Indian Navy News & Discussion - 03 July 2018

[lakshmanM]

It's just hard to believe. GRSE is offering top-notch stealth tech for new ASW-SWC corvette - RF/IR signature reduction, carbon composite superstructure, and low acoustic signature propulsion system. Meanwhile, our "next generation stealth" frigate is straight out of the 80s (not the good 80s). This can't be the real P17A design.
Image is from a Facebook page, but, I do agree with most of the points (IRSS is there).

[nam]

Nothing wrong with external boat. There might be operation reason. RCS does not increase due to that.

The assumption about surface reflection is just that assumption. None of the surface will be at 90 degrees.

The radar mast as shown in the CGI, I presume cannot be achieved with the current version of MF-STAR. In the CGI, the radar face is too small.

The sensors on the radar mast does not add RCS and any reflection will probably be lost in the sea clutter. To build a integrated mast, we need to have control over the entire suite of sensors on it. We integrate sensors from different country, so it not is not possible to have Zumwalt style mast at this moment.

The idea would be create reduced reflection, not Indian Zumwalt frigate.

[John]

The radar mast as shown in the CGI, I presume cannot be achieved with the current version of MF-STAR. In the CGI, the radar face is too small.

I would not go off dimensions in initial CGI to indicate the design is viable it is just a CGI and this was released very early, P-15B initial CGI had even smaller faces (however the initial CGI turned out to be pretty close to final design overall no surprise there). Plus we don't have clear picture of the CGI of the P-17A in the GRSE poster which i suspect is little more accurate than the initial CGI.

[titash]

I believe there are very specific reasons why the MDL model is what will land up being built by BOTH yards:

1) The mast is not a smooth pyramidal mast as shown in the GRSE graphics image; that graphics image originally came out 4-5 years ago in a TV interview by Rear Admiral KN Vaidyanathan, Director of Naval Design. Me thinks GRSE simply stole that image for this ceremony. Check out the link below; and by the way, this design only has 1 helicopter and is quite inaccurate.

https://youtu.be/7axAL3qHaNI

2) The mast for the ELTA 2248 radar is already designed and integrated for the Kolkata/Vishakapatnam class warships of similar hull size. This is not just about stealth, but also radar horizon height, topweight, cooling, etc. Why re-solve that problem again?

3) I heard on many occasions that the Shivalik stealthy design imposed unacceptable operational limitations on the usage of boats, torpedo tubes, etc. That's why they got rid of the large hangar/curtain doors and exposed the ugly insides in this updated design. This is also why the P-15A/B ships have similar non-stealthy looks amidships

4) IRLs are mandatory for quick reaction close range ASW, last ditch torpedo hard-kill defence, anti-diver ops, and shore bombardment. Too useful a weapon to get rid off

5) The model doesn't do a great job but the IR suppressors remain the same as P-17

So all-in-all, stealth is great but not if it's a pain in the a$$ for day-to-day operations.

It's just hard to believe. GRSE is offering top-notch stealth tech for new ASW-SWC corvette - RF/IR signature reduction, carbon composite superstructure, and low acoustic signature propulsion system. Meanwhile, our "next generation stealth" frigate is straight out of the 80s (not the good 80s). This can't be the real P17A design.
Image is from a Facebook page, but, I do agree with most of the points (IRSS is there).

[John]

^ Is any of that based on reported factual information or just opinions? As it stands we don’t have any confirmation which model is being used by which SY. Let’s wait for more concrete information before we speculate endlessly on this.

unacceptable operational limitations on the usage of boats, torpedo tubes

P-28 have same of the same features as P-17 ( in fact it was redesigned to add these features) so hence I wanted to see if your post is based on reported factual information.

[ramana]

tsarkar does the old standard of 1000 tonnes displacement per aircraft still hold for modern carriers?

[chola]

no doubt this class will also face the same fate. stopping at 3 or 4 is a chicken egg problem - low volume will impose high costs. costs can only be amortized over large build nos. the initial tranches of anything including JSF is costing more.

if they want low cost why not build a leander2 class and fit modern weapons on it

GD, those are classic concerns of our shipbuilding and it is proper to bring them up.

BUT the P-17A project does a LOT to remedy those very concerns you brought up.

