Samay wrote:Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade
ShauryaT, Plenty of refs on Shikarpur traders!
Samay wrote:Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade
Thank you for the pointer ramana. Have a long flight coming up and will be an interesting read. The day trade and creation of wealth is recognized as the key issue and traders are celebrated instead of being cursed - will be the day, India will start regaining its lost wealth.ramana wrote:Samay wrote:Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade
ShauryaT, Plenty of refs on Shikarpur traders!
ramana ji, since the roof top is a about to be a 'secured parameter'ramana wrote:Reading Curzon and all, the prize of the Great Game is India, not control of Central Asia which is a means to an end of controlling India. So the objective of the Great Game player is to ensure India doesnt fall to the other players. It would be better if they also control India but crucial to ensure others dont.
A question to the more knowledgeable folks here - I have followed this thread from its inception but don't recall the Iran question being discussed in relation to the Game. Has this been considered in your research on this topic? If so, can you please point me to it? I can take it from thereChandraS wrote:I don't have a personal opinion on the mullahcracy in Iran. But I do not agree with your assertion that it is in India's interest to overthrow the current dispensation, no matter how covertly we may do it. Pakistan's strategic leverage will not end with Iran becoming pro-West. It will only be redefined/restructured to solely be the cat's paw for the three and half friends of Pakistan against us. They will readily accept it since it's their raison d'etre anyways. This certainly will not be in our interests. As long as Pakistan (or even the idea of Pakistan) exists, they will have strategic leverage for use against us in the Great Game. For our interests to be served, Pakistan has to cease to exist physically and mentally. The resulting states can be leveraged by us to be in our circle of influence keeping them in congruence with our interests.Sanjay M wrote: Certainly it's in India's interests to see the Ayatallah thugocracy overthrown, although we shouldn't get involved directly, since we need good relations with whoever is in charge of Iran.
But would India benefit from the ouster of the mullahs? You bet it would.
Pakistan's whole claim to strategic leverage is due to its monopoly on transit into Afghanistan and Central Asia. If Iran were to become pro-Western again, then it would be an ideal route for the West into the region. Pakistan's strategic leverage would be badly compromised.
Anybody who doesn't see that isn't in tune with our national interests.
I for one am not interested in seeing Pakistan's strategic monopoly continue, if it can be removed.
It is true that the great game developed for the defence of India against Russian Tsarist aggression. IIRC, Russians since time of Aurangzeb have been interested in conquering India.ramana wrote:Reading Curzon and all, the prize of the Great Game is India, not control of Central Asia which is a means to an end of controlling India. So the objective of the Great Game player is to ensure India doesnt fall to the other players. It would be better if they also control India but crucial to ensure others dont.
The seeds of Judaism was started in the region of Iran in the ancient times.Paul wrote:Chandras.....The key Indian objective in the great game is to restore the land linkages between India and CA through Afghania. Ind addition, the Afghania upto the Amu Darya has to be brought back within Indian orbit as a buffer state.
The Achaemid emperor Cyrus freed the Israelites from Babylonian bondage. The shah had good relations with Iran. If western patronage of Israel keep declining with time as is happening now (with WWII generation withering away in europe and NA, western guilt over the holocaust will vanish leading to re-emergence of their genetic anti semitic feelings). Given time, Israel will have to look for non Arab allies. iran is one of them. I also think it is possible that Iran and Israel are accidental enemies not natural ones as with Arabs.
PS....the best outcome for India is for the Iranians to come together with Israel to take on the sunni powers.
There are reasons for these. Look for active cooperation with those countries to balance other countries in the region. They did the same thing with Indians in early 90s.sivabala wrote:FWIW,
The number of Iranian students in massa land is going up, however, the new arab students has gone down significantly. The numerical difference is stark. Khans honey moon tour to Afghan could be an extension of the policy. As the students are mostly of post graduate type, Amir Khans may have a plan for Iran in near future. The current post-election drama could just be a prelude in estimating the mullahs hold.
Also, the # of new Bangladeshi students also have gone up in sync with a decline in Pakistani students.
The funny thing is I was told of this increase by the students from respective countries.
