to develop their economy through trade and investment in infrastructure and social institutions, without dictating terms for political and economic reforms.

A Western diplomat based in Beijing commented, “It reads like a direct rebuke of U.S. and Western powers’ foreign policy on the continent. . . . t is meant to present them as a more attractive world power than the U.S.”6 By the end of 2006, China had invested about $6.27 billion in Africa, and two-way trade rocketed from $10 billion in 2000 to about $50 billion in 2007.
Long March to Long View

Again, the point is that the Chinese leadership takes the long view in a way that few Western leaders seem capable of doing these days. Determined to avoid future humiliations, China has pursued the single-minded goal of achieving a level of prosperity that will ensure its global status. This policy was spelled out in a 1991 editorial by Secretary Yang Baibing of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat in the Party’s mass-circulation People’s Daily:

We must make full use of the current favorable conditions both at home and abroad to push our economic construction onto a new stage and lay a foundation for rapid development in the next century. If we say that from mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, the Chinese nation finally stood up through more than 100 years of heroic struggles, in which one stepped into the breach as another fell, then from the mid-1900s to the mid-2000s, through another 100 years of struggle, our country will completely shake off poverty and truly stride along toward becoming a developed and prosperous country as a giant in the East.7

China has also made a major effort to learn from the mistakes of other major powers. In 2006, China Central Television broadcast an engaging, 12-part documentary, Rise of the Great Powers, which analyzed the emergence of nine great powers, including Spain, England and America, and endorsed the idea that China should study the experiences of nations and empires it once condemned as aggressors. Far from promoting an ideological worldview, the series attempted to be as objective as possible. The message conveyed to the Chinese public was subtle: China can become a great power, but must first understand why great powers succeeded and failed in the past. “Our China, the Chinese people, the Chinese race has become revitalized and is again stepping onto the world stage”, said Qian Chengdan, a professor at Beijing University and the intellectual father of the series. “It is extremely important for today’s China to be able to draw some lessons from the experiences of others.”

The most difficult relationship between China and any of its neighbors is clearly the one with Japan. The wounds have not fully healed from the Japanese occupation of China from 1931 to 1945. From time to time, the Chinese perceive the Japanese as behaving insensitively, demonstrating a lack of remorse for Japanese atrocities committed during the occupation. The Chinese were angered by then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s decision each year during his term in office to visit the Yasukuni shrine, which includes 14 convicted war criminals among its honored dead. One of the lowest points in the Sino-Japanese relationship occurred in April 2005, when widespread Chinese demonstrations followed the publication of a Japanese history textbook that downplayed Japan’s military aggression in the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.

The Japanese haven’t been the only ones to make mistakes. In November 1998, for example, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a six-day state visit to Japan that was nearly a disaster. For reasons still unclear, Jiang decided to use his visit to lecture every senior Japanese official he met on Japan’s poor record of atonement for its sins in World War II. In his public speeches, Jiang expressed his unhappiness with Japan’s reluctance to apologize unequivocally for its aggression during its occupation in China.

Despite the enormous difficulties and tensions built into the Sino-Japanese relationship, the Chinese leadership has worked hard to ensure that this relationship never went completely off the rails. China even managed to put the relationship back on a positive track during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s three-day official visit to Tokyo in April last year. Wen delivered a speech to the Japanese parliament that was both politically acceptable to Japan’s detractors in China and politically palatable to a skeptical Japanese public. He displayed enormous political skill, taking personal charge of this challenge:

I did a lot of preparation. Every sentence is written by me, and I did all the research work myself. Why? Because I feel our nation’s development has reached a critical moment. We need to have a peaceful and conducive international environment.8

The political difficulties inherent in the Sino-Japanese relationship are probably as intractable as those between Israel and Palestine, Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, or even the United States and Iran. Considering that 35 million Chinese were killed in the Japanese occupation, the political wounds of the Sino-Japanese relationship may be greater than any of the others. Nevertheless, since China has a deep national interest in preserving good ties with all its neighbors, it is prepared to accept Deng’s advice to “swallow bitter humiliation” and focus on making China a great nation again.