1) the run will be 7 instead of 3 or 4 (okay could be more but it’s a start),

2) parallel construction in multiple yards in MDL and GRSE just like Bath and Ingalls for the DDG51 that you mentioned,

3) and module construction method that the US and other Western industries use to ensure uniformity across yards and decrease build time.

[Paul]

tsarkar does the old standard of 1000 tonnes displacement per aircraft still hold for modern carriers?

One aircraft carrier per 1Trillion of GDP is a reasonable metric.

[chola]

tsarkar does the old standard of 1000 tonnes displacement per aircraft still hold for modern carriers?

One aircraft carrier per 1Trillion of GDP is a reasonable metric.

Nominal or PPP? We’ll be at par once the Vikrant comes onboard if we use nominal exchange rate for GDP.

If PPP, we’ll need the Vikrant and 8 more . . .

[Karthik S]

tsarkar does the old standard of 1000 tonnes displacement per aircraft still hold for modern carriers?

One aircraft carrier per 1Trillion of GDP is a reasonable metric.

Then 20 CVNs for USN?

[Singha]

They would have that today if the cold war had continued.
After the end of nimitz class funding the pace is slow and numbers down to what 10 now from a peak of 13 ?

I dont think they will reduce it further due to conflicts with russia plus china

[hnair]

3) I heard on many occasions that the Shivalik stealthy design imposed unacceptable operational limitations on the usage of boats, torpedo tubes, etc. That's why they got rid of the large hangar/curtain doors and exposed the ugly insides in this updated design. This is also why the P-15A/B ships have similar non-stealthy looks amidships

More or less what one hears about khan's vast fleet of DDG51 class - that ship's superstructure look so cluttered and anti-modern, it is as bad as a WWII cruiser! Yet the general view with service folks around the world is that it is a very sneaky ship for radars. I think unlike the USAF, khan's Navy went into basics of sea keeping and magazine size, with stealth as an after thought. Khan principal surface combatants are not going to fight alone and hence they can afford to do that, unlike the oiropean or ASEAN ones.

Mixed feelings about IN's approach in discarding that soothing side shutters - instead of refining the issues, it is discarding a design, but it is good that unachievable stealth objectives are not coming in the way of a good re-design based on primary operational needs

[brar_w]

I think unlike the USAF, khan's Navy went into basics of sea keeping and magazine size, with stealth as an after thought.

I don't think that is an accurate characterization of where the USN's modern designs are. For instance see the DDG-1000 and CGX concepts both of which incorporate stealth heavily. DDG-51 Flight-II and the new Flight-III are vessels that are sort of limited in term of what you could do to them because they are upgrades to a proven design. The Flight III is essentially a BMD system and a missile/sensor truck. We will know more in terms of where they want to head in the future when we begin to see design solutions for the Large Surface Combatant program(possible in the next 1-2 years) that the US Navy just kick started which not directly aimed at but is largely considered a Ticonderoga replacement.

They would have that today if the cold war had continued.
After the end of nimitz class funding the pace is slow and numbers down to what 10 now from a peak of 13 ?

I dont think they will reduce it further due to conflicts with russia plus china

Congress requires an 11 operational carrier force in the long run and the dip is temporary as the Ford class ramps up. With a shift to buying 2 carriers at a time, thereby reducing build times from 5 down to 3 years they can potentially have 12 Nimitz+Ford class carriers by late 2020s-early 2030s. That will likely be the upper bounds as you also have to take into account that the 45,000 ton class Americas with its capability to surge up with up to 20 F-35Bs is a significant capability boost compared to the Essex class so that can meet carrier surge requirements when deployed with a carrier escort group.

[vera_k]

After the end of nimitz class funding the pace is slow and numbers down to what 10 now from a peak of 13 ?

Metric seems like a good one. There are 20 if the conventional powered ones are included. The smaller ones are about the size of the Vikrant under construction.

[titash]

I think unlike the USAF, khan's Navy went into basics of sea keeping and magazine size, with stealth as an after thought.