Seeds dont just germinate by inaction. One needs to provide water, nutrients and protection for the seed to germinate, become a seedling and a tree and bear fruit. So for starters just jot the ideas in free format and later worry about structure.Y I Patel wrote:ramana,
Thanks for remembering! The seed of volition has been there for a long time. I don't know if a tree will grow, and when. Or what fruit it will bear. But the seed is there.
Gilgit and Baltistan - Strategic Relevance
By Vikram Sood
Issue: Vol 20.4Gilgit and Baltistan are parts of India, as much as the rest of the J & K state is, but this region does not seem to figure too prominently on our collective radar screen. Instead, we seem to have made the sanctity of the LOC an article of faith and never “violate” it even though Pakistan began its invasion on India on October 22, 1947 and has continued to violate the LOC since the cease-fire 56 years ago. The implication is that we are prepared to negotiate on the basis of the LOC as a boundary. Our media or our weather bureau seems to have forgotten this area also. Weather maps of the region do not show conditions in Gilgit, Skardu or Diamar like PTV, which never fails to tell us the weather conditions in Srinagar and Baramullah in ‘Maqbooza’ Kashmir. These are symbolisms but are important ones.
Although most of us know the strategic importance of J&K and the symbolism attached to multi-religious but predominantly Muslim J&K, to our ideals of secularism and nationhood, strategic issues connected with Gilgit and Baltistan are quite often not very central in our thought processes. Maybe one could get a better idea if one imagined that what we showed on our maps reflected reality on the ground. If we had what we show on our maps then the reality would have been something like this.
India would have had a border with NWFP - something that Pakistan could not tolerate given its sensitivities about the Durand Line, and the fear that India could play up this issue, and the traditionally friendly India-Afghan relations would be a disadvantage for Pakistan. All the waters of Indus and its tributaries would have substantially flown through Indian territory making the feudal farmers of Pakistan Punjab even more dependent on India. Domel, Muzaffarabad and the Haji Pir Bulge would have been in India’s control making GHQ Rawalpindi more vulnerable. India would have had access to Afghanistan through the Wakhan corridor - not the easiest of routes, but not unsurpassable, and definitely not at the mercy of Pakistan. The Karakoram Highway would not have existed and Pakistan would not have got its clandestine supplies from China and North Korea. China would not have had access to Gwadar and be able to connect Kashgar with Gwadar; nor would it have kept Pakistan supplied with lethal material clandestinely through the Karakoram Highway to counterbalance India.
There would not have been any terrorists hiding in the Neelam Valley to be launched into India and there would not have been any Kargil adventure nor the need for any troops on the heights of Siachen. There would not possibly have been displaced Mirpuris from the Mangla Dam reservoir area to migrate to the UK and form the core of anti-Indian protest in Europe. But even more crucial than the POK area, has been the Gilgit Baltistan area, and this is the one that does not figure in our strategic thinking, because this is the one that sits on the routes to China and Central Asia. The Karakoram Highway and the strategic Gwadar port close to the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf provide China vital access to the sea-lanes in the area. The US as inheritor of British imperial interests, in pursuit of Cold War first and then its new doctrine of pre-emption, would need this corridor to have access to the troubled Xinjiang.
For long, Indians have felt suspicious, and said so very often, that it was imperialist designs that got us into this situation. In two recently published books based on British Government, documents now made public set this doubt at rest. Clearly the entire exercise beginning with the impetus for the creation of Pakistan was the handiwork of British acting through their Viceroy in India. Tactical errors by the Congress when they resigned from the provincial governments at the start of the Second World War, in protest against dragging the country into their war without consulting the elected representatives, did not help.
Chandrashekhar Dasgupta’s “War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48″ depicts the two crucial years, when India lost POK and Gilgit Baltistan, not because of the superiority of the Pakistani forces, but because of three men essentially and the tangled web they wove. It was Mountbatten in Delhi, Bevin in Whitehall London and Noel-Baker in New York, who was particularly more loyal than the King. While in New York, Noel Baker zealously overplayed his hand in his blind love for Pakistan that even embarrassed Attlee. Bevin would give incomplete and slanted assessments, and in New Delhi, Mountbatten and his British officers in the Indian Army, invariably tried to underplay Pakistani transgressions, instead sought concessions from a trusting Nehru, and at the same time remained silent when it came to remotely blaming Pakistan. The ploy was the same - how could the raiders be asked to leave unless India also vacated. The same argument in different forms is applied today. This indirectly encouraged Pakistani obduracy and adventurism in Kashmir. Gradually India was pushed towards calling off operations into areas that later became to be known as Pak Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas; gradually India was inveigled into the UNSC route, and to find to its horror, that the tables had been turned on an unsuspecting but idealistic and newly independent government.
