India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[ShauryaT]

with an additional protocol that ALL NNWS only sign.

There is the additional protocol , which NNWS may optionally sign.
Then there is an additional protocol, which may have different provisions.
India is not signing the additional protocol, it is signing its own an additional protocol

The US has signed an additional protocol.

The US version of the additional protocol contains what is known as a ‘national security exclusion clause’, which permits the US to restrict IAEA inspections in respect to activities of ‘direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities’.

Stand corrected Gerard, on who signs the additional protocol. The key distinction is on the voluntary and perpetual nature, derived from the NPT, which changes the scope and impact on a country, of the additional protocol. The key thing to watch for is, if the IAEA will spend their resources monitoring India. You have previously articualated, and rightly so, that it does not make sense for the IAEA to be spending their meagre resources on an acknowledged weapons state. But, this will be driven not from economics alone but largely from Geo-Politics. The US has aspirations of locking India down to a second rate nuclear power (the new realistic goal) and is building tools to do so, if it so chooses to pursue that path.

[ramana]

And make India pay for it as the IAEA safeguards agreement had a fixed Euro amount per facility.

[Arun_S]

Can India stock, 10 years of uranium supply, for each of the reactor that it purchases. What will be the cost of this, compared to the total cost.

I have seen that the cost is arround $200 pr kg. 1000 tonnes would cost or 200 million dollars. If the cost of the nuclear plant is 2 billion dollars, only 10% of the total cost would be the Uranium store.

Am I missing out

Remember the Obama amendment. Fuel supply only for, what is needed for safe operating conditions - not a reserve to ride out sanctions. However, when there are sanctions, we will have other issues too. So, a 10 year fuel reserve is possible, if not economically optimal or feasible, especially through non poodles of USA.

In the previous thread I had clearly shown in detail the calculation of how much fuel is required for the 40GWe imported LWRs, and the cost of raw Uranium and enrichment. At current natural uranium prices and enrichment cost to operate the 40GWe LWR for 1 year is $3.1 Billion, thus 10 year fuel reserve will cost ~ $31 billion onleee.

[Arun_S]

Detailed calculation of amount of fuel needed for the 40GWE and its cost. Here is the a copy of the post. I am not quoting it because of forum server formatting issues.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=4175&st=0&sk=t&sd=a&start=320

-----------------------------Start of quote -----------------------------------------------------------------
Katare: Perhaps you did not see it, but I did earlier post a detailed breakdown to back the numbers that I posted earlier. For your benefit let me restate that. These are calculated from first principle, and thus more direct and verifiable from Physics and calculations.

Don't your lifetime cost list the combined figure of capital cost and continuous operational costs, rather than just the latter ? What does the $100 billion component for the LWRs constitute, for example ?

Two separate things:

• 1) When I said ">>although I challenge to say why settle for high lifetime cost when there is option for lower cost!" I am mentioning only the cost of running and maintain the facilities to operate the reactor I.e. reactor + spent fuel yard for cooling, reprocessing plant and fuel rod fabrication. I am not including the cost of acquiring these infrastructure in the first place that per std project planning are catagorized as Capital Cost.
  
  2) The $100 billion component is just the capital cost of acquiring the LWR reactor. It is based on internationally accepted (and reported by AK in his PPT) $2000/KWe capital cost per KW electricity generation times the 50GWe that AK's graphs it on page 13 of his PPT presentation for teh year 2020.
  50GWe X $2000/KWe = $100 Billion

Let me also show the basis and breakup of other numbers:

3). 100 year reactor operating life is the norm for new reactors including AHWR (one can easily find reference in DAE/BARC website).

4). To operate 50GWe over the assumed 100 year life time will need from first order approximation ~1,513,000 tonnes natural Uranium. of that :

• i) 1MWe-Year generation in LWR or HWR requires completely fissioning 1.21Kg of fissile material but since Natural U has only 0.7% of fissile U235, that corresponds to needing to buy 173kg of Nat-U (for simplicity let us keep out second order effect like discharge enrichment, that will make the number even worse).
  ii) Now LWR need enriched fuel. So assuming from the 0.7% U235 available in in Nat-U, enrichment process leave a depleted Uranium tail with U235 enrichment of 0.3%, the amount of Nat U required for running 1MWe of LWR is thus = 173 Kg/((0.7-0.3)/0.7) =>303 kg Nat-U to run a year LWR at 1MWe.
  iii) So for 50GWe that AK envisages involves buying and enriching 50,000MWe*303kg = 15,150 tonnes of Nat-U per year, so for 100 year one will need to buy 1.515 million tonne nat U.
  iv) Cost of natural uranium in metal market is $68/Lb assuming it holds for next 6 years and goes down (forget about upside for the time being) so it will cost at current prices $226.5 Billion. Enrichment cost for to LWR level enrichment will cost 77 billion. The net total, assuming no profit for the commercial enterprise and middle man that is = $303 billion.

