India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
How many of the modern generation are familiar with the workings of the ancient treatise on Sanskrit drama- Bharta's Natya shastra?
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Amit to keep things in perspective, MMS's actions as a PM shall be scrutinized may be some time later ,imo as far as the nuclear deal is concerned India's stand would have remained unchanged irrespective of the Government in power for everyone wanted to have his /her name associated with the N-deal ,also from BARC's and AK's presentations it is clear that for India to secure its energy needs it was imperative that we came to an agreement over the nuclear issue with the world community .amit wrote: I only hope once the end game is played out - and if it's played out to India's satisfaction (not just MMS' satisfaction) - folks will have the courage and honesty to admit that they were wrong about *#*%#* Singh.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Hmm, so, you are saying we are at the "nirvahana sandhi" ?ramana wrote:How many of the modern generation are familiar with the workings of the ancient treatise on Sanskrit drama- Bharta's Natya shastra?
इती मनोमोहन्सिम्हः कृतं नाटके चतुर्थोँकः
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Possibility of Vote on 123 Agreement in US Congress Analysed
The Split-Second Paper Chase
The Split-Second Paper Chase
Those who thought New Delhi's nuclear energy ambition would be fulfilled merely by securing the NSG's waiver had better be warned: it is expected to give the green signal subject to the approval of US Congress.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From Deccan Chronicle, 11 August, 2008
Harish Gupta
Harish Gupta
PM’s busy September
The delay in the Monsoon Session is due to PM Manmohan Singh’s keenness for a standing ovation when he returns from New York after the nuclear deal is passed. The US Congress will pass the deal before the PM leaves for New York on September 19. Dr Singh will be back in Delhi by September 24. He will break his return journey in Paris to sign an agreement with France for nuclear supplies. He is again slated to go to Moscow to sign a similar agreement with Russia. The Centre has lined up all these agreements to assert that the deal is not US-specific but India-specific.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Good post amit!amit wrote:MMS will have to show strong negotiation power to steer now. Hope he displays the same tenacity that helped him steer throgh the no confidence at the international stage to protect Indian interests.
I think MMS has steered the whole torturous process since 2005 wonderfully well till now.
Despite all the foul language used, the brickbats hurled and the stupid adjectives attached to his name, he's been clear on what his and India's ultimate goal is in this complex geo-political game and has kept his eye on the ball. Thus it is only natural that he dribbled past the hurdles set up by the Left and NDA.
It's not due an accident of fate, nor on account of divine intervention, that India is now in a position to threaten to walk out if NSG does not give a clean and unconditional waiver.
I only hope once the end game is played out - and if it's played out to India's satisfaction (not just MMS' satisfaction) - folks will have the courage and honesty to admit that they were wrong about *#*%#* Singh.
Even if we walk out on NSG, and we should do a Kamal nath if it feels sticky, at this stage our strategic program has already been accepted de-jure by the world. If deal fizzles at this stage the focus of the world from now onwards would be on finding ways to legalize India's program on it's own terms rather than on restricting or hoping to roll it back. Half the battle is already been won.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
NSG draft waiver covers all nuclear items
NSG draft waiver covers all nuclear items
Siddharth Varadarajan
Attempt made to qualify Indian adherence to future NSG rules
Draft rule change linked to non-proliferation commitments
India not keen on sitting as “observer”
New Delhi: The Nuclear Suppliers Group draft rule change circulated by the U.S. last week links the waiving of the cartel’s export restrictions for India to the non-proliferation commitments Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made in July 2005 and does not impose any extraneous conditions. However, with the U.S. being candid about the possibility of the draft undergoing substantial revision once the 45-nation group takes up the India exemption in Vienna on August 21, officials here are preparing for a tough fight ahead.
Despite an American proposal to that effect, the Indian side is not keen to “sit in” on the nuclear club’s deliberations as an “observer” or be called upon to bargain in any way with the group’s 44 other members. India does not want to be part of any NSG meeting unless it is part of the decision-making process, senior officials told The Hindu.
Instead, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, Shyam Saran, will travel to the Austrian capital to answer questions individual NSG members might have and generally drive home the point that the Prime Minister has no more wiggle room domestically. Indeed, if the U.S. is unable or unwilling to defend the proposed draft and ward off superfluous amendments, the United Progressive Alliance government will be under pressure to walk away.
The two-page draft finalised by the U.S. and India last week follows the structure of the version Washington had circulated in March 2006 but differs from it in certain crucial respects.
Gone is the paragraph calling on NSG members to strive for the earliest possible placement of all Indian nuclear facilities under international supervision. Gone also is the conditionality that had been built into the earlier draft, wherein nuclear sales were allowed so long as member states were satisfied India continued fully to meet its non-proliferation commitments. The proposed NSG exemption is still linked to India abiding by its commitments, but not in a way that could conceivably allow for immediate suspension of supplies in case an individual member believes India has reneged on its promises. Further, India’s adherence to future NSG guidelines has been qualified, albeit indirectly, by linking implementation to its participation in the decision-making process, and Indian access to dual-use items — regulated by Part 2 of the NSG’s guidelines — has now explicitly been brought in.
The draft guidelines do not exclude enrichment and reprocessing equipment. And they make no reference to a cut-off mechanism in case of any action by India, though there is a new reference to the maintenance of “contact and consultation” by NSG members “on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements by India.” Pursuant to a perceived violation by India, any NSG member could invoke this clause to demand consultations, though suspension of the Indian waiver would presumably require a consensus decision.
Potential wrinkle
The one area in the NSG draft where a potential wrinkle remains is in the paragraph clarifying India’s adherence to the group’s export guidelines.
In the July 2005 statement, the Prime Minister committed the country to “ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonisation and adherence to ... Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.” Though the commitment was clearly to the guidelines as they currently exist and not to any future amendments the NSG may introduce, India has had to fight a rearguard action to clarify that it will not be automatically bound by decisions to which it is not a party. Accordingly, the NSG draft rule change, which notes adherence to the club’s guidelines as one of India’s commitments, also requests the group’s chair to “review proposed amendments to the guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments” as these states may wish to make. The draft also stresses: “Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.”
Though this formulation falls short of granting India the same ‘veto’ rights as an NSG member — indeed New Delhi would ideally like to join the suppliers group but the U.S. and others are wary — Indian officials believe it sufficiently clarifies the fact that the country cannot be held responsible for non-adherence to future export guidelines the NSG may adopt without Indian concurrence.
This issue is considered important because India does not want the NSG to adopt guidelines that may negate the country’s commercial advantage as far as nuclear exports are concerned. Already, for example, some non-proliferation lobbyists want the NSG to ban the sale of pressurized heavy water reactors of the kind India has expertise in (along with Canada).
