Originally posted by Kanu:
Yes, we have to totally overwhel their Command, Control and Communications system. Then do a blitz, they shouldn't even know what happened.
Absolutely.
The point that Paddy is said to have made about "intergral" air power needs to be added to the very pertinent points made by Jasjit Singh in his inimitable clear fashion.
"Integral" air power with any force by itself is no good unless the air power is "intergrated" to work in a seamless fashion with other armed forces.
And again - air power (like sea power/land forces) are a "speciality" to be dealt with by specialists not unlike the need for separate bone surgeons and gynecological surgeons for bone problems and gynecological problems.
For example - look at a situation that Jasjit Singh describes: The enemy attacks a particualr area with a strong armored thrust - as part of a wide front war. Examples would be the Paki thrust at Akhnoor in 1965, or Longewala in 1971. Indian defences are being pushed back in the region - or under pressure. At the same time the attacking forces have a "tail" - a supply line and support from their side.
Now the defending soldier will want direct support on the battlefield. He will want attacking tanks to be picked off and artillery knocked out. He will want enemy support aircraft and helos shot down over the battle field.
But air power is limited, Only x of planes and y aircraft are available - so what to do? For this Jasjit has some very pertinent lessons based on the history of successes and failures in past wars all over the world - starting from before WW2
He says that being tempted to support the army in the battlefield can sometimes lead to loss of the battle. The batlefield bristles with AA guns - both enemy and friendly. Attrition is high and in the confusion of battle nobody knows who is hitting whom. Friendly fire incidents are very common. And while this is going on - the enemy supply line is untouched - because all your planes are busy protecting your soldiers in the battlefield. And the attacking forces keep coming on.
In the middle of this acute crisis - there is no point hitting factories and ports - which can only affect the war after months - we may lose the battle in hours.
Jasjit says that in this sort of situation, with limited air forces - the best thing to do to change the course of the battle is to use your air power to hit the enemy where he is weakest - that is in his supply line. The moving convoys do not have ready and fixed air defences, and the convoys will have further and further to go as the enemy advances into YOUR territory. So hit his command and control, hit his air defences and hit his fuel and food supply. This may mean that your soldier in the battlefront is left with less air cover than he wants, but that is the trade off. Once the enemy supply line is choked off - his attack and advance will peter out.
If you try to hit the battlefront, you have a lot of attrition that you cannot sustain, and the supply line is intact. A battleront is a concentration of firepower - unlike a moving supply line.
All this requires air dominance. And air dominance in the early part of the 21st century involves very high tech electronics - elint, ECM ECCM and smart munitions, UAVs avd UACVs, Satellite comm and intergrated battlefield info systems. Money and effort spent in these areas is most likely to help - at least until the next major tech revolution.
We still have a way to go before we get there - it is the
civilian-military complex that makes the difference here. India is still a "tier two" technological pwer - in fact it is Lower tier two - as opposed to Israel which is upper tier two. India will need to become a tier 1 technical power to "have arrived"
