rohitvats wrote:My dear good sir - in case of LCA it was exactly the insistence of scientific community which led to asking for the unobtanium from the word go which led to delay in the programme.... IAF wanted fast replacement for MiG-21 and not the complex project it became from day one with us trying to develop everything in situ. Radar, DFBW,Engine were all set as domestic targets by scientific community and not IAF
No that is incorrect & an misreading of the situation as it was. I am taking the liberty of replying to you as I find your posts on the Army etc pretty interesting & generally serious.
At least, I hope I wont have to face the problem of obnoxious replies and will face a reasoned statements in return.
Its a long mail, so if you have the patience read it. I took the liberty of spending a hour on it, digging out notes etc.
Now, the problem is when it comes to the above statements about technocrats leading the program, is that you are stating this based on the excellent book by AM Philip Rajkumar. Remember though, PR was a later entrant to the program & was not fully involved with the program as it started in terms of paperwork, consultancy etc for infra in 1983, followed by the negotiations for the first TD Phase which went on till the early 90's. He has a very good idea of the stuff that happened once he joined, till the program went on into the early-mid 2000's when he left, thereafter there have been many other changes as well, some of which he seems unaware of, eg his statements on the MK2 implied it would be a somewhat drastic change in airframe versus original LCA, so far the MK2 is much more conservative.
The other thing is remember, he is an IAF man. I have rarely if ever, heard any services guy speak ill of his organization on such a political issue, with ADA, HAL etc involved. The most I have heard is critique of IAF performance at wartime etc. Its just not done. Just take the Arjun, how many Army guys do we know of, who have come out and blasted or even criticized way its been treated and even army officers who supported it? Only Shukla after he left the org has done so. Rest, even 43AR guys and test crew have been very circumspect. You just dont criticize the plate from which you get the food, namak, roti, nishan or organizational pride/chauvinism, whatever you want to call it, but its just not done.
Incidentally thats what makes Philip Rajkumars downplayed critique of issues which he saw first hand such as IAF on "dont attend test flight and his promotion issues, so devastating. It just shows how much these issues impacted that it forced even him to speak up.
Anyways, to summarize, AM Philip Rajkumars words on issues where he was not directly involved need to be balanced vis a vis what people who may have been involved with the situation at the time said. This is the first rule of analysis, which you would have seen in the Arjun case as well, where some (not all) sections in the Army went out of their way to run down the program & put all the blame on the tank, designers etc but we got the correct view when GOI released information from the Std Committees, individual people started digging out information contradictory to the media soundbytes emerged.
So Rajkumar is not biased per se, but its important to have a source who actually was involved or has more details. In this case, I'd refer you to an article by Shri SR Valluri who was deeply involved with the initial LCA groundwork, including decisions around its technology specifications, and others. He later fell out with VS Arunachalam over the program, because Raj Mahindra was not appointed the LCA lead. So, SRV has his own issues to grind since he wanted to be the first ADA head afterwards, but Kota Harinarayana was chosen instead, but he was deeply involved with the FBW issue when vendors were evaluated. This is important as now for this niche topic, he does not have "opinion" but facts, as he saw them.
So what were they, basically ADA (or rather the people who would be ADA) invited the following groups for consultancy - I am going by an article/post which was posted by a senior member verbatim and which I read, but basically, four groups were invited for LCA Flight Control demo by the scientists.
First was Dassault, second was German group - Messerchmitt Bolkow Blohm, third was American group, and fourth, I think was British.
Now, what Valluri pointed out was the Dassault guys were extremely over the top, did not give due regard to Indian requirements, and did not even bother and could not answer the Indian scientists questions. You have to understand we had done a lot of research on the different technologies, so the questions were pointed and not naive. They ended the presentation noting that irrespective of what the team asked, they would be chosen because Delhi would choose them!! You can imagine the result of this "interaction". They didn't have the answers and were basically saying, we are going to get chosen because of politics so we dont care. Take what we give (and thats all you will get). Forget about proper learning, joint work etc.
The Germans it seems were the best. They were open, frank, courteous & did a proper exchange of opinions. But they also had lack of experience in flight controls, which was a challenge given LCA timelines.