Having failed in the great power game in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, as well as having wasted the first eight decades of the 20th century in mostly futile efforts to modernize, few serious observers expected China to emerge as the most astute and effective geopolitical player of the 21st century. But it is doing so, and this is no mean feat, for the geopolitical chessboard is far more complex than ever before.

The international politics of the 21st century will for the first time in human history constitute a system that is simultaneously global in scope and less than wholly Western in character. The decisions that affect the world can no longer be made in a few Western capitals whose cultural parameters in analyzing problems and solutions are essentially similar. New cultural and political perspectives are entering the scene. On this more complex chessboard, most Western commentators expected (with good reason) that the Western powers would continue to be the shrewdest and most adept geopolitical actors. Instead, they have floundered; the Europeans because they are introspective to a fault, and the Americans arguably because they are not introspective enough. Western incompetence has provided significant opportunities that China has been able to exploit without paying any serious political price.

The real extent of China’s geopolitical acumen manifests itself best, perhaps, in the way it has managed the Sino-American relationship. China’s record is not perfect. It is hard to understand, for example, why it initially turned the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk away from a port call in Hong Kong, thereby depriving many American sailors and their families of a Thanksgiving reunion in November 2007, only later to reverse course and allow the call after it was too late for the Kitty Hawk to turn around. The American Navy retaliated immediately by sailing the Kitty Hawk through the Taiwan Strait on its way back to Japan. (U.S. aircraft carriers have traditionally avoided this; even during heightened tensions in 1996, President Clinton refrained from sending two carriers into the Taiwan Strait.)

But the Chinese do not make many such mistakes. For example, within two months George W. Bush’s inauguration, a crisis erupted when a U.S. spy plane was downed near Hainan Island following an accident with a Chinese fighter jet. There were a few tense days before the American airmen were released, and the episode could have presaged a difficult Sino-American relationship. Instead, seven years later, it is amazing how solid and stable the Sino-American relationship has become. What happened?

Some of the credit goes to a geopolitical accident: 9/11. After the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked, the Bush Administration shifted its strategic sights to the Islamic world, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. China became an afterthought, something for the State Department to worry about. China could have remained astutely passive in the face of the crisis America was facing, but instead the Chinese acted on the wisdom embedded in the Chinese rendition for the word “crisis”, the combination of the Chinese characters for “danger” and “opportunity.” China realized that 9/11 provided an opportunity to improve ties with America, and it took full advantage.

One story I heard in UN corridors in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq demonstrated Chinese astuteness. Soon after America invaded Iraq in March 2003 without a legitimizing UN Security Council resolution, it realized that it would have a problem if the international community decided that a subsequent U.S.-led American military occupation of Iraq was “illegal.” If that became the accepted international understanding of the occupation, a court anywhere could have declared Iraqi oil sales illegal and therefore subject to international seizure. The only way out of this legal quandary was to get an enabling UN Security Council resolution that declared the occupation “legal” under international law. After the bruising battles with France, Germany and Russia in the UN Security Council a few months earlier, there was no guarantee that America would succeed in this. In the end, however, Washington did succeed with UNSC Resolution 1511, adopted on October 16, 2003. I subsequently asked a senior U.S. diplomat which country had been the most helpful in securing this resolution for America. He replied, without hesitation, “China.”

Why did the Chinese do this? Several possibilities come to mind. Beijing could have subscribed to the general sentiment in the Council that since America has already decided to defy the wishes of the UN Security Council on Iraq, little would be gained by further battles over a fait accompli. Or the Chinese may have shrewdly calculated that their interests would be best served by a longer rather than a shorter American stay in Iraq.

It is worth recalling that around that time, the Bush Administration was still ebullient about its successful invasion of Iraq. American televisions replayed scenes of the giant statue of Saddam being toppled in Firdos Square, with Iraqis smashing bits of the toppled statue with their shoes. Vice President Cheney had said that the invading soldiers would be “greeted as liberators”, and so for a while it appeared they were. When President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier on May 1, 2003 under the banner, “Mission Accomplished”, the Chinese might have calculated that by supporting UNSC Resolution 1511 they were only confirming and supporting an American victory.

