Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Posted: 16 Feb 2009 14:44
1 The Chinese government uses a Stalinist formula to determine which groups constitute unique minzu, variously translated as "nationalities" or "ethnic groups." Accordingly, to be considered a nationality, a group must have a common language, territory, economic life, and culture. Stalin, J.V. "Marxism and the National Question," in Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages University Publishing House, 1953), 302. More than 400 groups registered as separate nationalities in the 1953 census, with more than 240 requesting recognition in Yunnan Province alone. The government was only able to winnow the number to 55 after awkwardly gerrymandering ethnic boundaries by sending work teams of anthropologists and government officials to the countryside to determine which groups "objectively" constituted unique nationalities. Many groups continue to contest the government's classification system. For details on the classification process, see Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2000); Katherine Palmer Kaup "Regionalism and Ethnicnationalism in the People's Republic of China," 172 China Quarterly, 863–884 (2002); and Fei Xiaotong, Collected Works of Fei Xiaotong [Fei Xiaotong xuanji] (Fuzhou: Haixian Wenyi Chubanshe, 1996), 285.
2 S. Robert Ramsey, The Languages of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 157–292. Many of the minority languages are further divided into mutually unintelligible dialects.
3 The Uighurs, Kyrgiz, Kazahks, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in Xinjiang, for example, all have ethnic counterparts in neighboring countries, as do the Zhuang, Miao, Dai, and Shui in Yunnan and Guangxi.
4 The Chinese government and the other five members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed an agreement on June 2, 2005, to take "specific steps to step up the efficiency of cooperation in ensuring stability and security, including holding joint antiterrorist training exercises, training personnel and exchange of experience in fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism." "Kazakhstan: SCO Officials Express Concern Over Terrorist Levels in Central Asia," Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2 June 05 (FBIS, 2 June 05).
5 Chinese President Hu Jintao noted in May 2005 that the per capita GDP in minority areas is only 67.4 percent of the national average and rural per capita income only 71.4 percent of the national average. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference" [Hu Jintao zai zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 27 May 05. This figure, however, does not indicate the severity of economic discrepancies, as Han Chinese within minority areas typically have higher incomes than the minorities. The government tightly controls statistics on Han-minority economic discrepancies, and published statistics report figures based on regional differences rather than providing breakdowns by ethnic groups. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 149–53. Numerous factors contribute to minority poverty. Minorities are concentrated in harsh geographical terrains on China's periphery and lack the capital needed to extract natural resources in their territories. Poor infrastructure and low educational levels also contribute to their poverty. Government policies have exacerbated discrepancies in wealth between the minorities and Han. See Katherine Palmer, "Nationalities and Nationality Areas," in China Handbook, ed. Chris Hudson (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), 276–85. Several Western analysts report that central development strategies in Xinjiang since the launching of the Great Western Development campaign in 2000 have disproportionately favored Han Chinese. Nicholas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 44 The China Journal 65, 82–3, 85 (2000); Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 39. Uighur human rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer testified that the Great Western Development policies have had a deleterious impact on the Uighurs and resulted in the "bleakest period in Uighur history." Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members Briefing, The Human Rights Situation of the Uighurs in the People's Republic of China, 28 April 05.
6 Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
7 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment, Tibet Information Network (Online), 20 January 05; "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 November 04.
8 A Ningxia government report notes that only 5 percent of the minority populations in Ningxia and the Tibetan Autonomous Region were literate in 1949. By 1998, that figure had risen to 89.5 percent and 48 percent respectively, though these rates remained below the national average. "Implementing the Regional Autonomy System" [Shixing minzu quyu zizhifa zhidu], Ningxia Government Web site.
9 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3, 2004, 40–45. Han-minorities discrepancies in per capita income more than tripled in the first decade of reforms. Yang Zuolin, A General Discussion of Minority Economics [Minzu diqu jingji fazhan tongsu jianghua] (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 1993), 12. Minorities have had difficulty attracting foreign capital given their poor infrastructure, poorly trained labor force, and low levels of trade and private enterprise. 1994 tax revisions further exacerbated discrepancies in wealth.
10 The Tibetan illiteracy rate (47.55 percent), for example, is five times the national average (9.08 percent). Tabulation drawn from 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, August 2002), Table 2–3.
11 "Implementing 'China's Minority Education Regulations' Placed on Agenda," ["Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu tiaoli" de zhiding lierule yishi richeng], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 16 June 05.
12 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01.
13 The relationship between minority areas and the central government is reflected in an official news report, "The Central Party Puts Forth A Strategy for Xinjiang's Development and Stability" [Zhonggong zhongyang zuochu Xinjiang fazhan yu wending zhongda zhanlüe bushu], Xinhua (Online), 18 May 04. The report describes a meeting of the top-ranking government officials in Xinjiang called "to transmit the Central Party's Comprehensive Work Plan Regarding Xinjiang's Economic Development and Social Stability, and to develop plans for implementing it." At the meeting, Wang Lequan, Politburo member and Party General Secretary of Xinjiang, urged "all party and government officials from all levels within the autonomous region to earnestly study and adopt the spirit of the Center's comprehensive plan. We must focus all of our thinking on the spirit of the Center's directive, and, with a strong sense of enthusiasm and duty, quickly develop concrete implementation measures that blend each localities' and departments' concrete circumstances in order to rigorously promote all of these Xinjiang projects." Xinjiang's autonomy rests in how best to implement central directives according to local circumstances. In many cases, this results in policies more restrictive of individual liberties than those promoted by the central government. The report cited here, for example, advocates strengthening the role of the predominately Han, paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in order to promote regional stability.
14 REAL, art. 7.
15 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 19.
16 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 20.
17 The Chinese government has imposed the fewest controls on minorities that accept central authority, which in turn have made these groups more willing to cooperate with Han Chinese. Mutual distrust between Han authorities and several minority groups has led to tighter government controls in some areas, however, exacerbating ethnic tensions according to both Chinese and Western analysts. See, for example, Ma Mingliang, "Muslims and Non-Muslims Can Coexist in Harmony in China, as They Do in Malaysia, If They Understand Each Other's Culture Better," Islam in China, 31 Jul 05 (FBIS, 6 September 05); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.
18 REAL, art. 9. Authorities sentenced four Uighur boys to three and a half years in prison after a schoolhouse brawl in April 2005, on the charge of "undermining the friendship of the nationalities." "Uighur Youths, Teacher Detained After School Brawl, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 05.
19 Minorities in southwestern China live in closer proximity to Han Chinese than do Tibetans and Uighurs, who are separated from predominately Han-populated regions in central China by mountain ranges and deserts. Although many of the minorities in southwestern China live in single-ethnicity villages, often these villages will be interspersed in close proximity to those of other minority groups. Southwestern minorities tend to be segregated by villages rather than by larger administrative areas, whereas distances between communities of different ethnic groups tend to be greater in the Northwest. Many of the southwestern minority groups are also internally divided and have little interest in mobilizing against Han Chinese authority. For further detail see Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 171–81; and Thomas Heberer, "Nationalities Conflict and Ethnicity in the People's Republic of China, With Special Reference to the Yi in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Steven Harrel (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 232–7.
20 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of the REAL, issued 11 May 05, art. 8.
21 Ibid., arts. 30 and 34.
22 Ibid., arts. 31 and 32.
23 Ibid., art. 2.
24 "South-Central Nationalities University Opens Legal Aid Clinic" [Zhongnan minzu daxue chengli falü huanzhu zhongxin], Tianshan Net (Online), 21 March 05; "Suzhou Wujiang City Establishes New Social Services System for Migrant Minority Workers" [Suzhou Wujiang shi chuang xin wailai liudong shaoshu minzu fuwu tizhi], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05; "Jiangsu's Qiansu City Aggressively Expands New Approaches to Help Minority Migrants" [Jiangsu Qiansu shi jiji shensu xinshi xia fuwu "wailai" yu "waichu" shaoshu minzu de youxiao tujin], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05.
25 "Open Letter from the Darhad Mongols," Southern Mongolia Human Rights Watch (Online), March 2005.