The stage for all this had been set in a way by the years preceding India’s independence. Nirendra Singh Sarila’s recent book “The Shadow of the Great Game- The Untold Story of India’s Partition” describes this vividly. Jinnah, and thereby Muslim League, was encouraged in his demands partly as punishment for “Hindu” Indian National Congress refusal to help the Empire in its war in Europe. The readiness of the British to help create Pakistan was more than just annoyance and pique. Imperial strategic interests are not determined solely by this sort of sentimentality. Both these books should be read by all those interested in learning how empires are managed.
The creation of Pakistan was an exercise in the preservation of imperial interests in the region. At that the time, (in the early years of the war when the British did not anticipate they would have to quit India so soon) the main perceived threat to British interests, was the growing might of the Soviet Union, and Britain was worried about a possible Soviet thrust into Chitral, Gilgit and Swat. China did not figure in imperial calculations at that time because Chiang Kai Shek was an ally. It was argued, that a friendly Muslim Pakistan, would be a better bet at handling the expanding Russian Empire, and more likely to co-operate with British military and foreign policy matters, rather than a Hindu India sitting far way from the actual scene of action. British withdrawal would severely impair that country’s ability to protect its interests in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region - the vital sea and trade routes-and this breach could be filled by a pliant new Muslim state. The Indus valley, western Punjab and Balochistan were vital to the preservation of British security interests in the region. Besides, after Pakistan was created, the British did not want to be seen doing anything anti-Muslim, lest it further exacerbated the wrath of the Arab Muslim world, which was already angered by the creation of Israel.
From then on, it was a familiar story repeated on each occasion - Pakistan became intransigent and we know the reactions in 1965, 1971, 1999 and even in 2001. Each time there was a reluctance to blame Pakistan, and each time there was pressure on India to show restraint. We must also remember that in 1965 and 1971, neither country was a nuclear power, and so there was no question of there being a nuclear powder keg. Cold War interests reigned. Later, interests emanating from a desire for global dominance meant that the West turned a blind eye to Gen Zia ul Haq’s feverish and clandestine schemes to acquire the nuclear weapon in the 80s because Pakistan was the base country for the jehad against the Soviet Union. Then later, the AQ Khan nuclear sales have been sought to be underplayed because Pakistan is a vital ally in the war against terror. In essence, the situation today is very much the same as it was 60 years ago. Pakistan has continued its well organised and carefully calibrated war against India, with the West trying to shackle India in various ways, insisting that concessions should come from India, the bigger country. It was Attlee who urged India to exercise restraint in 1947 and it was Blair who made similar requests in 1999 and 2001. All this is history that may not have fully played itself out and likely to be repeated as the New Great Game warms up.
We need to pay more attention to this area of “Pak Occupied Gilgit and Baltistan,” as the Chairman of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF), refers to his land. The people of Baltistan (Skardu and Astore) have had close ethnic, religious ties with people of Ladakh; the Shias and Ismailis of Gilgit and Baltistan have had close ties with the Shias of Kargil and have been oppressed by the Sunnis of Pakistan. The Shias were 85 percent of the population in 1948 but are now down to 50 percent. Pakistani authorities have systematically settled Sunni Wahabbis in Gilgit and Baltistan through unfair land allocations or employment. Shias resent the education syllabus thrust on them.
The Northern Light Infantry, which was mainly manned by locals, is now increasingly manned by ‘outsiders’ because the locals, mostly Shias, are no longer trusted. All prominent bureaucratic positions are held by Sunnis from NWFP and Punjab. There is no freedom of expression and journalists are frequently locked up for reporting dissent. There are no writ petitions, no appeals to Supreme Court against any arbitrary action by the State. There has been no economic development in the area except for the construction of the Karakoram highway. No political activity is permitted. There are a few brave individuals like Abdul Hamid Khan of the BNF who carry on their campaign against Islamabad. More and more Gilgitis now seek self-determination and not a merger with Pakistan. And that their views must be taken into consideration for any discussions on the Kashmir question.
