Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Frontline has been consistent in publishing the nuke story from day one. They are all there in the archives.
--------------
S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
--------------
S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
self-deleted
Last edited by vasu_ray on 18 Sep 2009 03:09, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Possible.Gerard wrote:Would that not imply the top of the shaft and the A frame would survive?It seems that BARC was pretty confident of the shaft and that it would not vent.
However that should mean that the cratering, etc, comparatively, also would be abnormal.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Not the Andamans. The area is too ecologically sensitive. The whole island chain has been preserved by GoI and rightly so to protect the indeginous species and the tribes who live there.
Because, a nuclear blast originates at less than a kilometer depth from the earth's surface, while an earthquake originates > 25 Km depth. The frequency and amplitude of the wave pattern is completely different.
An earthquake can be quickly distinguished from a kiloton nuclear test.
It is subkiloton tests which can be disguised, and it is possible to test a weapon in parts. But the proof of the pudding lies only in testing the weaponized design to full yield, several times, by the end user (thereby testing for fool-proofness), each time in differing environmental conditions, and accounting for the fact that the warhead has aged or has been undergone servicing (Change of the Tritium cannister / LiD fuel).
No!ss_roy wrote:Considering that the andaman islands are earthquake prone, could we not have tested such weapons on or below some of the smaller and uninhabited islands in that chain?
Because, a nuclear blast originates at less than a kilometer depth from the earth's surface, while an earthquake originates > 25 Km depth. The frequency and amplitude of the wave pattern is completely different.
An earthquake can be quickly distinguished from a kiloton nuclear test.
It is subkiloton tests which can be disguised, and it is possible to test a weapon in parts. But the proof of the pudding lies only in testing the weaponized design to full yield, several times, by the end user (thereby testing for fool-proofness), each time in differing environmental conditions, and accounting for the fact that the warhead has aged or has been undergone servicing (Change of the Tritium cannister / LiD fuel).
Last edited by Gagan on 18 Sep 2009 02:50, edited 1 time in total.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 17249
- Joined: 10 Aug 2006 21:11
- Location: http://bharata-bhuti.blogspot.com/
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Acharya-san,Acharya wrote:Are you serious?RamaY wrote:
1. That NDA govt betrayed the nation with a fizzle bum and did not retest the design which would help India avoid yet another round of sanctions.
That was my counsel to Sonia-ji

My thought process is this: If P-II was indeed a fizzle and NDA govt knew it for sure, they should have continued with a follow-up test in 6-12 months provided they have had an alternative/corrected design. In 1998 no one expected India to come out of sanctions as easily as it happened. So another 6-12 months of sanctions wouldn’t have changed Indian case. If I were a BJP person and Sonia-ji blames me for something and get things done, I will be happy for myself and for her.
Coming to my advice to Sonia-ji; I do not mind which govt is ruling India as long as India becomes prosperous and strong. I am an Indutvavadi similar to many other friends here on BRF.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8909.pdf
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Containment of Underground Nuclear
Explosions, OTA-ISC-414 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October
1989)
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Containment of Underground Nuclear
Explosions, OTA-ISC-414 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October
1989)
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Indian dilemma is due to the civilian power reactor program. With the limited resources it should have been the other way round. Now to feed the civil program, military takes a back step. And to compound the problem the civil program increasingly requires imported fuel. If fuel is scarce why have the civil power program and subject oneself to hostage situation. Every where else you have the military program and after that is met the civil program comes on line.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Gagan,
Not all islands in that chain are worthy of preservation. Surely, an underground weapon test on a 200-300 m long island (that is at least 50 km from the nearest populated island) is not a bad idea.
Not all islands in that chain are worthy of preservation. Surely, an underground weapon test on a 200-300 m long island (that is at least 50 km from the nearest populated island) is not a bad idea.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
shyamd wrote:Why Santhanam's Pokhran revelations are too late
Scientist K Santhanam's claim that Pokhran II was a fizzle will not change anything as India's nuclear deal with the US makes it very difficult for India to test again, says strategic affairs expert B Raman.