I don't think that is an accurate characterization of where the USN's modern designs are. For instance see the DDG-1000 and CGX concepts both of which incorporate stealth heavily. DDG-51 Flight-II and the new Flight-III are vessels that are sort of limited in term of what you could do to them because they are upgrades to a proven design. The Flight III is essentially a BMD system and a missile/sensor truck. We will know more in terms of where they want to head in the future when we begin to see design solutions for the Large Surface Combatant program(possible in the next 1-2 years) that the US Navy just kick started which not directly aimed at but is largely considered a Ticonderoga replacement.

brar-ji, that is precisely the point. Stealth is a plus, no doubt. But large well armed ocean-going missile/sensor trucks will also do the job just fine if they are present in numbers and delivered on-time.

The plus points from the P-17A project are:
1. multiple yards i.e. second source
2. consistent break-even batch size of 3-4 ships per yard per design, in line with IN philosophy
3. modular construction
4. powerful AAW suite with AESA Multifunction Radar and Long Range VLS SAM battery
5. powerful ASuW suite with 8 BrahMos missiles and 127 mm gun
6. powerful ASW capabilities with 2 SeaHawks and Atlas ATAS (both finally on order I believe)
7. ASW self-defence suite comprises RBU-6000, Mareech, and hopefully 2x3 torpedo tubes will also be installed when the stealthy shutters go away
8. Cost optimized, non-Russian, reliable propulsion with boost Gas Turbines (GE) and economical cruise diesels (MAN)

Overall a solid design; the hull's sea keeping, engine reliability, and crew comfort have been validated with the 3 Shivaliks for the last 7 odd years. The stealth shutters go away due to operational experience wherein it was learnt the hard way that the gain in stealth is not worth the loss in operational efficiency.

Warship design is ultimately a trade off, and it makes sense to get a powerful reliable design in numbers to sea, rather than continue to experiment with every single design. Let the P-18 be the IN's Zumwalt design...

[Singha]

yes i had forgotten the LHD ships most of ADS size and packing JSF-Bs and UCAVs soon. will pack a fair sized bite to deal with medium threats alone.

[ramana]

I don't think that is an accurate characterization of where the USN's modern designs are. For instance see the DDG-1000 and CGX concepts both of which incorporate stealth heavily. DDG-51 Flight-II and the new Flight-III are vessels that are sort of limited in term of what you could do to them because they are upgrades to a proven design. The Flight III is essentially a BMD system and a missile/sensor truck. We will know more in terms of where they want to head in the future when we begin to see design solutions for the Large Surface Combatant program(possible in the next 1-2 years) that the US Navy just kick started which not directly aimed at but is largely considered a Ticonderoga replacement.

brar-ji, that is precisely the point. Stealth is a plus, no doubt. But large well armed ocean-going missile/sensor trucks will also do the job just fine if they are present in numbers and delivered on-time.

The plus points from the P-17A project are:
1. multiple yards i.e. second source
2. consistent break-even batch size of 3-4 ships per yard per design, in line with IN philosophy
3. modular construction
4. powerful AAW suite with AESA Multifunction Radar and Long Range VLS SAM battery
5. powerful ASuW suite with 8 BrahMos missiles and 127 mm gun
6. powerful ASW capabilities with 2 SeaHawks and Atlas ATAS (both finally on order I believe)
7. ASW self-defence suite comprises RBU-6000, Mareech, and hopefully 2x3 torpedo tubes will also be installed when the stealthy shutters go away
8. Cost optimized, non-Russian, reliable propulsion with boost Gas Turbines (GE) and economical cruise diesels (MAN)

Overall a solid design; the hull's sea keeping, engine reliability, and crew comfort have been validated with the 3 Shivaliks for the last 7 odd years. The stealth shutters go away due to operational experience wherein it was learnt the hard way that the gain in stealth is not worth the loss in operational efficiency.

Warship design is ultimately a trade off, and it makes sense to get a powerful reliable design in numbers to sea, rather than continue to experiment with every single design. Let the P-18 be the IN's Zumwalt design...

Titash, Thanks for putting things in perspective.
May be the P17A program will be way of the future IN procurement of capital ships.
This is the type of thinking that is needed.

[ramana]

Titash and John,
Can I ask you both to lead a discussion on IN force structure along with tsarkar's guidance?
What are the threats and what type of force is needed to respond to the threats?
I also would like a proactive force requirements discussion.
Trying to get back rigor in our discussion threads.