5). Cost of building FBR is definitely higher than a LWR or PHWR. The conventional wisdom is 2 to 3 times. So I assume it will be $5,000/KWe compared to $2000/KWe for non FBR reactors. AFAIK this does not include the cost of building backend facilities required to run the reactor liek cooling yard, re-processing and fuel fabrication.

So 330 GWe for LWR based FBR capacity that AK perprots (on slide# 13)for 2050 will cost 330,000 MWe X $5,000,000/MWe = $1650 Billion.

6). Indian 3 stage fuel cycle envisages feeding the deficit neutrons of multiple AHWR (based on Thorium) reactors from a FBR. For Wattage to Wattage the ratio IIRC 1:1 or 1:2 (I.e. 100 MWe FBR able to excess fuel to drive 200MWe AHWR) depending on when they reach FBR with metallic fuel rod rather then Oxide or Carbide based fuel element. In the first few decades of technology improvement that ratio will be lower. Assuming an average of slightly lower than 1:1 ratio between FBR and AHWR the average capital cost comes to ~$3750/KWe. Again I am not including the cost of building back-end facilities required to run the reactor like spent fuel cooling yard, re-processing and fuel fabrication.

So 275GWe for LWR based FBR capacity that AK purports (on slide# 13)for 2050 will cost 275,000 MWe X $3,750,000/MWe = $1031 Billion.

That should be enough to start to think about weakness of Shri Kakodkar's power point presentation.

That was a rather long post and given the paucity of time I have fulfilled 7 good deeds quota for the week.

Thanks for listening.

Please note that the 50GWe quoted above was from reading and measuring the bar graph. Later the CPI document indicated the DAE plan for LWR is ~40GWe and not 50GWe. So the numbers can be scaled accordingly.

If OTOH you did see this detailed post, then I am at loss to understand what more details in particular you sought from me!

Now back to your estimates. I commend your genuine effort to get to the bottom of reality, even though it is back of the envelop estimate. There are some corrections that I would like to suggest to your quick estimates. Pls bear with my limited response due to my constrains.

• 1.) LWR don't run on natural uranium. They require medium enriched uranium (typical 4.5%). Thus the cost of the fuel for LWR is cost of uranium plus cost of enrichment. So please also calculate enrichment cost.
  
  2.) The basic presumption of this argument built on global annual consumption and N power generation capacity. As I outlined in an earlier post the global Uranium consumption is far higher than the global Uranium production.
  • 
  Thus drawing heavily from Uranium inventory of varied enrichment (repeat varied enrichment). Thus consumption of 1 tonne of say 4% enriched Uranium inventory is reported as 1 tonne Uranium, but that 1 tonne was obtained few decades ago from a much larger amount of natural Uranium that went through enrichment process.
  
  So your estimate of 179.2 Tons of uranium consumption/GWe is misleading because that uranium is of various grade of enrichment and NOT natural uranium.
  
  I.e. 179.2 Tons of uranium consumption/GWe NOT= 179.2 Tons of natural uranium consumption/GWe
  
  So use of natural Uranium price in that calculation is wrong.
  
  3) It can be easily shown that 179.2 Tons of natural uranium can not generate 1GWe-Year energy, as following:
  179.2 Tons of natural uranium has 1,274 Kg fissile U235 (@ 0.711% natural enrichment)
  
  Great majority of global nuclear plants are LWR, that on an average use 4.5% enriched fuel and its spent fuel leaves behind 0.5% U235. I.e. 89% fuel is used. Enrichment process inputs 0.71% Natural enrichment Uranium and leave behind a tail enrichment of 0.3% (average). I.e. Enrichment process extracts 57% fissile material from the mined Uranium. Thus the LWR reactors fission only 51% of U235 present in the natural Uranium originally mined to fuel the LWR.
  
  HWR/PHWR is the other significant but small power reactor type in world. It uses natural-Uranium and the spent fuel of HWR leaves behind 0.22% U235 enrichment. I.e. 69% U235 fission efficiency (for the time being let us ignore effect of in-situ Pu fission that has a significant but second order effect in total energy output of HWR).
  
  Now to generate 1 MWe for 1 year requires fissioning 1.21 Kg fissile material.
  Thus if 179.2 Tonnes of natural Uranium is used to feed a LWR, it will only fission 51% of 1,274 Kg originally present in the mined Uranium; I.e. 650Kg. That in turn generates 542 MWe-year energy.
  
  This proves the fallacy of 179.2 Tonnes of natural-Uranium generating 1GWe-year energy.
  
  4) One could argue that globally some of the spent fuel is reprocessed to recover the Plutonium to feed it back into reactor as MoX fuel rod reduced Uranium consumption. While that will certainly be true in future decades when ~15% of the LWR fuel is expected to come from reprocessed MoX fuel, that IMO is far for reality today.
  
  In fact if India does import LWR per DAE/Kakodkar's pie in the sky vision, the reprocessed Pu will NOT be recycled back into LWR but be exclusively used as starting fuel for FBR. Thus the Uranium fuel inventory required for lifetime use will be as calculated in my estimate that is based on first principle. I earlier posted some information 3rd gen reactors
  http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf08.html
  all of them have a design life of between 60 to 100 years, that is much greater than 40 years.