K Santhanam was one of the 'Kaoboys' of the Research and Analysis Wing R N Kao, the founding father of the R&AW, had very high regard for his professional qualities. He was a delightful person to get along with -- a Tamil to his finger tips with a very keen sense of humour, sometimes bordering on unsettling sarcasm.
Kao took him into the R&AW shortly after it was formed on deputation from the Atomic Energy Commission. He was one of the small group of scientists and technical personnel in the newly-created Science & Technology division of the R&AW and he ultimately rose to be its head. When Kao joined Indira Gandhi [ Images ] as her Senior Adviser after she returned to power in 1980, he persuaded the R&AW to place the services of Santhanam at his disposal as his S&T adviser. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, Kao resigned from the post and his small set-up was wound up. Santhanam gravitated to the Ministry of Defence to assist Dr V Arunachalam and spent the rest of his career in the set-up of the Defence Research and Development Organisation.
Even though he never returned to the intelligence profession, he maintained close contacts with his former colleagues in the R&AW and retained his close personal friendship with many of them.
In its 50 years of history, one of the success stories of the R&AW was its ability to closely monitor the work of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. Santhanam was the first to discover the plans of Pakistan to set up a plutonium reprocessing plant in the 1970s with the help of the French and the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant with stolen and smuggled equipment and technologies from different parts of the world. If one day a book is written on the success of the R&AW's S&T Division, Santhanam would be an important hero of the narrative from the first to the last page. There were other heroes too.
Santhanam had a phenomenal memory for facts and figures, a remarkable capability for analysis and the knack of arriving at conclusions, which often proved to be correct. Some of the Tamil officers in the R&AW used to call him "vazha-vazha kozha-kozha" meaning "slippery". Santhanam because of his way of talking could sometimes be incomprehensible and unnecessarily mysterious. The more charitable friends of his attributed his way of talking to his highly-developed security consciousness. There was never a leak from his division so long as he was the chief.
If there is one criticism which could be levelled against him it is that he never built up the institutional memory of his division. Everything was stored in his memory. He hardly maintained any detailed notes of what he did and how he did it. The result was that his successors had difficulty in stepping into his shoes when he moved out of the organisation.
Santhanam has never been a loose-mouthed or attention-grabbing individual. His recent statement that the nuclear fusion test of 1998 was a fizzle has, therefore, caused considerable confusion and consternation
There are some puzzling aspects of his recent statements and the article which he contributed to The Hindu of September 17, on this subject. It is evident that he felt that the test was a fizzle right from 1998. It was not a conclusion reached by him recently after studying some new data, which were not available in 1998.
That being so, why did he keep quiet for so long? He has been quoted in some sections of the media as saying that he decided to go public now after 11 years because he apprehended a US attempt to force India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. His hint is that India needed to carry out more tests to master the fusion weapon. He should be knowing that after India signed the civil nuclear co-operation agreement with the US and subsequently agreed to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency of Vienna [ Images ], the question of its carrying out any more tests just does not arise in view of the commitments, which it has already made not to carry out any more tests.
One would have appreciated his action if he had made this disclosure before India signed the agreement with the US. He did not do so. He refrained from joining the other critics of the Indian agreement with the US and the subsequent developments. He thereby gave the impression that he had nothing against the agreement with the US.
There is another aspect, which is even more puzzling. The first National Security Advisory Board set up by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee [ Images ] government in 1999 a few months after the nuclear tests was given the task of proposing a draft nuclear doctrine. Santhanam evidently did not caution this NSAB that the fusion test was a fizzle. As a result, it reportedly prepared the draft doctrine under the belief that it was a success.
