Bharat Rakshak

Nihat wrote:All this just does not makes sense to me anymore. If I were to put my self in the shoes of the TSPA COAS then it would make perfect sense to tell Haqqani's to back off for a while and also persuade the Afghan Taliban (using ISI contacts) to lay low and go slow on the IED's et all. Meanwhile continue back channel talk with the Americans and persuade them to leave Afghanistan ASAP while declaring some sort of victory in defeating the Taliban.

American officials familiar with Pakistan say that the attack fit a pattern. The Pakistanis often seemed to retaliate for losses they had suffered in an accidental attack by United States forces with a deliberate assault on American troops, most probably to maintain morale among their own troops or to make a point to the Americans that they could not be pushed around, said a former American military officer who served in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

shravan wrote:Missile strike kills 5 in South Waziristan

WANA: Five people were killed and two wounded in a missile strike in South Waziristan tribal region on Tuesday.

According to sources, the missile targeted a house located in Warsak area of South Waziristan, killing people on the spot and leaving two others wounded.

The house was also completely destroyed in the attack. SAMAA

A clerical alliance in Pakistan has issued a religious decree (fatwa) saying that it is illegitimate (haram) to call the United States a "superpower" because "only Allah Almighty deserved the title." Decline-o-meter score: 4
The Sunni Ittehad Council may not carry the same weight as, say, Standard & Poor's when it comes to assessing American power, but it's still troubling that an alliance of generally moderate Sufi Barelvi leaders, who are often targeted for attacks by the Taliban, are calling for "jihad against the U.S., in defense of the homeland."
This, however, is telling:
The scholars called upon the [Pakistani] government to end the country’s role as front-line state in the so-called US war on terror and try to establish a new bloc comprising China, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They also urged the government to start preaching Jihad in the way of God with the armed forces making preparations to counter any foreign aggression. They urged all politicians to bring back their assets from abroad as well as returning bank loans got through political influence.
As RFE/RL's Gandhara' blog notes, the clerics "probably don't know that China is a majority non-Muslim country. They are also seemingly unaware that one of Beijing's major security nightmares is the rising appeal of jihad among its minority Turkic Uyghur Muslims."

Can Pakistan be weaned off its addiction to exporting violence? Unusually blunt comments to the U.S. Senate last week by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen have spurred the latest round of soul-searching on this perennial question.
Adm. Mullen, long regarded as Pakistan's best friend in the Obama administration, accused Islamabad of using violent extremism as "an instrument of policy." He also blamed the Pakistani army's spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of directly supporting insurgents who killed 25 people in an audacious attack on the U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul Sept. 13, and a truck bombing of a NATO outpost three days earlier that wounded 77 soldiers. "With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy," he said.According to the admiral, the Haqqani network, a Pakistan-based militant group believed by U.S. authorities to be responsible for those high profile attacks as well as a string of others, "acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency." This new and surprising frankness from Washington is an implicit warning to Islamabad that patience is running out.

A clerical alliance in Pakistan has issued a religious decree (fatwa) saying that it is illegitimate (haram) to call the United States a "superpower" because "only Allah Almighty deserved the title." Decline-o-meter score: 4

The second night our train stopped at a rather deserted platform at Benaras Railway Station. Dim yellow bulbs stuck into typically ancient British lampposts were struggling to light up the long stony platform, albeit unsuccessfully. Their feeble light mixed gloom to a prevailing semi-darkness. It was nearly midnight. I was not sure what time it was as the platform clock was so blackened by years of steam engine soot and neglect that the dial and the hands had long become indistinct. Only a shard of the original glass was still stuck precariously in the clock frame. There were a few men who looked like Muslims standing motionless against the station wall. They were very quiet, and I must be imagining, very gloomy too. After a little while, they moved away rather dejectedly. Maybe I had a guilty conscience, or maybe I guessed right. Then also there was a tea vendor who was hawking his steamy brew as “Hindu tea, Muslim tea”. As he came closer my inquisitiveness overcame discretion and I asked him what was it about Hindu tea and Muslim tea? He was amazed but explained: Hindus do not take tea from a teacup used by somebody else so we serve them in earthen cups and then cast them away. The Muslims do not mind, therefore we serve them in glass cups and reuse after washing.I understood then why Pakistan had to be created even after a thousand years of futile attempts to live amicably with others. Islam in the Indian subcontinent seemed to have committed the ‘original sin’ of defying Hinduism’s great power of absorption of competing ideologies and therefore was unforgiven. An equally powerful religion like Buddhism had to seek exile after hundreds of years of efforts to coexist. Sikhism is a relatively younger religion and is still struggling against a merger. Other religions are no match to the inherent strength and ancientness of Hinduism.