Voluntary commitments
The NSG draft begins by noting that the NSG members desire to contribute to an effective non-proliferation regime “and to the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
This phrase, which was there in the original U.S. draft of 2006 as well, was considered unobjectionable by New Delhi since the objectives of the NPT are “the cessation of the nuclear arms race” and the undertaking of “effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”
The opening paragraph of the new draft also says that the NSG “wishes to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those countries outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime” and limit the “further spread of nuclear weapons.”
In this respect, says the document circulated by the U.S., the NSG “welcomes India’s efforts with respect to ... [the six] non-proliferation commitments and actions” it has “taken voluntarily as a contributing partner to the non-proliferation regime.” These commitments, all drawn from the July 18, 2005 U.S.-India statement, are enumerated, including continuation of India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and its continuing adherence to NSG guidelines on nuclear exports.
The main change here compared to the 2006 draft is the inclusion of the word “voluntarily.” This has been done to dispel the impression that India’s bilateral commitments to the U.S. are now being “multi-lateralised” or made legally binding in any way.
After taking note of these non-proliferation commitments and actions, the proposed amendment says that “in view of the above,” the NSG has “adopted the following policy on civil nuclear cooperation by participating governments with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civil nuclear facilities.” This policy is then spelt out in two sections.
First, it says that notwithstanding the requirement of full-scope safeguards in Part 1 of its guidelines (Infcirc/254(Rev. 9)), member states may transfer “trigger list items and/or related technology” for peaceful purposes for use in the country’s safeguarded civil nuclear facilities. The only proviso is that the other conditions specified in the rules — e.g. a commitment from the recipient state to not use the imported items for explosive use, acceptance of IAEA safeguards on those items, etc. — must be fulfilled.
Though Part 2 of the NSG’s guidelines advise “prudence” but do not prohibit the sale of dual-use items for use in India’s civil nuclear programme, the draft amendment explicitly seeks to enable Indian access to these items as well. If accepted, the new guideline will thus say that member states may transfer dual-use items to India notwithstanding the reference in the guidelines to absence of full-scope safeguards in the recipient country being a “relevant factor” to be taken into account in considering whether to authorise transfers.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From Deccan Chronicle, 12 Aug., 2008 which got rid of MJAkbar to pelase its political connections.
Nuke meet ‘nuked’
Hyderabad, Aug. 11: It was meant to end confusion, clear nagging doubts, and induce clarity on the hottest subject of recent times. Instead it created more confusion. We are talking about the big meeting organised by the Congress high command on the Indo-US nuclear deal for party spokespersons who have to field tough questions from reporters. Spokespersons sat through sessions which lasted from 9 am till 6 pm. In the end, they were none the wiser for it. The Congress wanted to explain in detail the nitty-gritties of the issue to the spokespersons so as to equip them with facts and figures of the deal.
This is especially important since the opposition parties are levelling sundry allegations. The Left have launched a major campaign against the deal. So Congress managers organised a workshop of sorts at the Teen Moorthy Bhavan a couple of days ago. It was addressed by the Union Ministers, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, Mr Chidambaram, the senior leader, Mr Digvijay Singh, the Prime Minister’s security advisor, Mr M.K. Narayanan, Secretary of External Affairs, Mr Shyam Saran, the Planning Commission member, Mr Pandit and Mr Rahul Gandhi. Each speaker addressed the 140-odd party spokespersons for almost an hour each. After each speech, there was a question -answer session.
Those who attended the meeting felt that, none of the genuine doubts were addressed. When spokespersons referred to the apprehensions and doubts expressed by the opposition, the speakers brushed them aside. Asked whether the Hyde Act of the US had any link with the nuclear deal, one prominent speaker said a pointed no. Asked to elaborate on it, he lost his cool and said, "I am telling you, na?" All the questions which the spokespersons asked were replied with a stock answers like don’t worry, that is not correct. This landed the spokespersons in a spot. Obviously they cannot tell reporters, don’t worry, and because I tell you so.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Dileep wrote:इती मनोमोहन्सिम्हः कृतं नाटके चतुर्थोँकः

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
India exemption: NSG to decide on Sept 2If the September 2 vote goes according to plan then the Bush administration will present the 123 Agreement to the US Congress on September 8 for the final step of the process to operationalise the nuclear deal. On the Capitol Hill, lobbying has already started to ensure the kind of bipartisan support that the Hyde Act got last year.
Where is the draft?
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Katare, thanks.Katare wrote: Good post amit!
Even if we walk out on NSG, and we should do a Kamal nath if it feels sticky, at this stage our strategic program has already been accepted de-jure by the world. If deal fizzles at this stage the focus of the world from now onwards would be on finding ways to legalize India's program on it's own terms rather than on restricting or hoping to roll it back. Half the battle is already been won.

One point that struck me about the Kamal Nath episode at the trade talks which is of relevance to the nuclear deal was the way he walked out and came back to a hero's welcome.
Here we are depending on the US to bring around reluctant poodles at the NSG. And while US pursuasion was going into high gear the Indian Commerce Minister goes and thumbs his nose on an international agreement close to the heart of the US and its lackeys.
Does that show that India has become/will become a "poodle" to the US once the deal has been signed?
Another point: I'm sure if the NDA was in power, then the person who would have been Commerce Minister would have done eactly the same as Kamal Nath did.
Our "corrupt" politicians and "inept" babus have more self confidence than given credit for by a lot of "thinking" folks in India and also those who live in far off lands!
JMT
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
ramana wrote:From Deccan Chronicle, 11 August, 2008
Harish Gupta
PM’s busy September
The delay in the Monsoon Session is due to PM Manmohan Singh’s keenness for a standing ovation when he returns from New York after the nuclear deal is passed. The US Congress will pass the deal before the PM leaves for New York on September 19. Dr Singh will be back in Delhi by September 24. He will break his return journey in Paris to sign an agreement with France for nuclear supplies. He is again slated to go to Moscow to sign a similar agreement with Russia. The Centre has lined up all these agreements to assert that the deal is not US-specific but India-specific.
If the above quote is read along with this...:
The Split-Second Paper Chase
... then I'd like to know what happens if the NSG gives a clean and unconditional waiver while the US Congress Democrats either delay clearance to the deal or try to hide behind the Hyde Act?Those who thought New Delhi's nuclear energy ambition would be fulfilled merely by securing the NSG's waiver had better be warned: it is expected to give the green signal subject to the approval of US Congress.
Outlook seems to imply that if there's no OK from the Congress then 123 deals with France and Russia don't stand up (despite IAEA and to be hoped for waiver from NSG). Is this an accurate reading or yet another attemp at spin?
I don't see India agreeing to a clean and unconditional waiver subject to approval from the US Congress - simply because it then no longer remains clean and unconditional.
And I also don't see how Russia, for example, would agree to such a clause - which gives the US Congress the right to a veto to Indo-Russian N-trade.
Can some Guru clarify please?