One can understand his not doing so because at that time he was still serving in the DRDO under Dr A P J Abdul Kalam [ Images ] and it might have been embarrassing for him to go over the head of Kalam and sound a warning bell before the NSAB. Santhanam retired in 2001 and was appointed the Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi [ Images ], in place of Air Commodore Jasjit Singh. In that capacity, he replaced Jasjit Singh as a member of the third NSAB in 2002. According to sections of the media, it reportedly suggested some amendments to the recommendations made by the first board. Despite being a member of this NSAB, Santhanam does not appear to have shared with it his conclusion that the test was a fizzle. As a result whatever recommendation was made by the third NSAB, of which Santhanam was a member, was also reportedly based on the belief that the test was a success.
To say now that the test was a fizzle and that he knew it all along has caused a lot of concern in the minds of our public. This could unwittingly encourage adventurism by India's adversaries.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Wasn't it also stated that this was a weaponized version of the POK-1 device?ramana wrote:S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
How does a <10kt alleged fizzle produce a 25kt yield?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
From the OTA document aboveA properly designed shaft can take even a 5MT test!
The third test, “Cannikin,” November 6, 1971, was the Spartan warhead test with a reported yield of “less than five megatons. This test, by far the highest-yield underground test ever conducted by the United States, was too large to be safely conducted in Nevada.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Gerard wrote:Wasn't it also stated that this was a weaponized version of the POK-1 device?ramana wrote:S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
How does a <10kt alleged fizzle produce a 25kt yield?
Gerard this is what Raj Malhotra was referring to in aprevious post. The design obejctive of POK-I was that, however due to the slices configuration it didnt acheive that. Looks like that was fixed if we go by KS article. If so, it means that the bf also didnt work but then we need to know what he ment by that.
So the tests are a riddle wrapped in an enigma.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
But by your own assumptions and reasoning BARC had accurately modeled the seismic response from test site to the village and the yield threshold when village building wall will start to fall apart and kill innocent children and people. And the unacceptable damage that would have occurred had BARC bum delivered any more kT yield; the BARC team very carefully calibrated the design yield of S1 and S2 to prevent exceeding stress village buildings will be able to take.narayanan wrote:A little bit of thought would tell whoever made the above post about Khetolai residents being asked to stand outside, that asking people to stand OUTSIDE during a thermonuclear nuclear blast that may very well vent, is an incredibly stupid thing to do. Nuclear plumes rise to 12,000 feet and anyone who looks at those is likely to get blinded, certainly irradiated towards a slow and certain death.
What is this loss of faith in your own posts fearing exposure to radioactive venting, which BTW is only possible when the chimney of subsistence crater completly fall into the cavity, and teh cavity stand exposed to atmosphere?
Want to eat the cake and keep the cake intact too !!
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 385
- Joined: 19 Jun 2008 08:47
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
B Raman is hinting to Indians - "Don't test. Behave Good." throughout the article. His tone isn't good.NRao wrote:Scientist K Santhanam's claim that Pokhran II was a fizzle will not change anything as India's nuclear deal with the US makes it very difficult for India to test again, says strategic affairs expert B Raman.
That being so, why did he keep quiet for so long? He has been quoted in some sections of the media as saying that he decided to go public now after 11 years because he apprehended a US attempt to force India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. His hint is that India needed to carry out more tests to master the fusion weapon. He should be knowing that after India signed the civil nuclear co-operation agreement with the US and subsequently agreed to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency of Vienna [ Images ], the question of its carrying out any more tests just does not arise in view of the commitments, which it has already made not to carry out any more tests.
At best, B.Raman sounds paranoid. "Oh please, don't talk about tests now. We can't do it!! Sshhh."
Instead of wasting time on articulating why Santhanam is wrong or right, B.Raman should have spent time writing about if India really needs to sign CTBT considering the situation on China Border and Pakistani Harpoon modification and aids funds diversion to atomic weapon programme?
According to B Raman, India will be more secure against the proliferater Pakistan, by signing CTBT and Santhanam is doing a mistake by going against CTBT.NRao wrote:To say now that the test was a fizzle and that he knew it all along has caused a lot of concern in the minds of our public. This could unwittingly encourage adventurism by India's adversaries.
Whenever I read B. Raman, I always get a notion as if an pre-independence Indian Officer under British Rule is speaking and asking his Indian colleagues to behave "Good", to stand down and don't try to be naughty, when Gora is around.
