Sundarji during 2002 ?vishnua wrote:As per comparative destruction isn't what Gen Sunderji said during 2002 mobilization that if pakis are thinking of using nuclear weapons then pakistan will be wiped out of the map...
What did he mean wiping out of the map? Entire 160 mil will be kabum?
The question is do we have same capability for China..?? It reaches a static point like amerikhan or ruskies when you have enough to destroy 6 billion or 7 billion....
Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
Johann,
Just a few more points I needed to make. I am using the defintion of "war" from the US perspective. If placing NW's in Cuba was considered an act of war on U s by ex-SU, then it stands to reason that a mirror act of placing U S NW's in Germany should be considered an act of war on USSR as well. U S definition, not mine. Similarly, if a sustained campaign against U S to cap its capabilities is taken to be an act of war in DC, it automatically implies it is an act of war when the target is some other nation.
Secondly, I don't thnk that any nation (except those that could not be practically prevented) can really comfort themselves that if they develop NW's they will be subjected to only pressure, but not open attacks. Most nations do not feel this assurance. This is a coercive pressure.
Thirdly, Osikark (spellening?) & Syrian reactor was bombed by Israeelis & not the Khan, but this is a distinction that nations in ME need not make. The interests, actions, & capabilities of these two countries are coordinated & in synch, so these distinctions, while significant for you, are not significant for NW aspirants in ME (and elsewhere).
Forthly, nucleaarization of Irsael, TSP, & S. Africa were "allowed" or "tolerated" (though not celebrated) because they each provide some key benifit to Uncle Sam, not because of the acknowledgement of the principle that Nuklearization is *NOT* a valid causus belli.
Last comment: When we talk of Deterrence, there are two levels of it in reality. First, and the obvious one, is the surface-level Deterence where two NW's use Deterrence to prevent nuce war. Second under-the-surface Deterrence is to prevent non-NW states from obtainting these weapons in the first place. *Both* of them are operated on the idea of imposing unaccaptable losses: in the first case by threat of NW use; in the second case by imposing unaccaptable damage to economy, international standing, upto & including full conventional war.
Just a few more points I needed to make. I am using the defintion of "war" from the US perspective. If placing NW's in Cuba was considered an act of war on U s by ex-SU, then it stands to reason that a mirror act of placing U S NW's in Germany should be considered an act of war on USSR as well. U S definition, not mine. Similarly, if a sustained campaign against U S to cap its capabilities is taken to be an act of war in DC, it automatically implies it is an act of war when the target is some other nation.
Secondly, I don't thnk that any nation (except those that could not be practically prevented) can really comfort themselves that if they develop NW's they will be subjected to only pressure, but not open attacks. Most nations do not feel this assurance. This is a coercive pressure.
Thirdly, Osikark (spellening?) & Syrian reactor was bombed by Israeelis & not the Khan, but this is a distinction that nations in ME need not make. The interests, actions, & capabilities of these two countries are coordinated & in synch, so these distinctions, while significant for you, are not significant for NW aspirants in ME (and elsewhere).
Forthly, nucleaarization of Irsael, TSP, & S. Africa were "allowed" or "tolerated" (though not celebrated) because they each provide some key benifit to Uncle Sam, not because of the acknowledgement of the principle that Nuklearization is *NOT* a valid causus belli.
Last comment: When we talk of Deterrence, there are two levels of it in reality. First, and the obvious one, is the surface-level Deterence where two NW's use Deterrence to prevent nuce war. Second under-the-surface Deterrence is to prevent non-NW states from obtainting these weapons in the first place. *Both* of them are operated on the idea of imposing unaccaptable losses: in the first case by threat of NW use; in the second case by imposing unaccaptable damage to economy, international standing, upto & including full conventional war.
Re: Deterrence
Again, just to break the monotone of this thread, I will repeat my assertion is that "deterrence" based on the threat of mass death of the population and destruction of cities, is a completely wrong approach.
Much more effective is deterrence based on the ability to target key individuals. "Decapitation".
This is what was seen in Dec. 2001 - TSP targeted Indian Parliament, and this was seen to be crossing the Red Line. GOI showed that such attacks would certainly invite mass mobilization and the threat of all-out war. OTOH, even an attack against the J&K Legislature did not bring that about, and the Mumbai attack of Nov. 2008 did not bring it about.
If you think about why US had to go and pulverize Afghanistan, it was because the COTUS and WHOTUS were targeted on 9/11, not because a couple of tall bldgs collapsed in New York, and not even the Pentagon attack.
Likewise, I believe that credible targeting of key gang-leaders in Pindi and Muzzafarabad is much more deterrent than any number of mega fusion bums that claim to threaten to turn every Pakistani city to ashes, but cannot hit the leadership before their bizjets take off from 'hore and 'pindi.
So the best deterrent is a proven pin-point missile that can be launched at 5 minutes' notice and can have its target updated during its 15-minute flight. Certain death for the leadership.
Much more effective is deterrence based on the ability to target key individuals. "Decapitation".
This is what was seen in Dec. 2001 - TSP targeted Indian Parliament, and this was seen to be crossing the Red Line. GOI showed that such attacks would certainly invite mass mobilization and the threat of all-out war. OTOH, even an attack against the J&K Legislature did not bring that about, and the Mumbai attack of Nov. 2008 did not bring it about.
If you think about why US had to go and pulverize Afghanistan, it was because the COTUS and WHOTUS were targeted on 9/11, not because a couple of tall bldgs collapsed in New York, and not even the Pentagon attack.
Likewise, I believe that credible targeting of key gang-leaders in Pindi and Muzzafarabad is much more deterrent than any number of mega fusion bums that claim to threaten to turn every Pakistani city to ashes, but cannot hit the leadership before their bizjets take off from 'hore and 'pindi.
So the best deterrent is a proven pin-point missile that can be launched at 5 minutes' notice and can have its target updated during its 15-minute flight. Certain death for the leadership.
Re: Deterrence
Surinder,
+ During the Cold War the US showed no willingness to go to war, or even threaten war to unilaterally prevent the emergence of new nuclear power. The Johnson administration considered the option against the PRC, and shelved it because the Soviets wouldn't go along. The Soviet and US positions were reversed during the Nixon administration.
North Korea in the 1980s did not face a fraction of the attention it received in the 1990s and 2000s.
It is only *after* the end of the Cold War that the US has felt free to threaten hostile emerging nuclear states with military action. In the 1990s Iraq was attacked, and threatened with more attacks, while North Korea had carrots and military sticks dangled at it.
The articulation of Bush's doctrine of pre-emptive strikes against hostile states developing WMDs took the policy of the 1990s to a new level - the threat was particularly clear against state the US labeled a rogue regimes - Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cuba and Myanmar.
Even when the US bombed Libya in 1986 (an avowedly hostile state), it did not target its WMD related facilities. Qadhdhaffi did not feel pressured enough to hand over everything until the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam in 2003.
+ As far as the Cuban Missile Crisis goes, it wasn't called the Cold War for nothing. The US did *not* declare the missiles presence an act of war, and Kennedy made it clear to Khrushchev that he would not invade Cuba, or impose a total blockade. It was clear to all that the Cubans had no control of these missiles, and the Cuban leadership played no part in the decision-making during the crisis.
Kennedy secretly agreed to withdraw missiles from Italy and Turkey (which had been openly deployed), while Khrushchev openly withdrew missiles secretly deployed Cuba. In a couple of years both the US and USSR stationed on home soil that could reach each others major cities.
One of the reasons nothing the crisis was unique was because both sides recognised its pointlessness.