TIA
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
MMS it cannot be denied is a lucky man and has a lucky streak,physiognomically speaking as well,like the facial pointers of some other "lucky" individuals (a hobby of mine).The Georgian crisis has come as a Godsend for him/India,because with the first shots having been fired in this new "Cold War 2",analysts say that our chances of getting the N-deal passed on our terms,that is without any amendments, has a better chance now,given that any rejection of India's stand of "no changes" would lead India to reject it (emphasised publicly by Dr.M.R.Srinivasan-former nuclear boss and member of the AEC) ,would only antagonise India and allow it to revert back to its Cold War stand of pro-active friendship with Russia.Russia under Putin and Medvedev would care two hoots about any NSG objections selling India futher N-reactors and supplying fuel under the current circumstances.Bush & Co. would rather have India "inside the nuclear tent pissing out,rather than have us outside pissing in", ( paraphrase JFK's famous words about choosing LBJ-who hated him, as his running mate).The new geo-political realities have opened a window of opportunity for India/MMS and some imaginative diplomacy is required to seize the moment.
However,one expressed fear is that the NSG at a later date will change their rules to make it almost impossible for India to test further without suffering severely through abrogation of the deal,return of plants and fuel,sanctions,etc.,thus effectively bringing India into the NPT/CTBT by deceit.
However,one expressed fear is that the NSG at a later date will change their rules to make it almost impossible for India to test further without suffering severely through abrogation of the deal,return of plants and fuel,sanctions,etc.,thus effectively bringing India into the NPT/CTBT by deceit.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Philip Sir,Philip wrote: However,one expressed fear is that the NSG at a later date will change their rules to make it almost impossible for India to test further without suffering severely through abrogation of the deal,return of plants and fuel,sanctions,etc.,thus effectively bringing India into the NPT/CTBT by deceit.
If NSG gives India a clean and unconditional waiver (I must add there's still an IF here) then how can they change the rules later to screw us?
According to standard international practice India will sign on to a set of conditions presented by the NSG. NSG on its part will also be signing on to a set of conditions that it must follow vis a vis India. If the those conditions agreed to by NSG are changed then the agreement becomes null and void - so the separation of civil and military, the different fuel supplies/stockpiles etc become meaningless. India can walk out of the deal without any legal ramifications.
In such a situation do you expect the US to militarily force India to return fuel, reactors etc not only to the US but to France and Russia? And also force us to financially compensate the foreign compaines who'll be in the process of building the reactors/running them in India?
I think it's time we shed our fear of NPT/CTBT. There on their way to becoming history, along with the NPAs.
Along with them, let's also not become an historical artifact.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
The problem is according to the NSG draft, it is expected of India to abide by NSG export regulations and not only the current regulations but also all future regulations.amit wrote: According to standard international practice India will sign on to a set of conditions presented by the NSG. NSG on its part will also be signing on to a set of conditions that it must follow vis a vis India. If the those conditions agreed to by NSG are changed then the agreement becomes null and void - so the separation of civil and military, the different fuel supplies/stockpiles etc become meaningless. India can walk out of the deal without any legal ramifications.
On the other hand, NSG is not willing to accept India as a veto-carrying member in a body, which works by consensus. So all future changes the NSG may make to their rules, they would be asking India of her opinion, without needing to abide by it, as India would not be a part of the decision-making body.
So if they again change rules, which are not to India's liking at some point in the future, India would still have to change her rules and laws also in order to remain in conformance with NSG regulations, which is a condition for the waiver for India. I would consider that a loss of sovereignty, as we would have to follow rules not of our making.
Further conditions can creep in these amendments, where we could be affected.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Boss,RajeshA wrote: The problem is according to the NSG draft, it is expected of India to abide by NSG export regulations and not only the current regulations but also all future regulations.
On the other hand, NSG is not willing to accept India as a veto-carrying member in a body, which works by consensus. So all future changes the NSG may make to their rules, they would be asking India of her opinion, without needing to abide by it, as India would not be a part of the decision-making body.
So if they again change rules, which are not to India's liking at some point in the future, India would still have to change her rules and laws also in order to remain in conformance with NSG regulations, which is a condition for the waiver for India. I would consider that a loss of sovereignty, as we would have to follow rules not of our making.
Further conditions can creep in these amendments, where we could be affected.
Maybe I'm not understanding this properly, so I'd request your indulgence.
If the NSG can change the rules whenever it likes to and India has to abide by those changed rules, then how does a waiver remain "clean and unconditional".
As per what your'e saying - if my understanding is correct - then US via NSG can promise us the Moon (and all the uranium on it) and then jack us royally the moment we sign the dotted line?
Is that the case?
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Amit, I am trying to understand here some of the language of the proposed NSG draft for the NSG waiver. It says:amit wrote:Boss,RajeshA wrote: The problem is according to the NSG draft, it is expected of India to abide by NSG export regulations and not only the current regulations but also all future regulations.
On the other hand, NSG is not willing to accept India as a veto-carrying member in a body, which works by consensus. So all future changes the NSG may make to their rules, they would be asking India of her opinion, without needing to abide by it, as India would not be a part of the decision-making body.
So if they again change rules, which are not to India's liking at some point in the future, India would still have to change her rules and laws also in order to remain in conformance with NSG regulations, which is a condition for the waiver for India. I would consider that a loss of sovereignty, as we would have to follow rules not of our making.
Further conditions can creep in these amendments, where we could be affected.
Maybe I'm not understanding this properly, so I'd request your indulgence.
If the NSG can change the rules whenever it likes to and India has to abide by those changed rules, then how does a waiver remain "clean and unconditional".
As per what your'e saying - if my understanding is correct - then US via NSG can promise us the Moon (and all the uranium on it) and then jack us royally the moment we sign the dotted line?
Is that the case?
I would conclude, that:The one area in the NSG draft where a potential wrinkle remains is in the paragraph clarifying India’s adherence to the group’s export guidelines.
In the July 2005 statement, the Prime Minister committed the country to “ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonisation and adherence to ... Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.” Though the commitment was clearly to the guidelines as they currently exist and not to any future amendments the NSG may introduce, India has had to fight a rearguard action to clarify that it will not be automatically bound by decisions to which it is not a party. Accordingly, the NSG draft rule change, which notes adherence to the club’s guidelines as one of India’s commitments, also requests the group’s chair to “review proposed amendments to the guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments” as these states may wish to make. The draft also stresses: “Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.”
Though this formulation falls short of granting India the same ‘veto’ rights as an NSG member — indeed New Delhi would ideally like to join the suppliers group but the U.S. and others are wary — Indian officials believe it sufficiently clarifies the fact that the country cannot be held responsible for non-adherence to future export guidelines the NSG may adopt without Indian concurrence.