Next, it was Americans - I don't remember how the British one went or whether they were there. The Americans had the best technology, were open about helping India and whats more they had the enttire "package". Flight conmtrol development is not just software, hardware, its about flight testbeds, certification and processes involving IV & V, which is Indepenedent Verification and Validation. Now Rajiv Gandhi had visited USA and had received commitment for help on LCA, so America really offered the entire gamut of help, including engine (incidentally one funny thing, make of it what you can, he also asked the scientist guys where Italy could help, and later dropped idea when they said no). So this was the reason America was chosen.
The IAF guys may have said go with France just because of the tech denial aspect, but from ADA viewpoint, the French were not open about what they would provide, and also made some really misleading statements about technology. They just did not come across as reliable. Hence all this talk of moving to an analog FCS and then digital FBW is pure hogwash. Another thing ADA discovered was that having two different FBW - digital multi channel & one analog channel backup, was quite complex and may end up taking more time, and wasted anyhow, as the standardized technology being developed/forecasted in more places was anyways the 4 Quad Channel FBW. So that was another point. And even Rajkumar notes (and here is a good source because he was an observer/participant) that till the sanctions occurred, the US did do their share of the deal, they actually helped with the FBW, gave access to testbeds, their engine guys were also helpful.
Bottomline, this was not a technocrat driven decision purely based on "whatever is best in the sky let us go for it" even if unrealistic. They actually did a detailed survey of the vendors and decided who was the most realistic & went with it. You also have to remember, political leadership (ie Rajiv Gandhi & others) were deeply involved at the time. The US choice also had their support after his "breaking' visit to US where he was received warmly.
Now, coming to radar. Again, there is data from B Harry, others, plus reading to get a fair idea of how that situation developed. Initially, India had this radar on MiG-21, forget the name, but it was not really effective. But somewhere while LCA was being developed as point defense fighter, with short range missiles, IAF did a technology forecasting with ADA and decided the radar is necessary, plus beyond visual range missiles would start coming, which need a proper radar. Again you can figure this out, as I did by going and reading a lot of the LCA material from the 80's and early 90's. Its interesting to see how program evolved.
Again, the speficications here are very ambitious and even today, would approach what is current gen technology. Mind you this is happening in 1980's, early 1990's when there is no radar like this in the market or world, typical example of IAF specifying really hard standards.
Now the first mistake. It was decided to work with organizations which had existing experience. Basically ADA did evaluation of the country facilities and went to MOD for clearance.
The radar was basically given to HAL because, HAL made radar for MiG-21 and should do the radar by the MOD logic. This was a big mistake. HAL basically did not have a proper R&D culture and could not effectively program manage the radar, and also did not devote enough resources. Ultimately, they ended up with the hardware, developed by DRDO, DAE, software from HAL and others, all having issues with DRDO signal processor which also came with separate software. It should have all been in the LRDE or DLRL organizations which specialized in RF work, why HAL was chosen is a mistake.
So coming to the topic, first choice from HAL was to work with SAAB on radar , somewhere along the way, SAAB was dropped because SAAB asked for too much money, and SAAB itself was anyways working with British for their radar. So we went directly to the Brits and got the systems, components and used that too fit the radar up, while India developed equivalents, and we did, like the antenna.
Where the program went haywire, was the fact that HAL seriously did not sustain a proper plan for radar development and the IAF specifications were too ambitious.
Take the first, Rajkumar was involved with this aspect so he mentions some things - HAL did not even have a proper plan for flying testbed, so he approached CABs and had them use the Hack. Is this ADAs job? No, the system developer should draw up a detailed test program and share that with ADA after ADA provides high level performance specifications, size/power constraints and timelines. But HAL just did not, to be fair to them, until mid 1990s, they had funding problems and were under thumb of MOD. But this just shows the problems faced by ADA in herding cats and different organizations. Here ADA is going to CABS and getting HAL a testbed and what not.
Second, specifications, all this talk of IAF being reasonable with the LCA using claims of Marut etc is also totally humorous. The IAF cut no slack for the LCA performance. The LCA radar, has specifications of 120 km range (against small fighter target) which means Zhuk ME standard and approximately 20% more or at least equal when compared to todays APG-68 V(9) best in class mechanical radar on F-16 Block 52s being sold to Pakistan. It also was to have Doppler Mapping, DBR (A2G ranging) and Terrain Following Modes. Here is what is interesting. No IAF fighter has had these features before Kopyo radar in late 2000's and that too Kopyo range is not even half that of LCA radar. Furthermore, if you see IAF requirements circa 2003-05, SAR has been added to LCA radar. Because now latest fighter radars come with SAR. In contrast, Pakistans JF-17 has mostly A2A modes, and comes with limited A2G modes. High resolution SAR was not mentioned in KLJ-7 and will probably be provided as upgrade, "oneday".
