India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[ramana]

Indian long term interests are to support the de-Communisation of PRC. Then civilizational forces will assert themselves just as they are in Russia. Think of the Mao phase as a way to press gang/Shanghai China fromthe feudal world into the modern era and it was a bloody and costly exercise.

[Sanatanan]

. . . India doesn't rely on the NSG to build or maintain its non-safeguarded reactors.

I do hope that this turns out to be true in times to come.

Some time back (around Feb, 2007) there were news reports of delay in receipt of shipment of some Turbine related items from a foreign supplier for one of the reactors at Kaiga.

Electricity supply from Kaiga station likely to be delayed



Though the 220 MW nuclear power units –the 17th one in the country –is scheduled to be critical by February end, the units linkage with the southern grid may have to wait till the foreign instruments come. Karnataka may have to wait a few more months to receive electricity from the third unit of Kaiga atomic power station in Uttar Kannada as the import of some of the critical equipment is likely to be delayed. A shipping corporation of India (SCI) vessel to bring the equipment meant for “control and instrumentation” from a Ukraine port. However, the SCI ship could not approach the port as part of the sea has frozen in the winter. As a result, either the SCI has to wait till the ice melts or has to depend on other smaller ships to bring the machinery to the SCI ship. The chairman and managing director of Nuclear Power Corporation of India said that it is a matter of time and SCI is trying their best to get them to us as soon as possible. We are trying to meet the original deadline. The criticality is expected to happen between February 26 and 28. Subsequently, the unit will be synchronized with the southern grid by March 10. {Emphasis, mine}

I recollect that at the time this news had been posted by PTI also although I cannot get the link for that news item now.

I feel this may be one instance and that there may be other items too that are imported.

[svinayak]

http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl ... =161361708

India's house of cards
Gwynne Dyer

Saturday, August 9th 2008



Three weeks ago, the Indian government did everything but raise the dead to win a crucial vote on its nuclear deal with the United States.

Jailed members of parliament were given temporary release in order to vote, MPs in intensive care were wheeled into the chamber, and there was talk of multi-million dollar bribes being offered for MPs to change their votes.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh won, in the end, but the nuclear house of cards he has built over the past few years is still tottering. The nuclear deal got past the International Atomic Energy Agency a week ago, but it faces a stormier passage when it goes before the Nuclear Suppliers Group later this month. Indeed, NSG members that hate the deal but don't want to anger New Delhi can kill it just by stalling for a little while.

President Bush must send the completed deal, approved by the IAEA and the NSG, to the US Congress before early September, or it is effectively dead. Congress must have the bill for thirty days before it can vote on it. It is currently scheduled to adjourn in late September - and if the favoured candidate in the presidential election, Barack Obama, wins the November vote, the deal will not be resurrected after he takes office.

How do we know that? Because Obama really doesn't like nuclear weapons. Late last year, he rashly promised that he would never use nuclear weapons against civilians. Then, when he was criticised for that "gaffe" - whoever heard of a president who wasn't willing to kill civilians? - he went flat out and said that the United States should seek "a world in which there are no nuclear weapons.'' Not even American ones.

Obama has not specifically addressed the US-Indian nuclear deal, but he has said that he will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is certainly not compatible with accepting the deal that President George W Bush cut with Manmohan Singh. That deal is all about circumventing the NPT so that India (which has not signed the treaty) gets to keep its nuclear weapons, and still gets permission to buy nuclear materials and technology on the international market.

A moment's digression here, so that Indian readers don't go completely ballistic. The NPT is grossly unfair. There is no good argument for why five great powers - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France - should be seen as legitimate possessors of nuclear weapons while nobody else is entitled to them. Is India less important or less trustworthy than those countries?

The only reason India has been treated as a nuclear rogue state is that it carried out its first nuclear test in 1974, six years after the NPT was signed. And in fairness to Pakistani and Israeli readers, whose countries also possess nuclear weapons unauthorised by the NPT, neither is there any good argument for saying that great powers should have nuclear weapons and lesser powers should not. In fact, you could easily argue that case the other way around.

If you get tangled up in the question of what is fair, there will be no end to the discussion. The NPT is a crudely pragmatic device that was meant to head off a world of 20 or 30 nuclear-armed countries, and it has been moderately successful. Nobody is going to take India's nuclear weapons away (or Pakistan's, or Israel's), but there is still value in trying to prevent the further spread of such dreadful capabilities.

In that context, it does not help to give India a free pass, which is what is now being attempted by Washington. Yes, India has ignored the NPT and developed nuclear weapons, but the Bush administration wants to exempt it from the NPT sanctions that stop everybody else from selling it nuclear materials and technology because ... well, because the United States would like to have India as an ally.

The US-Indian deal is not really about nuclear weapons. It is about military cooperation on a much broader front; in fact, it is an alliance under another name. The target of the proposed alliance is China, which both the Bush administration and its Asian allies, notably in Japan, see as an emergent strategic threat. If they can sign the Indians up too, then China has a real two-front problem, and that may make it behave more cautiously. Or so the conventional strategic thinking goes.

The nuclear deal between the United States and India that has used up so much political time and energy over the past three years is the US downpayment on the Indian alliance. The US gets a big, nuclear-armed India as an ally on China's southern and western frontiers.

India gets China as a potential enemy, but it also gets access to American high-tech weapons, and it is washed clean of its sins on the nuclear proliferation front.

But the Nuclear Suppliers Group is unlikely to accept the deal without imposing some conditions (like no more nuclear tests) that the Indian parliament will not accept, and the US Congress may adjourn next month without voting on the legislation. Bush is gone in January, and Manmohan Singh's government, which must call an election next year, is probably gone by next July.

All that effort, all those lies, all those favours called in - and still it's probably not going to happen. India will probably not become America's loyal ally in Asia. Good.

- Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.

[ShauryaT]

Indian long term interests are to support the de-Communisation of PRC. Then civilizational forces will assert themselves just as they are in Russia. Think of the Mao phase as a way to press gang/Shanghai China fromthe feudal world into the modern era and it was a bloody and costly exercise.

China's geo-political interests will change in a dramatic manner, once, when and if, the communist hold, as you really know is not much more than a central, authoritive role, that Chinise civilization is highly comfortable with, is not more than 50% likely.

Game this: The chances that Tibet becomes autonomous in 2030, when China has a democratic government is?

[Gerard]

I feel this may be one instance and that there may be other items too that are imported.

imported despite NSG full scope safeguards rule?

[svinayak]

Indian long term interests are to support the de-Communisation of PRC. Then civilizational forces will assert themselves just as they are in Russia. Think of the Mao phase as a way to press gang/Shanghai China fromthe feudal world into the modern era and it was a bloody and costly exercise.

China's geo-political interests will change in a dramatic manner, once, when and if, the communist hold, as you really know is not much more than a central, authoritive role, that Chinise civilization is highly comfortable with, is not more than 50% likely.

Game this: The chances that Tibet becomes autonomous in 2030, when China has a democratic government is?

de-Communisation of PRC is not going to happen as imagined.
If one sees the steps taken by the CPC - They first included only workers/farmers as party members. Then they had their own intellectuals, army people. Later they added business people and now they are including religious people for harmonious china.
They are building a manufactured ruling class and structure. Under it is still an authoritarian govt.

[Gerard]

Indeed, NSG members that hate the deal but don't want to anger New Delhi can kill it just by stalling for a little while.

Those would be the non-supplier nations of the nuclear suppliers group. The actual suppliers may have other ideas.
Cheerleaders at a football game don't get to kick off. They're there to shake their behinds on the sidelines and look pretty.

[BSR Murthy]

Acharya wrote

India's house of cards
Gwynne Dyer

Must be related to the Butcher of Amritsar

[svinayak]

Acharya wrote

India's house of cards
Gwynne Dyer

Must be related to the Butcher of Amritsar

Older generation British folks do not like the deal since they do not want India to be an ally of US.
This goes back to historic rivalry between UK and US. Old world and New world.

[Gerard]

At the NSG, India needs political knockout, not technical decision

Ashok Malik
The Daily Pioneer
2008/08/09
posted in full since site does not archive

Located in a section of the Japanese mission in Vienna, the NSG secretariat is usually home to slow, unhurried bureaucrats. These are, however, not usual times. The NSG meets on August 21 and its 45 countries must unanimously give a waiver to India before the United States Congress can vote on the 123 Agreement.

In Washington, the Congress will meet after the Labour Day (Monday, September 1) weekend for its final pre-election session (both Congressional and presidential elections take place in November). The session is due to conclude on September 26. That really is the remaining window of opportunity for President George W Bush, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the India-US civil nuclear agreement.

Three things about the NSG leg of India's nuclear voyage need to be understood. First, the recent media debate over a "clean" waiver versus a "clean and unconditional" waiver and alleged strong disagreement with the draft of the waiver resolution the US would move at the NSG were enormous red herrings.

As a former Indian diplomat put it, "There is no such thing as an unconditional waiver. Every diplomatic agreement is governed by some conditions. 'Clean' is another matter." The US draft that India took objection too -- as least for public consumption -- was actually an early September 2005 version that was anyway due for subsequent revision.

The Government's determination to stand up to Uncle Sam and refuse to accept that early draft was largely for domestic consumption. It was a tactical move.

Second, left to technical delegations at the NSG, the India waiver would be discussed for years. To speed things up, India and the United States have worked on political leaderships. For instance, when Canada came on board during the G-8 Summit in Japan, it was largely because of President Bush's urging of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Some small countries remain a problem. New Zealand has domestic elections in November and Austria in September. Both insist the Indian nuclear deal could become an issue for voters. The Netherlands and Spain have some misgivings but are wary of alienating America. Both see Islamism as the number one threat, and realise America is a protector and India a potential bulwark.

Ireland and Switzerland still have concerns. Norway has to decide between angering America over the Indian nuclear deal and allying with its NATO partner to offset a threat perception from Russia.

Third, if the August 21 NSG plenary proves inconclusive, and if members ask for more time to "study" the provisions or put in new restrictive clauses (on enriching and reprocessing for instance), the Americans are going to press for another plenary in early September. By then a decision has to be taken.

What is likely is that the smaller countries will give in to the diplomatic pressure of the US and France, which is lobbying for India in the hope of nuclear business. Countries that have no capacity to enforce NPT infractions cannot become guardians of nuclear morality, defy the G-8 and hold the major powers hostage. That, in a nutshell, is why India is quietly confident.

[BSR Murthy]

Acharya wrote

India's house of cards
Gwynne Dyer

Must be related to the Butcher of Amritsar

Older generation British folks do not like the deal since they do not want India to be an ally of US.
This goes back to historic rivalry between UK and US. Old world and New world.

This guy is actually a Canadian. But, I agree with your point.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwynne_Dyer

[sanjaykumar]

Some small countries remain a problem. New Zealand has domestic elections in November and Austria in September. Both insist the Indian nuclear deal could become an issue for voters. The Netherlands and Spain have some misgivings but are wary of alienating America. Both see Islamism as the number one threat, and realise America is a protector and India a potential bulwark.


Yes one must take serious cosideration of New Zealand and Austrian voters, India must not antagonise them.


The great unwritten story of the nuclear deal is US blackmail of China. They must have threatened to yank out some nasty skeletons from the Chinese closet.