This issue is considered important because India does not want the NSG to adopt guidelines that may negate the country’s commercial advantage as far as nuclear exports are concerned. Already, for example, some non-proliferation lobbyists want the NSG to ban the sale of pressurized heavy water reactors of the kind India has expertise in (along with Canada).
a) India only has an advisory role, but not a decision-making participation. It is also uncertain, whether India would be sitting on in the NSG meetings in the future, probably not, as India would not be given NSG membership.
b) India need not show immediate conformance, however conformance will be expected.“review proposed amendments to the guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments”
Now all of these guidelines may just be concerned about“Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.”
i) conditions to be met,
ii) circumstances to be applicable,
iii) safeguards to be undertaken,
iv) assurances to be made,
for the export of items on the trigger list, related items and items on the dual-items list.
But what happens, if some day NSG wants to restrain the export only to countries, which have ratified CTBT, or FMCT or something else.
NSG can go ahead and amend its guidelines, and India would not be having much of a say in such amendments, but these can hamper trade with India.
India has no veto at the NSG, like everybody else. Malta has more power at the NSG than India. That is the problem.
Another problem is that if the matter is not decided now, India may not be allowed to be become a member for years and years, as there would still be some guidelines somewhere, that India has to sign NPT to become a member, which is not going to happen, and most of the rabid-NPAs at the NSG (Switzerland, Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) may simply again create problems, and the there may not be much of a push on this matter, as many would consider the Problem to be of hypothetical nature or of just status, etc, till a time comes when India would be faced with some done amendment which goes against India's national interests or muddle's up India's case still further.
I would have preferred a proper integration of India into the nuclear industry and non-proliferation bodies, like the NSG, even as India remains outside of NPT, where India has just as much say as any other NWS. In this case, we would not even have the status of Malta.
To come back to your question:
Unconditional simply means that no further conditions may be applied to India, other that those which India has already accepted (India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, upcoming Additional Protocol, Separation Plan, Adherence to the NSG Export Guidelines by Indian Laws). More specifically it means signing the NPT will not be a condition for India to be allowed to conduct nuclear commerce as per NSG guidelines.
India already adheres to Current NSG Guidelines. This however breaks down with regard to Future NSG Guidelines, as nobody has seen the future, and India has no veto on how the future evolves.
India has indeed included some language to mitigate this complete loss of control and voice, while made to stand outside of NSG, however the end product is far from ideal.
Clean means no further restrictions would be placed as to what India can import.
Clear just refers to the language of the NSG waiver. It should not be too convoluted, with too many ifs and whens.
I feel India's membership of NSG should be on the table on 2nd of September during the second meeting of NSG, and India can ask her other friends other than USA to propose such a membership. India's friends can plead, that it would make India's relations with NSG far more clearer, and they would not need to make further categories of countries associated with NSG.
I would however not claim to be an expert on these matters. Perhaps some proper BRF experts may wish to comment on the matter.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Rajesh,
Thanks for a very good post.
You've got me thinking. I've got to study this up a bit before I comment. You've raised excellent points.
Cheers!
Thanks for a very good post.
You've got me thinking. I've got to study this up a bit before I comment. You've raised excellent points.
Cheers!
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
It's the crux of the matter which I pointed out in an earlier ,earthier post,is that we are NOT being treated as nuclear equals,but as "turd" class associate members of the club only.The rules of the nuclear club and of the games that it might play from time to time,will be made by the full members and India will have to abide by those rules or get booted out of the club's verandah.The question that we must ask ourselves in all sincerity,is that in the entire wider context of India already being a genuine nuclear weapon state,possessing a large experienced nuclear power industry and self sufficient in huge reserves of thorium for our future use,why should we subordinate ourselves through signing an insidious deal that belittles us and reduces us in stature from our enviable position of nuclear independence right now,where we can show the uplifted finger to any bullying nation? Henceforth,we will be a prisoner of the N-club,chained with a "ball" of rules and regulations that will stifle our future advancement in N-technology and cripple our strategic deterrent.
If we are not going to be treated as equals then we will be returning to the days of colonialism,where we had to import textile technology for our mills from Manchester,etc., and like nuclear fuel,buy British textiles at the expense of the Indian weaver.We are not only allowing "John Company" to return,but handing over our nuclear sovereignity to foreign rule and running the risk of the capping and scuttling of our nuclear detterent by prohibiting future tests.If that is what is being described as fear,I am guilty .Just take a look at Georgia and its predicament after relying upon US promises of support! When we are threatened by a combined Sino-Pak advancement in nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems,do you expect the US/NSG to come to our aid or relax the rules for us? Dream on!
If we are not going to be treated as equals then we will be returning to the days of colonialism,where we had to import textile technology for our mills from Manchester,etc., and like nuclear fuel,buy British textiles at the expense of the Indian weaver.We are not only allowing "John Company" to return,but handing over our nuclear sovereignity to foreign rule and running the risk of the capping and scuttling of our nuclear detterent by prohibiting future tests.If that is what is being described as fear,I am guilty .Just take a look at Georgia and its predicament after relying upon US promises of support! When we are threatened by a combined Sino-Pak advancement in nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems,do you expect the US/NSG to come to our aid or relax the rules for us? Dream on!
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Richard Boucher briefing reporters in Japan, had a few things to say about Indo-US nuclear deal.
US & Japan: Joint Approach to South & Central Asia
US & Japan: Joint Approach to South & Central Asia
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
SC to hear N-deal PIL tomorrow
The Supreme Court has fixed August 13 for hearing a PIL petition challenging the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement which allegedly imposes American law on India.
The petition questioned whether the Centre was empowered to impose any American law upon India without legislative support as contemplated under Articles 107, 108 and 111 of the Constitution (legislative procedure), said advocate Manohar Lal Sharma.
The petition will be heard by a bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan. The petitioner has sought direction for declaring the treaty null and void.
With the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would impose the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as well as six other American laws upon India without following prescribed constitutional procedure.
The Hyde Act was a law inserted to exempt certain requirements contemplated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 including the nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
“The Hyde Act discloses mandatory terms for the President of the USA to be complied with under Section 104(g) Reporting to Congress: Information on nuclear activities in India: The President shall keep the appropriate Congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India including any material non-compliance by the Government of India with the non-proliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India; the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws are American laws and are binding upon the licensee, irrespective of American citizens or foreign citizens in all respects pertaining to the production, supply and export of nuclear material,” said the petition filed last week.
The petitioner contended that the freedom of life, and liberty could not be staked on personal ego, profit, ambition and political gain, either directly or indirectly.
The Supreme Court has fixed August 13 for hearing a PIL petition challenging the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement which allegedly imposes American law on India.
The petition questioned whether the Centre was empowered to impose any American law upon India without legislative support as contemplated under Articles 107, 108 and 111 of the Constitution (legislative procedure), said advocate Manohar Lal Sharma.
The petition will be heard by a bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan. The petitioner has sought direction for declaring the treaty null and void.
With the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would impose the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as well as six other American laws upon India without following prescribed constitutional procedure.