In the end I acknowledge and appreciate you taking the initiative and effort, to do your own research and calculations.
-------------------------------End of quote ---------------------------------------------------------------

[sraj]

NZ was willing to risk terminating its security relationship with the US by banning USN warships back in the 1980s when many of them had tactical nukes on board.

These kinds of countries want a radically different global security architecture, one that doesnt rely on deterrence through hard power, but instead through norm based approaches. They think its possible. In India I suppose that sort of thinking would be called Gandhian.

The correct question to ask is: the same Bush who did not let Chirac of France and Schroeder of Germany stand in his way when invading Iraq is going to let New Zealand dictate the terms on which the US/West accomodates India into the global non-proliferation architecture? What exactly is New Zealand's relevance to the global nuclear industry?

and India is expected to take GOTUS' expressions of helplessness at face value and not wonder if all that Bush/GOTUS/the West is looking for is "plausible deniability"?

India needs to have a PLAN B ready to avoid a repeat at NSG of the Hyde fiasco. US Senators and Congressmen basically used the Hyde Act to unilaterally maul beyond recognition the J18/M3 Bush-MMS agreements, with India reduced to the position of a bystander.

[Gerard]

U.S. proposes India nuclear waiver, approval in doubt

The United States has proposed to waive a ban on nuclear trade with India without conditions such as compliance with a nuclear test ban or U.N. inspections, but diplomats said on Thursday the draft was unlikely to pass.

A green light by the 45-nation NSG, which operates by consensus, is necessary for the 2005 U.S.-India deal on nuclear trade to proceed to U.S. Congress for final ratification.

I suspect the first majority vote in NSG history may be in the offering....

[ramana]

Gerard, So there is another draft in circulation. The arms control guy had conditions.So what is going on?

[sivab]

http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3274

Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India
[Text of Draft U.S. Proposal to NSG, August 2008]


1. At the _____ plenary meeting on ______ the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed that they:

a. desire to contribute to an effective non-proliferation regime and the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

b. seek to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons

c. wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime

d. seek to promote fundamental principles of safeguards and export control for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes

e. recognize the world's need for clean and reliable sources of energy for sustained growth and prosperity

2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

a. Deciding to separate its civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency

b. Conducting negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval of its Board of Governors regarding a Safeguards Agreement for application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities that is in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including Board of Governors document GOV/1621)

c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities

d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these

e. Having adopted a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear related material, equipment, and technology.

f. Harmonizing its export control lists with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and committing to adherence to NSG guidelines

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

3. In view of the above, Participating Governments have adopted the following policy on civilian nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civilian nuclear program

a. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of Infcirc/254 (Rev. 9) Part 1, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 1.

b. Notwithstanding paragraph 4(b) of the Part 2 guidelines, Participating Governments may transfer nuclear-related dual use equipment, etc. for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 2.

c. Participating Governments shall maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India.

4. In order to facilitate the efforts of non-member adherents to Infcirc/254 Parts 1 and 2 to remain current in their implementation of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member adherent may wish to make. Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.

5. The NSG Point of Contact is requested to submit this statement to the IAEA DG with a request that it be circulated to all Member States.

[Gerard]

The draft on armscontrol is the one they are bleating about

[ramana]

What about 2g? GOI has no issues?

[RajeshA]

U.S. proposes India nuclear waiver, approval in doubt
I suspect the first majority vote in NSG history may be in the offering....

As long as the NSG Plenary Meetings decide issues on the basis of consensus, a majority would not mean acceptance, it would be called a split decision and as such null and void, status quo.

Of course, that would be a major slap on US's face, not being able to convince a bunch of non-countries. The possibilities are:

1) The Non-Proliferation Activist States do not budge, and will vote in favor only if their conditions are met. USA yields. India walks away.

2) The NPASs do not budge. USA doesn't budge. India doesn't budge. There is no Waiver. India and USA go home, and deal dies.

3) The NPASs do not budge. USA pushes them out of NSG. Deal goes through.

4) The NPASs do not budge. The NSG Rules are changed to majority voting. Deal goes through.

5) The NPASs budge. Deal goes through.

[RajeshA]

What about 2g? GOI has no issues?

I guess that is a means of thwarting others to propose their own wording on the issue of nuclear testing, which could be formulated by others as a condition with consequences on flouting them instead of simply as a commitment. It could also be a way to clearly state India's policy on CTBT. Perhaps it was considered sensible to touch all aspects of the issue using a formulation of one's own choosing, rather than allowing it to the deliberations of non-proliferation activists.

However the item is indeed somewhat funny: an inclusion of a commitment to a unilateral undertaking in a multilateral agreement.

[RajeshA]

I suspect, there may be more than one draft available with USA, both having the approval of India: India's ideal draft and India's maximum red lines. Over the duration of the talks, USA may give in here there to the Non-Proliferation Activist States, so that they too can go home happy after signing on on the Waiver.