Anti-Shia violence continues in Gilgit and Baltistan and more than 80 persons had been killed in 2005 by October in clashes with State forces as Shias protested against state oppression or demanded better conditions. The practice of anti-Shia pogrom started in the 80s, and one of the persons who led a brutal campaign against the Shias in Gilgit in 1988, was Brig (now Gen) Pervez Musharraf, who was then based in Khapalu.
India needs to refocus attention on this region of Gilgit and Baltistan in the new globalisation context. If we are to be dependent on the uncertainties and unreliability of Pakistan for our energy supplies, it is also necessary to look elsewhere. Land routes from Russia and Kazakhstan through Kashgar could also reach India. Undoubtedly this means some negotiations with China on the boundary and trade issues. It means a new approach, less dependent on a volatile West Asia and a neighbour with whom the trust deficit remains high and will remain so for a long time to come. It means looking at the boundary question differently. It also means that we should now put 1962 behind us without forgetting the lessons of realpolitik. China may be described as a competitor or a threat on different occasions but it is equally an opportunity. It means giving shape to the Russia-India-China strategic triangle - among the three largest landmasses in the world, the largest markets in size and diversity, countries with the highest rates of growth, a Russia that would need manpower imports in the years ahead, and which could remain militarily and economically strong without total dependence on sea lanes controlled by others. This is what an Asian Century should be all about.
So if we extrapolate from what Arpi is saying that its the drive for bases that spurs the 'cashmere' initiatives, then its the drawdown in Iraq and the slow boil in TSP that are spurring the renewed interest in 'cashmere'.Exit Kashmir, enter Iraq
17 December 2002
The Pioneer
Claude Arpi
Younghusband, who became famous after his military expedition in 1904, once wrote: "We, who have dealt with Asiatics, can appreciate so well (the following tactic): Taking the opportunity, striking while the iron is hot, not letting the chance go by, knowing our mind, knowing what we want, and acting decisively when the exact occasion arises." For decades, London scrupulously followed Younghusband's advice. In 1946-47, although the British had decided to leave the subcontinent, they were not ready to renounce their influence in Asia. In the 1940s, two new factors appeared on the strategic scene: Aviation and the need for petrol. London took note of the new changes. In a report on the strategic consequences of the subcontinent's independence, the British generals concluded that Pakistan was the more important than India for 2 reasons. First, Pakistan was a Muslim nation and friendship with Pakistan could facilitate the rapport with oil-rich Muslim states in the Gulf; second, Pakistan was ideal for installing air bases to control Russia and Central Asia. This explains why London systematically took Pakistan's side in the Kashmir issue.
The US has stepped into British shoes. The same basic principles remained: Control over the air bases to control the region. The sober French monthly Le Monde Diplomatique published recently an article arguing that the US, the last colonial empire, did not require allies, but vassals. The US position vis-a-vis Kashmir, for the past 50 years, has to be seen in this perspective. Successive US administrations have been trying to find a pliable vassal in the region which will allow bases to keep a tab on Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics, Xinjiang and Tibet. The best bet for the US was, therefore, to have an independent Kashmir which they could fund and directly influence. Just a look at the map of Jammu and Kashmir makes one realise the extraordinary strategic importance of the state. The British knew it. Back in 1873, the GOvernor General of British India informed the Maharaja that London had decided to post a British Resident in Kashmir "in view of the important position of Your Highness's territories on the northwestern frontiers of British India." The concept of an independent Kashmir continued to ripen with the US administration. In May 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar to discuss with Abdullah the creation of an independent Sheikhdom. It suited perfectly the US interests: They could thus check Chinese advances in Xinjiang and Tibet and the Soviets' in Afghanistan. A "non-aligned" Nehru could certainly not be considered as a reliable ally for the purpose. Unfortunately for them, Abdullah was arrested in August 1953 and the idea had to be temporarily abandoned.