[svinayak]

Check the other thread on Understanding the great game. The Commonwealth is the old world - The colonial Rothschild empire.
The new world is the Americas and the Rockefeller. India is the battle ground between these two groups.
The architecture of the new order in Asia is US - the new world and it wants India in its security architecture.
The NSG was formed in London by the London Suppliers Groups - which the center of the old world.
All major countries are negotiating with US for what will they get for supporting the deal.

[svinayak]

The great unwritten story of the nuclear deal is US blackmail of China. They must have threatened to yank out some nasty skeletons from the Chinese closet.

Just the Olympics

[NRao]

Some random FYIs:

Just talked with a NRI involved with DOE efforts to tame "waste matter" - open source per him:
1) UREX is the tech going forward (expected to replace PUREX). Essentially to a lay man P is dropped from extraction
2) UREX is expected to be standard with GNEP
3) From his conversations with others, it is his understanding that India has subscribed to GNEP. (He was not much into the Indo-US deal)
4) On reprocessing techs: France leads (confirmed this with a buddy at Hanford). US and RU are in the same boat in that they have too much weapons grade waste and do not know what to do with it because of quantity. Japan is considered second in reproc techs. The reason France is #1 is because it has one reactor design and that enough research has been done to tame their waste. He felt that India should not select more than two reactor designs (and that the expectation to build some 40 reactors was too much to handle)
5) He feels that not too many (I read it as anyone) know about Indian reactors = waste and therefore even tho' India uses PUREX, it could be a modified version
6) Best way to deal with waste is vitrification. Reprocessing on a small scale (like India) UREX

There is more news, but does not pertain to India

[Sanatanan]

imported despite NSG full scope safeguards rule?

It seems so.

I suspect (unfortunately, I am not able to give links to substantiate it) India needs to import about 10% of the items required for building nuclear power plants (Indian design PHWR, PFBR etc). From a conventional and overall perspective of project management, this may be considered quite acceptable. However, for India, importation of these items may be as "critical" for the nuclear power project as delayed neutrons are, for control of the reactor.

As I see it, IAEA's rather exhaustive INFCIRC 254 P1 (Trigger List) and INFCIRC 254 P2 (Dual-use list) were prepared because some one thought India (and other non-NPT countries) might want to import items listed therein.

Now that India has been forced to adopt a separation plan, all that NSG countries need to do (to at least delay, if not kill, India's progress in the strategic sector) is to follow the regime that has been now worked out (Hyde / 123 / IAEA / NSG waiver) strictly and deny supply of equipment for the unsafeguarded facilities.

I think this is what Bush Administration has been hinting all along (Added later}.

[SSridhar]

. . . all that NSG countries need to do (to at least delay, if not kill, India's progress in the strategic sector) is to follow the regime that has been now worked out (Hyde / 123 / IAEA / NSG waiver) strictly and deny supply of equipment for the unsafeguarded facilities.

While theoretically the above scenario is plausible, it will not pan out practically that way. The dual-use list can include anything, even a screw-driver. So, it is going to be difficult to justify on that basis to a country like India at its present stage of growth. Secondly, the 'denial' scenario will not succeed unless all those NSG countries unitedly employ the same strategy, something that is most unlikely with an attractive market like India. The perceptions of these countries about India are not uniform and except for a few, the rest seem to accept the de-facto situation and would rather like to maximize their gains vis-a-vis India. Increasingly, India is also having counter leverage. Lastly, if the deal is concluded to India's satisfaction (otherwise, India is going to walk out anyway), that would be an implicit acceptance of India's NWS. Why should there be more restrictions on those few 'unsafeguarded facilities' than there had been all these years when the situation for India was far less favourable ?

[Neshant]

Iran will be attacked shortly after the 'deal' is signed.

[enqyoob]

Where's the Astrology thread? The predictions here are much better.

[Pulikeshi]

Why should there be more restrictions on those few 'unsafeguarded facilities' than there had been all these years when the situation for India was far less favourable ?

You are spot on, but what Sanatanan is suggesting seems to define the bounds
for making sure that the 'unsafeguarded facilities' remain few!
And perhaps the possibility to even cripple that ability in case such an option is required.

[SSridhar]

. . .for making sure that the 'unsafeguarded facilities' remain few!

That's a choice India has already made with the separation plan. Indian Redlines have been clearly made known to all those who wanted to know. Being an optimist, I feel that the situation can only get better for India, not worse, in the coming years.

[SSridhar]

Japanese firms eye lucrative nuclear market in India

A top official of Japan's Foreign Ministry said Japanese industries have "cutting edge technologies" in the nuclear power sector and would be interested in the Indian market if the Indo-US nuclear deal goes through.

"The Japanese industries do have cutting edge advanced nuclear power generation technology. Certainly we think our companies are as competitive as any other companies abroad to do business in India," Press Secretary of Japan's Foreign Ministry Kazuo Kodama told PTI here.

The official said there will be "huge opportunities" in the sector in India but refused to discuss the extent, saying "it is too early to comment elaborately on the issue."

"I do not deny that there will be huge business opportunities," said Kodama, Director General of Press and Public Relations in Foreign Affairs Ministry who was here last week.

Asked what will be Japan's stand during the crucial August 21-22 meeting, he evaded a direct reply but indicated that Japan will not pose any hurdle at the NSG.

Japan "understands India's need for nuclear energy... The issue requires "sensible approach by all parties," Kodama said.

"Japan intends to actively participate in the discussion on the nuclear deal at meeting with a comprehensive viewpoint that will strengthen non-proliferation regime," he said.

"When we joined consensus at the IAEA, we appreciated India's need for nuclear energy. We understand India's compulsion to develop nuclear energy," he said.