The Hyde Act was a law inserted to exempt certain requirements contemplated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 including the nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
“The Hyde Act discloses mandatory terms for the President of the USA to be complied with under Section 104(g) Reporting to Congress: Information on nuclear activities in India: The President shall keep the appropriate Congressional committees fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities of India including any material non-compliance by the Government of India with the non-proliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India; the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws are American laws and are binding upon the licensee, irrespective of American citizens or foreign citizens in all respects pertaining to the production, supply and export of nuclear material,” said the petition filed last week.
The petitioner contended that the freedom of life, and liberty could not be staked on personal ego, profit, ambition and political gain, either directly or indirectly.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
It's very important that if US-India are to undertake massive joint operations say in the event of the Taliban or AQ taking over power in Islamabad then a broader strategic relationship is necessary. The deal provides for that and that is why there is urgency on US's part. Without bringing India to a wider strategic circle, in no way can US-India undertake joint strikes to neutralize Porky nukes. US cannot and will not do it alone. It will definitely involve India in that venture. It's the same urgency they are exhibiting in IAF-USAF operations and other war games.
The strategic relationship with India is of fundamental importance. This is uncles backup strategy in case Porky nukes fall into Taliban hands. JMT
The strategic relationship with India is of fundamental importance. This is uncles backup strategy in case Porky nukes fall into Taliban hands. JMT
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From Deccan Chrnonicle, editorial page, 13 august, 2008
Please don’t nuke facts
With the future shape of the Indo-US nuclear deal now out of India’s grasp and in the hands of foreigners, two things stand out domestically. The first is that the line between fact and fiction has become so blurred that spin now dominates the discourse. Indeed, such is the bullish partisanship on the issue and the shutting out of parliamentary scrutiny, that little room has been left for an informed debate.
The second is that the risks of serious misunderstandings and tragedy in the years later have been compounded through deliberate ambiguities in the agreed documents.
Ambiguities may be fine with the US and the IAEA because the leverage lies with them. But for a recipient state to turn a deaf ear to the stated positions and interpretations of other parties is to court trouble.
In fact, New Delhi has publicly prided its ingenuity in fashioning ambiguities. Take the claim that the safeguards accord has been cleverly worded to enable India to take "unspecified sovereign actions" in a contingency — an assertion out of sync with the negotiating record.
Such claims flow out of a contested reference in that accord’s preamble, which records that an "essential basis" of India’s "concurrence to accept Agency safeguards" is the "conclusion of international cooperation arrangements" to help secure "uninterrupted" fuel supply and build a "strategic reserve" of fuel. Whether such rights-empowering international arrangements exist or not is merely a preambular insertion by India.
The preamble also notes that India "may take corrective measures" in the event of fuel-supply disruption. But "corrective measures" neither find mention in the numbered articles of the accord nor have they been defined in the text.
In effect, the accord precludes real correction by making safeguards indefinite and legally irrevocable.
IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei, in his statement introducing the accord for board approval, made clear that the preamble merely provided for "contextual background". He pointed out "the agreement is of indefinite duration" and its termination provisions "are the same as for other INFCIRC/66-type agreements" (designed for non-nuclear-weapons states to cover individual plants and shipments of fuel). The IAEA will enforce inspections until any safeguarded Indian facility — indigenous or imported — is "no longer usable for any nuclear activity".
Did India contest Mr ElBaradei’s statement? No, although Mr ElBaradei implicitly rubbished the India-specific claim by saying, "The text before you is an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement based on the agency’s standard safeguards practices and procedures".
In his subsequent news conference, Mr ElBaradei went on to say that a "concrete result" would be India’s co-option to help implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and conclude the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Against this background, would India have any case if it were stopped from building a strategic fuel reserve or slapped with a fuel cut-off?
Despite getting none of the rights the five established nuclear-weapons states have vis-à-vis the IAEA, India has accepted the agency’s paramount authority to settle "any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this agreement".
The board easily ratified the accord by consensus because it meets non-proliferation standards and opens the path to drafting India into the NPT regime as a de facto party.
While this accord sets the technical parameters for co-opting India into the non-proliferation regime, the impending exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) will set the political parameters.
The potential costs of equivocation primarily flow out of the earlier-negotiated 123 Agreement with the US — an accord that fudges or tiptoes around key issues relating to strategic fuel reserves, reprocessing right, corrective measures and a linkage between perpetual safeguards and perpetual fuel supply.
It also stands out for its lack of a dispute-resolution mechanism and for merely recording that India would seek the right to corrective measures in the safeguards accord.
Clearly spelled-out provisions, not equivocation and semantic subterfuge, was what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had pledged in Parliament — to "ensure there is no repeat of our experience with Tarapur".
Yet the accords negotiated with the US and IAEA risk making India an easier prey to external pressures. A quick comparison of these accords with the 1963 Indo-US 123 Agreement and the 1971 safeguards pact underscores that danger.
While the 1963 agreement guaranteed fuel "as needed" by India, the equivocation in the latest 123 accord is manifest from the fuel-related assurances left hanging in Article 5.6, which says the US is "willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement" — that is, at some point in the future. The accord arms the US with an open-ended right to suspend supplies forthwith simply by issuing a one-year termination notice on any ground, however extraneous.
While the 1963 agreement permitted India to reprocess after a "joint determination" with the US that the reprocessing facility was "safeguardable", the latest accord requires India not only to build a new dedicated facility to US satisfaction but also to separately negotiate and sign a congressionally-vetted agreement on reprocessing. Although the US overrode the terms of the 1963 agreement through a new 1978 domestic law, the latest 123 accord says its implementation will be governed by national laws, underscoring the Hyde Act’s primacy.
The more-equitable 1971 safeguards accord was trilateral, with the US as a party. The applicability and duration of safeguards were explicitly tied to American fuel supply. Its structure and provisions were uniquely India-specific.
By contrast, the latest accord is little India-specific. Despite a preambular reference to India’s civil-military separation plan, the accord in none of its articles acknowledges the existence of an Indian nuclear-weapons programme even for the purpose of defining the scope of safeguards.
The blunt fact is that India secured better agreements in an era in which the Chinese military invasion had shattered its confidence and the US PL-480 aid had fostered the image of a country with a begging bowl than in a period marking its rise as a knowledge powerhouse and nuclear-weapons state.
Little surprise, therefore, that spin is being aggressively employed to shroud inconvenient truths. In his July 22, 2008 speech in Parliament, the Prime Minister stated that while the G-8 passed a "harsh resolution" after the 1998 tests, at the "meeting of the G-8 held recently in Japan, the chairman’s summary has welcomed cooperation in civilian nuclear energy between India and the international community". Really?
This is what the chair’s summary said: "We look forward to working with India, the IAEA, the NSG and other parties to advance India’s non-proliferation commitments and progress so as to facilitate a more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation with India to help it meet its growing energy needs in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime." Note the reference to cooperation is secondary.
