The former head of French intelligence about the current work, failures and intelligence agencies combating terrorism
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The former head of French intelligence Alain SHUE (Alain Chouet) in an interview points to the failures of the French intelligence services, responsible for internal and external security, which took place before the events of 13 November.
Were you surprised by the presence of the transition to active Islamist militants in Paris, although some of them were known and were wanted?
Of course not. For about a year of intelligence experts, including myself, who is retired for 12 years, beat the alarm on the prevention of the risk of an imminent terrorist attack. It should be clearly understood that the "Islamic State" (IG) has a clear strategy for its development in becoming a state, while it is losing ground in the impoverishment of resources, which forces him to turn to terrorist acts, as his time was the case with 'Al -Kaidoy. " For IG need to maintain their credibility, their sponsors and their support. Until November 13, it was only about the people who led their immediate superiors, without receiving direct instructions from the IG. They spent lightning action in Syria and lack of professionalism. As an example, recall the case of the terrorist who shot himself in the foot, or a scene with a high-speed train Thalys, where militants jammed weapon. And today, on the contrary, we are faced with these well-trained and organized militants who brought violence to a new level.
It is the reason for this transparency of borders "Schengen area"?
These guys have European passports, both real and fake, which simplifies their task. But due to the fact that along with the "Schengen area", we have created a common legal space, but without a common legal rules. Specifically, we can go somewhere border controls, in the country where it is carried out not so well, because it is not very concerned about security issues, and then to move anywhere without any control. No one in Europe, no passport with security and our borders are transparent. You can rejoice in this fact, since otherwise the majority of the population would experience inconvenience. Fortunately, we live in a legal and free countries. There is no consensus on the introduction of continuous monitoring of persons at the border, such as practiced in Israel. For us it will not be possible.
Investigation into the events on November 13 revealed deficiencies in the conduct of domestic intelligence. What should be done to fix them?
Unless we are talking about the shortcomings of firefighters or police when there was a deliberate arson in the forest? Fortunately, I believe that the original union in 2008, DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, Department of Territorial Surveillance) and RG (Renseignements Généraux, General Intelligence) in a new intelligence agency DCRI (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur, Central Office of Internal Intelligence ) [2014 transformed into DGSI, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure, Main Department of Homeland Security] was a good idea. In theory, it was possible to combine the capabilities of intelligence and criminal police (Police Judiciaire, PJ) for the control of the territory, in particular problem areas. The trouble is that this association has been poorly implemented. Instead of having to integrate all RG, they dismantled for parts: a small part included in DCRI, some were in PJ, and the rest went to the regional service. Specificity RG, which was to work in the territory, was weakened. Since RG is less engaged journalists and trade unionists, and to keep abreast with respect to troubled neighborhoods. And this loss.
Also on the American model we would like to focus on technical intelligence, to "large amounts of information," and things like that. However, this is not a very efficient way. It is necessary to look at the United States, the statements of the NSA Director General Alexander, made in 2013, with respect to a very relative effectiveness of those billions of dollars that have been spent after the September 11, 2001. Today, in this issue we are in the same place: we are concentrating our resources on technical intelligence and weakens the human intelligence. In defense of the police, I note that until 13 November have been hundreds of successful searches, which suggests that they had a purpose but no legal framework and the political will to implement specific steps. The failure, if it took place, also often associated with the political side of the issue.
What happens to the foreign intelligence service, DGSE, your former home?
Here, the same problem that in the case of counterintelligence: priority technical data. To date, the DGSE not have enough people who speak Arabic, which is well-known adherents of Salafism, and their way of thinking. When people see the size of salaries in state institutions, the real experts are going to other places. In addition there is a business organization "on the Gallic style": a clumsy hierarchy, with the structures that are not interact with each other. Especially there is under-funding of human intelligence, as well as the lack of resources on the ground, as financed by technical means of intelligence, as well as domestic issues.
Satisfactory if the level of exchange of information between the DGSE and DGSI?
"In general, they are positive", if you apply the formula of Georges Marchais. But you still need the exchange of objects, and this is more difficult, as no exploration carried out on the ground. More seriously, the problem DGSE, where I worked for 35 years, is that it is necessary to know the moment when the information sent in the DGSI, will set in motion, that is, when the information becomes known. This leads us to the question: at what point my source, which is often located abroad in hazardous conditions in danger? As for us, as I believe, for journalists to protect their sources is the most important issue. But when the danger is no source, the information in a large volume without hesitation passed.
What should be done to improve the analysis and use of intelligence obtained?
You can always do better. To use, it is necessary to analyze, and to analyze the required qualified staff who know the culture, history and geography of a particular country. Wanted as both specialists with a long experience as both "apprentice", which should be taught. But our politicians have a complete lack of experience in intelligence matters. In early 2001, I was asked to refocus some of my people engaged in the fight against terrorism, to counter illegal immigration because of what happened with the discovery of the ship, jam clogged migrants. And then on September 12 the same year, I had to double the staff units to combat terrorism, as if I was the day I can find a similar 200-300 professionals ...