By the evening, the first roll call was ordered in our barrack. It was a CRP Havaldar who was yelling around. Major Jaffar Khan (retired as Brigadier, is in Rawalpindi and an ardent polo player) was standing aloof not seeming to hear. The Havaldar howled again. Jaffar Khan refused, telling him firmly and properly, “I am an officer and will not fall in under your orders.” This was incendiary. The Havaldar took a step back, cocked his weapon, pointed at him and barked, “Move or I shoot you.” Jaffar Khan was completely unmoved. We shuffled to rush the Havaldar but Major Jaffar Khan stopped us and demanded of him to call an officer. He became the first Pakistani officer to be put in a solitary confinement cell for the next three months. I had the privilege of the company of this very remarkable officer for the next three years in captivity. Unfortunately, soon a bogey of war crimes trials of at least 1,500 (unnamed) officers was floated and never lifted till the repatriation. What the Indians gained from this bluff is not clear but it was so counterproductive as to have embedded hostility in the minds of most Pakistani officers in the camps and for a long time to come. Of these PoWs, some rose to three star rank in the army and Air Force later.

A_Gupta wrote:

Nihat wrote:All this just does not makes sense to me anymore. If I were to put my self in the shoes of the TSPA COAS then it would make perfect sense to tell Haqqani's to back off for a while and also persuade the Afghan Taliban (using ISI contacts) to lay low and go slow on the IED's et all. Meanwhile continue back channel talk with the Americans and persuade them to leave Afghanistan ASAP while declaring some sort of victory in defeating the Taliban.

From the NYT article posted earlier:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/world ... icans.html

American officials familiar with Pakistan say that the attack fit a pattern. The Pakistanis often seemed to retaliate for losses they had suffered in an accidental attack by United States forces with a deliberate assault on American troops, most probably to maintain morale among their own troops or to make a point to the Americans that they could not be pushed around, said a former American military officer who served in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Army and intelligence service are behaving ever more provocatively—with potentially drastic ramifications for the war in Afghanistan.

Why are the ISI and the Pakistani Army making such risky moves? What is the calculation in the generals’ minds? Short answer is, they believe we are on the run in Afghanistan and they want to push us out faster.

The Army leadership ... feels it can weather any blowback from Washington. The generals assume U.S. military aid will be cut or eliminated by Congress sooner rather than later, and they are confident that the Saudis and Chinese will fill the gap. They also know NATO’s logistical supply line to Kabul runs through Karachi (more than half of everything NATO eats, drinks, and shoots arrives via Karachi despite intense efforts to find alternatives). They have leverage and they know it. And of course, they have the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world with a developing tactical nuclear capability. They feel they hold a lot of aces, maybe more than they should. Cocky poker players are dangerous.

Prem wrote:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 2011_pg3_2
understood then why Pakistan had to be created even after a thousand years of futile attempts to live amicably with others. Islam in the Indian subcontinent seemed to have committed the ‘original sin’ of defying Hinduism’s great power of absorption of competing ideologies and therefore was unforgiven.An equally powerful religion like Buddhism had to seek exile after hundreds of years of efforts to coexist. Sikhism is a relatively younger religion and is still struggling against a merger. Other religions are no match to the inherent strength and ancientness of Hinduism.

The United States Department of State lists a set of three criteria for designating an entity as a FTO. Admn. Mullen, while describing the Haqqani Network as a "veritable arm" of the ISI, used the expression "violent extremism," and NOT "terrorism," as a sleight of words to provide Pakistan plausible deniability and full and complete protection from being designated a FTO. Some very smart legal eagle GOTUS brain came up with Mullen's phrase of "violent extremism."