[Gerard]

The unilateral testing moratorium is also mentioned in the 123 isn't it?

[RajeshA]

The unilateral testing moratorium is also mentioned in the 123 isn't it?

AFAIK, there is no such mention.

123 Agreement between USA and India

[ramana]

The unilateral morotarium is only in GOI's PMO press release.KS fought hard to get it out of the 123.

[enqyoob]

This only states the reality that agreement or no agreement, if India tests again, most of these bozos will quit trading on nuke materials with India. It is, as stated above, far better than a condition imposed saying "India is banned from testing".

For that matter, US also has a unilateral moratorium on testing in place. Moratorium is not a ban.

If NSG passes this, there is nothing to prevent members from deciding, if a test occurs, whether they consider that justifiable or not.

Countries like New Zealand really have nothing to lose by taking the line that Might . NE. Right, because they ain't got none, and they are too small to aspire to anything like that. So they can either "align" with a large power, which in NZ's case means either Australia (whom they hate in a non-violent manner) or the US, which will invite Australian displeasure. So best bet is to take Leadership towards a world where Might does not mean Right, and the Meek Shall Inherit What's Left of Da Earth.

[ramana]

au contraire , the Indian and US moratariums are self proclaimed and not on any paper, while this is a multilateral and gains some ersatz de-jure recognition. So dont like it.

Shobori Ganguli also says the same. Time for walkout...

From Pioneer, 15 August 2008

India set to lose nuclear freedom

Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi

US exemption draft with NSG places country permanently under NPT regime

With a week to go before the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) starts deliberating on India's future in the global nuclear market, the draft US exemption proposal submitted to NSG chair Germany last week irrevocably places India under the global non-proliferation regime, robbing it of its nuclear independence.

Barring a cosmetic relaxation in a provision of the NSG Guidelines -- that it will not be brought under the IAEA's "comprehensive safeguards" -- India has been unsparingly placed under the non-proliferation norms of the NSG.

Seeking to "limit the further spread of nuclear weapons", the draft underlines the NSG's resolve, "to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime".

Lauding India for the steps it has taken "voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime", the draft says India's "non-proliferation commitments" include "continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty." In effect, India's sovereign and unilaterally imposed self-ban on further tests is being turned into a multilateral agreement.

On the face of it, India seems to have got concession on a key provision in the NSG guidelines, which calls for full-scope or "comprehensive safeguards" on all its nuclear facilities. The case being made out is that in India's case the civilian-military separation plan acknowledges the "special status" it has been seeking at the NSG.

However, barring concessions on paragraphs 4(a), 4 (b) and 4 (c) of Part 1 and 4(b) of Part 2 of the NSG guidelines, the draft says India will be allowed nuclear imports "for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines. These provisions, which essentially cover non-nuclear weapons states continue to bind India to its commitment to non-proliferation, including a moratorium on testing.

"What was 'unilateral' is to become a requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with other states. The implication treating India as a non-nuclear weapons state and implicitly of 'multilateralising' its unilateral test moratorium is that India will face a supply cut-off if it ever dared to test, leaving its imported power reactors high and dry," says strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney. He asserts that Part 2 of the guidelines "incorporates a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and technology even under safeguards".

Seen alongside the 123 agreement and the Hyde Act, the draft effectively places India under the CTBT, turning a bilateral provision with the US into a requirement at a multilateral level. The Hyde Act unambiguously states that the US can scrap the deal in the event of India's non-compliance with non-proliferation norms. The draft at the NSG takes this bilateral non-proliferation requirement to a multilateral realm.

Part 3 of the draft says regular channels of communication will be established "on matters connected with the implementation of the (NSG) Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India." While compliance with the NSG's non-proliferation guidelines is an "international commitment" imposed on India, the "bilateral agreements" point to the 123 agreement India has signed with the US. Again, the draft holds India up to its commitment to "sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol (with the IAEA) with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities." While placing India under IAEA safeguards is only a corollary to any such multilateral agreement, it must be borne in mind that the Additional Protocol can be highly invasive because the IAEA reserves the right to conduct inspections on any nuclear facility "safeguarded or unsafeguarded" if it suspects a country of violating the non-proliferation code.

The US has also bought itself an insurance cover in the Hyde Act if at a future date the NSG were to redefine its guidelines. "No item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the transfer," the Hyde Act specifies.

"The implications for India entering into cooperation on the basis of unilateral adherence to the NSG guidelines is that this cartel could change its guidelines in the future to impose new conditions on India and India would have no recourse after having invested billions of dollars in imported reactors," feels Chellaney.

As for amendments to the NSG Guidelines, the draft takes away from India more than what it gives. Underlining India's non-member status at the NSG it says, "The NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member may wish to make." The operational part of this clause, however, is that while India's comments may be welcome, "participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India." The keyword is "implementation," consultations not necessarily arming India with decision-making.