26 For example, Articles 15, 17, 18, and 22 of the State Council Regulations for the Implementation of the REAL require autonomous regions to give priority to border regions and minorities with small populations when making investment decisions. Bilingual education must be promoted, and autonomous governments are required to "guide and organize" local populations to seek jobs outside of their localities. Although the central government often encroaches on the autonomous governments' authority to determine their development strategies independently, the REAL in theory gave the autonomous regions the authority to control these policy decisions which are now determined by the central government.
27 The Party monitors and imposes strict controls on how minority cultures are represented in popular, official, and scholarly discourse. Controls over minority representation have been imposed on all minority groups, not simply on those who have strained relations with Han Chinese and the predominately Han government. For example, though authorities regularly arrest Uighurs who display overt signs of ethnic pride, government authorities in Guangxi have criticized Zhuang authors who display too little ethnic pride. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 118–9.
28 Article 7 of the REAL requires autonomous governments to "place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else."
29 The Constitution provides for the establishment of provincial-level autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties. The government began creating autonomous townships and villages in 1993 with the State Council's passage of the Regulation on the Administrative Work on Ethnic Villages [Minzu xiang xingzheng gongzuo tiaoli], issued 29 August 93.By 2003 the government had established five provincial-level autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, and 1,173 autonomous villages. The government decided which areas would be granted autonomous status "through consultation between the government of the next higher level and the representatives of the minority or minorities concerned." General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minorities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi shishi gangyao], issued 8 August 52, art. 9.Some members of the larger minority groups express concerns privately that the regional autonomy policy disproportionately favors smaller groups. Commission Staff Interviews. Many Uighurs and Zhuang note that within the provincial-level Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, several minority groups have their own autonomous prefectures or counties. Once established, these smaller autonomous areas are eligible for special development assistance funds that the central and provincial governments earmark for county-level autonomous governments. The Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang contains one-quarter of Xinjiang's total land. Although only 4.46 percent of the Bayinguoleng population is Mongol and 34.25 percent is Uighur, the Chinese Constitution and the REAL require that the head of the prefectural government be Mongol. In another example, a portion of Guangxi's poverty alleviation funds is earmarked for minority counties, which means that Bama Yao Autonomous County (17.24 percent Yao and 69.46 percent Zhuang) is eligible for certain development assistance programs not available to nearby Jingxi County, which does not have autonomous standing despite the fact that over 99 percent of its population is ethnically Zhuang. Article 16 of the Election Law also allows minorities with small populations a greater number of People's Congress delegates. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04. Some Western experts believe the government consciously pitted minorities against one another when establishing regional autonomous areas in order to weaken their ability to confront the state. Gardner Bovingdon, "Heteronomy and Its Discontents 'Minzu Regional Autonomy' in Xinjiang," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington, 2004), 117–154; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 86. Since 2000, the central government has explicitly stated that nationality development work will place a priority on the 22 smallest minority populations. Tang Ren, "Ethnic Minorities Need Help: Government Pledges Another Round of Poverty Alleviation Reforms to Save the Country's 22 Small Ethnic Groups," Beijing Review (Online), 26 July 05. The May 2005 REAL Implementing Regulations require provincial-level governments to give priority to smaller minorities in their economic development and investment plans.
30 Non-autonomous governments may also pass local legislation on issues not addressed by national law, but the autonomous areas have the power to pass local legislation expounding upon, or altering, national laws to suit minority customs.
31 PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 66.
32 Xinjiang has gone through eight drafts of its self-governing regulation since 1981. The Xinjiang People's Congress announced in January 2005 that it would restart the drafting process after the passage of the REAL Implementing Regulations, noting that "many issues [in the self-governing regulation] require reaching a compromise between national and local interests so the process has been slow." "Ten Issues Handled" [Shi jian yianjian jiande dao chuli], Xinjiang Capital Daily (Online), 20 January 05.
33 Article 19 of the REAL states that the self-governing regulations of autonomous regions must be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval before they go into effect. Self-governing regulations of autonomous prefectures and counties must receive the approval of the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses at the provincial or directly administered municipal level before becoming effective and then be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
34 Governments in many autonomous areas have been revising their self-governing regulations over the last few years. Yunnan Province announced in October 2004 that all 29 of its autonomous counties and 8 autonomous prefectures would revise their self-governing regulations. "Yunnan Province Comprehensively Pushes Revisions of Autonomous Prefectures and Counties Self-Governing Regulations," State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 12 April 05.
35 These alterations predominately deal with marriage, inheritance, elections, and grasslands legislation according to the State Council Information Office White Paper. "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities," State Council Information Office Web Site, 28 February 05; Cheng Jian, "Autonomous Statutes and Thoughts on Their Legislation in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region" [Lun danxing tiaoli: Neimenggu zizhiqu danzing tiaolifa xiancun wenti tanqi], Journal of Inner Mongolia University Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 6, November 2002, 49–52; Chao Li, "Thoughts on Autonomous Areas' Autonomous Legislative Powers" [Dui minzu zizhi difang zizhi jiguan lifa quan de sikao], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 23, No. 7, July 2002, 137–141; Ma Linlin, "Construction of Our Nation's Minority Economics Law" [Woguo shaoshu minzu diqu minzu jingji de fazhi jianshe], Academic Forum, No. 7, 2004, 57–9.
36 Chen Wenxing, Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances: On the Promotion of Yunnan's Autonomous Areas' Legislation" [Lifa gongzuo bixu shishi huiying qingshi bianqian: lun yunnan minzu sizhidifang lifa de tuijin"], Academic Exploration, No. 12, December 2004, 60–3; Li Baoqi, "On the Theory and Practice of the Financial Transfer Payment System in National Autonomous Areas" [Caizheng zhuanyi zhifu zhidu zai minzu zizhi difang de lilun yu shixian], Journal of Yanbian University, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2004, 51.
37 Zeng Xianyi, "The Legislative Base of the Autonomous Government Regulations" [Lun zizhi tiaoli de lifa jichu], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities—Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2004, 7. Chinese scholars regularly call for autonomous governments to exercise their right to formulate meaningful self-governing regulations, though these discussions do not appear in the popular press.
38 Zhou Li, et al, "Autonomous Legislation in the Course of Modernization" [Xiandai huajin chengzhong de zizhi lifa], Yunnan University Journal- Legal Studies Edition, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, 88; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law" [Lun minzu jingjifashiyong], Journal of the Guangxi Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2005, 18; Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms" [Yunnan falü rencai peiyang yu faxue jiaoyu gaige qianxi], Seeking Truth, Vol. 6, 2003, 58.
39 Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms," 57; Chen Wenxing, "Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances,"60–3; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
40 Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
41 Article 32 of the Inheritance Law mandates that the property of a deceased person with no survivors reverts to the state. PRC Inheritance Law, enacted 10 April 85. The customary practice of many Islamic groups, however, requires that such property be donated to the local mosque. No alterations or supplements to the National Inheritance Law have yet been passed. Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 19.
42 6.9 percent of government workers are minorities though minorities account for almost 9percent of China's total population. Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education" [Woguo minzu ganbu jiaoyu cunzai de zhuyaowenti ji lilun fenxi], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2004, 17; Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding The Current Situation Of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent" [Guanyu shaoshu minzu diqu ganbu rencai duiwu xianzhuang de diaocha yu sikao], Progressive Forum, March 2004, 24–5; Yang Guocai, "Building a Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Is the Crux to Developing Minority Nationality Areas" [Shaoshu minzu ganbu duiwu jianshe shi minzu diqu fazhan de guanjian], Yunnan Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2004, 84–6. The proportion of technically trained minorities placed in high- or mid-level positions is 19 and 45 percentage points below the Han average according to Na Canhui, "In- Depth Analysis of Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadres' Training" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyu jizhi shenxi], South-Central Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 24, April 2004, 183–4. The absolute number of technically trained minorities has increased substantially. One Chinese scholar reports that the number rose from 238,000 in 1979to over 1.7 million in 2002. Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyang he xuanbo shiyongde zhengce guiding he chenggong jingyan], Tianshui Government Administration Academy, Vol. 2, 2002, 18.