[Sanatanan]

Please follow this link to see the "Letters To The Editor" section of Frontline magazine (Aug 2 to 15, 2008). It is titled "Nuclear Deal" and has communications, among others, from Anil Kakodkar and Placid Rodriguez regading timing of Th Utilisation in India. These letters relate to an article titled “Project in peril” that had been published earlier (Aug 1, 2008) in Frontline (and linked in BRF) about Mr Kakodkar's recent lecture at IISC.

It is surprising to me that (either in the IISC lecture or the present communication), Mr Kakodkar has placed no emphasis on development of ADS and its role in conversion of Th to get adequate quantities of U233 which can be used to start breeding in thermal as well as fast reactors. Surely some thing must come out of ADS development in the decades to come - the time scale that is under consideration here?

I do not recollect seeing a link to these communications in these threads. My apologies if it has been posted already.

[Gerard]

NSG should accommodate India as equal partner: Srinivasan

[ramana]

NSG should accommodate India as equal partner: Srinivasan

Mumbai/Chennai, Aug 10 (PTI) After getting IAEA's nod on India-specific safeguards agreement, New Delhi is hoping for an "unconditional" and "clean" waiver from NSG to operationalise the Indo-US deal as equal partners, a top official today said.
The US, which has already changed goal posts three times, should enable the deal package in the current form to have a smooth passage at August 21-22 NSG plenary meeting as India is not in a position to give in any more, M R Srinivasan, member Atomic Energy Commission, told PTI.

"We are hopeful that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will not be unreasonable in giving clean and unconditional waiver to India in the coming week's negotiations," he said.

However, India would like the agreement to go through and with even a very small probability of them not accepting India as equal partners in the civil nuclear trade, "we may walk out of the deal," Srinivasan said, adding, "either the current package of the deal or no further giving in."

Meanwhile, speaking at a conference in Chennai, organised to detail the need for the Indo-US nuclear deal, he said, "We don't think the NSG will be in the end unreasonable to let India move ahead." "By coming out of nuclear isolation, India can be part of a decision-making process in issues like a country acquiring nuclear technology in a clandestine manner or some terrorist and anti-national groups acquiring nuclear arms or weapons of mass destruction," he said.

Among the benefits of the Indo-US nuclear deal, it would make India a 'responsible' member in the international community to tackle nuclear issues, he said. PTI

GOI is leaving no channel untruned to emphasize the unconditionality of the waiver. Its really a bow shot to the naysayers. I again say there will be no conditions in the waiver.

Its writ so it shall be!

[SSridhar]

"By coming out of nuclear isolation, India can be part of a decision-making process in issues like a country acquiring nuclear technology in a clandestine manner . . .

[ShauryaT]

GOI is leaving no channel untruned to emphasize the unconditionality of the waiver. Its really a bow shot to the naysayers. I again say there will be no conditions in the waiver.

Its writ so it shall be!

Ramana: There are two different reads here. One is there will be no additional new conditions than the one's agreed to with the 123 and IAEA. The US 123, as far as the US is concerned is backed by Hyde. India may want to ensure that with the NSG, there is no Hyde laden 123 type of conitionalities. Are we to believe that the US will come all this way only to hurt themselves?

The US will ensure that the key obligations Indian undertook as part of J18 will be the conditions for the waiver. Namely, Moratorium, FMCT.

My read is unlike the US, who has come around to accept India in the NPT+ category, there are members of the NSG, who are still dreaming about India being an NNWS NPT member eventually and that is what the current noise is about.

[Arun_S]

Where's the Astrology thread? The predictions here are much better.

I see no value add to the thread from above one liner. But an apt riposte to prediction and its efficacy is:

Girtay hain shah sawar midan-e-jung main.
Woh kya giraien-gay jo ghutnon kay bal chalay.

Translated:

• Only the horse-riders can fall in the battlefield
  How would a toddler, who crawls, fall down?

[ramana]

ShauryaT, I am afraid folks dont understand the game no. its in india's hand as they can walkout. And that negates the whole game till now. And a lot of geo-political capital is invested in this so far. So no conditions will be added.

[Gerard]

It`s clear, It`s nuclear

[Gerard]

US-India N-deal delaying IPI gas talks

[sraj]

PLAN B if NSG waiver draft language prepared by US does not meet GoI requirement of clean, clear and unconditional

1. MMS writes to Bush requesting that since proposed NSG waiver does not meet US commitments in J18, India does not wish the US to proceed with the NSG process, a la letter from Nehru to Eisenhower politely declining when the US Congress wanted both arms and both legs from India in return for parting with steel plant technology in the 50s.

2. Wait for a few years, and voila, get the needed uranium from non NSG sources and, maybe, some LWRs from Russia, using the approved IAEA umbrella safeguards agreement.

3. In the meantime, very publicly shred J18, M2, Hyde, and 123 because the US has failed in its J18 commitment to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear cooperation with India.

This should keep everyone on the straight and narrow path. Folks: remember, the US has threatened to walk out of NSG, which would end the existence of NSG. There are other countries which can also walk out of NSG without much cost, or dare anyone to expel them from NSG, since they give more to NSG by their membership than they get from it.

btw, who helped us build steel plants at Bhilai, Bokaro, etc after the polite letter sent by Nehru to Eisenhower?

MODIFIED PLAN B, now that we apparently have a US draft for NSG that GoI can more or less live with (btw, has anyone managed to get a copy of this draft yet?):

1. Obtain a GOTUS commitment not to support any changes in language suggested by other NSG members to the US draft (this assumes that India can live with the draft GoI has accepted).

2. Accept US invitation to attend NSG plenary as an 'Observer'. Take detailed notes of each countries' statements for future reference (the elephant has a long memory).