Not likely, however; Chinese policymakers are better students of history than their American counterparts, and they probably suspected that Bush’s proclamation of victory would soon prove false, or at least premature. If so, they would have calculated that America had walked into a quagmire that might in due course prove useful to China. And it soon did. In 2003, while America was busy with Iraq, the President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, unwisely decided to push his pro-independence agenda. Given the ideological orientation of the Bush Administration, it would have been natural for Chen to count on support from Washington. Instead, he received the opposite. No recent U.S. president has been as tough on Taiwan as Bush 43. What appears to be an informal quid pro quo must go down as one of the biggest coups Chinese diplomacy has secured in Washington.

Against this backdrop, it was natural for China to be helpful to the Bush Administration on the North Korean issue, as well. There is no doubt that the Chinese government was enormously upset when Kim Jong-il decided to explode his (mini) nuclear bomb on October 9, 2006. This could have triggered a crisis as severe as the one developing between the United States and Iran. Instead, barely a year later, the Bush Administration was thanking China for helping defuse the crisis, proving once again that when China applied itself to a geopolitical issue, it would inevitably achieve success. By contrast, the American handling of the Iran issue has so far proven unsuccessful by any measure, and embarrassing by several others.

There is a very simple explanation for why China has become geopolitically more competent than America: China is aware that the world has changed. China does careful global geopolitical calculations in which it tries to objectively analyze its geopolitical assets and liabilities. It then works out a long-term plan to enhance its assets and minimize its liabilities. Each time a new problem surfaces, China looks for advantage in it, assuming that it must adapt to the world, not shape the world as it wishes.

America believes the opposite. One deep-seated assumption among many U.S. strategic thinkers is that the United States is so powerful that it can dictate the terms of world order without having to adapt American policies. This arrogance also explains why the United States has twice failed to take advantage of major historical opportunities to shape world order to its advantage. The first opportunity came when the Cold War ended. The Clinton Administration reacted with a combination of hubris and complacency. It tried to spread the gospel of democracy, abandoned old useful allies (like Pakistan and Indonesia) and became completely indifferent to mounting global challenges that did not fit old categories. The mood of triumphalism prevented any kind of clear strategic thinking. The Bush Administration blew an equally valuable opportunity after 9/11. Instead of riding the global wave of good will and sympathy toward America, the Bush Administration progressively alienated virtually every major global constituency with its actions in Iraq and elsewhere. It could be said (to paraphrase Abba Eban) that America never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

It is never too late to attempt a comprehensive and global analysis of the geopolitical assets and liabilities that America has in the world. Undoubtedly, America has many assets, not least the many reservoirs of good will America has accumulated over decades. Not all has been lost, but the liabilities have grown by leaps and bounds. The Iraq war is one of them, but so is America’s unbalanced pro-Israel policy on the Palestine issue, and without doubt the inability of American strategic discourse to discuss objectively the Israel-Palestine issue has become a Chinese geopolitical asset. The rise of China is warmly welcomed throughout the Islamic world. China is increasingly seen as the only card that the Islamic world can play to temper America’s unwise geopolitical policies. Nothing demonstrates this better than China’s relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has been one of America’s most loyal allies for more than fifty years. Yet when one visits Saudi Arabia today, one senses the Saudis’ exasperation with America. Instead of dealing with a smart and sophisticated ally of the kind they were used to in the Cold War, the Saudis have to cope with a geopolitically incompetent Administration driven by short-term expediency and unable to consider the long-term impact of its own behavior. This has provided China an opportunity.

For many years, Saudi Arabia, an anti-communist country, kept Communist China at arms length and, indeed, maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 1990. Yet on April 22, 2006, when Hu Jintao left America after a rather unpleasant state visit (he was subject to a tirade by a Falun Gong supporter at a White House press conference, the accidental playing of the Taiwanese national anthem, a television scene of President Bush pulling him by the collar, and so on), he paid a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia during which he signed agreements on defense, security and trade. He also signed a deal for a $2 billion oil refinery and petrochemical project in northeastern China to be financed by the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). Earlier that year in January, King Abdallah had made a full-scale state visit to Beijing.