As the Kennedy Executive Committee agreed at the beginning, Khrushchev choice of a secret missile deployment was about testing Kennedy's political will, and that this was the crucial issue, not the military balance.
Testing the opponents will through crisis is one way of establishing deterrence, but it is a very dangerous one. The Reagan administration sought to test the Soviet leadership's will in 1981 with a series of military exercises, and the result was another crisis in 1983.
It still doesn't change the fact that this was an ideological as well as geopolitical competition, but not war in the sense of active armed conflict.
+ Israeli and US interests in synch over Osirak? That must be why the US ended intelligence sharing with Israel in the aftermath of the attack, and sent Jonathan Pollard to prison for life. When it came to nuclear proliferation US and Israeli interests were very much in tension with each other until the end of the cold war.
+ I have never heard any articulation of what benefit Argentinean or Brazilian nuclearisation had for the US. The military juntas in both states largely pursued nuclear weapons as part of their struggle dominance with each other, Chile, and ultimately the US and UK.
+ During the Cold War the US showed no willingness to go to war, or even threaten war to unilaterally prevent the emergence of new nuclear power. The Johnson administration considered the option against the PRC, and shelved it because the Soviets wouldn't go along. The Soviet and US positions were reversed during the Nixon administration.
North Korea in the 1980s did not face a fraction of the attention it received in the 1990s and 2000s.
It is only *after* the end of the Cold War that the US has felt free to threaten hostile emerging nuclear states with military action. In the 1990s Iraq was attacked, and threatened with more attacks, while North Korea had carrots and military sticks dangled at it.
The articulation of Bush's doctrine of pre-emptive strikes against hostile states developing WMDs took the policy of the 1990s to a new level - the threat was particularly clear against state the US labeled a rogue regimes - Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cuba and Myanmar.
Even when the US bombed Libya in 1986 (an avowedly hostile state), it did not target its WMD related facilities. Qadhdhaffi did not feel pressured enough to hand over everything until the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam in 2003.
+ As far as the Cuban Missile Crisis goes, it wasn't called the Cold War for nothing. The US did *not* declare the missiles presence an act of war, and Kennedy made it clear to Khrushchev that he would not invade Cuba, or impose a total blockade. It was clear to all that the Cubans had no control of these missiles, and the Cuban leadership played no part in the decision-making during the crisis.
Kennedy secretly agreed to withdraw missiles from Italy and Turkey (which had been openly deployed), while Khrushchev openly withdrew missiles secretly deployed Cuba. In a couple of years both the US and USSR stationed on home soil that could reach each others major cities.
One of the reasons nothing the crisis was unique was because both sides recognised its pointlessness.
As the Kennedy Executive Committee agreed at the beginning, Khrushchev choice of a secret missile deployment was about testing Kennedy's political will, and that this was the crucial issue, not the military balance.
Testing the opponents will through crisis is one way of establishing deterrence, but it is a very dangerous one. The Reagan administration sought to test the Soviet leadership's will in 1981 with a series of military exercises, and the result was another crisis in 1983.
It still doesn't change the fact that this was an ideological as well as geopolitical competition, but not war in the sense of active armed conflict.
+ Israeli and US interests in synch over Osirak? That must be why the US ended intelligence sharing with Israel in the aftermath of the attack, and sent Jonathan Pollard to prison for life. When it came to nuclear proliferation US and Israeli interests were very much in tension with each other until the end of the cold war.
+ I have never heard any articulation of what benefit Argentinean or Brazilian nuclearisation had for the US. The military juntas in both states largely pursued nuclear weapons as part of their struggle dominance with each other, Chile, and ultimately the US and UK.
Re: Deterrence
'Police Action' is not my term. That was the unfortunate initial rhetoric for the UN authorisation of force, until the Chinese came across the Yalu.Kanson wrote:Police action which went to the brink of Nuclear war. With so many casualties you can hardly call that as police action.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/casualty.htm
Is that not a total war when every industrial town and even every villages were destroyed. People were forced to live in caves, isnt it? Is napalm not a incendiary weapon ? Is Truman a peacenik ? Didnt he authorized the usage of N weapon during Korean war ? Didnt he deliver a speech on that? So with so many casualties and destruction why did not US made use of N weapon advantage at that time. There was as high as three dozen N weapons planned for use and atleast half dozen weapons where kept ready. Why US has squandered away an opportunity. It ended in a stalemate with so many casualties, right?
It was however a *limited* war, with limited goals. Very different from the two world wars that mobilised the total population, nationalised the economy, fought where it was possible to fight, and fought until the other side surrendered. It was a total war for the two Koreas, but not for the US or even the PRC who had the majority of combatants.
The Truman administration considered the use of nuclear weapons in 1951, but rejected it. This is the same Truman who had signed off on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
The reason is very simple. Using nuclear weapons on Japan couldn't produce more causalities than the alternative of invading and subduing Japan.
Using nuclear weapons in Korea would likely result in total war with Russia and China, which would produce far more casualties than protracted limited war in Korea.
In other words, nuclear weapons only seem like a good idea if you're *already* in a total war, and nuclear weapons have discouraged total war.
Nuclear weapons are more powerful than conventional bombs and missiles. No one has bothered to conventional weapons. There was once talk of banning the submarine, but no one did that either.The reason why Bio/Chem weapon was banned becoz they have more powerful weapon in the form of N weapon while others are still groping. Otherwise there wont be any treaty on that. In one or other way same goes for space and other 3 and 4 letter treaties.
If a weapon can not be used as a deterrent, if it can not be easily used as an effective battlefield weapon, if its use against enemies poses threats to oneslf, and if it horrifies public opnion it will be banned.
Nuclear have not been banned because they have been used as a deterrent, not as battlefield weapon since 1945.
The realists in the West are now worried about what happens when nukes stop being a weapon of deterrence and become a usable weapon, particularly for non-state actors. The alternative fear is of course that the West will have to wage not one cold war, but half a dozen.
Last edited by Johann on 29 Oct 2009 02:05, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
Unfortunately this is a much greater technical challenge than building a nuclear weapon! When is the last time the top leadership in any war was dispatched from the fray by air?enqyoob wrote:Again, just to break the monotone of this thread, I will repeat my assertion is that "deterrence" based on the threat of mass death of the population and destruction of cities, is a completely wrong approach.
Much more effective is deterrence based on the ability to target key individuals. "Decapitation".
...So the best deterrent is a proven pin-point missile that can be launched at 5 minutes' notice and can have its target updated during its 15-minute flight. Certain death for the leadership.
The US has made some very powerful strides in that direction, but they still cant get Zawahiri.
Despite almost 90 years of promises, air power power on its own can not eliminate an enemy regime. Its taking territory, or nuclear weapons as far as military options go.
The other alternatives are popular revolution, a coup from within, or assassination. Real revolutions take a long time to bubble up, and their timing can not be predicted. Coups and assassinations are a toss up when you're dealing with dictators who came to power precisely through such means. They already know all the tricks.
Re: Deterrence
Oh, good! Got Johann interested. 
True that the technical challenge is much greater, to ensure decapitation, but not if it is a surprise attack.
Also, technical challenge notwithstanding, this is the threat that should truly deter a dictatorship. True that they can go into hiding, but then they would be leaving their center of power, and that leaves the doors open for challengers to take over. This is far worse from the regime's pov than a total devastation of the cities - which would only destroy any thinking elite and make the regime more powerful.
So it is true deterrence.
I am thinking in the India-Pakistan context (or XXXX- Pakistan context). I bet the real message on 9/12/01 to the ISI chief in DC was not that US would bomb Pakistani cities, so much as that US would take out the entire Corps Commanders Council.