3. Prepare draft of 'polite letter' from MMS to Bush requesting US not to proceed with NSG process in view of US inability to meet J18 commitments etc etc (as per item 1 in PLAN B quoted above). Authorize Indian 'Observer' at both the first and second NSG plenaries to release this letter to global media, in consultation with PMO and MEA, immediately on spotting signs of the NSG waiver language crossing Indian redlines. Simultaneously, implement item 3 in PLAN B quoted above.

NET RESULT: The only thing left standing after this will be the approved IAEA umbrella agreement, which incorporates the first acknowledgement and acceptance of India's strategic nuclear programme by a global UN Agency's Board of Governors. No separation plan; no J18 (with Indian commitments to adhere to MTCR, nuclear export controls, etc); no Additional Protocol; no nothing. The NSG can keep its precious nuclear wares to itself. Non NSG sources of natural uranium (immediately), and one or more suppliers of reactors (within a few years), will materialize to meet Indian needs under the approved IAEA umbrella agreement.

ramana: it is very important not to let our guard down at this juncture, and assume that this will happen as per Indian wishes. The 'walkout' has to be planned to the last detail and executed meticulously before a tainted NSG waiver becomes a fait accompli! GOTUS good intent cannot be assumed given their track record of the past three years since July 18, 2005.

In this context, the small countries may turn out to be red herrings and the real mischief may come from an unexpected source (Japan? China? Canada? Australia? even Russia?) where the US can plausibly claim "helplessness" (this is where item 1 under MODIFIED PLAN B above becomes important).

[sraj]

Some small countries remain a problem. New Zealand has domestic elections in November and Austria in September. Both insist the Indian nuclear deal could become an issue for voters.

Perhaps the US can helpfully point out to both New Zealand and Austria that they do always have the option of resigning their NSG membership effective as of today.

After all, could someone educate us on what exactly these two countries contribute to the global nuclear industry?

[sraj]

More insight into the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

India, the IAEA and the art of ‘reservation’: Hindu

From the above analysis by Siddharth varadarajan:

By emphasising the integrity of the complete text and its commitment to be guided by what is actually written in the agreement (rather than by interpretations member states or even IAEA officials may choose to make in the future), India clarified that its sovereign right to take corrective measures in the event of fuel supply disruption is legally protected. What makes these clarifications especially important is that India and the IAEA are entering hitherto uncharted legal waters. ....................... In a worst-case scenario, disputes could still arise, especially under the political circumstances that India might feel compelled to take corrective steps in. But the potential for dispute and the provision of rights are likely to serve as a deterrent to both India and its partners.

India's clarifications at the August 1 IAEA Board meeting are not sufficient to protect India from disputes related to differing interpretation of provisions.

These disputes end up in the UN Security Council. Does India wish to voluntarily throw herself at the mercy of the future geopolitical interests of US/UK, France, Russia, or China? Is the Kashmir experience not enough?

This deal between India and the 'international community' provides immense benefit to the status quo powers. UNSC membership on par with the existing P-5 has to be an integral part of this deal. This will ensure that India is not taking undue risk by entering into agreements open to differing self-interested interpretations.

GoI needs to clarify what happened to the Bush MMS discussions in 2005 on this subject?

[Gerard]

The previous safeguard agreements with the IAEA could also have ended up at the UNSC. The IAEA has always had that option. Has any dispute arose? What is different now?
UNSC Resolution 1172 is still in effect. Has India complied with it? Will a more powerful India comply with it in, say, 20 years?

[Sanatanan]

NSG should accommodate India as equal partner: Srinivasan

. . . .
The US, which has already changed goal posts three times, should enable the deal package in the current form to have a smooth passage at August 21-22 NSG plenary meeting as India is not in a position to give in any more, M R Srinivasan, member Atomic Energy Commission, told PTI.

And GoI still wants to play the game with them? To suit their interests, US will shift goal posts, playing fields and even change the rules of the game. With this repeated experience, should India walk into the quicksand pit, "voluntarily" agreeing to shackle its legs?

[ShauryaT]

The previous safeguard agreements with the IAEA could also have ended up at the UNSC. The IAEA has always had that option. Has any dispute arose? What is different now?
UNSC Resolution 1172 is still in effect. Has India complied with it? Will a more powerful India comply with it in, say, 20 years?

Gerard: The issue is not IAEA. It will be stupid of India to cheat from the safeguarded foreign fuel. 1172, as you know, is under the non-enforceable section of UN chapter 7 (not sure of the number). It was the non enforceable section partly because, India had not violated any agreements with anyone for POK II. If the NSG demands that India, sign on to the same commitments, she gave to the US, in the form of J18 and a 123, governed by Hyde, and goes on to violate these commitments through a test, then the world will have reason to take stronger action, especially if there is other fish to fry. These things are seldom done in a vaccum.

[Sanatanan]

Article in Mainstream, by Ashok Parthasarathi: Renegotiate What in the 123 ?—An Enormous Amount !. This is in rebuttal of an earlier article in Indian Express (July 22, 2008) by Balachandran which I think had earlier been linked and discussed in these threads.

I am quoting A. Parthasarathi's article in full since I am not sure about Mainstream's archival.

Mainstream, Vol XLVI No 34

Renegotiate What in the 123 ?—An Enormous Amount !
dimanche 10 août 2008, par Ashok Parthasarathi

The article by G. Balachandran in The Indian Express of July 22, 2008 entitled “Renegotiate What ?” (in the 123 Agreement) is grossly inadequate, indeed dismissive. There are numerous Articles in the so-called Indo-US 123, “frozen” with effect from August 1, 2007, that require major re-negotiation. Here goes.

Firstly, Article 2.1 specifying that “Each Party … Respective national laws …”, is highly dangerous. That is why both the US-China and the US-Japan 123 are worded to contain the over-riding provision in the respective 123 Agreements being subject to international law. This must be brought about by renegotiation as there already are well-established precedents as indicated above.