The Islamic world is not the only place where China has benefited from America’s geopolitical fumbles. Russia is another country that should be a natural geopolitical ally of the United States. Any objective assessment of Russia’s long-term circumstances shows that Russia has far more to fear from the rise of China than it does from America. If America seeks a natural partner to work with in managing the rise of China, Russia should have been it. Russia’s longest border is with China. It has vast, unpopulated steppes right next to populous China. Despite all this, America’s many geopolitical missteps have driven Russia and China closer together. Russia and China have used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to squeeze American influence out of Central Asia, as illustrated by the fact that when the Bush Administration attempted to obtain “observer status” at the SCO in 2005 it was rebuffed.

None of this means that all is lost for America. A dynamic and rapidly changing world provides daily opportunities for America to redress the situation. However, for America to take advantage of its opportunities, it has to match China by engaging in similarly comprehensive analyses of both its global assets and liabilities. Essentially, Washington needs two parallel tracks when it comes to strategic thinking, one to manage the daily challenge of media spin concerning issues like Darfur and Kosovo, and another to manage the long-term challenges America faces geopolitically. For now, America attempts only the former.

All this might appear too cynical or Machiavellian to many American minds, but I doubt it. In all my encounters with individual American thinkers, I have found them as sophisticated and aware of global realities as any Chinese. The many politically correct constraints on American strategic discourse, however, seem to prevent them from expressing publicly what they readily admit to me privately. That need not be the case, as I am also confident that the American population is equally sophisticated, and wise enough to understand Max Weber’s advice: “It is not true that good can only follow from good, and evil only from evil; but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who says this is, indeed, a political infant.” If China can heed this advice, so can America.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 09 Aug 2011 16:23

>>It is odd: America is one of the most open societies in the world, yet when it comes to listening to the rest of the world or understanding the views of others, America instead resembles a closed society. Indian political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta once compared India and China by saying, “India is an open society with a closed mind; China is a closed society with an open mind.” The same comparison may well be made between America and China.

Nice bit of rhetoric. Rolls easily off the tongue and is easily absorbed by readers. But, in reality, effing nonsense. Seriously, think about it, what does it mean? What does PBM or KM mean by "open" mind? Or "closed" mind for that matter...

You will find that it means little more than a willingness to suborn principle or value systems on the altar of wealth; because this is particularly visible in the Chinese context in view of their official ideology's rejection of capitalistic tendency, it is viewed as a departure from strongly held views, and is consequently seen as a readiness to accept new ideas. "Open" mind.

On the other hand, neither the US, nor India need to make that move essentially. Wealth accumulation, though not exclusively so, is central to our basic worldview. So is open politics and pluralism. So where do we demonstrate an opening of minds? Perhaps by going some way towards the Chinese worldview, which is a combination of darwinistic capitalism (nothing wrong with that in my view) combined with authoritarianism of the kind exercised by the Chinese Communist Party? Nice sleight of hand there by KM.

We can have some more regard for such advise or observation when PBM or KM advises the Chinese to move towards a democratic and pluralistic political system. Or does he think that the Chinese system is more durable? If so, what is his case.

If not, what is his point with the above...

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 09 Aug 2011 17:44

JE Menon wrote:>>It is odd: America is one of the most open societies in the world, yet when it comes to listening to the rest of the world or understanding the views of others, America instead resembles a closed society. Indian political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta once compared India and China by saying, “India is an open society with a closed mind; China is a closed society with an open mind.” The same comparison may well be made between America and China.

Nice bit of rhetoric. Rolls easily off the tongue and is easily absorbed by readers. But, in reality, effing nonsense. Seriously, think about it, what does it mean? What does PBM or KM mean by "open" mind? Or "closed" mind for that matter...

You will find that it means little more than a willingness to suborn principle or value systems on the altar of wealth; because this is particularly visible in the Chinese context in view of their official ideology's rejection of capitalistic tendency, it is viewed as a departure from strongly held views, and is consequently seen as a readiness to accept new ideas. "Open" mind.

On the other hand, neither the US, nor India need to make that move essentially. Wealth accumulation, though not exclusively so, is central to our basic worldview. So is open politics and pluralism. So where do we demonstrate an opening of minds? Perhaps by going some way towards the Chinese worldview, which is a combination of darwinistic capitalism (nothing wrong with that in my view) combined with authoritarianism of the kind exercised by the Chinese Communist Party? Nice sleight of hand there by KM.