43 Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use," 15–8. In July 2002, the State Council approved the joint appointment of State Ethnic Affairs Commission officials to 20 government ministries and bureaus. Though these officials are not necessarily ethnic minorities, the majority of SEAC cadres are. The decision also helps assure that minority issues will be raised in each of these government offices. "State Ethnic Affairs Commissioners Joint Appointment to Other Commissions and Their Responsibilities" [Guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui bingzhi weiyuan danwei ji zhize], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 8 February 05.
44 Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education," 171–3. Government investment in education in Xinjiang in 2000 was only 45.45 percent of the national average, according to Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuangji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 74–7. The same article notes that although a higher percentage of people in Xinjiang have college degrees than the national average, the percentage of people receiving high school and middle school degrees is only 58.43 and 38.15 percent of the national average respectively.
45 Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding the Current Situation of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent," 24–5. Wang Xiubo also notes that many autonomous governments are having difficulty recruiting government employees under the age of 35. The State Council Implementation Decision calls for "vigorous training" of younger minority cadres to ensure that a corps of minorities is being trained to assume mid- and upper-level positions in the years ahead.
46 In the 10th People's Congress, for example, 13.91 percent of the deputies were minorities, well above the 8.9 percent they represent of the total population. State Council White Paper on Regional Autonomy, issued 28 February 05. The Election Law also allows ethnic groups not residing in autonomous areas to hold separate elections for congressional delegates "based on the local circumstances," though how these should be carried out remains unclear. Article 9 of the Election Law says that the State Council may allow autonomous people's congresses 5 percent more seats than they would normally be allowed on the basis of their population size. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses.
47 "Number of CPC Members Reaches 69.6 Million," China Daily, 24 May 05 (FBIS, 24 May 05). Because the party represents the interests of the entire nation without bias, it would be "unscientific" to require specific minority representation within the party ranks, according to the official party position. Guo Zhengli, The Theory and Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics [Zhongguo tese de minzu quyu sishi lilun yu shijian] (Urumqi: Xinjiang University Press, 1992), 92.
48 Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 178 China Quarterly 358, 363 (2004).
49 In a widely studied speech in May 2005, Hu Jintao stressed the need to increase party control over nationality work. He highlighted the need to "increase the contingent of nationality work cadres" while avoiding any mention of increasing the number of ethnic minority Party members. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
50 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion [Guanyu tuoshan jiejue gongchan dangyuan xinyang zongjiao wenti de tongzhi], issued20 March 93; Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism" [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa "guanyuwoguo shehuizhuyi shiqi he jiben zhengce de tongzhi"], issued March 1982. Religion is a central marker of ethnic identity for many in China, including the Tibetans and the country's ten Muslim minorities.
51 The Chinese government distinguishes between those from "the interior, advanced regions" and those from the "borderland, autonomous areas."
52 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy" [Yuan zang, yuanjiang zhibianganbu], State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
53 Louisa Lim, "Uighurs Lost Out in Development," BBC (Online), 19 December 03.
54 The Xinjiang Propaganda Department praised a local technical college for placing 60 minority graduates in the coastal city of Shenzhen. The school plans to send another 180 by year's end. "60 Xinjiang Minority Technical School Graduates Take Jobs in Shenzhen" [Xinjiang 60 ming shaoshu minzu zhongzhuansheng Shenzhen jiuye], Tianshan Net (Online), 14 April 05.
55 State Council Regulation on the Implementation of the REAL, art. 18.
56 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy," State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
57 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3,2004, 40–45.
58 Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 163–189; Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 362; David Bachman, "Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of Chinese Governance in China's Northwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165–168.
59 Uighurs also regularly report that they are discriminated against in the broader job market, with offices publicly posting help wanted signs stipulating "Uighurs need not apply." "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5)," Radio Free Asia. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman state that "members of the Han majority appear to advance more rapidly than similarly qualified Uighurs, while even in Kashgar many specialized occupations are reserved for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and other Han-dominated work units." Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 325. Economist Calla Weimer demonstrates statistically that Uighurs have less earning power than Han living in the same area. Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," 188.
60 REAL, art. 20.
61 Ibid., arts. 27 and 65; PRC Constitution, art. 9.
62 "Complaint Against the Chinese Government's Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders," Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online); Hong Jiang, Fences, Ecologies, and Changes in Pastoral Life: Society and Reclamation in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia, China, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Chicago, IL, 3 April 05; Enhebatu Togochog, Ecological Immigration and Human Rights in Inner Mongolia, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, 3 April 05.
63 Stanley Toops, "The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on Water," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004),271; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 84.
64 State Council Regulation on Implementation of the REAL, arts. 30 and 32. Article 8 requires the central government to compensate autonomous governments who have suffered financially after implementing ecological development projects. Many of the central government's largest ecological protection programs are in minority regions, which must share the financial burden of implementing the center's plans. The "three returns" plan of 2000 (returning farmland to forest, farmland to grasslands, and pasturelands to fallow) cost each of the affected banners in Inner Mongolia an average of 200,000 yuan annually, for example. Zhuang Wanlü , "Discussion of Minority Areas' Various Types of Poverty: The Problem of Local Government Financial Resources Poverty" [Lun minzu diqu de linglei pinkun—difang zhengfu caizheng pinkun wenti], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 24 No. 6, June 2003, 23.
65 REAL, art. 36. Minority governments have established a number of special schools to increase literacy among adult minorities. In these short courses, local education departments within the autonomous areas tailor textbooks to student needs. Some courses use local minority scripts to teach farming techniques and personal hygiene, for example. The government carefully monitors the depiction of minority history in all fields of publication, however, including textbooks. All textbooks must reflect official historiography showing "family ties and deep affection among the nationalities" and "common struggle towards prosperity of all the minorities within a multinational unitary state." Teachers are not allowed to include course segments on a particular minority group's distinct history. Commission Staff Interview.
66 "Education for Ethnic Minorities," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
67 Minorities Statistical Yearbook 2000 [Minzu tongji nianjian 2000], Ethnic Publishing House Web site. The percentage of minorities in the total student population in secondary technical schools rose for that same period from 0.4 percent to 6.6 percent, in teaching institutes from 2.1 percent to 10.7 percent, in middle schools from 2.6 percent to 6.8 percent, and primary schools from 2.2 percent to 9 percent.
68 More than 10,000 attended similar classes in preparation for secondary school. "Education for Ethnic Minorities II," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
69 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals," Seeking Truth, 16 January 05, No. 2, (FBIS, 1 February05).
70 Commission Staff Interview.
71 Steven Harrell and Ma Erzi (Mgebbu Lunze), "Folk Theories of Success Where Han Aren't Always Best," in China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development, ed. Gerard A. Postiglione (New York: Falmer Press, 1999), 220–1.
72 These are terms the government uses to deride those it believes promote the interests of their own ethnic group over the interests of the state as a whole or who favor the creation of a separate state for their minority group.
73 Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism."
74 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion.
74 Hu Jintao stressed the importance of "conducting nationality solidarity propaganda and education campaigns on an extensive scale" in his May address to the National Conference on Ethnic Minority Work, while Xinjiang's Party secretary announced that the region would "vigorously step up propaganda to reveal that the fallacies spread by national separatists are outrageous lies." Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological
75 Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals." On June 29, 2005, the central State Ethnic Affairs Commission met with more than 20 media organizations, including the Party's main theoretical journal and the national People's Daily, to discuss increasing propaganda work. "State Ethnic Affairs Commission Holds Meeting with Media Representatives"[Guojia minwei juban xinwen meiti zuotanhui], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 28 June 05.
76 "The Teahorse Road" [Chama gudao], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, May 2005.
77 One scholar argues that the Party in essence "created" certain ethnic groups through careful manipulation of ethnic cultural markers, widespread Party propaganda about the groups' histories and cultures, and banning of unofficial critiques of minorities' cultures. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang.
78 Michael Dillon, "Uyghur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang," Diplomatic Observer (Online), 14 August 02.
79 Members of some minority groups report that they are pleased to highlight their ethnic heritage in these and other state-sponsored forums. Numerous Zhuang scholars, peasants, and government workers, for example, participated with enthusiasm in the construction of a "Zhuang Village" display near the capital of Yunnan in 2001. Commission Staff Interviews.