Secondly, as regards further Indian nuclear tests, the author asks rhetorically whether any future government of ours would be able to get “a written promise that the US Congress will not impose any sanctions on us if we do a test”. I agree such a promise may not be securable. But what we can and should get from the Congress is mere silence on the matter, that is, what we have from both Russia and France, demonstrated operationally in not even a single observation by the governments of those countries after our 1998 Shakti tests. What is sauce for the goose is entirely possible to be sauce for the gander ! Balachandran states “no one seriously suggests that a new GOI would be able to influence the US Congress to modify Hyde accordingly” ! I believe a de facto ban on orders by our Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) on the US nuclear reactor company Westinghouse can do so.

Thirdly, Balachandran continues to beat the dead horse of Hyde being a “purely US domestic law, with no relevance for India”. This is not correct. No less a person than the US Secretary of State (Foreign Minister) of USA has testified before the House Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress as recently as March 16, 2008 that the Hyde Act applied to India as well. So, we can and must re-negotiate with US Congress through the USG to get the “silence clause” on nuclear testing brought into the Hyde Act to replace the existing termination and civil nuclear sanctions/provisions of Hyde, if we do tests. Even Balachandran admits that : “However, the text (of the 123 Agreement) has the leeway in it for a future US Government to exercise restraint in regard to the rights conferred on it under the US Atomic Energy Act 1954 (as amended latest in 1992) to not be triggered by an Indian nuclear test to abrogate the present Indo-US 123 Agreement and not to apply civil nuclear sanctions on us if we undertake a test.” Such discretion—for that is all it is—of the USG of the day apart, all that our government of the day has to do is to have the desire and the will to undertake such re-negotiation—which the Congress-led UPA Government did not and let the country down badly. All that the GOI has to do is to threaten the US Congress and USG of the day that it will exclude the bids of the US aircraft companies, Lockhead and Boeing, from consideration in the GOI’s proposed purchase of US $ 9 billion valued 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Tender !

Fourthly, “it (the 123 Agreement) does not mention (nuclear) tests”, says Balachandran. What is more, he goes on to say : “Again there can be no substantive improvement over the negotiated language.”( !!) This fallacious contention of his is untenable and wrong because he deliberately tries to treat the provisions and wordings of the Hyde Act and the 123 as if they are in separate watertight boxes with no inter-relations between them. The reality, as we all know, is that the 123 Agreement is a document derived from, and the dependent variable of, the primary, independent and over-riding US Congressional document which is the Hyde Act. The 123 may not mention the word “test”, but its wording in the last sentence of Article 14.2 deals with a major aspect of a test in elaborate detail barring merely the actual use of the word “test”. Secondly, the author knows fully well that were we to undertake a nuclear test all hell will break loose in the US Congress because Hyde specifies clearly that in such an event, all nuclear relations in and of all forms would have to be immediately terminated by USG and nuclear sanctions would have to be imposed by the USG on the GOI in terms of all prevailing US laws, not only Hyde, but the US Atomic Energy Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the NPT and the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, to mention only a few. All that the last sentence of Article 14.2 does is to undertake a very poor attempt at verbal gymnastics carrying zero substantive content. So, as mentioned earlier, the re-negotiation would have to be with reference to the provisions relating to testing by us in all the US Acts listed above, without worrying about what the wording is in the 123 Agreement.

Fifthly, Balachandran then says : “finally assurances on fuel supply ! The only (mine) sanction left for the US in the case of a test will be to withhold nuclear fuel.” He goes on to state dramatically : “No future Indian (he actually means US) Government can negotiate a 123 Agreement that promises unimpeded supply of nuclear fuel to India even if India were to conduct a test.” He then goes on to make the remarkably facetious in-favour-of India statement : “However, India can include sufficient penalties for stopping fuel (supply) in the commercial contract that it will negotiate for specific imports (of fuel) as it already has in the case of the (US origin) Tarapur reactors.”( !!)

My comments on these quotes are as follows seriatim. First, it is not “finally” the nuclear fuel supply issue. There are many more other issues that are involved and will have to be re-negotiated as indicated below. Second, it is rank naiveté to even propose in one’s wildest dreams that a “commercial agreement” with a US entity for supply of a governmentally owned and highly strategic material like nuclear uranium reactor fuel can be supplied by the concerned US Government entity—the US Department of Energy (containing the US Atomic Energy Commission) on terms which would involve it, that is, the US DOE accepting penalties for non-continuance of supply of such fuel when the very 123 Agreement which contains the same US Government’s fuel supply assurance has been terminated on account of a test by the proposed fuel recipient !! Indeed it is laughable ! The real problem is US laws starting with Hyde, not some piffling “penalties imposed by the GOI” in a non-existent “commercial contract” !!

♦

Sixthly, to come now to the “sensitive nuclear technologies and facilities” relating to : uranium enrichment, heavy water production and spent fuel (from reactors) re-processing to extract vital plutonium needed for our next generation, Fast Breeder Power Reactors. Balachandran argues that the provision by the USG to us of these “sensitive nuclear technologies and facilities (i) took Japan 10 years to negotiate their acquisition ; (ii) that too under very intrusive and restrictive conditions in the US-Japan 123 under normal international safeguards by IAEA ; and (iii) some of which were bilateral US administered safeguards, is just not worth the candle and so their de-facto denial under the Japan-US 123 ; and hence it is best to “postpone the whole issue of negotiations to acquire them”—even if indefinitely—begs the question as to why our MEA-DAE negotiating team kept insisting on their access to them in our 123 ? The formal answer is to give operational content to the provision of “full” Indo-US nuclear co-op as set-out and committed by both sides in the July 18, 2005, Singh-Bush Joint Statement. But then, as we already have all three such sensitive technologies, as a result of our own R&D over many years, why then include them at all in the 123 and receive the USG snub that the “USG may transfer GOI under the 123 Agreement itself pursuant to an amendment to that Agreement” ? We could and should have deleted all references to them from Article 5.1 of the 123 text and in the Definitions Sections of sensitive technologies and facilities altogether. This is another important issue of re-negotiation, that is, just deleting them in toto !