[sivab]

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/15/stories ... 091200.htm

‘No more flexibility left in India’s position’

Siddharth Varadarajan

Manmohan to convey message to Bush on eve of NSG meeting

New Delhi: With ‘non-proliferationists’ in the United States and beyond sharpening their blue pencils in preparation for the August 21 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India will emphasise to the U.S. “at the highest level” that the current draft waiver from the cartel’s export rules represents the “outer limit” of its flexibility and that the imposition of any extraneous conditions will be tantamount to derailing the deal.

Given the role U.S. President George W. Bush played in resolving difficult issues during the earlier stages of the nuclear dialogue, officials here say Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to convey this message by telephone to the American leader over the next few days.

The draft waiver finalised last week by the U.S. in consultation with India more or less meets the benchmark of being “clean and unconditional” say officials. If approved by the 45-nation club of nuclear exporters, the waiver would allow member states to export nuclear material to India under international safeguards. But any dilution of its provisions, they say, would be fatal.

As it stands, the draft is under attack from three quarters. First, within the U.S. establishment itself, there are those who advocate the qualification of the waiver to bring it in line with the more stringent conditions for nuclear commerce envisaged by the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement. Second, are NSG members like New Zealand, Ireland and Austria, who still harbour deep misgivings about allowing nuclear commerce with India so long as New Delhi refuses to give up its nuclear weapons. And third are non-proliferation activists, who have finally woken up to the fact that the sequencing built into the Hyde Act makes the veto power of the U.S. Congress irrelevant since the 123 Agreement will come before it after India has already won NSG approval.

Although many NSG members aired their concerns at the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1, New Zealand is the first to have gone public with a specific check-list of issues it intends to raise at the NSG meeting on August 21.

The New Zealand Herald of August 14 quotes Phil Goff, the country’s Minister for Disarmament, as saying Wellington was coordinating its stand with “like-minded countries” like Austria, Sweden, Netherlands and Ireland and that if its concerns were addressed, it could be persuaded to support the deal.

Among the questions Mr. Goff said he would like the NSG to take up next week were (1) Whether conditions could be built into the exemption which would terminate the waiver if India were to test a nuclear weapon, as was already the case under the Hyde Act; (2) Whether India would sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol; (3) How to prevent transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology; (4) What would happen if the IAEA safeguards agreement India had entered into were to be terminated.

Indian officials say some of these questions have already been settled, such as India’s acceptance of an Additional Protocol. As for termination of safeguards, since the IAEA agreement itself provides for this, it is meaningless for the NSG to make it an issue. On testing, India says it is committed to its unilateral moratorium and cannot go beyond this. Some NSG members have their own laws on this but India also has agreements with NSG states that do not call for termination of exports in the event of a test.

On ENR, India says that although it has no need for technology from other states, it should not be denied the right to buy equipment and components for use under safeguards.

The Herald quoted Mr. Goff as acknowledging that the safeguarding of additional Indian reactors was a plus. “We acknowledged that there were some positive things about India’s track record — though we didn’t agree with either their testing or their possession of nuclear weapons,” he was quoted as saying.

On August 5, an influential Congressman, Howard Berman, who heads the powerful Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reminding her of the assurance she gave Congress in February that the NSG decision would have to be “completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act.” He then emphasised four conditions which must be included: immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG states if India detonates a nuclear device, “perpetuity” safeguards for Indian civil nuclear facilities, a ban on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology by NSG states, and a requirement that any spent fuel originating from NSG supplied fuel be reprocessed only in a facility subject to “permanent and unconditional safeguards.”

The Bush administration is understood to have told Mr. Berman that his conditions would be taken care of once the NSG plenary meets on August 21.

But since the U.S. is at least formally committed to defending the waiver as it stands now, this means American officials are likely to fire from the shoulders of other NSG member states.

It is largely in order to pre-empt such a strategy that officials here believe Dr. Singh needs to emphasise to President Bush that his government has no room to manoeuvre.

Among the additional conditions non-proliferation activists like Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association are seeking are the mandatory return of imported nuclear fuel to NSG members in the event that New Delhi were to test a nuclear weapon.

[ramana]

So above draft is the one with the poison pills in it- it has the Berman and all other stuff. And MMS is agreeable to it?

[svinayak]

What a big fall this would be

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH15Df02.html

Somehow, a gung-ho attitude, which is historically uncharacteristic for an Indian, has begun creeping into his mindset lately. Perhaps the headiness of economic progress has hijacked level-headedness and moderation. Or, his new sense of well-being, his confidence that an enduring US-India partnership is underway; his comfort level that India is finally poised to pull away from its moth-eaten neighborhood of South Asia and venture into a brave new world; his cockiness that the world community will be averse to treading on Indian sensitivities; and, least of all, the resurgence of Hindu nationalism, paradoxically, even amid the culture of Western middle-class consumerism - all these have contributed to an unrealistic degree of swagger in Indian attitudes.
It may seem ludicrous, in retrospect, that sizeable sections within the Indian strategic community did fancy as recently as three or four months ago that India indeed held a "Tibet card" as Beijing Summer Olympic Games drew closer, and that India must use Afghanistan as a springboard to bleed Pakistan. The only good thing to come out of the present crisis in J&K is that it is a wake-up call for these strategic thinkers.