80 The White Paper notes that over 50 million copies of 4,800 separate book titles have been published in minority languages, and more than 200 magazines and 88 newspapers.
81 The Paper notes, for example, that it was the central authorities who "organized" 3,000 experts and scholars to compile a five-part series of books on each of China's ethnic minorities. The White Paper also reports that "the state has set up institutions to collect, assort, translate and study in an organized and programmed manner the three major heroic epics of China's ethnic minorities."
82 REAL, art.10.
83 Minglang Zhou, Multilingualism in China: The Politics of Writing Reforms for Minority Languages 1949–2002 (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). Not all of the minorities had unified written scripts when the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Practical challenges, such as determining which dialect should form the foundation for new phonetic scripts, limited many minorities' ability to utilize their own scripts rather than any concerted efforts by the central government to limit their use.
84 Select universities in the TAR, Inner Mongolia, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture offer coursework in minority languages, though generally minority language use is limited to primary and middle schools. In many areas, minority languages are used only in the lower levels of primary school until students master Chinese and are able to take all of their classes in Mandarin.
85 The REAL Implementing Regulations instruct autonomous areas to promote "bilingual teaching." Whereas Article 37 of the REAL previously only stipulated that "Han language and literature courses" should be offered in the senior grades of primary school or secondary school, the new Regulations encourage the use of Mandarin with minority languages in all courses. Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer reports that the Uighur language has been banned in schools throughout Xinjiang. Commission Staff Interview, 22 August 05.
86 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 69.
87 Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu menggu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], enacted 26 November 04.
88 Ibid. Article 18, for example, increases the number of translators in each government office and assures that they receive the same rank and compensation as others in their office. Article 14 states that offices and businesses should give priority in hiring to students who received their education in Mongol technical schools.
89 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," 62.
90 A survey conducted in Xinjiang in 2003 revealed that over 67 percent of those interviewed felt strong Mandarin language skills were the most important qualification for hiring minorities. Wang Jianjun, "Develop Social Surveys, Train Qualified Talent" [Kaizhan shehui diaocha peiyang shiyingxing hege rencai], Advanced Scientific Education, No. 6, 2003, 64–7. "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia.
91 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment in the TAR, Tibet Information Network. For detailed analysis, see Section VI—Tibet.
92 Moreover, these new cadres would not be allowed to serve in their own hometowns, despite a 1993 central government decision specifically exempting minorities from a national ban on local officials being placed in their home locales. "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang" [ Xinjiang jiang mianxiang shehui zhaokao700 ming gongwuyuan chongshi nanjiang ganbu duiwu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 7 April 05; Temporary Regulations on Public Officials [Guojia gongwuyuan zhanxing tiaoli], issued 19 August 93; Wang Lequan, "Those Who Master Minority Language Will Be Exempted From Civil Service Examination," [Wang Lequan: zhangwo minyu baokaogongwuyuan ke mianshi], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 25 July 05.
93 "To Establish Scientific Development Views: Xinjiang Urgently Needs to Address the Challenge of Its Talent Loss" [Luoshi kexue fazhanguan Xinjiang jidei huajie rencai liushi kunju],Workers' Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net, 1 May 05. The government has created some special programs to encourage minorities with doctoral degrees to conduct their research in autonomous areas. The government has set aside a million yuan each year since 2000, for example, to fund research projects by minority scholars. The applicant pool for these funds is a group of 516 minority scholars sent for one to two years of advanced scientific training outside of Xinjiang between 1992 and 2001. "The Clear Success Over the Last Five Years of The Scientific Research Program for Those in Xinjiang's Special Training Plan for Minority Technical Talent" [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu keji rencai teshu peiyang jihua keyan xiangmu shishi 5 nianlai chengxiaoxianzhu], Hami Information Outlet Web site, 12 June 05.
94 Official press coverage stressed that the flow of new workers would lead to "mutual prosperity" for both Xinjiang and Gansu. "Jointly Prosper: 4,000 Gansu Households Begin Work in Xinjiang's Construction and Production Corps," Gansu Daily, 21 April 05, reprinted on TianshanNet, 22 April 05.
95 Xinjiang is home to 8.2 million Uighurs, who are largely Sunni Muslims of Turkic descent. Several other minorities live in the region, including Tajiks, Kazahks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Xinjiang supplies over 35 percent of China's oil and gas, and borders eight countries.
96 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005; Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
97 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism" [Jiaqiang he gaijin fandui minzu fenliezhuyi douzhengzhong de sixiang zhengshi gongzuo], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 22–4.
98 Commission Staff Interview. "Press Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" [Zizhiqu chengli 50 zhounian xinwen fabuhuizhaokai], Tianshan Net (Online), 25 August 05.
99 "In the Midst of Glory and Hope: Key Points in Propaganda for Xinjiang 50th Anniversary"[Xinjiang zai huihuan yu xiwang zhong fengyongqianjin: qingzhu Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu chengli 50 nianzhou xuanchuan jiaoyu yaodian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 05; "AFP: Xinjiang Ribao Carries 'Editorial' Against Separatism as Uzbek President To Visit," Agence France-Presse, 25 May 05 (FBIS, 25 May 05).
100 "Xinjiang Has Become the Main Battlefield For China's Antiterrorism Struggle," China Youth Daily, 6 September 05 (FBIS, 7 September 05).
101 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang; Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
102 "Police Patrolmen in China's Xinjiang Capital Get Sub-Machine-Guns," Urumqi News, 1 March 05 (FBIS, 1 March 05).
103 Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-so-Silent Majority: Uighur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," 28 Modern China 39, 39–78 (2002). For similar findings, see Jay Todd Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China's Western Frontier," in China Beyond the Headlines, eds. T.B. Weston and L.M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),273–295; Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Joanne Smith, "Four Generations of Uighurs: The Shift towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among Xinjiang's Youth," Vol. 2, No. 2 Inner Asia 195, 195–224 (2000).
104 Michael Dillon, "Uighur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang."
105 China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
106 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
107 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 23.
108 Linguist Arienne Dwyer dates the beginning of a policy of forced linguistic assimilation to the mid-1980s. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.
109 "China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools," Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 04. Xinjiang residents previously had the choice of attending minority schools, in which classes were conducted in minority languages, or Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used. Graduates with Mandarin Chinese language skills are more competitive in the job market, and some Uighurs may welcome the opportunity to study the language. The government is demanding a rapid transition to bilingual schools, however, and is placing higher emphasis on Mandarin language use than on local minority language use. Uighurs in exile report that the government has banned Uighur language use in schools and that Uighurs fear "cultural annihilation" through the weakening of their language. Commission Staff Interview with Rebiya Kadeer, 22 August 05.
110 Teacher-student ratios in Xinjiang's colleges are 1:333 compared to the national average of 1:144, according to an article in the party's main theoretical journal. While more than 800new teachers are needed to bring Xinjiang's teacher-student ratio in line with the national average, Xinjiang actually lost more than 530 higher education teachers between 2001–2004. Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuag ji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No.2, 2004, 74–7.
111 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, 40.
112 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education" [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jianding luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted on Xinhua (Online), 26 April 05.
113 "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang," Xinjiang Daily.
114 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
115 "How to Handle the Issue of Religion Interfering in Education in Minority Areas with a Majority of Religious Believers" [Zai yixie duoshuren xinjiao de minzu diqu, rehe chuli zongjiao ganyu xuexiao jiaoyu wenti], State Minorities Bookstore Web site.
116 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
117 Zhang Jian, "Speech at the All-County 20th Teachers' Day Award Ceremony" [Zai quanxian qingzhu di ershi ge jiaoshijie ji biaozhang dahuishang de jianghua], Buerjin County (Xinjiang) Communist Party Office Web site, 10 September 04.
118 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
119 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
120 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
121Ibid.
122 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Appendix III.
123 The story tells of a wild pigeon who commits suicide rather than submit to being caged by humans who feed him well, but deny him his freedom. "RFA Publishes First English Translation of Noted Uighur Story," Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 June 05.