Seventhly, the Sub-Article 6(a) of main Article 5 on nuclear fuel supply by the USG to us is so badly worded—consisting merely of a lifting out-of-date and so irrelevant fuel supply commitments by the USG to the GOI as worded in the Singh-Bush Joint Statement needs to be thoroughly “cleaned up” to make it contemporary and operational and needs to be re-negotiated to bring it up-to-date to the “frozen” 123 of August 1, 2007 including making US-origin fuel supplies tough, crystal clear and comprehensive without loose “expressions of intent” of fuel supply for all US-origin nuclear reactors for the 40-year lifetime of our 123, deleting totally irrelevant clauses such as sub-Article 6(b) and to eliminate the stupid, impractical sub-Article 6(b)(ii) relating to the IAEA and not the USG providing only what former has competence and ability to do, namely, provide an India-specific safeguards agreement and for the USG to provide in sub-Article 6(a) what is the nub of the whole Indo-US 123 and for which the USG has both the responsibility and capability, namely, stable reliable, uninterrupted and continued supplies of nuclear fuel for our reactors, for the life-time of those reactors. This also calls for renegotiation between the USG and the GOI, albeit of a lower degree of complexity and difficulty.

Eighthly, where is the need at all for Article 10.4 on Safeguards which reads : “If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA Safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier (the USG) and the buyer (GOI)should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures” ? So delete sub-Article completely as part of re-negotiation.

Ninthly, Sub-Article 14.4 in 123 deals with the thorny and totally unacceptable provision on the so-called “Right of Return” by us to the USG of “any nuclear material, equipment (that is, reactors) non-nuclear material or components, namely, spares for US-origin reactors imported/transferred (by the USG to the GOI) under this Agreement and any special fissionable material, that is, plutonium produced through their use, that is, the use of such reactors. This sub-Article is downright impracticable as US-origin, in-operation reactors, even if shut down immediately on Termination or Cessation, would be far too radio-actively “hot” to permit either the USG or GOI pulling them out of their foundations in India and “returning them” to the USA, assuming that the USG and US people would want to accept such “return” !! What it effectively means is for the GOI to be required to shut those reactors down immediately and in perpetuity, thereby causing untold dislocation to our electricity grids and downstream industries based till then on nuclear electricity for those US-origin reactors resulting in huge economic loss to the GOI of thousands of crores of rupees for all time. What we technically could and are mandated to do under this sub-Article is to : (a) return all fresh US-origin fuel with us, if any ; (b) return all plutonium-containing fuel rods we have already produced in those US-origin reactors ; and © all plutonium already extracted by us from such fuel rods. This is totally impractical for reasons indicated above and has to be toughly re-negotiated to delete it.

Tenthly, and relatedly, Termination and Cessation of cooperation dealt with in Article 14 contains a number of matters requiring re-negotiation : (a) Article 14.1 states “the Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination”. Worded this way the “reasons” are global in character (could be a vote by the GOI against the USG in the General Assembly or any Specialised Agency of the UN or even an anti-American statement by a Minister of the GOI in our Parliament !! What is needed is to re-draft that clause as follows : “The Party giving notice of Termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such Termination, in terms of, and with regard to the specific provisions of, this Agreement.”

Eleventhly, and absolutely astonishingly, Article 14.2 states bluntly that “the Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement, if it, that is, the USG (solely) determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues relating to such reasons has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The totally one-sided nature of the above wording is so evident that it does not need any elaboration or a case needs to be made for its deletion in toto through re-negotiation.

Twelfthly, Article 6 (iii) after according to the GOI by the USG, a totally gratuous “consent” (not right) the reprocess spent fuel and extract vital plutonium in the process, critical for fuelling our own built next phase Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) and to be extracted from the spent fuel from our first phase Thermal Reactors (TRs) like those at Narora in UP and Kakrapur in Gujarat, proposes the setting up of a “National” Reprocessing Plant (NRP) wholly financed, designed, built and operated and maintained by us, but, mandatorily put under IAEA Safeguards in perpetuity. What is more, for ensuring such safeguard and ability we have to supply all design and manufacturing drawings, technical data and calculations, computer model etc. to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) where it will be reviewed by non-Indian inspectors !—a massive in-road by foreigners into our most sensitive and highly classified and secret nuclear technology and plant !! But that is not all ! The GOI is to agree to also comply with, the USG-origin highly intrusive so-called “arrangements and procedures” pertaining to the operation of the NRP ! Indeed, our total submission to the USG goes still further. We have to sign a separate Agreement with the USG relating to those “arrangements and procedures” under Section 131 of the US Atomic Energy Act, and that USG-GOI Agreement has to be separately approved by the US Congress, along with a God-knows-what set of conditions, stipulations, restrictions and even deterrent sanctions to ensure GOI compliance in perpetuity( !!) which the US Congress may impose !! And all this after having invested on estimated Rs 10,000 crores of capital alone plus at least Rs 500 crores of annual operating cost on the NRP in perpetuity.