We can have some more regard for such advise or observation when PBM or KM advises the Chinese to move towards a democratic and pluralistic political system. Or does he think that the Chinese system is more durable? If so, what is his case.

If not, what is his point with the above...

JEM,
Since KM here talks about the external behavioral traits of chinese diplomacy w.r.t the rest of the world - your points on the weaknesses of its internal political culture though valid are secondary.

If i aim to summarise my understanding from the article - the Chinese diplomacy's advantage is

A strategic culture - predicated on a 50 Yr Perspective plan (handed down from generation to generation in the elite of the CCP - Deng to Hu jintao for example) - unlike US which post cold war, often sees its strategic calculus getting "reset" every time a crisis emerges(9/11) or created through its ineptitude (Iraq,Sub-Prime). Its continuing enmity with Russia (or Iran - from an overdose of israel ) even 20 years after the end of the cold war - point to an inevitable dissipation of its vast diplomatic energies - it may even point to its closed minded approach.
Obviously india is nowhere near in this game with our elite composed of likes of Rahul baba (and business tycoons (Tatas,ambanis etc) who presently dont give a hoot about using strategic diplomacy to serve the longterm economic interests of India Inc) .
We can't realistically expect a consistent strategic culture pervading through successive governments for at least in the immediate 2 decades . Till then the "muddling through"/"reactive" approach which characterizes our diplomacy will be a given.

The only hope i can see is India Inc waking up to the benefits of a sound strategic culture in the near future and pushing our political class to adopt it in deference to their requirements.

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 09 Aug 2011 18:36

Lilo, I was specificially critiquing that paragraph. If it was all about external, he should have stuck to that. Talking rubbish about open and closed minds will be called out for what it is. On the other hand, it says a lot about the whole article, which contains the following sentences:
_____________________________________
Chinese policymakers are better students of history than their American counterparts

The rise of China is warmly welcomed throughout the Islamic world.

America to take advantage of its opportunities, it has to match China by engaging in similarly comprehensive analyses of both its global assets and liabilities.

China has become geopolitically more competent than America.

Chinese leadership takes the long view in a way that few Western leaders seem capable of doing these days.

China’s deft geopolitical instincts have deep historical roots.

The Chinese have developed a remarkable capacity to understand the voices of others around the globe

The American Foreign Service has never been so demoralized.

China has been offering no-strings attached financial and technical aid to the most needy in Africa.

China does careful global geopolitical calculations in which it tries to objectively analyze its geopolitical assets and liabilities. It then works out a long-term plan to enhance its assets and minimize its liabilities.
______________________________________________________________

Really? Each sentence there can, at a minimum, be disputed or refuted. And I just quoted a sample.

It can also be argued that Japan, broadly speaking, has a very similar approach to the one mentioned above. Yet, if anything, it maintains a far lower profile than China does. Why is China's geo-political approach specifically better?

China is now virtually surrounded by powers that are speaking softly, but strengthening their sticks and multiplying them as quickly as possible. This does not mean that China is not a big power, or that America's relative influence is not declining, but that such hagiographic articles do little to enhance our understanding of ground realities...

Lilo · Post by **Lilo** » 09 Aug 2011 20:01

JE Menon wrote:Lilo, I was specificially critiquing that paragraph. If it was all about external, he should have stuck to that. Talking rubbish about open and closed minds will be called out for what it is. On the other hand, it says a lot about the whole article, which contains the following sentences:
_____________________________________
Chinese policymakers are better students of history than their American counterparts

The rise of China is warmly welcomed throughout the Islamic world.

America to take advantage of its opportunities, it has to match China by engaging in similarly comprehensive analyses of both its global assets and liabilities.

China has become geopolitically more competent than America.

Chinese leadership takes the long view in a way that few Western leaders seem capable of doing these days.

China’s deft geopolitical instincts have deep historical roots.

The Chinese have developed a remarkable capacity to understand the voices of others around the globe

The American Foreign Service has never been so demoralized.