Likewise, there must be an implied or spoken promise from India that if the Indian Parliament or national leaders are targeted, Pakistan can expect their leadership to all encounter sun roof levers in short order. Same for Hafeez Saeed and Salahuddin in Lahore / Muzzafarabad.
While technically a bit challenging, it is so much more "elegant" than herding hundreds of WMD units and worrying every day that one would fall into the wrong hands, whether of the next Colonel Khan or Mullah Mehsood.
True that the technical challenge is much greater, to ensure decapitation, but not if it is a surprise attack.
Also, technical challenge notwithstanding, this is the threat that should truly deter a dictatorship. True that they can go into hiding, but then they would be leaving their center of power, and that leaves the doors open for challengers to take over. This is far worse from the regime's pov than a total devastation of the cities - which would only destroy any thinking elite and make the regime more powerful.
So it is true deterrence.
I am thinking in the India-Pakistan context (or XXXX- Pakistan context). I bet the real message on 9/12/01 to the ISI chief in DC was not that US would bomb Pakistani cities, so much as that US would take out the entire Corps Commanders Council.
Likewise, there must be an implied or spoken promise from India that if the Indian Parliament or national leaders are targeted, Pakistan can expect their leadership to all encounter sun roof levers in short order. Same for Hafeez Saeed and Salahuddin in Lahore / Muzzafarabad.
While technically a bit challenging, it is so much more "elegant" than herding hundreds of WMD units and worrying every day that one would fall into the wrong hands, whether of the next Colonel Khan or Mullah Mehsood.
Re: Deterrence
One can ask that if the Osirak attack was so against the U S interest, why was *all* aid, and *all* military sales not suspended? It may have been done without U S permission, and without taking them into confidence, but it did not do something which the Khan did not want done. But the more important point is not what I think, but what is perceived in the by states in the ME (because this what deters them from pursuing NW's): Do they perceive their nuculear ambitions curtailed at the threat of war? And the answer for them is yes, and has been yes even prior to Bush.Johann wrote:+ Israeli and US interests in synch over Osirak? That must be why the US ended intelligence sharing with Israel in the aftermath of the attack, and sent Jonathan Pollard to prison for life. When it came to nuclear proliferation US and Israeli interests were very much in tension with each other until the end of the cold war.
It is always a pleasure to argue with you, I get some refreshing insights, by the way.
Re: Deterrence
N,
- Its elegant and lovely and necessary solution to the world's problems, just like cold fusion or interstellar travel. Its a great vision, and with a lot of hard work its something we will be thankful for - one day. But not today, or even tomorrow.
- No democracy is ever going to strike out of the blue - there has to be a state of serious tension, and that's when the other side's leadership will go underground. Just like Hezb'allah in 2006, or Saddam in 2003. Keeping them worried and cut off is very valuable, but only in conjunction with a serious ground advance, which needless to say isnt going to happen if there are nuclear weapons in play.
Surinder,
The Americans in 1981 were attempting to normalise relations with Iraq, in order to contain revolutionary Iran.
In American eyes a revolutionary Iran that threatened Kuwait, Bahrain and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia was the greater threat. The Israeli perception at that point was the *exact* opposite. Iraq's involvement in previous wars against Israel, support for Palestinian militant groups , its continuing hostility and talk of an 'Arab bomb' made it the bigger threat at the time.
The fear of half of the administration was precisely that Iraq would blame the US for Israeli actions - Iraq and the US after all had not had diplomatic relations since 1967 because it blamed the US for Israeli victory.
In the end Saddam chose not to blame the Americans.
There were people in the administration, including Reagan who were Israel-friendly, and watered down the US reaction to the airstrike. The US-Israeli relationship is complex. It has been able to survive *not* because their interests always align, but because they are able to contain the fallout even when their interests radically diverge.
Until August 1990 Israel was the only state that saw proliferation in the ME as something worth using force over. Back in the early and mid 1960s the Kennedy and even at first the Johnson administrations were trying to woo Nasser, just as Eisenhower had attempted to at first.
Kennedy put pressure on Israel's nuclear programme, insisting on transparency in a bid to discourage Nasser from pursuing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, which he was starting to in order to match the Israelis.
Israel's response was much simpler. Egypt depended on imported European (mostly German/ex-Nazi) expertise in rocketry and nuclear science. The Mossad passed on warnings to these men to stop working with the Egyptians. Those that didnt listen were made examples of. Given the unwillingness of existing and emerging nuclear powers to work with Egypt at the time, that was that.
Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s had much more purchasing power thanks to the oil boom of the 1970s, and that changed things. Israel in addition to the strike on Osirak used many of the same methods it used against Egypt earlier. Dr. Gerald Bull's fate is amongst the better known.
p.s. history, politics, economic, strategy, technology - its endlessly fascinating how they mix isn't it? Always worth the time when there's serious interest!
- Its elegant and lovely and necessary solution to the world's problems, just like cold fusion or interstellar travel. Its a great vision, and with a lot of hard work its something we will be thankful for - one day. But not today, or even tomorrow.
- No democracy is ever going to strike out of the blue - there has to be a state of serious tension, and that's when the other side's leadership will go underground. Just like Hezb'allah in 2006, or Saddam in 2003. Keeping them worried and cut off is very valuable, but only in conjunction with a serious ground advance, which needless to say isnt going to happen if there are nuclear weapons in play.
Surinder,
The Americans in 1981 were attempting to normalise relations with Iraq, in order to contain revolutionary Iran.
In American eyes a revolutionary Iran that threatened Kuwait, Bahrain and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia was the greater threat. The Israeli perception at that point was the *exact* opposite. Iraq's involvement in previous wars against Israel, support for Palestinian militant groups , its continuing hostility and talk of an 'Arab bomb' made it the bigger threat at the time.
The fear of half of the administration was precisely that Iraq would blame the US for Israeli actions - Iraq and the US after all had not had diplomatic relations since 1967 because it blamed the US for Israeli victory.
In the end Saddam chose not to blame the Americans.
There were people in the administration, including Reagan who were Israel-friendly, and watered down the US reaction to the airstrike. The US-Israeli relationship is complex. It has been able to survive *not* because their interests always align, but because they are able to contain the fallout even when their interests radically diverge.
Until August 1990 Israel was the only state that saw proliferation in the ME as something worth using force over. Back in the early and mid 1960s the Kennedy and even at first the Johnson administrations were trying to woo Nasser, just as Eisenhower had attempted to at first.
Kennedy put pressure on Israel's nuclear programme, insisting on transparency in a bid to discourage Nasser from pursuing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, which he was starting to in order to match the Israelis.
Israel's response was much simpler. Egypt depended on imported European (mostly German/ex-Nazi) expertise in rocketry and nuclear science. The Mossad passed on warnings to these men to stop working with the Egyptians. Those that didnt listen were made examples of. Given the unwillingness of existing and emerging nuclear powers to work with Egypt at the time, that was that.
Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s had much more purchasing power thanks to the oil boom of the 1970s, and that changed things. Israel in addition to the strike on Osirak used many of the same methods it used against Egypt earlier. Dr. Gerald Bull's fate is amongst the better known.
p.s. history, politics, economic, strategy, technology - its endlessly fascinating how they mix isn't it? Always worth the time when there's serious interest!
Re: Deterrence
But the same thing happened to ppl who were purchased with that PP, as with those who helped Egypt (Odessa File ? ).Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s had much more purchasing power thanks to the oil boom of the 1970s, and that changed things.