And keep the Coast Guard in mind too.

[nam]

So fundamentally we have two designs P15B & P17A, which are all purpose are close in functions. We should just take P17A design and churn out frigate/destroyer on the same base design.

If we consider p17+p17A+p15A+p15B= 17 vessels. A base design would have reduced cost and possibly faster deliveries.

[Philip]

3 CVs ( 2 Vikrant class, no 2 a little larger) , 3-4 amphibs with STOVL or NLCA capability as well ,3-4 new CGs to accompany the 3 CBGs, (with a heavy load of various missiles in US style VLS modules which can accommodate various missile types) 12+ DDGs ( Delhis and Rajput replacements including ABMs) , 24 FFGs (P-17/A, Talwars,B class),12 FFLs ( P-28s) along with 12 NOPVs, 12 to 16 missile corvettes to replace the Khukri/Koras, 16 inshore ASW corvettes, 24 MCMs,24 FAC(M)s replacing the Tarantulas. 8 LSTs, around 20+ LCT/I/Us and miscellaneous patrol craft.
Subs: 6 SSBNs ( Arihant variants) , 6 new SSNs, 3-4 SSGNs ( Akulas on lease), plus 16 to 20 conv./ AIPsubs of Kilos/ Ru new type, 6 Scorpenes and 6 new German U- boats.A dozen mini-subs and a few squadrons of UW drones are also essential for constant monitoring on approaches to bases anx poets,chokepoints, island territories,etc.

The CG's OPVs should also be tasked, designed for fitment with ASW TAS and missiles during wartime.Some vessels also equipped with mine- countermeasure eqpt. like UW drones, etc.In a crisis they should complement the INs warships in defending the coastline and key naval bases, ports and onshore coastal facilities like N-power plants,refineries, etc.

While the sub fleets should be the top priority, the Fleet Air Arm requires e tra P-8Is, TU-22M3 Backfires (upgraded version) ,extra upgraded IL-38s ( for low and slow ASW ops) plus a few dozen LTA sized maritime/EW aircraft of the C-295 type.The DO-228s are available but have limitations.For maritime AWACS and EW, new IL-76-90 birds- same platform as the extra Phalcons, fitted with our indigenously developed slab EW radar along with EW eqpt. would have enough range and endurance to sanitise the IOR at a considerable distance from the maiinland/ islands.LR UAVs will assist in recce, though armed maritime UCAVs will not be able to carry contemp. ASMs like BMos or Nirbhay, better suited to Backfires and naval fighters.We have to develop the mindset that the Indian sub-continent is the perfect "unsinkable"CV from whete a host of IN and IAF aircraft can operate from carrying the most lethal weaponry. Around 8-10 large amphib. aircraft - a few US-2s along with some ASW equipped BE-200s will be able to operate from and service our island territories and assist in sea-rep.

Just a few thoughts.

[Philip]

Assisting the IN in its task of sanitising the IOR are naval facilities in key IOR locationz such as Mauritius, Oman, Indonesia, E.African coast/ Madagascar , the Maldives and ousting the Chins in Lanka.Recent political events in Male and Colombo give us a window of opportunity to capitalise on the floundering Chin attempts to install their puppets.The GOI should apply a " full- court-press" in both nations as of yesterday.

[ramana]

The CV are with ski jump or catapult.
You have not given threat these forces will challenge?
First let me ask and you reply.
In naval terms what should be the objective of the Indian Navy?

[souravB]

Assisting the IN in its task of sanitising the IOR are naval facilities in key IOR locationz such as Mauritius, Oman, Indonesia, E.African coast/ Madagascar , the Maldives and ousting the Chins in Lanka.Recent political events in Male and Colombo give us a window of opportunity to capitalise on the floundering Chin attempts to install their puppets.The GOI should apply a " full- court-press" in both nations as of yesterday.