China has been offering no-strings attached financial and technical aid to the most needy in Africa.

China does careful global geopolitical calculations in which it tries to objectively analyze its geopolitical assets and liabilities. It then works out a long-term plan to enhance its assets and minimize its liabilities.
______________________________________________________________

Really? Each sentence there can, at a minimum, be disputed or refuted. And I just quoted a sample.

It can also be argued that Japan, broadly speaking, has a very similar approach to the one mentioned above. Yet, if anything, it maintains a far lower profile than China does. Why is China's geo-political approach specifically better?

China is now virtually surrounded by powers that are speaking softly, but strengthening their sticks and multiplying them as quickly as possible. This does not mean that China is not a big power, or that America's relative influence is not declining, but that such hagiographic articles do little to enhance our understanding of ground realities...

JEM,
Hagiographic it is , however my limited experience with "Singapore School of Foreign Policy" (if i may call that) represented by Raja Mohan and KM , both of whom tend to dwell on the dangers of a rising china to India and US in their own ways - makes me gloss over any gratuitous statements which they might use to embellish their articles. It shouldn't take away (IMO) from their substantial arguments. They are after all also "manufacturing consent" in the policy domain.

Coming to Japan , it has the benefit of riding on the coat tails of US on complex (multilateral) issues and still conduct its bilateral diplomacy in full consonance with former because its foreign policy goals are anyway highly aligned with US. Another example is Germany which also has a passive approach to knotty issues letting US take the lead.

My point is that India has no such Godfathers it can rely on and if it aims to pursue an independent foreign policy of some substance like China it should have what it takes - an indigenous strategic culture and an elite imbibed in it.

Also, as shown by the ASEAN example in the article if the Chinese are evolving over their "middle kingdom"-"Black and White" hierarchical approach (drumming up this fear of "middle kingdom" IMO was overdone - now chinese it seems are well aware of this drawback) to interstate relations to something more nuanced and presentable, the strategic encirclement of china will not be so easy to enforce and many peripheral states may over time embrace china economically and later substantially.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 09 Aug 2011 20:12

ShauryaT wrote:
abhishek_sharma wrote:Narendra Singh Sarila is dead

Uff...
May his soul RIP. His work The Shadow of the Great Game: the Untold Story of India’s Partition, remains one of my favorite books on the subject.

Gaya gaya gaya!

May his soul enjoy the fruits of his good karma and return to Bharat to continue his journey.

His book helped me understand many aspects of Indian Partition. He will be remembered.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 13 Aug 2011 20:48

x-posting from Indian Interests thread.
The Resident Non-Indian ---- Aimee Ginsburg

‘India is the most difficult country in the world to relocate to and in which to assimilate with the local population,’ according to a recent media report that quoted a study done by HSBC Bank, polling 4,000 expats in 100 countries. Before you roll your eyes and exclaim, ‘Oh no, those foreigners complain too much,’ let me put this forth: although the angst of the immigrant who feels excluded may not be as pressing as our other major social ills, the strength and vibrancy of a society rests, among other measures, on its ability to absorb and assimilate ‘outsiders’. Yes, India was once colonised and is, therefore, suspicious of ‘outsiders’ and their motives, but hey, that’s over now, no? India is not in danger of being re-colonised, at least not by the likes of us, with our FabIndia kurtas, tulsi masala chai and Bollywood dance classes. And if we are bringing with us a host of other ideas, foods, fashions, ways of raising kids, why fear it? Cultural and ethnic diversity make a culture stronger; surely, it is the secret behind the US’s success.

devesh · Post by **devesh** » 14 Aug 2011 00:48

the above article is crap. now, they are saying that we need to "absorb" "outsiders," and "immigrants." what they mean is we need to pave the way for Caucasian Westerners to come live in the country. the message of the article is that "immigrants" shouldn't adapt to our "views" but we should adapt to their views to make it "easy" for them. and somehow, this is seen a "benchmark" for success.

this is absolute crap, without any subtlety. this is blatant Colonial mentality.

as for the "secret behind US's success" : it's the opposite of what the author is prescribing. US success is b/c it inculcates in the immigrants its values, not the other way around, like the author pretends. more blatant lying and Taqiya.....