124 Tohti Tunyaz's doctoral advisor in Japan denies any such publications exist. Tunyaz was arrested for obtaining state secrets, which according to the sentencing record were publicly available library materials he obtained from a state- employed librarian at Xinjiang University. "Honorary Members: Tohti Tunyaz," Pen American Center Web site.
125 The charges included "inciting to split China, organizing meetings, taking oaths, accepting membership and possessing illegal publications and counterrevolutionary videos for propaganda purposes." "Bingtuan Supreme Court Affirms Jail Terms for Uighur Youths," Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 December 03.
126 The names of the other defendants have not been disclosed. Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 49.
127 Ibid., 6.
2 S. Robert Ramsey, The Languages of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 157–292. Many of the minority languages are further divided into mutually unintelligible dialects.
3 The Uighurs, Kyrgiz, Kazahks, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in Xinjiang, for example, all have ethnic counterparts in neighboring countries, as do the Zhuang, Miao, Dai, and Shui in Yunnan and Guangxi.
4 The Chinese government and the other five members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed an agreement on June 2, 2005, to take "specific steps to step up the efficiency of cooperation in ensuring stability and security, including holding joint antiterrorist training exercises, training personnel and exchange of experience in fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism." "Kazakhstan: SCO Officials Express Concern Over Terrorist Levels in Central Asia," Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2 June 05 (FBIS, 2 June 05).
5 Chinese President Hu Jintao noted in May 2005 that the per capita GDP in minority areas is only 67.4 percent of the national average and rural per capita income only 71.4 percent of the national average. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference" [Hu Jintao zai zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 27 May 05. This figure, however, does not indicate the severity of economic discrepancies, as Han Chinese within minority areas typically have higher incomes than the minorities. The government tightly controls statistics on Han-minority economic discrepancies, and published statistics report figures based on regional differences rather than providing breakdowns by ethnic groups. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 149–53. Numerous factors contribute to minority poverty. Minorities are concentrated in harsh geographical terrains on China's periphery and lack the capital needed to extract natural resources in their territories. Poor infrastructure and low educational levels also contribute to their poverty. Government policies have exacerbated discrepancies in wealth between the minorities and Han. See Katherine Palmer, "Nationalities and Nationality Areas," in China Handbook, ed. Chris Hudson (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), 276–85. Several Western analysts report that central development strategies in Xinjiang since the launching of the Great Western Development campaign in 2000 have disproportionately favored Han Chinese. Nicholas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 44 The China Journal 65, 82–3, 85 (2000); Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 39. Uighur human rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer testified that the Great Western Development policies have had a deleterious impact on the Uighurs and resulted in the "bleakest period in Uighur history." Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members Briefing, The Human Rights Situation of the Uighurs in the People's Republic of China, 28 April 05.
6 Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
7 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment, Tibet Information Network (Online), 20 January 05; "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 November 04.
8 A Ningxia government report notes that only 5 percent of the minority populations in Ningxia and the Tibetan Autonomous Region were literate in 1949. By 1998, that figure had risen to 89.5 percent and 48 percent respectively, though these rates remained below the national average. "Implementing the Regional Autonomy System" [Shixing minzu quyu zizhifa zhidu], Ningxia Government Web site.
9 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3, 2004, 40–45. Han-minorities discrepancies in per capita income more than tripled in the first decade of reforms. Yang Zuolin, A General Discussion of Minority Economics [Minzu diqu jingji fazhan tongsu jianghua] (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 1993), 12. Minorities have had difficulty attracting foreign capital given their poor infrastructure, poorly trained labor force, and low levels of trade and private enterprise. 1994 tax revisions further exacerbated discrepancies in wealth.
10 The Tibetan illiteracy rate (47.55 percent), for example, is five times the national average (9.08 percent). Tabulation drawn from 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, August 2002), Table 2–3.
11 "Implementing 'China's Minority Education Regulations' Placed on Agenda," ["Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu tiaoli" de zhiding lierule yishi richeng], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 16 June 05.
12 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01.
13 The relationship between minority areas and the central government is reflected in an official news report, "The Central Party Puts Forth A Strategy for Xinjiang's Development and Stability" [Zhonggong zhongyang zuochu Xinjiang fazhan yu wending zhongda zhanlüe bushu], Xinhua (Online), 18 May 04. The report describes a meeting of the top-ranking government officials in Xinjiang called "to transmit the Central Party's Comprehensive Work Plan Regarding Xinjiang's Economic Development and Social Stability, and to develop plans for implementing it." At the meeting, Wang Lequan, Politburo member and Party General Secretary of Xinjiang, urged "all party and government officials from all levels within the autonomous region to earnestly study and adopt the spirit of the Center's comprehensive plan. We must focus all of our thinking on the spirit of the Center's directive, and, with a strong sense of enthusiasm and duty, quickly develop concrete implementation measures that blend each localities' and departments' concrete circumstances in order to rigorously promote all of these Xinjiang projects." Xinjiang's autonomy rests in how best to implement central directives according to local circumstances. In many cases, this results in policies more restrictive of individual liberties than those promoted by the central government. The report cited here, for example, advocates strengthening the role of the predominately Han, paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in order to promote regional stability.
14 REAL, art. 7.
15 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 19.
16 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 20.
17 The Chinese government has imposed the fewest controls on minorities that accept central authority, which in turn have made these groups more willing to cooperate with Han Chinese. Mutual distrust between Han authorities and several minority groups has led to tighter government controls in some areas, however, exacerbating ethnic tensions according to both Chinese and Western analysts. See, for example, Ma Mingliang, "Muslims and Non-Muslims Can Coexist in Harmony in China, as They Do in Malaysia, If They Understand Each Other's Culture Better," Islam in China, 31 Jul 05 (FBIS, 6 September 05); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.
18 REAL, art. 9. Authorities sentenced four Uighur boys to three and a half years in prison after a schoolhouse brawl in April 2005, on the charge of "undermining the friendship of the nationalities." "Uighur Youths, Teacher Detained After School Brawl, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 05.
19 Minorities in southwestern China live in closer proximity to Han Chinese than do Tibetans and Uighurs, who are separated from predominately Han-populated regions in central China by mountain ranges and deserts. Although many of the minorities in southwestern China live in single-ethnicity villages, often these villages will be interspersed in close proximity to those of other minority groups. Southwestern minorities tend to be segregated by villages rather than by larger administrative areas, whereas distances between communities of different ethnic groups tend to be greater in the Northwest. Many of the southwestern minority groups are also internally divided and have little interest in mobilizing against Han Chinese authority. For further detail see Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 171–81; and Thomas Heberer, "Nationalities Conflict and Ethnicity in the People's Republic of China, With Special Reference to the Yi in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Steven Harrel (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 232–7.
20 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of the REAL, issued 11 May 05, art. 8.
21 Ibid., arts. 30 and 34.
22 Ibid., arts. 31 and 32.
23 Ibid., art. 2.
24 "South-Central Nationalities University Opens Legal Aid Clinic" [Zhongnan minzu daxue chengli falü huanzhu zhongxin], Tianshan Net (Online), 21 March 05; "Suzhou Wujiang City Establishes New Social Services System for Migrant Minority Workers" [Suzhou Wujiang shi chuang xin wailai liudong shaoshu minzu fuwu tizhi], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05; "Jiangsu's Qiansu City Aggressively Expands New Approaches to Help Minority Migrants" [Jiangsu Qiansu shi jiji shensu xinshi xia fuwu "wailai" yu "waichu" shaoshu minzu de youxiao tujin], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05.
25 "Open Letter from the Darhad Mongols," Southern Mongolia Human Rights Watch (Online), March 2005.
26 For example, Articles 15, 17, 18, and 22 of the State Council Regulations for the Implementation of the REAL require autonomous regions to give priority to border regions and minorities with small populations when making investment decisions. Bilingual education must be promoted, and autonomous governments are required to "guide and organize" local populations to seek jobs outside of their localities. Although the central government often encroaches on the autonomous governments' authority to determine their development strategies independently, the REAL in theory gave the autonomous regions the authority to control these policy decisions which are now determined by the central government.