My 4th cousin thrice removed told me, from his "always reliable sources" that the story of what happened to the foreign expert in Frederick Forsyth's "Fist of God" is very close to reality. Not known exactly which gang "took him out", but the Israelis get the "credit" as usual. Source knew him well, and given his technical experience and penchant for "out-of-the-box" designs, the system described in the book is also quite credible in function, if not in specific design.
Question then is, why has nothing of the sort happened to those who designed the Shoe Bomb, or Pakistan's supposed nukes? Have the Israelis become stupid or lazy? Do they imagine that a Paki bomb will not make its way to Tel Aviv?
Johann:
Democracies may not hit out of the blue, but if a couple of such hits against dictators occur, I do believe that deterrence will have been re-established nicely. Trouble is that if there is retaliation from the dictator's survivors, it is still all-out war, so one cannot get rid of the WMD arsenal based on the existence of Poison Dart Predators, (figuratively speaking). However, all this talk of My MAD has to be 400% MADDER than your MAD, is simply mad. Quite irrelevant.
Re: Deterrence
N,
Yes, no question - that's why I mentioned Gerald Bull by name in my post. That's the engineer who was shot to death outside his own doorway in Belgium in March of 1990. Forsythe picked a good one there.
I should point out too that Israel's efforts against Iraq were not nearly as effective as against Egypt in the 1960s. For all their efforts after Osirak Iraq's projects just kept picking up pace until the bombs started to rain in 1991, and the sanctions and inspectors followed up.
As for why they haven't been more....active about Pakistan, I can only say they are suffering from severe overstretch. As the conflict has widened from their immediate Arab neighbours, to Arab states further out, to Islamic states even further out they've had to chose where to focus. They aren't supermen, just very determined people from a very small country with finite resources.
For example, Libya's progress came as a total shock to them when Qadhdhaffi threw the towel in 2003. They were busy watching Iraq, Syria and Iran, which had separate procurement chains from Pakistan and its clients. They chose these states because they were the ones most directly in conflict with the states that funded and directed groups conducting attacks on Israeli troops and civilians.
Just about all Israeli resources are aimed at monitoring and disrupting Iran and Syria. There's not much left over for Pakistan and North Korea - they've counting on the rest of the world to help there. Even on Iran they are candid enough to admit they cant stop it on their own, only delay. No country can completely thwart the nuclear ambition of a determined opponent on its own in the globalised, monetised world. It takes consensus.
Otherwise its easy to get obsessed seeking a level of certainty that just isn't there to be had no matter how MAD you get and how much money you spend on it!
Yes, no question - that's why I mentioned Gerald Bull by name in my post. That's the engineer who was shot to death outside his own doorway in Belgium in March of 1990. Forsythe picked a good one there.
I should point out too that Israel's efforts against Iraq were not nearly as effective as against Egypt in the 1960s. For all their efforts after Osirak Iraq's projects just kept picking up pace until the bombs started to rain in 1991, and the sanctions and inspectors followed up.
As for why they haven't been more....active about Pakistan, I can only say they are suffering from severe overstretch. As the conflict has widened from their immediate Arab neighbours, to Arab states further out, to Islamic states even further out they've had to chose where to focus. They aren't supermen, just very determined people from a very small country with finite resources.
For example, Libya's progress came as a total shock to them when Qadhdhaffi threw the towel in 2003. They were busy watching Iraq, Syria and Iran, which had separate procurement chains from Pakistan and its clients. They chose these states because they were the ones most directly in conflict with the states that funded and directed groups conducting attacks on Israeli troops and civilians.
Just about all Israeli resources are aimed at monitoring and disrupting Iran and Syria. There's not much left over for Pakistan and North Korea - they've counting on the rest of the world to help there. Even on Iran they are candid enough to admit they cant stop it on their own, only delay. No country can completely thwart the nuclear ambition of a determined opponent on its own in the globalised, monetised world. It takes consensus.
Irrelevant only if you have a good idea of the responsibilities involved in deterrence, statecraft and governance.enqyoob wrote: However, all this talk of My MAD has to be 400% MADDER than your MAD, is simply mad. Quite irrelevant.
Otherwise its easy to get obsessed seeking a level of certainty that just isn't there to be had no matter how MAD you get and how much money you spend on it!
-
Manish_Sharma
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Re: Deterrence
^^Johann regarding this issue of Israel being overstretched due to its finite resources, can something be worked out by India helping? I mean already we're working jointly on ABM, PHALCON + shared boundary with Pakistan.
Is there something possible with indian resources with israeli hi-tech weaponery and experience?
Is there something possible with indian resources with israeli hi-tech weaponery and experience?
Re: Deterrence
Manish, the time for that was circa 1980s - 90s. Unfortunately the Hamlets decided to hesitate. For good and sound reasons I am sure, but the opportunity slipped away. Some ppl claim that an operation was actually set up, then aborted at the last minute.
Then again, I believe that if the YY had "taken out" paki nuke labs, Pak would have
and PRC would have quite publicly established a thermonuclear umbrella over TSP and given them a good set of nukes. What would the world have done about that? So there really wasn't an opportunity. Unless the Hamlets in Dilli were suddenly replaced by crazy ppl who would immediately go to the brink against the PRC and threaten all out war if any nukes were imported into TSP, like Kennedy did about Cuba.
The US was on the other side in those days (still is, IMO). So India could not have got away with anything of the sort.
Therefore, there was no opportunity. Today, taking out the entire Paki WMD establishment would take an Iraq-type "reconstruction" using massive bombing, plus the ground invasion that Johann mentions. This would put YY soldiers facing 150 million gaddhe, incl. a good number of suicide bombers. No way out.
Which is why I say that the only real deterrence is a promise to wipe out the Corps Commanders, the leadership of all jehadi gangs, and all the real estate and foreign bank holdings of the Fauj and the Groper and the Sugar Thief.
There is one alternative: ensure that Islamabad falls to the "Taliban".
Then again, I believe that if the YY had "taken out" paki nuke labs, Pak would have
and PRC would have quite publicly established a thermonuclear umbrella over TSP and given them a good set of nukes. What would the world have done about that? So there really wasn't an opportunity. Unless the Hamlets in Dilli were suddenly replaced by crazy ppl who would immediately go to the brink against the PRC and threaten all out war if any nukes were imported into TSP, like Kennedy did about Cuba. The US was on the other side in those days (still is, IMO). So India could not have got away with anything of the sort.
Therefore, there was no opportunity. Today, taking out the entire Paki WMD establishment would take an Iraq-type "reconstruction" using massive bombing, plus the ground invasion that Johann mentions. This would put YY soldiers facing 150 million gaddhe, incl. a good number of suicide bombers. No way out.
Which is why I say that the only real deterrence is a promise to wipe out the Corps Commanders, the leadership of all jehadi gangs, and all the real estate and foreign bank holdings of the Fauj and the Groper and the Sugar Thief.
There is one alternative: ensure that Islamabad falls to the "Taliban".
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Manish_Sharma
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Re: Deterrence
^^ 
Another window closed!
Another window closed!Re: Deterrence
Now you know why HF 24 Marut never got the right engines from Egypt or UK.Israel's response was much simpler. Egypt depended on imported European (mostly German/ex-Nazi) expertise in rocketry and nuclear science. The Mossad passed on warnings to these men to stop working with the Egyptians. Those that didnt listen were made examples of. Given the unwillingness of existing and emerging nuclear powers to work with Egypt at the time, that was that.