Its difficult to find such hopeless and depressed commentary in China. They have "balls". This guy doesn't. I wonder if Indian strategic community is filled with such people. No wonder Indian foreign policy lacks balls.
Last edited by vishwakarmaa on 18 Sep 2009 04:13, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
It will be same state or worse as the S2 (15 kt subsistence crater).Gerard wrote:Would that not imply the top of the shaft and the A frame would survive?It seems that BARC was pretty confident of the shaft and that it would not vent.
-----------------------------------------------------
Nope.Gagan wrote:Now it sounds like
25 KT for the fission + 10 KT for the FBF Primary of the TN = ~ 35-37KT.
S1 gave 25 kT yield from fission that is sum of yield from FBF Primary (17 kt) + Fissile Spark Plug of secondary (8 kt) + tertiary (negligible)
S1 further gave an insignificant 2-3 kt from fusion of secondary fuel.
Total S1 yield = 27 -28 kT
-----------------------------------------------------
Yes, K Santhanam exposed teh farce of Pok-I, where the yield announced for public (Indian and foriegn) was much higher (12 kT by some currently available records, where as I vividly recall reading in 1974 news paper and magaznes reporting 20-22 kT yield). Where as the Radio chem report (I think that was done by RChidambaram) reported 8 kT. Sikka/RC and Akakodkar at el, in Current Science paper on seismic comparison to justify Pok-II yield as 45 compare its seismic signature with Pok-I and call that out as 3 times. And then magically use the publicly consumption Pok-I yield of 12 kT instead of 8 kT, thus scaling up Pok-II yield by 50% ( 12/ 8 = 1.5).Raj Malhotra wrote:Re Arun_S
If you remember a discussion few months back on BRF in which some BRites pointed out that it is normal to aim at 25kt yield with fission bomb and 8kg plutonium core also gels with that yield for the fission bomb. Hence I think Sanathanams article is more damaging. I think he is saying that fission bomb was 25kt but was reported to be 10kt to save some lungis.
One can see for themselves that is the same ratio between RC/Sikka claim of S1 + S2 = 60 kT (45 + 15) versus reality of = 42 kT (27 + 15) also reported by K Santhanam (Recall KS is specifying fission part of the S1 yield and you need to add fusion to it get totoal yield under question I.e. 25 + 2 = 27 kT).
And this is precisely what K Santanam says when called RC's bluff to not repeate the same slay of hand that was used in Pok-I.
As for radioactivity levels, senior BARC radiochemists who undertook radio-assay of fission products in samples similarly drilled at Pokhran-I (of May 1974) told Santhanam that the yield announced to the media was substantially higher than what they had submitted to Dr. Raja Ramanna. Dr. Chidambaram must publicly substantiate any claim that it did not occur in the TN test along with justification data.
KS is protecting the Chaddie of BARC (he has removed the loongi already) and is calling out only fission yield of S1 (fission yield is 25 kt out of a total yield of 27 kt).Raj Malhotra wrote:Which would mean that yield of TN is (Original fission 10kt + Original TN 43kt) = 53kt - revised 25kt for fission = 28kt for the fizzile TN. He refers to fission bomb and TN seperately and it is difficult to believe that he will confuse these terms. He also refers to 30m crater for 25kt fission bomb and NO crater for TN bomb. I think he is still saving some lungis and not telling what was the designed yield of TN but only referring to claimed yield of 50kt for TN which he saying was not achieved. The fear in the pit of my stomach is that even the "boosted" primary of TN may have failed.
Remember that S1 actual was Primary FBF Fission (17 kT) + Secondary fission spark plug (8 kT) and fusion yield of 2 to 3 kT.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
S2 was weaponized version of the basic design from Pok-I. Of course the Pok-I was a pure fission device with a huge 800 kg (IIRC) mass.Gerard wrote:Wasn't it also stated that this was a weaponized version of the POK-1 device?ramana wrote:S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
How does a <10kt alleged fizzle produce a 25kt yield?