In the '80s, the US fell back on Pakistan as a palliative to dominate the region and get rid of the Soviets in Afghanistan. By the time the SOviet Union collapsed, the US had begun to realise the danger of the ISlamic fundamentalism: The genie they had liberated was now out against them. On September 11, 2001, the US experienced the dimension of the problem. Supporting terrorism whether in overt or covert form was no longer in their interests. hence the slow shift in their Kashmir policy. However, to assert their world supremacy, a new target had to be found. Iraq for several reasons became the ideal one. An American think-tank Stratfor.com published recently an in-depth analysis of the US motivations for a military take-over of Iraq. Their conclusion was similar to the one reached 55 years ago by the British: "The primary reason is geography. If we look at a map, Iraq is the most strategic country between the Levant and the Persian Gulf. It shares borders with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and most of all, Saudi Arabia.... It would have ample room for deploying air power in the heart of the region...Within a matter of months, the US would become the most powerful military force native to the region."
After their timid Afghan campaign against the Taliban, an independent Kashmir lost its meaning. With a strong nuclear India, the idea of an "autonomous" Kashmir receded further. The US also realised that the heart of Islamic fundamentalism was not a resourceless Pakistan, but the oil-rich Gulf countries which had the means to sustain it. Therefore, the shift towards Iraq. This change in US policy was noticed when Ambassador Blackwill visited the Valley. For the first time, a US Ambassador did not meet the Hurriyat leaders. Instead, he lauded India for the peaceful conduct of the elections.
Its just an eye wash as always happens, most people go with it...ramana wrote:Dated but confirms this thread premise.
So if we extrapolate from what Arpi is saying that its the drive for bases that spurs the 'cashmere' initiatives, then its the drawdown in Iraq and the slow boil in TSP that are spurring the renewed interest in 'cashmere'.
Johann wrote:these'elites' alyas keep changing sides,dont theyThe elites in Arab states already believe that the US has shifted against them, and lined up with the Shia in Iraq and Iran.,one of them who was too worried with the us is now running for his life
only turks know what are their ambitions,didnt they controlled most of arab land at some timeTurkey plays a relatively small part in the US-Israel-Sunni Arab-Iran dance because its regional ambitions in the ME are so limited beyond the Kurdish issue - it is far more interested in the Mediterranean, EU and former Soviet Union.And that will finally decide western exit from there , at least it could.The situation in the ME remains fluid. The social and political stresses caused by declining oil revenues will be profound, and will work themselves out in different ways in different societies.Change in govt in both countries is subjected t two different actions for two different conclusions that us would like to act, both cant happen simultaneously, it may be too destabilising for us interests in the region as israel isn't yet allowed a 'no holds barred ' ...yet what we dont know is whether or not us is going to tilt towards iran more than Israel in a similar fashion it does in the subC , perhaps israelis would be knowing this ,and they will win in all situations,,, poor iraniansA change in the nature of governments in both Egypt and Iran are both possible, returning the situation to something like the 1960s and 1970s when Iran was America's most important friend in the region, and Egypt its greatest challenge.![]()
DHM062. Remnants of an Army by Lady Elizabeth Butler.
Depicts Dr. William Brydon, an assistant surgeon in the Bengal Army arriving at the gates of Jellabad on his exhausted and dying horse. He was thought to be the sole survivor of some 16,000 strong army and followers from Kabul, which was forced to retreat the 90 miles over snow covered passes to Jellabad during the first Aghan war. A few others eventually struggled through to the fort
Whole of central asia had close relations with India since thousands of years.Shortly after Independence, Sardar Vallabbhai Patel was asked to comment on the flare-up in Indonesia. ‘‘Indonesia? Ah, Indonesia,’’ Patel mused, and then, flashing a smile, replied, ‘‘Ask Jawaharlal.’’[proof that JLN was deciding India's foriegn policy according to his dhimmitude, and kept other sane people out of the equation,like SVBP]The story may well be apocryphal but it does suggest that his colleagues viewed Jawaharlal Nehru’s penchant for pontificating on world affairs as silly.