Remember
"Bomb in the backyard and an ICBM in the front yard of every country is the way to lasting peace"
Naked Fakir Sage Fukruddin baba PBUH 1300 CE
Re: Deterrence
Perhaps Johann is too polite to mention, but for any plan to decapitate TSP nukes, India must be the most interested party. That is where the access to is easiest, and that is the country that should have the maximum interest in seeing a nuke-free TSP. Israel does not find India up to the mark: India is neither strong in will nor intent, nor has stamina or stomach for this fight. No one, least of all isarael, wants to partner with India on such matters. There is little anyone can do when India itself is so soft & unfocussed.
Re: Deterrence
surinder's post leads then to the realization that it is not Pakistan's nukes that deter India: it is the prospect of what Pakistan is, with or without nukes.
I mean, do a mental picture of post-nuclear-war Pakistan, skipping right over the prospect of "denuked" (temporarily) Pakistan. Will it be reduced in terrorist nature? In fact it will be Jihad Houristan-e-Duniya. Nuclear war does not really eradicate the population, it merely devastates the economy and destroys most civilization, along with a number of deaths equivalent to a few years of natural causes (including IEDs in the case of TSP).
"Denuking" is a complete waste of time for the reasons I cited above: The PRC just has to bring another batch down the Karakoram Hwy, escorted by a division of PLA.
I mean, do a mental picture of post-nuclear-war Pakistan, skipping right over the prospect of "denuked" (temporarily) Pakistan. Will it be reduced in terrorist nature? In fact it will be Jihad Houristan-e-Duniya. Nuclear war does not really eradicate the population, it merely devastates the economy and destroys most civilization, along with a number of deaths equivalent to a few years of natural causes (including IEDs in the case of TSP).
"Denuking" is a complete waste of time for the reasons I cited above: The PRC just has to bring another batch down the Karakoram Hwy, escorted by a division of PLA.
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Manish_Sharma
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Re: Deterrence
How come China is never worrying that while they supply readymade NW to TSP, India can do the same to Vietnam and Taiwan:
1. They know that India doesn't have the stomach for it. For many reasons be it a.)power of china in conventional and NWs b.) wants to be a good boy
2. They don't care.
3. They think Vietnam and Taiwan even if supplied with prithvis and warheads will never dare to use it.
Before going ahead on a policy like that India would think in such a way and drop it.
1. They know that India doesn't have the stomach for it. For many reasons be it a.)power of china in conventional and NWs b.) wants to be a good boy
2. They don't care.
3. They think Vietnam and Taiwan even if supplied with prithvis and warheads will never dare to use it.
Before going ahead on a policy like that India would think in such a way and drop it.
Re: Deterrence
So far from the truth, specially the Israeli part.Perhaps Johann is too polite to mention, but for any plan to decapitate TSP nukes, India must be the most interested party. That is where the access to is easiest, and that is the country that should have the maximum interest in seeing a nuke-free TSP. Israel does not find India up to the mark: India is neither strong in will nor intent, nor has stamina or stomach for this fight. No one, least of all isarael, wants to partner with India on such matters. There is little anyone can do when India itself is so soft & unfocussed.
Re: Deterrence
PRC has a long-standing policy that Taiwan *SHALL NOT* nuklearize. If Taiwan were to attempt to do so, that would automatically initiate war. U S & Japan as main protectors of Taiwanese independence have accepted this, of course in return for a pledge not to use force. India has failed to draw this kind of a strong line in the sand w.r.t. TSP.
Someone more familiar with Vietnam can comment on that states nukulear posture. I think Vietnam as a signatory to NPT has already foreclosed its nuke option.
By the way, Mongolia is a prime country also for Inidia to court, if we had the ability to. With its strong Budhist culture, it already has a strong cultural connection.
Someone more familiar with Vietnam can comment on that states nukulear posture. I think Vietnam as a signatory to NPT has already foreclosed its nuke option.
By the way, Mongolia is a prime country also for Inidia to court, if we had the ability to. With its strong Budhist culture, it already has a strong cultural connection.
Re: Deterrence
Do we KNOW where the keys for these "NW" are? For sure?How come China is never worrying that while they supply readymade NW to TSP
It is my understanding that in 1998 they came - express - from Chicom. Right?
___________________________________________
This AM we got to know (again) that a Pakistani yahoo in the US has offered to dismantle their nukes IF (of course) India does so too.
The entity talking and those listening are the SAME. Infinite in some ways, finite in many others.
Re: Deterrence
Re. strikes on Kahuta
+ From all that I've read and heard, it doesn't seem like the option of striking Kahuta with the Israelis was off the table until Indira Gandhi's death in October 1984.
Although she had certainly delayed and postponed execution more than once, including just the month before she was killed by her bodyguard.
Despite postponements because of Pakistani threats to retaliate against Trombay (shouldnt that be Trumbai now?), or US diplomatic protests it never seems to have been definitively cancelled as an option from 1982-84. In some ways it was like the decision-making over whether to test at Pokhran again.
+ India definitively turned its back on hitting Kahuta and other sites when K.P.S. Menon and Humayun Khan signed the agreement not to hit each others nuclear facilities in December 1988. This seems to have been something Rajiv Gandhi favoured, although he also seems to have backed operationalising the Indian nuclear deterrent at around the same time.
In short rather than trying to de-nuclearise Pakistan -which might result in radioactive release from Trombay on to India's economic centre- RG consciously chose to accept and stabilise mutual nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.
+ When we look at the nature of young nuclear programmes, people are far less replaceable than buildings or equipment. Without A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's stocks of fissile material, and hence the size of its nuclear deterrent would have been far, far smaller for much longer. That could have made a difference if one day Pakistan has to be thoroughly de-nuclearised, or deterrence ever broke down. If he had received the Gerald Bull treatment in the early 1980s...
+ From all that I've read and heard, it doesn't seem like the option of striking Kahuta with the Israelis was off the table until Indira Gandhi's death in October 1984.
Although she had certainly delayed and postponed execution more than once, including just the month before she was killed by her bodyguard.
Despite postponements because of Pakistani threats to retaliate against Trombay (shouldnt that be Trumbai now?), or US diplomatic protests it never seems to have been definitively cancelled as an option from 1982-84. In some ways it was like the decision-making over whether to test at Pokhran again.
+ India definitively turned its back on hitting Kahuta and other sites when K.P.S. Menon and Humayun Khan signed the agreement not to hit each others nuclear facilities in December 1988. This seems to have been something Rajiv Gandhi favoured, although he also seems to have backed operationalising the Indian nuclear deterrent at around the same time.
In short rather than trying to de-nuclearise Pakistan -which might result in radioactive release from Trombay on to India's economic centre- RG consciously chose to accept and stabilise mutual nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.
+ When we look at the nature of young nuclear programmes, people are far less replaceable than buildings or equipment. Without A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's stocks of fissile material, and hence the size of its nuclear deterrent would have been far, far smaller for much longer. That could have made a difference if one day Pakistan has to be thoroughly de-nuclearised, or deterrence ever broke down. If he had received the Gerald Bull treatment in the early 1980s...
Re: Deterrence
NRao what does he say as I cant read it.NRao wrote:(XPosting) More of a FYI/Strat article:
K.Subrahmanyam :: India and International balance of forces
Re: Deterrence
Oct 25, 2009:ramana wrote:NRao what does he say as I cant read it.NRao wrote:(XPosting) More of a FYI/Strat article:
K.Subrahmanyam :: India and International balance of forces
Of late there is a lot of discussion in the print and electronic media about the Chinese
pressure on India and how India should manage that pressure. There is the pro-Chinese
lobby which advocates India accepting the Chinese hegemony and functioning as a
junior partner of China. On the other side we have the jingoists who want India to
balance China militarily, economically and technologically without spelling out how it
can be done Others take delight in enumerating the past and present failures of successive
Governments of India and subjecting the reader and the listener to a sense of gloom.