Weaponized design thus resulted in reduced explosives mass , newer neutron trigger and smaller physics package to deliver 12 kT by more efficiently using the fissile pit (not Anil Kalkodkar's sliced layers design that is patented to give lower yield due to material discontinuity along the compressive axis).
Dont be confused by the 25 kT fission number to belong to S2. It belongs to S1 which was almost entirely fission and with barely 7% fusion yield.
------------Added later ------------
Raj Malhotra is talking of discussion of many months ago, where I had asserted that design objective of Pok-I was ~25 kt, where as it yielded ~ 8 kt because of engineering flaws amongst others. The weaponized fission device that was tested as S2 was designed and performed per design, yielding 12 kt.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
My sources tell me tunnels for next round of test have been ready for many years.ss_roy wrote:Gagan,
Not all islands in that chain are worthy of preservation. Surely, an underground weapon test on a 200-300 m long island (that is at least 50 km from the nearest populated island) is not a bad idea.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news ... 024184.cms
When contacted by TOI, Mishra vehemently denied that there was any such voice vote. "There was a meeting held in the PMO but there was no such voice vote. Santhanam of course expressed some reservations in the meeting about the test result and there were differences between him and Kalam. However, Kalam was his boss and he laid all doubts to rest in an interview to a government news agency on September 22, 1998, that the test was successful with a 45 KT yield,'' said Mishra.
"I don't know why Santhanam is making such statements. The AEC scientists explained all aspects of the test in the meeting and the matter should have ended,'' he added.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
I think the editorial error came from editor's scissors. "Crater" should be read as "Cavity"Raj Malhotra wrote:Re Arun_S
... ... .. He also refers to 30m crater for 25kt fission bomb and NO crater for TN bomb. I think he is still saving some lungis and not telling what was the designed yield of TN but only referring to claimed yield of 50kt for TN which he saying was not achieved.
As IIRC Sarma said: Langauage could be better. Editors should have done a better job.
So 25 meter dia cavity came from teh 25 kT fission yield of S1, and that produced NO crater.
Had the device worked as it is claimed (50 kT) it would have created a subsistence crater of ~70m diameter.
There is nothing to substantiate that fear ; (public source or private).The fear in the pit of my stomach is that even the "boosted" primary of TN may have failed.
The 17 kT FBF worked as charm.
If there was crater formed on surface of the S1 shaft, the A-frame and shaft on the surface would have been as thoughtly destroyed as the A-frame in S2 test for which pics are available and can be seen.NRao wrote:What am I missing.
At even 28Kt the shaft and the A-frame should have vanished. Right?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Now this voice vote drama made by K.Santhanam is also discredited. I dont know what credibility he has to claim himself as paragon of truth when the reality is different.
Previously, his 25 m crater diameter theory was proved wrong. Evidence to that was linked. Now this voice vote.
Let us see where this going to land.
Previously, his 25 m crater diameter theory was proved wrong. Evidence to that was linked. Now this voice vote.
Let us see where this going to land.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
"The Hindu" publishes Frontline. "The Hindu"'s Chitra Subramaniam uncovered the Bofors scandal. "The Hindu" appears to like to put the INC governments on back foot. Is it an able and good fourth estate work? Or does it have an agenda? What was the stance of "The Hindu" during the Nuke deal? Maybe one can trace some dots back to China in all these renewed concern.ramana wrote:Frontline has been consistent in publishing the nuke story from day one. They are all there in the archives.
--------------
S-2 was pure fission and is stated so many places.
Sorry for the OT - in that my post does not have a technical perspective.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Evidence that it is indeed produced a crater of ~ 70 was already linked.Had the device worked as it is claimed (50 kT) it would have created a subsistence crater of ~70m diameter.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Becoz, Santhanam said so ? If there is no credibility on BARC, how this alone be doing good.There is nothing to substantiate that fear ; (public source or private).