I am generally a silent lurker in this forum but I like this idea of Philip saab so much that I am tempted to add my 2 paise. To add to his point, We should also be strengthening our CG in such a way that till A&N in east, LD in west and Sri Lanka in south should be the playground of our CG and IN ships can be free to deploy outside of this area.
The acoustic and other sensors should be placed along this line and ships other than Indian must only enter with our blessings. We must treat those two seas as any lake inside our country.
Most of the Naval deployments should be outwards of this region. These three strategic points A&N, LD and one point in Sri Lanka must be developed for Air bases which caters to IN aviation as well as IAF. Tejas would be a very nice fit for this particular role.
We must cajole Sri Lanka to let us set up that base even if that mean we concede something or force them.
We, for now can and should be making a statement that BoB and Ar.Sea is ours and ours alone and everybody else is a guest here.

[ramana]

Ok. I am going to press gang you to write a policy paper.
So start thinking on those lines.

[John]

Overall a solid design; the hull's sea keeping, engine reliability, and crew comfort have been validated with the 3 Shivaliks for the last 7 odd years. The stealth shutters go away due to operational experience wherein it was learnt the hard way that the gain in stealth is not worth the loss in operational efficiency.

Titash i don't agree with that assessment stealth shutters might not have worked out but that doesn't mean exposing both torpedo tubes and RHIB are the way to go. Kamorta class has already solved that issue by incorporating a design that encloses the tubes and X shaped hull that cover the RHIBs. Spent 1.2 billion dollars on these corvette we should definitely use some of lessons learned from it to apply those design features including the composite mast to P-17A asap. Especially since GRSE is the one that built them in first place.

I stand by my earlier comment i believe they building two different designs for P-17A and i believe a similar approach is playing out with the ASuW vessels.

Titash and John,
Can I ask you both to lead a discussion on IN force structure along with tsarkar's guidance?
What are the threats and what type of force is needed to respond to the threats?
I also would like a proactive force requirements discussion.

Sure i will come with more formal post. But I would start out by saying IN should focus on standardizing around 6000 Ton multi purpose Frigate design which utilizes heavy automation to allow crew size of around 200 and should be cranking them out in batches of 12 over 4 years. IMO building heavy DDGs/Cruisers and super carriers to keep pace with China is foolish due to size of latter budget.

[Philip]

Threat forces the combined PN and PLAN. I do not envisage any spat with the USN at all but for argument's sake such a force level would make any superpower think twice before venturing against us.

The third CV should have a ski-jump like the VikA and Vikrant-2.This will allow easy interoperability and switching of aircraft as one goes in for maintenance/ refit. Once the US gets its carrier UCAV acct together in the next decade, we can assess and evaluate the optimum size of CV that the IN will need.A mixed fleet of manned fighters and UCAVs appears to be the next evolution of the carrier.As so much of hardware is aboard a CV which demands a large escort, it becomes the most tempting target for the enemy, esp. heavily armed N-subs.3 med. sized subs plus 3 to 4 amphibs with STOVL / NLCA capability would be quite adequate to deal with the PN/ PLAN combine in the IOR.

Our primary objective should be total domination of the IOR and securing our energy supplies from the Gulf and ME.A UW pipeline from Iran must be the next big deal after Chahbahar.We should expand our land storage requirements to way beyond the current 9 day reserves , buying hugely when prices are v.low. Keeping the SLOCs open the other side of the coin.Here we are along with the rest of the west.Everyone except the Chins want open seas.A closer relationship with the OZ navy is needed as they have good capability and the natural enemy of China as it tries to dominate the Asia-Pacific.The problem is getting the Indonesians and OZ to work together as they consider each as a rival.