Perhaps these unrealistic exercises can be attributed to a major deficiency in the political
and academic capacity of the country—a lack of study and understanding of the
discipline of international relations and its dynamics. The venerable Bhishma taught in
the Mahabharata that for a king, there are no friends and enemies and only circumstances
make them so. Our own Raja nithi advocates Sama(alliance), Dhana (buying out),
,Bhedha (dividing the enemies) and Dhanda (force) as four components of strategy for a
ruler to deal with other rulers. Unfortunately possibly because of the security provided by
long years of colonial subjugation by the sole super power of the time, the dynamic
nature of international relations tends to be overlooked and there is an enormous
overburden of memories of past wrongs by other nations and a sense of paranoid
grievance against the rest of the world.
Our own leaders in the past have been practioners of real politik and were not
encumbered with burdens of past memories. They explored and exploited the possibilities
of international opportunities to the best advantage of the country .The outstanding
example of realpolitik was the strategy of non-alignment, which was balance of power in
a bipolar world, where because of the existence of the nuclear weapon, the two
adversaries could not go to war. When faced with the line-up of Pakistan-China-US in
1971, PM Indira Gandhi invoked the countervailing power of the Soviet Union by
concluding the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. This initiative amply served her purpose
of deterring China and the US from taking any action against India as Delhi proceeded to
assist in the liberation of Bangladesh. PM Nehru could correctly assess that though both
China and the Soviet Union professed to be communist allies, they were bound to
develop differences. Faced with the Chinese threat, Nehru cultivated the Soviet Union.
In spite of the Soviet statement of 27th October,1962 in which the Chinese brothers and
Indian friends were asked to make up their quarrel - which action by Moscow created a
lot of resentment in India - Nehru persisted with his friendship with the USSR.
Subsequently Moscow turned out to be the main supplier of defence equipment for India
and the Soviet Union and China had an ideological split.
Similarly we saw a dramatic shift in the attitude of US towards India during the Bush
presidency and the US exerting itself to remove the technology denial regimes on India
that Washington had promoted three decades ago. The international situation does not
remain static. Nations are not able to keep their strategies and policies frozen in their
search to further national interests in an ever changing world. Skillful diplomacy calls
for identification of opportunities in the changing alignment of forces to further our
national interest. India’s response to the initiative of US, Russia and France to change
the rules of the non-proliferation regime to accommodate India was an imaginative one -
though it evoked significant opposition domestically from those who found it difficult to
understand the changes taking place in the international politics and adjust themselves
accordingly.
The problem of Chinese pressure and a strategy to deal with that pressure calls for an
understanding of the underlying causes that led to the waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers’
Group rules for India. While there may be differences in the foreign policies of the US,
Russia and the European Union - they all agreed on supporting India on the nuclear
issue. While all the three vie with each other in offers to supply arms to India , it merits
notice that the US does not sell arms to China, even as it is eager to sell arms to India.
And while Russia sells arms to both India and China - it makes a difference in its arms
deals with Delhi and Beijing. For instance, Russia does not lease out nuclear submarines
to China nor does it help that country in building one. The European moves to sell arms
to China have been scotched by the US, on whose technology Europeans depend. The
significance of this differentiated treatment of the two countries, India and China should
be understood by Indians.
China is now the second ranking power in the world in terms of Gross National Product
and is expected to overtake the US in the next two decades .China is talking of a G-2
arrangement in which it would like to share the overall global financial management with
US. In military terms they talk of dividing the Pacific Ocean into two spheres of
influence between China and the US. This is a globalised world in which the rise of
Chinese power though not resisted with force as used to happen in the earlier eras , is
still viewed by other major powers of the world with concern , especially because China
is a totalitarian power .While in India there is a correct appreciation that the US and
China have developed a mutuality of interests on ensuring that the US dollar does not get
weakened and there is mutual co-ordination between the countries to safeguard their
respective economic interests, it is wrongly extrapolated to conclude that the US has
moved closer to China than it was to India under President Bush.
US Deputy Secretary of State, James Steinberg in a speech on 24th September, 2009
listed out the issues that will be discussed during President Obama ‘s visit to Beijing in
mid-November 2009. They include the following among others : China’s sweeping
assertion of its rights in the EEZs have caused concern to US and other nations; China is
to be urged to be more transparent militarily; Acute mistrust in the area of nuclear
weapons, space and cyber realm are to be discussed ; Resource mercantilism of China is
a cause for concern for US and other nations; So also China’s problematic engagement
with. actors like Iran ,Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe ; China must demonstrate that it
will not try to secure its energy needs at the expense of others; Human rights; and
strategic reassurance for other Asian countries. The list illustrates the concerns that the
US and other powers have about a rising China. In contrast, India happens to be a unique
case of an emerging power which does not cause such concern as it is integrated with the
democratic powers in terms of the values it espouses.
This is the favorable factor that India should exploit in trying to deal with China. The
major powers have an interest in strengthening India. There is no point in reviving the
memories of the Cold War era and worrying whether the US is trustworthy. We have to
look at their current and future national interest calculations and calibrate our responses
astutely.
(The Hindi version of this article first appeared in the Dainik Jagran of Sunday, October
25, 2009. )
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JwalaMukhi
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Re: Deterrence
Well, in short, the parties responsible for nuclearization of Pakistan should have the responsibility and anxiety about denuclearization of pakistan. The idea of cleaning up and picking up after the mess perpetuated by imbecile policies of the wise guys, cannot be done by India.Johann wrote: Despite postponements because of Pakistani threats to retaliate against Trombay (shouldnt that be Trumbai now?), or US diplomatic protests it never seems to have been definitively cancelled as an option from 1982-84. In some ways it was like the decision-making over whether to test at Pokhran again.
+ India definitively turned its back on hitting Kahuta and other sites when K.P.S. Menon and Humayun Khan signed the agreement not to hit each others nuclear facilities in December 1988. This seems to have been something Rajiv Gandhi favoured, although he also seems to have backed operationalising the Indian nuclear deterrent at around the same time.
In short rather than trying to de-nuclearise Pakistan -which might result in radioactive release from Trombay on to India's economic centre- RG consciously chose to accept and stabilise mutual nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan.
+ When we look at the nature of young nuclear programmes, people are far less replaceable than buildings or equipment. Without A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's stocks of fissile material, and hence the size of its nuclear deterrent would have been far, far smaller for much longer. That could have made a difference if one day Pakistan has to be thoroughly de-nuclearised, or deterrence ever broke down. If he had received the Gerald Bull treatment in the early 1980s...
Sure, India is affected by all the designs of imbecile policies of the patrons of pakistan. But to lay charge at India; in not cleaning up and picking up the pieces created by inimical parties, does not have merit.
Even now, the policies are aimed at containing the fall out within the region and confining it to the sub-continent. But Allah, being all merciful and powerful, does not recognize that it should be bound within the Indian subcontinent. One can throw all the money, weapons, perfidy and aid, yada yada to contain that within the subcontinent. But alas, at the end of the day it is a genie that is out and the fallout will certainly have global reach one way or other.
No sincere intent is seen in taking up responsibility for the imbecile policies adopted. In the meanwhile, it will be fashionable to blame India for not doing enough.
Re: Deterrence
JM,
I haven't seen any evidence that anyone in the establishment in the US or Europe expects India to de-nuclearise Pakistan, or holds it responsible for failing to act decisively on this matter.
Israel is a different matter.