The primary thrust is on advancing "India’s non-proliferation commitments and progress". Civil nuclear cooperation is just the means to achieve the objective to reinforce the NPT regime. The G-8 leaders, in their separate declaration, actually pledged to "redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen" the NPT, which perpetuates a five-nation nuclear monopoly.
The Prime Minister also made the following dream-selling claim on July 22: "It will open up new opportunities for trade in dual-use high technologies, opening up new pathways to accelerate industrialisation of our country." The deal, however, is intended to open commercially-lucrative exports for safeguarded Indian facilities while specifically denying dual-use nuclear technologies. Easing high-technology and civilian space export controls is not part of this deal.
New Delhi, after agreeing to more and more conditions, is now threatening to turn its back on the imports-centered deal unless NSG waiver is "unconditional".
This is redolent of what the Prime Minister told Parliament on August 17, 2006: "It is clear if the final product is in its current form, India will have grave difficulties in accepting the Bill. The US has been left in no doubt as to our position." But when the Hyde Act was passed ignoring that warning, New Delhi didn’t make even a peep.
More misrepresentation will come when the NSG makes multilateral some of the bilateral conditions of the 123 Agreement and unilateral terms of the Hyde Act. The latest US draft submitted to the NSG, after consultations with India, shows that New Delhi has already acquiesced to its test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality.
But to deflect attention, spinmeisters introduced a red herring — the draft’s "full-scope safeguards" objective, presenting that as the main sticking point and then claiming India has upheld its interest by making the US drop that reference.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Fallback against NSG hiccup
Fallback against NSG hiccup
K.P. NAYAR
Washington, Aug. 12: Die-hard supporters of the nuclear deal with America within the UPA government are preparing a fallback strategy for continuing with the deal even if the Nuclear Suppliers Group imposes conditions on New Delhi that others within and outside the government consider unacceptable.
They have already persuaded South Block to reject an offer by Germany, chair of the NSG, to seat India as a “special guest” at the group’s meeting in Vienna on August 21 and 22.
According to US officials here who had first broached the idea in Berlin, a strong Indian presence in Vienna, including foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, would have enabled New Delhi to defend the proposed exemption from NSG guidelines.
Supporters of the nuclear deal in New Delhi successfully argued against any Indian participation in Vienna on the ground that if India was not present at the NSG meeting, it could continue with the deal on the ground that it was not a party to any NSG decision that fell short of a “clean exemption”.
This is the same argument that the UPA government is using to live down the Hyde Act. It has argued that the prescriptive provisions of the act are America’s domestic business and that India is not bound by them.
In putting forth the same argument about a conditional NSG waiver, the government’s spin would be that India is not a member of the NSG, it has no locus standi in the group and that India did not in any way agree to be a party to the NSG decision on the waiver.
France and Russia are quietly lobbying NSG countries to agree to a formula in Vienna that will allow individual NSG members to engage in nuclear commerce with India as long as they are within the broad framework of existing global non-proliferation goals.
In doing so, individual countries will take into account India’s safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the IAEA, its separation plan for civil and military facilities filed with the IAEA and its stellar record in non-proliferation.
It is an argument that will also fit in with the Indian spin if there are conditions attached to an NSG waiver. Discussions are now under way in South Block on whether this spin can hold water even if Menon and other Indian officials go to Vienna before the NSG meeting to damp down proliferation worries among some countries.
The issue under discussion is whether such interaction by Menon will make India a party to an eventual NSG decision. In the run-up to the NSG’s meeting in 10 days, Germany, India and the US are co-ordinating their strategy for changing the group’s rules in favour of New Delhi.
According to diplomats in Vienna, the German strategy is to shore up a first line of defenders within the group who are staunchly for a clean exemption for India. These will include countries that want to sell nuclear equipment and technology to India such as France, Russia, the UK and, of course, the US and Germany.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Jindal Steel Plans to Build Nuclear Power Plants
Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. plans to build nuclear plants after India changes rules to allow non-state companies to enter the atomic-energy business
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From Indian point of view ,In 2 decades or so NSG, UNO etc international organisations will become irrlevant. All it require is 10 Trillion $ economy and India will be able to say NO to any one with full length of forearm.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Smaller NSG nations for changes in N-deal?
The non-pro crowd at the NSG wants to put in amendments that will cover three main subjects — asking India to join the NPT and CTBT, putting the civilian nuclear facilities under permanent safeguards (no matter what happens to the fuel supplies) or a roundabout way of introducing the deleted para 4 of the NSG guidelines which will "require" comprehensive safeguards. There may even be a brave attempt to put in a so-called "testing clause".
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
The smaller nations in NSG are fronting for someone else or some other group.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
How many such three letter treaties has Japan been able to say no to in spite of having the second largest economy for at least two decades now? How many stealth aircrafts or BM or BMD has it been able to build in spite of all their technology prowress?Prem wrote:From Indian point of view ,In 2 decades or so NSG, UNO etc international organisations will become irrlevant. All it require is 10 Trillion $ economy and India will be able to say NO to any one with full length of forearm.
The size of the economy needs a backing of military, political and soft power to change things to your satisfaction in this world.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Most of the above post is your feelings and believes which may or may not have anything to do with the facts of the matter. It would be nice if you can back your claims up with some citations or quotations or use phrases like “I think” or “IMO”.Philip wrote:It's the crux of the matter which I pointed out in an earlier ,earthier post,is that we are NOT being treated as nuclear equals,but as "turd" class associate members of the club only.The rules of the nuclear club and of the games that it might play from time to time,will be made by the full members and India will have to abide by those rules or get booted out of the club's verandah.The question that we must ask ourselves in all sincerity,is that in the entire wider context of India already being a genuine nuclear weapon state,possessing a large experienced nuclear power industry and self sufficient in huge reserves of thorium for our future use,why should we subordinate ourselves through signing an insidious deal that belittles us and reduces us in stature from our enviable position of nuclear independence right now,where we can show the uplifted finger to any bullying nation? Henceforth,we will be a prisoner of the N-club,chained with a "ball" of rules and regulations that will stifle our future advancement in N-technology and cripple our strategic deterrent.
If we are not going to be treated as equals then we will be returning to the days of colonialism,where we had to import textile technology for our mills from Manchester,etc., and like nuclear fuel,buy British textiles at the expense of the Indian weaver.We are not only allowing "John Company" to return,but handing over our nuclear sovereignity to foreign rule and running the risk of the capping and scuttling of our nuclear detterent by prohibiting future tests.If that is what is being described as fear,I am guilty .Just take a look at Georgia and its predicament after relying upon US promises of support! When we are threatened by a combined Sino-Pak advancement in nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems,do you expect the US/NSG to come to our aid or relax the rules for us? Dream on!