Forward basing reqd. in the ASEAN countries to thwart the PLAN in its own backyard , in the Indo- China Sea, should it interfere in any Indo- Pak spat and make advances in the NEast or Ladakh.We have an arrangement with S'pore for naval logistic support which is v.good.Indo- Spore naval exercises are at an advanced ASW level too. A robust defence relationship with Vietnam is needed with 3- D facilities for our naval assets incl. sub. logistics. We need to beef up their defence just as China does with Pak.The Viets must be given civilian N-tech too ( read between the lines) apart from BMos, other desi missiles and mil. hatdware. The Chins are to develop a deep- water port in Burma to ship their oil there and by pipeline to S.China thus avoiding the "Malacca dilemma" chokepoint.Imagine if the Chins also lay a pipeline from H'tota to Burma! This is why Hambantota Port and thousands of hectares adjoining it under exclusive Chin control where they can set up an airstrip and huge logistic and repair facilities, oil storage (just like the WW2 oil tank farm at Trinco) for the PLAN is so vital to them, explainibg their pilitical games in SL where they've used tons of boodle to buy out venal and corrupt Lankan politicos.We must wargame a total air and naval blockafe of the island for the future if the GOSL makes moves to allow the stationing of PLAN assets and regular visits to its ports.An eco. squeeze on the GOSL and combined dpl. actions in concert with the US/ West is reqd.The recently ousted Ranil W govt. was on the verge of placing an order for a Russian frigate which the Chins wanted to scuttle at any cost.A strong Ru defence relationship with Russia...and India is abhorrent to them, as we are already building the SLNs OPVs having delivered 2 so far.

The GOI should at all costs prevent the Trinco oil tank farm from being given to the Chins.This is the secret plan of the Sirisena- Rajapakse gang for which the Chins will provide them with boodle for survival.With the Colombo Port City, H'tota and Trinco too in their pockets,plus a presence in Burma and possibly in BDesh- to whom it has given old subs, India would be gravely threatened and encircled by China in our very own backyard.Of all nations, SL is the key to neutralising India.Remember that the Europeans conquered India through their naval power starting 500 yrs. ago and it was through S.India that they proceeded to finally rule the entire country.

[titash]

John - your thought process is certainly an option, but I would wager against it. The Shivaliks don't have the large HWTs that the Kamorta class has as their primary ASW weapons. Add a magazine and reload mechanism and that is quite a bit of space eating into what is essentially a Shivalik repeat. At max you may see 2x3 LWTs for close in work nearby where the boats are. Also not sure if the stealth design lends itself to the X-form modification that can hide the boats and LWTs. I'm assuming someone has run the RCS before finalizing the models.

We'll know if there are 2 designs or not by 2022 anyways, but the mast form for the ELTA 2248 radar on the MDL model is a repeat of the Kolkata/Vishakaptnam class, and appears much more credible than the GRSE smooth form factor.

Did you happen to see the video on my previous post? It looks like the GRSE CGI is from some CNN IBN news interview...

Overall a solid design; the hull's sea keeping, engine reliability, and crew comfort have been validated with the 3 Shivaliks for the last 7 odd years. The stealth shutters go away due to operational experience wherein it was learnt the hard way that the gain in stealth is not worth the loss in operational efficiency.

Titash i don't agree with that assessment stealth shutters might not have worked out but that doesn't mean exposing both torpedo tubes and RHIB are the way to go. Kamorta class has already solved that issue by incorporating a design that encloses the tubes and X shaped hull that cover the RHIBs. Spent 1.2 billion dollars on these corvette we should definitely use some of lessons learned from it to apply those design features including the composite mast to P-17A asap. Especially since GRSE is the one that built them in first place.

I stand by my earlier comment i believe they building two different designs for P-17A and i believe a similar approach is playing out with the ASuW vessels.

Titash and John,
Can I ask you both to lead a discussion on IN force structure along with tsarkar's guidance?
What are the threats and what type of force is needed to respond to the threats?
I also would like a proactive force requirements discussion.

Sure i will come with more formal post. But I would start out by saying IN should focus on standardizing around 6000 Ton multi purpose Frigate design which utilizes heavy automation to allow crew size of around 200 and should be cranking them out in batches of 12 over 4 years. IMO building heavy DDGs/Cruisers and super carriers to keep pace with China is foolish due to size of latter budget.

[titash]

Regarding force levels, I see 2 distinct warship lines that more or less do the same job and have the same capabilities:
P-15, P-15A, P-15B...10 ships...Russian/Ukrainian propulsion package with 2 helicopters and general purpose weapons fit on 7000+ tons
P-17, P-17A...10 ships...Western propulsion package with 2 helicopters and general purpose weapons fit on 6000+ tons

These appear to be hedging against sanctions from the west vs. quieting and cost effectiveness. They all do the same job and one ship is as good as another. 14 of these 20 ships are first rate with AEGIS like capabilities.