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Six decades later, Nehru’s preachiness has been replaced by an astonishing measure of babu-speak. ‘‘We don’t comment on the internal affairs of another country’’ has become the template response of ministers to almost everything, including attacks on Indian students in Australia and the offensive depiction of the Goddess Lakshmi by Burger King. Given this stonewalling, South Block’s silence on the upsurge in the so-called Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of China isn’t surprising. ‘‘What’s it got to do with us?’’ may well be the Twitter-formatted ministerial response.![]()
That Xinjiang or East Turkestan(as it is called by Uighur nationalists) has long and profound links with India has been conveniently forgotten. Yet, as late as 1951, India had its own consulate in Kashgar, the trading hub of Xinjiang, an arrangement that dated back to 1890. The occupant of Chini-Bagh (renamed India House in 1947 but now known by its original name) in Kashgar was drawn from the Indian Political Service and received instructions, not from Whitehall but from the Viceroy’s council. Indeed, before he was accorded full diplomatic recognition by the Chinese government in 1904, Sir George Macartney’s official position was special assistant for Chinese affairs to the resident in Kashmir — a pointer to the fact Xinjiang had everything to do with India.
The consulate in Kashgar had two primary responsibilities.First, to be an observation post in the Great Game that involved Russia, Turkey and British India [and later japan when it invaded china;] secondly, to look after the interests of the Indian traders in Xinjiang. There was also a third, unstated role: as a facilitator of archaeology.
In 1890, Captain Hamilton Bower stumbled across 5th century Sanskrit manuscripts on birch bark leaves while surveying the Taklamakan desert. This discovery led to a flood of archaeological expeditions from Russia, Sweden, Germany and Britain. Sir Aurel Stein, a scholar of Hungarian Jewish descent, was by far the most well known of these scholars who established Xinjiang’s importance as a centre of Buddhism. Modelling himself on the 7th century Chinese pilgrim Xuan Zang, Stein, with his fox terrier Dash in tow, gathered a rich haul of antiquities which he donated to the British Museum and left a few pieces for museums in India.
China viewed the likes of Stein as bounty hunters which they undoubtedly were. However, China’s commitment to preserving Xinjiang’s heritage has itself come under a cloud. The indiscriminate demolition of the old town in Kashgar has riled Uighurs, already sore at being reduced to a minority by organised Han Chinese immigration.
It was the wooliness of Nehru and the gullibility of K N Panikkar, India’s first ambassador to China, which allowed Zhou Enlai to sweet-talk India into closing its consulates in both Kashgar and Lhasa in Tibet.Zhou gave a verbal assurance that Indian interests will be looked after by a friendly China. The closure was the precursor to the stealthy construction of the Karakoram highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet and the formal occupation of Aksai Chin in 1962. India suffered humiliation because it was too trusting and had abandoned its geo-political responsibilities.
Unlike what the Panchsheel lovers claim, invoking a lost legacy isn’t fanciful nostalgia. When the Communists reneged on their commitment to grant Uighurs political autonomy — the top leadership of the community was conveniently killed while flying to Beijing for talks — several hundred Uighurs fled China. These included Isa Yusuf Alpetkin and Mehmet Emin Bughra, the leaders of the Eastern Turkestan Republic which existed from the 1930s to 1949. It is significant that they took refuge in India because they regarded New Delhi as a sympathetic neighbour. It is only after they experienced India’s cravenness that they shifted to Turkey.
It is fortunate that the sustained neglect of India’s interests in Central Asia was somewhat corrected by P V Narasimha Rao with his support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Today, India enjoys both goodwill and a political clout with the leadership of the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks — communities that have ties with the Uighurs and are agitated by the goings-on in Xinjiang. These are relationships waiting to be built on.
If India wants to play a more meaningful role in global affairs, it has to come to terms with its rich imperial inheritance. There is precious little in the post-1947 record that can guide India’s journey back to relevance. The meek, it has repeatedly been shown, don’t inherit the earth.
Islamist fighters on the Silk RoadIslamist fighters on the Silk Road
M.K. Bhadrakumar
A steadily rising curve of Islamist activities is becoming visible in Central Asia.
...
There are reports that U.S. special forces facilitated the movement of “foreign fighters” from the Wazir tribes on the Pakistani-Afghan border into Chardara district. (Chardara is a Pashtun enclave.) These are very alarming signals reminiscent of the run-up to the Andizhan uprising in the Ferghana valley in May 2005, which had covert American involvement. Conceivably, the security situation may worsen along the route of the Turkmenistan-Xinjiang pipeline
...
To be sure, a second post-Soviet wave of Islamism is appearing in the region. Islamist fighters are arriving on the Silk Road, poking Russia’s — and China’s — “soft underbelly” in a way that will do Brzezenski proud.