The definition of the phrase "violent extremism" does not meet the Legal Criteria no. 2 that sates "The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. "

Voilà , Pakistan did NOT commit "terrorism" when it helped kill American troops. CH's, Curtis's et al articles are all farce! In a few days time, expect a glib State Dept. spokespreson take pains to parse "violent extremism" as meaning different from to "engage in terrorist activity" as a rationale to protect Pakistan. Case shut, Pakistan continues as our important non-nato ally. Murderous Pakistani army once again goes scot free, protected and shielded by the GOTUS. As I had said earlier, Pakistan is untouchable. Slap me silly!

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

jrjrao wrote:Bruce Reidel

)Rational
September 27th, 2011
9:15 am

I think we screwed up with both Afghanistan and Pakistan back in the 80s when we turned the Soviet war in Afghanistan into their Vietnam, but let the Pakistanis take credit for it. They learned they could screw us over with impunity, and the Afghanis thought when we came in after the fact and took credit for everything that we were full of it. Funneling the weapons through Pakistan was probably a necessity, but we should have figured out a way to let the Afghan people know where they came from. Then MAYBE they wouldn’t be using those same weapons against us now. Just my thoughts on the matter. Oh, and as far as Pakistan goes, we could just cut off their aide, and let India know we won’t stand in the way if they get expansionist ideas.

kasthuri wrote:

Fundamental lies exposed in splintering U.S.-Pakistan alliance

Commentary: Lara Logan is chief foreign correspondent for CBS News.

The U.S. relationship with Pakistan is unraveling.

This began when Osama bin Laden took a Navy SEAL bullet to his chest and then his head.

In that moment, the lie that has defined this relationship was exposed. And it became a matter of time before this relationship had to be redefined.

The unraveling is a slow and fascinating descent. The truth lies somewhere at the bottom of a very black pool thick with the blood of American soldiers.

Finally, when it is all exposed and there is no more pretense, we might be able to honor those who have died in Afghanistan. Until that point, their deaths are a stain on our national pride and everything that America is supposed to represent.

Because we sent our own into harm's way in Afghanistan, without telling them or the country that it was an impossible fight.

And it is not impossible because there is no way to defeat the enemy. It is impossible for two simple reasons. First, the enemy is inside Pakistan, not Afghanistan; Second, only one side is fighting a war -- and it's not us.

Somewhere along the way we stopped believing it was possible to defeat the Taliban and its allies because we found ourselves trapped in a war with no end, where we could not rely on our allies and all that blood and treasure seemed to be squandered for no reason.

The truth is it became impossible to defeat the Taliban because of a political decision - and agreement with Pakistan - not to target the enemy leadership and fighters once they crossed the Afghan border into Pakistan. Not because they are so powerful or popular or important to Afghanistan. But because they are protected by a supposed U.S. ally, Pakistan, who offered to help us defeat al Qaeda instead, and by a terrible U.S. political miscalculation, probably based in arrogance - and ignorance.

The truth is also that the U.S. and NATO stopped fighting a war in Afghanistan the moment Kabul fell and Osama bin Laden was able to escape Tora Bora and slip across the border to safety inside Pakistan. The U.S. stopped fighting a war and instead came up with another name - "counter-insurgency." That was just another politically-motivated excuse not to face reality or make the tough decisions that needed to be made.

There was no such self-deception on the other side. The Taliban and its allies were very clear on where they stood: They were at war, fighting to regain control of their country and defeat then U.S. anywhere and everywhere they could be reached.

While we pretended that building schools and roads was the answer and the path to peace and a better future for all in Afghanistan, our enemies were training and recruiting and perfecting their tactics and performance on the battlefield.

While we were lying to ourselves and calling this fight a counter-insurgency, the Taliban were rallying their supporters and troops with a call to arms, a fight to the death, a war with America.

When you can send 10 or 15 or even 30 suicide bombers into a battle with the U.S. or an attack on an American base -- as the Taliban have repeatedly -- those fighters are not poor men looking to make a quick buck.

Do not accept that there is no way to counter U.S. enemies like the Haqqani network, which has come to attention since the recent attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

Cell phones link Pakistan to U.S. embassy attack

There is a way and it is very simple. The Haqqani network does not exist without the Haqqanis.

Your "partners" in the Pakistani military, your "allies" in the Pakistani security establishment know where they are on a daily, if not hourly basis.

There is no "Haqqani network" without the Haqqanis.