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
India's existing safeguards agreements are limited to 2 Tarapur units (LWRs) and 2 Rawatbhata units (PHWRs), plus 2 Koodankulam units (LWRs) currently under construction. For the Tarapur LWRs, India has run all over the world since 1974 to get LEU supplies after the US cut-off. The 2 Rawatbhata PHWR units are actually fed domestic uranium despite being under safeguards, therefore no issue of fuel supplies. Any fuel supply issues relating to Koodankulam are still in the future.Gerard wrote:The previous safeguard agreements with the IAEA could also have ended up at the UNSC. The IAEA has always had that option. Has any dispute arose? What is different now?
What is different now?
At least 40,000 MW (perhaps more) of LWR capacity is expected to be imported, together with linked fuel supply arrangements, under the new IAEA safeguards agreement. Also, 8 indigenous reactors (perhaps additional ones in subsequent years) will be put under the same IAEA safeguards agreement, presumably linked to fuel supply arrangements from abroad.
Scenario: Fuel supply from abroad to these safeguarded plants is disrupted for any reason. To avoid the adverse economic impact of reactor shutdowns, India decides to temporarily feed these reactors domestic uranium. However, it does not wish this domestic uranium to get trapped in the safeguarded category as a result (it may need this fuel as feedstock for its unsafeguarded FBRs; it may need it for its strategic programme; it may need it for other unspecified purposes which cannot be achieved with IAEA inspectors running around - say IPR protection; etc). India therefore invokes the corrective measures provision to "temporarily suspend" safeguards on these facilities while it keeps them running with unsafeguarded domestic fuel and works on restoring imported fuel supplies. IAEA claims this is a breach of India's international obligations, and sends the India file to UNSC (of which India is not a member) for appropriate action. The P-5 'interpret' the provisions of India's IAEA agreement according to their geopolitical needs, and issue their ruling in the form of a UNSC resolution. Case closed, under international law. India to please comply!
Chapter VI Resolutions have no enforcement mechanisms and are generally considered to have no binding force under international law. Only Resolutions made under Chapter VII are considered legally binding on members.UNSC Resolution 1172 is still in effect. Has India complied with it? Will a more powerful India comply with it in, say, 20 years?
It is in India's interest (and in most countries' interest, except for the sole superpower of any given moment) to uphold international law as a way to somewhat moderate the law of the jungle that would otherwise prevail. That is why India has wisely refrained from signing treaties that it may have to break in the future, while loudly proclaiming its credentials as a law-abiding member of the comity of nations.
In the case of this nuclear deal, India is consciously signing multilateral agreements in which crucial provisions with far-reaching implications for India's future security are being interpreted differently from day one (witness the statements made by different countries for the record at the August 1 IAEA Board meeting). This requires that India - for its own protection - become a member of the UNSC on par with the P-5, as part of this deal.
GoI should inform Parliament about their discussions with the US on this subject.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Whatever economic size India attains, China will be twice.From Indian point of view ,In 2 decades or so NSG, UNO etc international organisations will become irrlevant. All it require is 10 Trillion $ economy and India will be able to say NO to any one with full length of forearm.
China will eventually become a larger economy than the US. This will happen within our lifetime.
I have trouble envisioning China as being anything other than a threat to India.
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Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Whatever economic size India attains, China will be twice.
Economies tend to arrive at a finite per capita income almost asymptotically.
In 20 yrs 20% of China will be retired, most of the Indian workforce will be in their most productive years. China is a demographic time bomb.

In 20 yrs 20% of China will be retired, most of the Indian workforce will be in their most productive years. China is a demographic time bomb.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Somebody asked where is the NSG draft.
I think it is here:
http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/12/stories ... 711000.htm
in Varadarajan's story in the Hindu.
I think it is here:
http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/12/stories ... 711000.htm
in Varadarajan's story in the Hindu.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
The purpose of this "planted" article in Times of India is obvious.
Unkil wants the Indians to start getting used to idea that there will be conditions.
TOI is playing this game. Note the article is attributed to "sources" and not "Indian sources".
Those "sources" are Unkil.
Unkil wants the Indians to start getting used to idea that there will be conditions.
TOI is playing this game. Note the article is attributed to "sources" and not "Indian sources".
Those "sources" are Unkil.
Gerard wrote:Smaller NSG nations for changes in N-deal?The non-pro crowd at the NSG wants to put in amendments that will cover three main subjects — asking India to join the NPT and CTBT, putting the civilian nuclear facilities under permanent safeguards (no matter what happens to the fuel supplies) or a roundabout way of introducing the deleted para 4 of the NSG guidelines which will "require" comprehensive safeguards. There may even be a brave attempt to put in a so-called "testing clause".
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From the Siddharth Varadarajan piece posted above by RaviBG:
This makes the so-called NSG waiver draft painstakingly negotiated between Indian and US officials worthless.
Watch out for a repeat of the Hyde Act passed in November 2006 by a Republican-controlled lame-duck Congress, where a bunch of Senators and Congressmen in the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees aided by their staffers in contact with NPAs proceeded to maul the July 18, 2005 (J18) and March 3, 2006 (M3) Bush-MMS agreements beyond recognition, and Bush could appear to stay above the fray and maintain "plausible deniability".
Hyde (not J18 and M3) then became the template for the subsequently negotiated 123 Agreement in July, 2007. All the contortions of the Indian negotiators in the 123 language could not hide the plain fact that it did not reflect J18/M3.
Ever since, KS in particular has been vociferously stating that IAEA/NSG are what counts and these will enable India to trade with Russia/France, and India need not buy anything from the US. Has KS come out and stated unambiguously that India should walk away from the whole deal if the NSG waiver is tainted and seeks to multi-lateralise some of the odious Hyde Act conditions?
This is the correct approach in view of US not committing to oppose any changes in the agreed NSG draft. In this case, India's presence will only be used to create the global illusion of India's agreement to the 11th hour (at the second plenary on Sept 2) surprise changes that will likely come from an unexpected source. India will be better positioned to walk away if it holds the US strictly responsible to delivering its side of the J18 agreement:
"the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India".
I believe NSG is already at an advanced stage of discussing a proposal to ban exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, with all members except Canada on board. Will India face this ban with retrospective efffect if the NSG approves it after the India waiver?
Finally, "testing" should not appear in the NSG waiver in any form.
This is a HUGE PROBLEM.However, with the U.S. being candid about the possibility of the draft undergoing substantial revision once the 45-nation group takes up the India exemption in Vienna on August 21, officials here are preparing for a tough fight ahead.
This makes the so-called NSG waiver draft painstakingly negotiated between Indian and US officials worthless.
Watch out for a repeat of the Hyde Act passed in November 2006 by a Republican-controlled lame-duck Congress, where a bunch of Senators and Congressmen in the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees aided by their staffers in contact with NPAs proceeded to maul the July 18, 2005 (J18) and March 3, 2006 (M3) Bush-MMS agreements beyond recognition, and Bush could appear to stay above the fray and maintain "plausible deniability".