(The writer is a former diplomat.)
A post from a reader--Samay wrote:
Whole of central asia had close relations with India since thousands of years.
Buddhism which kept on propagating eastwards ,also reached through silk route and flourished in the Uighur land.
Even the british while expansion kept a tab on japanese and russian influence in this region,which played very important role .
It was nehru's timid behaviour that he forgot that tibet and some part of the central asia wants to be a part of India, and whole of MEA,neglected this region like they neglect the northeast ,.
It's surprising to see that the MEA and the Indian babu establishment is still sleeping,
busy pleasing politicians than country's interests .
It's all right to talk about India's imperial heritage in respect of Xinjiang but in this day and age it is hopeless to talk about any country's imperial heritage. There are candidates with a much better showing in terms of their imperial past. India had no imperial heritage: only British India as part of the British empire had. Macartney at Kashgar was unofficially HBM's consul at Kashgar, although for long he was not recognized as such (nor was he even designated as consul for a very long time). His role in the Great Game was unofficial, as was the Great Game itself. There were others who played similar roles after him, e.g., F. M. Bailey. While these were good listening posts, no actual diplomacy was being carried out by any of them.
Besides, being under the control of the Indian foreign department in Calcutta/Delhi, they had no great relevance to the British foreign office in London. Records at the India Office (now called British Library) show that the British foreign office anxiously waited for reports and inputs from these listening posts, although the foreign office had its own personnel in several parts of the Chinese empire/republic, including those at Kashgar, Lhasa, and Tachienlu (called Dar-tse-do by the Tibetans), all of which reported to the British ambassador (called HBM's minister) in China with occasional endorsements to the Indian foreign department. Reports from consuls and consul-generals at several of these places used to be seen by the Indian foreign secretary, who was the viceroy's principal officer on foreign affairs.
An 'Indian foreign policy' was largely the handiwork of successive viceroys, not all of whom had a penchant for either the Great Game or for foreign affairs generally. In almost all matters the Indian foreign department was subordinate to the British foreign office, just as the Indian government was subordinate to the British government in London. Problems of communication left some leeway to the Indian foreign department.
and thisWASHINGTON, July 16 (Reuters) - The United States needs to develop strategies for competing with China for energy business in Central Asia, where Beijing's government can simply go in and write checks, the U.S. energy envoy said on Thursday.
Richard Morningstar used Turkmenistan as an example, where he said China was building a natural gas pipeline at its own cost and had agreed to provide a loan of some $3 billion for energy exploration.
"China is having increasing and heavy influence in Central Asia," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "It is hard for us to compete with China in some of these countries," he added.
"It's easy for Turkmenistan to make a deal with China, when China comes in and says, 'hey, we're going to write a check for X amount of money, we're going to build a pipeline,'" he said. "That's not a hard deal to accept, and we (the United States) can't compete in that way."
But, "we also have to develop a strategy to deal with that," and encourage U.S. companies to negotiate creatively with Turkmenistan, Morningstar said.
Washington should also think about whether it makes sense for U.S. companies to cooperate with China in such countries, he said.
Morningstar, the special U.S. envoy for Eurasian energy, has just returned to the United States from a trip to Turkmenistan and Turkey.
In Ankara on Monday he attended the signing of a transit deal for the Nabucco gas pipeline, aimed at cutting Europe's energy dependence on Russia by supplying gas from the Caspian Sea and Middle East.
Turkmenistan is considered a possible supplier for the pipeline, which plans to pump 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe by 2014. Continued...
If we do not increase our presence in central asia today, tommorow they will be too rich to let other players in, since CAR is the new energy destination of the world economy, its like a world cup elimination round,and usa was able to get a wild entry through afpak,.PUNE: Up against shortage of vital nuclear fuel like uranium for running the nuclear power plants to their optimum capacity, India is looking
towards the Central Asian and African countries for sourcing nuclear fuel.
Speaking to reporters here on Tuesday, Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar said, the nuclear power generation in the country is between 55 to 60 per cent of the total installed capacity of 4,100 MW. "This is primarily because of shortage of fuel like uranium," he said.