The 17 kT FBF worked as charm.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Arun, are you not seriously compromising security details of India. In whose interest you are making such statements ?Arun_S wrote:My sources tell me tunnels for next round of test have been ready for many years.ss_roy wrote:Gagan,
Not all islands in that chain are worthy of preservation. Surely, an underground weapon test on a 200-300 m long island (that is at least 50 km from the nearest populated island) is not a bad idea.
You claim, you are not working on behalf of NPA. But your statements shows may be you are. Pls edit all these non-sense.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 3532
- Joined: 08 Jan 2007 02:37
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
I agree with Kanson and gotta admit Arunji: that statement clearly does not do any good whichever way one looks at it. It is one thing to say / dispute what went wrong if you have any doubts and work to bring together forward looking changes but releasing this kind of info is surely uncalled for. A lot of folks here perhaps believe and would like to see you play a more consturctive role.Arun_S wrote:My sources tell me tunnels for next round of test have been ready for many years.
Kanson wrote:Arun, are you not seriously compromising security details of India. In whose interest you are making such statements ?
I hope you know what you are doing and if not, please refrain from releasing classified data. I sure will puke my whole life and consider it unpardonable crime if I have aided, however indirectly, to anything that will prove to be detrimental to India's security.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Arun_S could you do a quick paint drawing to show what you mean by a cavity vs a crater?
Thanks
Thanks
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Arun_S,
On second thought, these tunnels might be more useful for perpetual storage of our 'white worshiping' leaders.
PS- Every nuclear power has dug more than a few holes that were never used, so nobody can really claim to be surprised.
On second thought, these tunnels might be more useful for perpetual storage of our 'white worshiping' leaders.
PS- Every nuclear power has dug more than a few holes that were never used, so nobody can really claim to be surprised.
My sources tell me tunnels for next round of test have been ready for many years.
Last edited by ss_roy on 18 Sep 2009 05:34, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
I've stayed in the A&N islands. There are only two such islands AFAIK. Both semi extinct volcanos. Both are a few Kms across and 100 - 150 Kms away from the main andaman islands.ss_roy wrote:Surely, an underground weapon test on a 200-300 m long island (that is at least 50 km from the nearest populated island) is not a bad idea.
1. Barren Island
2. Narcondum Island
But seriously doing a test on a semiextinct volcano is crazy. These peaks spew out smoke from time to time, there are frequent earthquakes.
The other islands are too close to the main islands, are surrounded by extreme fragile corral reef with a wonderful-colorful ecosystem of their own. Too beautiful with white beaches and light blue sea to be used for anything as horrible as nuclear testing.
Aren't there some islands south of the equator in the Indian Ocean?
Last edited by Gagan on 18 Sep 2009 05:36, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Thx Arun_S.Arun_S wrote:
If there was crater formed on surface of the S1 shaft, the A-frame and shaft on the surface would have been as thoughtly destroyed as the A-frame in S2 test for which pics are available and can be seen.NRao wrote:What am I missing.
At even 28Kt the shaft and the A-frame should have vanished. Right?
However, that answer makes the situation even more dicey.
IF I understand the discussion, S1 did produce 18 +7 +2 = 27Kt? With that kind of thud, there should be a crater?
BUT, there is no crater (dust blew high and settled down). So, was there 27Kt at all? Or, actually, even 1 KT?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Here is a precious gem from Narayanan on possibility of S1 venting out of the shaft and "anyone who looks at those is likely to get blinded". To be blinded the temperature of the vent out cloud has to be many thousands degrees (similar to atmospheric test of nuke), totally unheard of from any underground test conducted by anyone. I didn't expect such wisdom totally un-founded by science or engineering. And from a person who professes to teach this forum scientific method of seismological damage to village building structure, using stimulus-response based field characterization.narayanan wrote:A little bit of thought would tell whoever made the above post about Khetolai residents being asked to stand outside, that asking people to stand OUTSIDE during a thermonuclear nuclear blast that may very well vent, is an incredibly stupid thing to do. Nuclear plumes rise to 12,000 feet and anyone who looks at those is likely to get blinded, certainly irradiated towards a slow and certain death.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Gagan,
To conduct a nuclear test for a 100-400 kt nuke, you require:
1] an isolated rocky or coral island (less than half a kilometer long). The Lakshadweep area is another possibility.