27 The Party monitors and imposes strict controls on how minority cultures are represented in popular, official, and scholarly discourse. Controls over minority representation have been imposed on all minority groups, not simply on those who have strained relations with Han Chinese and the predominately Han government. For example, though authorities regularly arrest Uighurs who display overt signs of ethnic pride, government authorities in Guangxi have criticized Zhuang authors who display too little ethnic pride. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 118–9.
28 Article 7 of the REAL requires autonomous governments to "place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else."
29 The Constitution provides for the establishment of provincial-level autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties. The government began creating autonomous townships and villages in 1993 with the State Council's passage of the Regulation on the Administrative Work on Ethnic Villages [Minzu xiang xingzheng gongzuo tiaoli], issued 29 August 93.By 2003 the government had established five provincial-level autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, and 1,173 autonomous villages. The government decided which areas would be granted autonomous status "through consultation between the government of the next higher level and the representatives of the minority or minorities concerned." General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minorities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi shishi gangyao], issued 8 August 52, art. 9.Some members of the larger minority groups express concerns privately that the regional autonomy policy disproportionately favors smaller groups. Commission Staff Interviews. Many Uighurs and Zhuang note that within the provincial-level Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, several minority groups have their own autonomous prefectures or counties. Once established, these smaller autonomous areas are eligible for special development assistance funds that the central and provincial governments earmark for county-level autonomous governments. The Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang contains one-quarter of Xinjiang's total land. Although only 4.46 percent of the Bayinguoleng population is Mongol and 34.25 percent is Uighur, the Chinese Constitution and the REAL require that the head of the prefectural government be Mongol. In another example, a portion of Guangxi's poverty alleviation funds is earmarked for minority counties, which means that Bama Yao Autonomous County (17.24 percent Yao and 69.46 percent Zhuang) is eligible for certain development assistance programs not available to nearby Jingxi County, which does not have autonomous standing despite the fact that over 99 percent of its population is ethnically Zhuang. Article 16 of the Election Law also allows minorities with small populations a greater number of People's Congress delegates. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04. Some Western experts believe the government consciously pitted minorities against one another when establishing regional autonomous areas in order to weaken their ability to confront the state. Gardner Bovingdon, "Heteronomy and Its Discontents 'Minzu Regional Autonomy' in Xinjiang," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington, 2004), 117–154; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 86. Since 2000, the central government has explicitly stated that nationality development work will place a priority on the 22 smallest minority populations. Tang Ren, "Ethnic Minorities Need Help: Government Pledges Another Round of Poverty Alleviation Reforms to Save the Country's 22 Small Ethnic Groups," Beijing Review (Online), 26 July 05. The May 2005 REAL Implementing Regulations require provincial-level governments to give priority to smaller minorities in their economic development and investment plans.
30 Non-autonomous governments may also pass local legislation on issues not addressed by national law, but the autonomous areas have the power to pass local legislation expounding upon, or altering, national laws to suit minority customs.
31 PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 66.
32 Xinjiang has gone through eight drafts of its self-governing regulation since 1981. The Xinjiang People's Congress announced in January 2005 that it would restart the drafting process after the passage of the REAL Implementing Regulations, noting that "many issues [in the self-governing regulation] require reaching a compromise between national and local interests so the process has been slow." "Ten Issues Handled" [Shi jian yianjian jiande dao chuli], Xinjiang Capital Daily (Online), 20 January 05.
33 Article 19 of the REAL states that the self-governing regulations of autonomous regions must be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval before they go into effect. Self-governing regulations of autonomous prefectures and counties must receive the approval of the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses at the provincial or directly administered municipal level before becoming effective and then be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
34 Governments in many autonomous areas have been revising their self-governing regulations over the last few years. Yunnan Province announced in October 2004 that all 29 of its autonomous counties and 8 autonomous prefectures would revise their self-governing regulations. "Yunnan Province Comprehensively Pushes Revisions of Autonomous Prefectures and Counties Self-Governing Regulations," State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 12 April 05.
35 These alterations predominately deal with marriage, inheritance, elections, and grasslands legislation according to the State Council Information Office White Paper. "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities," State Council Information Office Web Site, 28 February 05; Cheng Jian, "Autonomous Statutes and Thoughts on Their Legislation in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region" [Lun danxing tiaoli: Neimenggu zizhiqu danzing tiaolifa xiancun wenti tanqi], Journal of Inner Mongolia University Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 6, November 2002, 49–52; Chao Li, "Thoughts on Autonomous Areas' Autonomous Legislative Powers" [Dui minzu zizhi difang zizhi jiguan lifa quan de sikao], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 23, No. 7, July 2002, 137–141; Ma Linlin, "Construction of Our Nation's Minority Economics Law" [Woguo shaoshu minzu diqu minzu jingji de fazhi jianshe], Academic Forum, No. 7, 2004, 57–9.
36 Chen Wenxing, Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances: On the Promotion of Yunnan's Autonomous Areas' Legislation" [Lifa gongzuo bixu shishi huiying qingshi bianqian: lun yunnan minzu sizhidifang lifa de tuijin"], Academic Exploration, No. 12, December 2004, 60–3; Li Baoqi, "On the Theory and Practice of the Financial Transfer Payment System in National Autonomous Areas" [Caizheng zhuanyi zhifu zhidu zai minzu zizhi difang de lilun yu shixian], Journal of Yanbian University, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2004, 51.
37 Zeng Xianyi, "The Legislative Base of the Autonomous Government Regulations" [Lun zizhi tiaoli de lifa jichu], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities—Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2004, 7. Chinese scholars regularly call for autonomous governments to exercise their right to formulate meaningful self-governing regulations, though these discussions do not appear in the popular press.
38 Zhou Li, et al, "Autonomous Legislation in the Course of Modernization" [Xiandai huajin chengzhong de zizhi lifa], Yunnan University Journal- Legal Studies Edition, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, 88; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law" [Lun minzu jingjifashiyong], Journal of the Guangxi Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2005, 18; Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms" [Yunnan falü rencai peiyang yu faxue jiaoyu gaige qianxi], Seeking Truth, Vol. 6, 2003, 58.
39 Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms," 57; Chen Wenxing, "Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances,"60–3; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
40 Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
41 Article 32 of the Inheritance Law mandates that the property of a deceased person with no survivors reverts to the state. PRC Inheritance Law, enacted 10 April 85. The customary practice of many Islamic groups, however, requires that such property be donated to the local mosque. No alterations or supplements to the National Inheritance Law have yet been passed. Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 19.
42 6.9 percent of government workers are minorities though minorities account for almost 9percent of China's total population. Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education" [Woguo minzu ganbu jiaoyu cunzai de zhuyaowenti ji lilun fenxi], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2004, 17; Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding The Current Situation Of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent" [Guanyu shaoshu minzu diqu ganbu rencai duiwu xianzhuang de diaocha yu sikao], Progressive Forum, March 2004, 24–5; Yang Guocai, "Building a Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Is the Crux to Developing Minority Nationality Areas" [Shaoshu minzu ganbu duiwu jianshe shi minzu diqu fazhan de guanjian], Yunnan Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2004, 84–6. The proportion of technically trained minorities placed in high- or mid-level positions is 19 and 45 percentage points below the Han average according to Na Canhui, "In- Depth Analysis of Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadres' Training" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyu jizhi shenxi], South-Central Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 24, April 2004, 183–4. The absolute number of technically trained minorities has increased substantially. One Chinese scholar reports that the number rose from 238,000 in 1979to over 1.7 million in 2002. Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyang he xuanbo shiyongde zhengce guiding he chenggong jingyan], Tianshui Government Administration Academy, Vol. 2, 2002, 18.
43 Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use," 15–8. In July 2002, the State Council approved the joint appointment of State Ethnic Affairs Commission officials to 20 government ministries and bureaus. Though these officials are not necessarily ethnic minorities, the majority of SEAC cadres are. The decision also helps assure that minority issues will be raised in each of these government offices. "State Ethnic Affairs Commissioners Joint Appointment to Other Commissions and Their Responsibilities" [Guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui bingzhi weiyuan danwei ji zhize], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 8 February 05.
44 Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education," 171–3. Government investment in education in Xinjiang in 2000 was only 45.45 percent of the national average, according to Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuangji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 74–7. The same article notes that although a higher percentage of people in Xinjiang have college degrees than the national average, the percentage of people receiving high school and middle school degrees is only 58.43 and 38.15 percent of the national average respectively.