If you are not referring to Western governments, but to my post, then you missed my point, which was not about blame;
- Indira Gandhi seemed although cautious was the only Indian leader who seemed willing to conduct a strike on Kahuta. Her death took the option off the GoI's table unfortunately.
- Israel and India alike might have done better to target A.Q. Khan rather than the enrichment hall at Kahuta in the early 1980s. There would have been fewer military and diplomatic costs, and Pakistan would have found him harder to replace than a building and some machines.
Given that Israel had history of focusing on personnel, I'm not sure why this wasn't a bigger axis of effort. In particular since Khan did travel to Europe and the Arab world where Israel did have the capability to reach people.
I haven't seen any evidence that anyone in the establishment in the US or Europe expects India to de-nuclearise Pakistan, or holds it responsible for failing to act decisively on this matter.
Israel is a different matter.
If you are not referring to Western governments, but to my post, then you missed my point, which was not about blame;
- Indira Gandhi seemed although cautious was the only Indian leader who seemed willing to conduct a strike on Kahuta. Her death took the option off the GoI's table unfortunately.
- Israel and India alike might have done better to target A.Q. Khan rather than the enrichment hall at Kahuta in the early 1980s. There would have been fewer military and diplomatic costs, and Pakistan would have found him harder to replace than a building and some machines.
Given that Israel had history of focusing on personnel, I'm not sure why this wasn't a bigger axis of effort. In particular since Khan did travel to Europe and the Arab world where Israel did have the capability to reach people.
Re: Deterrence
Cross post
Two points below:
1) China "alarmed" at India's 1974 test started proliferating soon and the usual funding suspects were at work then
2) Five "nearly simultaneous" blasts? Even the best estimates - from those who put India's tests at 45 kt gave 19 kt or so to those "five" tests. What is "nearly simultaneous?" may 11 and may 13 were "nearly simultaneous" weren't they?
Several interesting titbits in that article - but I will post only a couple and re read before I post the references to deterrence.Amber G. wrote:Pervez Amir Ali Hoodbhoy's
The Flight to Nowhere: Pakistan’s Nuclear Trajectory
This unpublished piece is an excerpt of the forthcoming book of Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung ( Nov 09)
Pakistan - Reality, Denial and the Complexity of its state.
Two points below:
1) China "alarmed" at India's 1974 test started proliferating soon and the usual funding suspects were at work then
2) Five "nearly simultaneous" blasts? Even the best estimates - from those who put India's tests at 45 kt gave 19 kt or so to those "five" tests. What is "nearly simultaneous?" may 11 and may 13 were "nearly simultaneous" weren't they?
Apologists for India’s bomb say that Pakistan’s quest began in 1972. This is wrong, but it was indeed
close to the beginning. A year earlier Pakistan had been decisively defeated by India, whose military
intervention followed the bloody civil war in East Pakistan. Bangladesh emerged, leaving the “Two-Nation
Theory” – the basis on which Pakistan had come into existence – in tatters. On 20 January 1972, in the
city of Multan, an emotionally charged Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called a meeting of senior
scientists and engineers wherein he exhorted them to build the Bomb, fired the existing chairman of the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (Dr. Ishrat Usmani), and hired a new one (Munir Ahmad Khan).
Nevertheless, some of my senior physics colleagues present at that meeting – including Dr. Riazuddin,
who later received a high Pakistani award for being the Bomb’s chief theoretician – are certain that
nothing actually moved on the ground until the shock waves from the India’s 1974 nuclear test reached
Pakistan, now half its former size.
ii
There was soon an all-out “Manhattan-style” effort in Pakistan to counter the Indian bomb . Bhutto raised
money from Arab states such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, and crucial nuclear help from China. Alarmed at
the Indian success, China willingly shared the designs of its first weapon, tested in Lop Nur in 1964, with
Pakistan. It also supplied UF6 gas for testing the centrifuges, before a UF6 plant was secretly imported
iii
from Germany . This gas is the raw material from which the bomb material is ultimately extracted. By
1986, or possibly a year earlier, Pakistan too had the Bomb. Just 17 days after the Indian tests, on May
28 1998, the Chaghi mountains in Baluchistan turned white from five nearly simultaneous atomic blasts.
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JwalaMukhi
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Re: Deterrence
The said establishments do not have the locus standi to self-appoint to be the judge/s in this situation. Hence, any direct expectation or assigning responsibility to India would be a standing joke.Johann wrote: I haven't seen any evidence that anyone in the establishment in the US or Europe expects India to de-nuclearise Pakistan, or holds it responsible for failing to act decisively on this matter.
A.Q.Khan's capabilities are overstated, he would be feeling very proud if he saw the disproportionate talent associated to him. It is equivalent to saying that India's Ex-president visited for a week to some facilities in US and from that he mastered the art and design of missiles. Sorry, there is huge network and machinery that is needed to run such an operation. A.Q. Khan is a mere convenient face. (It is like saying Hitler alone is responsible, by just taking him out the third Reich would have collapsed - possibly that has more plausibility). The patrons who wanted the nuclear materials to reach pakistan wanted it to happen and A.Q.Khan was a mere conduit, who could have been replaced any number of other Khans.- Israel and India alike might have done better to target A.Q. Khan rather than the enrichment hall at Kahuta in the early 1980s. There would have been fewer military and diplomatic costs, and Pakistan would have found him harder to replace than a building and some machines.
Re: Deterrence
I remain confused as to what this is about really. In any case, the Americans are pretty much reserving the in-extremis job of intervening to sweep up warheads and fissile materials from Pakistan to themselves. Even if there was any sort of intelligence cooperation or logistical agreements with India it would not serve them to highlight it, let alone do the sort of things you are indignantly protesting.JwalaMukhi wrote:The said establishments do not have the locus standi to self-appoint to be the judge/s in this situation. Hence, any direct expectation or assigning responsibility to India would be a standing joke.
Pakistan's nuclear establishment in the form of PAEC never wanted or expected to have to deal with AQK. They were set on the plutonium route.A.Q.Khan's capabilities are overstated, he would be feeling very proud if he saw the disproportionate talent associated to him. It is equivalent to saying that India's Ex-president visited for a week to some facilities in US and from that he mastered the art and design of missiles. Sorry, there is huge network and machinery that is needed to run such an operation. A.Q. Khan is a mere convenient face. (It is like saying Hitler alone is responsible, by just taking him out the third Reich would have collapsed - possibly that has more plausibility). The patrons who wanted the nuclear materials to reach pakistan wanted it to happen and A.Q.Khan was a mere conduit, who could have been replaced any number of other Khans.
AQK was however the only person in Pakistan who had first hand experience and understanding of the technology of uranium enrichment, and with the right contacts in European centrifuge related industry in the 1970s and early 1980s. There really wasn't anyone else, which is why Khan was treated with such deference by the Army and civilian elite in Pakistan for years and years.
By the early 1990s he could have been replaced by his underlings, but not in the beginning. Without him, Pakistan would have been limited to the HEU China provided for two devices worth. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would have stayed *miniscule* until Khusab reactor came online in the last decade.
Something worth killing for I'd say.
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JwalaMukhi
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Re: Deterrence
Johann, will let it pass. Peace!Johann wrote:[
I remain confused as to what this is about really. In any case, the Americans are pretty much reserving the in-extremis job of intervening to sweep up warheads and fissile materials from Pakistan to themselves.
This somehow borders on Sally's cat syndrome. What would have happened to the cat had Sally not rescued her. There would have lot of other felines and other Sally's too.AQK was however the only person in Pakistan who had first hand experience and understanding of the technology of uranium enrichment, and with the right contacts in European centrifuge related industry in the 1970s and early 1980s. There really wasn't anyone else, which is why Khan was treated with such deference by the Army and civilian elite in Pakistan for years and years.