When you can rally dozens of troops to set off into the most unforgiving mountains in the middle of winter, to lay in wait in the freezing cold, without the comfort of a warm fire and hot food and lie in wait for an attack on a remote American outpost, just so you can have the greatest degree of surprise and chance of success, then you are not dealing with men who are frustrated with government corruption and are just looking to make some money.

You are in the midst of a serious, full-blown war and to have any chance of defeating your enemy, at the very least you have to recognize that you are not in a campaign-style battle for the support of the population. You are, in fact, in the midst of a full-blown all-out war that you cannot afford to lose.

You have not won. You are not yet safe. You have not sent a message to the world that you will not be attacked in the way America was attacked on 9/11. You have not convinced people across the globe that you are serious, that you will not tolerate any incursion or loss of life on your soil, no matter what. You have not said to the world in no uncertain terms that you will prevail no matter what.

Instead, you have lied to yourself. You have changed the name of "war" to counter-insurgency even when the very definition of the terms denies the simple facts - that the Taliban is not an "insurgent" group trying to overthrown a legitimate government. That they were the government when the U.S. got involved and they are now fighting a war to regain the power they lost to their enemies, because of the U.S. bombing campaign in 2001.

If this sounds like a call to arms, it is not.

It is simply a statement of truth. All it what it is. If you are not prepared to fight a war, do not send your troops to war.

If you are not prepared to kill your enemy where they stand, in Afghanistan or Pakistan, by whatever means possible, then do not lie to your troops and your nation and pretend you are at war.

Do not lie to the Afghan people and pretend you are there for them.

Get out. Go home.

And live with the consequences

In 1947, as soon as Pakistan was born, in operation
'Gulmarg', the Pakistani Punjabi Army Generals trained the tribal, &
local militia from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and sent them to attack an
unprepared Kashmir. They occupied a big chunk of it and it still remains
occupied by Pakistan.

The objective was to capture Kashmir
with its principal city Srinagar. Maj Gen Akbar Khan was made commander.
Deputy commissioners & political agents, invited each tribe in NWFP
& FATA to form 'lashkars' of thousand men each for invading Jammu
& Kashmir for plunder.

The lashkars were formed at Bannu,
Wana, Thal, Kohat, Peshawar and Nowshera. They were trained and armed by
the local Brigade commanders from the Army stocks. Two regular army
officers, and some solders disguised as tribal, were provided to each
lashkar. The lashkars were to assemble at a segregated area near the now
infamous Abbottabad where they were to be briefed and dispersed for the
various missions.

Also, since the beginning (1947), the
Pashtun in Afghanistan & Pakistan disregarded the artificial &
whimsical British Durand line that divided the Pashtun. They wanted and
still want an independent Pashtunistan.

In future, if the
British mistakes were corrected and the three independent nations,
Pashtunistan, Baluchistan and Sindh were created, most of the problems
will dissolve and the region, devoid of the Punjabi manipulations &
exploitations, will be peaceful & will flourish.

Throughout
1950s and early 60s, Pakistani Punjabi Army constantly fought with the
Pashtun using American weapons under the pretext of fighting Communism.
US was not pleased because the Pashtun asked for Soviet help. The
American press blamed Pakistan for driving Afghanistan into the Soviet
camp.

In 1950s, the foxy Pakistan Punjabi Army supported &
armed the non-Pashtun in Afghanistan/Pakistan to fight the Pashtun.
With the rise of Taliban (mainly Pashtun) movement, the Pakistani
Punjabi Army shifted it's support to the Pashtun dominated Taliban. The
Pakistani Punjabi Generals use the brave Pashtun as cannon-fodder, as
insignificant people who can be sacrificed for the goals & good of
the Punjabi.
So, it's time to expose the Pakistani Army/ISI propaganda that blames others.