So here you have a MiG-21 class airframe sized plane, with a radar with performance expected to be equal to the best MSA available today, can you imagine what that does to power requirements and systems required to "drive" such a unit? TWT (the power source for radar) which takes power from propulsion is 650 W average. Ok, the Zhuk ME is 1-1.2 KW average, and nearly the same diameter. The MMR has to do more with less & it cant add more processing (weight!).
For radars, 4 things are critical, antenna size, power, gain (sensitivity of radar) and third signal processing. Also, to fit into aircraft, weight/volume.
So the LCA, has to have a nose, which can fit a radar dia in fact more than Zhuk ME (on MiG-29), has power at around half that of Zhuk ME, and has to have performance equal to the radar, with features, Russia is still introducing on type (Flight says, Phazatron started introducing high resolution SAR recently, and introduced SAR on radars with Kopyo variants after working decade plus on the technology).
Lets get to the even more interesting part, weight - the Zhuk ME, weighs 220 Kg. The LCA MMR required specifications? 130 Kg (
http://www.acig.org/exclusives/aero/acig_aero05_lca.htm). Note the interesting thing (combined signal processor, data processor and also combined receiver/exciter). In contrast, for Su-30 MKI radar, there is Signal processor, two separate data processors (supplied by India) and separate, receiver/exciter.
The weight of Bars radar is 650 Kg, 250 kg antenna, so 400 kg rest. So just see the comparison here, for the AUW of the MMR at 130 kg, including the antenna even when comparing to the rest of the Bars radar!! The lightest version of the ELTA 2032 is quoted at around ~100 Kg per Avionics Journal, more capable ones will weigh more. So here you have the MMR which has performance expected at the RDY-2/Zhuk ME level and is expected to have a large dia antenna, high speed scanning, all the advanced features, and yet be lightweight.
The Israelis when they were brought into "fix" signal processing for A2G issues, were reportedly surprised at the demands made of the radar sets!! Only when the IAF got its Kopyo, did it realize how unrealistic the MMR was in terms of specifications, and that they could do well with lesser! Kopyo 21 has 57 km range, much lesser against small target).
So as Rajkumar implies but does not openly specify, we went to the Russians for it, after he had a discussion with the then IAF chief (i think it was Krishnaswamy, who was relatively reasonable, having a test flying background, so was willing to hear out Rajkumar). The Russians if you recall were advertising Kopyo-M with "enhanced range" - only 75 km!! But even there, the Russians put their foot down, bureaucracy/who knows what, and that didnt occur. Ultimately, we went to Israel and have the set working now. Point is the IAF specs were very ambitious, and are today, achieved with sets that are either heavier, or more powerful (power), and are on larger, more powerful aircraft. The LCA being a MiG21 replacement, and has to have radar which is double the range (even more actually) than MiG-29 (65 kM range vs 5Sq Mtr) and MiRAGE 2000 H (same level) and modes which were not there in any, such as SAR (later added) and modes which were there only on one type (Mirage 2000) - A2G - Doppler Mapping, Ranging, and TFR (which some dont even credit RDM with having). This is just ONE example, of how IAF requirements are so hard to meet.
Now, I am not going to get into more details here, because somebody will take a one liner two liner weblink and say AHA! this is also 100 kg, but anyone reasonable should be able to work out the larger picture in terms of power, antenna dia, features, LRUs & the overall performance expected.
Remember, when the features for this radar were specified - the state of the technology can be summed up by the ELTA EL/M -2035, one of the "better" radars available then. Naval Weapons tells me, the radar had an all up weight (AUW) of 138 kg BUT a range of 46 km.