By the early 1990s he could have been replaced by his underlings, but not in the beginning. Without him, Pakistan would have been limited to the HEU China provided for two devices worth. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would have stayed *miniscule* until Khusab reactor came online in the last decade.
Something worth killing for I'd say.
This is more like a cinematic dramatization, where the lone guy stands between the destruction of civilization and the evil. Khan was a mere cog in the wheel, and the cog wasn't indispensible.
Re: Deterrence
JM,
It isn't an unrealistic exaggeration at all.
Compare the amount of fissile material North Korea produced with its plutonium route, and the amount of fissile material Iran is producing.
Without AQK the Chinese would have still provided the CHIC-4 design, and still provided the HEU for two weapons.
Pakistan would have still been able to exercise deterrence.
What would the difference have been without the uranium route that A.Q.K. was the key to (for the Iranians as well!)?
It all depends on whether you think deterrence with Pakistan is stable, or if Pakistan itself is stable.
If North Korea collapses, policing up a couple of weapons, or a few kg of plutonium will be far easier than going after 60 or 120 weapons. If North Korea's regime launches in a dying spasm, it will do far less damage.
It isn't an unrealistic exaggeration at all.
Compare the amount of fissile material North Korea produced with its plutonium route, and the amount of fissile material Iran is producing.
Without AQK the Chinese would have still provided the CHIC-4 design, and still provided the HEU for two weapons.
Pakistan would have still been able to exercise deterrence.
What would the difference have been without the uranium route that A.Q.K. was the key to (for the Iranians as well!)?
It all depends on whether you think deterrence with Pakistan is stable, or if Pakistan itself is stable.
If North Korea collapses, policing up a couple of weapons, or a few kg of plutonium will be far easier than going after 60 or 120 weapons. If North Korea's regime launches in a dying spasm, it will do far less damage.
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Manish_Sharma
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- Joined: 07 Sep 2009 16:17
Re: Deterrence
I remember in the childhood we used to hear often that plane crash killing of Dr. Bhaba was done by Americans to retard the growth of Indian Nuclear capability.
Re: Deterrence
Was it China used by Uncle to keep India behind.Manish_Sharma wrote:I remember in the childhood we used to hear often that plane crash killing of Dr. Bhaba was done by Americans to retard the growth of Indian Nuclear capability.
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JwalaMukhi
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Re: Deterrence
This is a great view point from the perspective of global cops who would want to police. But from Indian perspective, one is too many in its backyard. Let's assume taking out AQK would have restricted Bakistan to a deterrence; but that deterrence is what the global cop/s would have loved. That's a well defined boundary condition to play havoc in Indian subcontinent. That's is not in India's interest. Ideally, from Indian perspective, the patrons responsible for trying to let the genie out in Indian subcontinent hoping it would remain there, were exhibiting behavior that smacks of disregard for lives in the subcontinent to begin with.Johann wrote: Compare the amount of fissile material North Korea produced with its plutonium route, and the amount of fissile material Iran is producing.
Without AQK the Chinese would have still provided the CHIC-4 design, and still provided the HEU for two weapons.
Pakistan would have still been able to exercise deterrence.
What would the difference have been without the uranium route that A.Q.K. was the key to (for the Iranians as well!)?
It all depends on whether you think deterrence with Pakistan is stable, or if Pakistan itself is stable.
If North Korea collapses, policing up a couple of weapons, or a few kg of plutonium will be far easier than going after 60 or 120 weapons. If North Korea's regime launches in a dying spasm, it will do far less damage.
The patrons would still like it to go back to it being a limited, controllable tool against India. Hence, any half-hearted and insincere attempts in rolling back the genie is not going to cut ice.
Re: Deterrence
JM,
I can't quite follow your argument.
Deterrence failure and/or state collapse (and there is a link between the two) isn't something that exclusively concerns the Americans.
If deterrence fails with North Korea, it is South Korea, the US and Japan will pay in that order.
If deterrence fails with Pakistan, it is India and the US that will pay, again in order.
The smaller the arsenal, the smaller that price.
It is the citizens and closest neighbours of unstable states that always pay the heaviest price. However US engagement in both regions means that it would still likely suffer casualties on a scale that would dwarf 9/11.
The country that played the largest role in directly supporting the nuclear ambitions of both these states - the PRC - is the one that will pay the least price of those who are affected.
In any case, the point remains that the uranium route greatly expanded Pakistan's stocks of fissile materials, and magnified the size of an unstable Pakistan's threat to both the Subcontinent and the West. No one is sure exactly what the North Koreans are doing right now with the uranium enrichment technology they received from the Pakistanis. In fact confronting North Korea over that question in 2002 is what led to the N. Koreans withdrawal from the NPT.
I can't quite follow your argument.
Deterrence failure and/or state collapse (and there is a link between the two) isn't something that exclusively concerns the Americans.
If deterrence fails with North Korea, it is South Korea, the US and Japan will pay in that order.
If deterrence fails with Pakistan, it is India and the US that will pay, again in order.
The smaller the arsenal, the smaller that price.
It is the citizens and closest neighbours of unstable states that always pay the heaviest price. However US engagement in both regions means that it would still likely suffer casualties on a scale that would dwarf 9/11.
The country that played the largest role in directly supporting the nuclear ambitions of both these states - the PRC - is the one that will pay the least price of those who are affected.
In any case, the point remains that the uranium route greatly expanded Pakistan's stocks of fissile materials, and magnified the size of an unstable Pakistan's threat to both the Subcontinent and the West. No one is sure exactly what the North Koreans are doing right now with the uranium enrichment technology they received from the Pakistanis. In fact confronting North Korea over that question in 2002 is what led to the N. Koreans withdrawal from the NPT.
Last edited by Johann on 01 Nov 2009 01:21, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
Cross-posted from the BRM/ SRR thread:
shiv conducts big Sijjal Weapon Demo:
shiv conducts big Sijjal Weapon Demo:
New article:
SIZZLE OR FIZZLE: THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST SOAP OPERA
Shiv Sastry
Paper No. SRRP04010901, Security Research Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 2009.
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Manish_Sharma
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 5128
- Joined: 07 Sep 2009 16:17
Re: Deterrence
Is there some reason that no nuclear war scenario exists on BR? I have been going through the scenarios and isn't it possible to have someone write a Humphrey Hawksley's Dragonfire or WWIII kind of scenario?
Re: Deterrence
Why? As the ancient saying goes (this was from a wag explaining why US Generals gave a thumbs-down for the Neutron Bomb):
But that sentiment has become very dangerous to express even in jest, since "9/11".
I recently read a book on 8.4 earthquakes. Much nicer than reading about Nuclear War. If they make THAT into a movie, I may go watch it.
Radiation sickness is not a nice thing to contemplate.
????Half the fun is watching the buildings fall
But that sentiment has become very dangerous to express even in jest, since "9/11".
I recently read a book on 8.4 earthquakes. Much nicer than reading about Nuclear War. If they make THAT into a movie, I may go watch it.
Radiation sickness is not a nice thing to contemplate.
Re: Deterrence
It has been discussed beforeManish_Sharma wrote:Is there some reason that no nuclear war scenario exists on BR? I have been going through the scenarios and isn't it possible to have someone write a Humphrey Hawksley's Dragonfire or WWIII kind of scenario?
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... &sk=t&sd=a
also see
http://www.ippnw.org/PDF files/Bombay.pdf
or maybe this will work
www.ippnw.org/PDF%20files/Bombay.pdf