Are we at last done with the NRP ? No, not by a long shot !! Why ? Because after allowing all these monstrous intrusions and compromises of our national sovereignty and having made all the gigantic financial investments indicated above in an NRP mortgaged in perpetuity to the USA and the IAEA, we are required to agree under Termination and Cessation Article 14.9 of our 123 to giving the USG the unencumbered right to “suspend” the above referred “arrangements and procedures” in something called “exceptional circumstances”. Although 14.9 does state that these “circumstances” are to be “as defined by the Parties (namely, the USG and the GOI) after consultations”, why should we want to suspend those “arrangements and procedures” when we have gone to such lengths as indicated above to accept them, even with some modifications, and when we know that such suspension would lead to a (indeterminately long) “suspension of the operation”, that is, shutting down of the Rs 10,000 crore NRP ! It would be the USG that would want the suspension of those “arrangements and procedures”, thereby bringing the NRP’s operations to an abrupt and indefinite standstill !!

All this shows that : (a) Article 14.9 has to be deleted in toto ; (b) Article 6 (iii) on the reprocessing consent by the USG, the provisions/stipulations separately of the IAEA and USG have to be very drastically re-negotiated. This is particularly the case when all this is not even mentioned, let alone required, under the Hyde Act, which is the “mother” of our 123 Agreement with the USA !!

Finally, there is an appalling and total unforgivable goof on the part of the GOI’s negotiating team of not having any Arbitration Article at all. The Article 15 on “Settlement of Disputes” in our 123 merely states that any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be “promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute”. The first elementary question which arises is : what happens if the dispute cannot be settled/resolved through negotiations/discussions ? We are well and truly stuck because the entire agreement is totally silent on this crucial matter. What our negotiating team should have done is to get the USG to just incorporate in our 123 the elaborate Arbitration Article contained in the Japanese Government-USG 123 Agreement which took almost two years to negotiate but was finally accepted by the USG. It is an Arbitration Article and would have met all our requirements but that was not done. Why ? Who is responsible ? Should the government not fix responsibility on the concerned top officials of our delegation to the GOI-USG 123 Negotiations to bring him/her to book as lack of a compressive Arbitration Article will, in the years to come, arise again and again to make the inevitable differences and disputes that would occur during the 40-year agreement bring our 123 to prolonged halts, if not, suspensions and even cessation and further major concerns to the GOI of that much touted phrase “National Interest”.

♦

To sum up, the contention of the author Balachandran that “no critic of the GOI’s negotiating posture can say, in public, with any degree of confidence, that they will be able to negotiate a better 123 Agreement on any of the specific points noted above”, is totally untenable. The 123 cries out for massive re-negotiation on the points set out above. It is not surprising that this is the case when, the entire process, from the very first round of the GOI-USG negotiations of the 123 started in early March 2007 and its completion at a break-neck speed in an appalling short period of five months, that is, July 31, 2007 when the 123s involving China, Japan and South Korea took years ! This is not an “achievement” on our part. On the contrary, it is a reflection of the slapdash way in which the negotiations were concluded without even a single lawyer in the Indian team, not even the Addition Secretary and Head of the Ministry of External Affairs’ own Legal and Treaties Division, let alone legal experts from the Law Ministry or from other experienced arms of the Government of India, thereby resulting in a terrible product of scrambled eggs is something we now have to live with for 40-years—the life-time of the GOI-USG 123 Agreement ! Who was the all-powerful man who allowed this to happen ? The man who applied the by-now- notorious injunction onto the leader of our 123 negotiating team—our National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan—on the night before the team left for Washington D.C. on the last critical round of negotiations with its USG counterpart in the last week of July 2007 : “Narayanan, don’t come back (to Delhi) without the (123) Agreement (fully sown up).”

The author is a former Secretary to the Government of India in various Scientific Departments and Science Adviser to the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

[ShauryaT]

ShauryaT, I am afraid folks dont understand the game no. its in india's hand as they can walkout. And that negates the whole game till now. And a lot of geo-political capital is invested in this so far. So no conditions will be added.

If India plays her cards well, then there is a unique window of opportunity that is available. The script goes something like this.

MMS says to Bush, no more conditions. Bush resists, says Congress will not accepat and allies make noise.

MMS says to Bush that although the deal has bi-partisan support in the US, it does not enjoy that support in India and if NSG unconditional exemption does not follow through, he will not be able to sign on. Also, if the INC does not come to power next year, the deal is likely to get scrapped and the US would have wasted a historical opportunity.

Bush goes back mumbles a little, puts some loose language to adhere to, previous agreements leading up to the exemption and an unconditional exemption comes through.

Result: The US would have put themselves at a distinct disadvantage in lucrative commercial deals but reconciles that it was never about that. The lucrative deals would be limited anyways, due to the high cost of nuclear energy. Bush would take the risk on the commercial side to seal the strategic advantages of the deal.

Benefit for India: No conditions imposed on trade with other members of the NSG. Not even the moratorium or commitment to work towards an FMCT.

Potenial Spoiler: US Congress.

I am still not sure, what all this means, if it plays out this way. MMS will have to show strong negotiation power to steer now. Hope he displays the same tenacity that helped him steer throgh the no confidence at the international stage to protect Indian interests.

[amit]

MMS will have to show strong negotiation power to steer now. Hope he displays the same tenacity that helped him steer throgh the no confidence at the international stage to protect Indian interests.

I think MMS has steered the whole torturous process since 2005 wonderfully well till now.

Despite all the foul language used, the brickbats hurled and the stupid adjectives attached to his name, he's been clear on what his and India's ultimate goal is in this complex geo-political game and has kept his eye on the ball. Thus it is only natural that he dribbled past the hurdles set up by the Left and NDA.

It's not due an accident of fate, nor on account of divine intervention, that India is now in a position to threaten to walk out if NSG does not give a clean and unconditional waiver.

I only hope once the end game is played out - and if it's played out to India's satisfaction (not just MMS' satisfaction) - folks will have the courage and honesty to admit that they were wrong about *#*%#* Singh.