Talwar...10 ships (batch I, II, III)...Russian/Ukrainian propulsion package with 1 AEW helicopters and armed to the teeth on 3500+ tons. A jack of all trades for showing the flag, intimidating the pakis, etc.

Once the 3 Brahmaputras are decomissioned, there will be no more legacy Leander hulls with steam propulsion (originally 6 + 3+ 3 = 12 units). I bet the Navy will accelerate this process and/or consider selling them. The 5 Rajput hulls have better steel than the Leander hulls and will stay in service until the Vishakapatnam class is fully commissioned. We might see a 1 for 1 decommissioning.

Sure i will come with more formal post. But I would start out by saying IN should focus on standardizing around 6000 Ton multi purpose Frigate design which utilizes heavy automation to allow crew size of around 200 and should be cranking them out in batches of 12 over 4 years. IMO building heavy DDGs/Cruisers and super carriers to keep pace with China is foolish due to size of latter budget.

[hnair]

I think unlike the USAF, khan's Navy went into basics of sea keeping and magazine size, with stealth as an after thought.

I don't think that is an accurate characterization of where the USN's modern designs are. For instance see the DDG-1000 and CGX concepts both of which incorporate stealth heavily. DDG-51 Flight-II and the new Flight-III are vessels that are sort of limited in term of what you could do to them because they are upgrades to a proven design. The Flight III is essentially a BMD system and a missile/sensor truck. We will know more in terms of where they want to head in the future when we begin to see design solutions for the Large Surface Combatant program(possible in the next 1-2 years) that the US Navy just kick started which not directly aimed at but is largely considered a Ticonderoga replacement.

brar_w, clearly, I was not talking about US Navy's modern designs, just what they went with as workhorse design for mass production.

DDG-1000, LCS and Sea Wolf seems like programs that started with big numbers, but became more of an evolutionary midpoint than a full on mass production like the DDG51 or Virginia class. Most probably due to changes in adversarial capabilities and that causes questions to be raised about affordability. Whereas both DDG51 and Virginia class seem to be cost-effective and having acquisitions in vast numbers, atleast two decades from now.

So am not questioning the US Navy's repertoire of modern hull designs, but trying to see if what worked for them has relevance to the change in priority of stealth in P17Bs' newer design

[hnair]

btw, wasn't there some talk for a ski-jump with EMALS, since EMALS allow curved linear motors, unlike steam cats? Is there any downside?

[SaiK]

On ski-jump of indigenous aircraft carrier, IAC-1with Warship Overseer Cmde Cyril.
Inspiring to see giant vessel of great complexity, taking shape; with Indian ingenuity defying all odds. Like Arihant, Navy shows the way, yet again; how to "Make in India". Sea trials by 2020? https://t.co/4dH8JEGZsq

[Prithwiraj]

I think after the fire begining of year INS Shivalik has not gone out in any mission. It must be still in Vizag and possibly going through repairs. In most of the deployment and maritime exercises I have observed two sister ships of Shivalik class but not INS Shivalik

[brar_w]

So am not questioning the US Navy's repertoire of modern hull designs, but trying to see if what worked for them has relevance to the change in priority of stealth in P17Bs' newer design

Good points. I'd leave the LCS out because it wasn't a serious effort at anything other than to give the SecDef at the time (Rumsfeld) the numbers he could go home with. DDG-1000, and CGX were conceived during the cold war and executed after it so the small numbers of the former made it more complicated and expensive just as a lot many other things that barely made it through. That said, the 15K ton DDG-1000 is widely expected to be a baseline for future large surface combatant so that will probably influence the next US Navy ship class heavily so that is a good indication of what they are looking for in terms of a future clean sheet vessel.

[jaysimha]

Updates in Navy website
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/insvalsura/
ETHICS AND ETIQUETTES


-------------------------------------
http://indiannavy.gov.in/nih/home
National Institute of Hydrography, Goa, India.