or
2] A shallow undersea island that could be prepared with a modified old oil rig (we are looking for natural gas
)
To conduct a nuclear test for a 100-400 kt nuke, you require:
1] an isolated rocky or coral island (less than half a kilometer long). The Lakshadweep area is another possibility.
or
2] A shallow undersea island that could be prepared with a modified old oil rig (we are looking for natural gas

Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Will anyone feel any more comfortable if I said I have access to Chidambram and all his friends and detractors?Kanson wrote:Becoz, Santhanam said so ? If there is no credibility on BARC, how this alone be doing good.There is nothing to substantiate that fear ; (public source or private).
The 17 kT FBF worked as charm.
Your personal choice to believe or disbelieve me.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Even the 8 KT Smiling Buddha resulted in a Crater. I guess the shaft was not too deep.
Arun_S is this the difference?

Arun_S is this the difference?

Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Nope, I am compromise nothing.Kanson wrote:Arun, are you not seriously compromising security details of India. In whose interest you are making such statements ?Arun_S wrote:My sources tell me tunnels for next round of test have been ready for many years.
You claim, you are not working on behalf of NPA. But your statements shows may be you are. Pls edit all these non-sense.
I stand by my statement.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 3532
- Joined: 08 Jan 2007 02:37
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
I agree SS-Roy. Given the situation so fluid, I thought it won't do any good to raise alarm bells even if the info was true. It is time for reflection and being responsible. JMTCss_roy wrote:PS- Every nuclear power has dug more than a few holes that were never used, so nobody can really claim to be surprised.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Here's a bit of pure wickedness:
Is anyone saying India cannot scale a basic fission design up from 15 kilotons to something greater ?
France deployed a 120 kt fission weapon using 25kg of weapons grade plutonium. Couldn't India follow the same path without absolutely necessitating further testing ? BTW the MR31 warhead so described weighed 700kg. That was the payload the 2001 Agni-2 test was conducted with...
Is anyone saying India cannot scale a basic fission design up from 15 kilotons to something greater ?
France deployed a 120 kt fission weapon using 25kg of weapons grade plutonium. Couldn't India follow the same path without absolutely necessitating further testing ? BTW the MR31 warhead so described weighed 700kg. That was the payload the 2001 Agni-2 test was conducted with...
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
My understanding of the KS article is the same. I think ramana posted something on the lines of S2 being 25Kt and S1 completely fizzled. ramana?Arun_S wrote:
Dont be confused by the 25 kT fission number to belong to S2. It belongs to S1 which was almost entirely fission and with barely 7% fusion yield
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
I think this is what exists today, because this would explain the limited ranges of the Agni series. Was the MR31 warhead used in a SLBM?Sanjay wrote:Here's a bit of pure wickedness:
Is anyone saying India cannot scale a basic fission design up from 15 kilotons to something greater ?
France deployed a 120 kt fission weapon using 25kg of weapons grade plutonium. Couldn't India follow the same path without absolutely necessitating further testing ? BTW the MR31 warhead so described weighed 700kg. That was the payload the 2001 Agni-2 test was conducted with...
Last edited by vera_k on 18 Sep 2009 06:04, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
It is not the question of your stand. What reason necessitates to bring these type of discussion or state these things. What is the point ?Arun_S wrote: Nope, I am compromise nothing.
I stand by my statement.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2
Sanjay wrote:Here's a bit of pure wickedness:
Is anyone saying India cannot scale a basic fission design up from 15 kilotons to something greater ?
France deployed a 120 kt fission weapon using 25kg of weapons grade plutonium. Couldn't India follow the same path without absolutely necessitating further testing ? BTW the MR31 warhead so described weighed 700kg. That was the payload the 2001 Agni-2 test was conducted with...