45 Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding the Current Situation of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent," 24–5. Wang Xiubo also notes that many autonomous governments are having difficulty recruiting government employees under the age of 35. The State Council Implementation Decision calls for "vigorous training" of younger minority cadres to ensure that a corps of minorities is being trained to assume mid- and upper-level positions in the years ahead.
46 In the 10th People's Congress, for example, 13.91 percent of the deputies were minorities, well above the 8.9 percent they represent of the total population. State Council White Paper on Regional Autonomy, issued 28 February 05. The Election Law also allows ethnic groups not residing in autonomous areas to hold separate elections for congressional delegates "based on the local circumstances," though how these should be carried out remains unclear. Article 9 of the Election Law says that the State Council may allow autonomous people's congresses 5 percent more seats than they would normally be allowed on the basis of their population size. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses.
47 "Number of CPC Members Reaches 69.6 Million," China Daily, 24 May 05 (FBIS, 24 May 05). Because the party represents the interests of the entire nation without bias, it would be "unscientific" to require specific minority representation within the party ranks, according to the official party position. Guo Zhengli, The Theory and Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics [Zhongguo tese de minzu quyu sishi lilun yu shijian] (Urumqi: Xinjiang University Press, 1992), 92.
48 Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 178 China Quarterly 358, 363 (2004).
49 In a widely studied speech in May 2005, Hu Jintao stressed the need to increase party control over nationality work. He highlighted the need to "increase the contingent of nationality work cadres" while avoiding any mention of increasing the number of ethnic minority Party members. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
50 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion [Guanyu tuoshan jiejue gongchan dangyuan xinyang zongjiao wenti de tongzhi], issued20 March 93; Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism" [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa "guanyuwoguo shehuizhuyi shiqi he jiben zhengce de tongzhi"], issued March 1982. Religion is a central marker of ethnic identity for many in China, including the Tibetans and the country's ten Muslim minorities.
51 The Chinese government distinguishes between those from "the interior, advanced regions" and those from the "borderland, autonomous areas."
52 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy" [Yuan zang, yuanjiang zhibianganbu], State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
53 Louisa Lim, "Uighurs Lost Out in Development," BBC (Online), 19 December 03.
54 The Xinjiang Propaganda Department praised a local technical college for placing 60 minority graduates in the coastal city of Shenzhen. The school plans to send another 180 by year's end. "60 Xinjiang Minority Technical School Graduates Take Jobs in Shenzhen" [Xinjiang 60 ming shaoshu minzu zhongzhuansheng Shenzhen jiuye], Tianshan Net (Online), 14 April 05.
55 State Council Regulation on the Implementation of the REAL, art. 18.
56 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy," State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
57 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3,2004, 40–45.
58 Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 163–189; Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 362; David Bachman, "Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of Chinese Governance in China's Northwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165–168.
59 Uighurs also regularly report that they are discriminated against in the broader job market, with offices publicly posting help wanted signs stipulating "Uighurs need not apply." "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5)," Radio Free Asia. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman state that "members of the Han majority appear to advance more rapidly than similarly qualified Uighurs, while even in Kashgar many specialized occupations are reserved for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and other Han-dominated work units." Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 325. Economist Calla Weimer demonstrates statistically that Uighurs have less earning power than Han living in the same area. Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," 188.
60 REAL, art. 20.
61 Ibid., arts. 27 and 65; PRC Constitution, art. 9.
62 "Complaint Against the Chinese Government's Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders," Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online); Hong Jiang, Fences, Ecologies, and Changes in Pastoral Life: Society and Reclamation in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia, China, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Chicago, IL, 3 April 05; Enhebatu Togochog, Ecological Immigration and Human Rights in Inner Mongolia, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, 3 April 05.
63 Stanley Toops, "The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on Water," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004),271; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 84.
64 State Council Regulation on Implementation of the REAL, arts. 30 and 32. Article 8 requires the central government to compensate autonomous governments who have suffered financially after implementing ecological development projects. Many of the central government's largest ecological protection programs are in minority regions, which must share the financial burden of implementing the center's plans. The "three returns" plan of 2000 (returning farmland to forest, farmland to grasslands, and pasturelands to fallow) cost each of the affected banners in Inner Mongolia an average of 200,000 yuan annually, for example. Zhuang Wanlü , "Discussion of Minority Areas' Various Types of Poverty: The Problem of Local Government Financial Resources Poverty" [Lun minzu diqu de linglei pinkun—difang zhengfu caizheng pinkun wenti], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 24 No. 6, June 2003, 23.
65 REAL, art. 36. Minority governments have established a number of special schools to increase literacy among adult minorities. In these short courses, local education departments within the autonomous areas tailor textbooks to student needs. Some courses use local minority scripts to teach farming techniques and personal hygiene, for example. The government carefully monitors the depiction of minority history in all fields of publication, however, including textbooks. All textbooks must reflect official historiography showing "family ties and deep affection among the nationalities" and "common struggle towards prosperity of all the minorities within a multinational unitary state." Teachers are not allowed to include course segments on a particular minority group's distinct history. Commission Staff Interview.
66 "Education for Ethnic Minorities," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
67 Minorities Statistical Yearbook 2000 [Minzu tongji nianjian 2000], Ethnic Publishing House Web site. The percentage of minorities in the total student population in secondary technical schools rose for that same period from 0.4 percent to 6.6 percent, in teaching institutes from 2.1 percent to 10.7 percent, in middle schools from 2.6 percent to 6.8 percent, and primary schools from 2.2 percent to 9 percent.
68 More than 10,000 attended similar classes in preparation for secondary school. "Education for Ethnic Minorities II," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
69 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals," Seeking Truth, 16 January 05, No. 2, (FBIS, 1 February05).
70 Commission Staff Interview.
71 Steven Harrell and Ma Erzi (Mgebbu Lunze), "Folk Theories of Success Where Han Aren't Always Best," in China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development, ed. Gerard A. Postiglione (New York: Falmer Press, 1999), 220–1.
72 These are terms the government uses to deride those it believes promote the interests of their own ethnic group over the interests of the state as a whole or who favor the creation of a separate state for their minority group.
73 Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism."
74 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion.
74 Hu Jintao stressed the importance of "conducting nationality solidarity propaganda and education campaigns on an extensive scale" in his May address to the National Conference on Ethnic Minority Work, while Xinjiang's Party secretary announced that the region would "vigorously step up propaganda to reveal that the fallacies spread by national separatists are outrageous lies." Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological
75 Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals." On June 29, 2005, the central State Ethnic Affairs Commission met with more than 20 media organizations, including the Party's main theoretical journal and the national People's Daily, to discuss increasing propaganda work. "State Ethnic Affairs Commission Holds Meeting with Media Representatives"[Guojia minwei juban xinwen meiti zuotanhui], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 28 June 05.
76 "The Teahorse Road" [Chama gudao], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, May 2005.
77 One scholar argues that the Party in essence "created" certain ethnic groups through careful manipulation of ethnic cultural markers, widespread Party propaganda about the groups' histories and cultures, and banning of unofficial critiques of minorities' cultures. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang.
78 Michael Dillon, "Uyghur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang," Diplomatic Observer (Online), 14 August 02.
79 Members of some minority groups report that they are pleased to highlight their ethnic heritage in these and other state-sponsored forums. Numerous Zhuang scholars, peasants, and government workers, for example, participated with enthusiasm in the construction of a "Zhuang Village" display near the capital of Yunnan in 2001. Commission Staff Interviews.
80 The White Paper notes that over 50 million copies of 4,800 separate book titles have been published in minority languages, and more than 200 magazines and 88 newspapers.
81 The Paper notes, for example, that it was the central authorities who "organized" 3,000 experts and scholars to compile a five-part series of books on each of China's ethnic minorities. The White Paper also reports that "the state has set up institutions to collect, assort, translate and study in an organized and programmed manner the three major heroic epics of China's ethnic minorities."