[Singha]

what are the pros and cons of a HWT launcher on a ship that is a torpedo room underwater , well protected by armour like the CIC and has tubes that angled on both sides to fire the fish entirely underwater like that of a submarine. location could be under the main cannon near the bow where the ship is slim and narrow. or 6 fixed tubes loaded vertically but firing down instead of up. add more tubes along the flanks if you want.

likewise how about intelligent anti-torpedos that swim out from launch tubes on the sides underwater and do a HTK on inbound torps homing in both actively with a small sonar and passively on the torps screw noises and pings. a task force could even have a few small 500t unmanned ships dispersed on the flanks to cover any torpedo attack as a outer screen.

[ks_sachin]

what are the pros and cons of a HWT launcher on a ship that is a torpedo room underwater , well protected by armour like the CIC and has tubes that angled on both sides to fire the fish entirely underwater like that of a submarine. location could be under the main cannon near the bow where the ship is slim and narrow. or 6 fixed tubes loaded vertically but firing down instead of up. add more tubes along the flanks if you want.

likewise how about intelligent anti-torpedos that swim out from launch tubes on the sides underwater and do a HTK on inbound torps homing in both actively with a small sonar and passively on the torps screw noises and pings. a task force could even have a few small 500t unmanned ships dispersed on the flanks to cover any torpedo attack as a outer screen.

Like a 007 movie?

[Philip]

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 631063.cms
Xcpt:

India’s China-watchers often draw attention to the intensifying Pakistan-China nexus. Beijing’s military partnership with Pakistan – which now includes an offer of eight-Yuan class Chinese submarines – is indeed worrisome. But Indian analysts do not recognise enough the reality that China’s real sensitivities lie in the Western Pacific, where India must plan for a greater counterpresence. China’s submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean undercut the logic of India as a net security provider in South Asia. The attempt at eroding New Delhi’s strategic primacy in its own backyard makes the latter’s need for a counterstrategy in the wider Indo-Pacific region urgent and imperative.

This can only happen if the IN realises that the top piority must be given to augmenting the sub fleet much beyond its current force projection.

https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/imps ... te-emerge/

The accompanying pic. of the ASW corvette is rather disappointing. A little 30mm "popgun",incapable of inflicting heavy damage on a surfaced wounded sub,and the absence of a heli-deck,easily achievable within the 750t size,which would enable ASW helos to operate from the corvettes from their shore bases,since these corvettes are meant only for inshore coastal,shallow water ASW ops. While the specs. say that a TAS may be provided,and that LWT torpedoes are aboard,just one ASW RBU appears to be the bare minimum.What these corvettes lack which are the approx. size of our erstwhile Nanuchka class missile corvettes and almost double the size of the Pauk ASW corvettes that we operated,are a better ASW sensor and weaponry package.The Pauks carried a larger gun,two sizes of TTs and has a VDS at the stern. Since half are to be built at GSL,we look forward to that design to appear,perhaps it may be an improvement.

[Rishi_Tri]

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 631063.cms

This can only happen if the IN realises that the top priority must be given to augmenting the sub fleet much beyond its current force projection.

Don't you think it is already underway with
1. at least three Arihant class (if they can be called so) hybrid SSBNs at least floated out,
2. fourth Arihant + also under construction,
3. 3 much larger SSBNs being designed, and another
4. 6 SSKs also being planned / designed.

In next 15 years we could be going up to 6-7 operational n powered vessels.

Not to mention the diesel electrics

1. 6 Kalvari class
2. 6 to be built under SPM model

That makes it 25 new subs in next 15-20 years, half of which shall be N powered.

[Kartik]

From Janes

India fast tracks purchase of MH-60R helicopters

India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a letter of request (LOR) to the US government on 15 November regarding the intended purchase of 24 Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk multirole naval helicopters for the Indian Navy (IN).

IN officials told Jane’s that the long-delayed request to acquire the platforms for an estimated INR135 billion (USD1.88 billion) – under the US Foreign Military Sales programme – is likely to be signed within a year.

The IN anticipates the delivery of the MH-60Rs, which are intended to replace the service’s fleet of Sea King Mk 42B/C and Ka-28 helicopters, to begin around 2020 and be completed 48 months later.

USD 1.88 billion for 24 MH-60Rs, with the associated spares, ground equipment, manuals, etc.. Damn expensive helicopters.

[Cybaru]

Probably has a similar 5-year maintenance contract built in. 78 million a pop another reason to make things at home and use Dhruv in this role as well!