Altair wrote:I was talking to an NGO guy working for Balochis, and Chinese talk came up. This fellow had considerable experience in China and their activities inside Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. He mentioned that China does not need Pakistan for any reason whatsoever to screw India. China had more sympathizers inside India than Pakistan can ever dream of.
A couple of terrorist attacks on India in a calender year is not going to slow Indian development by any stretch and the Chinese know it. He mentioned however that Chinese are in Pakistan for only putting an end to Unkils influence on Af-Pak and they are succeeding. Chinese always have had a plan for the Americans in the subcontinent. It was the Americans who never got the message.
It all makes sense to me now. After the phone call to stop the truck bombing, I am willing to bet, Chinese gave a go ahead to Pakis. I dont think this is about Haqqanis at all. This is Chinese kicking the American ass out of South Asia. This whole thing was a setup.

arun wrote:In the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mohammadden clerics of the Barelvi School of the Sunni Mohammaddenism who have been touted in the recent past as being less fanatical than their counterparts of the Deobandi School of the Sunni sect, declare Jihad on the US:

Fatwa for Jihad against America

He was disappointed when a major Pakistani offensive planned against Haqqani fighters in key tribal areas didn't happen, and a string of attacks by the militant group in recent weeks forced Adm. Mullen to drop his practice of refraining from public criticism of Pakistan. Even now, though, he stressed that while Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has provided strategic support to the Haqqanis, they don't necessarily control the details of the militant group's operations. "It is very clear they have supported them," Adm. Mullen said. "I don't think the Haqqanis can be turned on and off like a light switch. But there are steps that could be taken to impact the Haqqanis over time."

In Pakistan, Adm. Mullen was often praised for what was seen as his willingness to listen to Pakistan's concerns, and his efforts to address them. But the Pakistani view of Adm. Mullen has dimmed somewhat, particularly after last week's remarks.

Adm. Mike Mullen’s assertion last week that an anti-American insurgent group in Afghanistan is a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s spy service was overstated and contributed to overheated reactions in Pakistan and misperceptions in Washington, according to American officials involved in U.S. policy in the region.

The internal criticism by the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they did not want to challenge Mullen openly, reflects concern over the accuracy of Mullen’s characterizations at a time when Obama administration officials have been frustrated in their efforts to persuade Pakistan to break its ties to Afghan insurgent groups.

Mullen’s language “overstates the case,” said a senior Pentagon official with access to classified intelligence files on Pakistan, because there is scant evidence of direction or control. If anything, the official said, the intelligence indicates that Pakistan treads a delicate if duplicitous line, providing support to insurgent groups including the Haqqani network but avoiding actions that would provoke a U.S. response.

“The Pakistani government has been dealing with Haqqani for a long time and still sees strategic value in guiding Haqqani and using them for their purposes,” the Pentagon official said. But “it’s not in their interest to inflame us in a way that an attack on a [U.S.] compound would do.”

Anantha wrote:Shiv, Altair
Agreeing to both of you can one say this then?
Alqeeda, Haqani etc are Chinese proxies floated via Paki Army
Uighuribans, LeT are US proxies floated/sponsored by Khan saab (against China/India)
TS army takes money from China and Unkil to do supari work

Altair wrote:I was talking to an NGO guy working for Balochis, and Chinese talk came up. This fellow had considerable experience in China and their activities inside Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. He mentioned that China does not need Pakistan for any reason whatsoever to screw India. China had more sympathizers inside India than Pakistan can ever dream of.
A couple of terrorist attacks on India in a calender year is not going to slow Indian development by any stretch and the Chinese know it. He mentioned however that Chinese are in Pakistan for only putting an end to Unkils influence on Af-Pak and they are succeeding. Chinese always have had a plan for the Americans in the subcontinent. It was the Americans who never got the message.
It all makes sense to me now. After the phone call to stop the truck bombing, I am willing to bet, Chinese gave a go ahead to Pakis. I dont think this is about Haqqanis at all. This is Chinese kicking the American ass out of South Asia. This whole thing was a setup.

arun wrote:The Government of the United States commences a circumspect back pedalling move to disown the stinging criticism of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan by its very own Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.

The reflexive US instinct to mollycoddle their Major Non NATO Ally it appears is simply too strong :

Adm. Mike Mullen’s assertion last week that an anti-American insurgent group in Afghanistan is a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s spy service was overstated and contributed to overheated reactions in Pakistan and misperceptions in Washington, according to American officials involved in U.S. policy in the region.

From the Washington Post:

Clicky

Dipanker wrote:

Adm. Mike Mullen’s assertion last week that an anti-American insurgent group in Afghanistan is a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s spy service was overstated and contributed to overheated reactions in Pakistan and misperceptions in Washington, according to American officials involved in U.S. policy in the region.