Hyde (not J18 and M3) then became the template for the subsequently negotiated 123 Agreement in July, 2007. All the contortions of the Indian negotiators in the 123 language could not hide the plain fact that it did not reflect J18/M3.
Ever since, KS in particular has been vociferously stating that IAEA/NSG are what counts and these will enable India to trade with Russia/France, and India need not buy anything from the US. Has KS come out and stated unambiguously that India should walk away from the whole deal if the NSG waiver is tainted and seeks to multi-lateralise some of the odious Hyde Act conditions?
Despite an American proposal to that effect, the Indian side is not keen to “sit in” on the nuclear club’s deliberations as an “observer” or be called upon to bargain in any way with the group’s 44 other members. India does not want to be part of any NSG meeting unless it is part of the decision-making process, senior officials told The Hindu.
This is the correct approach in view of US not committing to oppose any changes in the agreed NSG draft. In this case, India's presence will only be used to create the global illusion of India's agreement to the 11th hour (at the second plenary on Sept 2) surprise changes that will likely come from an unexpected source. India will be better positioned to walk away if it holds the US strictly responsible to delivering its side of the J18 agreement:
"the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India".
This is clearly inadequate, and a problem.Accordingly, the NSG draft rule change, which notes adherence to the club’s guidelines as one of India’s commitments, also requests the group’s chair to “review proposed amendments to the guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments” as these states may wish to make. The draft also stresses: “Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.”
I believe NSG is already at an advanced stage of discussing a proposal to ban exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, with all members except Canada on board. Will India face this ban with retrospective efffect if the NSG approves it after the India waiver?
Finally, "testing" should not appear in the NSG waiver in any form.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I have a question for the nuclear experts:
Does India sign onto anything with NSG at all? Is it some form of agreement between India and NSG accepting any conditions for the sake of nuclear commerce?
My reading is, that it is similar to the Hyde Act. Whereas Hyde Act was a US domestic law enabling US to conduct nuclear commerce with India, similarly NSG Waiver is an amendment allowing NSG countries to conduct nuclear commerce with India. In both cases, India is not a party. As such India would also not be giving any assurances or pledges in writing.
All the conditions being imposed, will be imposed on the NSG countries, who wish to conduct nuclear commerce with India, not directly on India. However indirectly the NSG country signing a nuclear deal with India, would have to follow these conditions and restrictions and include such in the bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, and thereby these conditions and restrictions would indirectly be applied to India, just as is the case with 123 Agreement. Even if the bilateral agreement is mute, the trading NSG country would have to make similar amendments in its domestic laws and make the bilateral agreements dependent on them, again as is the case with 123 Agreement.
That is also the reason, why India is against multilateralising these conditions and restrictions.
However in the end, these conditions and restrictions does pit certain countries in the NSG against the others. France may be willing to sell reprocessing technology along with its reactors, and would certainly feel at a disadvantage if it is not allowed to use a certain offering in its sales pitch to India. So one would expect France to discourage the inclusion of such restrictions. One could expect a clash between the countries who have nuclear industries and things to sell versus countries who have nothing but non-proliferation to sell to its domestic constituents.
The nuclear trading nations need these small countries to provide the waiver to the guidelines, so they cannot totally ignore their views if they want an amendment. On the other hand, these countries also do not want to lose business opportunities because of too many constraints, so they will not accept an amendment which is full of these conditions and restrictions. There will be a tug-of-war.
Moreover India would be observing the level of enthusiasm, with which certain countries try to clinch the waiver in India's favor, because after all, India would want to offer nuclear business primarily to those countries who give the maximum support.
Even though the Real Nuclear Suppliers may object to conditions like "termination on testing" and restrictions like "enrichment and reprocessing technology", "limited dual-use item exports under stringent rules", they may however not make too much a noise regarding prescriptions like
1) NPT or CTBT signing
2) Permanent Safeguards independent of secured supply
3) Full-Scope Comprehensive Safeguards mention in §4, etc.
In order to stave off such language, one would have to rely on USA's good intentions or the nuclear option of walking away.
Perhaps one should keep in mind, there are other Uranium producing countries outside of NSG, namely
a) Namibia (7.5%)
b) Niger (7.4%)
c) Uzbekistan (5.5%)
Now that India has a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, it should be less of a problem, importing Uranium from these countries.
Does India sign onto anything with NSG at all? Is it some form of agreement between India and NSG accepting any conditions for the sake of nuclear commerce?
My reading is, that it is similar to the Hyde Act. Whereas Hyde Act was a US domestic law enabling US to conduct nuclear commerce with India, similarly NSG Waiver is an amendment allowing NSG countries to conduct nuclear commerce with India. In both cases, India is not a party. As such India would also not be giving any assurances or pledges in writing.
All the conditions being imposed, will be imposed on the NSG countries, who wish to conduct nuclear commerce with India, not directly on India. However indirectly the NSG country signing a nuclear deal with India, would have to follow these conditions and restrictions and include such in the bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, and thereby these conditions and restrictions would indirectly be applied to India, just as is the case with 123 Agreement. Even if the bilateral agreement is mute, the trading NSG country would have to make similar amendments in its domestic laws and make the bilateral agreements dependent on them, again as is the case with 123 Agreement.
That is also the reason, why India is against multilateralising these conditions and restrictions.
However in the end, these conditions and restrictions does pit certain countries in the NSG against the others. France may be willing to sell reprocessing technology along with its reactors, and would certainly feel at a disadvantage if it is not allowed to use a certain offering in its sales pitch to India. So one would expect France to discourage the inclusion of such restrictions. One could expect a clash between the countries who have nuclear industries and things to sell versus countries who have nothing but non-proliferation to sell to its domestic constituents.
The nuclear trading nations need these small countries to provide the waiver to the guidelines, so they cannot totally ignore their views if they want an amendment. On the other hand, these countries also do not want to lose business opportunities because of too many constraints, so they will not accept an amendment which is full of these conditions and restrictions. There will be a tug-of-war.
Moreover India would be observing the level of enthusiasm, with which certain countries try to clinch the waiver in India's favor, because after all, India would want to offer nuclear business primarily to those countries who give the maximum support.
Even though the Real Nuclear Suppliers may object to conditions like "termination on testing" and restrictions like "enrichment and reprocessing technology", "limited dual-use item exports under stringent rules", they may however not make too much a noise regarding prescriptions like
1) NPT or CTBT signing
2) Permanent Safeguards independent of secured supply
3) Full-Scope Comprehensive Safeguards mention in §4, etc.
In order to stave off such language, one would have to rely on USA's good intentions or the nuclear option of walking away.
Perhaps one should keep in mind, there are other Uranium producing countries outside of NSG, namely
a) Namibia (7.5%)
b) Niger (7.4%)
c) Uzbekistan (5.5%)
Now that India has a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, it should be less of a problem, importing Uranium from these countries.