Now, I really don't know whether the effort I put into reply is even worth it, but take a look at the LCA EW suit. A point defense plane, now has to have a state of art RWJ suite. Original plan as I recall, having seen multiple discussions on topic (public) was to have integrated "EW armor" which means the power/cooling requirements have to be kept in place already. Now, they have something called RWJ. RWJ is a very complex piece of equipment that makes this ELTA 8222 pod look obsolete. It has multiple receivers transmitters & can handle higher spectral density, and multiple targets, from different locations. It is being designed
in specific for the LCA. Why do you think this is being done? Because its a fact of life that threat scenario is rising, but then also see that specifications/performance required is higher than that of ELTA 8222 by several factors, and being an integrated system, when it appears on MK2 or whatever, it has more challenges in terms of weight/cooling and wiring! Second, the "hidden" reason. If they had not done this, guess what happens. As plane is being developed, there comes foreign vendor with brochure, saying "my plane is integrated with internal jammer" you have obsolete aircraft unable to defend itself. So you see the problems? A customer which has the best of the world on offer, and will not compromise, and ever changing requirements.
Another example of change and which backs up Vinas post about IAF not really being bothers about the program till the thing went into FSED 1. The ADA spent thousands of man hours, using original IAF requirements to come up with a first class mission computer using 386 chips for the LCA. Once TD flew, and avionics are ready, IAF comes to ADA and says, well we want an open architecture system that is like this, because everyone uses OA nowadays. Sure, did Mirage 2000 or even Jaguars have OA, no - only once they get upgraded will they have it. But in FSED Phase 1 itself, the ADA had to again go back and rework the avionics to put in new systems which were OA. So now you have the Open Architecture Computer on LCA MK1. I had noted some details somewhere about the number of avionics changes that are changed even from TD onwards. Basically, at every stage, it has been a challenge for ADA. The customer has had late change requests which really complicate the program, and will not accept anything less than gold standard at the word go. At the recent induction of the MK1, IAF chief made pointed remarks about not yet 4G, will have to complete tests etc and caused a needless controversy and later, noted he did agree LCA was a 4G plane and he was just referring to the test process. Fine, but when Mirage 2000 was inducted, I am told, it came without some of its most critical equipment. French refused to budge on price. Ultimately systems were fitted AFTER we purchased the aircraft. Tell me, how many articles can you find about Mirage 2000 induction not being upto mark, generation problems etc.
Basically we do have a problem with the LCA, like it or not, and as much offense it causes some (not you) that the LCA ASRs which the IAF set, signed off on, were clearly unrealistic and too ambitious. You have a guy from the horses mouth, JA Maolankar in recent Aero India noting about LCA Navy, saying "ok we were probably too ambitious, and its ok now to actually do build up the capabilities" - am paraphrasing but you can find his statement in original text. All these comparisons to the Gripen are also a big joke, and I am deliberately not doing that, because it just shows the folks who originally raised these queries are absolutely unaware of the differences between the program and the challenges LCA team has faced. For instance, the landing gear was to be sourced from US. They promised they would deliver a best in class gear, specifically designed for the LCA, and those estimates were originally planned for the weight estimations. Then come sanctions, that option is no longer there and HAL delivered a production standard gear for the LCA in short turn around time. At least a few ADA guys were very happy with HAL for this work. What happens to the weight estimations then, versus what the US had claimed (and who knows whether they'd have met them, because like i said leading OEM systems are challenged by LCA requirements) and versus what ADA has to incorporate now?
Another example, in Rajkumars book, there is reference to how ADA had just 3-4 set of actuators from Moog of USA and actually shifted them around from LCA flight aircraft to ground testbed (Iron Bird) and also, how they had actually integrated engine on own, since propulsion guys had foresight to request detailed engine integration data (which was actually GEs job) and even here they just had a few engines which were calibrated and could be used. Now, I shared this with some flight test guys at an event and they could not believe me. No other program (apparently) has been run with such conditions. Sanctions come, and first, you manage to run the flight test program with limited equipment which was not enough for the job and second, you actually replace import items for the program via local replacements. You do all this, and that too with limited budgeting & actually get it to IOC and then, where is the talk of delays and the like!! Its a miracle we actually managed to get it to IOC. Its very certain, that given the critical engine & actuators issue, plus the FBW issue, the US political depts thought the LCA would be cancelled. Finally, a letter went to Antony, as reported, saying dont fly this plane, last attempt probably.
And now, the much vaunted Gripen. All due credits to SAAB or whatever, but the comparison with ADA project management is a joke. SAAB never faced sanctions. They have the who's who of the world's best OEMs at beck and call. Want an engine? Volvo Flygmotor license produces a derivative of GE404 and can even do own integration. FBW? Work with Brits, even work with them for initial studies. Radar? Ericcson worked with Ferranti, which became GE Marconi which became Selex and has made Eurofighter radar. Today, they are using SELEX TRM with PS-05 backend, and nobody calls them names, LOL over this approach!! Same approach from LRDE, and LRDE is useless. For actuators, Moog - no sanctions. INS system, I think it was Rockwell, other systems from US as well.