How does the exchange of information between European countries?
Not very well, as the exchange and transfer of intelligence between national intelligence services is strictly regulated and is sandwiched within the "Schengen area". In addition, some countries would like to maintain its sovereignty in this area. In addition, the system PNR (Rassenger name record - a database of names of the passengers) had still not been created, as opposed to a few countries. Again, not enough common legal rules. Sharing intelligence from foreign intelligence easier to pass at the bilateral level, from country to country, because we have the habit of the old agreement. But you can not talk about anything in a forum where there are 28 countries that often have different interests. And of course there are problems at the level of large-scale electronic intelligence, which many regard as a clash with the freedom of citizens.
The exchange of information takes place with the great powers such as the US or Russia?
With the United States it works somehow. They have 16 intelligence agencies, who are not connected, they operate 300,000 employees. This is the realm of specialization and isolation one from the other departments. Here is a simple example. The FBI can ask us for information, but to give it to us can not, because it is secret. This is problem. In the case of Russia, there is a difficulty of another kind: the integration of intelligence in the service of Russian foreign policy. In short, they give us only what they want, and this information should be checked. Each time it should be treated with great caution.
Maybe we do not keep a constant exploration of destroyed states or countries where there is a war, such as Syria, Iraq, Libya?
To a large extent, yes. France severed all ties with Syrian intelligence agencies DGSE. Although security services created in order to have dinner even with the devil himself, or else they do not need. The fact that the authorities wanted to break off all relations with the Syrian regime is fully justified decision. But the role of intelligence is to be able to, and, if necessary, to maintain the informal communication channel. When recently the Syrian secret services tried to restore an informal channel of communication with the help of former employees of the French secret services, they received a categorical refusal. Whether right or left in power, but there is a lack of understanding of what are the security services. Our job is to maintain contact with suspicious persons. We do not judge, not the police, not the diplomats, and if we are allowed to talk with Syrian agents, that it will not be the political intelligence of the Assad regime.
In the case of Libya and Iraq in recent years it has also lost some good contacts. Not every day, but we worked with them against violence from Islamists. We knew that in the list of 50 people they send to us, there were five of their opposition to the regime. We took this into account. Today, we are blind, of the three countries we do not get information. And in the gray areas, where there is no state authority, in the Sahel, or anywhere else, it's hard work blond with blue eyes, or recruit agents on the spot, as the Islamo-mafia groups are very dangerous and kill without hesitation.
At what level is being shared with the countries of the Maghreb, Turkey and Egypt?
With the Maghreb countries, as well as with the other, the exchange is carried out in accordance with their own interests, but it is very useful. For example, it is the Moroccan intelligence helped us in the last days to reach a group of Saint-Denis. Algerian security services work is conducted in accordance with the policy in respect of the ruling regime. In Tunisia, the security services virtually destroyed. In Egypt, they are weakened, but still working. As for Turkey, we say so - they are tough.
Are there countries that conduct their game, or who have other views on the Islamists, different from ours?
Yes, there are ideological and financial supporters of terrorism. Petrosteyty Gulf who are trying by all means, in particular through the dissemination of the ideology of Salafism, prevent the creation of a Shiite axis from Lebanon to Iran, who have problems with legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims, and which prevent any manifestation of democracy. Saudi Arabia, for example, is already 30 years engaged in propaganda of Salafism and Wahhabism in Europe, with the help of schools and foundations, and today we see the result. Even 30 years ago, French Muslims do not know what Wahhabism. At one time, in 1980, Iran has resorted to state terrorism, but declined it.
In conclusion, you're fighting for something to collect less data but to develop human intelligence in the French security services.
In the US, a massive collection of information is not possible to avoid terrorist attacks in Boston, and even weekly campus shootings, which the authors declared in social networks. You should not put all your eggs in one basket, namely massive wiretapping. We need human and operational resources. Abandoning one satellite radio-electronic intelligence, we can employ hundreds of people. But it takes time and political will. In the late 1990s, after the terrorist attacks occurred in 1995, related to the situation in Algeria, came to me and said that my service is expensive, it does not solve major problems, since nothing happens. The Ministry of Economy has made a sad kind for inclusion in the budget of the vacancies. The number today DGSE of 4500-5000, of whom 1,000 are administrative staff. The problem is not a number, and how to use frames in their quality. The same applies to DGSI. I add that there are 80,000 people Gendarmerie, which at one time stood on every corner and talked to everyone. They retrain as tax collectors and grandparents Morozov on the side of the road, rather than to create a special body, the traffic police. Therefore, the operational work of counterintelligence and protection of the country weakened.
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