[ramana]

Nice timing or what to release the daft on Aug 14 just before Independence day!

[ramana]

From DC 15 Aug., 2008

Jury still out on NSG waiver


New Delhi Aug. 14: The text of NSG waiver suggests a “policy on civilian nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civilian nuclear programme” will be adopted on the premise that India will continue her unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and the NSG members will strive for the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the NPT. No consequences are spelled out if India does not act “as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime” but the text stipulates that nuclear fuel, technology and materials such as trigger list items and dual-use equipment may be transferred to India provided the transfer satisfies certain provisions.

“[It implies] our unilateral moratorium is being made binding on us,” protested Dr AN Prasad, a former director of the Mumbai-based BARC. “We can’t carry out tests and still keep the waiver ... to suggest otherwise is humbug”. He contended the waiver will be subject to review and it could be amended in the future. The 123 Agreement and the NSG draft are so “loosely worded” that there can be more than one interpretation, he added.

[Gerard]

US clean waiver to India at NSG riles non-pro hawks

The word out of Vienna is that while some smaller NSG states are voicing their reservations on the India specific waivers and loose language of the proposals, the US has the situation under control with broad support from major NSG members.

[ramana]

Good summation cartoon

[sivab]

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/14idsld4.htm

August 14, 2008
Former President A P J Abdul Kalam kindly answered Archana Masih and Saisuresh Sivaswamy's questions for an exclusive interview with rediff.com:

Sir, you recently supported the India-US Nuclear Agreement, which many don't know if it is good or not for India. Could you explain why it is good and what will India get if this deal is passed?

Passage of this deal will enable India to get uranium from many countries for the existing uranium-based power plants. It will also accelerate the pace of development of thorium-based reactors using the fast breeder system which will eventually make India self-reliant. It will definitely be useful in our energy independence mission.

How do you view the debate over the nuclear deal which you have endorsed? Does the deal have the potential to emasculate indigenous science and technology efforts, as some critics fear?

The deal has nothing to do with Indian science. Definitely, this deal will put pressure on nuclear scientists and India to become self-reliant in thorium-based nuclear reactors.

[Manny]

If this deal fails cause of the NPTAs, India should do the testing..whatever they need to do.

And also start burning the high sulfur content coal for electricity.

Manny

[SSridhar]

I do not think that Clause 2(g) is a big issue. If we look closely, this is what it says

In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

The NSG countries 'take note of' India's 'voluntary efforts'. They also speak of 'non-proliferation commitments and actions' of which, they have specified seven items (a thru' g). There is a huge gap between a commitment and an action. While an action will follow a commitment, the reverse isn't true. No action, by itself, can be interpreted as a commitment. Commitments are legally binding terms and conditions between agreeing parties and are long term in nature. An action, in the absence of a commitment, is short-term in nature and purely voluntary.

Unilateral moratorium is an action by India dictated purely by India's exigencies. This action cannot be extrapolated into a commitment. Signing a FMCT would be a commitment, whenever that happens. It is a long way away, IMHO.

[ramana]

There is one thing when India gives a voluntary moratorium on testing and to pursue FMCO and another thing when a group of 45 countries put that in writing about India's intentions. There shouldn't have been these refs in section 2.g. it is a virtual dejure and no longer defacto. if these words are to assuage non suppliers like NZ and when US, France and Russia who are the principal eqpmt suppliers, are ready work with India I see no reason for these words in an intl agreement. i believe these are the conditions and caveats attached. Its no longer a clean waiver.

India should walkout if these are retained.

[Gerard]

Nuclear diplomacy

two subatomic physics research laboratories — one in B.C. and one in India — have announced a union made in atomic heaven.

TRIUMF, which is based at the University of British Columbia, and Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), located in Kolkata, will embark on an initial $2.24 million partnership, which will spur developments in cancer diagnosis, nuclear and medical-isotope research.

"Through this partnership, we will design and build a revolutionary new generation of accelerators with impacts in physics, materials science and nuclear medicine," TRIUMF director Nigel Lockyer told a handful of people at a posh reception celebrating the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding.

"It will end up being the world’s most powerful electron accelerator of energy.

"The first reactor in Bombay was of Canadian design. Then the relationship got a little bit strange because India behaved apparently very naughty," he said referring to when India was internationally criticized for testing its first atomic bomb in 1974. A wry smile spread across his face as the intimate gathering of 50 laughed.

[Paul]

No more flexibility left in India’s position’



Siddharth Varadarajan



Manmohan to convey message to Bush on eve of NSG meeting





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Draft under attack from three quarters

Congressman stresses four conditions


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New Delhi: With ‘non-proliferationists’ in the United States and beyond sharpening their blue pencils in preparation for the August 21 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India will emphasise to the U.S. “at the highest level” that the current draft waiver from the cartel’s export rules represents the “outer limit” of its flexibility and that the imposition of any extraneous conditions will be tantamount to derailing the deal.