Referring to the target of adding an extra 3,000 MW to the existing installed capacity for nuclear power in the country by end of 2010, Kakodkar said that the AEC plans to meet this objective by sourcing fuel from different countries.
"Recently, we got 300 tonnes of uranium from France. We also entered into an agreement with Russia in February 2009 and are expecting 2,000 tonnes of nuclear fuel from this arrangement," Kakodkar said. Next, he added that Central Asian and African countries are being tapped for sourcing nuclear fuel.
According to Kakodkar, the country's total installed capacity for nuclear power would go up to 6,700 MW by early 2011, with the addition of 2,600 MW to the existing installed capacity of 4,100 MW. "This will happen in a phased manner," he said.source :TOI
We are going to enter Central Asia for that we have to help America in Afghanistan....Samay wrote:If we do not increase our presence in central asia today,
Dear,It is a wide misconception in our country that we can only gain anything if we toe usa's line in all aspects of thinking ,mind you,shravan wrote:We are going to enter Central Asia for that we have to help America in Afghanistan....Samay wrote:If we do not increase our presence in central asia today,
To the Editor:
Robert Kaplan ("Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century," March/April 2009) correctly underscores the Indian Ocean's strategic importance. But in envisioning "dynamic great-power rivalry" between Beijing and New Delhi there, he is too pessimistic about the United States' ability to maintain influence, too optimistic about China's ability to exert influence rapidly, and too dismissive of India's inherent regional advantages.
Kaplan contends that the United States must skillfully manage an inevitable decline by leveraging the support of allies. But the U.S. military has successfully sustained its level of operations in the region while expanding its range of missions. Washington is working intently with its partners to support cooperative maritime activities globally, as expressed in the maritime strategy released in October 2007.
The United States is shaping itself into an indispensable maritime balancer by deploying the right number and right kind of naval forces and establishing task forces and maritime headquarters that bring diverse partners together. These activities efficiently act as a tipping weight in the Indian Ocean, allowing the United States' other forces to be used elsewhere.
Kaplan's "elegant decline" argument also gives more weight to the number of U.S. ships, submarines, and aircraft than is warranted. The current versatility and capabilities of U.S. naval platforms, coupled with their useful employment in specific scenarios, is a clearer measure of their effectiveness than numbers alone.
Kaplan is correct that the United States must strive to be "continually useful," and the U.S. Navy is doing so. Under U.S. leadership, the multinational naval coalition Combined Task Force 151 conducts counterpiracy operations in the Indian Ocean region, most recently rescuing a U.S. merchant captain taken hostage by pirates.
Moreover, the United States' systemic indispensability is being nurtured through two key initiatives. First, the United States has established regional "maritime operations centers" around the world, partnering with other countries to plan, coordinate, and execute a wide range of mutually beneficial naval actions. Second, the U.S. Coast Guard, in concert with the U.S. Navy, has closely collaborated with interested nations through the Maritime Domain Awareness project to study the global maritime factors that affect collective security, safety, trade, and environmental interests. U.S. energy and leadership are essential here. This is not decline but preeminence (without domination).
Taiwan's status, combined with other territorial and resource interests on China's maritime periphery, will leave China's navy primarily focused on Taiwan for the foreseeable future. Moreover, deploying a sustainable out-of-area expeditionary capability requires not only ships and ports but also extensive logistical support and high levels of training and experience. Ship steaming times to the Arabian Gulf from Chinese and Indian naval ports are 13 days and three days, respectively, making it comparatively easier for India to secure the sea-lanes there and respond to a crisis. India, which clearly enjoys a home-court advantage in the Indian Ocean, neither needs to solve the expeditionary problem nor possesses a strategic imperative similar to Taiwan that would bind its naval operations. No matter how much access to Indian Ocean ports China may gain, it cannot trump geography without a revolution in capabilities and strategic interests.
THOMAS CULORA
Chair, Warfare Analysis and Research Department, U.S. Naval War College
ANDREW ERICKSON
Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Good info. Find out more about how other stans were created. Kasakhstan is crucial.Paul wrote:
Among the major nuggets in this book, Stalin formed the Tajikistan SSR in 1929 to showcase the glory of communism at the gateway of “Hindustan”. I believe this reveals a key input into why POK went to Pakistan and the Wakhan corridor was formed.