So SAAB did what China is doing with ARJ-21, it set overall functional requirements, did design & development, again with consultancy, had extensive industrial infra of its own, experience also collaborated with multiple OEMs for detailed systems & even materials and structures and finally did system integration, design and verification, certification. In contrast, ADA has had to manage both design, system design, compensate for lack of system suppliers in India (many avionics in LCA are ADA designed, and only now moving to private partners) and finally, face sanctions. Also, the program as it started was regarded as meddling, and the primary customer kept away (Advisors to IAF CAS on historic occasion of KH2001 flight clearance, keep away!!). At the end of the day, what we have with the LCA is pure, dogged, determination. If we can make the LCA despite all such challenges, and yet have an aircraft which is competitive in criteria with aircraft made using best in class technology from OEMs worldwide who specialize in those special systems, I see no reason why we should flagellate about this program.
I can write more about the Kaveri engine disaster, but I will leave that for now, unless you are really interested. The Kaveri is probably the one case in the LCA where we bit off more than we could chew, and second, where the MOD bureaucracy just did not understand the programs criticality.
Which is why The biggest thing still lacking is an detailed organization at the GOI level which coordinates long term projects and is willing to invest as necessary. Business Standard carries an article exactly on this. Nobody has even bothered to understand what LCA represents. That it takes a one journalist to write this, versus GOI saying it, shows the state of affairs in our country. All sorts of fellows do vendor sponsored junkets, write stuff touting their products in trade glossies, others are agents, but there is little to no understanding of the actual details on the impact of the indian programs on indian industry. Even otherwise well meaning officers in armed forces are sometimes absolutely unaware of what is what, and why. They go by what media says, or what vendors tell them.
Two more things that I will add that I can certify will change the dynamic of the IAFs sometimes there/sometimes not there attitude towards local systems. They need an actual technology cell inhouse, staffed with DRDO/PSU/PVT guys if need be if manpower is an issue, which work closely with them beyond just individual programs but at the overall level. Not only will this impact their understanding of how challenging these issues are and define an understanding of "essential" versus "good to have". "Good to have" is the critical 20% last mile connectivity which has caused so many issues and can be incorporated via upgrades.
Second, we need more funding at the national and organizational level. One, ADA is currently totally reliant on HAL for building LCA prototypes and design and verification of the actual flying testbeds. In Skunk Works & other key houses of excellence, design & production engineering is integrated, because it was finally realized, that the production house always had issues fitting in development work with its mature, produce as many as possible aircraft schedule. There is intense competition for resources (tooling, and infrastructure) and manpower in such cases, and this clearly affected LCA testing, where you have notes about how one HAL chief was not keen on the LCA (its not a HAL project) and the IJT was prioritized over LCA testing (losing valuable time, and which is more important from national perspective, IJT or HAL). Again, funding for ADA to do a lot of prototyping and testing on their own with HAL people integrated , and transferring TOT to HAL might have actually been faster. And a national body which laid down the law in terms of priorities (LCA is critical, LCA more than IJT) would have done the job. Guess what, China has just announced they are doing exactly this.
More funding also means the ridiculous, every two three years people working on MMR at HAL leave does not occur. We have - imported 125 radars for MiG-21, 62 for MiG-29, 50 for Mirage 2000, 80 for Jaguar all of MMR level (which can be scaled up and down in derivative technology). That is 317 radars or $1 Billion of radars @ 3 Million per radar, plus add another 2 Billion in maintenance. So 2-3 Billion$ over lifecycle. How much did we spend on MMR. Talk about how foolish India is in not spending where it matters.
Ultimately, a nation gets what it deserves. The Indian taxpayer has long had his money used in the most foolish way possible by citing national emergency and timely delivery, where even that does not occur. CAG analysis of "emergency procurement" at Operation Vijay revealed guidelines were relaxed for emergency import, most of which items did not reach us in time. Scorpene, Gorshkov all show how many times we have been taken to the cleaners by vendors after they see once we sign up there is TINA. And why is there TINA, because Indians will continue to bicker and miss the wood for the trees when it comes to such issues like LCA.
In reality, the Tejas RWR weighs much less.
