"Exercise Garlic Marauder" - Classic!
ramana wrote:Badar, Can you look at the combat capability of the Rafale and compare it to existing IAF fighters and give us an idea of how much more or less the IAF strength will be? Say in interceptor role the baseline is the Mig 21 upgrade. Say Rafale is xTimes Mig 21 Upgrade
In attack role the baseline is the Jaguar. Say Rafale is y times Jaguar
How much is x and y?
My interest is to see how much is the IAF combat capability improved with this plane.
Various accounts say IAF is around 32 to 39.5 squadrons of existing inventory.
Will the addition of Rafale make it more effective strength due to capability, sortie rate and other unmeasurable 'ities'?
Ramana, Till we know the final specs of the IAF Rafale and its avionics and weapons outfit, it will be hard to make a proper estimate of IAF intentions or of Rafale capabilities.
Second, though it is fashionable for military-industrial PR firms to bandy things like X is 4.5 times more effective than Y (Russians being notorious at this "Complex 47.8 is 350% more effective than old Article.176"), those statements usually don't really have a lot of meaning - specially when spoken of complex weapon systems like combat aircraft which are very sensitive to environmental issues. These numbers are neither scalable, nor do they take context into account. And in air combat, context is everything. Third, I have neither the information or resources to conjure these numbers.
Finally, Capability wise the Rafale can do everything the Jaguar/MiG-21 could do thrice over. In almost every conceivable merit it is superior - agility, situational awareness, survivability, lethality, adaptability, reach, persistence and sustainability. Flexible mission planning system, live data sharing and network centric operations, sustainable maintainability and high sortie rates will likely make this aircraft superior to every aircraft in IAF inventory. Only the MKI in its air superiority role might not be outclassed by this machine. But on the other hand is its large operating and support cost and relatively limited upgrade flexibility due to design density and airframe choices.
That said, and assuming ADA Rafale as baseline: if you throw out all the fishbeds and plug in the ordered Rafales you could make some reasonable but rough conjectures.
* Net IAF numerical strength does not change by much. We are right now running to stay in position. For growth to our authorized strength we will need additional induction. MMRCA has taken some pressure off the falling strength numbers but the base problem is not solved[1].
* IAF offensive strike capability takes an immense stride forward. An fleetwide upward spike of 200% of current capability wrt to Pakistan and as much as 400% wrt to China. We can argue the exact numbers all day along, but that is my guesstimate.
* MKI will remain the mainstay for command of the air. It will overmatch PAF and be able to hold its own against PLAAF. Proper use of Rafale to supplement the MKI in an A2A role is a more heavily dependent upon support assets than the MKI is. Rafale has added a menacing axe-head to the IAF arsenal. To properly exploit its capabilities a sturdy haft is needed.
* The Rafale will slide seamlessly into our training and maintenance commands. The operations/plans and tactical aviation community will have to burn a lot of midnight oil to wring out the full potential our of this aircraft. France will be of limited assistance to us beyond tactical proficiency. No airforce operates a mix of aircraft like IAF does (MKI/Rafale/Phalcon/support assets etc) and it is largely up to the IAF to figure out the best way to exploit LO capabilities in view of our own and opposition capabilities. The upside is that IAF/IN institution is a lot more intellectually agile than the IA, so I don't see that as a matter of concern, but merely patience.
[1]
* Note that our official target is the ability to wage war on two and a half fronts by 2027. Thats barely 15 years away (or in MoD terms just one acquisition decision cycle away
)
* We still need some cheap to acquire and operate fighters in quantity for air defense role (committing some MKI/Rafale for this role is a waste of resources). An economical OAS Teja/JF-17/Gripen class aircraft is still needed. IAF must be a little more flexible on the quality in favor of costs.
* AMCA has not really gotten into stride, and it is already quite late. Anyone see a realistic prospect of ARS to IOC in 15 years? People foreseeing a new MMCA acquisition program (ala F-35) a decade hence might not be too far off the map.
* FGFA will come, when it comes. And it wont come soon.
...you would have been an excellent accountant at Enron!