82 REAL, art.10.
83 Minglang Zhou, Multilingualism in China: The Politics of Writing Reforms for Minority Languages 1949–2002 (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). Not all of the minorities had unified written scripts when the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Practical challenges, such as determining which dialect should form the foundation for new phonetic scripts, limited many minorities' ability to utilize their own scripts rather than any concerted efforts by the central government to limit their use.
84 Select universities in the TAR, Inner Mongolia, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture offer coursework in minority languages, though generally minority language use is limited to primary and middle schools. In many areas, minority languages are used only in the lower levels of primary school until students master Chinese and are able to take all of their classes in Mandarin.
85 The REAL Implementing Regulations instruct autonomous areas to promote "bilingual teaching." Whereas Article 37 of the REAL previously only stipulated that "Han language and literature courses" should be offered in the senior grades of primary school or secondary school, the new Regulations encourage the use of Mandarin with minority languages in all courses. Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer reports that the Uighur language has been banned in schools throughout Xinjiang. Commission Staff Interview, 22 August 05.
86 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 69.
87 Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu menggu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], enacted 26 November 04.
88 Ibid. Article 18, for example, increases the number of translators in each government office and assures that they receive the same rank and compensation as others in their office. Article 14 states that offices and businesses should give priority in hiring to students who received their education in Mongol technical schools.
89 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," 62.
90 A survey conducted in Xinjiang in 2003 revealed that over 67 percent of those interviewed felt strong Mandarin language skills were the most important qualification for hiring minorities. Wang Jianjun, "Develop Social Surveys, Train Qualified Talent" [Kaizhan shehui diaocha peiyang shiyingxing hege rencai], Advanced Scientific Education, No. 6, 2003, 64–7. "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia.
91 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment in the TAR, Tibet Information Network. For detailed analysis, see Section VI—Tibet.
92 Moreover, these new cadres would not be allowed to serve in their own hometowns, despite a 1993 central government decision specifically exempting minorities from a national ban on local officials being placed in their home locales. "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang" [ Xinjiang jiang mianxiang shehui zhaokao700 ming gongwuyuan chongshi nanjiang ganbu duiwu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 7 April 05; Temporary Regulations on Public Officials [Guojia gongwuyuan zhanxing tiaoli], issued 19 August 93; Wang Lequan, "Those Who Master Minority Language Will Be Exempted From Civil Service Examination," [Wang Lequan: zhangwo minyu baokaogongwuyuan ke mianshi], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 25 July 05.
93 "To Establish Scientific Development Views: Xinjiang Urgently Needs to Address the Challenge of Its Talent Loss" [Luoshi kexue fazhanguan Xinjiang jidei huajie rencai liushi kunju],Workers' Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net, 1 May 05. The government has created some special programs to encourage minorities with doctoral degrees to conduct their research in autonomous areas. The government has set aside a million yuan each year since 2000, for example, to fund research projects by minority scholars. The applicant pool for these funds is a group of 516 minority scholars sent for one to two years of advanced scientific training outside of Xinjiang between 1992 and 2001. "The Clear Success Over the Last Five Years of The Scientific Research Program for Those in Xinjiang's Special Training Plan for Minority Technical Talent" [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu keji rencai teshu peiyang jihua keyan xiangmu shishi 5 nianlai chengxiaoxianzhu], Hami Information Outlet Web site, 12 June 05.
94 Official press coverage stressed that the flow of new workers would lead to "mutual prosperity" for both Xinjiang and Gansu. "Jointly Prosper: 4,000 Gansu Households Begin Work in Xinjiang's Construction and Production Corps," Gansu Daily, 21 April 05, reprinted on TianshanNet, 22 April 05.
95 Xinjiang is home to 8.2 million Uighurs, who are largely Sunni Muslims of Turkic descent. Several other minorities live in the region, including Tajiks, Kazahks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Xinjiang supplies over 35 percent of China's oil and gas, and borders eight countries.
96 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005; Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
97 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism" [Jiaqiang he gaijin fandui minzu fenliezhuyi douzhengzhong de sixiang zhengshi gongzuo], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 22–4.
98 Commission Staff Interview. "Press Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" [Zizhiqu chengli 50 zhounian xinwen fabuhuizhaokai], Tianshan Net (Online), 25 August 05.
99 "In the Midst of Glory and Hope: Key Points in Propaganda for Xinjiang 50th Anniversary"[Xinjiang zai huihuan yu xiwang zhong fengyongqianjin: qingzhu Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu chengli 50 nianzhou xuanchuan jiaoyu yaodian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 05; "AFP: Xinjiang Ribao Carries 'Editorial' Against Separatism as Uzbek President To Visit," Agence France-Presse, 25 May 05 (FBIS, 25 May 05).
100 "Xinjiang Has Become the Main Battlefield For China's Antiterrorism Struggle," China Youth Daily, 6 September 05 (FBIS, 7 September 05).
101 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang; Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
102 "Police Patrolmen in China's Xinjiang Capital Get Sub-Machine-Guns," Urumqi News, 1 March 05 (FBIS, 1 March 05).
103 Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-so-Silent Majority: Uighur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," 28 Modern China 39, 39–78 (2002). For similar findings, see Jay Todd Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China's Western Frontier," in China Beyond the Headlines, eds. T.B. Weston and L.M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),273–295; Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Joanne Smith, "Four Generations of Uighurs: The Shift towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among Xinjiang's Youth," Vol. 2, No. 2 Inner Asia 195, 195–224 (2000).
104 Michael Dillon, "Uighur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang."
105 China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
106 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
107 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 23.
108 Linguist Arienne Dwyer dates the beginning of a policy of forced linguistic assimilation to the mid-1980s. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.
109 "China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools," Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 04. Xinjiang residents previously had the choice of attending minority schools, in which classes were conducted in minority languages, or Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used. Graduates with Mandarin Chinese language skills are more competitive in the job market, and some Uighurs may welcome the opportunity to study the language. The government is demanding a rapid transition to bilingual schools, however, and is placing higher emphasis on Mandarin language use than on local minority language use. Uighurs in exile report that the government has banned Uighur language use in schools and that Uighurs fear "cultural annihilation" through the weakening of their language. Commission Staff Interview with Rebiya Kadeer, 22 August 05.
110 Teacher-student ratios in Xinjiang's colleges are 1:333 compared to the national average of 1:144, according to an article in the party's main theoretical journal. While more than 800new teachers are needed to bring Xinjiang's teacher-student ratio in line with the national average, Xinjiang actually lost more than 530 higher education teachers between 2001–2004. Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuag ji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No.2, 2004, 74–7.
111 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, 40.
112 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education" [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jianding luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted on Xinhua (Online), 26 April 05.
113 "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang," Xinjiang Daily.
114 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
115 "How to Handle the Issue of Religion Interfering in Education in Minority Areas with a Majority of Religious Believers" [Zai yixie duoshuren xinjiao de minzu diqu, rehe chuli zongjiao ganyu xuexiao jiaoyu wenti], State Minorities Bookstore Web site.
116 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
117 Zhang Jian, "Speech at the All-County 20th Teachers' Day Award Ceremony" [Zai quanxian qingzhu di ershi ge jiaoshijie ji biaozhang dahuishang de jianghua], Buerjin County (Xinjiang) Communist Party Office Web site, 10 September 04.
118 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
119 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
120 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
121Ibid.
122 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Appendix III.
123 The story tells of a wild pigeon who commits suicide rather than submit to being caged by humans who feed him well, but deny him his freedom. "RFA Publishes First English Translation of Noted Uighur Story," Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 June 05.
124 Tohti Tunyaz's doctoral advisor in Japan denies any such publications exist. Tunyaz was arrested for obtaining state secrets, which according to the sentencing record were publicly available library materials he obtained from a state- employed librarian at Xinjiang University. "Honorary Members: Tohti Tunyaz," Pen American Center Web site.
125 The charges included "inciting to split China, organizing meetings, taking oaths, accepting membership and possessing illegal publications and counterrevolutionary videos for propaganda purposes." "Bingtuan Supreme Court Affirms Jail Terms for Uighur Youths," Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 December 03.
126 The names of the other defendants have not been disclosed. Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 49.
127 Ibid., 6.
. In this light,
Poster banned 