From the Washington Post:

Clicky

[

Amazing! Paki still has sympathizers left in US establishment. When are these idiots going to learn.

Prem wrote:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.as ... 2011_pg3_2
Poakers Remain Jokers

By the evening, the first roll call was ordered in our barrack. It was a CRP Havaldar who was yelling around. Major Jaffar Khan (retired as Brigadier, is in Rawalpindi and an ardent polo player) was standing aloof not seeming to hear. The Havaldar howled again. Jaffar Khan refused, telling him firmly and properly, “I am an officer and will not fall in under your orders.”

the height of Pakistan’s crisis in relations with the United States, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani reminded his Chinese guest of the words he had used to describe its relationship with China. ”Pak-China friendship is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey.” In a press release issued by the prime minister’s office during a visit to Islamabad by Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, Gilani also promised China that “‘your friends are our friends, your enemies are our enemies and your security is our security.”( Pokers putting hand in Hu's pocket)
It was language designed to show that even after Admiral Mike Mullen’s assertion that the Afghan militant Haqqani network was effectively a proxy of the Pakistan army, China – Pakistan’s “all weather friend” – stood at its side. The Pakistan media enthusiastically played up Meng’s visit, jumping on a relatively small offer of financial help and a dreamed-of defence pact with China to build up hopes of Chinese support.Faced with such hyperbole, I flipped across to the website of the People’s Daily to see what it had to say about Pakistan. At the time I looked, there was no mention of Pakistan. It did however give prominence to a story about China and India holding a strategic dialogue to build economic ties.The comparison is instructive in so many ways.
First of all Pakistan is not the centre of the world even though those of us who cover it tend to think it is. And China is a big country, setting itself on a trajectory to outstrip the United States. It pays far less attention to India than India does to China, let alone becoming as obsessed with Pakistan’s problems as Pakistan is with casting China in the role of saviour.
Secondly, Pakistan has consistently over-estimated the support it is likely to get from China for decades. As far back as its 1965 war with India – launched in a failed bid to wrest control of Kashmir – it misjudged China’s willingness to intervene on its behalf. At the time, Pakistan-China relations were riding high. China had just inflicted a humiliating defeat on India in a 1962 border war. Pakistan had then – in Indian eyes – added insult to injury by reaching a provisional border agreement with China and agreeing to build the strategic Karakoram Highway to link it properly to India’s enemy. Yet during the 1965 war, Pakistan’s expectations of Chinese help were proved disastrously wrong.At the time of the 1971 war with India – a crisis bigger than the one faced by Pakistan today – China gave no military support when Pakistan was split in two with Indian backing to carve out the new country of Bangladesh. The United States gave little real help, either, beyond deploying the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal - something that is bitterly remembered by Pakistan – but somehow China’s own record was forgotten.
Indeed history is so stacked up in favour of the argument that Pakistan has consistently over-estimated its likely support from China that it is hard to believe the Pakistan government does not know this already. If it had any doubts it would have cleared these up when the government first sought Chinese financial help in 2008 only to be rebuffed and sent packing to the IMF - a decision which left Pakistan more vulnerable to U.S. influence.And even without the historical evidence, it would be clear that China’s concerns about Pakistan-based Islamist militants focused on its own Xinjiang province would mean that Beijing would be unlikely to come out all guns blazing in defence of Pakistan’s right to tolerate or support groups like the Haqqani network. China is also steadily building economic relations with India – which if anything is even more sensitive than the United States to any hint of tolerance for militant groups by Pakistan or its allies.In other words, it is reasonable to assume the Pakistan government knows full well that there are limits to Chinese support in its confrontation with the United States. And that by extension its “higher than mountains, deeper than oceans” talk is designed for a domestic audience.And this is where it gets even more interesting. What does the government’s public language about China tell us about Pakistan and particularly its civilian-military relations?
Step back for a moment and consider that Mullen’s comments have created a huge nationalistic backlash in Pakistan. Whether by design or default, the biggest beneficiary of this backlash is the Pakistan army as the one institution which can defend the country against any American military attack. (Watch this “war video” clip from Pakistan television celebrating the prowess of Pakistan’s armed forces to see how the American threats are being played domestically.)