Given the role U.S. President George W. Bush played in resolving difficult issues during the earlier stages of the nuclear dialogue, officials here say Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to convey this message by telephone to the American leader over the next few days.

The draft waiver finalised last week by the U.S. in consultation with India more or less meets the benchmark of being “clean and unconditional” say officials. If approved by the 45-nation club of nuclear exporters, the waiver would allow member states to export nuclear material to India under international safeguards. But any dilution of its provisions, they say, would be fatal.

As it stands, the draft is under attack from three quarters. First, within the U.S. establishment itself, there are those who advocate the qualification of the waiver to bring it in line with the more stringent conditions for nuclear commerce envisaged by the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement. Second, are NSG members like New Zealand, Ireland and Austria, who still harbour deep misgivings about allowing nuclear commerce with India so long as New Delhi refuses to give up its nuclear weapons. And third are non-proliferation activists, who have finally woken up to the fact that the sequencing built into the Hyde Act makes the veto power of the U.S. Congress irrelevant since the 123 Agreement will come before it after India has already won NSG approval.

Although many NSG members aired their concerns at the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1, New Zealand is the first to have gone public with a specific check-list of issues it intends to raise at the NSG meeting on August 21.

The New Zealand Herald of August 14 quotes Phil Goff, the country’s Minister for Disarmament, as saying Wellington was coordinating its stand with “like-minded countries” like Austria, Sweden, Netherlands and Ireland and that if its concerns were addressed, it could be persuaded to support the deal.

Among the questions Mr. Goff said he would like the NSG to take up next week were (1) Whether conditions could be built into the exemption which would terminate the waiver if India were to test a nuclear weapon, as was already the case under the Hyde Act; (2) Whether India would sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol; (3) How to prevent transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology; (4) What would happen if the IAEA safeguards agreement India had entered into were to be terminated.

Indian officials say some of these questions have already been settled, such as India’s acceptance of an Additional Protocol. As for termination of safeguards, since the IAEA agreement itself provides for this, it is meaningless for the NSG to make it an issue. On testing, India says it is committed to its unilateral moratorium and cannot go beyond this. Some NSG members have their own laws on this but India also has agreements with NSG states that do not call for termination of exports in the event of a test.

On ENR, India says that although it has no need for technology from other states, it should not be denied the right to buy equipment and components for use under safeguards.

The Herald quoted Mr. Goff as acknowledging that the safeguarding of additional Indian reactors was a plus. “We acknowledged that there were some positive things about India’s track record — though we didn’t agree with either their testing or their possession of nuclear weapons,” he was quoted as saying.

On August 5, an influential Congressman, Howard Berman, who heads the powerful Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reminding her of the assurance she gave Congress in February that the NSG decision would have to be “completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act.” He then emphasised four conditions which must be included: immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG states if India detonates a nuclear device, “perpetuity” safeguards for Indian civil nuclear facilities, a ban on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology by NSG states, and a requirement that any spent fuel originating from NSG supplied fuel be reprocessed only in a facility subject to “permanent and unconditional safeguards.”

The Bush administration is understood to have told Mr. Berman that his conditions would be taken care of once the NSG plenary meets on August 21.

But since the U.S. is at least formally committed to defending the waiver as it stands now, this means [nAmerican officials are likely to fire from the shoulders of other NSG member states.

It is largely in order to pre-empt such a strategy that officials here believe Dr. Singh needs to emphasise to President Bush that his government has no room to manoeuvre.

Among the additional conditions non-proliferation activists like Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association are seeking are the mandatory return of imported nuclear fuel to NSG members in the event that New Delhi were to test a nuclear weapon.

[arnab]

There is one thing when India gives a voluntary moratorium on testing and to pursue FMCO and another thing when a group of 45 countries put that in writing about India's intentions. There shouldn't have been these refs in section 2.g. it is a virtual dejure and no longer defacto. if these words are to assuage non suppliers like NZ and when US, France and Russia who are the principal eqpmt suppliers, are ready work with India I see no reason for these words in an intl agreement. i believe these are the conditions and caveats attached. Its no longer a clean waiver.

India should walkout if these are retained.

So what is the implication of 'noting India's voluntary moratarium' being in writing in terms of actual outcomes for India? IOW, why is the deal do-able if that particular sentence were missing? It is not as if India can test (without any overt cause) and then claim - hey hey you never said anything about not testing, so you can't stop the fuel supplies.

[NRao]

On ENR, India says that although it has no need for technology from other states, it should not be denied the right to buy equipment and components for use under safeguards.

That seems to resolve issues about reprocessing.

On August 5, an influential Congressman, Howard Berman, who heads the powerful Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reminding her of the assurance she gave Congress in February that the NSG decision would have to be “completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act.” He then emphasised four conditions which must be included: immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG states if India detonates a nuclear device, “perpetuity” safeguards for Indian civil nuclear facilities, a ban on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology by NSG states, and a requirement that any spent fuel originating from NSG supplied fuel be reprocessed only in a facility subject to “permanent and unconditional safeguards.”

Congressman Berman seems to have not opened his email memo letting people know that the Amby to India stated that the Hyde Act, 123 and the IAEA agreement should hopefully resolve all concerns that NSG members may have. That was an American game plan - for emphasis, not an Indian!!

On his four conditions: one nuclear state telling another responsible nuclear state what to do?

[Pulikeshi]

arnab,

It converts the bilateral (b/w India & US) constraint/disincentive to test on India's part and converts it into a multilateral one.

[arnab]

arnab,

It converts the bilateral (b/w India & US) constraint/disincentive to test on India's part and converts it into a multilateral one.

OK, but I still don't get it as to why 2g might be read as a coercive statement. To me it looks more like a series of justifications that the NSG is providing for their actions vis a vis a non-NPT signatory.


2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

So why is it a deal breaker? Which part of 2g is untrue? India is observing 'voluntary restraint' and the second bit is 'aspirational' about India working with the rest of the world for a FMCT. Just like India wanting to work with the rest of the world for universal nuclear disarmament.

[ramana]

Arnab, I dont see whats so difficult about the issue.

India saying something can be subject to change based on excigencies but when its in a multilateral agreement even if its the same statement it acquires its own dynamics and is tantamount to lockdown. I think I am being very clear and consistent about this.

[arnab]

Arnab, I dont see whats so difficult about the issue.

India saying something can be subject to change based on excigencies but when its in a multilateral agreement even if its the same statement it acquires its own dynamics and is tantamount to lockdown. I think I am being very clear and consistent about this.

I wasn't questioning the consistency or clarity of your arguments. I was merely seeking clarifications regarding to what I might be missing. I think I see you what you are getting at but I still think that the concern is exaggerated. JMT.

[svinayak]

Arnab, I dont see whats so difficult about the issue.

India saying something can be subject to change based on excigencies but when its in a multilateral agreement even if its the same statement it acquires its own dynamics and is tantamount to lockdown. I think I am being very clear and consistent about this.

I wasn't questioning the consistency or clarity of your arguments. I was merely seeking clarifications regarding to what I might be missing. I think I see you what you are getting at but I still think that the concern is exaggerated. JMT.

It is a blackmail.
Multilateral agreement on testing cannot be accepted by India.

[arnab]

I wasn't questioning the consistency or clarity of your arguments. I was merely seeking clarifications regarding to what I might be missing. I think I see you what you are getting at but I still think that the concern is exaggerated. JMT.

It is a blackmail.
Multilateral agreement on testing cannot be accepted by India.

hmm I can hear the NSG draft writer agonising

Hum aah bhi bharte hain to ho jaatein hain badnaam
Woh qatl bhi karte hain to charcha nahin hota.

[amit]

It is a blackmail.
Multilateral agreement on testing cannot be accepted by India.

In that case can’t all the points here be construed as a part of multilateral commitments on the part of India?

2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

a. Deciding to separate its civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency

b. Conducting negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval of its Board of Governors regarding a Safeguards Agreement for application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities that is in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including Board of Governors document GOV/1621)

c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities

d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these

e. Having adopted a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear related material, equipment, and technology.

f. Harmonizing its export control lists with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and committing to adherence to NSG guidelines

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

For example when interpreting 2e, what’s to prevent the US at a later date to charge some Indian entity was violating the clause by exporting some “nuclear-related material” to, say, Iran? It’s happened before hasn’t it?

And the preamble to 2 says: steps that India has taken voluntarily. And that the NSG "welcomes India's efforts".

When it’s being enshrined that any restraint/action on the part of India – as covered by this section - is voluntary, how does it become a binding multilateral commitment on the part of India? I'm a bit confused on how this conclusion is being jumped to?

When Vajpayee made the voluntary moratorium commitment, did he make the commitment only to the US or for the whole world? A lot of countries/leaders have said subsequently that they hoped that India maintains its volutary commitment and also that commitment formed one of the pillars of the rappochment with the US that began during Jaswant's time. How different was that from this?

IMO, we need to keep in sight one important point. Deal or no deal if we test there’s going to some sanction or the other. Like 1998, while the US may come at us hard, France and Russia may be prepared to go easy and settle for some face saving and ineffective measures – depending on business considerations.

My reading is that the language is sufficiently fudged to find dual meaning. It’s an attempt to eat the cake and have it too – provide a fig leaf to the righteous while allowing the practical to do business with India.

Also please correct me if I’m wrong but unlike at IAEA, India is not going sign on anything at the NSG right? Then how does it become a binding multilateral commitment on the part of India?

How does it become de jure as opposed to de facto?

Would be grateful on some clarification on this.

If India walks away from the N-deal in the sense that it does not consumate the deal with the US and yet the NSG still puts this amendment into practice, does it remain a binding multilateral commitment on the part of India?

Is it still de jure as opposed to de facto just because a group of countries has written it in a treaty that India is voluntarily observing a moratorium on further testing?